Defence Mobilisation Planning
Comparative Study
An Examination of Overseas Planning
The Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF) has established a small Directorate within Force Design Division in response to significant changes in Australia’s strategic outlook, to ensure a contemporary mobilisation planning framework across Defence. This mobilisation planning process will be conducted over two and a half years and will include several research activities.

In June 2020, RAND Australia was engaged by the Australian Department of Defence to undertake a series of material studies and analysis activities. RAND Australia was asked to undertake a comparative study of mobilisation planning in selected countries to discern principles for mobilisation planning.

For this a comprehensive international literature review was undertaken spanning the United States, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Singapore. To present the results so that they could be readily compared against each other, a research framework was constructed comprising examination of four areas: Planning Model, Activation, Attributes and Principles, and Forecast Trends. This framework proved useful in drawing out policy and planning approaches to mobilisation, in most case studies, if not explicitly listing details of specific mobilisation events. Accompanying this report, in a separate electronic volume, are the individual findings for each of the countries studied. As a more contemporary mobilisation plan for Australian Defence is being built, the report presents comparisons that might usefully be considered in the planning. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) may be mobilised in a new range of situations, from engaging in different warfighting constructs to increasing support during domestic natural disasters and crises, and it is recognised that such new situations require a whole-of-society approach. To engage the whole of society it is suggested a new strategic narrative around national resilience may be required.

This report is intended for an audience that has some familiarity with mobilisation planning and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defence or the ADF.

Essential research in the delivery of this work was provided by RAND Europe and RAND United States staff. For more information about RAND Australia, see www.rand.org/australia or contact the RAND Australia Director listed on that webpage.
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Summary

Background

The Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF) has established a small directorate within Force Design Division in response to significant changes in Australia’s strategic outlook. The strategic events driving a response by Defence are not unique to Australia. Central to other countries responses, to similar events, are concepts of total defence. Total defence depends on the entire civil community mobilising, working in cooperation with or as part of their armed forces and vice versa, to defend against natural and man-made disasters, grey-zone activities, and war. Therefore, central to total defence is mobilisation planning on a national scale. In this effort, RAND Australia was asked to examine mobilisation planning overseas. RAND Australia selected to examine activities in Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Singapore, and the United States. After establishing the current Australian context, it is used as a basis to consider the approaches these other nations have taken and then to explore opportunities and issues for mobilisation planning in Australia.

To achieve this, a comprehensive, international literature review was undertaken. A range of documents produced by each respective country’s armed or defence forces was accessed; specific military services within those forces, such as the Army; and responsible Government Agencies, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. As this research was conducted over a relatively short, three-month period that coincided with COVID-19 lockdown periods, opportunity to interview subject matter experts that may have contributed information relevant to mobilisation issues was extremely limited. It should also be noted that this research was conducted before the final report of the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements became available. Thus, any reference to this Royal Commission is against the draft propositions by Counsel Assisting only, as of 4 September 2020.1

As the report will reveal, there is significant emphasis on the role of the general population in mobilisation efforts. This emphasis is consistent with the threat assessments each country has made where it is expected the general population will play a significant role in identifying, protecting and defending against a range of threats including terrorism, coercion, and cyberattacks. As such, how the Armed Forces supports civil society in crises dominates the majority of publicly available information. Meanwhile, discourse pertaining to the armed forces is usually focussed on manpower. This may be a result of the prevailing national service or conscription practices in most of the countries studied, however, even the United States cites manpower as one of the biggest, ‘most critical resources in the mobilization

1 For information, see Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020a.
base because of the time and expense involved in developing skilled military and civilian personnel and technologically sophisticated military equipment.2

To enable consistent comparisons between the countries, the following framework was employed to draw out policy and planning approaches to mobilisation:

- **Planning model**: this lists the different concepts that each nation has adopted to ensure its security. This was necessary as, in most countries studied, these concepts impacted heavily on what mobilisation comprises for that country.
- **Activation**: consistent with the above, this details what mobilisation may comprise in terms of personnel and their responsibilities or mechanisms that may be invoked during mobilisation. Further, mobilisation is predominantly focussed on crises rather than war. As such, it describes processes involving civil defence and civil society, as well as the Armed Forces.
- **Attributes and principles**: through analysis of recent preparedness activities or planning exercises undertaken by the respective country, this examines the mobilisation models employed, as most have not mobilised since the Second World War.
- **Forecast trends**: this details how countries’ mobilisation planning is evolving in response to local or global changes.

### International Comparisons

The following sections provide a summary of salient features of each country that emerged from the analysis.

**Switzerland**

Switzerland has long used total defence as the basis for its defence posture, while also operating under the assumption of ‘armed neutrality’. Its current assessment emphasises the importance of total defence, in responding to external threats, such as those posed by increased tensions between large state actors3 or, increasingly, to internal threats, such as terrorist attacks and natural or man-made catastrophes.4 As such, the Swiss are emphasising much closer cooperation between the military and civilian authorities in order to respond appropriately.5 In Switzerland, the armed forces are being more frequently used to provide greater support to civilian organisations such as the police or border guards in providing security and, at the canton level, to assist with small-scale disasters.6

The Swiss Armed Forces currently have three goals of protection and security: the country (including its airspace), its population, and its critical infrastructure.7 Two

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2 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
3 Service de Renseignement de la Confédération, 2019.
4 Armée Suisse, undated i; DDPS, 2000.
5 DDPS, 2000.
7 Armée Suisse, 2018a.
overarching tasks provide help to civilian authorities when requested and promote peace. The provision of help to civilian authorities is divided into three further mobilisation subcategories. Help is provided

- when a serious threat to the internal security of the country presents itself which civilian authorities cannot address on their own
- for large-scale events taking place in Switzerland
- when necessary in case of a disaster, in Switzerland or abroad.

In cultural and social terms, Switzerland has a diverse population spread across a federation of 26 cantons, each having a large degree of autonomy in terms of governance and decisionmaking, as is the case in Australia. Because of the diversity in culture and governance, ensuring social cohesion is a goal of the federal government, and is enshrined in the constitution. Total defence is a key tenet to developing societal cohesion through the mixing of linguistically and culturally diverse citizens.

In 2018, Switzerland’s Development Programme of the Armed Forces (DEVA) instituted a mobilisation process to improve the availability of its Armed Forces. Through a national program of public call-up exercises, up to 35,000 personnel can now be mobilised within 10 days. This number comprises Reserve components maintained through National Service. While the numbers available for mobilisation are impressive from a capacity perspective, this process also recognises the importance of capability. Full-time serving armed forces (most capable) are mobilised first. Those currently on training are mobilised next. In addition, high-availability militia (MADE) can be activated to specifically help civilian authorities within 24 to 96 hours. The planning process explicitly identifies these levels and MADE personnel in advance, enabling a more optimal mobilisation.

**Singapore**

Singapore combines its diplomatic efforts with its own total defence strategy as the basis for its broader deterrence strategy. Their concept, called Total Defence, comprises six pillars: Military, Civil, Economic, Social, Digital, and Psychological Defence. All pillars require citizens as well as the Armed Forces, to play their part in Singapore’s defence against conventional and nonconventional threats, as well as other security challenges. Civil Defence prompts the community to remain alert and vigilant for suspicious persons or activities especially as they do not consider themselves safe from terrorism. Strong Economic Defence is seen to support businesses against economic downturns and other impacts from the pandemic. For cyber, there has been a range of ongoing initiatives including the launch of a sixth pillar of Digital Defence in 2019—a whole-of-nation effort to improve cybersecurity...
and recognise and counter disinformation. It is noteworthy that only one is focussed on Military Defence comprising the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), National Service personnel and the Singapore Armed Forces Volunteer Corps (SAFVC).

Underpinning all other pillars is the Psychological Defence pillar, which is considered key to ensuring solidarity, resilience, and national identity. Importantly, the requirements for both Social and Psychological Defence are communicated through clear and consistent messaging using a variety of media, ensuring clarity about what the military requires of the general population and what the general population may require of the military. A range of regular and large-scale mobilisation exercises involving civil defence members (such as Singapore Police Force officers and civilian security officers) and military defence members (both full-time National Servicemen and regulars from the Army) reinforce the importance of Total Defence and keep the general population aware and engaged.

Finland

Finland is a useful counterpoint as, unlike nations of comparable size, it did not decrease its total defence investment following the end of the Cold War. Indeed, Finland has largely retained its total defence concept since the 1940s as successive governments prioritised its capability to mobilise the whole of society. It continues to progress and update its approach consistent with continuing changes in society, the security environment, and technology. Fundamentally, Finland’s defence posture necessitates close cooperation with civil society formalised through partnership and security agreements, letters of intent, and joint exercises. Key stakeholders from across all sectors meet regularly to update plans and practise how to maintain the ‘critical functions of society’ during national crises.

General principles and implementation guidelines for Finland’s current security concept are outlined in the 2017 Security Strategy for Society. This policy positions defence to perform the conventional roles of safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the population’s security, while emphasising the risks of novel threats such as climate change, environmental degradation and cyberattack. Significantly, it requires defence to be structured to uphold basic values, promote the population’s well-being, and maintain the functioning of society. As such, the Strategy highlights three key areas: preparedness, crisis management, and security of supply, all focussed on securing Finland’s Seven Vital Functions for Society. These comprise: Leadership, International and EU Activities, Defence Capability, Internal Security, Economy, Infrastructure and Security of Supply, Functional Capacity of the Population and Services, and Psychological Resilience.

Psychological Resilience is a key pillar of the Security Strategy for Society and entails bolstering individual citizens’ will to fight or endure hardship, and potentially invoking

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12 As detailed in Chapter 2.
13 See for example: Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2018b.
14 As detailed in Chapter 3.
emergency powers to ensure that the basic needs of the population are met in times of crisis. Having faced major conventional warfighting threats over many generations, civil preparedness, will to fight, and endurance are key parts of Finland’s national identity, drawing on concepts of sisu (loosely translated as stoical determination, grit, or resilience). Alongside these direct measures, the Strategy also emphasises the need to reinforce the broader resilience of Finnish social structures ahead of any crisis in the first place; this means building a fairer, better-governed, and more democratic society in peacetime conditions and then articulating what actions are required to ensure psychological resilience during crisis and during recovery (from a crisis).  

In terms of the national industrial base, Finland, through its defence industrial strategy, provides closer coordination among businesses and research, education and training institutions. Together, these organisations are proactive in ensuring supply of key goods, skills, and expertise in a range of underlying technology and engineering clusters such as the following:

- Technologies and engineering relating to command, control, communications, computers (C4) and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Reconnaissance (ISTAR)
- Material technology and structural engineering
- Technologies and engineering for multitechnology systems (systems integration)
- Bio- and chemical technologies and engineering
- Cyber and digital skills relating to implementation of the Cyber Security Strategy.

Sweden

Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden’s total defence concept has become more focussed on civilian defence, with an emphasis on crisis management. However, in 2015, as a result of security environment deteriorations, the Swedish Government instructed its Armed Forces and the Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap; MSB) to resume joint total defence planning. This led to revision of this policy, reiterating that mobilisation is a whole-of-nation effort. It notes that national, regional, and local government and the private sector should

- in peacetime offer the ability to meet different forms of open and hidden pressures that can be exerted by various means such as political, psychological, economic, and military
- increase their ability to identify and respond to intelligence activities, cyberattacks, and information operations against the country
- increase their ability to withstand an armed attack on Sweden by a qualified opponent.

In Sweden, ‘social cohesion and equality’ are considered essential to a strong will to fight and support for total defence—particularly in ensuring trust between the government and its

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17 As detailed in Chapter 3.
18 Muravska et al., 2019; For more information, see Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2016.
citizens, which is a central tenet of Swedish public administration.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, the societal aspect is part of a longer history, the ‘psychological defence’ concept becoming integral to Swedish defence during the Second World War and the Cold War. More recently, due to heightened concerns over disinformation and grey-zone activities, psychological defence has been prioritised.

Another element of Sweden’s revitalised total defence concept is that it also ensures Constitutional and Organisational Readiness.\textsuperscript{20} The first of these is concerned with legal provisions, the latter with clarity of roles and responsibilities and tasks of stakeholders. In both cases, arrangements have been tried and tested, training has been provided, and mobilisation exercises have been conducted that encompassed exploring supply chain resilience as well as robustness of digital infrastructure and communications channels.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{United States of America}

It is easier for countries with relatively small national bases—which include workforce, transportation, facilities, industry, training, communications and other aspects that can be utilised in a national response—to leverage their entire population when operationalising their form of a total defence concept. However, even a large nation with an all-volunteer force such as the United States institutes key elements that align with total defence constructs. For instance, the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines four vital national interests, or ‘four pillars’ that that could encompass many of the elements of total defence defined above: (1) protect the homeland, the American people, and the American way of life, (2) promote American prosperity, (3) preserve peace through strength, and (4) advance American influence.\textsuperscript{22} While this is predominantly aimed at positioning the United States in a competitive position beyond its borders, it is interesting to examine the language used in the pillars describing national interest. The use of the descriptor \textit{vital} is consistent with Finland’s security strategy; pillars are what Singapore calls the six components of its Total Defence concept. The inclusion of diplomacy, deterrence, resilience, and values as key tools or outcomes aligns the intent of the NSS even more so with that of the total defence concepts of the other countries studied.

DoD Joint Publication 4-05, \textit{Joint Mobilization Planning}, defines mobilisation as ‘the process of assembling and organising national resources to support national objectives in time of war and other emergencies’, as well as ‘the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency’.\textsuperscript{23} The first definition above encompasses some aspects of total defence concepts. The second definition is specific to the role of the armed forces in response to war of

\textsuperscript{19} As detailed in Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{20} Försvarsmakten and MSB, 2016.
\textsuperscript{21} Försvarsmakten and MSB, 2019.
\textsuperscript{22} National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017.
\textsuperscript{23} U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
emergency. It should be noted that this study focusses most on the first definition. That said, examining how the United States brings its Armed Forces to readiness is discussed.

Since the U.S. Defense Force is an all-volunteer force, the U.S. military has developed a total force policy that encompasses active-duty military personnel, reserve component military personnel, civilian military personnel, and military contractors. Mobilisation planning for both domestic emergencies in the United States and overseas contingencies also includes these various elements of the total force, as well as civilian resources.

Australian Mobilisation Planning Context

Australia does not have recent experiences to leverage for mobilisation planning. While lower levels of mobilisation have occurred since the late 1990s, these military operations have called on only narrow elements of Defence industry and some employers of Defence reserves. Indeed, the 1990 Wrigley Report is ‘the most recent time that the Australian Government decided to seriously examine national mobilisation’. Since then, the growth of national security activities other than conventional state-on-state warfare suggests a need to review mobilisation planning to encompass an expanded spectrum of operations. Support to domestic disasters creates a different challenge in that Defence will be expected to provide access to specialist capabilities that the state, territory, or local governments do not have. As such, the future environment against which Australia will need to mobilise can be characterised in two ways. It will need

- to be able to move fast to respond to the most likely events
- to diversify the preparation beyond that of conventional war, and in recognition of the likely warning times relating to different events.

Australia is seeking to adapt how it approaches mobilising the community in a more proactive way against potential threats. For instance, the Cyber Security Strategy 2020 details a ‘whole-of-community effort’ to counter the threat posed by external agents (including nations). It is also worth observing that Australia’s Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (NDRRF) guides national, whole-of-society efforts to proactively reduce disaster risk and minimise the loss and suffering caused by disasters.

However, while there has been increased community engagement with mobilisation efforts as a result of cyberattacks, the bushfires, and the COVID-19 pandemic, broad-based awareness of issues of national security is relatively low. This is in part because Australia does not have ongoing mechanisms to support long term awareness and a shared narrative,

24 Department of Defence, 2020d, Paragraphs 8 and 9.
28 Department of Home Affairs, 2018b.
29 Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020a, p.7.
and in part because Defence does not yet effectively, or explicitly, incorporate a whole-of-
nation construct, such as social cohesion, citizen support, and material and psychological
resilience, into its planning or doctrine. Certainly the Wrigley Report makes clear the
centrality of deep cross-societal participation to successful mobilisation. The report
recommended that, ‘[w]hile the career military professional is clearly crucial to building and
maintaining effective national defence in peacetime, few would dispute that in times of
national danger the professional will need to be reinforced, perhaps massively, by others in
the community’. There is an incentive for Defence to proactively reinforce the civil-military
relationship, as it supports an enhanced focus on the protection of Australia in extremis,
while being supported by a civil society invested in a mutually agreed social contract.

Another key feature of mobilisation planning is the capacity to sustain an operation; in
effect, the capacity to activate the national base and maintain the necessary level of
productivity. Here national base is used as a generic term to represent the resources available
to the nation to support its warfighting efforts including workforce, transportation,
equipment, health services, facilities, training, communications, legislative issues, and
funding. As the recent Defence mobilisation review observes, Defence’s long-held
approach towards mobilisation planning is more aligned with what a large nation would
undertake, where a commensurate large industrial base could be drawn from. The
Australian government, through Defence, is seeking to address these resources (or lack
thereof) with initiatives such as the National Naval Continuous Shipbuilding Program,
among others, which prioritises sovereign-based industries and attracts long-term multiyear
investments. However, given that Australia’s current security and economic partners are not
necessarily the same, its dependence on imports in key sectors may still make it vulnerable
in a prolonged conflict. Establishing what is necessary for a sustained, minimal level of
capability will be a key consideration in mobilisation planning.

An Australian Total Defence Concept

As Defence implements its new policy objectives of Shape, Deter and Respond, it is
important to reflect how close this position aligns with the total defence concepts that other
nations employ. It is noted that such concepts involve a much more detailed, open, and active
dialogue with the whole of society, individuals, all levels of government, and the private
sector. This is perhaps the most vital element to acknowledge—mobilisation is regarded as a
whole-of-nation activity—therefore the whole of nation must be engaged in the planning and
preparation. What the comparison of other countries indicates is that the current definition for
mobilisation in Australia as ‘the process of transition between preparedness and the conduct

30 Layton, 2020, p. 38.
33 Department of Defence, 2020e, Paragraph 26.
of a specific operation’\textsuperscript{34} may need revision to better represent the more dynamic nature of emerging operations and crises against which Defence may need to mobilise. The range may be too great and the warning times too short to be able to successfully transition from states of preparedness and it may be more appropriate to think of perpetual preparedness and adopt a risk-based approach to mobilisation.

The Defence Strategic Update (DSU) outlines Defence’s intent to ‘work closely with other arms of Government’, to expand its ‘capability to respond to grey-zone activities’, and to become self-reliant in the delivery of deterrent effects. This exemplifies the notion of modern deterrence: tailoring deterrence threats and adopting an all-of-government response. Furthermore, if deterrence measures do not work, the capacity and capability to respond decisively (either alone or with Australian allies) are maintained by ‘enhanc[ing]the lethality of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for high-intensity operations’. Total defence encompasses modern deterrence, which explains efforts to strengthen and revitalise total defence concepts in most overseas countries considered here. Modern deterrence is one of the key tenets the countries pursue driven by changing security environments, and with increasing priority against ongoing diplomatic efforts. Therefore, just as other nations do, there is ample opportunity for Australia to incorporate mobilisation planning into overall concepts for deterrence.

Defence is also being asked to enhance its capacity to support civil authorities in response to natural disasters and crises. This is entirely consistent with the civil defence aspects which countries have in their total defence concepts. But, as is suggested later in the report, given the role and responsibilities of the Home Affairs Portfolio, Defence may want to prioritise pursuing a stronger relationship with the Portfolio to support at least activities such as civil defence.

\textit{Preparing Against a Full Spectrum of Operations}

As the preceding section indicates, against an evolving threat landscape, Defence may need to leverage the whole-of-society or national base. Conversely, as natural or man-made threats increase in severity and frequency, the national base may expect to leverage Defence. For Defence to be ready and able to meet this expanded range of threats or demands, it might want to consider adopting a risk-based approach to its mobilisation planning cognisant that warning times may vary as may the threats faced. Assessed against both likelihood and impact, Defence will need to maintain the ability to adapt and structure itself to enable rapid access to the correct skills, training, and capability when required, wherever it may reside.

With such an approach the gap between Defence and the national base needs to be bridged. An effective communication strategy that brings the national base into the discussion is required. Mimicking the 2020 \textit{Cyber Security Strategy} and its call for everyone to play their part in cyber defence may be a good first step. Similar leverage of Defence’s support to communities that have been impacted by natural disasters and crises could be made.

\textsuperscript{34} ADDP, 2013, pp. 1–2.
Building the infrastructure that facilitates ready and appropriate interaction between the civil and military communities is important. Beyond the specific strategic relationship building being undertaken by the Australian Reserves (discussed later in the report), mobilisation exercises offer the best opportunity to design, test and enhance this. Consistent with a risk-based rather than event-driven approach, continual exercise of mechanisms and processes against varying scenarios will reinforce expectations and build confidence between both parties as they work together, in support of the other. As exercises mature, a much better understanding of what is expected and what can be delivered is gained by all, responses will become streamlined and faster and ensure the supporting infrastructure is robust.

**Understanding Resources**

To develop effective mobilisation plans, it is critical for Defence to understand the resource requirements, not only for the ADF, but also the national base. Furthermore, there is a need to understand the implications of a protracted conflict on these. This will enable Defence to explore and experiment with options for meeting the most likely and/or most dangerous threats. Options may include taking a location-specific approach to mobilisation, leveraging what is available at a state, territory, or regional level—specific to that state or what that state or regional location offers in terms of mobilisation, rather than a single national approach. Understanding the specialist skills that Defence will need will help alleviate issues associated with a shortened (or lack of) warning time. In the event of a prolonged conflict or crisis, Defence should identify where it can successfully manage the decrease in resources or capabilities versus those sovereign capabilities that must be sustained. Then, whether the nation itself can deliver such capabilities, which allies can supply these, and whether Australia can rely on these allies to do so and what needs to be stockpiled in country, should be determined. This may produce the evidence needed to introduce similar policies such as the Defense Production Act (DPA) that the United States has to ensure preferential treatment for military production and construction, and stockpiling. Consistent with Defence’s current program of exercises, focussed on testing concepts, force design, and capability options, it is suggested that the program be extended in appropriate exercises, to examine a more stressed state in which points where the national base needs to be mobilised are reached. How long such mobilisation efforts need to be sustained should also be investigated.

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35 Here, *region* refers to an area that offers up its own specific capabilities, located within a state but perhaps more isolated from the capital city, for example, Townsville and its environs may be considered a region within the state of Queensland.
Acknowledgements

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## Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3SIR</td>
<td>3rd Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment</td>
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<td>ACSC</td>
<td>Australian Cyber Security Centre</td>
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
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<td>ADDP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<td>ADHQ</td>
<td>Australian Defence Headquarters</td>
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<td>AI</td>
<td>artificial intelligence</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
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<td>APGC</td>
<td>Air Power Generation Command</td>
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<td>C4</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers</td>
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<td>C4I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence</td>
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<td>CBR</td>
<td>chemical-biological-radiological</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>community development councils</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>chief of defence force</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Swiss francs</td>
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<td>CIF</td>
<td>community isolation facilities</td>
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<td>COMDISPLAN</td>
<td>Australian Government Disaster Plan</td>
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<td>CRAF</td>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet</td>
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<td>CSE</td>
<td>Conduct of Strategic Exercises</td>
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<td>DACC</td>
<td>Defence Assistance to the Civil Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDPS</td>
<td>Federal Department of Defence, Protection, Population, and Sports</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVA</td>
<td>Development Programme of the Armed Forces or Développement de l’armée [Switzerland]</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFACA</td>
<td>Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMOB</td>
<td>Directorate of Mobilisation Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense [United States]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Defense Production Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DPAS  Defense Priorities and Allocation System
DST  defence science and technology
DSU20  *2020 Defence Strategic Update*
EMA  Emergency Management Australia
EOP  enhanced opportunity partner
EPA  Environmental Protection Agency
EU  European Union
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOI  Swedish Defence Research Agency
GDP  gross domestic product
ICT  in-camp training
IDHQ  Island’s Defence Headquarters [Singapore]
IFC  Information Fusion Centre [Singapore]
IPPT  Individual Physical Proficiency Tests
ISTAR  Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
LTA  Land Transport Authority [Singapore]
MADE  high-availability militia [Switzerland]
MATC  Mobile Air Traffic Control
MEC  Mobilisation and Equipping Centre
MINDEF  Ministry of Defence [Singapore]
MOU  memorandum of understanding
MSB  Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap (Civil Contingencies Agency) [Sweden]
MSTF  Maritime Security Task Force
NATCATDISPLAN  Natural Catastrophic Disaster Plan
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDRRF  *Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Framework*
NGO  nongovernmental organisations
NICC  National Interagency Coordination Center
NIFC  National Interagency Fire Center
NRF  NATO Response Force
   National Response Framework [United States]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>National Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSmen</td>
<td>National Servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSN</td>
<td>National Security Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSRB</td>
<td>National Security Resources Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy [United States]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFPP</td>
<td>Office Fédéral de la Protection de la Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORNS</td>
<td>operationally ready national servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>People’s Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>People’s Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFRA</td>
<td>publicly funded research agencies</td>
</tr>
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<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>Royal Fleet Auxiliary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Response Forces</td>
</tr>
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<td>RSAF</td>
<td>Republic of Singapore Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSN</td>
<td>Republic of Singapore Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Service’s Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RYD</td>
<td>Reserve and Youth Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Singapore Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFVC</td>
<td>Singapore Armed Forces Volunteer Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>State Emergency Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMBEX</td>
<td>Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>small to medium enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StaR</td>
<td>science, technology and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWPZ</td>
<td>South-Western Pacific Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCDF</td>
<td>Vice Chief of Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>Victoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Western Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

Background

The Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ) is sponsoring the development of a contemporary Defence mobilisation plan. This is consistent with the release of the Defence Strategic Update (DSU) on 1 July 2020, with its premise that forecast change (from just four years ago) is happening faster than expected due in part to technological change but also to increased levels of strategic competition within the Indo-Pacific which itself increasingly encompasses more grey-zone tactics than conventional military activities. To quote the Prime Minister at the launch of the update: ‘the largely benign security environment . . . that Australia has enjoyed, basically from the fall of the Berlin Wall . . . [has] gone’. This indicates an imperative to review, revise and update how Defence plans to mobilise in response. Recent commentary has further highlighted that without a concerted strategic approach to boosting services that support national mobilisation, Defence might not be able to deploy; sustain; or, reconstitute any capability it loses leading to ‘historic failure’. This conclusion is arrived at when several persistent underlying assumptions to mobilisation that have changed since previous mobilisation events are considered.

In addition to changing landscapes most keenly associated with conflict, or events just short thereof, there have been similar increases in demand for Defence to support national crises. Indeed, the DSU repeatedly identified disaster and national resilience as key determinants for Defence, noting that ‘disaster response and resilience measures demand a higher priority in defence planning’. As a result, one of six new activities to be undertaken by Defence to implement its new objectives of Shape, Deter, and Respond is to ‘enhance Defence’s capacity to support civil authorities in response to natural disasters and crises’.

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1 Department of Defence, 2020c, p. 12. In this report, we have adopted the meaning of grey zone outlined in the DSU: ‘one of a range of terms used to describe activities designed to coerce countries in ways that seek to avoid military conflict. Examples include using para-military forces, militarisation of disputed features, exploiting influence, interference operations and the coercive use of trade and economic levers. These tactics are not new. But they are now being used in our immediate region against shared interests in security and stability. They are facilitated by technological developments including cyber warfare’. Other terms to describe such activities include hybrid warfare or modern political warfare. Some describe the same activities as statecraft, as will be discussed later in the report.

2 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2020.

3 Boulton, 2020.

4 Department of Defence, 2020c, p. 16.

5 Department of Defence, 2020c, p. 25.
This emerging driver is also recognised outside of Defence. For instance, the draft propositions made by the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements\(^6\) state that

The Australian government should provide state, territory and local governments with more comprehensive information and guidance about Commonwealth resources and assistance. This should include:

1. the effects that can be achieved by deployment of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to support and complement a state or territory’s response to, and recovery from, natural disasters;
2. arrangements for access, including for ADF assistance.\(^7\)

In seeking to address these issues the ADF is facing and identify how competing demands for the ADF may be better managed, several other countries mobilisation planning and preparation to meet a similar broad range of events have been examined. It has been identified that such preparation involves a much more detailed, open, and active dialogue with the whole of society, individuals, all levels of government, and the private sector. This is perhaps the most vital idea to note: mobilisation is a whole-of-nation activity, therefore, rather than confining planning and preparation to ADF doctrine publications, the whole nation must be engaged.

Against this the Australian history of mobilisation has been re-examined to identify the impact when the nation has mobilised. This overview highlights how public opinion informs legitimacy, what the nation will tolerate, and how the Government and Defence have wrestled with improving mobilisation planning over the years. As highlighted in the opening paragraphs, events currently occurring both in Australia and in areas of strategic interest seem to be culminating opportunity to bring strategic mobilisation not only to the centre of Defence planning, but also to the public, demanding not only its attention but also its participation.

The Vice Chief of Defence Force (VCDF) has established a small Directorate of Mobilisation Planning (DMOB) within Force Design Division in response to significant changes in Australia’s strategic outlook, to ensure a contemporary mobilisation planning framework across Defence. The development of this mobilisation planning framework will be conducted over two and a half years and will include several research activities. The work reported here constitutes one such research activity.

**Research Purpose and Approach**

The goal of this work is to develop an understanding of mobilisation planning in other countries. For the VCDF to develop a contemporary mobilisation plan, DMOB identified that there was a need to understand current and emerging trends in mobilisation planning overseas from which Australian Defence can leverage. This should afford Defence the confidence that

\(^6\) Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020b.

\(^7\) It should be noted that this research was conducted at a time when only the draft propositions made by the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements were available, as at 31 August 2020.
Australian mobilisation planning is consistent with international practice and Australia is better prepared for emerging strategic challenges.

To achieve this, a comprehensive, international literature review was undertaken. This comprised accessing a range of documents produced by each respective country’s Armed or Defence Forces; specific services within those forces, such as the Army; and responsible Government Agencies, for example, the Department of Defense DoD; (in the United States) and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap; MSB). For the European countries, these documents were usually written in their own local language and thus required translation by RAND staff. Alongside these, further research was accessed that reviewed: (1) how responses to natural domestic disasters were undertaken; (2) a history of mobilisation in Australia, for the reader less informed in this; and (3) different issues related to ideas of societal resilience. All these documents are publicly accessible.

As this research was conducted over a relatively short three-month period of time which coincided with COVID-19 lockdown periods, opportunity to interview subject-matter experts who may have contributed information relevant to mobilisation issues was extremely limited. It should also be noted that this research was conducted before the final report of the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements was available. Thus any reference to this Royal Commission is against the draft propositions by Counsel Assisting only, as at 30 August 2020.8

International Comparisons

To enable consistent comparisons between the countries the following framework was employed to draw out policy and planning approaches to mobilisation:

- **Planning model:** this lists the different concepts that each nation has adopted to ensure its security. This was necessary as, in most countries studied, these concepts impacted heavily on what mobilisation comprises for that country.
- **Activation:** consistent with the above, this details what mobilisation may comprise in terms of personnel and their responsibilities or mechanisms that may be invoked during mobilisation. Further, mobilisation is predominantly focussed on crises rather than war. As such, it describes processes involving civil defence and civil society as well as the Armed Forces.
- **Attributes and principles:** through analysis of recent preparedness activities or planning exercises undertaken by the respective country, this examines the mobilisation models employed, as most have not mobilised since the Second World War. This section most keenly describes the ongoing refinement to mobilisation planning processes.
- **Forecast trends:** this details how countries’ mobilisation planning is evolving in response to local or global changes.

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8 For information, see Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020b.
Each country’s response to these phases is examined. A comparison of the countries against each phase of this framework is presented in tabular form at the end of the executive summary.

Selection of Country Case Studies

DMOB requested that the study focus on five countries that offer points of comparison and contrast with Australian mobilisation planning. The list of countries was to include Sweden and the United States. The remaining countries were determined in discussion with the client and selected to be Switzerland, Singapore, and Finland.

Switzerland was chosen as it was one of the originators of total defence, and the country remains well prepared for defensive action. Total defence is also regarded as a good way of unifying what is otherwise a fragmented country—linguistically and culturally (and previously along religious lines as well, although less so now). It relies on National Service despite several unsuccessful referenda to abolish it in favour of a volunteer-led militia. Switzerland also mobilised its military during the peak of the COVID-19 crisis in the country.

Singapore was chosen for its strategic location in the Indo-Pacific and more recent (1984) adoption of the total defence concept, offering a more contemporary view of how such concepts can be adapted and evolve. Its named Total Defence concept comprises six pillars, with the last sixth pillar—Digital Defence—introduced only in 2019, aligning with best practice on cyber security. The inclusion of Social and Psychological Defence acknowledges the importance of social cohesion and will to fight in defending a country against much larger peers and other less obvious threats—a position that Australia potentially faces.

Despite similarities to Sweden, and Switzerland to a lesser extent, Finland, which was also chosen, did not decrease its total defence investment following the end of the Cold War as other countries did and continues to maintain a contemporary approach to total defence—currently presented as the Seven Vital Functions for Society.

In discussions with the client, it was noted that the countries selected for examination have not mobilised at a national level since the Second World War. While there was still much utility in examining how planning and preparation for mobilisation was undertaken and rehearsed in these countries, which is at high and concerted levels despite the lack of major events, it was determined that it was useful to extend the analysis study to encompass a broader range of events. In doing so, comparison against Australia could more readily be undertaken where the following could be examined:

- Australian response to that of countries overseas against similar events
- Australian response to the same (most likely) global event
- Examples of how communities are mobilised outside of war.

Presentation of Findings

This report is organised so that it presents each of the case studies first. Information found is presented in a format consistent with the framework described above. The case studies,
which contain additional information, are presented in their original format in a separate electronic volume for the reader to access separately.

Important context regarding what Australia might be required to supply to Defence as it mobilises for war in the future or as it is increasingly called upon to assist in national crises is presented next. Within this section focussed on future demands, comparison is made with how the overseas countries studied are responding to similar demands or changes.

In the next section a synopsis of how mobilisation was undertaken historically in Australia serves not only to inform the reader less knowledgeable about mobilisation but also to show how a more open, strategic narrative between military and civil communities is needed and how this is a step towards international practice, for building national or psychological resilience, which is considered by overseas countries as fundamental to delivering total defence concepts. The conclusion drawn from the examination of each country’s total defence concept is that there is a relationship, perhaps an interdependency, between national resilience and mobilisation. Without national resilience, mobilising the support required against a number of different threats may not be forthcoming.

The final section draws direct observations for Australia and presents a rationale for baselining activities delivered as mobilisation exercises to understand what is needed by Defence and what is available, as well as some options for mechanisms to ensure that what is needed can be delivered.

The report is structured in this manner so that the reader, after examining the practise of overseas countries, is given suggestions as to how Australian mobilisation planning may be informed by planning conducted overseas. Within these sections the observations are not exhaustive, and it is recommended that the individual overseas case studies are reviewed in their own right, so that the reader may draw their own comparisons and conclusions.

As the report reveals, there is significant emphasis on the role of the general population in mobilisation efforts. Indeed central to mobilisation planning for many of the countries studied is the concept of total defence, which depends upon national mobilisation of the entire civil community working in cooperation with or as part of their Armed Forces, to defend against natural and man-made disasters, grey-zone activities, and war. This emphasis is also consistent with the threat assessments each country has made where it is expected the general population will play a significant role in identifying, protecting, and defending against a range of threats including terrorism, coercion, and cyberattacks. As such, how the Armed Forces supports civil society in crises dominates the majority of information publicly accessible. Meanwhile, discourse pertaining to the Armed Forces is usually focussed on manpower. This may be a result of the prevailing national service or conscription practices in most of the countries studied, however, even the United States, which is much more focussed on the support to the mobilisation of military forces to fight wars (away from the United States), cites manpower

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9 Note that the Australian spelling of mobilisation is used throughout this report unless we are referring to specific items that contain the word spelt differently in their title. Differences are mainly observed in the U.S. case study, Chapter 6.
as one of the biggest and ‘most critical resources in the mobilization base because of the time and expense involved in developing skilled military and civilian personnel and technologically sophisticated military equipment’. As a result there is only limited information available that details how the national base (outside of the population) is, or may be, accessed by the Armed Forces in mobilisation.

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10 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
2. Case Study: Singapore

Country Overview

Singapore consists of Singapore Island plus a further 60 small islets. It has a population of 5,907,917 people and this is expected to reach 5,925,000 in 2021.¹ Its land area is 719 square kilometres, and thus has a completely urban population. When compared to Sydney, with its population of 5.19 million people and area of some 12,000 square kilometres, Singapore’s population density is nearly 20 times greater. Due to past (and continuing) immigration, Singapore’s population is ethnically diverse, with three-quarters of the population comprising Chinese people (74.3 per cent) and the next two largest ethnic groups being Malay (13.4 per cent) and Indian (9.0 per cent).²

Singapore became an independent state in 1965, when it was ejected from the Federation of Malaysia, but it remains a member of the Commonwealth. There is ostensibly one level of Government of the Republic of Singapore defined by the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. This executive branch of government is made up of the president and the cabinet of Singapore. The role of the president is largely ceremonial, and it is the cabinet, composed of the prime minister and other ministers, which directs and controls the government. The cabinet is formed by the political party that gains a simple majority in each general election.

There are five community development councils (CDCs) appointed by the board of management of the People’s Association (PA) for districts in Singapore. The chair of a CDC is the mayor for the district, and as ministers are most usually designated as mayors, it is the ministers who are usually appointed as chairs of CDCs, further streamlining governance and coordination.

Premised on the way war is conducted today, with its limited resources, the nature of its society and the size of the country, Singapore requires a total defence capability, which involves not only the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) but also the civilian population. This requires, through its Total Defence concept, that every sector of society is mobilised. It is a response that demands that everyone plays their part, to ensure Singapore’s security against all forms of attack, both military and non-military. Total Defence comprises six pillars of Military, Civil, Economic, Social, Digital, and Psychological Defence, and from the descriptions given below, social contracts between the government, industry, and population to defend Singapore can be seen. Psychological Defence is considered the most important in realising Total Defence: ‘It is about the ability of people to trust each other, have faith in societal and government institutions, provided they are not corrupt, and resilient to forces aimed at sowing discord and creating fissures in society’.³

¹ Britannica, undated a.
² Britannica, undated b.
³ Zhang, 2018.
Despite its Total Concepts being founded on Swiss and Swedish concepts, for psychological defence Singapore looks to copy Finland more, where ‘its people [are observed to be] strongly banded together, distinct in their culture and language, shar[ing]a collective sense of self-determination’. It identifies a ‘well-established social compact, which forms the bedrock of social cohesion, and psychological resilience of a people’. Singapore considers it ‘a cultural ballast, arguably stronger than military defence’.4

Singapore Armed Forces

The SAF are focussed on deterrence and diplomacy to defend their homeland and they have successfully engaged in a range of deployments and activities, most of which are described in detail in the associated annex. It practices regular mobilisation exercises with the National Service (NS), with the prospect of protecting its Nation by fighting on their sovereign land.

The SAF comprise the Singapore Army, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF), and the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN).

Today the Singapore Army comprises

- three Combined Arms Divisions: 3 Div, 6 Div and 9 Div
- two Army Operational Reserve Divisions, 21st and 25th
- one island defence command: the 2 People’s Defence Forces (PDF).

The 2 PDFs, also designated as the Island’s Defence Headquarters (IDHQ) is responsible for homeland security, including that of key civilian installations and infrastructure. 2 PDF is also responsible for the coordination and secondment of military resources to civilian agencies in the event of a civil emergency.5

The RSAF has seventeen squadrons and four air bases; the RSN has eight squadrons and two naval bases. Table 2.1 represents the current manpower that is available to the SAF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manpower Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military age</td>
<td>16.5 years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>18 years of age, 22- to 24-month period (compulsory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available for military service</td>
<td>4,017,314 age 18–49 years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaching military age annually</td>
<td>67,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active personnel</td>
<td>72,500 (including average 46,800 conscripts annually)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve personnel</td>
<td>312,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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4 Zhang, 2018.
5 Wikipedia, undated a.
National Service

As can be seen from Table 2.1, the number of active personnel derives more than half its strength from NS. All male Singaporean citizens or second-generation permanent residents between the ages of 18 and 40 are required to enlist for two years’ compulsory active duty, with most serving in the Army. The remainder are primarily directed to serve in the Civil Defence services. While women can join the SAF in a professional capacity, they are not required to undertake NS. Hence those currently undertaking, as well as those that have completed, their compulsory two-year national service are colloquially referred to as National Servicemen (NSMen).

Operationally ready national servicemen (ORNS) include those NSmen who have completed their compulsory NS but are continuing their ten-year operationally ready training. Considered part of the extended SAF, they must apply for an Exit Permit if travelling for more than six months. Over the ten years they are required to attend in-camp training (ICT) for up to 40 days a year and are required to attempt and pass Individual Physical Proficiency Tests (IPPT) regularly. This represents a ready force in excess of 1.2 million personnel at any one time, 20 per cent of Singapore’s population.

Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) Reserve comprises personnel who have completed their ten-year NS training cycle, but still can be mobilised in emergency or war. Most complete NS upon reaching age 40 (nonofficers) or 50 (officers).

Singapore Armed Forces Volunteer Corps

The current Singapore Armed Forces Volunteer Corps (SAFVC) was specifically raised in 2014 to allow women, first-generation permanent residents, and new citizens to volunteer in support of national defence. The target for their first intake in 2015 was 150; however, in response to over 1,000 applications, the inaugural cohort comprised of 226 volunteers and continues to grow. There is a range of roles and services that the volunteers can fill, some contingent on their prior qualifications or experience.6 A large number are trained as security troopers, guarding key installations across Singapore alongside active servicemen and reservists. The rest serve in specialised roles. They typically serve up to 14 days each year and are notified for deployment via the same SAF100V process that ORNS are advised but given three to six months’ notice.

Funding

Over the past 15 years, Singapore’s military expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has declined from a peak in 2003 of 4.9 per cent to its lowest point of 3.1 per cent in 2018, representing US$10.84 billion.

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6 Singapore Armed Forces Volunteer Corps, undated.
2020 Threat Assessment

Singapore has established a credible force in a relatively short period of time, but the MINDEF presented the rationale for a restructured SAF against an appraisal of geopolitics earlier this year.\(^7\) It assesses that as the United States descends from the hyperdominant position it has held for some 70 years since Second World War, China is a rising global power. This is a consistent global view, with more countries considering the Indo-Pacific as their priority theatre, primarily because China is considered a strategic competitor or even rival power.\(^8\) However, Singapore acknowledges other regional powers, such as Japan, India, and Australia, are gaining strength as well.

Singapore also considers President Trump’s declaration that the United States is protecting shipping lanes, carrying natural gas and crude oil from the Middle East, for zero compensation, not too large an exaggeration. The United States is an exporter of energy itself, for the first time in 70 years, and is now less dependent upon the Middle East than China, Japan, and other Asian nations are. Meanwhile, Russia, through Syria, now has direct access to the Mediterranean Sea from where it can begin to build and exert its military presence. Asia and Oceania have increased their military spending every year since 1988, and, at US$507 billion, the region accounted for 28 per cent of the total global defence spending last year. That compares with just 9 per cent in 1988.\(^9\)

Against this backdrop, Singapore considers the evolving spectrum of threats against which it must be better prepared, to be terrorism, cyber threats and maritime threats. With respect to terrorism, it considers itself quite vulnerable to returning fighters. Thus, it has increased and formalised intelligence sharing through the ASEAN ‘Our Eyes’ initiative. The SAF will assist in this effort but is also restructuring its own military intelligence units, so that counterterrorism intelligence to detect, forewarn, and respond to terrorist plots is part of its core missions.

To guide the restructuring efforts required to meet security challenges in the new cyber environment, MINDEF and the SAF have convened a high-level committee focussed on cyber threats and headed up by the Permanent Secretary (Defence Development) and Chief of Defence Force (CDF).\(^10\) In the SAF’s history, this is being considered as important as introducing another service: an integrated cyber command and force to defend digital borders against state and nonstate foreign cyber actors. They have acknowledged that the cyber domain is more difficult to plan for and operate in than in air, land, and sea, and thus may require different types of units and force configuration. They are also focussed on recruiting

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7 Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2020c.
8 Not just United States and Australia: in 2018, France’s Air Force conducted its largest deployment in Southeast Asia since 2004—from Australia to India; at the same time the British Navy deployed three ships to the region and increased its joint military exercises with the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea.
10 This builds on the launch of a sixth Total Defence Pillar—Digital Defence—in 2019, described later in the text.
soldiers of the right aptitude, again recognising that the skills required in the cyber arena may be different. Once restructuring is complete, which they concede will take some years, CDF will continue to oversee mission outcomes. However, the Chief C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) will be responsible for raising, training, and sustaining the force, reporting directly to the CDF, like the other services. The SAF Cyber Command is expected to provide threat assessments and early warning in cyber-attacks, as well as the response.

In response to increases in incidents of piracy in the Singapore Strait and intrusions into Singapore territorial waters, the RSN’s Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) is acquiring new purpose-built platforms in the shape of four refurbished patrol vessels. Singapore is also in discussions with Malaysia and Indonesia to extend the Malacca Straits Patrol initiative to other surrounding waters.

Planning Model

A summary of what Singapore’s six Total Defence pillars comprise is given in Figure 2.1 below. The following sections then summarise information that the Singapore Government broadcasts to its population in expectation of what they can do to support each of the pillars.11

Figure 2.1. Singapore Total Defence Pillars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Defence</th>
<th>Civil Defence</th>
<th>Economic Defence</th>
<th>Social Defence</th>
<th>Digital Defence</th>
<th>Psychological Defence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Singapore Armed Forces  
• National Servicemen  
• SAF Volunteer Corps  
• Missions: Deterrence and Diplomacy | • Threats and Crises  
• Emergencies  
• Police and Fire Services  
• Vigilance  
• ‘Be Alert’ | • Government, Business and Industry  
• Education  
• Fiscal Responsibility  
• Conservation  
• Environmentally Friendly | • Social Cohesion  
• Citizenship  
• Immigration  
• Multiculturalism | • Cyber Security  
• Counter-misinformation | • Resilience  
• National Identity |

SOURCE: Adapted from Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2020d.

Military Defence

‘A strong and formidable defence force made up of Regulars and National Servicemen, and supported by the entire nation’.

Deterrence—making adversaries ‘think twice’—is one of the key missions in this pillar. But if Singapore is attacked, the SAF standing force is readily augmented by (in fact is critically dependent upon) NSmen. The nation is asked to support the Military Defence pillar

11 Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2020d.
by supporting the SAF as they keep fit and to take any opportunity to boost their morale. Specifically, women are called on to either join the SAF or serve with the SAFVC.

**Civil Defence**

‘The ability to spot signs of threats, respond effectively and recover quickly from crises’.

This acknowledges that current government resources are insufficient to deal with multiple- or large-scale threats. It therefore calls on all Singaporeans—at the individual, organisation, or community level—to ‘pitch in’ to help and be self-sufficient. It calls on people to be alert, respond first, and be prepared. Therefore, it actively encourages people to participate in Civil Defence exercises and be qualified or trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), first aid, firefighting, etc., as well as remaining vigilant and reporting suspicious persons or activities.

**Economic Defence**

‘A strong and resilient economy that is globally competitive and able to bounce back from any crises’.

Economic Defence is described as supporting the competitiveness of Singapore’s economy so that it cannot only sustain its population but also recover from global downturns. It also seeks to maintain the attractiveness of Singapore’s economy so that investor confidence remains high. The community at large is asked to contribute to this pillar through pursuing high levels of education, prudent living ‘within means’, conserving energy and water, and adopting environmentally friendly practices!

**Social Defence**

‘The bonds that unite us, built on trust and understanding among people of different races and religions, living in harmony and looking out for one another’.

As already described, Singapore is a multiracial, multireligious, and multicultural society and it is recognised that effort is needed for social cohesion among these different groups. This pillar calls on the general community to be respectful of all races and build bonds with old and new citizens through Singaporean experiences while acknowledging different cultures and traditions or underprivileged.

**Digital Defence**

‘Being secure, alert and responsible online’.

The sentiment articulated here is not dissimilar to that expressed in *Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2020*—acknowledging that digital technology pervading all aspects of life has many advantages, but also makes Singapore vulnerable to threats from the digital domain. These threats may include cyberattacks on networks and infrastructure, as well as
fake news or deliberate disinformation. In response, it asks everyone to adopt good
cybersecurity practices to safeguard personal data, devices and systems, and be aware of
phishing attacks and internet scams.

*Psychological Defence*

‘The will and resolve to defend our way of life and interests, and the fighting
spirit to overcome challenges together’.

This pillar identifies national identity as an important component to Singapore’s will to
fight and resilience. It encourages Singaporeans to be proud and remember their history and
the principles that helped Singapore succeed, and to have a strong resolve to stay united.
Singaporeans treat this pillar as one of the most important in realising Total Defence—as it
goes to the very heart of the concept that ‘everyone has a part to play’. With a disinterested
and disaffected population, it is unlikely that the other pillars would be successful.

*Activation*

Against these efforts of the general population the SAF, ORNS, and SAFVC all engage in
more humanitarian or civil efforts. Their readiness and ability to contribute to a range of
activities are supported through continual training, a range of exercises, and mobilisation
activities. As was shown in Table 2.1, mobilisation efforts include the ORNS who are called
back for operational duties in times of war or national emergency and if called up they would
be integrated into, augment, and dramatically expand the ‘Standing Forces’ up to five times
its peacetime size, fully staffed and equipped, while maintaining a cohesive structure.

Mobilisation activities are conducted regularly, primarily for the purposes of ensuring
the operational readiness of the ORNS. In any one year between 20 and 30 exercises are
undertaken, with different units being activated in different exercises.

Personnel are notified of their ICT activity (which may last less than six or more than
seven days) via MINDEF notification channels which they are required to acknowledge.
Furthermore, a soft copy of the official notice is also issued, an ‘SAF100’, via Manage Call-
Ups and Manning on the NS portal. The SAF100 has ICT details, including the reporting
date, time, venue, attire, and instructions for call-up. If personnel are unable to participate,
they must apply for deferment via the same eService—noting that absence from ICT without
approved deferment may lead to disciplinary action.

Servicemen are also required to be ready for Manning. If placed on Manning, Active
and ORNS must be ready at any time to report to their assigned Mobilisation Centre upon
activation. Notification can occur through two ways:

- **Open mobilisation**: personnel are notified through broadcast of codewords representing
  their unit in mass media like TV and radio, and through personal contact numbers—
  home, office, or mobile phone.
- **Silent mobilisation**: personnel are notified through personal contact numbers—home,
  office, or mobile phone.
Attributes and Principles—Exercising Mobilisation Plans

Singapore Army

In January 2018, Singapore conducted over two days a large military mobilisation exercise at Selarang Camp, involving around 8,000 active and operationally ready NSmen participating from nine divisions and assigned units, along with 700 vehicles from the 9th Singapore Division and its assigned units. The exercise was designed to test the SAF’s readiness to respond to a full spectrum of operations, especially homeland security and to test enhancements to mobilisation and equipping processes which included self-service kiosks and drawing of equipment and ammunition. With silent mobilisation, between 80 and 90 per cent of men reported in to the enhanced One-Stop Mobilisation and Equipping Centre (MEC) within a few hours. The MEC uses self-service kiosks to reduce waiting time for NSmen and has humidity-controlled storage facilities which ensure the equipment is well-maintained and ready for use.

Over the two days, as part of an interagency response with the Singapore Police Force officers and Sports Hub security officers, full-time NSmen and regulars from the Army Standby Force were also activated to respond to simulated homeland security threats, as part of the mobilisation exercise. The 3rd Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment (3SIR) responded to a simulated active shooter scenario at the Singapore Sports Hub, where soldiers, police, and security officers conducted cordon and search operations together. This exercise was part of a series of events conducted by the SAF and Civil Defence to test and validate Singapore’s multiagency response plan in the event of a terrorist attack. The exercise was also scheduled to raise public awareness on the current threat landscape and to encourage continued vigilance from members of the public.

Royal Singaporean Air Force

In December 2018 the RSAF conducted an open mobilisation exercise where NSmen from five fighter Squadrons reported to Changi Air Base, Paya Lebar Air Base, and Tengah Air Base within hours of activation. These servicemen form part of the Air Combat Command’s Fighter Group and include aircrews and ground crews.

RSAF regularly conducts Exercise Torrent, also known as the Alternate Runway Exercise. The seventh and last exercise was conducted in 2016 and involved the conversion of a major road, measuring 2,500 metres in length and 24 metres in width, into a runway. It took 48 hours and involved 110 RSAF servicemen. Key squadrons from Air Power Generation Command (APGC) were mobilised along with a variety of equipment, including a Mobile Air Traffic Control (MATC) tower. The Force Protection Squadron, 605 Squadron, provided...
security for the area of operations and the vicinity of the major road to ensure uninterrupted launch and recovery operations. The squadron worked closely with the Land Transport Authority (LTA) and the Singapore Police Force to ensure road closures and traffic diversions occurred to facilitate the exercise.

**Republic of Singapore Navy**

The RSN participates in a range of ongoing maritime security efforts in cooperation with other nations in the region. These range from piracy incidents to planned, longstanding exercises.

In March 2020, through close collaboration between Singaporean and Indonesian authorities, including shipping companies and littoral states, the Indonesian Navy apprehended three perpetrators who had boarded a Liberian-flagged bulk carrier in the Singapore Strait early in the morning, in the waters east of Pulau Karimun Kecil, Indonesia. The RSN’s Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) and Information Fusion Centre (IFC) played a key role in disrupting the sea robbery.16

In May 2019, the RSN participated in the latest Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX) with a frigate (RSS Steadfast, with an S-70B naval helicopter embarked aboard) and a missile corvette (RSS Valiant), while the Indian Navy participated with a destroyer (INS Kolkata embarked with a Chetak helicopter), an oiler (INS Shakti embarked with a Sea King helicopter), and a P-8I maritime patrol aircraft. Four F-16D+ fighter aircraft and a Fokker-50 maritime patrol aircraft from the RSAF also participated in the exercise. During the exercise, the two navies worked together to plan and execute advanced naval warfare serials, including gunnery live-firing. The sea phase culminated in mission-oriented exercises where ships and aircraft participated in a series of air defence and surface warfare missions.

**‘Total Wipeout’**

In 1991, the entire SAF mobilised in response to a joint military exercise being conducted by Malaysia and Indonesia in Johor, just 20 km from where National Day celebrations were being held at the National Stadium in Singapore.17 The exercise featured some 300 paratroopers and live fire, and was code-named, some say quite deliberately and provocatively, ‘Pukul Habis’, or ‘Total Wipeout’ in Malay. The official military exercise name was ‘Malindo Darasa 3AB’. Darasa means ‘air, sea, and land’. Further reports indicated that the purpose of the exercise was to test the cooperation and response between Malaysia and Indonesia in case a neighbouring country turned hostile.18

Singapore, unaware of the exercise, responded with a massive mobilisation of thousands of NSmen called back. Armour and artillery assets deployed to staging areas and soldiers

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18 Kampong Kid, 2017.
mobilised to sit along the edges of the Malaysian railway in Tanjong Pagar with live ammunition. Live mines were also planted around Singapore.

While there is no official government documentation available, the first prime minister of Singapore, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, did acknowledge the event in a statement made in his 2011 book *Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going*:

On our National Day, 9 August 1991, The Malaysian and the Indonesian armed forces held joint exercises at Kota Tinggi with parachute drops. Hence, we mobilised our forces, in addition to forces parading for the National Day celebrations. I did not think they would invade us, but they wanted to intimidate us and con us, so that we know our place at the bottom of the pecking order in the region.19

**Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic**

Singapore’s nationwide response to the COVID-19 pandemic won it worldwide praise for how it communicated and mobilised the entire public service and community at large20 and how it persisted in testing and tracing, ‘leaving no stone unturned’ as described by the World Health Organisation (WHO).21

In the response the SAF assisted in the distribution of more than five million masks, manned and thermal imagery machines at airports, and over 1,300 SAF members undertook contact tracing working with Ministry of Health staff. When an outbreak occurred after several migrant workers returned to Singapore, former SAF personnel worked as part of an interagency taskforce to set up and run community isolation facilities (CIFs). This was at the request of the Ministry of Health, which was leading the pandemic response. It requested people with experience in coordinating and running operations and leading such taskforces, provide assistance. The SAF provided health care at the CIFs and housed approximately 3,000 patients at six military camps.

The SAF have been mobilised to provide this kind of support previously: following the 1986 Collapse of Hotel New World and in the 2003 response to SARS.22 Altogether these examples illustrate that the rhetoric that the Ministry of Defence apportions to Total Defence, is perhaps deserved. To cite directly from the website:

Total Defence has seen us through SARS, the fall-out from the 9/11 attacks, the economic crises of 1997 and 2008, and the haze in recent years. It has become a fundamental aspect of what makes us Singaporean and is shown in the things that we do on a daily basis—whether it is by fulfilling National Service duties, volunteering in Civil Defence activities, working hard and contributing to a strong economy, strengthening community ties with one another regardless of race and religion, or staying committed to defending the country.23

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20 *Straits Times*, 2020.
23 Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2020d.
Forecast Trends

The Total Defence policy continues to enjoy great success in Singapore. It appears endemic to how the entire population protects itself and its nation. The inclusion, in 2019, of a sixth pillar focused on Digital Defence demonstrates that the government at least believe it is a very effective way of engaging the entire national base in defence activities.

A Greener SAF

In line with the Economic Defence pillar through which environmentally sustainable practices are promoted, and consistent with the whole-of-nation response to tackle climate change impacts such as rising sea levels, MINDEF and SAF are working closely with relevant agencies on coastal adaptation. Singapore’s first polder development at Pulau Tekong comprises a dike, which protects the reclaimed land from the sea, and a network of drains and pumps to keep the land dry. The tracts of land created, which are below sea level, are to be used for Army training. If this proves successful, the model and template will be used for other areas in Singapore. 24

MINDEF and the SAF also provide public information notices to demonstrate what ‘green’ initiatives they are contributing to. They publish flyers detailing how certain initiatives are seeking the development of eco-friendly infrastructure with a focus on sustainable design, construction and operations, as well as others utilising hybrid vehicles and food waste management. 25

While this is perhaps outside normal mobilisation planning considerations, it demonstrates that the SAF must be consistent with its behaviour and thinking outside its own organisation—contributing to the resilience of the environment.

Towards a World-Class, Next-Generation SAF

In Singapore’s restructuring efforts to keep pace with the evolving threat landscape, a number of additional initiatives are being developed that will support training for more complex conventional operations on a much larger scale. Through its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Australia, training facilities in Shoalwater Bay and Greenvale are being built to provide the SAF with modern instrumented training ranges such as Combined Arms Air-Land Ranges and Urban Operations Live Firing facilities. These will cover an area approximately ten times the size of Singapore. According to a speech by the Minister of Defence, ‘When these facilities are completed, the SAF will be able to conduct integrated training across all three Services, involving up to 14,000 personnel annually, and over a period of up to 18 weeks’. 26

26 Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2020c.
In December 2019, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper was signed to establish a fighter training detachment in Guam. The RSAF plans to deploy F-15s, F-16s, and supporting assets such as the Gulfstream 550 Airborne Early Warning to Guam for training. The airspace around Guam, together with training facilities, will allow the RSAF to conduct larger-scale, more complex, and realistic Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground training.

Singapore has also stated concern over more nontraditional operations, such as grey-zone threats, and low-level terrorist attacks and has reported that the SAF has compiled a range of such grey-zone threats and options available to respond for each. However, to date, no details as to what these comprise are available.27

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27 Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2020c.
3. Case Study: Finland

Country Overview

Finland inhabits a precarious geopolitical position on the frontier between the European Union (EU) and Russia, with its small population of only 5.5 million (making it the 25th most populous nation in Europe) and limited governmental resources needing to secure a vast, complex territory of around 338,455 square kilometres (130,678 square miles). This includes everything from the major city of Helsinki—home to around a third of Finnish citizens and economic activity—to remote Arctic regions, vast taiga (boreal forests) and lakes, and an extensive coastline and mix of populated and unpopulated islands in the Baltic Sea, including the autonomous region of the Aland Islands archipelago.

Finland is a Nordic welfare state, in which the state takes responsibility for health and social services, social policy, and social security.¹ Rights to a life of dignity and the essential means of subsistence and care are enshrined in the constitution, which sees the rigorous maintenance of civic structures, welfare, and social policy as part of the social contract (with citizens, in exchange, obligated to serve the national effort through military or civil defence). This social contract includes education, employment, housing, income, and social protection for the entire population.² The country enjoys high rates of equality between citizens and genders, along with high levels of education and employment, contributing to a strong, stable, and cohesive society.³

‘Psychological resilience’ is a key theme of the 2017 Security Strategy for Society and one of the Finnish Government’s seven recognised Vital Functions for Society, which details its total defence concept, discussed below. This psychological resilience entails bolstering individual citizens’ will to fight or endure hardship, and potentially invoking emergency powers of the types described in the previous section to ensure that the basic needs of the population are met in times of crisis. Alongside these direct measures, the Strategy also emphasises the need to reinforce the broader resilience of Finnish social structures ahead of any crisis in the first place; this means building a fairer, better-governed and more democratic society in peacetime conditions, as outlined in Figure 3.1.

¹ Kosonen, Puustinen, and Tallberg, 2019.
Finnish Defence Forces

As of September 2020, the Finnish Defence Forces maintain approximately 30,000 active personnel, the majority of whom are conscripts at any given time. The Finnish Army, for example, consists of 4,000 professional soldiers and 12,000 conscripts. A total of 23,000 conscripts undergo training each year. In a crisis, the Defence Forces can draw on a larger pool of 900,000 reserves, along with 200,000 members of the auxiliary reserve, with around 1.5 million Finnish nationals liable for military service at any one time, representing nearly 30 per cent of the population. Table 3.1 summarises the manpower available to the Defence Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manpower Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military age</td>
<td>18 years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>165, 255, or 347 day terms (compulsory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average 23,000 conscripts annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available for military service</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaching military age annually</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active personnel</td>
<td>30,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve personnel</td>
<td>228,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After mobilisation, the Finnish Army is divided into 32,000 manoeuvrable troops, representing the main strike force; 96,000 regional troops for territorial defence—this is the main bulk of the Army tasked with slowing down the adversary; and a 32,000 strong local force assigned to defend military sites, critical infrastructure, and provide support to the civil authorities. These forces draw upon the wider pool of reservists as required. Professional soldiers constitute only 3.5 per cent of the total manpower, ensuring that Finland will ultimately be defended by conscripts in any major crisis. The total wartime military force of 280,000 represents around 4 per cent of the total Finnish population. Beyond the Army, the Finnish Defence Forces also include the more professionalised Air Force and Navy, which by their platform-centric nature, are less dependent on conscripts as a percentage of overall manpower but can still draw on a sizeable pool of reservists if necessary.

**Finnish Army**

For the Finnish Army, operations are controlled by Army Headquarters in Helsinki. The majority of army units are located in the more populated southern part of the country, although there are some brigades located in the Arctic Circle, the east and the west of the country. The Finnish Army has eight brigade-level units, including the Army Academy. Each of these has some professional soldiers and some conscripts and reserves. Unlike the other six offices, the Army Academy and the Utti Jaeger Regiment do not have subordinate regional offices. The Regional Offices are responsible for conscription in peacetime and for mobilisation planning and execution in times of crisis.

**Finnish Air Force**

The Finnish Air Force trains approximately 1,300 conscripts each year for a variety of air-defence tasks, including training for battlespace management, signals, force protection, ground repairs, ordnance handling, military police, and other functions, along with a limited number of pilot reserve officer roles. The primary Air Force’s capabilities are 64 F/A-18C/D multirole fighters, along with more limited numbers of electronic warfare and transport aircraft. The Air Force has approximately 2,000 uniformed and nonuniformed service members, in addition to around 38,000 reserves.

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7 Szymański, 2017.
11 European Defence Information, undated.
**Finnish Navy**

The Finnish Navy trains around 3,200 conscripts annually, in addition to having a professional volunteer force of around 1,400. It is made up of Navy Command, the naval vessels of the Coastal Fleet, and the coastal jaeger troops of the Finnish-speaking Coastal Brigade and the Swedish-speaking Nyland Brigade.

**Finnish Border Guard**

Alongside the military, there is also the paramilitary Finnish Border Guard, which operates under the Ministry of the Interior and functions across land, air, and sea with responsibilities for border surveillance, crime prevention, maritime safety, search and rescue, and environmental protection, as well as to mobilise for the national defence in times of crisis. It employs around 2,800 people and trains hundreds of conscripts annually in a wide range of roles, from snipers and medics to drivers.\(^{12}\)

**Conscription**

The Constitution of Finland decrees that ‘Every Finnish citizen is obligated to participate or assist in the national defence’. A central tenet of this is Finland’s model of conscription, either for military or civil service. Conscription is mandatory for men over the age of 18 years and voluntary for women over 18, with 16,000–20,000 serving conscripts in the Finnish Defence Forces each year.\(^{13}\) This is backed by a large reserve component and mobilisation system, which has undergone reforms in recent years to decrease mobilisation timelines and increase combat readiness.\(^{14}\)

**Funding**

Mobilisation capabilities and defence spending were high before and during the Cold War, and—despite some funding cuts—they have remained comparatively high even after the Soviet Union’s collapse. In contrast to most other European nations, including Norway and Sweden, Finland has largely retained the legal, organisational, and physical structures for territorial and civil defence it built up before 1990, with successive governments prioritising development of Finland’s capability to mobilise the whole of society for total defence.

The total Finnish Defence Forces budget for 2019 was €3.1 billion (US$3.6 billion)—representing 1.3 per cent of GDP. This constituted a 9 per cent increase compared to 2018.\(^{15}\) Notwithstanding uncertainty over the long-term economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Finnish defence spending is projected to increase significantly in the next few years to allow for major procurements, most notably the HX Fighter Programme, to replace the Air Force’s...
ageing F/A-18C/D Hornets, and the Navy Squadron 2020 vessel programme. Spending is set to increase by 60 per cent in 2021 to around €5 billion and remain there for 2022 and 2023.\(^\text{16}\)
This should make defence spending more than 2 per cent of GDP in 2021.\(^\text{17}\)

### 2020 Threat Assessment

Throughout the 1940s, Finland fought several wars of national survival against the much larger Soviet Union, contributing to a national identity built around concepts of *sisu* (loosely translated as stoical determination, grit, or resilience) in the face of great odds. More recently, it has been subject to Russian coercive diplomacy, border incursions, espionage, and cyberattacks.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2013–2014 provided a shock both to defence planners and to the political debate in Finnish society.\(^\text{18}\) This catalysed a series of reform initiatives that were launched in 2015 and 2016, aimed at reversing the downward trend in defence spending, accelerating the mobilisation process, and raising combat readiness to respond to new threats.\(^\text{19}\) This was accompanied by the Ministry of Defence sending letters to all 900,000 reservists in 2015, providing updated advice on what would be expected of them in the event of any ‘crisis situation’.\(^\text{20}\)

Finland has not had to activate its full reserve force since the Second World War, meaning that it has not been fully tested; at the same time, Finland has maintained a greater and more sustained focus on the importance of resilience, mobilisation, and civil defence than the large majority of other European nations since the end of the Cold War.

Nevertheless, the latest 2017 iteration of the *Security Strategy for Society* focuses on describing the practicalities of the Finnish model of joint preparedness given rapid changes in society, the security environment, and technology.\(^\text{21}\) It states that the most important role of defence policy is to safeguard national sovereignty, territorial integrity and basic values, promote the population’s security and well-being, and maintain the functioning of society.

Despite not being a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member, Finland cooperates with the Alliance as an enhanced opportunity partner (EOP) and has, alongside Sweden, sought to deepen this relationship in recent years in response to the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea region.\(^\text{22}\) This includes participating in crisis management exercises and joint training, sharing lessons learned on total defence and in responses to hybrid warfare, improving joint situational awareness, and increasing Host Nation Support.

\(^{16}\) IHS Janes, 2020.

\(^{17}\) Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2020a.

\(^{18}\) Easton et al., 2017.

\(^{19}\) Szymański, 2017.

\(^{20}\) Capon, 2015.


\(^{22}\) NATO, 2020.
capacity and it also includes the option of participating in a supporting role in the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF), subject to national decisions. Finland also participates in regional security cooperation through membership of the European Union (EU) and the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) framework.\textsuperscript{23} In recognition of Finland’s longstanding and well-developed mechanisms for addressing ‘hybrid’, ‘grey-zone’, or ‘subthreshold’ threats (threats below the level of open conflict), Helsinki hosts the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) to provide expertise to both the EU and NATO.\textsuperscript{24}

**Planning Model**

Finland’s approach to defence mobilisation maximises its resilience to ‘hybrid’ subversion, coercion or armed attack and deterrence posture. Maintaining a policy of nonalignment and armed neutrality—akin to its neighbour Sweden—Finland not being a member of NATO instead relies on a comprehensive security concept, based on national military service, interagency cooperation, civil preparedness, stockpiling, and other measures to bolster societal and psychological resilience to deter any external aggressor. This concept runs in parallel with diplomatic efforts to reassure neighbouring Russia of Finland’s purely defensive intentions and build mutual trust and bilateral cooperation on issues of mutual interest.

Finland is currently undergoing development of a revised security strategy, with updates to many subordinate policy and strategy documents (e.g., the national defence strategy) expected in 2021. For now, the latest *Security Strategy for Society* highlights three key areas: preparedness, crisis management, and security of supply.\textsuperscript{25} This leverages a mix of policy and legal measures, backed by both defence and civil capabilities, collectively intended to secure what Finland identifies as the Seven Vital Functions for Society, as shown in Figure 3.2.

The *Strategy* provides guidelines on how to safeguard societal functions and emphasises ‘psychological resilience’, whereby communities can withstand and recover from crisis situations. As physical manifestations of resilience, the country safeguards and stockpiles key resources (fuel, food, medical equipment, etc.) and maintains 45,000 civil defence shelters to accommodate 3.6 million citizens. The comprehensive security concept also seeks to share responsibility for defence across society, that is, total defence.

This policy postures defence to perform the conventional roles of safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity and population’s security, while emphasising the risks of novel threats such as climate change, environmental degradation, and cyberattack.

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\textsuperscript{23} A cooperation rather than a command structure, NORDEFCO brings together Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden and aims to strength the participant’s national defence through collaboration on common initiatives.

\textsuperscript{24} For more information, see Hybrid CoE, undated.

\textsuperscript{25} Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2017a.
Figure 3.2. Finland’s Seven Vital Functions for Society

![Diagram of Finland’s Seven Vital Functions for Society]


The ‘Comprehensive defence approach’ includes all the military and civil functions towards safeguarding the country against threats; in particular, coordinating the measures of the public sector, that is the government, state authorities, and municipalities.²⁶

Finland’s current comprehensive security policy is managed by the Security Committee, an interagency body hosted within the Ministry of Defence and formed in 2013. It’s a cross-government committee tasked with monitoring developments in the Finnish security environment and society, as well as coordinating proactive preparations to address any potential manmade or natural threats to the nation.

Responsibilities span the full gamut of security threats and responses, including territorial defence, civil defence, security of supply for key resources and trade, natural disaster, public health and pandemics, and cybersecurity. Finnish total defence involves cooperation between the public administration—for example, there is a Head of Preparedness in each ministry—and the business community, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and the EU and NATO.²⁷

Coordination of defence activities occurs through the Ministry of Defence, whose Security and Defence Committee monitors changes in security circumstances and evaluates necessary changes to security policy, with the Defence Command executing military operations.²⁸

In the event of a major incident or crisis, the president is empowered to invoke emergency powers for up to a year through consultation with Parliament. The Ministry of Defence and Finnish Defence Forces, along with other relevant bodies such as the National Emergency Supply Agency or paramilitary Finnish Border Guard, also have delegated authorities and

contingency plans to begin mobilising forces and resources as needed, depending on the nature and timelines of the threat.

The business community is also involved in security preparedness. Certain sectors are legally required to observe certain security requirements—for example, the telecommunications, transport, energy, and financing sectors. Industry and trade associations are mandated to help members coordinate to address these requirements, as well as share relevant information and good practice. NGOs are included in the security preparedness plan, and the government maintains close links with them, as well as reaching out directly to citizens through official government communications, the use of a reservist database, and increasingly also the novel use of outreach means such as social media.²⁹

Activation

Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991 as amended up to 696/2003) defines emergency conditions that could trigger mobilisation of both Finland’s military and civil defence as

1. an armed attack against Finland, as well as war and the aftermath of war;
2. a serious violation of the territorial integrity of Finland and a threat of war against the country;
3. war or a threat of war between foreign countries and a serious international crisis implying the threat of war and requiring immediate action for the increase of the defensive readiness of Finland, as well as other specific conditions outside Finland having a comparable effect, if they may pose a grave danger to the foundations of national existence . . . ;
4. a serious threat to the livelihood of the population or the foundations of the national economy brought about by hampered or interrupted import of indispensable fuels and other energy, raw materials and goods or by a comparable serious disruption of international trade; and
5. a catastrophe.³⁰

Finland must be able to resist military pressure and respond to large-scale attacks.³¹ In times of war, or when there is a threat of war, Finnish civil defence is activated, in which authorities alert the population, initiate evacuation to shelters, and ready firefighting, rescue operations, and medical care.³² In addition, defence capability is mobilised to repeal violations of territorial integrity and military attacks. The 2017 Security Strategy for Society also highlights the growing salience of novel threats such as climate change, environmental degradation, and cyberattack, including disruption of the Finnish financial system or the function of globalised supply chains upon which Finland’s economy relies.³³

³⁰ Finnish Ministry of Justice, undated.
National mobilisation in a crisis may not be confined to, or even necessarily focus on, the Finnish Defence Forces. Alongside the military reserve and auxiliary reserve, the Finnish Government can also call upon extensive mechanisms for civil defence. These are reinforced through close cooperation with civil society via partnership and security agreements, letters of intent, as well as joint exercises. Private, public, and civil society actors meet frequently to update plans and to practise how to maintain the ‘critical functions of society’ during national crises. This also includes close ties with Finnish business operators, both in defence industry and in wider sectors of the national economy. Outside of the defence and security sectors, emergency powers enable the Finnish Government, in particular, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, to call upon the wider resources of businesses and workers within Finland as needed in a crisis. This requires both public- and private-sector actors to take measures to safeguard security of supply into their planning, operations, and budgets, as well as to ensure the necessary infrastructure, stockpiles, data, and processes for implementation. This cuts across the entire production chain, with the Finnish comprehensive security concept addressing everything from international trade to finance and banking, raw material extraction, local manufacturing, and distribution.

Attributes and Principles—Exercising Mobilisation

Finnish defence doctrine acknowledges that it would be impractical to repulse a full-scale attack across its 1,340 km border with Russia. Instead it seeks to retain control of areas of high strategic importance and use attrition and counterstrikes to wear down invading forces in the countryside. Recognising that there may not always be sufficient strategic warning to enable full mobilisation of the Finnish Defence Forces ahead of a crisis, Finland emphasises capabilities to detect any attack or incursion early on and then delay any adversary’s forces for long enough for the large Finnish reserve to mobilise.

As more professionalised units with reduced reliance on conscripts or reservists, the Finnish Navy and Air Force are on constant alert with at least one navy ship continually patrolling or on instant standby, with another prepared to leave port in hours. The Finnish Air Force combat capability is around 60 F-18 Hornets. Several of these recently upgraded F-18 Hornets always remain armed and ready to take off, with a key aim of the Air Force

35 Salonius-Pasternak, 2017.
36 Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (2018) presents the powers and responsibilities to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment.
38 Salonius-Pasternak, 2017.
being to prevent the adversary gaining air superiority in the opening phase of conflict while the Finnish Army mobilises and deploys to the operational area.\textsuperscript{40}

The Finnish Army was, until recently, fundamentally a training organisation for conscripts and reservists. The recently established readiness forces allow a more rapid dispersal of assets and counterattacks. These units are led by professional soldiers, mainly consisting of conscripts who complete an additional six months of readiness unit training. These units receive additional training on weapon systems, such as antitank weapons, advanced small-unit tactics, urban operations, as well as heliborne insertion and extraction. Some of the readiness units are equipped with Leopard 2A6 tanks.\textsuperscript{41} The key features of the Army’s model for bolstering readiness are outlined in Figure 3.3.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{Figure3.3.png}
\caption{The Finnish Army’s Six Features of Readiness}
\end{figure}

\textbf{SOURCE:} Adapted from Finnish Army, 2020g

In 2017, the Defence Minister, Jussi Niinistö, noted that the time needed to mobilise the Finnish Defence Forces was its ‘Achilles heel’.\textsuperscript{42} Measures adopted to address this deficiency included updating the database of all 900,000 available reservists, doubling the maximum time limits for refresher training and expanding the scale of refresher exercises for reservists to improve skills and tactics (up from 5,000 to 18,000 reservists per year), and empowering the Defence Forces to call up 25,000 reservists for snap exercises without the three months of notice previously required.\textsuperscript{43} The Finnish Army also embarked on a Training 2020 reform programme to improve the process of call-ups, better coordinate with the paramilitary Finnish Border Guard and other armed services, and ‘turn conscript training into an increasingly flexible, upwardly progressive and cost-effective entity that utilises up-to-date tools and methods’.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40} Salonius-Pasternak, 2017.
\textsuperscript{41} Jonsson and Engvall, 2018.
\textsuperscript{42} Jonsson and Engvall, 2018.
\textsuperscript{43} Szymański, 2017.
\textsuperscript{44} Finnish Army, 2020b.
Legislative change was also enacted to the Conscription Act to amend the previous interpretation of legislation that conscripts could not be put in harm’s way. As a result, conscripts who have received sufficient training can now participate in mobilisation to counter threats to territory integrity. This policy also included a decision to extend compulsory military service from 6 to 12 months for some conscripts to provide conscripted manpower for three readiness brigades, offsetting the limitations on combat readiness of a Finnish Army that had traditionally been focussed on training conscripts and reservists rather than on deploying at short notice on actual operations. These newly designated Rapid Response Forces (RRF) are tasked, alongside border guard and air and naval assets, with delaying any armed incursion into Finland long enough to enable the main ground force of 280,000 to mobilise.

By 2017, the Finnish Army was reportedly now able to field ‘thousands of soldiers’ within hours. Mobilisation responsibilities were also delegated from the central organisation to individual units to speed up mustering times, and Finland also examined means of enabling more covert mobilisation in early stages of a crisis; for example, enabling the armed forces to initiate a low-profile and rapid increase in the readiness of certain units ahead of a more visible (and politically contentious) presidential decree on general mobilisation.

Finally, Finland also recognised the increasing need to prepare to receive, support, and coordinate with possible large-scale deployments of international partner forces on Finnish soil in the event of a crisis. This has resulted in increased cooperation with NATO and Nordic partners, including efforts to boost Finnish capabilities for Host Nation Support, enhance interoperability, build and share a common situational picture, and plan and attend joint exercises and training.

Given the finite resources of Finnish defence, some observers argue that ‘the current focus on readiness units and rapid mobilisation units has meant that the training of reservists has been put on the back burner’, potentially with negative consequences for the medium term; others note ‘the possible need for a large-scale readiness exercise to test the whole system rather than, as now, testing it piecemeal in smaller exercises’. Assuming the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic allow, Finland has announced plans to hold such an exercise in 2021 (in part inspired by Sweden’s Aurora exercise, which tests 20,000 personnel from across all three military branches, or by the 2018 NATO-led Trident Juncture exercise in Norway).

**Future Trends**

There are several future trends which are likely to have an impact on how mobilisation planning will be conducted in Finland in the future.

**Fluctuating Support for Conscription Among Young Finns**

While conscription is largely supported by Finnish citizens, this support has mainly come from people over the age of 50 (84 per cent). Support among those under the age of 25 had

45 Jonsson and Engvall, 2018, p. 4.
been dwindling (56 per cent in 2018), but a recent survey (November–December 2019) found that young Finns are increasingly likely to support conscription (over 80 per cent), amid growing concerns relating to the global refugee crisis and international terrorism.\textsuperscript{47} Support for conscription is likely to remain volatile among young Finns, depending on the wider sociopolitical environment.

\textit{Growing Gender Gap in Relation to Military Conscription}

When asked the question, ‘If Finland were attacked, do you think the Finns should defend themselves, under all circumstances, even though the outcome looked uncertain?’, women were more likely to oppose war than men, instead prioritising negotiation and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{48} Women are required only to volunteer for national service, they are not conscripted, but can join as full-time members of the Finnish military. However, reports from female full-time members state they often feel excluded from their units.\textsuperscript{49} Given these reports together with the non-compulsory nature of national service, there is a possibility that women may become increasingly underrepresented in military decisionmaking exacerbating further, any gender gap problems.

\textit{Accession to NATO Remains a (Distant?) Possibility}

Finland remains active in NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiatives, and accession to NATO is an important but controversial political talking point. The majority of Finns (56 per cent)\textsuperscript{50} do not support joining NATO and Russia has stated that it considers accession to the alliance to be a provocation.\textsuperscript{51} However, the case for joining NATO has been made by Finnish public officials.\textsuperscript{52} If Finland were to accede, adjustments would need to be made to defence mobilisation to ensure interoperability.

\textit{Continued Joint NATO Exercises Could Intensify Russian Interference}

NATO Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018 saw Russian attempts to jam signals and interfere with exercises and communications, scrambling GPS signals and posing a risk to military and civilian aircraft in the region. As the evidence provided by Norwegian intelligence did not disclose assessment methods, Russia denied the allegations.\textsuperscript{53} There is a risk that future joint exercises on Russia’s border could escalate such interference, potentially hemming in mobilisation exercises or posing a threat to aircraft.

\textsuperscript{47} Yle, 2020.
\textsuperscript{48} Yle, 2020.
\textsuperscript{49} Yle, 2019.
\textsuperscript{50} Kervinen, 2019.
\textsuperscript{51} Vanttinen, 2020.
\textsuperscript{52} Suoninen and Rosendahl, 2014.
\textsuperscript{53} O’Dwyer, 2018.
4. Case Study: Switzerland

Country Overview

Switzerland is a landlocked country spanning an area of 41,282 square kilometres, with natural defences in the form of the Alps and Jura mountain ranges.\(^1\) The country has a population of 8.5 million, of whom a quarter are foreign nationals. Close to 85 per cent of the population live in urban areas.\(^2\)

Switzerland is a federal state comprising 26 cantons, similar to the Australian states and territories (or U.S. states). Cantons have a fairly high level of autonomy—each canton is sovereign according to the Swiss Constitution—and as such have their own constitutions as well as law enforcement, legislature, and executive procedures. Cantons are further divided into municipalities, which also have a degree of autonomy over their own affairs. However, the Armed Forces, along with several other matters (such as telecommunications, the postal service, foreign relations) are governed at the federal level.

Because of the diversity in culture and governance, ensuring social cohesion is a goal of the federal government, and is enshrined in the constitution. Total defence is a key tenet to developing societal cohesion through the mixing of linguistically and culturally diverse citizens.

To help foster integration in a nation with several linguistic and cultural (e.g., religious) differences and to provide a federal-level pact to protect the cantons against external aggression,\(^3\) Switzerland has been divided into four ‘territorial divisions’. These divisions were previously known as ‘territorial zones’ and had less autonomy.\(^4\) This division partly aligns on linguistic divisions (between the German-, French-, and Italian-speaking regions), but also to provide additional resources at the regional level, highlighting the shift of the military’s activities towards primarily providing support to cantonal civilian authorities.\(^5\)

Swiss Armed Forces

Since the end of the Cold War the Swiss defence system has been continually scaled back. The Development Programme of the Armed Forces (DEVA)\(^6\) has continued this, with the maximum total headcount permissible in the Armed Forces reaching an all-time low (at least in recent times). The costs of maintaining the current defence system, both in terms of personnel and equipment, and the changing nature of the threats are two of the main reasons

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\(^1\) European Commission, 2020.
\(^2\) European Commission, 2020.
\(^3\) Juilland, 2012.
\(^5\) Conseil Fédéral, 2014.
\(^6\) Juilland, 2012.
for this. Despite this, aspects of total defence remain embedded in the military service, which remains compulsory despite referenda, in 1989, 2001, and 2013, seeking to abolish the current system.

The Swiss Armed Forces possesses a small corps of professional soldiers but is mainly a ‘militia army’ composed of volunteers that operates on land but also defends sovereign airspace. Only Swiss nationals can join the Armed Forces. All Swiss men are obliged to undertake military service, while this remains optional for women. Swiss living abroad in time of peace are not obliged to serve but can volunteer for service. However, all Swiss (men) living abroad may be summoned in case there is a need for national defence, as per the Law on the Armed Forces.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of Armed Forces personnel has diminished, due to the various reforms that have been put in place over the years. From numbering over 800,000 individuals in 1989, the number of personnel fell to under 500,000 in 1995, and then again to just over 200,000 in 2005.

As Table 4.1 shows, in 2019 the Swiss Armed Forces comprises 140,304 individuals, of whom 38,768 were reservists. This drop in the number of personnel reflects the regular reforms undertaken by the Swiss Armed Forces to streamline its organisation, reduce personnel numbers, and cut down on costs. Current regulation, under the latest reform which took place in 2018, states that the size of the Armed Forces should be between 100,000 and 140,000.

Table 4.1. Swiss Armed Forces Manpower Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manpower Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military age</td>
<td>19 years of age for male compulsory military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 years of age for voluntary male and female military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>19–34 years of age (males only), 245 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19–36 for subaltern officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19–52 for staff officers and higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available for military service</td>
<td>1,852,580 males, age 16–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,807,667 females, age 16–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fit for military service</td>
<td>1,510,259 males, age 16–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,475,993 females, age 16–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaching military age</td>
<td>48,076 males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annually</td>
<td>44,049 females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active personnel</td>
<td>140,304 (2019) (including 38,768 reservists)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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8 Juillard, 2012.
10 Armée Suisse, 2019b.
11 Armée Suisse, 2019b.
12 Armée Suisse, 2019b.
13 According IHS Janes (2020), active personnel is 3,400 and reserves are 176,800.
Conscription

Once a person turns 18, they become conscripted into military service (or can volunteer for conscription) contingent on passing a series of exams. Individuals may be excluded if they have a criminal record, if they are not allowed to own a firearm, or if they are found unfit for service on medical grounds. If found inapt for military service, individuals may still be asked to take part in the civil protection corps, described below. Once recruited, all personnel first undertake an initial training of around four to five months at a military recruitment school before continuing to attend refresher courses on a yearly basis up until the allocated number of service days have been reached according to individual rank.

Individuals may also refuse to undertake their military service; in which case they have to accomplish civil service that serves the community. They can apply for work in a broad variety of areas such as health care, welfare, environmental protection, agriculture (small or alpine farms), research projects, and development assistance abroad. But civilian servicemen must have the appropriate skills for each type of assignment. This type of service does have benefits for the individual, however, there are strong measures in place to dissuade them from selecting this option: civil service lasts 1.5 times longer than the standard military service of 245 days. Individuals who do not complete their military or civil service in full subsequently pay an additional tax, applicable from the ages of 19 to 37. The tax amounts to 3 per cent of an individual’s taxable income per year, but at least a minimum of 400 Swiss francs (CHF). If a person is found to be inapt, they also have to pay this tax (albeit only partially if taking part in the civil protection corps).

Civil Protection Corps

Men may also be drafted to be part of the civil protection corps, as an alternative to the military. Individuals can also volunteer to be part of the civil protection corps, including women, men who have already completed their military (or civil) service, and foreigners living in Switzerland, if they are between the ages of 20 and 65. People who voluntarily engage in civil protection have the same rights and obligations as required persons, which includes a salary and subsistence.

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14 Conseil Fédéral, 2020c.
15 Armée Suisse, undated h.
16 OFPP, 2015.
17 Wikipedia, undated b.
18 Ch.ch, undated.
19 To be judged inapt, an individual would have to have a criminal record, not to be allowed to own a firearm, or to be found unfit for service on medical grounds.
20 Armée Suisse, undated h.
21 Conseil Fédéral, 2020d.
Individuals within the civil protection corps are allocated a specific function, which includes military staff coordination, support functions (e.g., control shelters, monitor support provision), front-line worker, construction work, inventory management, and cook. These individuals are not accounted for in the number of military personnel. There are 280 civil protection organisations, comprising a total of around 75,000 active members. Around 15 per cent of these organisations are organised at the cantonal level, 70 per cent are at the regional level, and 15 per cent at the municipal level.

Funding

The military has a budget of 5 billion CHF (over US$5.4 billion) for 2020. For the 2021 to 2024 period, the Federal Council is seeking approval from Parliament for a budget of 21.1 billion CHF, as well as 2.7 billion of commitment appropriations for equipment and maintenance of military bases and infrastructure.

2020 Threat Assessment

Defence of the country up to and during the Cold War involved a number of unique initiatives, such as nuclear bomb shelters in all new buildings, and incorporated national critical infrastructures (such as television, radio, and the mail system) under military command by allowing CEOs to take up military functions. But the attention was mainly on resisting invasion. Mobilisation planning began to downscale through the twentieth century and continued through Army XXI reforms (2005–2017) where Switzerland perceived a ‘massive reduction’ of the military threat in Europe. The Swiss threat assessment published in 2019, noted threats were still posed by increased tensions between large state actors, but they were considered less relevant in terms of a direct impact to the country (i.e., invasion) and concerns had shifted towards internal threats, namely terrorist attacks or natural or man-made catastrophes. This meant closer cooperation between the military and civilian authorities in order to respond to any issues or threats was needed.

In addition, while Switzerland may be a small and neutral player on the international scene and not subject to external manipulation seen in other Western societies, these external

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22 OFPP, undated b.
23 OFPP, undated c.
24 OFPP, undated c.
25 According the conversion rate 1 CHF = US$1.08, as of 29 September 2020.
26 Armée Suisse, undated b.
27 DDPS, undated a.
29 Service de Renseignement de la Confédération, 2019.
30 Armée Suisse, undated i; DDPS, 2000.
threats remain likely, especially those posed by influence operations owing to the Swiss
system of direct democracy. Although not directly referenced in the 2020 threat assessment,
this was a concern in the upcoming September 2020 vote put to the public on whether the
Swiss military would be given the funds to buy new combat planes.

There are also growing concerns regarding internal threats to cohesion stemming from
widening political polarisation especially around immigration and widening of social
inequalities. However, these do not impact on mobilisation effort given the mandatory
nature of Swiss military service.

The 2020 national threat assessment highlights five main ongoing threats:

- terrorism, in particular Islamist terrorism
- espionage, which could be used as a manipulation tool or for sabotage
- the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
- attacks to Swiss critical infrastructure, particularly via cyberattacks, which federal
  services and private organisations have been victim of in recent years
- violent extremism from both extreme left- and right-wing parties

Additionally, tensions between Western countries and Russia and conflicts between the
United States and certain countries, such as Iran, continue to be of concern to Swiss security,
due to the potential fallouts of these situations.

Given all this, the Armed Forces have realised it is not possible to manage these ongoing
threats without a mobilisation strategy and it has taken significant steps towards revamping
its defence model.

Planning Model

The Swiss defence model was originally built upon a total defence concept while also
operating under the assumption of ‘armed neutrality’, whereby it does not participate or
take sides in conflicts but maintains a military for self-defence and peacekeeping purposes.

The Armed Forces currently have three goals: protection and security of the country
(including its airspace), its population, and its critical infrastructure. Within these, it has two
overarching tasks: (1) provide help to civilian authorities when requested and (2) promote

32 They may influence, in particular, votes concerning Swiss defence, such as the purchase of new equipment. Confédération Suisse, 2020a.
33 Confédération Suisse, 2020a. In the 27 September 2020 votes, one of the questions posed was whether the
Swiss population accepted that the military should purchase new combat planes for a maximum cost of 6 billion
CHF. This is the second time in recent years that a vote on combat planes has been put before the public; in
2014, the Swiss population rejected a proposal to purchase 22 JAS 39 Gripen for 3 billion CHF. This time they
were successful. See O’Sullivan, 2020.
34 Contrary to these concerns, a controversial right wing proposal calling for the suspension of the free
movement of people accord was clearly rejected. See O’Sullivan, 2020.
35 Confédération Suisse, 2020a.
36 Juilland, 2012. Total defence pertains to a whole-of-society approach to undertaking national defence.
37 Armée Suisse, undated h.
peace.\textsuperscript{38} The provision of help to civilian authorities can be divided into three further subcategories. Help is provided

- when a serious threat to the internal security of the country presents itself which civilian authorities cannot address on their own, which includes defending the sovereign airspace, protecting the population, or providing additional manpower
- for large-scale (i.e., national or international) events taking place in Switzerland
- when necessary in case of a disaster (whether man-made or natural), in Switzerland or abroad.\textsuperscript{39}

The categorisation of the areas in which the Armed Forces expects to provide support is provided in Table 4.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Type</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent service provision</td>
<td>Support provision to law enforcement authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain and develop defence capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uphold air space sovereignty and police Swiss air space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipated service provision</td>
<td>Support to civilian authorities (e.g., security assistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support provision externally and humanitarian help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonforeseeable service provision</td>
<td>Support to civilian authorities in cases of serious threat or disaster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Armed Forces can provide support to law enforcement authorities only if it is within the public interest and the civilian authorities are not able to perform their duties due to a lack of personnel (including the inability of civil protection units to provide support), materiel, or time. The framework of the support is determined by the civilian authorities, in agreement with the Federal Department of Defence, Protection, Population, and Sports (Département Fédéral de la Défense, de la Protection de la Population et des Sports; DDPS) or the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{40} When troops provide support to law enforcement authorities, they are regulated by the law on the use of police authority (called the ‘use of restraint’).\textsuperscript{41}

**Coordination**

Depending on the severity of the event, different mechanisms are put into place to coordinate intervention processes. For what is termed as ‘major events’, which include wider regional issues such as a large-scale fire, train incident, or large traffic incident, civilian

\textsuperscript{38} OFPP, 2015.

\textsuperscript{39} Armée Suisse, undated f. ’Promotion of peace’ generally refers to external peace operations, such as in Kosovo, with the participation in KFOR, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Source: House of Switzerland, 2020.

\textsuperscript{40} Conseil Fédéral, 2020c.

\textsuperscript{41} Conseil Fédéral, 2018.
protection is invoked. This comprises five bodies: police, fire crews, health care services, technical services (e.g., for evacuation, supply of water and energy), and the civil protection corps.

For what is termed ‘larger catastrophes and urgent situations’, which include natural disasters (e.g., earthquake, heatwave, flooding) or man-made disasters (e.g., terrorism, pandemic, large scale social unrest), and where local bodies do not have the resources or the means to address the issue, civil protection actors, the Armed Forces, and private businesses work together to address the issues. This is summarised in Figure 4.1.

**Figure 4.1. Approach Taken in Case of Major Catastrophe and/or Urgent Situation**

Under the DEVA, the mobilisation of troops has been reinstated, in order to solidify the way in which the Armed Forces provide support to civilian authorities, and to increase the availability of troops. The new mobilisation guidelines also regulate the mobilisation processes and how various competencies are distributed between the federal level, the cantons, the municipalities, and individuals. The new approach to mobilisation has already been put underway, and is intended to be fully operational in 2021. This new approach is described in more detail in the Activation section next.

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42 This includes owners of critical infrastructure, such as energy, water, waste management, transport, and communications.


44 Scherly, undated.
Switzerland also established, in 2010, the National Security Network (NSN). The NSN was put into place to ensure federal-level oversight during national crises between the federal government, cantons, and municipalities, rather than act as a tool to manage crises. This was done by the Federal Council as it had noticed gaps in how cantons and federal structures were set up to respond to urgent situations or catastrophes. The NSN also helps coordinate the implementation of federal-level cybersecurity at the cantonal level.

**Activation**

**National Mobilisation**

Under the DEVA, the new mobilisation plan seeks to ‘fundamentally improve the availability of the Armed Forces’. Under this new system, up to 35,000 personnel could be mobilised in ten days. Different types of personnel would be mobilised according to a four-level prioritisation, shown in Figure 4.2, with the aim being to mobilise at the next level if the current level of mobilisation does not suffice.

![Figure 4.2. Swiss Mobilisation Process, as of 2018](source)

SOURCE: Adapted from Armée Suisse, 2018a (author’s translation).

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45 Parlement Suisse, 2016.
46 Le Nouvelliste, 2013.
47 Parlement Suisse, 2016.
48 Armée Suisse, 2019a.
49 Armée Suisse, 2019a.
Mobilisation is undertaken should civil authorities request the help of the Armed Forces, such as in cases of protecting the country, its population, and its critical infrastructure, or if ‘active service’ (i.e., defence of the nation) is requested by the Federal Council. In the event that more than 2,000 troops are needed, or the support of the Armed Forces is required for more than three weeks, this requires the approval of the Swiss Federal Assembly.

This makes use of the various options which individuals can use to undertake their military service. One option is to attend refresher courses on a yearly basis, until the mandatory time has been served. A second option is to complete the military service all at once (‘long-term military service’).

Individuals are also asked to indicate their availability, which allows the formation of high-availability militia (MADE), which can be summoned within 24 to 96 hours to help civilian authorities. Limited details are available regarding MADE, but it includes at least five logistics battalions and one transport battalion.

With regard to the logistics of mobilisation, the necessary equipment for MADE troops is decentralised, across five logistic hubs (as of June 2019) in order to ensure that troops can access equipment rapidly when mobilised. Equipment for regular troops are not subject to availability rules, and therefore are not immediately available. When mobilised, the logistics hub is able to equip ten battalions (approximately 600 to 800 personnel) per day.

An automatised mobilisation alert system is used, called the eAlarm. The system sends an automatic text or phone call to the relevant troops. Individuals then need to confirm receipt of the alert. Specifically, there are four phases within the new mobilisation process, which applies to all parts of the Armed Forces:

1. The Operations Command triggers the start of mobilisation. Troops not currently in service are alerted via SMS, email, or phone call. Other ways through which to raise awareness around mobilisation includes broadcasting messages on media channels (e.g., radio and television) and via the siren system. Once alerted, troops are required to attend the assigned military base either as specified in the alert, or as rapidly as possible.
2. Once on base, units self-organise according to the instructions provided by the central command. This includes setting up and securing the base as required by the situation.
3. Assigned troops fetch the necessary equipment that has been allocated to them from the nearest logistics hub, before returning to the base with the necessary material and vehicles.
4. The entire mobilisation process is meant to take place within a 24-hour period, after which troops are ready to await further instruction on the deployment to respond to the crisis. MADE troops are the exception in that they will likely move straight from the mobilisation preparation to the area of operations, meaning that they can be on the ground in the space of 24 to 96 hours. 59

Attributes and Principles—Exercising Mobilisation Plans

National Security Network Exercises

To test how well the NSN functions, it conducted two exercises in 2014 and 2019, around risks and threats that Switzerland may face, and how it responds to them. The 2014 exercise included all cantons, the seven federal departments, the military, crisis management organisations, and private companies, and ran for three weeks in total (albeit not continuously). The first part of the exercise was coordinated in a decentralised manner in the cantons, then, in the final week, it was coordinated in a centralised manner at the federal level. The 2014 scenario focussed on a lack of electricity at the same time as an influenza pandemic. 60

The 2019 exercise included similar participants, namely federal and cantonal organisations (including the military), as well as representatives of towns and critical infrastructure, bringing together 2,100 participants. 61 This exercise was again decentralised, meaning that participating individuals took place from their usual workplace, and lasted 52 hours. The 2019 scenario focussed on dealing with a terrorist attack at Zurich’s train station, causing paralysis of the Swiss rail network, widespread food poisoning, the presence of an unknown plane in the Swiss airspace, and a large amount of migration flows in the south of the country. 62 As part of this scenario, the Armed Forces was prepared to mobilise up to 8,500 troops. 63

Overall, these exercises helped locate areas where coordination could be improved, ensure cooperation is effective, and enable all relevant actors to prepare for a range of hybrid threats. 64 The NSN is complemented by the Conduct of Strategic Exercises (CSE), a strategic and federal-level crisis management exercise which has operated since 1997. 65 Each exercise is evaluated with lessons learnt captured and recommendations put forward.

60 ERNS, 2015.
64 Käser and Wigger, 2019.
65 Chancellerie Fédérale, undated. Other more specific exercises exist, such as in the nuclear domain. See DDPS, 2017.
The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic prompted the largest mobilisation of the Swiss Armed Forces since the Second World War.\textsuperscript{66} In mid-March 2020, the Federal Council started taking exceptional measures to protect the population, in line with the actions taken by other European countries (i.e., closing bars, restaurants, shops, border controls, etc.). In addition to these, the Federal Council approved the use of the Armed Forces—up to 8,000 troops—in order to help the cantons deal with the pandemic, due to the lack of capacity by civilian authorities to manage the extent of the situation.\textsuperscript{67} This included, as per their mobilisation process or plan, professional staff, long-term military personnel, attendees of refresher courses/recruitment school, and certain MADE troops.\textsuperscript{68} It was within the remit of the Federal Council to lengthen the service time of long-term military personnel, attendees of refresher courses/recruitment school, and MADE troops to ensure that they would remain mobilised within the time imparted (30 June 2020)\textsuperscript{69}—this was invoked by the Federal Council a couple of weeks after the start of mobilisation.\textsuperscript{70}

The Armed Forces were approved to help in hospitals, with logistics, and with security issues, as the government foresaw that civilian authorities would need the additional support. The use of these troops was enabled until the end of June 2020.\textsuperscript{71} In total, around 6,000 troops were mobilised, providing 320,000 days of service during their mobilisation period.\textsuperscript{72}

The mobilisation of the troops followed the mobilisation plan with the troops in regular service, that is, the professional staff, long-term military personnel, and attendees of refresher courses and recruitment school being mobilised first. In addition to that, MADE troops were also mobilised, including four health care battalions and five sanitation companies.\textsuperscript{73} As the situation evolved, so did the mobilisation effort; as the need for personnel lessened over time, as civilian authorities progressively gained control over the virus, specific troops were disbanded.\textsuperscript{74}

Despite being demobilised, these troops had to remain available in case there was a need to provide immediate support.\textsuperscript{75} The decision to let personnel go was based on civilian and personal factors. Individuals working in small and medium sized enterprises, holding a key

\textsuperscript{66} Robinet-Borgomano, 2020.
\textsuperscript{67} OFSP, 2020.
\textsuperscript{68} OFSP, 2020.
\textsuperscript{69} OFSP, 2020.
\textsuperscript{70} OFSP, 2020.
\textsuperscript{71} OFSP, 2020.
\textsuperscript{72} Armée Suisse, 2020a.
\textsuperscript{73} OFSP, 2020.
\textsuperscript{74} Hug, 2020b.
\textsuperscript{75} Hug, 2020b.
role as part of what is called the national ‘economic supply’, working in critical infrastructures, with care duties, or with upcoming exams were prioritised.76

In addition to the Armed Forces, civil protection units were also mobilised during the pandemic. Following on several days after the military, 24,000 people were mobilised as part of civil protection.77 Civil protection mobilisation was carried out at both the federal and the regional level. At the federal level, the Federal Council enabled up to 850,000 days of service by civil protection units until the end of June 2020 and made 23 million CHF available.78 As required, the relevant steering bodies coordinated the civil protection units at the regional level and cantonal level. These units helped civilian health care services, focusing on reducing their burden, and helping with the set-up of emergency hospitals and logistics. In total, the civil protection units contributed 300,000 days of service nationally during their mobilisation period.79

**Group of Eight (G8) 2003 Meeting**

In 2003, the G8 meeting bringing together the heads of state from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom (UK), and United States was held in Evian, France. Due to the proximity with Switzerland, and the large-scale demonstrations that usually accompany G8 meetings, France requested support from Switzerland regarding the event’s security.80 Security provision is first and foremost a cantonal matter; however, the three cantons bordering Evian (Geneva, Vaud, and Valais) requested assistance from the Confederation given that the effort required to provide this support would exceed the resources available in the cantons. This, in addition to the security risks and the high-profile nature of the event, led the Federal Council to request a mobilisation of the Armed Forces, under the ‘security assistance’ principle.81

The Federal Council requested 4,500 troops between 22 May and 5 June 2003; given this was above the threshold of 2,000 troops, it was put to vote at the Federal Assembly before it could be approved.82 The role of the Armed Forces was mainly to work behind the scenes, so as not to militarise the event; they provided assistance to the cantonal police forces, transport support, medical services, and security provision at the airport and to diplomats.83

76 Hug, 2020b.
77 Armée Suisse, 2020b.
78 Armée Suisse, 2020b.
79 Armée Suisse, 2020b.
81 This fell under the Armed Forces policy ‘Army 95’, which differs from how mobilisation is currently undertaken under the DEVA (the latest policy).
Future Trends

There are several future trends which will have a likely impact on how mobilisation planning will be conducted in Switzerland in the future.

Military Service Is Increasingly Seen Through an Economic Lens

Employment priorities may come into conflict with mandatory military service, as companies in Switzerland must accommodate this military service which they consider places them at a disadvantage compared to international competitors.

Stresses on the military budget have seen the DEVA to reduce the regulatory size of the Armed Forces and the number of compulsory military service days. While this might appease employers, military heads have stated that the number of troops cannot be reduced further; otherwise the military would not be able to maintain its current levels of operability.

Difficulty in Recruiting and Retaining Personnel

The option for individuals to undertake their national service in a number of ways is having a detrimental effect on the preparedness of the Armed Forces and its number of personnel. There are also difficulties in recruiting specialist roles, including cooks, drivers, and military doctors. More stringent conditions to opt for civil service were refused by the National Council in June 2020, meaning that this will remain an issue for the Armed Forces in the years to come, unless an alternative approach is found.

Changing Priorities of the Armed Forces

Since 2002, the Armed Forces have been tasked to provide greater support with ‘general protection tasks’, supporting organisations such as the police or border guards in providing security. There is a more regular use of the Armed Forces at the cantonal level to help with small-scale disasters rather than any conventional threat. As most of the military’s recent interventions have been focussed on civil protection, the value of a traditional military is being questioned. However, according to the latest opinion polls, 77 per cent of people polled

84 Mannitz and Hass, 2009.
85 Curiale, 2015; Mannitz and Hass, 2009.
86 Armée Suisse, 2019a.
89 Armée Suisse, 2018b; 24 Heures, 2019.
90 Parlement Suisse, 2019.
92 Wurz, 2013.
believe that Switzerland must possess a military force (slightly down from 2019, where 79 per cent were in favour). 

**Greater Focus on Cyberthreats**

Several years ago, an internal audit by the government highlighted the vulnerability of the Armed Forces to cyberattacks; indeed, until recently the Armed Forces did not have dedicated cyber defences. Given the previous cyberattack on the Swiss defence company RUAG in 2015, Switzerland knows it remains vulnerable and a second national strategy to protect Switzerland against cyber risks was enacted from 2018 to 2023; a Cyber Defence Campus was created in 2019, which brings together the DDPS, industry, and academia; and an action plan will be put into place in 2020 to ensure the protection of the Department against cyberattacks.

The Armed Forces have invested in the necessary infrastructure and resources to protect itself, resilient to disruption, in operations. Access to this disruption-resilient infrastructure by other authorities and operators of critical infrastructure can be made in crises. As such, the Armed Forces, when developing their cyber capability, ensure that integration with the civilian sector, and other authorities is possible. This approach is likely to continue, with the Armed Forces focusing more on cyber; this is currently showcased through the Armed Forces, a ‘cyber company’ created in 2018 offering cyber training to new recruits.

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93 Based on around 1,200 people.
94 Gain, 2019.
95 Woeldgen, 2019.
96 DDPS, undated b.
98 Armée Suisse, undated k.
5: Case Study: Sweden

Country Overview

Sweden is a Nordic European country spanning 438,574 square kilometres, the third largest country in the EU.¹ The Baltic Sea borders its 2,700 kilometres–long southern coast and the Scandinavian mountain range spans its western border with Norway.² Sweden’s 10.3 million inhabitants are unevenly spread across its territory, despite its average population density of 25.4 inhabitants per square kilometre, and are increasingly moving towards urban densely populated areas.³

Sweden is a monarchy but the king, who is head of state, does not enjoy political power. The prime minister is appointed by the speaker of the parliament, Riksdag.⁴ At the regional level, there are 21 counties in Sweden, run by elected regional councils as well as regional government authorities, the county administrative boards. Health and medical services are primarily the responsibility of the counties’.⁵ Each county is comprised of several municipalities, there are a total of 290 municipalities in Sweden. This local level of government is run by a municipal council elected by the population which is responsible for the appointment of the municipal board that executes local decisions.⁶ Municipalities have prerogative over locally provided public services such as schools, social services, and elderly care.⁷ The population elects the representatives to the abovementioned levels of government every four years in a direct vote. Non-Swedish residents can vote for the local and regional elections.⁸

Sweden is an open country that has a long history of immigration and multiculturalism, which has been an integral part of modern Sweden. However, social cohesion and equality are also key concerns of the Swedish government in order to ensure a strong will to fight and support for total defence—particularly in ensuring trust between the government and its citizens, which is a central tenet of Swedish public administration.

The importance of social cohesion and citizen support for total defence also has a long history in Sweden and was an integral part of Swedish total defence during the Second World War and the ensuing Cold War period, which is shown by the prominence of psychological defence in the Swedish total defence model. Up until 2008, the Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence was responsible for the monitoring and

¹ European Commission, undated.
⁴ Government Offices of Sweden, undated a.
⁵ Informationsverige.se, 2020.
⁶ Government Offices of Sweden, undated c.
⁸ Government Offices of Sweden, undated b.
influencing of opinion—particularly foreign interference—and psychological defence was historically also considered one of three total defence pillars alongside economic and military defence. The board, originally established in 1954, was then incorporated into the MSB and the wider responsibilities for psychological defence outsourced to other government agencies with an information responsibility.  

Swedish Armed Forces

The Swedish Armed Forces comprise three service branches: the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which are supported by shared and pooled capabilities such as training, logistics, command and control, as well as intelligence. The Home Guard and the National Security Forces are also a part of the Armed Forces organisation. In peacetime, the Swedish Armed Forces are present in more than 70 different locations across Sweden. The Armed Forces currently comprise 22,700 staff supported by 32,400 part-time, reservist, and Home Guard personnel, as shown in Table 5.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>9,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military staff</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian staff</td>
<td>8,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Guard</td>
<td>20,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time military staff</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve officers</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>55,100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Conscription

Conscription was introduced in Sweden in 1995 and applies to everyone between the ages of 16 and 70 who lives in Sweden. Following the government’s decision in 2010, both men and women are obliged to serve, and service may be completed in any of the following three forms, which may involve carrying weapons in battle, traditional military service, or helping in major accidents or natural disasters:

- conscription into the Armed Forces
- civil conscription into organisations controlled by the government
- general national service serving an organisation that must continue to function within a state of heightened alert. This may mean that an individual continues to do their normal job, is placed in a voluntary organisation or tasked to other work of importance to Sweden’s total defence.

Minors (those under the age of 18) are exempt from armed combat and may be assigned other tasks, such as showing the way to shelters or the like. Anyone who refuses to perform

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compulsory military service can be sentenced to a fine or imprisonment for a maximum of one year. In the event of heightened preparedness, the upper limit for refusing to perform compulsory military service is four years’ imprisonment.

On 2 March 2017, the government decided that conscripts would be obliged to complete enlistment and basic training with military service.

Table 5.2 summarises the manpower available to the Swedish Armed Forces, but it should be noted that the Government can mobilise all Swedish citizens aged 16–70 at a state of heightened alert, as well as to support of private businesses.

Table 5.2. Swedish Armed Forces Manpower Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military age</td>
<td>16–70 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available for military service</td>
<td>3,020,782 males, age 18–47 (2017 estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,760,451 females, age 18–47 (2017 estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fit for military service</td>
<td>4,980,592 males, age 18–47 (2017 estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,649,875 females, age 18–47 (2017 estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaching military age annually</td>
<td>58,937 males (2017 estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56,225 females (2017 estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active personnel</td>
<td>22,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve personnel</td>
<td>34,500 Reservists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Swedish Volunteer Defence Organisations

In addition to regular personnel and the Home Guard, the Armed Forces are also supported by the Swedish Volunteer Defence Organisations (Frivilliga försvarsorganisationer), which can support the Armed Forces in specialist assignments, personnel, and education and training activities. There are currently 18 volunteer organisations with approximately 350,000 members.¹⁰

2020 Threat Assessment

According to the 2019 Swedish Security Service Yearbook, Sweden is targeted by several threats: terrorism, and more specifically Islamist or right-wing terrorist attacks; violent extremism; intelligence, and influence operations conducted by hostile states or Swedish nationals related to these countries; cybersecurity attacks on Swedish critical infrastructure; and the increased likelihood of armed conflict.¹¹

While Sweden considers a separate armed military attack directly targeting Sweden unlikely, it concedes that crises or incidents—including those involving military force—may

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¹⁰ Swedish Armed Forces, undated.
occur, and the threat of military attack could never be ruled out, citing Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine following the Russian annexation of Crimea as a demonstration that the risk had increased.\(^\text{12}\) Reports from August 2020 indicate that Sweden may be well founded in its vigilance here as it responded to Russian and Western (NATO) military operations in the Baltic Sea at [levels] ‘not seen since the Cold War’.\(^\text{13}\) In response, Sweden is reported to have lifted its military readiness for the first time since 1991.

Another report from the Swedish Defence College illustrates an increased range of different events since 2015 including:

- a number of large forest fires that triggered significant crisis management/emergency response operations in 2015 and 2018
- increased concerns of terrorist activities in Sweden and the terrorist attack in Stockholm in 2017
- a large IT-security incident at the National Transport Authority where the management of a database of all vehicle information and key infrastructure information (including police, military, etc.) was outsourced to IBM in the Czech Republic whose staff did not have clearances
- the migration ‘crisis’ of 2015, which forced Sweden to introduce additional border security checks (particularly at the Swedish–Danish border).

The government remains keenly aware of Sweden’s dependence upon global digital transformation not only for its own information and communication purposes but also the opportunities it offers in terms of employment, innovation, efficiency, and growth in Sweden. Being hacked for fraudulent or espionage purposes remained the highest perceived threat in Sweden in 2018.\(^\text{14}\) Such fears prompted a reissue in the same year of a pamphlet of the type produced during the Cold War. *If the War Comes*, which was distributed by the Armed Forces from 1941 to 1991, was revised to *If Crisis or War Comes*, and issued to all 4.7 million Swedish households to inform them on modern threats such as terrorism, fake news, and cell phone usage during a crisis and outlining Swedish citizens’ role in total defence.\(^\text{15}\)

**Planning Model**

Sweden operates a total defence model that applies to both planning and crisis or conflict management. Within the Swedish model, total defence refers to all operations required to prepare Sweden for war and includes both military and civil defence.

As Figure 5.1 indicates, Sweden’s military defence is led by the Swedish Armed Forces and supported by several other organisations, including the Home Guard. The Armed Forces are responsible for the traditional defence tasks such as territorial security and defence of the nation. Swedish civil defence refers to the operations of responsible organisations that enable

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\(^\text{13}\) See for example *Moscow Times*, 2020; Keyton, 2020.
\(^\text{14}\) See for example Statista, 2020.
\(^\text{15}\) MSB, 2018.
all of society’s resilience in the event of a crisis or conflict. Civil defence includes work carried out by central government agencies, municipalities, county councils and regions, private companies, and voluntary organisations.

As a result of an evolving threat environment following the end of the Cold War, the emphasis on civilian defence was increasingly replaced by a focus on crisis management, and, therefore, the Swedish total defence model is closely linked to its crisis management structure.\(^\text{16}\) However, the deterioration of the security environment, discussed in the preceding section, prompted the Swedish government to instruct the Swedish Armed Forces, MSB, and the relevant civilian authorities to resume joint total defence planning in 2015.\(^\text{17}\)

**Coordination**

Many organisations are involved in total defence planning and mobilisation, each with their own roles and responsibilities. There are three distinct phases of mobilisation of total defence resources within the Swedish model:

- **total defence planning** (*beredskapsplanering*)—day-to-day operations and planning stage
- **crisis management** (*krishantering*)—responding to large-scale incidents or crisis
- **heightened state of alert** (*höjd beredskap*) or **highest state of alert** (*högsta beredskap*)—mobilisation of total defence in response to threat of war or war against Sweden.

\(^{16}\) Crisis management was historically one part of the civil part of total defence. MSB, undated.

\(^{17}\) Regeringskansliet, 2015.
The foundation of crisis management and total defence mobilisation rests on three fundamental principles of the Swedish crisis management system:

- the **responsibility principle**, which states that the agency or department that has responsibility of a function should also retain that responsibility during a crisis
- the **equality principle**, which states that functions should continue as normal to the largest extent possible during crisis
- the **subsidiarity principle**, which states that decisions should be taken at the most immediate or local level that is consistent with their resolution.\(^{18}\)

In practice, this means that, to the largest extent possible, extant structures, processes, and funding should be used for total defence planning and as mandated by the equality principle, each actor should continue their responsibilities during crisis or heightened state of alert. The coordination of total defence is split into geographical areas of responsibility and civil and military defence coordination:

- Municipalities are responsible for coordination of total defence operations at the local level within their jurisdiction
- County administrative boards are responsible for coordination of total defence activities at the regional level
- National-level coordination responsibility lies with the government supported by central government agencies
- Civil-military coordination is the responsibility of the Armed Forces and MSB, which acts as the main civil coordinator of crisis management and total defence.

In addition to the main coordinating actors, there are also certain government agencies with special total defence responsibilities (**bevakningsansvariga myndigheter**),\(^{19}\) which focus on reducing societal vulnerabilities and improving readiness. The total defence planning activities of the government agencies with special responsibilities are coordinated through six thematic work areas: technical infrastructure; transport; dangerous substances; economic security; geographic area responsibilities; and safety, rescue, and health care.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) MSB, 2019b.

\(^{19}\) These agencies comprise the Swedish Energy Transmission Operator (Affärsverket svenska kraftnät), National Electrical Safety Board (Elsäkerhetsverket), Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen), Public Health Agency of Sweden (Folkhälsomyndigheten), Swedish Social Insurance Agency (Försäkringskassan), Swedish Coast Guard (Kustbevakningen), Swedish National Food Agency (Livsmedelsverket), Civil Aviation Administration (Luftfartssverket), Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket), Swedish Pensions Agency (Pensionsmyndigheten), Swedish Police Authority (Polisen), Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (Post- och telestyrelsen), Swedish National Debt Office (Riksgäldskontoret), Swedish Maritime Administration (Sjöfartsverket), Swedish Tax Agency (Skatteverket), National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen), Swedish Energy Agency (Energimyndigheten), Swedish Board of Agriculture (Statens jordbruksverk), National Veterinary Institute (Statens veterinärmedicinska anstalt), Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten), Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen), Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket), Swedish Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen), Swedish Customs Service (Tullverket).

Total defence encompassing all parts of society, including both the public and private sectors, means that in practice or mobilisation, central, regional, and local government and the private sector must be able

- to meet different forms of open and hidden pressures that can be exerted by various means such as political, psychological, economic, and military
- to increase their ability to identify and respond to intelligence activities, cyberattacks, and information operations against the country, and
- to increase their ability to withstand an armed attack on Sweden by a qualified opponent.

In order to achieve this, a range of joint total defence planning activities to strengthen the planning and mobilisation system have been undertaken. For the Armed Forces and in relation to military defence, the initial activities in support of resumed total defence planning have involved

- planning for support to the Armed Forces by assessing total defence actors’ ability to maintain vital societal functions and provide support to the Armed Forces in a state of heightened alert
- exploring the possibilities and ways of placing individuals across society into total defence roles, preliminary within government agencies with a special total defence responsibility
- exploring supply chain resilience and the Defence Materiel Administration’s ability to ensure security of supply from industry and civil society
- increasing knowledge and ability in the total defence stakeholders through joint meetings, workshops, and training and education efforts
- undertaking total defence exercising, particularly through a national total defence exercise (Totalförsvarsövning 2020)—however, this was partially postponed due to Covid-19.\textsuperscript{21}
- strategic direction, development and maintenance of safe and robust collaboration mechanisms, focussed on digital infrastructure and communications channels.\textsuperscript{22}

In contrast, MSB has focussed on developing its capacity to support relevant actors in the planning for civil defence, including coordination and planning between civil defence actors and the Armed Forces. This has involved three overarching civil defence themes:

- increasing civil defence competence across the civil defence actors (e.g., learning and development, training and exercise, research relating to civil defence), which also includes the development of management methods and decisionmaking support systems for civil defence
- increasing the knowledge and development of secure communications systems for civil defence, particularly to facilitate joint planning and information exchange between civil defence actors and between civil and military defence
- developing the ability of civil defence actors to mobilise its organisation at a time of heightened state of alert (krigsorganisation) and to mobilise its relevant personnel into their civil defence/total defence roles (krigsplacering).\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} Ängshammar, 2020.
\textsuperscript{22} Försvarsmakten and MSB, 2019.
\textsuperscript{23} Klintäng and Dyberg-Ek, 2018.
By the end of 2020, the government is expected to present a defence bill to the parliament proposing objectives for the total defence, revised objectives for the military and civilian defence, and development of the Swedish Armed Forces up to 2030. Furthermore, it will outline a broad range of issues such as security policy, defence acquisition, research and development, skills supply, military security services, cyber defence, and international defence cooperation.

**Activation**

The ultimate decisionmaking power to mobilise total defence rests with the Swedish Government, where distinctions can be made between mobilisation of resources during peace time and during a heightened state of alert.

In peacetime, agencies with total defence responsibilities continuously mobilise their resources within their jurisdiction and area of responsibility (e.g., the Swedish Security Police will mobilise against antagonistic threats to Sweden such as terrorist activities, etc.). Beyond this, the government can also mobilise a variety of resources without placing Sweden into a heightened state of alert, including placing the Armed Forces into wartime organisation, mobilising conscripts or the Home Guard. These decisions can be taken at the discretion of the government if it assesses that there is a risk of war or if there are extraordinary circumstances that fall within the law that would require a mobilisation of total defence resources before Sweden is subject to an act of aggression or is at war (e.g., in order to deter aggression).

Similarly, the government can declare a heightened or the highest state of alert within the same decisionmaking structure. Within a heightened state of alert, the government can mobilise all resources within the total defence structure and leverage a comprehensive set of legislation and regulations in the defence of Sweden. These include the power to intervene and restrict individual and corporate freedoms in several ways, including the ability to requisition private property or services of importance to Sweden’s total defence, impose rationing, and mobilise all conscripts.

**Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic**

The management of the COVID-19 epidemic requires a special mention; it not only illustrates a recent response to a national emergency but it also highlights a response that has set Sweden apart from many countries which opted for population confinement measures and business closures with different degrees. Instead, Sweden did not apply measures to reduce the freedom of movement of its population but merely urged citizens to act responsibly and to follow social distancing guidelines, and respect bans on large gatherings. Indeed schools, gyms, cafes, bars, and restaurants remained open during the spread of the pandemic.²⁴

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A key factor to understand the unconventional Swedish response lies in the legislative framework and the rules set by the constitution with regard to freedom of movement and the independence of government and public authorities.\(^\text{25}\) First, the government is not allowed to declare a state of emergency in peacetime and thus it cannot implement the lockdowns that other countries have established; during peacetime, the constitution guarantees full freedom of movement for Swedish citizens. Second, the constitution mandates that government agencies are independent from the government, which must follow the directives set by the responsible agency in each area. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is the Public Health Agency who has the lead and has set the strategy without the involvement of politicians.\(^\text{26}\) Third, the constitution gives a strong role to local self-government; local authorities have ample competencies on health care, and the power of the central government to overrule such competencies is limited.

Therefore, the prohibition of the use of lockdowns and state of emergency as policy tools, as well as the Public Health Agency taking the leading role in dealing with the pandemic, led the government to rely primarily on information and recommendations to influence the behaviour of the public.\(^\text{27}\) Trust in government and public institutions in Sweden is among the highest of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries,\(^\text{28}\) and the government has relied heavily on the relationship with its citizens to implement self-distancing and self-regulation. In turn, the response of the population has been overwhelmingly compliant with the guidelines set by the government. This stance has also limited the mobilisation of defence forces to assist in the pandemic.

**Future Trends**

The future development and improvement of total defence is currently one of the key priorities of the Swedish government, which also means that there is significant work currently underway or planned in relation to several parts of total defence. These efforts include the following.

**A Revitalised Focus on Supply-Chain Security and Security of Supply**

Historically, security of supply was one of the key areas of Swedish total defence and recent efforts seek to better understand the state of supply across vital sectors and how that would work in a modern crisis or conflict. There are concerns that Sweden is now dependent on imports, potentially using brittle or ‘on-demand’ supply chains, in several important areas

\(^{26}\) The Public Health Agency also coordinates collaboration through the National Pandemic Group with the other four public agencies with competencies in fighting the pandemic: the Civil Contingencies Agency, the Medical Products Agency, the National Board of Health and Welfare, and the Work Environment Authority.
\(^{27}\) Jonung, 2020.
\(^{28}\) Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2016.
such as food, energy and health care. These concerns have been further exacerbated following the COVID-19 pandemic, which prompted supply concerns in relation to protective equipment and drugs.

**Re-establishment and Further Development of National Stockpiling (Beredskapslager)**

One of the proposed solutions for the perceived lack of supply security is national stockpiling (beredskapslager). Sweden, in contrast to Finland, decreased its investment in national stockpiles following the end of the Cold War and now seeks to re-establish the role and importance of national stockpiles for total defence. This includes exploring better ways of working with the private sector and how to ensure that private companies in Sweden can help contribute to total defence and stockpiling.

**Effective Total Defence Communication**

This is being pursued to ensure trust and communication can be delivered to all areas of the Sweden across geographic areas and socioeconomic divisions. There have been concerns about how information from the government is received and listened to in certain areas of the Swedish population, such as low socioeconomic areas or areas with a large proportion of Swedish citizens born outside of Sweden.

**Psychological Defence**

Here the role and future work of the agency for psychological defence is being explored together with how to best understand, track and mitigate information, or influence operations targeting Sweden (including misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, etc.). This includes efforts both from outside of Sweden (i.e., by foreign adversaries) and within Sweden (e.g., by political or extremist groups, etc.).

**Improved Leadership and Coordination of Total Defence**

This relates to the coordination and leadership of total defence activities across all levels of government (e.g., local, regional, and national) and across the civil-military spectrum. As the Swedish total defence operating model relies on many organisations being involved at any one time, clear coordination and leadership is an essential enabler for effective total defence. While there is a strong legal foundation for the total defence model, there may be revisions, refinement, and exercising required to ensure effective total defence in contemporary Swedish society.

Under the direction of the Public Health Agency, defence forces have provided support in the form of staff and materials when required. As part of such support, the Swedish Armed Forces have built a field hospital in Uppsala29 and deployed military medical workers, and

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conscript soldiers have assisted in the collection of self-test kits in a national investigation of
the occurrence of COVID-19 among the population.\textsuperscript{30} As part of Sweden’s total defence
planning and preparedness and at the request of the Swedish National Board of Health and
Welfare, the Swedish Armed Forces have made available capabilities for the transport and
treatment of patients with severe forms of coronavirus.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30} Ångshammar, 2020.
\textsuperscript{31} Jansson, 2020.
6. Case Study: United States

The case study for the United States is presented differently from that of the other countries. While the events for which the U.S. military might mobilise include domestic events such as natural disasters, where it supports local, state, and federal authorities, mobilisation planning in the United States also focuses on how manpower and industrial capacity can be mobilised to support overseas military contingencies. It is acknowledged that this approach is more consistent with how Defence in Australia currently approaches mobilisation, but does differ significantly to that of nations with smaller national bases that must leverage their entire population when operationalising their form of a total defence concept.

However, before discussing these military mobilisation approaches it is useful to note that even as a large nation, the United States institutes key elements of total defence as described in the preceding country case studies. This is most readily observed in the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). Guided by a stated return to principled realism, it identifies four vital national interests or four pillars of national security: (1) protect the homeland, the American people, and the American way of life, (2) promote American prosperity, (3) preserve peace through strength, and (4) advance American influence. These are described in more detail below, together with the roles the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contribute to the pillars articulated in the NSS.

Four Pillars of the U.S. National Security

It is certainly interesting to examine the language used in the NSS. The term vital is used as a descriptor to describe U.S. interests. These interests are organised under four pillars. The use of the descriptor vital is consistent with Finland’s security strategy; ‘pillars’ are what Singapore calls the six components of its Total Defence concept. The inclusion of diplomacy, deterrence, resilience, and values as key tools or outcomes, aligns the intent of the NSS even more so with that of the total defence concepts of the other countries studied.

Protect the Homeland, the American People, and the American Way of Life

This pillar encompasses activities that are focussed on

- defence against weapons of mass destruction
- combatting biothreats and pandemics

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1 In this section, the U.S. spelling of ‘defense’ is adopted, primarily due to the context in which the word is used. As stated earlier however, the Australian spelling of mobilisation is used except where the same word is used in a title or is present in a quotation or citation.
The DHS has responsibility for securing the U.S. homeland. The 2020 Homeland Threat Assessment, which is the first of its kind, as a ‘whole-of-DHS’ report, draws upon sources of information and expertise from across DHS, including intelligence, law enforcement, and operational components, to identify a range of threats facing the United States. These include

- the cyber threat to the homeland
- foreign influence activity in the homeland
- threats to U.S. economic security
- the terrorist threat to the homeland
- transnational criminal organization threats to national security
- illegal immigration to the United States
- natural disasters.5

This list is similar to the threats listed as concerns by the other countries studied in this report. In the United States, DHS aims to mitigate risks to the U.S. homeland by interdicting threats, hardening assets to eliminate vulnerabilities, and enhancing rapid recovery efforts to reduce potential consequences from physical attacks, natural disasters, and cyber incidents. In the United States, the National Response Framework (NRF) outlines that local authorities are responsible for responding to a domestic emergency first, then if more resources are needed local authorities turn to state resources. Then if those state resources are overwhelmed, they turn to federal resources. The U.S. military’s role in domestic emergencies is primarily to support domestic civilian authorities.6

**Promote American Prosperity**

Aimed at revitalising the domestic economy, the United States, through this pillar, is pursuing

- fair and reciprocal economic relationships to address trade imbalances
- sustainment of their lead in research and technology
- protecting the U.S. national security innovation base
- energy dominance.7

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5 DHS, 2020, p. 6.
6 Dunlap, 2017.
**Preserve Peace through Strength**

Here activities are focussed on

- renewing competitive advantages through rebuilding a credible military, the defense industrial base, and space and cyberspace capabilities
- diplomacy and statecraft using tools of national power, to ensure that regions of the world are not dominated by one power militarily, economically, or having values undermined
- nurturing relationships with allies and partners.\(^8\)

Through this pillar, the United States seeks to reinforce its traditional diplomatic approaches by maintaining credible military forces to deter war and protect its security. The most recent National Defense Strategy\(^9\) details how this pillar will be met. It identifies both China and Russia as posing the greatest threats to U.S. security and prosperity, together with other countries such as North Korea and Iran. Beyond the first and foremost objective of ‘defending the homeland from attack’,\(^10\) the remaining objectives are focussed on sustaining strategic (often military) advantages and protecting its vital interests globally and in key regions. In addition, it encourages other countries to assist in maintaining balances of power—shouldering their ‘fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect against common threats’.\(^11\) The 2018 National Defense Strategy, also asserts that a decline in longstanding rules-based international order is ‘creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any (the U.S.) has experienced in recent memory’. Thus, it identifies ‘[i]nter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, [as] the primary concern in U.S. national security’.\(^12\)

**Advance American Influence**

This pillar is focussed on activities that support U.S. interests, consistent with its values.\(^13\) To ensure this, activities include

- competing and leading in multilateral organisations
- being an international role mode by continuing the commitment to liberty, democracy, and the rule of law
- playing a catalytic role in promoting private-sector-led economic growth, helping aspiring partners become future trading and security partners
- remaining a generous nation.

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\(^12\) U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 1.
To inform Australia’s deliberations regarding mobilisation, the approach the United States takes in mobilisation is described next.

Planning Model

DoD Joint Publication 4-05 (*Joint Mobilization Planning*) defines mobilisation as ‘the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war and other emergencies’, as well as ‘the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency’. The 2018 National Defense Strategy requires the development of a more lethal force in order to ensure that the United States can deter or, if necessary, win in the case of a conflict with a near-peer adversary. This requirement, along with mobilisation plans, is further translated into the plans of the military services.

Mobilisation includes assembling and organizing personnel and materiel, activating the Reserve Component, extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces to a state of readiness for war or another national emergency. Within *Joint Mobilization Planning* three subcategories have been defined:

- **Partial mobilization**: expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilise Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security.

- **Full mobilization**: results from action by the Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units and individuals in the existing approved force structure, as well as all retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months.

- **Total mobilization**: based on a decision by the Congress and the President to organise and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security.

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14 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
17 A further category of Selective Mobilization was previously included but has been approved for removal from the DoD dictionary (see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, p. GL-7). Nevertheless, it is still referred to in some illustrations within the same JP 4-05 publication. A definition of this is taken from U.S. Marine Corps, 2019: Selective mobilisation: expansion of the active Armed Forces following a decision by the Congress and/or the President to mobilise Reserve Component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is the result of an enemy attack.
These different levels of mobilisation are associated with different levels of military commitment and are by triggered by different emergency mobilisation authorities. Figure 6.1 provides an illustrative example of the relationship between levels of mobilisation, military commitment/contingency, duration of mobilisation, and the relevant emergency authorities, as defined in Joint Mobilization Planning.

**Figure 6.1. Levels of U.S. Military Commitments**


**Activation**

Most of the discourse on mobilisation of the joint total force if not focussed on readiness issues is focussed on the issue of manpower. In fact, according to U.S. joint doctrine, the United States considers manpower, along with industrial capacity, to be one of the ‘two most critical resources in the mobilization base because of the time and expense involved in developing skilled military and civilian personnel and technologically sophisticated military equipment’. While the total force includes a number of manpower categories, it is the Reserve Component that provides the primary source for augmenting the capabilities of the Active Component, as it maintains and trains based on the national defence priorities.

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18 The term *activation* is consistent with the framework used for this study and as described within the introduction of this report. It is noted in U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018) that the term refers specifically to order to active duty (other than for training) in the federal service. That is not the meaning intended here.

19 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
established by the National Defense Strategy, and is already integrated into the military chain of command.

*Joint Mobilization Planning* also summarises the relationship between levels of mobilisation, types of forces mobilised, and the maximum potential lengths of mobilisation, based on the relevant sections of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.). Figure 6.2 provides an indicative view of this relationship.

**Figure 6.2. Levels of U.S. Mobilisation**

![Levels of U.S. Mobilisation](Image)


Attributes and Principles: Mobilisation of Civilian Resources

The United States has a large and capable government military sector—its Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest federal employee with 1.3 million active service members, 732,000 civilian employees, and more than 811,000 members of the National Guard and Federal Reserves. Throughout history, the DoD has largely relied on its ability to find

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20 For example, ‘Title 10, U.S.C., Section 12304a, authority provides for a short-term (up to 120 days) involuntary mobilization for any ready reserve unit under federal authority to respond to a domestic emergency or major disaster’. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, II-3.

civilian expertise either within the DoD agencies or by contracting outside service providers. However, recent large-scale engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent spike in the need for civilian manpower, as well as the need for new skills in response to technological changes have led to the development of programs aimed at engaging with the skills available in the broader population.

Mobilisation of civilian resources for national defence purposes and protection of the civilian populations gained urgency in the United States after the end of the Second World War. The development of nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union pushed civil defence issues to the forefront of public discussion and, with time, also the national defence agenda. The following sections provide an overview of a selection of aspects related to the U.S. approach to mobilisation of civilian resources for civil emergencies and defence efforts.\(^{22}\)

**Mobilising Civilian Manpower**

Americans may volunteer for the Active or Reserve Components of the U.S. Armed Forces, join DoD as a civilian employee, or work as civilian contractors.

*Joint Mobilization Planning* states that civilian manpower is an integral part of its total joint force policy.\(^{23}\) It further states that in crises, careful management of the civilian workforce is needed, and does not preclude the option that government and contractor employees with critical skills may deploy to the theatre individually or with supported military units.

Military Services’ plans also include aspects that are related to mobilisation of civilian resources. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps’s *Total Force Mobilization and Deployment Plan*, does note the possibility that total force mobilisation would mean a higher demand for personnel, whereby the new personnel requirements would be sources through ‘individual augmentees’ from across the total force. This includes active and reserve marines, civilian USMC employees and recalling retired service members.\(^{24}\) The civilian work force is thus only one of the pools of personnel resources and may be a source for specific skills (e.g., supply operations, transportation, training range management, and law enforcement).

**Contracting as a Means of Mobilising Additional Assets**

Throughout history where the DoD has used contractors to support its military operations, they are specifically defined within the Code of Federal Regulations as ‘any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, or other legal nonfederal entity that enters into a contract directly

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\(^{22}\) This is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of U.S. civil defense, emergency and crisis management, and homeland defense. Rather, it focuses on a selection of illustrative examples that deal with how civilian resources may be mobilised for civil defense, emergency and crisis management, and homeland defense needs.

\(^{23}\) See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, p. IV–6.

\(^{24}\) U.S. Marine Corps, 2019.
with the DoD to furnish services, supplies, or construction’. Thus, the term encompasses both individual contractors and firms. The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-76 also establishes that positions that are deemed to be ‘inherently governmental’ can be fulfilled only by government employees. Nevertheless, using service contractors remains a controversial issue as it is directly related to the delineation of the government and private areas of work. A case in point is the concern expressed by members of the U.S. Congress over the transparency, accountability, and legal issues, specifically in the case of employing armed civilians, as a result of the so-called Nisour Square Massacre in 2007 in Iraq, when employees of the private military company Blackwater Security Consulting killed several unarmed Iraqi civilians.

The use of contracted personnel has increased along with the uptake of more and more sophisticated technology and the DoD’s reduction of its in-house logistics and support following the end of the Cold War. In 2009, it was estimated that contractors constituted 69 per cent of the DoD’s manpower in Afghanistan, and in 2011 in Afghanistan and Iraq contractors constituted 52 per cent of the U.S. DoD’s presence. The Congressional Research Service has assessed the overall average contractor presence in the more recent Afghanistan and Iraq operations to be 50 per cent of the total DoD in-country presence.

Individual contractors were hired for tasks such as intelligence analysis, serving as civilian advisors, doing software development to base maintenance, and transport and security services. Private security contractors were also hired to protect fixed locations, guard convoys, and train police and military personnel. According to 2018 data, contractors in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan tended to be mostly employed in the logistics and maintenance mission category, followed by base support and construction.

Military contractors offer several benefits compared with other means of hiring civilians that are outside of the DoD network:

- a surge capability: the DoD can hire them faster than it can develop an internal capability

26 Also in Cancian, 2019.
27 It should also be noted that contractors supporting contingency operations abroad are considered to be noncombatants and do not have combat immunity under international law.
28 Wolfs 2015.
29 Schwartz and Swain, 2011.
30 Schwartz and Swain, 2011.
31 CRS, 2018.
32 CRS, 2018.
33 Peters and Plagakis, 2019.
34 CRS, 2018.
- quicker deployment: contractors can deploy quickly to provide additional critical support capabilities
- expertise: contractors may provide specialised expertise that the DoD may not have in sufficient numbers (e.g., linguistics, weapons systems maintenance)\textsuperscript{36}
- economic savings in the long run: contractors are hired when the need arises and there is no need to pay for leave entitlements and training
- opportunity to free up military personnel from noncombat roles for combat missions\textsuperscript{37}
- help in counteracting the force management levels set by the executive and legislative branches of the government through the Congress’s provision in the annual appropriations legislation.\textsuperscript{38} At least some experts hold the opinion that external resource limits may have increased the DoD’s ‘reliance on . . . contractor and temporary duty personnel to effectively execute ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.’\textsuperscript{39}
- additional benefits of contracting local nationals, which supports local workforce and contributes to stability.\textsuperscript{40}

However, contracting presents several challenges:

- Ineffective management and use of contractors, ‘prevent[ing] troops from receiving what they need, when they need it, and [leading] to wasteful spending’\textsuperscript{41}
- Lack of investment in the military in terms of training and development
- Depletion of military personnel by their leaving the services and becoming contractors, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the military.

\textit{Mobilising Equipment and Materiel}

Mobilisation also involves materiel and equipment across all classes of supply and mainly deals either with redistributing the materiel and equipment already available to the forces in need or ‘increasing the availability of the materiel and equipment’ to support the forces and the mission.\textsuperscript{42} While joint force mobilisation could include mobilisation of the resources that are already with the military units, battalions and brigades, war reserves and prepositioned military equipment in the case of an operation abroad, it could also include calling for a surge in the industrial base and seeking commercially available items not only from the United States but also from foreign sources.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{36} CRS, 2018.
\textsuperscript{37} Schwartz and Swain, 2011.
\textsuperscript{38} Peters and Plagakis, 2019.
\textsuperscript{39} Peters and Plagakis, 2019.
\textsuperscript{40} Military contractors do not need to be U.S. citizens. In fact, it was reported that in FY 2018, of the 25,239 DoD contractors in Afghanistan, only 44 per cent were U.S. nationals, 42 per cent were third-country nationals, and around 14 per cent were local nationals. Peters and Plagakis, 2019; Schwartz and Swain, 2011.
\textsuperscript{41} CRS, 2018.
\textsuperscript{42} U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
\textsuperscript{43} U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
Transportation is an area where the DoD does have some well-established specialised frameworks for making use of the capabilities residing in the civilian domain, notwithstanding commercial contracting. Examples here include the strategic air- and sea-lift programs, such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), which contractually commits a selection of aircraft of the U.S. airlines to increase the DoD’s airlift capability, and in 2019 had 25 carriers and 433 aircraft. Also the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force, upon the activation of which additional vessels may be obtained from the National Defense Reserve Fleet.

Last, but not least, a key tool available to the U.S. government to mobilise the American industry is the Defense Production Act (DPA). The DPA may authorise the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS) which ‘allows preferential treatment for contracts or orders relating to certain approved defense or energy programs for military production and construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, and stockpiling’. According to DPAS Title 50, U.S.C., Section 4517, ‘the President may provide appropriate incentives to develop, maintain, modernize, restore and expand the productive capacities of domestic sources for critical components, critical technology items, materials, and industrial resources essential for the execution of the national security strategy of the United States’. At the same time it should also be noted that the U.S. government owns and/or operates military production facilities where it does not need to involve DPAS to accelerate production rates or activate standby and laid-away production capacity.

Mobilising Civilian Resources to Respond to Domestic Emergencies

This section highlights how the United States mobilises civilian resources to respond to domestic emergencies.

Tiered Approach to Emergency Response

In the United States, small-scale emergencies are normally responded to by local, state, tribal agencies or with assistance from neighbouring local jurisdictions involving the mutual aid principle. If a local community is not able to respond to the emergency, it may request the state government for help. The state may also request federal assistance either by requesting an ‘emergency’ or ‘major disaster’ declaration under the Stafford Act, or by asking help from individual federal agencies, as in the absence of the president’s declaration of emergency, organisations such as the Small Business Administration, and the Departments of

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44 RAND interview with internal expert, August 2020.
45 Air Mobility Command, 2019.
46 In 2017, for example, 55 companies, 97 ocean-going ships, 303 tugs, and other vessels were authorized under the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2017.
47 Note that Canada’s defence industry is part of the North American Defense Industrial Base and may be included in the United States’ industrial preparedness planning.
48 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
50 FEMA, undated c.
Administration, Health and Human Resources, and Transportation, are able to provide more limited relief. Nevertheless, even after the president’s declaration of an emergency, the state or local authorities may remain in lead of the efforts, with federal agencies providing support and coordination assistance.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is a primary civilian federal agency that assists with disaster response, and its primary mission is to ‘reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards’. FEMA has an important role as a coordinator and organiser of interagency teams and capabilities in response to emergencies. As such, FEMA’s role encompasses preparation for, protection against and response to, recovery from and mitigation of the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, man-made disasters. It is one the lead federal agencies that supports the building of tribal, local, state, regional, national capabilities. In addition to that, its mandate also includes hazardous response capabilities, chemical stockpile emergency preparedness, radiological emergency preparedness, and tools to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards.

FEMA, however, is not the only agency that may be involved in emergency response—other agencies also may have response authority based on the character of the emergency. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has the response authority for oil spills in the U.S. coastal zone, while the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for inland oil spills.

An example of tiered response is that relating to wildfires. The response to wildfires is complex as it depends on whether the fire is on federal, state, local, or private land, and as such does not follow the traditional National Response Framework process. Nevertheless, it is of interest to examine here, especially given Australia’s response to its equivalent—bushfires—have recently been the subject of a royal commission.

The U.S Forest Service assesses that every year about 7,500 wildfires destroy about 1.5 million acres of National Forests and Grasslands, and more than 73,000 wildfires burn around 7 million acres of land every year in total. The U.S. Forest Service is the main responder to all wildfires in National Forests and Grasslands. Its response to wildfires is guided by dedicated policies, specifically the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, its subsequent implementation guidance and the Land Management Plans. Where the wildfire happens on land that falls under the jurisdiction of other federal, state, tribal, or local agencies, the Forest Service takes on a supporting role by providing firefighters and equipment.

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51 FEMA, undated d.
52 Unless the emergency takes place in an area under federal jurisdiction (e.g., in national parks or coastal waters), and with the exception of terrorist attacks. Labrador and Cheatham, 2020. Additional incident response aspects are covered, for example, by the National Response Plan: DHS, undated.
53 FEMA, 2008a.
54 FEMA, undated b.
56 Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020a.
57 U.S. Forest Service, undated.
States may have their own fire service mobilisation plans. For example, the Washington State Fire Services Resource Mobilisation Plan (2018) was required by the Washington State Legislature following the 1991 Spokane Fire Storm. The plan describes the roles and responsibilities, procedures, resources, and compensation principles. The plan illustrates the important role that local jurisdiction and capabilities have in the case of a large fire emergency. As Figure 6.3 shows, the first response comes from local actors and capabilities, and their involvement continues throughout the emergency. If the local jurisdiction is not able to contain the crisis with the resources available, it may evoke ‘mutual aid’ resources (blue) from neighbouring jurisdictions. If necessary, the next step may be taken to request the mobilisation of relevant resources across the state (yellow). The National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) at the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) also has a role in emergency response coordination to wildfires. The Center is a partner to the NRF and facilitates the coordination with such actors as the Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Associate of State Foresters, and various federal agencies. As such, its role is more about protecting communities and their infrastructure, rather than using them as resources to fight wildfires.

**Figure 6.3. Fire Incident Development and Levels of Response in Washington State**

![Figure 6.3](image_url)

**Volunteerism and Crises**

Volunteerism is well developed in the United States, and there are numerous organisations that provide the framework for participation in emergency preparedness, response, and management.\(^{58}\) Table 6.1 illustrates a selection of volunteer organisations that provide members of society with the ability to contribute to emergency preparation, response, and mitigation.

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\(^{58}\) In 2017, for example, 77.34 million or 30 per cent of American adults volunteered nearly 6.9 billion hours through a volunteer organization. National and Community Service, 2018.
Table 6.1. Selected Examples of Volunteer Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description / Main Focus</th>
<th>Membership / Trained</th>
<th>Coordinating Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Radio Relay League</td>
<td>Advancement of amateur radio skills, volunteers support communities in disaster response</td>
<td>More than 160,000 members</td>
<td>National association for Amateur Radio in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
<td>Trains CPR and basic aid skills, volunteer for mass care and sheltering operations</td>
<td>Approx. 372,000 volunteers in 2019</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Corps</td>
<td>Prepare communities for the threats of terrorism, crime, public health via dissemination of informative materials and educational events at schools, workplaces, and places of worship</td>
<td>Network of 1,200 state, local, and tribal Citizen Corps Councils of community leaders</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Air Patrol</td>
<td>Provides emergency services for state, local, and federal government</td>
<td>60,000 members</td>
<td>Civil Air Patrol’s Board of Governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Emergency Response</td>
<td>Disaster preparedness and response skills</td>
<td>Approx. 600,000 people have received CERT training since 1993</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team (CERT)</td>
<td>Support for fire and emergency service departments with nonemergency tasks</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Funded via the DHS, managed via the National Volunteer Fire Council and the International Association of Fire Chiefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Reserve Corps</td>
<td>Coordination of medical skills and interests to help with ongoing public health or large emergency situations</td>
<td>Approx. 175,000 volunteers</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary for Emergency Management &amp; Medical Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Neighborhood Watch</td>
<td>Assistance to law enforcement agencies and their communities with the aim to prevent and reduce crime, and improve local communities</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Division of the National Sheriff’s Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programas de vigilancia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers in Police Service</td>
<td>Local Citizen Corps program allowing their local community members to volunteer to support their local law enforcement agency</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>The International Association of Chiefs of Police in partnership with the Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Over the last twenty years the country’s volunteer spirit has responded to such shock events as the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in September 2001, hurricanes (e.g., Harvey, Irma, Maria, and Katerina), floods and wildfires. For example, FEMA crowdsourced more than 5,400 digital volunteers to collect and analyse images of damage in Puerto Rico, while local
volunteers helped identify and provide assistance to those who were not able to leave.\textsuperscript{59} Similarly, in Texas and Louisiana volunteer individuals formed the co-called Cajun Navy and used their boats to rescue people stranded by the 2017 floods following Hurricane Harvey.\textsuperscript{60}

Despite the above, volunteer organisations and individuals have varied and often limited role in emergency management and disaster response. At times, disaster response efforts are not always able to effectively manage or capitalise on surges of volunteerism around large-scale emergencies.\textsuperscript{61} The FEMA 2017 hurricane season report notes, for example, that ‘seamless integration of public, private sector, and volunteer organization actions to stabilize critical lifelines should be included in the national response architecture’.\textsuperscript{62} Regardless of such recommendations, analysts are concerned that the problem may persist for several reasons:

- Volunteer management is often an afterthought and volunteer organisations, or groups remain not well integrated into emergency response plans and actions.
- It may be challenging to maintain the interest and motivation of volunteers, between disasters, especially as more volunteers prefer to engage with acute disasters.
- Volunteers are aging (most volunteers are retired and over the age of 55), and while this may be countered by infusing volunteer organisations with younger people, for them this may not be the most opportune time in life to volunteer, for both personal and professional reasons.
- Volunteers have increasingly high expectations from their volunteer experience and want to see the impact of their work.\textsuperscript{63}

Following Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria that all arrived in quick succession, the United States experienced an enormous volunteer response. However, the traditional model of recruitment of volunteers via organizations, training, and assignment to tasks could not cope with the sheer magnitude of volunteerism seen at this time. This led to problems in the assignment of volunteers to tasks. For example, in Houston, hundreds of volunteers travelled to miscommunicated locations or were assigned jobs that were already filled.\textsuperscript{64}

Observations

If vital national interests are threatened, federal and military resources may be mobilised in response. Mobilisation, as described in \textit{Joint Mobilization Planning}, may include assembling and organising personnel and materiel, activating the Reserve Component, extending terms of service, surging and mobilising the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the

\textsuperscript{59} FEMA, 2018.
\textsuperscript{60} Wachtendorf and Kendra, 2017.
\textsuperscript{61} FEMA, 2018, p. l.
\textsuperscript{62} FEMA, 2018, p. l.
\textsuperscript{63} IBM, 2018; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine, 2017.
\textsuperscript{64} IBM, 2018.
Armed Forces to a higher state of readiness. Civilians and contractors may also be a part of any mobilisation.

The primacy of local and state level authority is engrained in the U.S. approach to domestic emergency situations, notwithstanding federal assistance and support. Thus, the way a civil emergency is dealt with may differ across localities. No such distinctions exist within the other countries studied, or any such barriers are readily relegated so federal authorities lead and coordinate in large emergencies. The size of these small nations dictates a whole of nation approach. This difference should be of interest to Australia: it is larger than the small nations studied in terms of land area and population, and while it competes with the United States in land area, its population and distribution do not.
7. Mobilising for What Type of Threat?

A primary function of the ADF requires it to be structured for war and against this it requires a clear understanding of the national support resources required for an expanded 'spectrum of conflict' and management of different patterns of escalation.¹

But, as reported in the latest mobilisation review, Defence’s long-held approach towards mobilisation planning is more aligned with what a large country (as big as the United States) would undertake, where a commensurate large industrial base could be drawn from against conventional threats.²

In this section, the two potentially contradictory statements in the preceding paragraphs of ‘an expanded spectrum of conflict’ and ‘against (only) conventional threats’ are addressed first. It would be limiting for Australia to only plan against conventional threats given Defence operations will need to account for the increasing prevalence of grey-zone activities; changes to operational tempo wrought by application of new technologies; and, especially, effects being rendered in the cyber domain.

In examining this expanded spectrum, it is proposed that a risk-based approach to mobilisation may be required. Furthermore, it has been identified that the DSU reflects an approach to grey-zone activities in particular, that is akin to modern deterrence and the opportunities of incorporating mobilisation planning into such an approach are explored.

Grey-Zone Activities

With regards to grey-zone activities, as the CDF himself stated in 2019, totalitarian regimes conceptualise warfare differently along the entire spectrum from peace to nuclear while the West (which includes Australia) has a much sharper distinction more focussed on the kinetic conventional end. Furthermore, such modern political warfare, as practiced by authoritarian regimes, include cyber operations, information campaigns, theft of IP, coercion, propaganda, and a propensity to break international norms, but these modi operandi generally fall short of an Australian conceptualisation of war and generally Australians are reticent to pursue such endeavours, whereas authoritarian regimes use these to subvert, erode, and undermine political standing and—ultimately—the will to fight.³

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¹ This statement has been adapted from a recent paper proposing a New Narrative for the Mobilisation of a Nation (see footnote 6). This paper concluded that outcomes of a framework for National Support developed as part of the 1997 Defence Efficiency Review would achieve such a structured ADF. And central to this framework was mobilisation. Beaumont, 2019.

² Department of Defence, 2020d, Paragraph 26.

³ Campbell, 2019.
All that said, some argue that grey-zone activities are not new, it is simply a new term for statecraft which has been practised over ‘millennia of civilisation’. But statecraft is characterised as a ‘whole of nation endeavour’ which involves, ‘the use of all a nation’s resources in an integrated campaign (short of war) to achieve an objective’. What is suggested is that perhaps we have fallen out of practice, and this is further compounded by new ways in which statecraft is being exercised.

Within the existing Preparedness and Mobilisation doctrine, all stages of mobilisation require similar use of national resources; at stage 3, this is significant use; and, at stage 4, resources are directed through public rather than private sector decisionmaking to maximise the operational effectiveness of Defence capabilities. But again, as reported, while lower levels of mobilisation have occurred since the late 1990’s, ADF operations have called on only narrow elements of Defence industry and some employers of Defence reserves: large-scale, national mobilisation has not occurred since the Vietnam War, nor, as the report further indicates, has the need arisen for Defence to mobilise in other, less traditional ways than that done for the Vietnam War. Thus, just as we have fallen out of practice with statecraft, we have similarly done so with mobilisation. Therefore, as concepts and plans with respect to mobilisation are refreshed there is opportunity to nuance these to encompass an expanded spectrum of operations which includes a resurgence in grey-zone activities. This aligns with one of the objectives the DSU 2020 has listed for Defence to increase its capability to respond to grey-zone activities.

Impacts of New Technology

The character of war is changing, and certainly future war will be typified by compressed space and time. This is being driven by the introduction of technology, from artificial intelligence (AI) that is applied to expedite the ingest and analysis of data and hence decisionmaking, or as a vital component in autonomous systems, through to new weapons systems that can travel much further and faster. The cyber domain is constrained by neither time nor distance and as a recent examination of what cyber operations may comprise and how prepared Australia is for a cyber war, concluded: we have lost ‘our strategic advantage as an isolated island due to Cyber’.

When considering these characteristics, it is no surprise that the recent DSU deemed the ten-year strategic warning time as inappropriate for defence planning. Different events do attract different warning times: a cyberattack will likely have little to no warning time, whereas an invasion of mainland Australia should still afford some time warning. But against cyberattacks there is a need for persistent surveillance and poise, ready to counter strike—

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5 Burke, 1959, art. 2.
6 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP), 2013.
7 Department of Defence, 2020e, Paragraphs 8 and 9.
8 Department of Defence, 2020c, p. 25.
9 Department of Defence, 2020e.
whatever that may comprise in cyber—when required. This requires ongoing, consistent investment, such as so-called evergreening approaches, that allows capability investment to keep pace with technology development. These are very different from the current Defence investment processes but are being introduced gradually into information and communication technology projects where the rate of technology development is high.\textsuperscript{10} At this stage, little to no consideration has been given to the impacts on mobilisation with such approaches.

There may not be a requirement to respond (instantaneously) to everything, but perhaps what is required is versatility. Versatility is based on a breadth of competencies, instead of a collection of specialised organisations or players. Against this, versatility may be prioritised over adaptability, especially as the impact of some emerging technologies, such as autonomous systems, may have on battlefield outcomes are still being discovered.

These systems are being pursued for a range of reasons, including the speed of response they afford through to removing humans from harm’s way in not only warfighting but also in dangerous maintenance tasks.\textsuperscript{11} However, as a recent U.S. RAND study found:

- Autonomous and unmanned systems could affect extended deterrence and [the United States’] ability to assure [its] allies of U.S. commitment. [Manned systems may remain better for deterrence than unmanned ones. Are there implications for ‘killing’ an unmanned system?]
- Widespread AI and autonomous systems could lead to inadvertent escalation and crisis instability [due to the speed at which systems respond (ironically), not allowing time for dynamics to resolve].
- Different mixes of human and artificial agents could affect the escalatory dynamics between two sides [human casualties significantly increase tensions].
- Machines will likely be worse at understanding the human signalling involved [in] deterrence, especially de-escalation.\textsuperscript{12}

From this it may be concluded that escalation may happen so quickly that it cannot be managed or responded to in the most desired way. Furthermore, patterns of escalation may not even be recognised by either human (as they happen so fast) or machine (as they do not comprehend). Against such scenarios, waiting for events to happen or resolve so that it is known what to mobilise for, may be catastrophic. What does this then mean for mobilisation planning? How might the ability to judge and manage the likelihood and impact of a range of events occurring at different rates of escalation be improved?

** Adopting a Risk-Based Approach  

Does mobilisation planning need to adopt a more proactive risk-based approach, as opposed to the event driven reactive response currently articulated? This would bring mobilisation planning into alignment with how Australian domestic threat management is

\textsuperscript{10} A leading example here is the Cyber Security Program in the Chief Information Officer Group in the Australian Department of Defence.
\textsuperscript{11} Savitz, 2018.
\textsuperscript{12} Wong et al., 2020.
designed (discussed in the next section) as well as international best practice, which will also be discussed next.

Such an approach facilitates

- **the need to be able to move fast** as responses would be structured against the likelihood of events; the most likely event(s) would be those for which the ADF is most prepared, and thus when they occur the ADF would be able to move quickly in response
- **diversification of the preparation** beyond that of conventional war, because, as discussed, against an expanded spectrum of conflict a broader range of responses do need to be developed, but given their likelihood of occurrence, preparation can be scheduled accordingly; different warning times relating to different events can also be leveraged.

**Modern Deterrence**

Against grey-zone activities, the military alone cannot defend, and so, perhaps this requires preparation of a different response. This is already being reflected in documents such as the recently released *Cyber Security Strategy 2020*, which details a ‘whole-of-community effort’ against a series of actions to be undertaken by governments, businesses, and the community to realise an improved security position.\(^\text{13}\) It is interesting to note that this position is concerned with economic and financial security just as much as security of critical infrastructure. The public release of this Strategy, together with further announcements the prime minister made with respect to cyberattacks on Australia,\(^\text{14}\) are indicative of a more overt deterrence campaign by the Australian government. The public announcement of the increased focus on the Indo-Pacific, as highlighted in the introduction, substantiates this further.

Here a more modern use of deterrence is inferred although the definition remains pertinent: the action of discouraging an action or event through instilling doubt or fear of the consequences.\(^\text{15}\) The implication is defence goals can be achieved without fighting. A Center for Strategic and International Studies study suggested last year that modern deterrence is made most effective by the following:

1. Establishing norms of behaviour; these are agreements or standards on what is acceptable or not behaviour. In the cyber (and space) domains these are still being developed.
2. Tailoring deterrence threats to individual actors; different actions require different responses—this is compounded when the actor may not be known—unattributable—or the act is too small or ambiguous to render a response, as in some grey-zone activities, particularly in the Cyber domain.

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\(^\text{13}\) Department of Home Affairs, 2020.
\(^\text{14}\) Prime Minister of Australia, 2020.
\(^\text{15}\) The term was most keenly associated with the Cold War with respect to the use of nuclear weapons.
3. Adopting an all of government and society response; this is required, as within contemporary society, everything and everyone may become a target; everything may be weaponised.

4. Building credibility with adversaries, such as by always following through on threats; this last point means once agreed norms have been broken and other deterrence measures failed, there should be a reciprocating action—repeated bluffs will fail. Demonstrating that there is the intent and capability to follow through when threats are made is important.\(^\text{16}\)

Against these steps it is interesting to re-examine the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU20), in which Defence has revised its policy objectives to be Shape, Deter, and Respond. These compare well with the equivalent objectives of Diplomacy and Deterrence to be discussed next, most of the overseas countries studied have adopted, either explicitly in the case of Singapore or implicitly for Sweden, Switzerland, and Finland. In addition, there appears to be strong linkage between the six activities articulated in the DSU20 to support these objectives and the total defence constructs that the same overseas countries studied in this paper have, if not explicitly at least in intent.

**Learning from Total Defence Concepts**

Just as other nations do, there is ample opportunity to incorporate mobilisation into overall concepts for deterrence. Deterrence is one of the key tenets pursued by Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Singapore. Diplomacy, the other tenet, is being maintained due to their geopolitical positions and limited resources as small nations with each pursuing ‘armed neutrality’ and purely defensive intentions towards their larger—potentially threatening—neighbours. But for all four countries, driven by changing security environments, deterrence has become a more important consideration than diplomacy. Here, similar concerns that Australia has over coercion, espionage, or foreign interference; and attacks to critical infrastructure, particularly via cyberattacks, abound. Terrorism and violent extremism remain of equal concern.

In response to these activities, all four countries have identified the merits of their total defence concepts as a way to ensure that not only are their Armed Forces prepared but the entire nation is, that is, individuals, community/volunteer groups, local governments, businesses, key industries, and state and municipal governments. This goes to the third point made above: a whole of society response.

Sweden’s total defence concept focussed on civilian defence, post the Cold War, gradually became more linked to crisis management. However, in 2015, as a result of security environment deteriorations the Swedish Government instructed its MSB to resume joint total defence planning. A subsequent joint publication (2016) ensured that total (within

\(^\text{16}\) Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019.
total defence) equated to the whole of society and as such confirmed that central, regional, and local government and the private sector should:

- Already in peacetime, have the ability to meet different forms of open and hidden pressures that can be exerted by various means such as political, psychological, economic and military;
- Increase their ability to identify and respond to intelligence activities, cyberattacks, and information operations against the country; and
- Increase their ability to withstand an armed attack on Sweden by a qualified opponent.

These deterrence activities are in turn supported by three distinct phases of mobilisation of resources within the Swedish model:

- **Total defence planning** (*beredskapsplanering*)—day-to-day operations and planning stage;
- **Crisis management** (*krishantering*)—responding to large-scale incidents or crisis;
- **Heightened state of alert** (*höjd beredskap*) or **highest state of alert** (*högsta beredskap*)—mobilisation of total defence in response to threat of war or war against Sweden.

Finland which largely retained its total defence concept since the 1940’s as successive governments prioritised its capability to mobilise the whole of society, continues to progress and update its approach consistent with continuing changes in society, the security environment, and technology. Even with the legal, organisational, and physical structures for territorial and civil defence in place, in 2013, it formed the Security Committee, an interagency body hosted by the Ministry of Defence, tasked with monitoring developments in the Finnish security environment and society—as the name suggests. But it is also responsible for ensuring readiness against any natural or man-made threats to the nation and therefore includes territorial defence, civil defence, security of supply for key resources and trade, natural disaster, public health and pandemics, and cybersecurity.

General principles and implementation guidelines for Finland’s current (2017) security concept are outlined in the *Security Strategy for Society*. Here, the defence policy, while prioritising the expected roles of safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and population’s security, remains structured to uphold basic values, promote the population’s well-being, and maintain the functioning of society. As such, the Strategy highlights three key areas: preparedness, crisis management, and security of supply, all focussed on securing Finland’s seven vital functions of society, as shown in Figure 3.2.

Switzerland also maintains aspects of a total defence concept within its current defence model. Its current assessment of threats emphasises the importance it places on this, as even though a number of external threats, mainly posed by increased tensions between large state actors, persist, again, concerns have shifted more towards internal threats, namely terrorist

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19 Service de Renseignement de la Confédération, 2019.
attacks and natural or man-made catastrophes. Thus they similarly call for much closer cooperation between the military and civilian authorities in order to respond appropriately.

The Swiss Armed Forces currently have three goals: protection and security of the country (including its airspace), its population, and its critical infrastructure. Within these, it has two overarching tasks: (1) provide help to civilian authorities when requested and (2) promote peace. The provision of help to civilian authorities is divided into three further mobilisation subcategories. Help is provided:

1. when a serious threat to the internal security of the country presents itself which civilian authorities cannot address on their own, which includes defending the sovereign airspace, protecting the population, or providing additional personnel
2. for large-scale (i.e., national or international) events taking place in Switzerland
3. when necessary in case of a disaster (whether man-made or natural), in both Switzerland or abroad.

As China continues to dominate Indo-Pacific geopolitics, more attention turns that way and U.S.-Chinese tensions continue. Here, Singapore finds itself in the centre. But, through a range of MOU renewals with both the United States and China in 2019, it is competently maintaining its state of neutrality in this coveted, if not contested area. Beyond these diplomatic efforts, Singapore has Total Defence as its all-round defence and deterrence strategy. Only one of Singapore’s six Defence pillars is focussed on Military Defence. All pillars require citizens, as well as the Armed Forces, to play their part in Singapore’s defence against non-conventional threats and other security challenges.

Singapore, in its most recent security assessment expected more unforeseen events arising predominantly from terrorism, cyber, and maritime threats. Mobilisation exercises involving interagency responses to simulated homeland security threats have been conducted for a while where Civil Defence members (such as Singapore Police Force officers and civilian security officers) and Military Defence members (both full-time NSmen and regulars from the Army) are activated. But Civil Defence also prompts the community to remain alert and vigilant for suspicious persons or activities, especially as they do not consider themselves safe from terrorism and are particularly vulnerable to return fighters. Strong Economic Defence is seen to support businesses against economic downturns and other impacts from the pandemic. For cyber there have been a range of ongoing initiatives including the launch of a sixth pillar of Digital Defence in 2019—a whole-of-nation effort to improve cybersecurity and recognise and counter disinformation. Underpinning all of Singapore’s

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20 Armée Suisse, undated g; DDPS, 2000.
22 Armée Suisse, undated j.
23 OFPP, 2015.
24 Armée Suisse, undated g.
25 See, for example, Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2018b.
26 Ministry of Defence Singapore, 2020c.
Total Defence efforts is the Psychological Defence pillar which is considered key to ensuring solidarity and resilience of the whole nation.

But consistent with its European peers, Singapore is preparing for a much broader range of events in general including man-made and natural, conventional, and non-conventional. In the adoption of total defence concepts, all four countries, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and Singapore, have recognised that not only must their Armed Forces be prepared but the entire nation must be, that is, individuals, community/volunteer groups, local governments, businesses, key industries, state and municipal governments, and all parties participate in mobilisation exercises, in cooperation—contributing their part.

For such small countries, with relatively small national bases, such total defence concepts that leverage the entire population are appropriate. However, even when considering a much larger country such as the United States, elements of such concepts exist. For example, in the United States, the interdependence between the armed forces and the nation at large are formally described in the 2018 updates to Joint Mobilization Planning doctrine. As shown in Figure 6.1, there exist against all levels of mobilisation, expectations of military commitment and the relevant emergency authorities. This is consistent with how the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff defines mobilisation as not only ‘the process of assembling and organising national resources to support national objectives in time of war and other emergencies’, but also ‘the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency’.27

But if things at the U.S. state level are examined—further similarities are seen. Each state has its own National Guard—their own Military Defence. The strong traditions of individualism and individual liberty within the United States has meant that state and local authorities have also retained significant control over how a civil emergency is dealt with—this is analogous to Civil Defence. But such strong traditions also align with strong national identity—an important element of Psychological Defence. Given the size of the United States such a state-based approach does make more sense—natural events such as hurricanes impact the East Coast more than the West. The West, however, is confronted with wildfires. The size of each state means they have their own economic and social dimensions, too, which may impact how well the response or how resilient the state is.

In examination of how the response to cyber is being developed at the state level—that is, Digital Defence, a much closer relationship like that seen in the European and Singapore case studies—is emerging between the community and military: civilian cyber experts are joining National Guard cyber security cells.28 Ohio, in particular, is establishing Cyber Reserves of trained and vetted civilians as an outcome of partnerships between public, private, military, and educational organisations and will help local governments respond to cyberattacks.29

Other National Guards are benefitting directly from the presence of skilled cyber experts in

28 Dickstein, 2019.
29 Ohio National Guard Public Affairs, 2019.
local large IT companies such as Microsoft and Amazon. These state-based initiatives are relatively new as usually most cyber security for the nation falls into the DHS in the United States. Cyber Command also plays a role outside of defending DoD networks, when asked.

Observations for Australia

In reviewing these case studies there are similarities to draw from both the smaller countries and the United States, and Australia has options to revise its mobilisation concepts to build on the strengths from each individual country’s response. The expense alone of the establishment of a ‘National Guard’ equivalent in each state may preclude it from consideration in Australia but building infrastructure that supports closer local partnerships between the military and civilian communities—expanding and supporting activities and roles which state-based military agencies fulfil—may be more tenable. This type of partnership evident in all the countries studied demonstrates there is a clear understanding of the symbiotic relationship—social contract—that exists between the military and the rest of the community. As detailed in Section 8 of the report there is a growing expectation that the Military will engage more in response to national emergencies or crises, and currently it is in Defence’s hands to manage how it responds to this demand and maintain balance with its more traditional tasks.

It is noted that Defence is already engaging in some of this relationship building with businesses and industries in their capacity as employers of Defence Reservists. A review in 2019 of the Defence Reserves Support Council commissioned by the (then) Reserve and Youth Division (RYD) of Defence, recommended it enhance Defence capability through partnerships with priority industry sectors and employers through three streams that would deliver industry insight and enhance partnerships; inform Defence policy development; and, enhance access to part-time capability.

The basis for these recommendations were taken from components identified in a UK case study needed to ensure ready access to Reserves. These included:

- Tailored and focussed relationships with employers depending on their size and sector, built on predictability and mutual benefit.
- The establishment of joint employer partnerships, where civilian employers communicate the benefits of and support their employees to undertake reserve service.

In order to inform their relationship building, Defence is examining afresh the impacts on communities when the call out of the Reserve is increased and identifying elements of the community, which includes local businesses and industries, that can cope and others that

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30 RAND interview with internal expert, August 2020.
31 DHS, undated.
32 Department of Defence, 2019.
33 Cited in Ministry of Defence (UK), 2013, pp. 41–58.
cannot or find it difficult. Exemptions from service are granted both at the individual and organisational level, where such circumstances prevail, however Defence has acknowledged it has further relationship building to do with all businesses and industries so that all parties can better understand the criticalities of access to the right skills.34 Interestingly, it is organisations like the State Emergency Services (SES) who have requested exemption for all Reservists who are serving members of the SES, especially in bushfire season. In a total defence concept, SES members would comprise part of the civil defence. Regardless, it is easy to see how such initiatives could be built upon to encompass more specific mobilisation requirements. Data regarding what the local industries provide together with their resident skills could also be leveraged.

Complementing this internal opportunity, a more robust partnership with the Home Affairs portfolio would also reap benefits for Defence in its mobilisation efforts. Home Affairs has responsibility for some of the activities associated with the described total defence concepts such as the 2020 Cyber Security Strategy, and as will be discussed in the next section, national coordination for the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is illustrated by mapping the Singapore Total Defence Pillars (as an example framework) against what their Australian equivalents may be. As can be seen in Figure 7.1, there is overlap, but also differences and gaps.

**Figure 7.1. Mapping Australian Federal Government Constructs to Singapore’s Total Defence Pillars**

![Mapping Australian Federal Government Constructs to Singapore's Total Defence Pillars](image)

NOTE: ABF = Australian Border Force; AFP = Australian Federal Police; ASIO = Australian Security Intelligence Organisation; CFI = Countering Foreign Interference; CT = Counter Terrorism.

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34 This information was elicited from participants at a workshop held by RAND in August 2020 as part of this project.
As shown, the Australian Defence Organisation and the Military Defence pillar align quite well, but Singapore relies on its NSmen and SAF Volunteer Corps as key elements of its Armed Forces. The Australian Home Affairs Portfolio contains several elements that align to the Singaporean Civil, Digital, and Social Defence pillars—but there are some key differences. The Singapore Civil Defence Force is an emergency service in Singapore under the Ministry of Home Affairs that provides firefighting, technical rescue, emergency medical services, and coordinates national civil defence—in Australia, the provision of these services is the responsibility of the State Government, as highlighted by the yellow box.

While national resilience is a key objective of the Home Affairs portfolio and similar named objectives reside in the Singaporean Psychological Defence pillar, they have different intent: in Australia national resilience focuses more on what the potential threats may be, whereas in Singapore its efforts are focussed more on building the resilience of the community at large, regardless of the threat. In fact, the activities associated with Psychological Defence are, as Section 10 will discuss, missing to a large extent in the Australian strategic narrative. Similarly, within the Social Defence pillar, Singapore focusses on activities that promote social cohesion, recognising that a large part of the population is and will continue to comprise migrants. Within the Australian Home Affairs portfolio, social cohesion is assumed and what activities focus on here are potential disruptors to that assumed cohesion. Immigration is heavily policed and currently more focussed on identifying illegal immigrants. Singapore emphasises immigration as a key initiative for population and skill growth. Finally, while economic security does align with the Home Affairs mission of ‘unity, prosperity and security’, the specific activities that Singapore promotes to assure its economic security are not part of the Home Affairs remit.

All this aside, what is currently missing from discussion is how much and in what ways the Military may need to draw on the civilian population in its endeavours. The Cyber Security Strategy may have set the precedent for a more open dialogue between Defence and the community at large of expectations on both sides in pursuing an approach to modern deterrence. Incorporating mobilisation into deterrence concepts will provide a useful entry point for Defence to build relationships with the national base, providing much more visibility of what it has to offer and ample opportunity to engage in more robust discussions regarding national mobilisation for war.

Before such total defence concept-based ideas are dismissed, an example of how this may be done starting, as Australia would, without supporting Defence policies and national service obligations, can be taken from the UK’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Modern Deterrence project launched in late 2018. This project commenced after an initial think-tank activity which focussed on whole-of-society defence and deterrence against grey-zone activities.35 The intention of the project is to advance the understanding of comprehensive deterrence and its application to decisionmakers in the Armed Forces, politics and government,

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35 They use the term hybrid aggression, which encompasses hybrid warfare, threshold warfare, and grey-zone warfare.
and the private sector as a ‘blending of traditional deterrence and societal resilience against emerging forms of warfare’.\textsuperscript{36}

As their first annual report details,\textsuperscript{37} their initial focus on deterrence by societal resilience led them to examine best practices from countries including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Singapore, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Their summary of outcomes is long and includes a range of activities that an emerging, more strategic approach to mobilisation in Australia, might encompass:

- ways of bridging the divide between government/Armed Forces and civil society (private sector and the public) including:
  - national security courses for emerging leaders from government/politics, industry, civil society, armed forces
  - incentivising companies to play a stronger role in national security
  - total defence exercises
  - national security school curricula
- resilience training in local communities
- logistics and total defence (including communications with the local population) during NATO’s Trident Juncture 18 exercise
- training government officials in how to counter disinformation
- securing supply chains; resilience against supply chain disruptions
- countering malign influence: debunking and asymmetric second strikes
- improving resilience of sectors critical to national security, including telecommunications and financial services
- civilian-political military cooperation
- Policy:
  - Planning and exercises
  - Crisis response

The importance of some of these activities—such as bridging the divide between government, Armed Forces, and civil society—are discussed in detail in the section calling for a strategic narrative on national resilience.

\textsuperscript{36} Royal United Services Institute, 2019a.
\textsuperscript{37} Royal United Services Institute, 2019b.
8. Mobilisation for Domestic Catastrophic Disasters

Mobilisation for the purposes of war is traditionally where the focus for mobilisation planning has fallen.¹ However, as highlighted in the previous section, there is much debate around the role of Defence in time of domestic need. As such, planning needs to be conceived across an even broader mobilisation continuum. As seen in other nations, a key feature is balance between domestic-facing institutions and Defence. For instance, Finland’s 2017 *Security Strategy for Society* emphasises the risks of novel threats such as climate change, environmental degradation, and cyberattack.² In Switzerland, its armed forces are being more frequently used to provide greater support to civilian organisations such as the police or border guards in providing security, and at the canton level, to assist with small-scale disasters.³

A key feature that emerged from our analysis of international experiences is that while the national base supports Defence as it deals with external threats, when the threat is domestic, the pendulum swings to Defence supporting the national base in dealing with internal threats, such as significant natural disasters, pandemics, and terrorism.

**Recent Experience of Domestic Defence Support**

Australia has experienced a number of catastrophic natural disasters in recent times, with the expectation that the prevalence and scale of such events will grow in the future,⁴ imposing significant social, economic, and environmental costs.⁵ Furthermore, as the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, there are other catastrophic hazards that pose a threat. It might be observed that Australia’s response to such events represent a mobilisation of the national base. Defence, for its part, has played an active and very public role in supporting state, territory, and local governments’ responses to and recovery from these events. In the light of that, it is instructive to understand the nature of these events and Defence’s mobilisation response.

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5. Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre, 2019, p. 2.
Bushfires

Responding to a catastrophic natural disaster, like the 2020 bushfires, represent short-term activity. The nature of the threat is immediate with the potential for high mortality rates in affected areas. The dangers are generally to the physical and built environments. There is (generally) a clear signal that the threat has passed, either during the event (an area has been burnt out) or as environmental conditions change in a way that alleviates the threat. The driver for seeking Australian Government support, in general (and Defence, in particular), is that the size and intensity of such fires overwhelm the capacity of the local entities defending against them, and the number of active fires overwhelms the state or territory governments’ capacity to respond. As such, in cases where ‘civilian resources are inadequate, unavailable or cannot be mobilised in time, emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) arrangements enable the Australian Defence Force to contribute in order to save human life, alleviate suffering and prevent loss of animal life or property’. In the case of the 2009 ‘Black Saturday’ Bushfires, about 450 ADF personnel were mobilised and operating within 48 hours, with a peak effort of 800 ADF personnel. Under a DACC call out, Defence’s response has to be measured, as such support should ‘be limited to that which can be accomplished within the standing core qualifications, skills and resources available to ADF elements at the time, which are then augmented by what reasonable additional mission training and resources can be provided within the available time frame’.

In response to a catastrophic bushfire, the number of ADF personnel that can be brought to bear is relatively small, compared with the number of firefighters, state emergency services and other local components. As such, the Defence support can be characterised around providing capabilities that the state, territory, or local governments do not possess. These capabilities include ‘logistics support including airlift (fixed and rotary wing aircraft), sealift, land transport, engineering and medical support, temporary accommodation, imagery, and communications’. For instance, Defence has used its airborne ISR assets to help pinpoint fire fronts. It has used its maritime capabilities to support mass evacuations, particularly in cases where the local physical infrastructure may not be well suited to enable this. It has also been used to provide logistical support to the firefighting efforts.

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6 The National Catastrophic Natural Disaster Plan (NATCATDISPLAN) defines a catastrophic natural disaster as an ‘event of national consequence’ with the defining features that it will ‘not be possible to immediately meet the needs of those requiring assistance within the existing capability of an individual State or nationally; and [it will] take a considerable time from which to recover; and the affected Executive Government is temporarily incapacitated or requests urgent assistance.’ Emergency Management Australia, 2017b, p.1.
8 Fetchik, 2012, p. 34.
9 Department of Defence, 2020a, p. 8.
11 For examples of support provided to Operation Bushfire Assist, 2019–2020, see Department of Defence, 2020d.
In the recovery phase, the Defence role can change to one of providing additional capacity. In this phase, however, it could be argued that the national base has demobilised, with the volunteer cadre returning to their normal routine. In these cases, Defence support under DACC is aimed at assisting the state, territory, or local governments in activities such as restoring basic infrastructure while ensuring the safety of those living in affected areas.

**Pandemic**

Australia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is illustrative of the mobilisation efforts against a more persistent, longer duration and national-scale threat. In this case, the response and recovery phases occur concurrently, with the commencement of the recovery phase occurring slightly after that of response phase. In this case, the Australian Government mobilised virtually all functions, rapidly adapting structures, roles, and functions to meet emerging needs. Defence’s contribution, then, appears to be focussed primarily on providing additional capacity. For instance, the provision of ADF personnel to support quarantining at hotels, manage roadblock, or checking up on those self-quarantining. This allowed state and territory resources to focus their efforts on their primary role. For instance, the police could continue (perhaps in a more limited manner) their law enforcement duties. Similarly, the initial surge in demand for (appropriately qualified) private security services could be better managed if ADF personnel provided capacity in the early stages. Similarly, Defence assisted federal and state government agencies in their contact tracing efforts and augmented medical capacity in response to an outbreak in Tasmania. Defence also contributed to the national bases effort to produce face masks and ventilators. While these examples are representative of increasing the capacity of the national base, depending on the contagion event, Defence is also well placed to provide other (unique) capabilities. This would certainly be the case if the cause of an exposure event was of a Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR) basis. However, the more likely scenario remains in Defence’s use in capacity building and augmentation.

**Mechanisms for Mobilising Defence for Catastrophic Domestic Emergencies**

In responding to catastrophic national emergencies, the Australian Government can enact a number of different plans. The most commonly used one is the *Disaster Response Plan* (often referred to as the Australian Government Disaster Plan or COMDISPLAN). This provides the basis for ‘non-financial assistance to Australian states and territories in an emergency or disaster’. In cases of catastrophic national disasters, the NATCATDISPLAN

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13 Emergency Management Australia, 2017a, p. 3.
14 Emergency Management Australia, 2017b.
can be invoked. At its most extreme (and where national mobilisation is most likely to occur), they seek to respond to events that are ‘beyond our current arrangements, thinking, experience and imagination (i.e., that has overwhelmed our technical, non-technical and social systems and resources, and has degraded or disabled governance structures and strategic and operational decision-making functions’).\textsuperscript{15} In doing so, they aim to ‘ensure the response and recovery efforts provide the maximum good for the maximum number of people’.\textsuperscript{16} Emergency Management Australia (EMA), in the Department of Home Affairs, provides the coordination function for the Australian Government.

Similar arrangements for Federal coordination exist in other nations. For instance, Switzerland established the \textit{National Security Network} in 2010 to provide federal oversight during national crises across all levels of government.\textsuperscript{17} In Sweden, when dealing with national emergencies, civil-military coordination is achieved through the MSB.\textsuperscript{18} The MSB focusses on supporting key stakeholders and operators in the planning for civil defence, including coordination and planning between civil defence actors and the Armed Forces. Finland appears to have a slightly different approach with an INTERAGENCY body, the \textit{Security Committee}, coordinating all responses, including man-made or natural threats. Unlike Australia, this is hosted within the Ministry of Defence.

Underpinning national coordination efforts in Australia is the \textit{Australian Disaster Preparedness Framework}\textsuperscript{19} (ADPF) which supports the development of capabilities needed to ‘effectively prepare for and manage severe to catastrophic disasters’.\textsuperscript{20} The ADPF breaks the national capability requirements into a number of categories, many of which are relevant to Defence. These are: planning, fatality management, search and rescue, civil disaster expansion, warnings and information, public order and community safety, evacuation and support, mass care, intelligence and situational awareness, responder protection and sustainment, built environment and infrastructure recovery, logistics and supply chain management, impact assessment, hazard response, economic recovery, natural environment recovery, biosecurity, social recovery, crisis leadership and management, research and learning, and community planning, capacity and resilience building.\textsuperscript{21}

DACC lists the arrangements that guide ‘the application of Defence resources to provide support outside the core business of military operations’.\textsuperscript{22} This assumes that Defence assets are at the required level of readiness and can be mobilised so as ‘to achieve the Australian

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Department of Home Affairs, 2018a, p. 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Emergency Management Australia, 2017b, p. 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Parlement Suisse, 2016.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} MSB, undated.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Department of Home Affairs, 2018a.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Department of Home Affairs, 2018a, p. 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Department of Home Affairs, 2018a, pp. 11–13.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Department of Defence, 2020a, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
Government’s expected Defence outcomes\textsuperscript{23} measured against ‘the ability and capacity of the ADF to respond’\textsuperscript{24} by making resources available in an emergency, or to lend support in nonemergency situations.\textsuperscript{25} Importantly, under COMDISPLAN arrangements, Defence is a follower organisation as it does not have lead agency responsibility for any type of domestic (or international) response or recovery action.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, DACC cannot ‘involve the use, or potential use, of force by Defence members’.\textsuperscript{27}

As an aside, in cases of national security risk that ‘present significant threats to public safety, public health and/or critical infrastructure’, EMA maintains its coordination role.\textsuperscript{28} In this case, \textit{Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority} (DFACA) can be invoked wherein the ADF may be asked ‘to assist in the event of ‘domestic violence’ (for example, civil unrest or a terrorist incident)’.\textsuperscript{29} This aid can take three forms:\textsuperscript{30}

- Aid to Commonwealth or Territory authorities in their performance of law enforcement tasks.
- Aid to State authorities in their performance of law enforcement tasks under State laws (e.g., in the search for criminals).
- Aid to customs, fisheries, and police forces in performance of law enforcement tasks for the execution and maintenance of certain statutes of the Commonwealth.

Switzerland provides a useful comparison here, given its federated model. Like DACC, it utilises the DEVA. Under DEVA, military mobilisation underpins the manner by which the Swiss Armed Forces provide support to civilian authorities. It also regulates the mobilisation processes and, interestingly, articulates how key responsibilities and competencies are distributed across all levels of government.\textsuperscript{31} Like Australia, the Swiss Armed Forces provide support to law enforcement authorities if it is within the public interest and when civilian authorities cannot perform these duties due. The civilian (canton-level) authorities maintain full responsibilities, with military support provided through agreements with the DDPS or the commander-in-chief of the Swiss Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{23} Department of Defence, 2020a, p. 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{24} Department of Defence, 2020a, p. 6.  \\
\textsuperscript{25} Department of Defence, 2020a, p. 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{26} Cited from Elphick, 2020, p. 6.  \\
\textsuperscript{27} Department of Defence, 2020a, p. 3.  \\
\textsuperscript{28} Portillo-Castro, 2019, p. 5.  \\
\textsuperscript{29} Portillo-Castro, 2019, p. 5.  \\
\textsuperscript{30} Ward, 1998.  \\
\textsuperscript{31} Conseil Fédéral, 2017.  \\
\textsuperscript{32} Conseil Fédéral, 2020c.  \\
\end{flushleft}
Observations on the Australian Approach to Disaster Management

The effectiveness of these arrangements has been called into question at the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements.\textsuperscript{33} Central to this is the relationship between the Federal Government and the jurisdictions. A key dimension of this that the Royal Commission has focussed on is the role of Defence, the nature of its support, the capacity to pre-deploy in the face of a looming threat, and the mechanisms by which it is called upon.\textsuperscript{34} Its recommendation on the ability to declare a national emergency, and to use this as a basis to initiate Defence support, clearly demonstrates a desire (by the Royal Commission at least) for Defence Mobilisation to cover the full spectrum of hazards once they meet the ‘catastrophic’ threshold, ensuring that these emergency powers would still only be used in exceptional circumstances.

It is noteworthy that the approach Australia takes to disaster management is that based upon risk, rather than event. It is consistent with the international approaches that have been explored, both in terms of the treatment of catastrophic natural disasters and how Defence support is conceived, planned for, and delivered. This is unsurprising since Australia is a signatory to the Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction\textsuperscript{35}—a risk-based approach based on 4 priorities—understanding disaster risk; strengthening disaster risk governance; investing in disaster risk reduction; and enhancing disaster risk preparedness. An important feature of the Sendai Framework is that it ‘broadens the concept of disaster risk reduction to include post-disaster recovery and development activities to encourage recovery plans to focus on restoring and rebuilding in ways that mitigate or reduce future vulnerabilities’.\textsuperscript{36} However, this presents a challenge, and something Defence would need to consider in its support of domestic (nonsecurity) threats. That is the potentially competing requirements of achieving immediate goals while avoiding ‘creating new or worsening existing long-term societal needs that can contribute to a community’ s vulnerability to future disaster’, as this represents an ‘important part of post-disaster reconstruction planning’.\textsuperscript{37}

Given international models for mobilisation, it is worth observing that Australia’s Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (NDRRF)\textsuperscript{38} is based round 4 pillars: Built Environment, Social Environment, Natural Environment, and Economic Environment.\textsuperscript{39} The NDRRF ‘guides national, whole-of-society efforts to proactively reduce disaster risk and minimise the loss and suffering caused by disasters’.\textsuperscript{40} Endorsed in March 2020, it is based around the Sendai

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{33} Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020b, pp. 7–9.
\bibitem{34} Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020b, pp. 14–16.
\bibitem{35} UNDRR, 2015.
\bibitem{36} Finucane et al., 2020, p. 486.
\bibitem{37} Finucane et al., 2020, p. 483.
\bibitem{38} Department of Home Affairs, 2018b.
\bibitem{39} Department of Home Affairs, 2018b, p. 7
\bibitem{40} Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020a, p. 7.
\end{thebibliography}
Framework, and identifies 5-year outcomes and supporting strategies (2019–2023) for each of these four priorities. These are intended to underpin the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, which identifies 20 sectors that can contribute to disaster risk reduction, such as: critical infrastructure, education, community services, social policy, health. From a bushfire and natural hazard perspective, the Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC identified five key issues associated with shared responsibility and community engagement:

- Ensuring government and agencies enable communities to manage their own risks.
- Ensuring government collaborates with community to break down silos and build trust and effective partnerships.
- Developing community engagement models that can most effectively build capability and partnerships in support of enhanced disaster resilience.
- Building community engagement capacity within and across sectors.
- Ensuring emergency management sector organisations build effective partnerships with each other and the community across prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.

The Royal Commission proposition associated with stress testing national natural disaster arrangements is noteworthy since this is a common feature of the total defence arrangements (or similar arrangements) in Sweden, Switzerland, Singapore, and Finland. In all these cases, and consistent with the Royal Commission’s Draft Propositions, key national base stakeholders are active participants. These both help to appreciate the role each plays and the mechanisms for communication and engagement, as well as raising the profile of mobilisation and expectations for the non-Defence contributors. In many ways, this is no different to the way Defence typically tests its capabilities against threats (such as through exercises). It is merely a change in terms of participation. Conversely, it might suggest that the typical stress testing Defence undertakes in preparation for military operations should include testing the mobilisation settings, particularly in the case of extended operations that will require Defence to reach into the national base to maintain its warfighting capability (or at least allow it to gracefully degrade (such as through attrition) to a predefining minimal level of capability that can be reconstituted and sustained for extended periods.

It is also worth deliberating further over the fact that the type of support Defence is most likely to provide during a catastrophic event is the provision of specialist capabilities that the state, territory, or local governments do not have. Conversely, in the post-crisis phase, Defence support is more likely to focus on providing additional capacity as those civilian (often volunteer) entities that provided support during the emergency are ‘demobilised’. Comparisons with the United States, whose large land mass is like Australia and depending on location may be confronted with significantly different threats, reveal a similar response:

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41 Department of Home Affairs, 2018b, p. 20.
42 Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre, 2019, p. 10.
its military forces support rather than replace civilian federal, state or local organisations, through specialist capabilities and experience in areas such as logistics and transportation, search and rescue, engineering, and medical aid.\footnote{Dunlap, 2017.} However, one difference from Australia is the United States can also activate the National Guard at the state level under the command of the Governor, in response to national emergencies.\footnote{Dunlap, 2017.}

Finally, there may be some legal implications on the employment of the ADF. A 2012 analysis of ADF response to the ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires noted that while the emergency services have authority to constrain individual rights (e.g., enter properties, restrict peoples’ movement), those authorities may not extend to Defence personnel assigned to operations in support of those disasters. It is suggested that no state or territory legislative arrangements appear to consider ‘the possibility that ADF personnel will be used to augment emergency services’.\footnote{Fetchik, 2012, p. 34.} Complicating matters further, the paper notes that ‘unlike a private person, ADF personnel do not qualify for protection against civil liability under “Good Samaritan” legislation because assistance rendered by ADF members (in that capacity) occurs in the course of paid duty’, with some actions potentially giving ‘rise to criminal liability’.\footnote{Fetchik, 2012, p. 34.} The paper also noted potential issues associated with ‘the capacity of fire victims to make insurance claims for damage caused by ADF personnel’.\footnote{Fetchik, 2012, p. 35.} While it is accepted claims for damages that resulted from the actions of firefighters is, from an insurance perspective, considered to be caused by the fire itself, such a provision may not by extended to Defence personnel.\footnote{Fetchik, 2012, p. 35.} This issue has been noted by the \textit{Royal Commission}.\footnote{Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, 2020b, p. 16.}
9. The History of Australia’s Mobilisation for War

Introduction

Presented in this section is a condensed overview for the less informed reader of what Australia and Defence has undertaken in its previous mobilisation efforts for war. It does not list all that was involved in efforts—other authors, whom are referenced heavily have presented this in much greater detail.1 Primarily, this re-examination was conducted to identify the changing attitudes of the nation towards mobilisation efforts and measures the Government took to ensure that Australia could meet its military commitments. The impacts of public opinion on legitimacy and how much Australian communities were willing to contribute or tolerate are highlighted.

As this overview demonstrates, the dynamics between the civil sector (broadly defined) and the military became increasingly significant in shaping the parameters for mobilisation over the course of the historical trajectory—from the First World War to engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was particularly apparent when conflicts necessitated longer, more complex, and more uncertain levels of commitment, and as the conduct, character, and manifestations of war became progressively more unconventional. In the current threat environment, where grey-zone and hybrid warfare all but define the modern warfighting paradigm, the citizenry has a growing investment in the shape of Australia’s security landscape. Accordingly, this historical account is followed by a more detailed investigation of the civil-military dynamics in the contemporary mobilisation context. This discussion develops the conceptual and contextual terrain around national resilience and analyses the imperative for a resonant and effectual strategic narrative across every stage and dimension of mobilisation.

First World War

During the First World War, Australia largely provided supplies and soldiers for the British Empire under the protection of a large British Navy able to protect sea lines of communication.2 Mobilisation planning at this time was informed by ‘The Australian Defence Scheme’, devised in 1910 and modelled on the British War Book. But while this model outlined activities to be undertaken by government departments during crises and war, the size of the expeditionary force Australia might commit was unclear. ‘A force of 12,000 was discussed pre-war, but, wracked by Empire fervour, 20,000 soldiers were offered when war broke out’.3

1 See for example, Layton, 2020.
2 See Kitchener, 1910.
Australian troops fighting overseas during the First World War enlisted voluntarily, enthusiasm for the war founded on loyalty to the British Empire as much as, if not more than, to ensure the security of the Australian continent. However, when the scale of Australian casualties on the Western Front became known, and the war looked to drag on, volunteer numbers declined significantly. In 1916, however, Australia was required to provide reinforcements of 5,500 men per month to maintain its forces overseas at an operational level. A referendum was held to gain societal agreement to a requirement that men undergoing compulsory training to serve overseas. It was defeated with 1,087,557 votes in favour and 1,160,033 against.

In 1917, Britain sought a sixth Australian division for active service overseas, but enlistment rates had continued to fall. The scale of casualties, and the distance of the war from Australian soil made it difficult to sustain domestic enthusiasm over the longer term. Prime Minister Hughes was compelled to hold a second conscription referendum, questioning whether voluntary enlistment should continue, and proposing that shortfalls be met by compulsory reinforcements of single men, widowers, and divorcees without dependents between 20 and 44 years of age. These men would be called up by ballot. The referendum was defeated with 1,015,159 votes in favour and 1,181,747 against.

By the end of the war, approximately half of Australia’s eligible white male population had enlisted. Eighty per cent served overseas, mostly in combat roles, including 210,000 in the infantry and more than 30,000 in the Light Horse. During the First World War, 60,000 Australians were killed, which is almost twice that of the Second World War. According to Peter Layton, the mobilisation undertaken for the First World War ‘was unsustainable, adversely impacting both the war effort and the post-war peace’.

**Interwar Period and Second World War**

When the Second World War began, it was perceived by Australian decisionmakers, at least militarily, as a repeat of the First World War. Forces would be deployed to Europe while Australia mobilised at home, protected from the conflict and providing supplies to the

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4 Between 1911 and 1929 Australian males aged between 18 and 60 were required to serve in militia service within Australia and its territories. The Defence Acts of 1903 and 1904 empowered the Australian government to call up ‘unexempted’ males in time of war. The Defence Act in 1909 made training and service compulsory in time of peace. Over the 18 years this scheme ran, it had a chequered record of success. The junior cadets were abolished in June 1922. Universal military training and the holding of military camps were suspended from 1 November 1929, pending a general review of defence policy. Barrie, 2020, p. 36.

5 For an account of Defence planning during the early years of the First World War, see Meaney, 2009.

6 Barrie, 2020, p. 36.

7 Barrie, 2020, p. 36.

8 ‘[I]n economic terms, the First World War was the most damaging of any war Australia has participated in. Real aggregate GDP declined across 1914–20 by 9.5 per cent with per capita incomes declining over 16 per cent. Indeed, per capita incomes did not return to 1914 levels until 1938. At war’s end, total government debt (federal and state) stood at around 120 per cent GDP, up from 75 per cent in 1914. For Australia, the First World War could be classified economically as a depression’. Layton, 2020, pp. 13–14.

Empire. During the first two years of the Second World War, Australia was spared any immediate threat to peace. Behind the scenes, there was deep concern about the threat posed by Japan, the viability of the Singapore strategy, and the ability to fight a war on two fronts, but the likelihood of invasion was largely discounted.\(^{10}\) As Paul Hasluck observed, ‘[u]nder the cover of Allied armies engaging the enemy in Europe and the Middle East, and the British Navy keeping hazardous watch and ward over the sea lanes, Australia had time to organise her war effort, to mobilise her resources, to collect her thoughts, and to muster resolution’.\(^{11}\)

Prior to the war, policy guidelines had been developed in the wake of an Imperial Conference (1937) which provided that ‘the UK rearmament program was straining its resources and Australia should rely more on its own production capabilities; shipment of arms from the UK might be problematic during a new European war; and Australia should not depend on early, or even complete, fulfilment of its orders for aircraft from Britain’. To this end, Australia began to develop munitions, aircraft, and shipbuilding industries.\(^{12}\) This was particularly important, not just because of the output, but because the establishment of those factories and organisational structures facilitated rapid expansion when there was greater demand over 1942 and 1943.\(^{13}\) Layton argues that, to some degree, mobilisation had been made easier ‘as the lingering aftermath of the Great Depression meant there were considerable resources in terms of labour, equipment and materials unused or working below full capacity. This spare capacity was gradually taken up’.\(^ {14}\)

In 1939, Prime Minister Menzies also reintroduced compulsory military training starting from 1 January 1940, which required unmarried men turning 21 years in the call-up period to commence three months training with the militia. He later stated that the forces needed to be kept sufficiently trained at a strength of 75,000 men, adding that ‘there is, I believe, a growing recognition of the fact that military training for the defence of Australia should be a normal part of our civic life, and that if it is to be just and democratic, it should be made compulsory’.\(^{15}\) In June 1940, Menzies also authorised the expansion of the militia by about 120,000.\(^{16}\)

Moreover, a *War Book* was developed to outline the responsibilities of various government departments during a crisis or declaration of war, which was to be supplemented departmental war books which would expand on the detail for each. The *War Book* covered, among other issues, internal security, civil defence, insurance, transport issues, finance, and economic

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\(^{10}\) See McCarthy, 1976; Ross, 1994.

\(^{11}\) Hasluck, 1952, p. 559.

\(^{12}\) Since the outbreak of war approximately 35 new government munitions factories and 77 munitions annexes had been built or commenced in Australia. It was estimated that, on the second anniversary of the outbreak of war, about 50,000 workers were directly engaged in munitions manufacture and about 150,000 were indirectly engaged. Hasluck, 1952, p. 560.

\(^{13}\) Hasluck, 1952, p. 561.

\(^{14}\) Layton, 2020, p. 18.

\(^{15}\) National Archives of Australia, undated.

warfare. It was largely based on lessons from the First World War or recent British planning. According to the War Book, the primary effect of a Japanese attack would be disruption to coastal shipping for several months, and the ‘UK’s announcement to prepare for a three-year war with Germany was accepted if not believed; the formation of the new Department of Munitions and Supply with a five-year “sunset” clause reflected this advice’. Australian perceptions that the war would be conducted principally in the northern hemisphere was strengthened by the fall of France in mid-1940.

By mid-1941, however, the Australian government had significant concerns about the threat posed by Japan and had become disillusioned by the strategic direction taken by the UK. The focus shifted to home defence, even as the war against Germany continued to dominate force deployments. Across this period (1939–1941), Australia’s strategy involved raising and deploying expeditionary forces, while also rallying society for a longer-term mobilisation. Peter Layton observes, expeditionary forces ‘were purposely not too large; the eligible workforce was deliberately reserved for other activities associated with the war, such as manufacturing. Australian products were made available for export to support the Allied war effort, but such exports were those that met the political need of marketing primary produce surpluses and the fiscal need to maintain overseas monetary exchange balances to pay for essential imports’. Moreover, the emphasis on home defence was such that it did not take from maintaining the expeditionary forces. ‘Focusing the Air Force on training Allied aircrews rather than restructuring for the defence of Australia was the most obvious manifestation of this. The munitions industry was developed rapidly, but not to a stage where it became a workforce competitor to the armed forces or those industries supplying civil needs’.

In 1942, against a backdrop of warring Allied and Axis blocs, and the perceived existential threat from Japan, Prime Minister Curtin publicly declared ‘total mobilisation’. The following day, Darwin was struck by Japanese air raids in the largest single attack by a foreign power ever mounted on Australia. An explanation of what ‘total mobilisation’ meant for the community was delivered by a government spokesman. ‘It means that upon the gazettal of the total mobilisation regulations everybody in this country who has anything or is anything can be ordered by the Government to do what the Government decides. All the possessions of all the people are henceforth at the Government’s disposal’.

Moreover, while the Australian Labor Party (ALP) had been opposed to compulsory military service, as prime minister in 1942, and as Australia faced a greater threat, Curtin sought to amend ALP policy to allow members of the militia to serve overseas. ‘The

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17 See Ball and Langtry, 1980; Langtry, 1987. This provides an overview of the War Book and its utility.
19 Layton, 2020, p. 17.
20 Layton, 2020, p. 18.
consequent Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act provided for the use of Australian conscripts in the South-Western Pacific Zone (SWPZ) during the period of war. The Act also provided that this approval would lapse within six months of Australia ceasing to be involved in hostilities’. The Australian government assumed an unprecedented level of control over society and the economy. There was a hurried expansion of defensive activities which saw considerable governmental and administrative innovation. While that level of activity could not be sustained, it demonstrated what Australia could do in extremis and with the lessons of the partial mobilisations of 1939–1941, fresh in the defence mind.

However, there were also signs that the move toward a fully mobilised war economy may have been too fulsome. Australia had over-committed to its plans for the Armed Forces as well as munitions, aircraft supply, general war production, and support for allies. As the direct risk to Australia had reduced, and with victory looking increasingly likely, in mid-1943 the emphasis on home defence shifted to the offensive, and Australia was again viewed as a support base. This meant rebalancing demands on national resources, including the expectation that the Australian Armed Forces would contribute significantly to the defeat of Japan and be involved at surrender negotiations, commitments to supporting U.S. forces as they moved north under reciprocal aid, and societal relief from the austerity of 1942–43.

1950s

Australian mobilisation efforts in the 1950s were guided by growing concern among world leaders that a Third World War may be imminent. Australia’s involvement in the Korean War and the Malayan emergency was modest, but those conflicts were perceived as part of a much larger geostrategic conflict. Prime Minister Menzies warned Australians of a Communist ‘pattern of aggression’. He declared,

> The dangers of war have increased considerably. It is my belief that the state of the world is such that we cannot, and must not, give ourselves more than three years in which to get ready to defend ourselves. Indeed, three years is a liberal estimate. … Let me be clear. I am not prophesying war. I merely point out that there is an imminent danger of one, and that against that imminent danger we must be prepared, and in time.

The general strategic view in this period was that Australia’s role in the future war would largely involve sending expeditionary forces offshore. While there appeared little risk of direct threat or invasion, Menzies asserted that ‘[w]herever there is a crucial theatre of war in such a fight, there will the security of Australia be defended’.

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22 Barrie, 2020, p. 37.
23 Layton, 2020, p. 22.
25 Layton, 2020, p. 27.
26 Menzies, 1951, p. 78.
There was a flurry of interest in mobilisation planning. In 1950, the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was established in order to coordinate the departments involved most immediately with war preparation and economic development.28 ‘The NSRB’s review work involved examining the national mobilisation that would be necessary in the event of war, particularly in terms of determining the priorities between defence sector, development sector and the general civilian sector of the economy’.29 At much the same time, the Menzies government also sponsored the National Service Act, requiring the compulsory call-up of men turning 18 on or after 1 November 1950, for service training of 176 days.30 Moreover, a new War Book was put together in 1956, the aim of which was to ‘facilitate the transition from peace to war by laying down actions to be taken by various departments and agencies in the early stages of a war emergency’. The measures described fell into two groups: those approved in advance that should be completed “as far as possible automatically”, and those to be referred to Cabinet when there was a threat or outbreak of war.31

This interest was not maintained, as the implications of nuclear war made existing mobilisation concepts seem outdated. Significantly, there was no resolve to modernise mobilisation planning against the nuclear threat, as was occurring in other nations. For example, in the United States the broadly disseminated ‘duck and cover’ film became firmly ingrained in the collective imaginary,32 and the Alert America convoy,33 a national education and mobilisation campaign to demonstrate the value of preparing for an atomic attack, travelled 36,000 miles throughout the nation’s 82 major cities and attracted 1.1 million people.34 In Australia, the political narrative veered to either end of the spectrum, that is, the threat of nuclear attack was too remote from the Australian continent or represented total annihilation.35 From 1952, efforts to write military advice for civil defence planning, and deliver a civil defence policy were largely defeated because of the prevailing view that there was no imminent threat to justify large scale expenditure on civil defence, and the Department of Defence was disinclined to underwrite such a policy.36 John Steinbach argues, from ‘1951 through to 1957 the only outcome, as far as civil defence thinking went, was a belated appreciation that there was actually no need of it’.37

28 See also the Defence Preparations Act 1951, and the associated Parliamentary debate. This was an unprecedented piece of peacetime legislation for mobilisation planning.
30 Barrie, 2020, p. 37.
35 Steinbach, 2002.
36 Steinbach, 2002.
Vietnam War and Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation

During this period, Australian units were fighting during Indonesian Confrontation as part of a larger British and Commonwealth force under British command. In 1964, Australia significantly increased the Defence Budget and against this conflict, reintroduced conscription. At much the same time, Australia also became involved in the Vietnam War. This conflict changed the way Australia conducted its military involvements and was particularly powerful in highlighting the role of public opinion when engaged in a prolonged conflict. Australia’s involvement in Vietnam began with a small commitment of 30 military advisors in 1962, and over the following decade, grew to 7,672 Australian personnel. ‘Between 1965 and December 1972 over 800,000 men registered for National Service. Some 63,000 were conscripted and over 19,000 (just under one third) served in Vietnam. Although registration was compulsory, a process of selection by ballot determined who would be called up. Two ballots were conducted each year. The ballots selected several dates in the selected period and all males with corresponding birthdays were called up for national service’.

In the early 1960s, Australia’s support for South Vietnam was consistent with the policies of other nations to curb the spread of communism in Europe and Asia. From 1966, however, there was growing opposition to Australia’s involvement in the war. War images of children burned by napalm, of the dead of My Lai, and of a South Vietnamese general summarily executing a member of the Viet Cong in the streets of Saigon, strongly influenced public opinion on the legitimacy of the war. It became increasingly unpopular, perceived as an unjust conflict, and the cause of great social and political dissent. The moratorium marches of 1970 and 1971 drew more than 200,000 people in cities and towns throughout the country. Post-Vietnam, Australia moved away from forward defence, placing greater emphasis on the defence of the Australian continent. There was also recognition of the public’s intolerance for casualties. Successive Australian governments exercised increased caution when deploying military forces overseas. In 1972 Prime Minister Whitlam announced the end of ‘peace time’ conscription.

1990s

In the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought a marked shift in international dynamics towards individual and human rights. Contemporary international conditions also drove change in the character and orientation of the ADF. There was ‘enormous scope’

38 Barrie, 2020, p. 37.
39 During this period, Australian units were also fighting during the Indonesian Confrontation as part of a larger British and Commonwealth force under British command.
40 DVA, 2019.
43 In the 1980s, some conceptual work occurred in relation to force expansion and the way in which the military could draw on the civil community. See the Dibb Review; Defence White Paper 1987; the Wrigley Review, 1990.
for bringing the organisation under public scrutiny on contemporary societal issues, and particularly questions of individual rights.\textsuperscript{44} The organisation moved toward mobilising in military theatres with a more direct humanitarian agenda, including peacekeeping, interventions, and disaster relief. Indeed, in 1993, Australia had more than 2,000 peacekeepers in the field, with large contingents in Cambodia and Somalia. A year later, an Australian contingent was sent to Rwanda, where involvement was largely centred on medical staff who were able to treat people in local communities as well as members of the UN force. Moreover, Australians have served on Bougainville since 1997.\textsuperscript{45}

In 1999, Australia led an operation which dwarfed its previous peacekeeping efforts. The UN-authorised force, INTERFET, largely consisted of ADF personnel deployed to East Timor to establish and uphold peace in the wake of the independence referendum. Australia contributed over 5,500 personnel and the force commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove. The ADF had not planned for the intervention and in an effort to reduce military personnel, logistics capabilities were outsourced, and only limited provision made for offshore operations where there would be limited or no presence of Australian contractors or commercial firms. Layton also highlights that ‘[t]he 1999 timing was doubly unfortunate in that the transition of the various logistics and support agencies and organisations from being mainly military to a blend of military and civilian was incomplete, imperfect and untested’.\textsuperscript{46}

In the East Timor case, limited use was made of national mobilisation, with excessive importance placed on stockholdings. Layton argues, ‘there were few contingency stockholdings, operational security prevented stockholding build-up pre-deployment, there were concurrent demands arising from other operations and exercises, there was little in-house understanding of usage rates, there was an unexpected need to also supply some coalition partners and for some items there were long lead times’. This event demonstrated that Australian commercial support elements needed to be integrated much more effectively and seamlessly into the national support base, to ensure the best use of local capabilities and resources.\textsuperscript{47}

**Afghanistan**

Australia first committed military personnel to Afghanistan in October 2001 after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. The shocking, and highly visible, nature of these attacks played a significant role generating early bipartisanship in the Australian response.\textsuperscript{48} Then prime minister, John Howard, took the symbolic step of invoking Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty, and when the United States launched Operation Enduring

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} McAllister and Makkai, 1991, p. 211; Miller, 2014, p. 67.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Australian War Memorial, undated.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Layton, 2020, p. 33.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Layton, 2020, pp. 36–37.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Maley, 2015, p. 82.
\end{itemize}
Freedom, it was fully supported to the extent that Australian politicians from the major parties also broadly adopted the vocabulary of the Bush administration’s ‘global War on Terror’. ⁴⁹

As in Australia’s engagement in Iraq War, mobilisation for the war in Afghanistan was selective. The initial Australian deployment in 2001 of around 120 Special Forces troops lasted for less than 12 months. ‘From November to April 2002, Australian SAS squadrons participated in operations in the mountainous regions south of Kabul, conducting reconnaissance and surveillance, searching for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters and their bases’. ⁵⁰ While the war ended somewhat inconclusively in 2002, soldiers remained on deployment in Afghanistan, continuing operations with coalition forces to pursue Taliban terrorist groups and conduct reconstruction and engineering projects, and undertaking mentoring operations with the Afghan National Army’s frontline forces. ⁵¹ This contribution to the war in Afghanistan, known as Operation Slipper was conducted from 2001 to 2014. ⁵²

Justifying such a long-term engagement was an ongoing challenge. The reason for Australian involvement in Afghanistan has been, from the beginning, that in building a more secure and democratic Afghanistan Australia improves its own security. The Minister for Defence said in his June 2010 statement to Parliament: ‘Our fundamental objective in Afghanistan is to combat a clear threat from international terrorism to both international security and our own national security. Australia cannot afford, and Australians cannot afford, to let Afghanistan again become a safe haven and training ground for terrorist organisations’. ⁵³ While that rhetoric may have been persuasive in the early stages of the conflict, public support was not sustained. The Afghanistan experience demonstrates that mobilisation is, as Layton argues, more than an engineering or logistical planning exercise, it also includes social issues and concerns. ⁵⁴ Ongoing deployment of Australians in Oruzgan province produced growing numbers of Australian casualties, and even with these losses, and without broad-based support from the public, successive governments renewed Australian commitment to the war.

2003 Iraq War

Australia’s participation in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was atypical as there was limited warning time, specifically in terms of military operations. But, as Australia’s contributions to the conflict were to be buttressed by other nations’ national support bases, the

⁴⁹ Maley, 2015, pp. 85–86.
⁵⁰ Australian War Memorial, undated.
⁵¹ Australian War Memorial, undated.
⁵² After this date, Australia’s ‘train, advise and assist’ mission in Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission has been conducted under the code name Operation Highroad.
⁵³ Watt, 2010.
⁵⁴ Layton, 2019, p. 4.
problem was lessened to some degree.\textsuperscript{55} There were, however, ‘issues of compartmentalisation of information preventing the Australian national support base from being fully activated before the war commenced’, and there were some problems in terms of outsourcing to other nations the national support base. While support was generally solid, there were some issues around timeliness and quality. There were also operational constraints when it became clear that some of the build standards of the equipment operated by Australian and U.S. forces were not identical. This meant that support for some ADF equipment by U.S. forces was not possible, rendering its use impractical during the conflict.\textsuperscript{56}

However, as Layton argues, ‘the short duration of the invasion, the operational plan being implemented almost unhindered and the lack of significant adversary response minimised most impacts’. In Iraq the use of national mobilisation was ‘deliberately marginal’. ‘[T]here was an expectation that just-in-time support could be provided by the global marketplace or allies. Australia’s ability to access equipment quickly was both a function of having a close strategic relationship with the United States but also having close personal relationships’.\textsuperscript{57}

**Observations**

There appears throughout this history timeline a series of ‘missed opportunities’ to introduce not only improved mobilisation planning, but other initiatives that may have promoted a much closer relationship between military and civil parties to support mobilisation. This includes NS, which will be discussed in the next section, is in part responsible in a number of overseas countries for their closer relationships.

As highlighted in the opening paragraphs of this report, a confluence of national events and geopolitical developments present opportunity to bring strategic mobilisation not only to the centre of Defence planning, but also to the public, demanding not only their attention but also their participation.

\textsuperscript{55} Layton, 2020, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{56} Layton, 2020, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{57} Layton, 2020, pp. 35–36.
Current national and world events have demonstrated the significance of a nation’s resilience in mobilising for national emergencies, and the importance of those factors in planning for the future. The response of the Australian people to the recent pandemic and bushfires has been largely cohesive, and recent cyberattacks and actions of malign foreign interference have been met by decisive legislation\(^1\) and *Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2020*.\(^2\) Yet, these emergencies have exposed areas of national susceptibility, cross-sectoral tensions, and the fundamentality of delivering protective measures and civil resilience across a broad spectrum of national threats. Each event has demanded new types and levels of interaction between the federal government, the states, local communities, and the Defence sector, and exposed a need for effective coordination, messaging, and understanding in terms of roles and responsibilities.\(^3\) This is vitally important when measures are implemented that are seen to curb civil liberties,\(^4\) as exemplified by border closures, lockdowns, and restrictions of movement enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic response.

**The Need to Bridge the Gap**

Australia faces national challenges where the citizens are increasingly the frontline actors. Whether national disasters, pandemics, or hybrid warfare, the importance of the social dimension to national security has become heightened. This may compel greater ‘shared purpose’\(^5\) between civil society, government, Defence, and industry when planning for and delivering mobilisation efforts. Katherine Mansted, Senior Adviser for Public Policy at the National Security College, ANU, argues that Australia needs ‘a new national security paradigm that recognises the centrality of the social realm and engages citizens as key players’.\(^6\) Recognising the role of the citizenry is important as ‘the provisioning of security has become increasingly difficult for the nation-state, as its span of control does not efficiently correspond with the transnational threats at the heart of this emerging uncertainty’, and will require ‘the nation-state to agree on a new social contract with its citizens, based on a mutual understanding that acknowledges at least a partial shift from prevention of threats to management of the impacts of threats’.\(^7\) In terms of national mobilisation planning, which is by its very nature,

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\(^1\) Federal Register of Legislation, 2018.
\(^3\) Berger and Reupert, 2020, pp. 494–496.
\(^5\) Bonchek, 2016.
\(^6\) Mansted, 2019.
\(^7\) Fjäder, 2014.
a cross-sectoral exercise, the explicit nature of the relationship between the civil and Defence sectors requires consideration.

This is especially important as the sectors have conventionally been segregated from each other, in part, a product of the established democratic system, and in part, resultant of the theory of objective civilian primacy over the military. Because the use of force is not the basis for a government’s longevity, the relationship between the military, the government, and the citizenry, is multifaceted and ever-changing.

Leading civil-military scholar James Burk observes, democratic civil-military relations must include ‘direct and indirect dealings that ordinary people and institutions have with the military’. These dealings include legislative debates over the funding and regulation and use of the military. And the definition and implementation of national security policy requires complex negotiation between civilian and military representatives alike. In some contexts, the conflict between the democracies and militaries is growing as each party steadfastly holds onto its own history and hierarchy and regime of principles, norms, and rules. While this may be a necessary convoluted relationship, given the fundamental role of the military, it makes democracies susceptible to cross-sectoral fracture. Unfortunately, the intentionally insular character of the military system, committed first and foremost to preparing its people for war, only exacerbates this further. While the military shares the same core democratic values as civilians, it accepts an ideological divide between its conservative leadership and liberal, individualistic civil society, and believes that it should operate in a separate domain to remain effective and apolitical.

This may have been appropriate for World Wars fought on foreign soil, but with the changing character of war encompassing attacks on home soil, against our own citizens, it may no longer be so. Recent crises have demonstrated the increasing interdependence of Defence and civil sectors. Building a stronger relationship between these sectors is arguably well overdue. The Wrigley Report of 1990 was ‘the most recent time that the Australian Government decided to seriously examine national mobilisation’. The report made clear the centrality of deep cross societal participation to mobilisation, recommending that, ‘[w]hile the career military professional is clearly crucial to building and maintaining effective

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8 Agnew, 2012, pp. 1–19; Strachan, 2003, pp. 43–63; Winslow, 2001. The ‘Project on the Gap between the Military and Civilian Society’ was sponsored by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (known as the TISS study), directed by Peter Feaver, Richard Kohn and others. The project’s findings were developed in Feaver and Kohn, 2001.

9 See Huntington, 1957. Huntington proposed a theory of objective civilian control, the ‘gap’ was ‘an ideological divide between a generally conservative officer corps and a liberal and individualistic civilian society’, and control over the armed forces was best asserted by their professionalisation.


11 Department of Defence, 2015.


13 Layton, 2020, p. 38.

14 Layton, 2020, p. 38.
national defence in peacetime, few would dispute that in times of national danger the professional will need to be reinforced, perhaps massively, by others in the community. The issue is not whether ordinary citizens would be involved in military service, but when and how they should'. As Australia is currently facing challenges that are truly national in scope, and is mobilising in precedent setting ways, there is a rare opportunity to address cross-sectoral issues as it matures an effective mobilisation strategy for the future.

Communication Strategy

Such a mobilisation strategy will require, however, the development of a rigorous, well-crafted communication strategy that articulates responsibilities and expectations, and a new ‘strategic narrative’ that brings the sectors together in shared purpose. The ‘strategic narrative’ provides storylines which ‘explain events convincingly and from which inferences could be drawn’. They are designed ‘with the intention of structuring the responses of others to developing events’, by resonating with ‘the experience, culture, and concerns of its intended audience. If effectively constructed, provide actions with legitimacy and offer a cognitive path to victory’. This last point is important as it is often the cognitive domain that is decisive in the outcome; responsible for stamina, resilience, and the will to fight.

Hew Strachan and Ruth Harris have recently argued, ‘the formation of effective strategy in a democracy requires conversations both between the government and its civil service and armed forces, and between the government and its electorate’. This alertness to the security environment ‘creates a more robust society’ and ‘provides a level of protection as it reduces the returns on attack’. As hybrid and grey-zone warfare prospers at the interface of civil and military sectors, increased ‘societal ownership’ is a means to effective resilience, shifting ‘the balance (in Huntington’s terminology) from “objective” to “subjective” military control’.

In Australia, while there has been an augmented role for the civil sector in mobilising against recent cyberattacks, bushfires, and the pandemic, broad-based awareness of national security matters remains relatively low. This is in part because Australia does not have ongoing mechanisms, like national service, to support long-term awareness and a shared narrative, and in part because the ADF does not effectively incorporate civil sector matters,

16 Freedman, 2015, p. 19.
17 McNerney et al., 2018, p. xv. This report found that ‘the effective use of engagement and information (internally directed indoctrination and externally directed messaging) can greatly influence will to fight and thus should improve the chances of victory. While our research focussed on states in conflict, it is especially important to note that these mechanisms are most effective before a conflict begins’. Moreover, ‘engagement efforts can help a government strengthen the resolve of partners and bring adversaries to the negotiating table’. Relatedly, the report discovered that the concept of ‘national identity, permeates almost every other aspect of will to fight. . . . The implications are significant for strengthening or weakening will to fight and even for strengthening or weakening the very foundations of society. While difficult to analyze in a way that is rigorous yet useful to policymakers, national identity is an underlying and crucial variable in our model’.
18 Strachan and Harris, 2020, pp. 23–24.
including social cohesion, citizen support, and material and psychological resilience, into its planning or doctrine.

**Psychological Resilience**

Nations with a strong history of national service, military or civil, have a more natural cohesion/affiliation between Defence, industry, and civil society. There is a culture of societal contribution, and clear roles for mobilisation. As is illustrated in the following examples, each has an entrenched culture of military service, and a civil-military relationship defined by the acceptance of the premise that the universal nature of service anchors broader society to its defence force.

In Finland, ‘Psychological Resilience’ was a key theme of 2017 Security Strategy for Society, as well as ‘one of the Finnish Government’s seven recognised Vital Functions for Society. This entails bolstering individual citizens’ will to fight or endure hardship, and potentially invoking emergency powers of the types described in the previous section to ensure that the basic needs of the population are met in times of crisis. Alongside these direct measures, the Strategy also emphasises the need to reinforce the broader resilience of Finnish social structures ahead of any crisis in the first place; this means building a fairer, better-governed and more democratic society in peacetime conditions’.19

The emphasis on ‘psychological resilience’ in Finland’s defence approach is consistent with, and bolstered by, ‘a national identity built around concepts of “sisu” (loosely translating to English as stoical determination, grit or resilience)’. Having fought a number of wars of national survival against the Soviet Union throughout 1939 and the 1940s, against unfavourable odds, Finland has habituated civil preparedness, will to fight, and endurance, into its defensive identity to the extent that it provides guidelines, through its Security Strategy for Society ‘on how to safeguard societal functions’ and the importance of fostering conditions ‘whereby communities can withstand and recover from crisis situations’. This defensive approach necessitates ‘close cooperation with civil society via partnership and security agreements, letters of intent, as well as joint exercises’. In addition, ‘private, public and civil society actors meet frequently to update plans and to practise how to maintain the “critical functions of society” during national crises’.20

Similarly, the Swedish total defence model assumes ‘Psychological Defence’ as a key pillar. In Sweden, ‘social cohesion and equality’ are considered essential to ‘a strong will to fight and support for total defence—particularly in ensuring trust between the government and its citizens, which is a central tenet of Swedish public administration’.21 Certainly, the societal aspect is part of a longer history, the ‘psychological defence’ concept becoming integral to Swedish defence during the Second World War and the Cold War. And more

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19 As detailed in Chapter 3.
20 As detailed in Chapter 3.
21 As detailed in Chapter 3.
recently, as Sweden’s security environment has deteriorated, and there are heightened concerns about disinformation and hybrid/grey-zone activities, psychological defence has been prioritised.

This is as evinced by the dissemination of an information pamphlet, *If Crisis or War Comes*, preparing the country. Based on a pamphlet distributed during the Cold War (between 1941 and 1991), it was delivered to ‘all 4.7 million Swedish households to inform them on modern threats such as terrorism, fake news and cell phone usage during a crisis and outlining Swedish citizens’ role in total defence’. The societal dimension will be further reinforced with the establishment of a new government agency with a ‘mandate to coordinate, support and develop Sweden’s societal resilience and psychological defence’. The agency would:

- Identify, analyse, and be able to meet undue information influence and other misleading information directed at Sweden or Swedish interests;
- Disseminate knowledge and continuously contribute to the preparedness with regard to psychological defence among other relevant actors, such as other authorities, county administrative boards, municipalities and organizations in need of support;
- Ensure that training and exercises take place within the authority’s area of responsibility;
- Monitor, order, quality assure and convey research and other knowledge development in matters relating to psychological defence; and,
- Support media companies in identifying, analysing and meeting undue information influence, to the extent that such support is requested.

Switzerland, too, bases its defence concept on the total defence model, ‘while also operating under the assumption of “armed neutrality”, whereby it does not participate or take sides in conflicts but maintains a military for self-defence and peacekeeping purposes’. In cultural and social terms, Switzerland has a diverse population (i.e., different national languages, religious backgrounds, cultures), and the 26 cantons into which it is federated, have a large degree of autonomy in terms of governance and decisionmaking, not unlike Australia. Because of the diversity in culture and governance, ‘ensuring social cohesion is a goal of the federal government and is enshrined in the constitution. Specifically, the second article of the constitution states that the Confederation ‘favours joint prosperity, sustainable development, internal cohesion, and cultural diversity of the country’.

One of the key mechanisms for developing societal cohesion is through the mixing of people from different parts of Switzerland through the Swiss military. Swiss men are obliged to undertake military service (this is optional for women) and are obliged to keep their equipment and personal firearm at home. If individuals refuse to undertake military service, they are required to complete civil service, which lasts 1.5 times longer than the standard military service of 245 days to dissuade from the option. This emphasis on compulsory

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22 As detailed in Chapter 5.
23 As detailed in Chapter 5.
24 As detailed in Chapter 4.
military service (despite referenda in 1989, 2001 and 2013) not only aids social cohesion, it supports civil-military anchoring. While there is a civil-military gap appearing in Swiss society, and there have been some efforts to suppress military service, the Swiss population remains largely supportive of their Armed Forces and understand the societal benefits of service. This cohesion serves as societal resilience and psychological buttress to national mobilisation efforts.

Again, ascribing to the total defence model, ‘Singapore has successfully inculcated the entire population into its concept of Total Defence, and there is a high level of respect for the SAF’. Moreover, it includes ‘Psychological Defence’ which recognises the importance of resilience and national identity in this approach and does so in a way that is explicit and open, creating clarity around what the military requires of the general population against what the general population may require of it’. ‘This dynamic is supported with clear and consistent messaging through a variety of media exactly what each of the Defence pillars requires of the general population’.

Even as the United States operates according to a different model and contends with a strikingly dissimilar domestic and threat environment, it assumes the fortitude of its national identity, and to a significant extent, relies on it to strengthen civil resilience during domestic crises. Steadfast belief in the providential mission of the nation, and reverence for the values written into the U.S. Constitution represents broad-based psychological resilience among the American people. It also informs a localised, community-based response to emergencies. For example, during the Cold War, while civil defence issues were at the forefront of public discussion and the national defence agenda, ‘strong traditions of individualism and individual liberty, control of federal government’, meant that ‘state and local authorities have retained significant control over the way a civil emergency is dealt with, thus creating an environment where the response to civil emergencies is localised and may differ across the country. The primacy of local and state level response is engrained in the United States’ approach to domestic emergency situations’.

However, this approach may only benefit those states that enjoy a positive economic position. As Finucane and colleagues identified, disasters are not only becoming more common, but also costlier. Thus, not only are the responses shaped by the economic position of the state, but in the aftermath of disaster, as policymakers rush to minimise ongoing risks, such efforts may in the long term leave some communities even more vulnerable. The lack of balance between short-term solutions and long-term policymaking may be further undermining any remaining community resilience.

Given the United States geographical size (which is similar to Australia’s), it also makes sense that the ability to marshal the right capabilities and capacity to respond in a timely manner to threats, is driven by location. As such, the military tends to support, rather than

25 As detailed in Chapter 2.
26 As detailed in Chapter 6.
27 Finucane et al., 2020, pp. 482–500.
replace, the civilian federal, state, or local organisations, through specialist capabilities and experience in areas such as logistics and transportation, search and rescue, engineering, medical aid. But location in the United States also attracts different responses and different levels of attention—consistent with perhaps their economic position and driven by political interests. A review of responses to Hurricanes Harvey (in Houston, Texas) and Maria (in Puerto Rico) indicated a large disparity in the federal government response from meals and water that were distributed, to the number of helicopters deployed to the different disaster sites. The locations even attracted different levels of attention from President Trump.

Civil-Military Relationship Building

Australia is, in relative terms, lacking a comparable means of anchoring the sectors to each other, and of delivering broad-based psychological resilience among the citizenry. It does not have a history of ongoing national or universal service or a strong national narrative like that which strengthens societal resilience in the United States. Moreover, the ADF neglects to incorporate, in an explicit sense, concepts of psychological resilience into its national defence approach. As such, it does not have the mechanisms to effectively safeguard societal functions and both draw from, and rely on, communities instilled with the strength to withstand and recover from crisis situations. The ADF, taking the lead from some of the cases above, may need to be more deliberate in its strategic engagement with civil society, in conceptual, social, and material terms. Particularly as the national challenges of recent years, which have largely involved crises around structures, resources, and services in the civil sector, show no sign of easing.

Certainly, there is incentive for the ADF to proactively reinforce the civil-military relationship, as it would allow for enhanced focus on the protection of Australia in extremis, while being supported by a civil society invested in a mutually agreed social contract. Military commitments during the summer bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic have prompted concern ‘about ever-increasing demands on the military to help when domestic disasters strike’ and the effect on its ability to train and fights wars. While this may be answered by material measures it must be bolstered by stronger national and psychological resilience, enhanced by civil preparedness. In the contemporary context, the ADF relies heavily on an implicit idea of a national resilience model, only triggering mobilisation when that model fails, as exemplified when the ADF was called out during Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST.

A sophisticated understanding of what resilience means in the context of various Australian communities and how it can be measured, evaluated, and most importantly, fostered may need to be incorporated into planning. Moreover, contingency response plans

29 See, for example, Vinik, 2018.
should be developed in cooperation and coordination with non-government sectors so as to effectively integrate the community into emergency planning and response measures.31 Increasingly, ‘the resilience of civil structures, resources and services is the first line of defence for today’s modern societies’.32 The ADF has an obligation to develop its mobilisation planning in a way that is commensurate with that threat profile, and which keeps the parent society it is designed to defend at the forefront of considerations.

32 Roepke and Thankey, 2019.
11. Baselining Current Mobilisation Supply and Demand

The rationale for the undertaking of a baselining activity to understand what is needed in any Australian Defence mobilisation effort against what may be available is examined in this section. Well documented changes in the National Base since the last nation-wide mobilisation efforts are large, and a better understanding of where gaps now exist is needed. Options for how equipment and material is accessed by the overseas countries studied are presented as options to mobilisation planning here, but very quickly, in the overseas cases where total defence predominates, the discussion turns to whole-of-society mobilisation. Regardless of who may possess authority or delegation, what is emphasised is the continued way in which mechanisms are tested and mobilisation is exercised. Testing, practising, and exercising is a key facet of mobilisation planning, since it assists in understanding where the limitations and stressors are. It is no different to any other military activity.

With a more detailed understanding of the gaps, opportunities to engage with international partners to ameliorate these or build up stockholding for the most critical materiel could be pursued.

Several different examples are available to demonstrate of what mobilisation efforts comprise, who is mobilised, at what stage of mobilisation, and for how long personnel may be mobilised. Similar charts could be constructed for Australia by drawing on existing data such as that which informs Total Workforce Pocket Briefs in the Army. But accessing the right skill base for modern warfare is more than a numbers game and options for how this is achieved also needs to be considered.

As most of the detailed content with respect to scale and numbers is best read in context, it is recommended that the individual case study sections are accessed directly.

National Base

Returning to the earlier statement regarding Defence’s long held approach towards mobilisation planning as more aligned to that which a large country (as big as the United States) would undertake, where a commensurate large industrial base could be drawn from against conventional threats. The second flaw in this statement is centred around the ‘commensurate large industrial base’.

Geographically, Australia is a large country, but its population, economy, and defence force are not. Furthermore, even in relative terms to its size, Australia’s national industrial base is small. It has changed significantly over the last 50–60 years and has become somewhat diminished in the areas that mobilisation efforts would traditionally draw from.

The term national base is used as a generic term to represent the resources available to the nation including workforce, transportation, equipment, health support, facilities, training, communications, legislative issues, and funding.1 Also included is the industrial base which

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comprises several different sectors including agribusiness, construction, financial services, manufacturing, mining, power, energy and utilities, and defence. According to ADF doctrine, ‘the National Support Base encompasses the full range of organisations, systems, and arrangements, both formal and informal, that own, control or influence ADF access to, and the use of, capability’.²

Initially, the most appropriate part of the national base that Defence may turn to is the Defence Industry sector. However, despite initiatives such as the Defence Industrial Capability Plan³ that recognise the importance of defence industry sovereignty, and the skills base, value-added work in Australia and infrastructure it brings, large multinationals still dominate the sector, squeezing out the local, mainly small to medium enterprises (SMEs) at whom the plan is targeted. It remains unclear (and untested), where, in times of crisis, the loyalties of such multinationals reside or who in their global market they prioritise. These issues do not augur well for Australia, given the amount of capability with which Defence is usually concerned is at least an order of magnitude smaller, if not two, than other competing countries. Initiatives like the Navy’s Continuous Shipbuilding Program among other prioritised sovereign-based industries, have recognised the need to establish a deeper national capability in this space, but this is a long multi-year initiative, still fraught with its own issues of sustaining the supply to keep the demand for shipbuilding skills alive.

Even if the defence industry sector successfully diversifies, there is still not enough within this to support mobilisation efforts. Manufacturing, for a long time comprised an important part of the national base, contributing at its peak a significant percentage of the GDP and employing almost a third of the workforce. The nation capitalised on its manufacturing base that had grown steadily from its humble beginnings, such that it was able to mobilise quickly and effectively to support Defence during the Second World War, and it continued to grow and contribute to the economy for more than ten years after that war’s conclusion.⁴ However, due to global economic changes (starting in the 1970s), where Asian nations started to adopt Western-style manufacturing and subsequent government policy changes that removed protectionist tariffs, the manufacturing industry began to decline. Previously protected by tariffs, the manufacturing sector had become comfortable but complacent, especially with respect to innovation, such that when subjected to global competition (in the 1980s and 1990s), the manufacturing sector was all but decimated and even today it now still only constitutes 6 per cent of the Australian GDP, compared to 15–20 per cent elsewhere in the world.⁵

The implications of these economic initiatives on the national base are still playing out today as the crisis associated with the coronavirus has shown—Australia’s dependence now on imports and other supply lines makes it vulnerable to disruptions to supply chains and manufacturing in other countries. Considering medical supplies alone, it is reported that

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² In geographical terms, the national support base refers to the Australian nation.
³ Department of Defence, 2018.
⁴ Milne, 2010.
⁵ Milne, 2010.
Australia imports more than it exports by a ratio of 7:1 for diagnostic equipment, and 2:1 for instruments; and, we import over 90 per cent of medicines which are themselves at the end of a very long global supply chain.

These examples are not exhaustive, and there are initiatives emerging with respect to how overseas supply shortages can be addressed more locally. The impacts of globalisation on Australian national resources may not be unique either. But given Australia’s unique geographic location, its allies, and its economic partners (who are not the same), may mean that access to resources to overcome shortcomings in its national base may not be easily addressed. Revised approaches to mobilisation planning will need to take this into consideration.

**Options for Mobilising Resources in Support of the Department of Defence**

For mobilising American industry, the U.S. government has the DPA. The DPA may authorise the DPAS which ‘allows preferential treatment for contracts or orders relating to certain approved defense or energy programs for military production and construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, and stockpiling’. Parts of the DPA, with respect to priorities, have been invoked in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and there was much pressure on the President to extend his powers further, compelling companies to manufacture further medical supplies.

The cumulative effects of the pandemic have had implications for production and manufacturing in Australia. The revised Strategic Defensive posture to ‘zero warning time’ means force structure planning or capability delivery outcomes cannot be as readily leveraged preparation for mobilisation. Against this, some are already asserting that Australia will need to take a range of measures ‘from trade and power (fuels and green technologies) to manufacturing and services, … to be a fortress with the ability to open and close the doors as needed’. Others are calling for an ‘Australian DPA’—a National Strategic Industries Act which calls for identification of nationally critical heavy industries, such as mining through to water security, agriculture, and strategic resource reserves.

Sovereign capability and associated supply chains need to be understood to ensure at least some critical defence capabilities can be sustained and regenerated if threat events perpetuate. This will include knowing what to stockpile in cases where Australia cannot reasonably create all elements needed (e.g., microprocessors). Again, looking to the United States, where

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9 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
10 See, for example, Farley, 2020.
with respect to mobilising equipment and materiel for its Armed Forces, it has articulated in doctrine\textsuperscript{13} options for how a surge (if required) against the industrial base for commercially available items may be met. As discussed in Chapter 6, the DoD also has well-established mechanisms for accessing transport assets from the CRAF, and National Defense Reserve Fleet.

The Australian Government has already set precedents this year during the bushfires where it mobilised for the ‘first time in Australia’s history’ the Army Reserve for disaster relief through a compulsory call-out.\textsuperscript{14} This indicates that its civilian base was not enough. Correspondingly, perhaps what the Army or ADF may face, might test the limits of its capability. But rather than turning to the national base in crisis, perhaps initiatives such as a National Strategic Industries Act could start to pave the way in understanding what is needed. It may also be a demonstration of commitment and support to mobilisation on a national level, recognising the key role the national base at large plays. This needs to be cultivated but goes hand in hand with recognising and readily accepting defence dual purposes of a range of different capabilities.

Such an undertaking would also be consistent with other associated initiatives such as the Defence Sensitive Technologies Policy Framework\textsuperscript{15} or the newly raised Critical Technologies branch within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.\textsuperscript{16} Both are focussed on protecting technologies that have actual or potential advantages and limit any associated disadvantages and disruption to the Defence mission and broader economic and sovereign interests, respectively.

The total defence approaches practised by the other countries examined already coordinate military and civil functions undertaken in safeguarding against threats together. In Finland, as each ministry has different roles in civil and territorial defence preparedness, coordination and planning occur through the Head of Preparedness in each ministry. In the event of a major crisis the President can invoke emergency powers and the Ministry of Defence and Finnish Defence Forces have delegated authorities and contingency plans as expected, as well as agencies such as the National Emergency Supply Agency and Finnish Border Guard which is managed by a general functional model. As discussed already, Australia possesses similar delegations and authorities at the Federal Government level. However, in Finland, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment has also been given responsibility to prepare the wider resources of businesses and workers outside of the defence and security sectors, to be mobilised in the event of a crisis:

This requires both public and private sector actors to take measures to safeguard security of supply into their planning, operations and budgets, as well as to ensure the necessary infrastructure, stockpiles, data and processes for implementation. This cuts across the entire production chain, with the Finnish comprehensive security concept addressing everything from

\textsuperscript{13} U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
\textsuperscript{14} Foley, 2020.
\textsuperscript{15} Department of Defence, 2020b.
\textsuperscript{16} Private communication with DST staff, July 2020.
international trade to finance and banking, raw material extraction, local manufacturing and distribution. This is supported by the work of the National Emergency Supply Agency, which engages both in voluntary partnerships with businesses as well as enactment of competence-specific legislation affecting critical sectors.\footnote{As per Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, 2018.}

In addition, members of the business community are also involved in security preparedness with legal requirements imposed on some sectors to meet security requirements—such as telecommunications and transport, energy, and finance. Other industry and trade associations are \textbf{mandated} to help meet requirements. This Finnish model for a whole-of-society approach to civil preparedness and mobilisation is illustrated by Figure 11.1, taken from the Security Strategy for Society:\footnote{Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2017a.}

\textbf{Figure 11.1. Finnish Model for a Whole-of-Society Approach to Civil Preparedness and Mobilisation}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure_11.1.png}
\end{center}

\textit{SOURCE: Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2017a}

Notwithstanding these national efforts, the Security Strategy emphasises the increasingly ‘vital’ role of international cooperation for preparedness, where it states that ‘national preparedness measures should be supplemented and strengthened through membership of the European Union and international security co-operation’.\footnote{Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2011.}

As Sweden has worked towards revitalising its total defence model it has ensured Constitutional and Organisational Readiness. The first is concerned with legal provisions, while the latter with clarity of roles and responsibilities and tasks of stakeholders. In both cases arrangements have been tried and tested, training provided, and mobilisation exercises conducted, which encompassed exploring supply chain resilience as well as robustness of digital infrastructure and communications channels.\footnote{MSB, 2019.}
While policy changes may be required—like a National Strategic Industries Act—practice of mobilisation is also required. Mobilisation exercises need to test and try current arrangements and identify where shortcomings and gaps may be.

To this end, paper exercises might be a useful start, calculating whether key resources could be raised, whether the appropriate infrastructure exists to support mobilisation. For example, could Australia raise a merchant Navy if it needed it? This question then prompts further considerations such as: what are the mechanisms that allow nationalisation of the commensurate assets—ships and boats—for a merchant navy?

The UK’s response to the same question, highlights their ability to raise the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) which includes their Merchant Navy. The UK can call on any British flagged ship and supporting staff and sailors are mobilised at short notice as Royal Navy personnel.

The RFA was activated in the Falklands War and most assets performed troop carrying duties, but the Royal Navy commandeered two large container ships, the first named Atlantic Conveyor and with only limited modifications converted it into an impromptu aircraft carrier with helicopters and Harrier jump jets that did not require a long carrier deck. The second sistership Atlantic Causeway was more extensively modified with an aviation refuelling system and hangar structure built on deck. The Conveyor was inadvertently struck by missiles during the conflict and eventually sank despite attempts to rescue it.21

Notwithstanding the utility that the RFA offers, there are limiting factors associated with how extensively assets can be used, particularly around port infrastructure.22 That said, without first exercising the idea, secondary issues like this may not be identified.

Another consideration may be location. Is location a driver, or should it be, for the type of mobilisation undertaken? For instance, South Australia (SA) and Western Australia (WA) are better placed to mobilise a shipbuilding/manufacturing base; Victoria (VIC), New South Wales (NSW) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) are better placed to mobilise for a cyberattack—indeed initiatives within the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) to establish its own bespoke Protected Network (outside of its normal highly classified operational networks) was in part justified by the larger talent pool it could access within VIC and NSW, outside of the ACSC in Canberra, to assist in its Cyber Defence.23 Any additions to infrastructure or training for mobilisation may need to make similar considerations with respect to where the skills or assets may reside.

It is also understood that the Defence Science and Technology (DST) group are undertaking on behalf of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) a Basing Study to inform investments for upgrading infrastructure.24 Such basing issues are pertinent to mobilisation planning in general, particularly in terms of concentration, staging points, and training hubs

21 Roblin, 2019.
22 Private communication with RAND Europe researchers, July 2020.
24 Private communications with DST staff, August 2020.
and the logistical, transportation infrastructure support required in turn, to sustain them.
Thus, there may be opportunity to contribute mobilisation requirements to decisionmaking associated with this Basing Study.

To be in a position to influence a range of other initiatives so that mobilisation planning requirements are considered, the requirements first need to be articulated. It is acknowledged that there are a (large) number of options for mobilisation, so strategic choices need to be made, winners picked\(^\text{25}\) (to avoid trying everything) since Australia does not have the capacity to maintain everything to its pre-war levels—but how? What makes a winner? Is this informed by planning requirements it can do, against those it definitely cannot do? Or does the latter present the greatest vulnerability? It is suggested that a range of exercises, paper-based, modelling and wargaming need to be undertaken to understand answers better here.

### Mobilising Personnel: Numbers and Sources of Labour

Each case study has a different way of presenting how forces are mobilised. Some models include the different levels of mobilisation, others include the length of time expected when mobilised; others their total obligation to national service.

For example, the United States, again through its JP 4-05 Joint Mobilization Planning (2018) summarises the relationship between levels of mobilisation, types of forces mobilised, and the maximum potential lengths of mobilisation, based on the relevant sections of Title 10, U.S.C. as shown in Figure 6.2.

Switzerland’s DEVA, instituted in 2018, was a new mobilisation process to improve the availability of its Armed Forces. As shown in figure 4.2 it has assured that within 10 days up to 35,000 personnel can be mobilised, where MADE are activated to help civilian authorities within 24 to 96 hours.

Both of these models demonstrate the reliance on their Reserve components. In Australia there has also been an increasing reliance on the Reserve component of the Defence Force as part of the operational force and an understanding that the ADF may not have achieved the same operational outcomes without the Reserve. While numbers available for mobilisation are important, acknowledging that quantity is a quality of its own, a key requirement in modern warfare are the right skills. Understanding the availability of skills Defence needs to directly and indirectly draw upon is the next step, as well as knowing how these resource movements impact the productive capacity of the nation.

Given the changing character of war, how the ADF has traditionally generated its forces may need to be revised and examination made of the ways in which existing skills in the civilian population are more readily accessed and that access negotiated on a priority basis as

\(^{25}\) Holding for the upcoming Manufacturing strategy—from Crowe, 2020: ‘Prime Minister Scott Morrison will outline the manufacturing strategy on Thursday ahead of the federal budget on Tuesday, emphasising the need to specialise in industries where Australia can compete on cost and quality. The government regards its space industry program last year, which cost $150 million to help Australian agencies work with NASA, as an example. Minister Andrews named food processing and batteries as targets for government support, given Australia produces raw materials in both areas and could gain more value from creating the finished product’.
opposed to building and then retaining those skills in service. Against a range of technological changes, there is a persistent callout for innovation and adaptability pointing to a requirement for broad generalists rather than separate specific technical streams, where intellectual curiosity is a stated ‘skill’ requirement. This goes to the heart of versatility and adaptability discussed earlier.

Against these last points, the ever-increasing demand for information and communications technology skills brings the issues to the fore. This is already a highly competitive area, and it is with these skills that the ADF are looking to regain or establish new warfighting advantages through the use of robotics, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence in existing missions or new ones that may emerge in cyber or undersea environments, for example. So, their acquisition of, or access to, these skills has now become critical to warfighting success.

To this end, the Finnish approach drives much closer coordination with businesses and research, education and training institutions through its defence industrial strategy than similar defence industry plans do here in Australia. The Finnish are proactive in ensuring supply of key goods and skills and expertise in underlying technologies. For example, in its industrial strategy, Finland has listed four critical defence areas: Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4), Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), Engagement and Protection. Against these there is a much more explicit list of sovereign base skills and expertise:

- Technologies and engineering relating to C4 and ISTAR
- Material technology and structural engineering
- Technologies and engineering for multi-technology systems (systems integration)
- Bio- and chemical technologies and engineering
- Cyber and digital skills relating to implementation of the Cyber Security Strategy.

The *Defence Science and Technology Strategy 2030* is consistent in part with this approach as it outlines a plan to deliver support to Defence from a national science and technology enterprise, which includes publicly funded research agencies (PFRAs), universities, large companies, SMEs, and entrepreneurs. But while it does call for prioritisation of DST goals and has listed several science, technology and research (STaR) Shots as its identified priorities, this does not extend to a sovereign base of skills and expertise for the purposes of mobilisation.

While focussing on skills and expertise, specific education pertinent to mobilisation could also be delivered. The intent would be an education campaign delivered to not just those within Defence but also those within the civil community that may be required to increase their contribution to the national base from a security point of view. As highlighted in the Swedish case study, baseline knowledge relating to security threats and how to respond to

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26 Muravska et al., 2019.
27 For more information, see Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2016; Muravska et al., 2019.
28 Department of Defence, 2020f.
them are fundamental to a more secure nation. But the threats and/or response are highly specific to their part of society. The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) has developed a conceptual model that illustrates the areas and associated knowledge needs of total defence, as shown in Figure 11.2, that provides a useful starting point. The model consists of four interrelated knowledge layers:

- Knowledge of threats, relating to the capacity of identifying, understanding, analysing, and responding to antagonistic threats.
- Methodological knowledge, including supporting analysis and decisionmaking processes to increase stakeholders’ ability to identify and respond to threats. This may relate to knowledge on joint planning and coordination, build and leverage joint knowledge, or knowledge held in other organisations, etc.
- System knowledge, or in other words, the understanding of the system in which knowledge of threats and methods are to be used (e.g., relating to policy development and strategic planning, doctrine and concept development, and capability development). System knowledge also includes the necessary conditions for total defence, including responsibilities, funding, and required coordination and collaboration.
- Synthesis, relating to the ability of the total defence system to coherently synthesise, integrate, and share knowledge that affect the prerequisites, objectives, and key tasks of the crisis management system, civil defence, and military defence.

Figure 11.2. Swedish Defence Research Agency Total Defence Knowledge Model

SOURCE: Rossbach et al., 2019.
12. Summary

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the preceding sections. The following summary represents key observations that the DMOB may want to consider in its mobilisation planning efforts.

An Australian Total Defence Concept

As Defence implements its new policy objectives of **Shape**, **Deter**, and **Respond**, it is important to reflect how close this position aligns to the total defence concepts that overseas countries employ.

Defence has been asked to prioritise our immediate region. Consistent with what Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Singapore are doing—the intent here is to bring the focus much closer to home. This contrasts with where Defence has focussed its efforts in its most recent operations which have been more expeditionary in nature, allied with and aligned to the approach the United States is maintaining. If there was doubt in this, the related objective of ‘maintain(ing) the ADF’s ability to deploy forces globally where the Government chooses to do so, including in the context of U.S.-led coalitions’ clearly indicates a much more discretionary approach to such expeditionary operations will be taken from now on.

Thus, as Australia’s attention turns to matters closer to home, Defence has also been directed to ‘work closely with other arms of Government’ and expand its ‘capability to respond to grey-zone activities’ and the ADF is directed to grow its self-reliance to deliver deterrent effects.¹ This is entirely consistent with steps 2 and 3 recommended to make modern deterrence most effective: tailoring deterrence threats and adopting an all of government response. Furthermore, if deterrence measures do not work, they are preparing to respond decisively by ‘enhanc(ing) the lethality of the ADF for high-intensity operations’.² This is consistent with step 4 in building credibility with adversaries, such as by always following through on threats. As discussed, total defence concepts encompass such modern deterrence approaches, hence why they persist and are being strengthened and revitalised in Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Singapore.

Defence is also being asked to enhance its capacity to support to civil authorities in response to natural disasters and crises. This is entirely consistent with the civil defence aspects which the countries studied consider part of their total defence concepts. But as suggested, given the role and responsibilities of the Home Affairs Portfolio, Defence may also wish to initially pursue a stronger relationship with them to support this endeavour.

But while this augurs well with Australia aligning to international best practice, there is a key element that still needs to be considered: psychological defence or national resilience. This element in all the total defence concepts studied is seen as fundamental to their success.

¹ Department of Defence, 2020c.
² Department of Defence, 2020c.
Activities are designed to foster a whole-of-society response and require the community to contribute equally to deterrence activities if they are to be successful. What is suggested is that this may start with a more open dialogue regarding what may be required from the community in a range of mobilisation efforts supporting Defence.

Finally, if Defence, or indeed Australia, is to realise or embrace a total defence approach, it may consider examining conceptual models that illustrate the areas and associated knowledge needs of total defence. This may inform how it approaches each of the additional areas required to complete its concept and identify the further requirements it needs so that it can be successfully implemented. Some of the information discussed under the following sections goes to this point.

**Preparing Against a Full Spectrum of Crises**

As the preceding section indicates against external threats, Defence needs to leverage the whole-of-society or national base. In return the national base can expect to leverage Defence. But in order to be able to be ready and able to do so Defence needs to adopt a risk-based approach to its mobilisation planning cognisant that warning-times may vary as may the threats faced. Assessed against both likelihood and impact, Defence will need to maintain the ability to adapt and structure itself to enable rapid access to the correct skills, training, and capability when required.

With such an approach, the gap between Defence and the National Base needs to be bridged. Again, an effective communication strategy that brings the National Base into the discussion is required. Mimicking the 2020 Cyber Security Strategy and its call out for everyone to play their part in cyber defence may be a good first step. Similar leverage of Defence’s support to communities that have been impacted by natural disasters and crises could be made, perhaps calling for a quid quo pro? Initiatives underway with the Australian Defence Reserves could be capitalised on to instil a broader whole-of-society approach, setting the agenda for a discussion between balancing the communities need of people against Defence’s need for them as Reservists.

Building the infrastructure that facilitates ready and appropriate interaction between the civil and military communities is important. Beyond the specific strategic relationship building being undertaken by the Australian Reserves, mobilisation exercises offer a good opportunity to design, test, and enhance this. Consistent with a risk-based rather than event driven approach, continual exercise of mechanisms and processes against varying scenarios will reinforce expectations and build confidence between both parties as they work together, in support of the other. As exercises mature, a much better understanding of what is expected and what can be delivered is gained by all, and responses will become streamlined and faster and ensure the supporting infrastructure is robust.

**Optimising Resources**

But to maximise the outcomes of these efforts, Defence must build a much better understanding of what it needs and explore options for how these needs may be met. As
discussed, this may encompass exploring Defence’s capacity to broaden its asset base to include, for example, a Merchant Navy. Other options may include taking a location-specific approach to mobilisation, leveraging what is available at a regional level—specific to that region or what that region location offers in terms of mobilisation—rather than a single national approach. What specialist skills that Defence could provide with additional training and what specialist skills it may need to access, and the processes by which they may be accessed need also to be understood.

In the event of a prolonged event, conflict or crisis, Defence must identify where it can gracefully decay versus those sovereign capabilities that must be sustained. Then, whether the nation itself can deliver them, what allies can supply and whether Australia can rely on them to do so and what Australia might need to stockpile, in country, should be determined.

**Mobilisation Is More than Numbers**

While mobilisation efforts are about people and ensuring that there are enough skilled, trained, and prepared personnel, mobilisation also requires a detailed understanding of capabilities and systems and how they are used to support defence concepts. Consistent with Defence’s current program of exercises, focussed on testing concepts, force design and capability options, it is suggested that the program be extended in appropriate exercises to examine a more stressed state in which points where the national base needs to be mobilised are reached. How long such mobilisation efforts need to be sustained should also be investigated.
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The boundaries of rule-based order and global norms are being tested everywhere. Grey-zone tactics, rapid technological change, and the increased frequency and severity of natural and man-made disasters add new pressures to societal stability and prosperity. Regionally, strategic competition within the Indo-Pacific continues to increase. The Australian Government responded to this expanded range of threats in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU20). The policy proposals articulated therein are consistent with modern deterrence and different from Defence’s traditional expeditionary methodology. A number of other countries, such as Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Singapore, have adopted deterrence positions based on the concept of ‘total defence’. This depends on the entire civil community being ready and prepared to mobilise in collaboration with its armed forces but utilising economic, digital, and psychological means, just as much as military, to defend against contemporary threats. The authors suggest that adopting elements of a total defence framework for mobilisation planning would be consistent with the policy proposals in DSU20, as well as with international practice. The authors’ comparison extends to the United States, where, through its National Security Strategy, it emphasises similar dimensions to total defence whilst maintaining its expeditionary approach to warfighting.

Psychological and societal resilience is important to the success of total defence. The authors propose the development of a strategic narrative to engage and prepare Australian society for the new challenges. They also suggest that risk-based, rather than event-driven, approaches to mobilisation planning may meet the speed and effectiveness required in the new threat landscape.