



Research Report

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Assessing the Value of Overseas Military Campaigning in Strategic Competition

Technical Annex

For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA1798-1.

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About This Annex

This technical annex documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled *Evaluating the Return on Army Activities in Competition*, sponsored by Futures and Concepts Center, Army Futures Command. The purpose of the project was to develop a framework for assessing the cost-benefit trade-offs of different types of competitive activities and apply the framework to select activities to help the U.S. Army better calibrate and prioritize its responses to Chinese and Russian hostile measures.

The main report is available at www.rand.org/t/RRA1798-1.

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Summary

This technical annex documents the research and analysis presented in summary form in the main report, *Assessing the Value of Overseas Military Campaigning in Strategic Competition*, available at www.rand.org/t/RRR1798-1. The purpose of the project was to develop a framework for assessing the cost-benefit trade-offs of different types of competitive activities. In this annex, we discuss our data sources and modeling strategies, and we present our baseline models and robustness analyses.

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Evaluation Methods, Data, and Results

This annex provides technical details of the analyses documented in the main report, *Assessing the Value of Overseas Military Campaigning in Strategic Competition*. In Chapters 2 through 5 of that report, we provide a brief overview of our analytic framework and the methods and data we used in the analysis of likely competition outcomes associated with a variety of U.S. campaigning tools across a range of implementation environments. In this appendix, we provide a more-detailed discussion of the methods and data used in our evaluation. We also provide summary tables of our regression results for each of the primary analyses that we performed. Appendix B provides a discussion of alternative data sources and model specifications (robustness checks), while Appendix C provides detailed regression results for all the models described in this appendix.

Model Specifications

To identify broad patterns of campaigning outcomes, we performed a large- N quantitative analysis spanning the years 1945 to 2010. Data availability prevented us from being able to examine periods before 1945 and after 2010 in sufficient detail. Our unit of analysis is the country-year, and we examined all countries within this time frame.¹ Because our analysis captures campaigning activities conducted by the United States with or within partner nations, however, we implicitly were examining the U.S.–potential partner country-year. Our data form an unbalanced panel in which some countries appear in the data for the full range of years, while others have only partial coverage.²

¹ Specifically, a *country*, in this context, must be a member of the United Nations or both have a population greater than 500,000 and receive diplomatic missions from two major powers. See Correlates of War Project, “State System Membership List,” v2016, 2017.

² That is, we are missing data such that we do not consider the full set of country-years in our sample. This can introduce bias into our results if our models contain missing data that are not missing randomly but are instead missing for some reason that is also correlated with our variables of interest. While there are several methodologies for calculating missing data from existing data, several assumptions must be true for these methods to reduce potential bias. Often, however, these methods increase the power of a model without truly reducing bias, giving false confidence in the precision of estimates. For this reason, we did not employ these methods.

Equation A.1 represents our model for a continuous dependent variable—for example, materiel transfers originating from the United States—using ordinary least squares regression.³ We regressed the dependent variable in country i in time t on a one-year lag of a specific U.S. campaigning tool ($t-1$) for country i . Our β for each campaigning tool captures the change in our dependent variable, on average and in our sample, for a 1-unit shift in the campaigning tool. We also included a vector of controls, all lagged by one year, with $\gamma_{i,t-1}$ representing the corresponding *effect sizes* or coefficients on these variables. Our results can be interpreted as the marginal effect or average effect with all our control variables held constant as follows:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_{i,t-1}(\text{Activity}) + \gamma_{i,t-1}(\text{Controls}) + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Equation A.2 represents our model for each binary dependent variable—for example, military intimidation—using probit regression.⁴ Here $\Pr(Y = 1)$ denotes the probability that a malign activity will take on a value of 1 for a given country-year, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. The parameters β , indexed by country and time, for each variable (X), whether campaigning tool or control, are estimated for both our posture options and our controls by maximum likelihood.

$$\Pr(Y_{i,t} = 1 | X_{i,t-1}) = \Phi(X_{i,t-1} \beta_{i,t-1}). \quad (\text{A.2})$$

The calculated probability of a particular competition outcome depends not simply on the value of each campaigning tool but on the value of each control variable in the model as well. To determine both the direction and magnitude of the apparent effect of each campaigning tool, we examined the apparent impact of each campaigning tool on competition outcomes when our controls are held at their mean values.

In each model, our standard errors are clustered by country. In technical terms, this clustering method helps adjust standard errors for correlation of residuals within clusters. Practically, this ensures that we did not overstate our confidence in the results when our observations are linked because they represent the same country at different points in time.

³ Count variables, such as the number of terror events that a country experiences, are also treated as continuous in our modeling.

⁴ The two main statistical models for binary dependent variables are probit regression and logistic regression. Logistic regression (*logit*) is better suited in the case of extreme values for independent variables. However, in our models, all extremity is removed from our variables of interest through our treatment of outliers. As a result, the choice of probit or logit will not likely dictate our results. Further, probit assumes our errors take a standard normal distribution, a more common real-life distribution than the standard logistic distribution used by logit.

Dependent Variables: Competition Outcomes

In Chapter 2 of the main report, we examine three sets of competition outcomes: deterrence, access and cooperation, and stabilization and resilience.

Deterrence

- **Military intimidation and armed conflict:** We operationalized military intimidation and armed conflict using the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute (MID). We created three measures from these data. First, we captured military disputes using all MIDs. We captured military intimidation using low-hostility MIDs. We captured the use of military force using high-hostility MIDs.⁵ Data on MIDs run from 1945 to 2010.⁶
- **Economic coercion:** To measure economic coercion used against U.S. allies and partners, we used data on economic sanctions from the Global Sanctions Database.⁷ In this dataset, cases of sanctions capture the implementation of measures to limit economic exchange with another state for the purposes of political objectives. The data include trade sanctions, financial sanctions, arms sanctions, military assistance sanctions, travel sanctions, and other forms of sanctions. These data run from 1905 to 2010.
- **Proxy warfare:** Our measure of adversary support for a proxy captures the provision of military support to a violent nonstate actor in the midst of an ongoing intrastate conflict with the government of the potential U.S. partner.⁸ Data on violent nonstate actors cover those groups that were actively engaged in an intrastate conflict with the government of the state in which they were located from 1946 through 2010.⁹

Access and Cooperation

- **Access agreements:** Our measure of access agreements includes all legal agreements pertaining to U.S. military access within a given country. Data on access agreements

⁵ Glenn Palmer, Vito D’Orazio, Michael R. Kenwick, and Roseanne W. McManus, “Updating the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data: A Response to Gibler, Miller, and Little,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 64, No. 2, 2019.

⁶ Like several of our variables, the MID data cover a longer period (1816 to 2014), but our analysis does not permit examination of the full range of the data. For all data sources, we indicate only the period that our analysis covers.

⁷ Gabriel Felbermayr, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin, and Yoto V. Yotov, “The Global Sanctions Data Base,” *European Economic Review*, Vol. 129, 2020.

⁸ Stephen Watts, Bryan Frederick, Nathan Chandler, Mark Toukan, Christian Curriden, Erik Mueller, Edward Geist, Ariane Tabatabai, Sara Plana, Brandon Corbin, and Jeffrey Martini, *Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition: Military Implications*, RAND Corporation, RR-A307-3, 2023.

⁹ Ralph Sundberg, Kristine Eck, and Joakim Kreutz, “Introducing the UC DP Non-State Conflict Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2012.

come from previous RAND Corporation research on security-related agreements and run from 1955 to 2010.¹⁰

- **Materiel transfers:** To assess materiel transfers, we measured the level of arms and other systems that the potential U.S. partner imports from the United States as opposed to sources other than the United States. These data come from the Arms Transfer Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) trend-indicator value (TIV). The TIV is a SIPRI-defined figure that represents the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer, calculated either from the production cost of the weapon, or, if the production cost is not known, through a comparison with core weapons based on size and performance characteristics; type of electronics, loading or unloading arrangements, engine, tracks or wheels, armament and materials; and the year in which the weapon was produced.¹¹ These data run from 1950 to 2012. We took the inverse hyperbolic sine of this level, a commonly used method to account for significantly skewed data, such as the SIPRI data on materiel transfers.¹²
- **Military trainees:** To assess leader education, we counted the number of military trainees for each country using the International Military Training Activities Database–USA (IMTAD-USA).¹³ This source captures all trainees listed in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State Foreign Military Training Report (FMTR). These data run from 1999 to 2016. While other datasets focusing on individual programs, such as International Military Education and Training (IMET), have greater coverage, focusing on a single program can lead to issues that have driven misleading findings in the past.¹⁴
- **Public opinion:** Public opinion data capture the percentage of respondents in nationwide samples who approve of U.S. leadership in the world. The data come from Gallup World Poll and run from 2006 to 2021.¹⁵
- **United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting:** We measured foreign policy similarity using the similarity of the UNGA voting profiles of the United States and the

¹⁰ Jennifer Kavanagh, *US Security-Related Agreements in Force Since 1955: Introducing a New Database*, RAND Corporation, RR-736-AF, 2014.

¹¹ SIPRI, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,” database, undated.

¹² John B. Burbidge, Lonnie Magee, and A. Leslie Robb, “Alternative Transformations to Handle Extreme Values of the Dependent Variable,” *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 83, No. 401, 1988.

¹³ Theodore McLaughlin, Lee J. M. Seymour, and Simon Pierre Boulanger Martel, “Tracking the Rise of United States Foreign Military Training: IMTAD-USA, a New Dataset and Research Agenda,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 59 No. 2, 2022.

¹⁴ Specifically, IMET and other forms of training are highly uncorrelated. See McLaughlin, Seymour, and Boulanger Martel, 2022.

¹⁵ Gallup, “Global Research,” webpage, undated.

partner. We examined only security-specific votes within the UNGA to ensure that we captured only those votes most directly related to strategic competition.¹⁶

Stabilization and Resilience

- **Terrorism:** Our measure of terrorism is a count of the number of terrorist attacks against a potential U.S. partner in a given year. Data are from the Global Terrorism Database.¹⁷ We took the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of terrorist attacks to account for a significant skew in the data.
- **Civil war:** Our measure of civil conflict captures the onset of a new civil conflict with at least 25 battle deaths in a given year. The data come from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which captures all conflicts from 1946 to 2020.¹⁸
- **Government respect for rights:** We also measured stability as a function of government repression. We did so using data from the CIRI Human Rights dataset.¹⁹ We used the Physical Integrity Rights index, which captures torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance by the government on a scale from 0 to 8, where 0 indicates significant human rights abuses and 8 indicates full respect for these rights. These data run from 1981 to 2016.

Independent Variables: Campaigning Tools

- **Enduring presence:** We measured U.S. enduring presence using data from the Pentagon's Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The DMDC provides data on the number and service of military U.S. personnel stationed overseas within the borders of each allied and partner nation in a given year.²⁰ Using the RAND U.S. Military Inter-

¹⁶ Michael A. Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2017. Estimation techniques follow Dan Alexander and Bryan Rooney, "Vote-Buying by the United States in the United Nations," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 1, 2019.

¹⁷ University of Maryland, "Global Terrorism Database," database, last updated May 2022.

¹⁸ Håvard Strand and Håvard Hegre, "Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2020," *Conflict Trends*, Vol. 3, 2021.

¹⁹ David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, "The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2010.

²⁰ For DMDC data use in previous RAND research, see Stephen Watts, Bryan Rooney, Gene Germanovich, Bruce McClintock, Stephanie Pezard, Clint Reach, and Melissa Shostak, *Deterrence and Escalation in Competition with Russia: The Role of Ground Forces in Preventing Hostile Measures Below Armed Conflict in Europe*, RAND Corporation, RR-A720-1, 2022; Angela O'Mahony, Miranda Priebe, Bryan Frederick, Jennifer Kavanagh, Matthew Lane, Trevor Johnston, Thomas S. Szayna, Jakub Hlavka, Stephen Watts, and Matthew Povlock, *U.S. Presence and the Incidence of Conflict*, RAND Corporation, RR-1906-A, 2018; and Bryan Frederick, Stephen Watts, Matthew Lane, Abby Doll, Ashley L. Rhoades, and Meagan L. Smith, *Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces*, RAND Corporation, RR-2533-A, 2020.

vention Dataset, we removed all U.S. personnel who were actively engaged in combat.²¹ We then took the inverse hyperbolic sine of this level to account for significant outliers in the data.

- **Footprint:** Measuring U.S. footprint over time is very difficult with current data sources. We attempted to capture U.S. footprint using DoD contracting data. Contracting data were taken from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS).²² For each country, we extracted all contracting line items belonging to DoD in which the point of purchase is an entity within the country. We summed the total obligated dollar amount and took the inverse hyperbolic sine of this figure. Even though contracting data are a weak proxy for U.S. footprint, such data capture activities such as locally procured logistics and sustainment support, but they also capture other DoD overseas purchases. In the main report, we noted having lower levels of confidence in these findings due to the vagueness of the data.
- **Agreements:** We examined two levels of U.S. military agreements. First, we considered the existence of a mutual defense pact between the United States and a given country. We identified mutual defense pacts using the Correlates of War Project's Formal Alliances data that cover 1945 to 2010.²³ Our measure captures whether the partner state had an active defense pact with the United States, where *defense pacts* are those alliances that commit states to intervene militarily on the side of any treaty partner that is attacked.²⁴ Second, we examined lesser agreements, including access and status-of-forces agreements, legal agreements, agreements on materiel transfers, operational agreements, financial agreements, and other guarantees. These data were taken from previous RAND research on security-related agreements and run from 1955 to 2010.²⁵
- **Exercises:** We examined the apparent impact of U.S. exercises using the 2021 Joint Military Exercises Data Set.²⁶ This data source is based on information on 5,000 exercises extracted from a LexisNexis search of major world newspapers, wire service stories, and the BBC Monitoring Service's international reports. The data run from 1980 to 2016. Our variable captures the occurrence of a U.S. exercise with the partner nation in a

²¹ See Bryan Frederick, Jennifer Kavanagh, Stephanie Pezard, Alexandra Stark, Nathan Chandler, James Hoobler, and Joeun Kim, *Assessing Trade-Offs in U.S. Military Intervention Decisions: Whether, When, and with What Size Force to Intervene*, RAND Corporation, RR-4293-A.

²² FPDS, homepage, undated.

²³ Douglas M. Gibler, *International Military Alliances, 1648–2008*, CQ Press, 2008.

²⁴ Gibler, 2008.

²⁵ Kavanagh, 2014.

²⁶ Jordan Bernhardt, "Joint Military Exercises Dataset," ver. 1.0, Harvard Dataverse, 2021. See also Jordan Bernhardt and Lauren Sukin, "Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 65, No. 5, 2021.

given year and is coded 1 if the United States engages in one or more exercises with the state in question and 0 otherwise.²⁷

- **Materiel transfers:** To assess materiel transfers, we measured the level of arms that the potential U.S. partner imported from the United States in a given year. As with our dependent variable, data come from the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database TIV. We again took the inverse hyperbolic sine of this level.
- **Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions:** Data on HA/DR missions were taken from the RAND U.S. Military Intervention Dataset. This dataset captures all U.S. military interventions from 1898 to 2016. Our measure is coded 1 if the United States initiated a humanitarian mission in a given country-year and 0 otherwise.

Implementation Environment

Several conditioning factors may affect our relationships of interest. We examined three implementation environments in detail, with additional implementation environments examined in less detail in various tests of the robustness of our statistical results. In each of these cases, we included an interaction term between the conditioning variable and the variable measuring the U.S. campaigning instrument being examined.

- **Partner level of development:** The outcomes of U.S. cooperation may be very different for wealthy, highly capable states than for lesser developed countries. To account for this fact, we created a measure that delineates low- and lower-middle-income states in comparison with upper-middle-income and high-income states according to categorizations from the World Bank and our measure of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.²⁸ In some cases, we differentiated between high-income states and all others, with the difference noted in our summary of results.
- **Competition intensity:** Both U.S. partners and potential competitors may behave differently in an environment of global superpower competition as opposed to an era with lower levels of competition. We measured competition intensity by distinguishing between the environment of the Cold War period and the environment of the post-Cold War era, noting that our data end prior to much of the recent increase in competition between the United States and China. In our robustness tests, we also examined the

²⁷ In robustness checks, we examined the results for both the number of exercises and the size of exercises.

²⁸ Claire H. Hollweg, Sebastián Sáez, A. H. Aguiar, T. L. Walmsley, G. Narayanan, B. A. Aguiar, R. McDougall, I. Borchert, B. Gootiiz, and A. Mattoo, “World Development Indicators (database),” World Bank, 2019. For income cut points, see World Bank Data Team, “New Country Classifications by Income Level: 2019–2020,” *Data Blog*, July 1, 2019.

proximity of a U.S. ally or partner to a U.S. rival as a second measure of competition intensity.²⁹

- **U.S. alliances:** In addition to the independent impact of U.S. alliances, there is reason to believe that U.S. campaigning tools may vary in effectiveness when used within a formal alliance structure rather than a less-firm commitment. We considered the presence or absence of a mutual defense pact between the United States and a given country, as defined earlier.

Control Variables

U.S. campaigning tools are just one set of factors that may lead to outcomes in strategic competition. Furthermore, there are theoretical reasons to believe that certain environmental conditions may be more or less beneficial for achieving desired competition outcomes in light of U.S. activities. To better isolate the effects of U.S. activities on competition outcomes, we incorporated these other factors in our models as statistical controls. Several of the variables we treated as activities or outcomes of interest are also important controls in other statistical models. In this section, we discuss which elements of the geopolitical context must be considered and accounted for when examining the relationship between U.S. campaigning tools and competition outcomes. We then explain how they are operationalized in our models.

- **U.S. alliance:** The United States frequently engages in other campaigning activities with its ongoing allies. Allies may be more willing to grant the United States influence, while the presence of a U.S. alliance may deter adversaries—both state and nonstate—from targeting the ally (or potentially provoke them).³⁰ Our measure captures whether the partner state has an active defense pact with the United States, where *defense pacts* are those alliances that commit states to intervene militarily on the side of any treaty partner that is attacked.³¹
- **Level of democracy:** While the United States cooperates with less-democratic nations, it has also expressed a long-standing commitment to democracy and may engage in a greater range of campaigning activities with democratic countries. Democracy has also been shown to be a predictor of conflict outcomes and a determinant of stability. We measured the level of democracy within a country using the Polity index, which includes the following as key components of democracy: the competitiveness and openness of elections, the nature of political participation, and the extent of checks on execu-

²⁹ Paul F. Diehl, Gary Goertz, and Yahve Gallegos, “Peace Data: Concept, Measurement, Patterns, and Research Agenda,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 2019.

³⁰ We control for a formal alliance in models in which that is not our key variable of interest.

³¹ Gibler, 2008.

tive authority. The scores run from -10 to 10, where higher numbers indicate greater levels of democracy.³²

- **GDP per capita:** The economic development and absorptive capacity of a country will be an important determinant of the level and type of campaigning activities that it engages in with the United States. In addition, countries with higher levels of economic output may use those resources to deter coercion and should be more resilient to internal threats. We included a measure of each state's GDP per capita, the country's economic output weighted by its population.³³ We then took the inverse hyperbolic sine of this measure to minimize the effect of outliers when using significantly skewed data.
- **UNGA voting similarity:** Partners that share foreign policy interests with the United States are more likely to cooperate with the United States in its campaigning activities and may be more likely to agree to host U.S. forces. They may also confront the same adversaries that the United States seeks to deter. We measure UNGA voting similarity as discussed above.
- **Material capabilities:** Partners may receive a different package of U.S. campaigning tools according to their military capabilities and their ability to operate with the U.S. military. Material capabilities are also important supports for state stability and deterring malign action from adversaries. We used the composite indicator of national capabilities (CINC) score, which includes six indicators of national material capabilities: military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population.³⁴ The CINC score measures the sum of these indicators for each individual country compared with the total in the overall system to place capabilities in reference to all other states. We then took the inverse hyperbolic sine of that figure to account for data skew.
- **Trade with the United States:** The United States may choose to engage in higher levels of military activity with states with which it has a strong trading relationship. In turn, states may be more willing to cooperate with the United States when they are also dependent on U.S. trade. Adversaries may also seek to put pressure on U.S. trading partners to reduce their military cooperation with the United States. We therefore included a measure of the extent to which a state's economy depends on trade with the United States, measured by its exports of goods and services with the United States as a percentage of its total trade in goods and services.³⁵
- **Natural resources:** The United States has previously used military tools to ensure the continued flow of natural resources. Natural resource-producing states, however, have

³² Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Polity IV Project*, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2002.

³³ Hollweg et al., 2019.

³⁴ J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Vol. 19, 1972.

³⁵ Hollweg et al., 2019.

been known to have certain pathologies that lead to national instability and may be attractive targets for foreign adversaries. We measured natural resources using a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for oil-producing states and 0 otherwise.³⁶

- **Cold War:** Because U.S. behavior toward partners may be different between the Cold War period and the post–Cold War era, as might the responses of adversaries, we controlled for this with a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for all years during the Cold War and 0 otherwise.
- **Rivalry:** States that face the ongoing threat of conflict may actively seek U.S. military cooperation and may grant influence in exchange for U.S. military assistance. These states, however, are also more likely to be targeted by adversaries. We captured the ongoing threat of conflict using the concept of interstate rivalry. *Rival states* are those that perceive one another as a threat and have engaged in sustained competition with the potential to escalate to military conflict.³⁷ We controlled for this with a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a state has an ongoing interstate rivalry and 0 otherwise.

Table A.1 shows the control variables that pertain to each set of models. In our baseline analyses, we used relatively sparse models, using the smallest number of controls possible while still controlling for the most likely alternative explanations for our findings.

In each model, we also accounted for how, over time, dynamics may shift the nature of our relationships of interest by using year-fixed effects. In several of our core models, we

TABLE A.1
Contextual Factors (Control Variables)

| Variable | MIDs | Access | Cooperation; Sanctions | Stabilization; Proxy Funding |
|------------------------------|------|--------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| U.S. alliance | X | X | X | X |
| Level of democracy | X | X | X | X |
| GDP per capita | X | X | X | X |
| Trade with the United States | | X | X | |
| UN voting similarity | | X | X ^a | |
| Material capabilities | X | | X | X |
| Natural resources | | | | X |
| Cold War | X | X | X | X |
| Ongoing rivalry | X | | X | X |

^a This does not include models in which UNGA voting similarity is the outcome variable.

³⁶ Hollweg et al., 2019.

³⁷ William R Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2001.

used country-fixed effects to hold cross-national dynamics constant to gain better leverage in understanding the effect of changes within a country. In the remaining models, we determined that the unexplained variance in our variables was largely cross-country, suggesting that our country-year fixed-effect models did not have sufficient explanatory power. For all models, we ran our analysis both using country-fixed effects and without country-fixed effects. We report findings from the models that we believe better capture relevant variation in the main report but provide the results of both models in our regression tables in Appendix C.

Threats to Causal Inference

Examining the impact of U.S. campaigning tools on partner and competitor responses is subject to several threats to causal inference. The first threat is that of spurious correlation—that is, the concern that the statistical relationship between two variables is not due to a true causal relationship but rather appears to be so because the independent variable and dependent variable are both related to a third variable that is not included in the model: a confounding variable.

This is especially important in an analysis in which U.S. policy is a deliberate choice. The United States decides where and how to conduct military cooperation activities based both on the likelihood it will secure influence in the partner nation and on the likelihood that it will be targeted with malign action from a competitor.³⁸ This complicates our ability to assess the true effect of U.S. military activities, since the United States may, for example, choose the easiest and hardest cases, respectively, when applying these tools.

To help combat this problem, the most common methodological choice is to directly include these variables into the regression model. In our baseline specifications, we used control variables to account for the observable factors that may influence this decisionmaking. For instance, by controlling for economic output, we can identify countries that may otherwise be less likely to be struck by instability that might also make particularly attractive partners for the United States. This is an imperfect solution to this threat to causality. We are able to include only potential confounding variables that are *observable* into our regression models. Unobservable factors cannot be included as controls.

To increase the robustness of our analysis, we took several further steps. First, we followed recent RAND research in conducting an additional test of our relationships by first modeling this selection process. We conducted a series of two-stage models in which we first predicted the likelihood of a U.S. campaigning tool for each country using a series of predictors identified in the literature and in previous RAND research.³⁹ For each of our continuous variables, we predicted the likelihood that a country will be in the top 10 percent of cases in the data.

³⁸ James Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” *International Interactions*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2002.

³⁹ This list approximates the controls chosen in our baseline models. See Kavanagh, 2014; O’Mahony et al., 2018.

For an example, we predicted the likelihood that each state will be above the 90th percentile of countries hosting noncombat U.S. forces. For each of our dichotomous variables, we predicted the likelihood that the event will occur in a given year. For example, we predicted the likelihood that a state will participate in an exercise with the United States.⁴⁰

We then used a methodology known as *propensity score weighting*. First, we calculated the predicted probability (P) that the potential U.S. partner will engage in this high level of cooperation with the United States in a given year. The weights (Ω) are defined as follows: $\Omega = 1/P$ for those states for which this cooperation variable is 1—for example, the occurrence of an exercise or troop presence in the 90th percentile of cases—and $\Omega = 1/(1 - P)$ for those in which cooperation is a 0.

We assessed the results from both the weighted and unweighted methods to provide our best estimate of the relationship between our variables of interest. We did not favor the weighted models alone for two reasons. First, while they attempt to correct for bias caused by selection effects, they also present the risk of misspecification, which can introduce further bias.⁴¹ Second, these methods are not designed to deal with continuous treatments, so for such continuous independent variables as U.S. force presence, we were forced to set an arbitrary threshold of a significant number of forces—in our case, the 90th percentile—to use as the predictor. The sensitivity of our models to this choice has not been fully explored. Thus, while we believe these models provide a significant piece of evidence in our analysis, we are reluctant to treat them as the sole standard.⁴²

Synthetic Control Method

Beyond our use of control variables and propensity-weighted models, for certain relationships in which we believe selection bias is particularly prevalent, we employed a statistical tool known as synthetic control method (SCM). Like two-way fixed effects, SCM is a causal inference tool. The method produces a *synthetic counterfactual* that is designed to resemble the *treated* unit (i.e., a country that engages in a particular activity with the United States) in the years before the activity takes place. The synthetic counterfactual is created by first selecting a “donor” pool of countries that never experience the activity (or experience it to a lesser degree). SCM then assigns weights to each donor country such that the differences between the treated country and the synthetic control are minimized for each competition outcome. If successful, the synthetic control will closely track the treated country’s competition outcomes in the pretreatment period and will resemble it along the control variables, which, in this

⁴⁰ These results can be found later in this appendix.

⁴¹ These models are also not well suited for exploring interaction effects, because they predict the treatment (e.g., forces) but not the treatment in a specific implementation environment (e.g., forces in a low-income environment).

⁴² In addition, unlike other methods for causal identification that cannot be used here because of other limitations, such as instrumental variable analysis, this method has yet to be fully explored in the literature.

case, are per capita income and total population. Researchers then observe how the treated unit and its synthetic control behave in the years after the activity occurs, and the differences in competition outcomes that emerge are interpreted as the causal effect of the activity.⁴³

SCM is useful for our study because it allows us to observe the dynamic effects of an intervention, which our fixed effects models do not provide. In this study's primary model specifications, we investigated the effect of a campaigning activity in the preceding year on outcomes in the present year. However, it is not always clear that the effects of activities will transpire in the year after they take place. SCM estimates effects in each year after the activity takes place for as long as the researcher provides data. Another benefit is that the method uses a different set of assumptions than two-way fixed effects to identify causal effects—thus serving as a robustness check to the primary models and specifications.

The tool, however, has its drawbacks: First, like propensity score weighting, SCM requires a binary treatment, but many of the activities that we studied are not binary and are difficult to dichotomize. For instance, enduring presence, which captures the number of U.S. troops stationed in a partner nation, is a continuous variable: It takes values ranging from zero to the hundreds of thousands. What constitutes a treatment is left to researchers to define. And even when the activity is dichotomous, as is the case with U.S. exercises, the activity does not always occur in every year (i.e., it is not as if a switch is being flipped from off to on). Because dichotomizing SCM is labor-intensive, we employed this tool for only two analyses: U.S. exercises and enduring presence and their effects on military intimidation and armed conflict.

Defining Treatment and Donor Cases in SCM

Fitting these activities into the binary treatment framework required for the application of SCM is difficult and requires a bespoke approach for each activity. To identify treatments of U.S. exercises, we found countries that did not experience any U.S. exercises for a five-year period (i.e., the pretreatment period) and then conducted five or more exercises with the United States in the next 11 years. There were 100 cases that fit this treatment criteria. One country, Panama, experienced an exercise treatment twice—first in 1983 and again in 2002. For each year in which there was at least one valid U.S. exercise treatment case, we also identified suitable donor countries that conducted either 0 or 1 exercise in the entire 16-year period. There were a total of 997 cases that fit these criteria.

Dichotomizing enduring U.S. presence is more challenging. To do so, we searched for instances in which U.S. presence increased rapidly in a short period. Specifically, we found countries where the United States increased its presence by roughly one reinforced brigade (according to our rule of thumb of 5,000 troops) from one year to the next. We were concerned that effects might be contaminated by large changes in presence before the arrival of the reinforced brigade, so we removed cases in which presence increased (or decreased)

⁴³ Albert Abadie, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller, "Synthetic Control Method for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California's Tobacco Control Program," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 2010.

by 500 troops or more (less) in any of the five years preceding the addition of the reinforced brigade. Fourteen cases fit these criteria. To be a valid donor, a country must not have experienced changes of more than 100 troops in any given year for the entire 16-year period. There were 1,533 cases that fit these criteria.

We do not suggest that the modeling techniques that we have used eliminate concerns about threats to causal inference. We were unable to use a randomized controlled trial, given our specific quantities of interest, and such commonly employed techniques as instrumental variable analysis were not feasible in this specific analysis. As a result, we note that our results show correlations and suggest the possibility of a causal relationship.

Additional Modeling Issues

In addition to the threats to causal inference described above, there are several other modeling issues that had to be addressed in our analysis. The first is the issue of complex causality. Specifically, U.S. operations, activities, and investments (OAI) may not have a direct, linear relationship with our outcomes of interest. To better understand this possibility, we modeled the relationship between our independent and dependent variables across several functional forms for nonlinear relationships, including quadratic and cubic relationships, as well as stepwise relationships at key thresholds of our independent variables. In this appendix, we note specifically where we saw strong evidence of a nonlinear relationship.

In addition, a major issue in analysis of this type is poor data quality and the need to use imperfect proxies for quantities of interest. In our quantitative analysis, we were unable to examine several relationships of interest because of the lack of sufficient data. Wherever possible, we used multiple variables or codings of variables to ensure that our results held when variables of interest were measured imperfectly. In our results, we mark where we consider that confidence should be reduced in response to the imperfect nature of our proxies.

Assessing Aggregate Confidence Levels in Statistical Results

We ran hundreds of statistical models to refine our understanding of the relationships between each campaigning instrument, in each implementation environment, for each campaigning objective. A critical part of this study, therefore, was to identify a holistic set of relationships that will be valuable for Army decisionmakers.

When our different methodologies agreed, we have greater confidence in our findings. When our methods disagreed on the relative *significance* of our findings, we have less confidence in that result if there is no strong theoretical reason to prefer one model over the other. When models disagree on the *direction* of the result (separate from the question of whether the relationship differs in different implementation environments), we consider our findings to be inconclusive. There are, however, very few disagreements of this type in our analysis. The alternative specifications of our baseline models generally yielded results consistent with our baseline results.

As we discuss in the main report, for us to have high confidence in a result, it must pass three tests. First, it must pass several statistical tests—results must not only be significant according to standard tests of statistical significance, but they must also be robust across a number of different model specifications, including ones using more advanced statistical techniques, such as two-stage models with propensity weighting or SCM. Second, we must be able to explain those results with a compelling, logical explanation rooted in either military doctrine or academic theory (or both). Finally, we must be able to identify examples of such relationships—that is, historical cases in which experts using qualitative analytic methods have argued that a particular campaigning instrument had an outcome consistent with our statistical models. If the results pass all three tests, we have high confidence in them. If they pass only two of these tests, we have moderate confidence in them. And if they pass only one test, we have low confidence in them. In this section, we discuss how we coded the statistical test. Our coding rules are as follows:

- High confidence in all implementation environments: We have high confidence in a relationship across most implementation environments if the baseline model is statistically significant at the 90-percent level *and* the baseline results are corroborated in most of the implementation environments and sensitivity analyses. An example of a relationship in which we have high confidence across all implementation environments is the favorable relationship between multilateral exercises and materiel transfers (see Table A.2). Each of our baseline, implementation environment, and sensitivity analyses is either statistically significant or suggestive, each points in the same direction, and the relationship is theoretically consistent. The relationship between multilateral exercises and UNGA votes is an example of a relationship that we coded as high confidence in specific implementation environments (low-income, Cold War, nonallies).
- High confidence in some implementation environments: There is a strong difference between the results across implementation environment treatments (e.g., during and after the Cold War) in which one environment is statistically significant and the other is not. In almost all cases, the baseline model is also statistically significant. (See Table A.2.)
- Moderate confidence in all implementation environments: (1) The baseline model is statistically significant at the 90-percent level, *but* there is less corroboration in the implementation environments and sensitivity analyses. These models tend to reach statistical significance levels between only 70 percent and 90 percent. We coded the relationship between defense treaties and armed conflict as moderate confidence in all implementation environments. (2) The relationship does not meet the 90-percent level in the baseline, propensity weighted, or income models. It does reach the 90-percent level in both the Cold War and post-Cold War models, which does not distinguish across the implementation environments. Taken together, these models provide moderate confidence that the Army should consider the impact of defense treaties on the likelihood of armed conflict onset. (See Table A.2.)

TABLE A.2
Variation in Competition Coding

| Model | Exercises and Materiel Transfers | Exercises and UNGA Votes | Defense Treaty and Armed Conflict | Overseas Forces and UNGA Votes | Overseas Forces and Armed Conflict |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Baseline | | | | | |
| Propensity weighted | | | | | |
| High income | | | | | |
| Low income | | | | | |
| Cold War | | | | | |
| Post-Cold War | | | | | |
| Allies | | | | | |
| Nonallies | | | | | |

NOTE: Column headings describe relationships. Color and the direction of the arrows indicate favorable (green and upward arrows) or unfavorable (red and downward arrows) relationships between campaigning tools and a given outcome. Shading indicates the degree of confidence we have in a specific finding, with darker shading indicating more confidence. Results are high confidence if statistically significant at the 90-percent level. Results are moderate confidence if the level of statistical significance is between 70 and 90 percent. Whole gray circles represent a lack of significant findings, while gray circles with a slash represent relationships we could not test (either because they were true by definition or we lacked appropriate data or models).

- **Moderate confidence in some implementation environments:** We coded results as moderate confidence in some implementation environments when there was evidence of a statistically significant relationship in at least one but not all implementation environments. We did not encounter many examples of moderate confidence in some implementation environments. An exemplar for this coding is the relationship between

overseas forces and UNGA votes. The relationship between UNGA votes and overseas forces is statistically significant with high-income partners but not in other models. (See Table A.2.)⁴⁴

- Suggestive: We coded relationships as suggestive if there are weak but theoretically consistent results that are important to highlight for Army planners. The relationship between overseas forces and armed conflict is an example. The baseline model shows a weak overall relationship, but the suggestive results across multiple implementation environments highlight that planners ought to take into account implementation considerations as they plan overseas presence. In our aggregate tables, we use a gray circle to denote the absence of statistical significance but include comments to note contexts planners may wish to be aware of. (See Table A.2.)

Discussion of Regression Analysis

In Chapters 2 through 5 of the main report, we provide an overview of our historical statistical analysis and highlight the central findings. In this section, we discuss our findings in greater depth. We discuss both the size and significance of our observed effects, noting that we make limited claims about the causality of our analysis. Our model specifications are motivated by theory, including a robust set of controls, and represent the standard for best practices in the field. In addition, by employing such methods as propensity weighting and SCM, we advanced our statistical models well beyond traditional correlational analysis. Even these models, however, do not reach the “gold standard” of randomized controlled trials (or similar experimental research designs, such as natural experiments). Consequently, throughout this annex, we refer to the *apparent effects* of U.S. campaigning instruments, recognizing that there might yet be other factors driving our results that we have not accounted for in our models.

We tested for statistical significance primarily at the 0.10 significance level.⁴⁵ We also considered less-strict levels of significance—specifically the 0.30 significance level—to be of interest and remark on such cases as providing suggestive evidence. We must note that where we did not find a significant relationship, this does not mean that there is no relationship but rather that our analysis did not uncover a relationship. Theoretically, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Further, in some of our models, we considered rare events, and

⁴⁴ The other examples of moderate confidence in some implementation environments involve local contracting data. We downgraded all local contracting results because of concerns over data quality.

⁴⁵ This number indicates our confidence in the results and represents the probability that the difference between our estimated effect size and no effect could be found by chance. It is a less-strict standard than is applied in many statistical analyses (which often employ 0.05 or 0.01 thresholds) because many of our outcomes of interest are rare events. In addition, the levels of confidence presented are for two-tailed tests, which are more appropriate for models in which there is no strong theoretical expectation of the direction of the effect rather than one-tailed tests, which have a less-strict level of confidence required.

in others, such as our examination of implementation environments, we considered smaller groups of cases that meet our criteria, which makes finding statistically significant relationships difficult. Finally, we were, at points, forced to use imperfect proxies for our true variables of interest. As a result of these caveats, we must be clear that we cannot definitively rule out a relationship purely through lack of evidence in our samples.

We describe the substantive effects for our ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in terms of marginal effects. For these models, our calculated effect sizes represent the effect when all control variables are held constant. For our dichotomous variables, we present substantive results in terms of predicted probabilities—that is, the predicted probability that an event will occur at a specific level of our measure of campaigning tool—with all variables other than our quantity of interest held at their means.

Forces

Our analysis for enduring presence presents a largely favorable view of the impact of the enduring U.S. presence (Table A.3). First, our results suggest that an enduring U.S. presence is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of the partner being targeted with armed conflict and military intimidation. For our analysis of U.S. force presence, we examined increases equivalent to roughly a brigade. Looking first at all disputes, increasing the U.S. noncombat presence from zero to 1,000 is associated with a 30-percent decrease in the predicted probability of a dispute, from 14 percent to 10 percent. These results are consistent across both our weighted and unweighted models. Our robustness checks demonstrate that this apparent effect of U.S. presence becomes statistically significant only above the threshold of 1,000 U.S. personnel. While it is clear that higher levels of U.S. forces are associated with an even greater level of deterrence, establishing the precise magnitudes at different thresholds is difficult with the functional form used in our model.

TABLE A.3
U.S. Forces and Deterrence Outcomes

| | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Noncombat U.S. presence (IHS) | -0.00553+ (0.00498) | -0.00400 (0.00439) | -0.00283 (0.00411) | -0.0171 (0.0117) | 0.00251+ (0.00612) |
| Observations | 5,349 | 4,032 | 4,849 | 4,928 | 1,340 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

For military intimidation, the apparent effects are even more dramatic. Increasing the U.S. noncombat presence from zero to 1,000 is associated with a 39-percent decrease in the probability of military intimidation. Further, in our weighted model, this relationship is significant at the 0.05 level. We also found that the deterrent impact of U.S. presence on military intimidation is most strongly concentrated in U.S. allies.

For armed conflict, the relationship is not significant in our standard models. Since armed conflict is a rare event, it is challenging to establish statistical significance. However, when we considered implementation environments, we found suggestive evidence that U.S. presence is associated with a decrease in the probability of armed conflict. We found suggestive evidence that U.S. presence is associated with a decreased likelihood of the partner being targeted with armed conflict for high-income states, which may be better able to absorb U.S. support, and in the post-Cold War time frame, in which the U.S. role as the sole superpower may have had an additional suppressive effect on armed conflict. As a result, we have some confidence that U.S. presence may deter conflict at higher levels in specific circumstances. We also found that suggestive evidence of a relationship for nonallies does not appear, statistically, for allies. This finding probably does not mean that U.S. forces stationed in allied countries do not deter but rather that it is hard to determine the precise balance of deterrence contributed by alliances and personnel, particularly for rare events.

There is significant evidence that a forward U.S. presence is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of economic coercion. This is true in both our baseline and weighted models. Economic coercion is relatively prevalent in the data, occurring in 33 percent of our country-years. Increasing the U.S. noncombat presence from zero to 1,000 is associated with a 43-percent decrease in the probability of economic coercion. We also found evidence that this holds true regardless of implementation environment.

We found no evidence that a U.S. presence systematically alters the likelihood of an adversary funding a proxy within the host nation. We did find suggestive evidence at the 0.3 level that, in the post-Cold War world, a U.S. presence has been associated with increases in proxy support. However, we note that there is a high potential for endogeneity in examining this relationship.

An enduring U.S. presence appears to have a less pronounced impact on U.S. influence in partner nations, at least according to our measures of influence (Table A.4). It is important to note, however, that the United States typically positions forces (at least in large numbers) in countries with which it already has close relationships, which would make it difficult to observe a large increase in cooperation with the measures we were using.

We did find evidence that host nations are substantially more likely to receive materiel transfers from the United States than from other nations. An increase in the size of the noncombat U.S. presence from 100 troops to 1,000 troops is associated with an increase of 20 percent in the proportion of arms purchased from the United States rather than another supplier. We also found evidence that this pattern holds regardless of implementation environment.

We found some evidence of foreign policy convergence for the United States and the partner nation given a U.S. military presence stationed in-country. The United States and

TABLE A.4
U.S. Forces and Cooperation Outcomes

| | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Noncombat U.S. presence (IHS) | 0.00180 (0.00212) | 0.00158 (0.00612) | 0.0257*** (0.00492) | 0.0956+ (0.0623) | -0.335 (1.528) |
| Observations | 6,146 | 5,459 | 5,542 | 1,495 | 611 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine; PME = Professional Military Education.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

high-income partner nations are more likely to vote alongside one another in the UNGA as the U.S. presence increases. We also found evidence at a lower level of confidence that the number of foreign trainees increases as the size of the U.S. presence increases, particularly for low-income states and nonallies.

We did not find systematic evidence that a U.S. presence is associated with a shift in public opinion. Previous work, however, has indicated that a U.S. military presence has led to an increase in public support for the U.S. military, suggesting that our results may be due to insufficient data.⁴⁶ We did not find evidence that a noncombat U.S. presence is associated with an increase in the probability of an access agreement; however, given that the U.S. presence is predicated on an existing agreement, this is not a surprise.⁴⁷

Our historical quantitative analysis revealed that there may be deleterious effects of a U.S. military presence on our stabilization outcomes (Table A.5). Both our baseline and weighted model show an association between U.S. presence and the number of terror events, though with only weaker confidence. Terror events increase by 0.03 percent for every 1-percent increase in troops. To put this in less-abstract terms, terror events would be expected to increase by 30.6 percent when U.S. presence increases from 100 troops to 1,000 troops. We also found that this relationship was strongest during the Cold War and persists even for U.S. allies.

⁴⁶ See Michael A. Allen, Michael E. Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Andrew Stravers, "Outside the Wire: U.S. Military Deployments and Public Opinion in Host States," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 114, No. 2, 2020.

⁴⁷ We did find evidence of a relationship for U.S. allies between U.S. presence and access. However, this relationship is likely true by definition.

TABLE A.5
U.S. Forces and Stabilization Outcomes

| | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Noncombat U.S. presence (IHS) | 0.00170 (0.00427) | -0.0250 (0.0611) | -0.0580+ (0.0507) | 0.0343+ (0.0326) |
| Observations | 3,361 | 2,548 | 4,101 | 5,435 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Our results for civil conflict and government respect for rights are more complex. There is very little evidence of a relationship between U.S. presence and civil conflict except for high-income states, where a U.S. presence is associated with a decrease in conflict.⁴⁸ We found that U.S. presence is associated with a moderate decrease in government respect for rights, however. Further, we found that these results were driven primarily by cases of low-income states and the Cold War time frame.

Footprint and Agreements

Our analysis showed a sharp distinction between footprint and agreements and, further, a distinction between the types of agreement that the United States forms (Table A.6). Beginning with agreements, we found evidence that mutual defense treaties are associated with higher levels of deterrence for all forms of military disputes (Table A.7). Further, while military disputes are relatively rare events, the magnitudes of these apparent effects are significant. A mutual defense pact is associated with a 61-percent decrease in the probability of a dispute of any type, from 16 percent to 6 percent. We also found that a mutual defense pact is associated with an 80-percent decrease in the probability of military intimidation and a 52-percent decrease in the probability of armed conflict.

By comparison, we found much weaker evidence that lesser U.S. agreements substantially affect the likelihood of conflict for partner nations. While they are associated with a decrease

⁴⁸ We did find some weak evidence that U.S. allies are somewhat more likely to be targeted with civil conflict and proxy support when hosting a larger U.S. presence, although we found that this largely corresponds to a small number of cases—the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey—with ongoing civil violence and conflict in colonial holdings.

TABLE A.6
Defense Pacts and Deterrence Outcomes

| | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.106** | -0.0940*** | -0.0673+ | 0.122+ | 0.0103 |
| | (0.0343) | (0.0162) | (0.0359) | (0.0829) | (0.0306) |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE A.7
Military Agreements and Deterrence Outcomes

| | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Military agreement | -0.0163+ | -0.00345 | -0.0149+ | -0.00957 | -0.00595 |
| | (0.0135) | (0.0111) | (0.0141) | (0.0171) | (0.0189) |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

in the likelihood of a military dispute, we could find evidence only at a much lower level of significance and did not find support in our weighted models, reducing our confidence.

We found limited evidence that mutual defense pacts are associated with an increase in the probability of economic coercion. While the magnitude of this apparent effect is large, a 63-percent increase in the probability of economic coercion, our confidence in this relationship is low. To the extent that this relationship exists, it was found primarily during the Cold War.

While we did see evidence that mutual defense pacts can deter military conflict between states, we saw no evidence that they suppress proxy support by adversaries—nor did we see

evidence that they provoke proxy support. The same holds true for lesser military agreements, and, for both variables, we saw little evidence of a relationship regardless of the implementation environment.

Mutual defense treaties also have a strong association with increased cooperation with the United States (Table A.8). A mutual defense treaty is associated with an increase in the probability of an access agreement from 10 percent to 34 percent, a massive increase.⁴⁹ Defense treaties are also associated with an increase in the proportion of arms that allies purchase from the United States rather than other sources (Table A.9). This increase is such that for a state at the mean proportion of U.S. materiel transfers, the formation of a mutual defense treaty would be expected to double the proportion of transfers from the United States. For lesser forms of agreement, we found evidence of such a relationship only conditionally, during the Cold War and for lower-income states, and at lower levels of confidence.

Both mutual defense treaties and lesser agreements are associated with greater security policy convergence for the United States and its allies and partners. In both instances, however, the magnitude of the calculated effect is low, equating to just 12 percent and 3 percent, respectively, of the standard deviation of the UNGA voting similarity score. For both forms of agreements, our results are strongest for high-income countries and during the Cold War. We note that we cannot say with confidence that there is a statistical relationship between either form of agreement and either public opinion of the United States or our measure of PME trainees.

Our results for U.S. agreements and stabilization outcomes are highly conditional (Table A.10). While our baseline and weighted results contain no evidence of a relationship

TABLE A.8
Defense Pacts and Cooperation Outcomes

| | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0285+ | 0.170** | 0.113* | -0.242 | 0.780 |
| | (0.0159) | (0.0554) | (0.0545) | (0.891) | (3.959) |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use Probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

⁴⁹ Because our measure of lesser agreements includes access agreements, we cannot look at the comparable relationship for this variable.

TABLE A.9
Military Agreements and Cooperation Outcomes

| | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Military agreement | 0.00734* (0.00308) | 0.0145+ (0.0102) | 0.0742 (0.0811) | -0.856 (1.064) |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

between mutual defense treaties and terrorism, we did find that these alliances are associated with increases in the count of terror events both for low-income countries and in the Cold War environment. Our analysis of lesser agreements similarly displays this split between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments. We found suggestive evidence that U.S. defense treaties are associated with a lower likelihood of intrastate conflict for high-income states, although we have very low confidence in this result, and this pattern is not found for lesser agreements.

Interestingly, while we found no overall relationship between mutual defense treaties and government respect for human rights, we found suggestive evidence of a decrease in government respect for human rights in low-income countries and, more strongly, during the Cold War. This might suggest that when the United States has made a significant pledge of

TABLE A.10
Defense Pacts and Stabilization Outcomes

| | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0157 (0.0203) | 0.0384 (0.216) | 0.0775 (0.178) |
| Observations | 3,427 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

support, foreign nations may not feel compelled to enforce democratic norms, at least when strategic competition is intense and, thus, the strategic value of partnerships for the United States is greater. For lesser agreements, however, we see small but significant increases in government respect for human rights, including for low-income countries and especially in the post-Cold War time frame (Table A.11). For these countries with less-clear security relationships with the United States, the United States may be able to exert greater leverage on protecting human rights—or these nations might increase their defense of human rights in hopes of maintaining U.S. support.

U.S. footprint, measured in terms of DoD procurement spending, comes with significant caveats, as we discussed earlier in this appendix. The data we used may not be representative of the larger category of U.S. footprint, and more analysis, therefore, is required. Hence, we are cautious in our interpretation: We do not assess our results to be indicative of high confidence, and we hesitate to discuss specific magnitudes for our findings.

Nevertheless, our analysis of local contracting suggests that the United States may gain influence and cooperation with partners while, at the same time, exposing these partners to the risk of increased conflict from both foreign and domestic sources (Table A.12). We found that increases in DoD procurement are associated with a sharp increase in military disputes. For both military intimidation and armed conflict, we found statistically significant increases in the probability of dispute occurrence when local contracting increases. For military intimidation, we have the highest confidence in this relationship for the post-Cold War context, while, for armed conflict, we have our highest confidence in this relationship in high-income states.

We also found relatively consistent evidence that DoD procurement spending is associated with an increase in the probability of an adversary supporting a proxy within the U.S. partner nation. Proxy support was extremely rare in our sample, occurring in just 1 percent of country-years. As a result, the magnitude of these apparent effects is small. Further, we

TABLE A.11
Military Agreements and Stabilization Outcomes

| | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Military agreement | -0.00407 (0.0120) | 0.0710 (0.0696) | 0.175** (0.0544) | -0.0349 (0.0483) |
| Observations | 3,427 | 2,620 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE A.12
Local Contracting and Deterrence Outcomes

| | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| DoD local contracting (IHS) | 0.00438* | 0.00223+ | 0.00364* | 0.000382 | 0.00270+ |
| | (0.00200) | (0.00146) | (0.00174) | (0.00230) | (0.00170) |
| Observations | 2,451 | 2,356 | 2,451 | 2,571 | 1,651 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

found evidence of this relationship—at different levels of confidence—in all implementation environments.⁵⁰

DoD procurement spending also has an association with a higher likelihood of terrorist violence (Table A.13). These apparent effects are strongest in the post–Cold War context and for U.S. allies but include both high- and low-income states. We did not find consistent similar results for either intrastate violence or government respect for human rights. We did,

TABLE A.13
Local Contracting and Stabilization Outcomes

| | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| DoD local contracting (IHS) | -4.01e-05 | 0.0205 | -0.0122 | 0.0281** |
| | (0.000743) | (0.0223) | (0.0122) | (0.00963) |
| Observations | 2,023 | 1,800 | 2,479 | 2,598 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

⁵⁰ Our highest level of confidence, however, was for relationships with high-income states and U.S. allies.

however, find suggestive evidence that DoD procurement spending has been associated with decreased respect for human rights in the post–Cold War time frame and for nonallies.

However, we found that the U.S. footprint is associated with higher levels of cooperation. Increasing procurement spending is associated with an increase in the probability of an access agreement (Table A.14). It is also associated with an increase in the percentage of arms acquired from the United States, although the magnitude is much smaller. Here we found very little evidence that the implementation environment dictates the presence or absence of this relationship. Further, while increases in spending are also associated with increases in foreign policy similarity for all except low-income non–U.S. allies, we found that the magnitude of these apparent effects is comparatively quite small.

Results for military trainees and public opinion are conditional. We found that the apparent relationship between contracting and training is concentrated in high-income states. Alternately, we found evidence of a relationship between DoD procurement and partner nation public opinion only for low-income states. Given the minimal conditions under which there is evidence of this relationship, we express very low confidence in these findings.

Activities

Our analysis shows that U.S. activities do not have uniformly favorable or unfavorable results (Table A.15). We began with bilateral and multilateral exercises conducted with the United States. We found that the relationship between militarized disputes and exercises is, in the short term, modest. However, the impact of exercises grows greater over time, suggesting that their primary value is not as a signal but as a long-term commitment to capability building. In addition, we found evidence that the strongest relationship is for high-income states.

TABLE A.14
Local Contracting and Cooperation Outcomes

| | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| DoD local contracting (IHS) | 0.00123* | 0.00374* | 0.00467** | 0.0613*** | –0.166 |
| | (0.000524) | (0.00172) | (0.00153) | (0.0122) | (0.174) |
| Observations | 3,119 | 2,712 | 2,571 | 1,102 | 572 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE A.15
U.S. Exercises and Deterrence Outcomes

| | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| U.S. exercise | -0.0153 (0.0209) | -0.0281+ (0.0169) | -0.000643 (0.0212) | -0.113** (0.0415) | 0.0132 (0.0369) |
| Observations | 3,803 | 2,935 | 3,322 | 3,569 | 734 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Looking more closely at the level of escalation within a dispute, we found that exercises are most strongly associated with a decline in military intimidation rather than armed conflict. The magnitude of this apparent effect is large even in the short term: Holding one or more exercises with the United States is associated with a 34-percent decrease in the likelihood of military intimidation. As with the larger category of disputes, we found that this relationship is statistically significant only for higher-income states and U.S. allies. We did not find evidence of a relationship between U.S. military exercises and the likelihood of proxy funding by an adversary.

We did, however, find evidence of a relationship between U.S. exercises and a reduction in economic sanctions at a high level of statistical significance. These results are concentrated in low-income states and are most prevalent in the post-Cold War period but include both allies and partners. However, we note that we do not have a strong theoretical motivation for this relationship. As a result, in our discussion, we downgraded our assessment of confidence in this finding.

U.S. exercises are also associated with an increase in several cooperative activities between the United States and partner nations (Table A.16). However, the magnitudes of these impacts are modest. U.S. exercises have a positive relationship with U.S. materiel transfers in all models, but the calculated effect of a single exercise is negligible. The relationship between U.S. exercises and military trainees is positive and significant across all models, but the calculated effect size is small, just 7 percent of a standard deviation shift in our PME trainees variable for each additional exercise. The pattern is the same for foreign policy similarity but with slightly larger magnitudes, at 11 percent of a standard deviation shift in our UNGA voting similarity variable for each additional exercise.

We cannot say with confidence that engaging in a military exercise with the United States is a strong predictor of the formation of an access agreement, since our results are inconsistent across model specifications. In addition, we saw no clear patterns in the estimated relationship between military exercises and partner-nation public opinion.

TABLE A.16
U.S. Exercises and Cooperation Outcomes

| | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| U.S. exercise | 0.0156** (0.00475) | -0.0123 (0.0163) | 0.0315* (0.0126) | 0.605*** (0.158) | -1.963+ (1.827) |
| Observations | 5,167 | 4,460 | 4,553 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

We also found evidence of a relationship between U.S. military exercises and the occurrence of terrorist violence (Table A.17). States that hold at least one exercise with the United States are modestly more likely to experience terrorism on average, equivalent to 11 percent of a standard deviation for our terror measure. However, this hides significant nuance. We found evidence that increases in terrorism were more likely during the Cold War, for non-allies, and for low-income states, while we saw a decrease in terror events for high-income states and U.S. allies, as well as suggestive evidence for a favorable relationship in the post-Cold War period.

The results for our other stabilization and resilience measures are less clear. There is no statistically significant evidence to suggest that exercises are associated with a greater or lesser likelihood of intrastate conflict. In addition, while we found evidence that U.S. exercises were

TABLE A.17
U.S. Exercises and Stabilization Outcomes

| | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|---------------|------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|
| U.S. exercise | -0.00511 (0.0226) | -0.404** (0.124) | -0.109+ (0.0883) | 0.0956+ (0.0874) |
| Observations | 1,751 | 2,620 | 4,182 | 4,692 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

associated with greater violations of human rights among nonallies during the Cold War, we found no significant evidence of this relationship in our larger samples.

Our analysis of materiel transfers suggests that they may be more provocative than other U.S. campaigning tools (Table A.18).⁵¹ Increased arms transfers are associated with a significant increase in military disputes for all samples. Moving from no materiel transfers to 50 million TIV, roughly equivalent to an F-35A *Lightning*, increases the predicted probability of a dispute by 40 percent.⁵²

Our results suggest that U.S. arms transfers are associated with an increase in military intimidation. The predicted probability of military intimidation increases by 29 percent between 0 TIV and 50 million TIV. We found that this was especially true of U.S. allies during the Cold War. However, we also found that our results are not significant for the highest-income countries and are only marginally significant post-Cold War.

The same pattern holds for armed conflict (Table A.19). The predicted probability of armed conflict increases by 48 percent between 0 TIV and 50 million TIV. Again, this relationship is not statistically significant for the highest-income countries and is not significant in the post-Cold War context but is strongly significant for U.S. allies and in the Cold War time frame.⁵³ We found no consistently significant relationship between materiel transfers and economic coercion across our baseline models. However, we found that materiel transfers are associated with a reduced probability of economic coercion in the highest-income countries.

TABLE A.18
Materiel Transfers and Deterrence Outcomes

| | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Materiel transfers (IHS) | 0.0149*** (0.00416) | 0.00411* (0.00189) | 0.0120*** (0.00336) | -0.000442 (0.00898) | 0.00304* (0.00125) |
| Observations | 5,927 | 5,840 | 5,927 | 5,631 | 5,360 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

⁵¹ In our analysis, recall that our data are in the unconventional measure of TIV, which accounts for production costs rather than costs of sales to capture value rather than price.

⁵² SIPRI, undated, “Sources and Methods.”

⁵³ In our analysis of materiel transfers, we also compared the highest-income countries to countries in the upper-middle-income bracket and below based on previous research.

TABLE A.19
Material Transfers and Stabilization Outcomes

| | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Material transfers (IHS) | 0.00235+ | 0.0554 | -0.0240 | 0.120** |
| | (0.00183) | (0.105) | (0.0425) | (0.0394) |
| Observations | 5,996 | 2,620 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

We found further evidence that materiel transfers are associated with an increase in the probability of an adversary supporting a proxy group within the recipient country. Comparing a state receiving 50 million TIV in arms with a state with no materiel transfers, we found that the probability of proxy support increases by more than 100 percent.

Our evidence suggests that arms transfers are also potentially destabilizing for the recipient country. U.S. materiel transfers are associated with an increase in terror attacks across all models and all implementation environments. A 10-percent increase in materiel transfers is associated with a 1.2-percent increase in terror attacks. Given the substantial value of some U.S. arms transfers, materiel provision has the potential to lead to significantly more terrorist violence.

Arms transfers are also associated with an increase in the probability of civil conflict. The predicted probability of civil conflict increases by 27 percent between 0 TIV and 50 million TIV. We note, however, that these apparent effects are concentrated in lower-income countries, and there is evidence to suggest that these apparent effects are stronger in the post-Cold War time frame. Results for respect for human rights are less consistent, though we did find evidence that arms transfers are associated with higher levels of repression in lower-middle-income and low-income countries.

Given these unfavorable outcomes, it is important to consider how materiel transfers may also increase cooperation between the United States and its partners. Here we did find evidence of favorable outcomes.⁵⁴ Materiel transfers are strongly associated with a greater likelihood of the United States and the partner forming an access agreement with high levels of confidence (Table A.20). The predicted probability of access agreement formation increases by 54 percent from 0 TIV to 50 million TIV. These results also persist for non-U.S. allies. We

⁵⁴ Note that we did not examine the relationship between materiel transfers and the percentage of arms a state receives from the United States as opposed to other nations, because the two are definitionally linked.

TABLE A.20
Materiel Transfers and Cooperation Outcomes

| | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Materiel transfers (IHS) | 0.00229 (0.00311) | 0.0194*** (0.00339) | 0.0650*** (0.00332) | 0.335*** (0.0431) | 0.648 (0.805) |
| Observations | 5,929 | 5,786 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

also found evidence of increasing returns to scale at higher levels of materiel transfers. There is, thus, strong evidence that arms transfers serve as a precursor to U.S. access.

We also found consistent evidence that U.S. materiel transfers are associated with military trainees. This is intuitive, given that U.S. arms transfers often entail training in the use of these arms, which would naturally lend itself to more-advanced forms of training. A 10-percent increase in materiel transfers is associated with a 3.4-percent increase in the number of trainees participating in U.S. programs.

The results for the relationship between arms transfers and partner-nation UNGA voting are more conditional. We found evidence that arms transfers are positively associated with foreign policy similarity for higher-income countries but negatively associated with foreign policy similarity for lower-income countries. Further, the magnitude of this relationship is very small.

We found the same pattern for the relationship between materiel transfers and public opinion, where arms transfers are positively associated with public opinion of the United States for higher-income countries and allies but negatively associated with public opinion for lower-income countries. We found that, on average, the provision of 1 million TIV is associated with an increase of 1.5 percentage points in public opinion for high-income states.

One of the major difficulties in examining the relationship between U.S. HA/DR operations and stabilization outcomes is that HA/DR missions often occur in nations where instability is already present. As a result, examining the likelihood of terrorism, intrastate conflict and proxy support, and violations of human rights may provide misleading results, because the root cause of these events is not the HA/DR mission itself but rather the events that led to intervention. Although endogeneity is a concern in all our models, it is such a substantial concern here that we are unable to present these results with any confidence.

These concerns may also be present in our models of HA/DR operations and deterrence, because instability may also make states an easier target for their adversaries. However, in

these models, we found inconsistent results: Our analysis never found evidence of a statistical relationship that reaches conventional levels of significance.⁵⁵ There are also risks of endogeneity in these relationships. As a result, we can provide little evidence of a relationship between these operations and deterrence.

We can, however, examine cooperation outcomes. We found evidence across all models that HA/DR missions improve public opinion of the United States (Table A.21). This shift is also comparatively large, equating to a 7-percent increase in U.S. favorability, on average. We also found evidence that HA/DR missions are associated with an increase in military leader training for high-income states.

We found some evidence that HA/DR missions also are associated with greater U.S. arms sales, though only in the Cold War time frame and for non-U.S. allies, and contradictory findings in our weighted models give us pause about the strength of this relationship. Similarly, we found insufficient results for our foreign policy similarity variable (UNGA voting) to draw conclusions about the effect of HA/DR missions in this regard.

TABLE A.21
HA/DR Operations and Cooperation Outcomes

| | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| HA/DR operation | 0.00958 (0.0106) | -0.0128 (0.0356) | 0.00727 (0.0402) | 0.201 (0.232) | 7.195* (3.382) |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

⁵⁵ We found that HA/DR missions are associated with an increase in MIDs and a decrease in sanctions in specific models, but we did not find consistent-enough evidence to consider these results persuasive.

Robustness Analysis

In Appendix A, we provided a more-detailed discussion of the methods and data used in our evaluation presented in the main report. We have strong confidence in the models we presented in that report. Those models used data that we believed best represented the relationships we were testing, and they employed the model specifications that we thought were most appropriate for our analyses. Each choice of data or model involves trade-offs, however. Alternative sources of data or model specifications might be useful for certain purposes. We therefore ran tests using other data sources and other model specifications to see whether they reinforced our findings or suggested that our findings should be caveated.¹ These findings are more suggestive, as they have not undergone the same level of scrutiny as the analyses in our main report. However, we also note that we did not encounter any findings in these robustness checks that suggested strong reason to doubt the results in the main report, and many provide confirming evidence.

In this appendix, we present the results of these robustness checks. We do not go into detail on each of our models here; instead, we focus on models that may be of particular interest. When describing these models, for all results that we do not discuss in depth, we found no significant differences of interest from our baseline analysis in our robustness checks.

Alternative Data and Model Specifications

Returns to Scale and Threshold Effects

In addition to our baseline models, we also investigated two potential ways in which U.S. campaigning tools may have nonlinear effects on competition outcomes. First, we examined whether U.S. campaigning tools had constant returns to scale—meaning that the apparent effect of the campaigning tool is the same regardless of the intensity level of the tool—or they had increasing (decreasing) returns to scale—meaning that the apparent effect is larger (smaller) at higher (lower) levels of intensity of the campaigning tool. To do so, we allowed our

¹ We considered a substantial number of alternative specifications for our models, including varying the measurement of our independent and dependent variables, altering the set of controls in each model, and changing the fixed effects structure to examine country-and-year fixed effects, regional-and-year fixed effects, and year fixed effects alone.

independent variables to take a common nonlinear form, quadratic, and examined whether the marginal effect of the variable changes at different levels of the U.S. activity.

Second, we also examined whether the campaigning tools demonstrated threshold effects. That is, we examined whether there was a significant relationship between a campaigning tool and a competition outcome that existed only if the level of the campaigning tool was sufficiently high (or low). To do so, we created dummy variables for a series of thresholds according to theoretical breakpoints in our data. In this section, we summarize our evidence for returns to scale and threshold effects for several U.S. campaigning tools.

Forces

The apparent relationship between U.S. forces and military disputes demonstrates clear threshold effects. The apparent deterrent impact of a forward U.S. presence manifests only for countries hosting greater than 5,000 troops, with some suggestive evidence that this effect occurs between 1,000 and 5,000 troops. This is particularly clear for military intimidation, where we saw strong evidence of increasing returns to scale. Our findings provided no evidence that a presence short of a battalion is likely to deter an adversary, calling into question the idea of tripwire forces, and we did not find strong evidence of a deterrent association short of a brigade. We also found that a U.S. presence greater than a brigade is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of an adversary funding a proxy within the U.S. partner country.² We also found suggestive evidence that terror attacks are more likely given a larger U.S. presence and that there may be increasingly unfavorable results as the size of this presence increases.

In terms of cooperation, a U.S. force presence is associated with significantly increasing returns for arms imports from the United States. Other cooperation outcomes do not show this pattern.³ In fact, the apparent effect of U.S. presence on alignment with foreign policy displays decreasing returns to scale. We also identified an interesting pattern for U.S. forces and public opinion. Both large and small numbers of U.S. forces are associated with more favorable viewpoints held by the public. However, for intermediate levels of U.S. presence, we found evidence of a negative relationship. Without a theoretical explanation for this pattern, we are hesitant to read too much into these results, but the relationship is worthy of additional study.

Footprint

Examining potential returns to scale for the U.S. footprint, we found that local contracting appears increasingly provocative at higher levels of spending. This is true for all levels of mili-

² For states with a U.S. presence above 20,000 troops, however, we saw an increase in proxy violence. This reflects the particular time and states involved, being heavily driven by the Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom and French activities in Indochina.

³ We did find evidence of this pattern for access agreements. However, we worry this particular finding may be true by definition, since significant force presence requires continued access.

tary disputes, including military intimidation and armed conflict. We also found evidence that adversary support for proxies and economic coercion are both more likely above a significant threshold—above the 50th and 75th percentile of spending, respectively.

We found significant evidence that, while low levels of local contracting do not appear to increase the likelihood of terror events, high levels of spending appear to have increasingly escalatory effects. We did not see the same effect for human rights violations, however. Higher levels of spending instead appear to have decreasing returns to scale. That is, greater increases in local contracting dollars do not appear to equate to a greater disregard of human rights.

We also saw evidence of increasing returns to scale for the relationship between local contracting and the likelihood of an access agreement, with the strongest apparent effects at a very high threshold. We saw similar patterns of increasing returns to scale for arms transfers, military trainees, and foreign policy similarity as revealed by UNGA votes.

Activities

We found little evidence that, when states participate in a greater number of exercises alongside the United States, these exercises appear to have a greater deterrent effect on military intimidation. Instead, the strongest deterrent effect appears to be for fewer exercises. Our analysis also suggests there may be diminishing returns for the deterrent effect of exercises on economic coercion, though with lower confidence.⁴ However, we did see that engaging in a greater number of exercises with the United States appears to have an increasingly deterrent effect for armed conflict. We also found some evidence that engaging in a greater number of exercises has an increasingly favorable impact on reducing the likelihood of terrorist violence and civil conflict. We do not have a strong theoretical explanation for these differing patterns. It is noteworthy, however, that the outcomes involving actual violence (as opposed to threatened violence or other coercion) are the ones that appear to be most deterred by more-intensive exercising with the United States.

Our analysis also suggests that there are largely decreasing returns to scale for many cooperative activities with the United States, including U.S. arms imports, PME participation, and foreign policy convergence.

Finally, we examined the possibility of increasing or decreasing returns to scale for U.S. materiel transfers. We found that for all forms of military disputes, materiel transfers are increasingly associated with an even greater likelihood of conflict. However, we also found that U.S. materiel transfers appear particularly likely to provoke economic coercion at lower thresholds of materiel transfers.

The results for our stabilization outcomes are mixed. Increased levels of materiel transfers are associated with an increasingly larger likelihood of government repression while also being associated with a reduction in terror events. This suggests that the provision of arms may allow the government to combat terrorism but that, in doing so, it may repress its citizens.

⁴ We also saw this pattern for government respect for human rights, but the effect was not significant.

We found more-positive apparent effects for cooperation with the United States. U.S. materiel transfers appear increasingly likely to result in an access agreement at higher levels of transfers. We also saw increasing returns to scale for materiel transfers and foreign policy similarity. We found decreasing returns to scale for military trainees. This may indicate, however, that countries that receive substantial quantities of U.S. materiel transfers are already more able to use those arms than states receiving fewer transfers.

Effects over Time

As we have discussed, U.S. campaigning tools may have different impacts on competition outcomes in the short run from those over a longer time frame. Our SCM analysis showed two examples of this phenomenon, in the impact of U.S. forward presence and U.S. exercises on deterrence and stabilization outcomes. We explored these two cases with advanced statistical methods highlighted in Appendix A. For robustness, we also examined the possibility of differing effects over time for the other relationships between U.S. campaigning tools and competition outcomes on a larger scale.

In general, we did not find clear trends over time. This is, in many ways, unsurprising. Looking at deterrence and stabilization outcomes over time with traditional statistical regressions is particularly difficult, since the number of potentially confounding factors increases with each year. In this section, we highlight only the results from this analysis that show consistent strong patterns. We defined the *medium term* as effects that persist between three and five years after the U.S. campaigning activity. We defined the *longer term* as effects that persist between five and ten years after the U.S. campaigning activity.

First, major U.S. signals of resolve—a U.S. presence and a U.S. defense commitment—and more minor U.S. campaigning activities—local contracting and U.S. exercises—are all associated with the import of arms from the United States in the short term, as indicated by our baseline analysis, and in the longer term. In addition, we found that consistent materiel transfers over time are associated with an increasing likelihood that a partner will grant the United States access.

Second, several of the potentially concerning findings in our baseline analysis also appear to persist over time. The apparent increase in government repression following local contracting by DoD seems to grow larger in the medium term. In addition, we found evidence that materiel transfers are associated with an increased likelihood of the partner being targeted with armed conflict and terrorist violence, not just in the immediate term but also in the medium term.

Additional U.S. Campaigning Tools

In addition to the campaigning tools that we describe in the main report, we examined several other campaigning tools in various levels of detail. Many of the variables that we examined had insufficient data to draw firm conclusions. Others were dropped from our analysis because of concerns about the possibility of endogeneity. These include several indicators of

U.S. operations, including stability operations, deterrence operations, advisory operations, and counter-proxy support.

Two tools that were excluded from our larger analysis deserve greater attention. The first is U.S. security cooperation as captured by Greenbook assistance, as well as the narrower category of U.S. foreign military financing (FMF). In the main report, we examine materiel transfers. This is our preferred measure of security cooperation because, compared with Greenbook data, it captures the same phenomenon consistently: the provision of such materiel as weapons, sensors, and vehicles. Greenbook assistance captures a broader variety of programs that may have very different intents and very different outcomes. Our measure nevertheless captures significantly more cooperation than the narrower class of FMF.⁵ However, there is value in understanding our findings for materiel transfers in relation to both the broader and narrower classes of cooperation.

Beginning with our analysis of deterrence outcomes, we found evidence that security assistance overall is not associated with an increase in military disputes. We did find, however, that security assistance provided to high-income countries, which are better able to absorb security cooperation, appears to have a deterrent impact on disputes at all levels; we found evidence at a lower level of confidence that security assistance to low-income countries appears to increase the probability that an adversary will engage the partner in armed conflict. When we looked more narrowly at the category of FMF, the effect was starker. Increases in FMF appear to make the partner more likely to be a target of military disputes across the escalation ladder.

We did, however, find consistent evidence that both Greenbook assistance and FMF are associated with a decreased likelihood of economic coercion against the partner, especially for high-income partners. This is counter to our results for materiel transfers, in which we found a negative relationship in certain implementation environments. Our results for proxy warfare are mixed and show no consistent pattern.

We also found that both security assistance writ large and FMF are associated with decreases in partner stability. For both measures of U.S. support, we saw an apparent increase in the probability of terrorist violence, especially in low-income countries. We also saw a strong association between U.S. security aid and FMF and the probability of interstate conflict. Finally, we saw some evidence that U.S. security aid is associated with a decrease in government respect for human rights.

The relationship between security assistance and cooperation between the United States and the partner is mixed. We found consistent evidence that security assistance is associated with greater arms imports from the United States. This is an intuitive result, as the provision of arms also entails training and other support. Security assistance more broadly is also associated with an increased likelihood of U.S. access within the partner nation and more mili-

⁵ In addition, compared with FMF, materiel transfers focus on the value of the goods provided rather than what is charged for providing defense articles and services.

tary trainees from the partner to the United States. We did not find such consistent results for the FMF subset alone.

Interestingly, both forms of security cooperation are associated with lower public opinion. Previous results have suggested that U.S. posture is likely to raise public opinion when it increases contact with U.S. forces or material benefits for the partner nation's populace. Security cooperation of this sort may do neither. We did find benefits at the elite level, however, because security cooperation—particularly FMF—is associated with a convergence in foreign policy between the United States and the partner nation.

Previous analysis considered the role of nearby troops in deterring conflict and adversary behavior below the level of armed conflict. Following this work, we also examined the role that U.S. forces not located in the country of interest play in deterrence outcomes, noting that we had no strong priors about the effects of a regional presence on either stabilization or cooperation outcomes. We followed a measure of nearby personnel that has been used in previous RAND analysis.⁶ First, for all states outside the partner country, U.S. presence is binned into several categories: a heavy, light, or air-defense ground presence; U.S. Air Force (USAF) fighters and bombers; and U.S. Navy carrier strike groups (CSGs). This model then discounts U.S. presence depending on the distance from the partner country and the ability of different U.S. capabilities to traverse this distance.

To better follow this analysis, we used directed dyad-year data rather than the country-year data that we used in our baseline analyses. However, our analysis differs from previous RAND work in two major ways. First, we followed our initial modeling strategy in using country fixed effects. Second, we included a control for both the in-country and the distance-weighted capabilities located near the potential adversary to account for the possibility that the U.S. presence might be located closer to the adversary than to the partner nation, as well as the total U.S. presence within the partner nation.

Our analysis showed similar results to previous findings but with lower levels of confidence, which we attribute to the strict modeling specification we used. U.S. heavy ground and air-defense artillery forces located near the state of interest are both negatively associated with military disputes, including armed conflict and military intimidation, though only the latter form of U.S. presence is statistically significant in our models. We found that light U.S. ground forces are associated with military intimidation, although, as in previous work, we found this relationship is only marginally significant. However, we did find strong evidence that a nearby U.S. heavy and light presence are both associated with a decrease in the likelihood of proxy violence.

We continued to find suggestive evidence that U.S. fighters and bombers are associated with a decrease in military disputes and intimidation, respectively. However, while previous analysis had found moderate evidence that fighters were associated with an increase in armed

⁶ For a full description of this measure, see Frederick et al., 2020.

conflict, we did not find statistically significant evidence of such a relationship.⁷ We also found no significant relationship between Navy CSGs and any form of dispute.

Implementation Environments

Democracy Versus Nondemocracy

As we have discussed, although the United States has both democratic and less-democratic nations as allies and partners, it may choose a different set of campaigning tools when engaging with different regime types. Further, democracies and nondemocracies confront conflict and instability in different ways. In the main report, we measure the level of democracy within a country using the Polity index, on a scale from -10 to 10, such that higher numbers indicate greater levels of democracy.⁸ For this robustness analysis, we created a dichotomous variable by which countries with a Polity score of 6 or higher were coded as democracies, while all other states were coded as nondemocracies. We then interacted this measure with each of our U.S. campaigning tools. We discuss our findings below.

Forces

We did see evidence that the apparent effects of U.S. forces differ between democracies and nondemocracies. Beginning with the results for deterrence, there is not strong evidence that the apparently deterrent relationship between U.S. forces and military intimidation and armed conflict depends on the regime type of the partner nation. The results are somewhat stronger for nondemocracies, but we have very low confidence in this difference. While we found in our initial models that there is significant evidence that a forward U.S. presence is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of economic coercion, we found that this apparent effect is concentrated solely in democratic partner nations. Finally, although we found, on average, no evidence that a U.S. presence systematically alters the likelihood of an adversary funding a proxy within the host nation, we found evidence with modest confidence that a U.S. presence might increase proxy funding within democratic nations.

Our results for the disparate impact of U.S. forces in democracies and nondemocracies show that, while cooperation with both types of states increases when the United States uses its campaigning tools, the form it takes is different. While foreign policy convergence appears to be more likely when democratic states host a U.S. presence, nondemocratic states appear more likely to send military officers for PME within the United States as the size of the U.S. presence increases, with the latter apparent effect having a higher level of confidence.

We also found that the most pernicious apparent effect of a forward U.S. presence—an increase in the likelihood of terrorist violence—appears to be concentrated in democratic

⁷ We instead found suggestive evidence that U.S. bombers are associated with a greater likelihood of armed conflict.

⁸ See Marshall, Jagers, and Gurr, 2002.

countries.⁹ This finding is consistent with previous literature, which has shown that democracies are particularly vulnerable to terrorist violence because of their permissive environment for human rights and constraints on the actions that the executive can take to combat terrorism.¹⁰

Footprint and Agreements

We found evidence that both mutual defense pacts and lesser forms of agreement have different competition outcomes for democratic and nondemocratic states. While we saw no difference between democratic and nondemocratic allies in deterring conflict, we found suggestive evidence that lesser agreements are associated with a lower likelihood of disputes and armed conflict in nondemocratic nations. However, we have a lower level of confidence in this relationship.

Although, in our main analysis, we found limited evidence that mutual defense pacts are associated with an increase in the probability of economic coercion, we found in our robustness analysis that this apparent relationship is concentrated solely in nondemocratic countries. We also found that both alliances and lesser agreements are associated with adversary support of a proxy in democratic nations, although we found that this is driven by a small number of cases.¹¹

Our robustness analysis found that, while we have different levels of confidence in our results, there is very little evidence that the association between U.S. alliances and lesser agreements and cooperation with the United States varies significantly by regime type.

There were several surprises among our findings for stabilization. We found that, while defense pacts are associated with an increase in terrorist violence, this is true only for nondemocracies. This is counter to both expectations about the relative likelihood of terrorism in democracies and the apparent effects of U.S. forward presence and should be explored in greater detail.¹² According to our main analysis, defense pacts in low-income nondemocracies

⁹ We also found evidence that a U.S. presence is associated with lower levels of government respect for human rights in democracies but not in nondemocracies. However, we believe this finding to be a result of censoring or floor data effects. States that have a poor human rights record are unable to move lower on the human rights scale, unlike those at higher levels of government respect for human rights.

¹⁰ See, for example, Quan Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2005.

¹¹ There is lesser evidence that new agreements short of alliance commitments are associated with a reduction in proxy frequency for nondemocratic nations.

¹² One potential explanation found in the literature is that, rather than attacking the democratic U.S. ally, terrorist groups are choosing to target U.S. nationals instead. Scholars have found that terrorist groups appear to be willing to attack a highly capable ally in lieu of their own government. However, this does not fully explain why this is not the case for nondemocratic allies. See Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer, "The Friend of My Enemy Is My Enemy: International Alliances and International Terrorism," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2010.

appear particularly likely to spark terrorist violence. We also found that mutual defense pacts appear to reduce the likelihood of civil conflict for democracies, but not for nondemocracies.

Perhaps most interestingly, while U.S. alliance commitments in nondemocratic countries are associated with a reduction in government respect for human rights, lesser agreements have the opposite effect. Further, this result is highly significant. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that states receiving lower forms of commitment from the United States may maintain a stronger human rights record in hopes of securing greater commitment, while states that are already strongly backed by the United States may not fear abandonment.

Local contracting results also show distinctions between democratic and nondemocratic nations. The association between local contracting and militarized disputes and military intimidation is strongest for democratic nations. We did not see such clear differences for armed conflict or proxy support, however, where local contracting appears to increase the likelihood of a U.S. partner being targeted regardless of regime type.

There are also sharp distinctions between this campaigning tool and competition outcomes across regime type. The most significant is for foreign policy similarity as reflected in UNGA voting. While local contracting appears to increase foreign policy convergence for democracies, it actually appears to *decrease* foreign policy convergence for nondemocratic states. Further, both these findings come with high statistical confidence. In addition, local contracting is associated with an increase in access agreements for democratic states only.

Stabilization outcomes show both expected and surprising findings. Local contracting is associated with an increase in terror events for democratic nations, which, as we noted, may already be subject to an increased risk of terrorism. Interestingly, however, local contracting is associated with a decrease in government respect for human rights for democratic nations. While there is no clear explanation for this relationship, it is possible that influxes of local spending increase nondemocratic characteristics, such as corruption, which have clearer effects when a nation is a democracy than if it is already a nondemocracy.

Activities

There are very few clear patterns that distinguish the effects of U.S. exercises on competition outcomes in democracies and nondemocracies. The apparent deterrent relationship between exercises and military intimidation is strongest for nondemocratic nations, but our confidence in this result is low. We also found that, while exercises are associated with a reduction in the likelihood of economic coercion for both democracies and nondemocracies, the results are stronger for nondemocracies.

Cooperation with the United States appears strong following U.S. exercises for both democracies and nondemocracies. While we saw some variation in terms of confidence and magnitude, it is not consistent, with some stronger and more-significant effects for democracies and some for nondemocracies.

Our stabilization results again reveal little to distinguish democracies and nondemocracies. The only result of significance is that exercises are associated with an increase in terror

events for nondemocratic nations. For democracies, exercises are associated with a decrease in terror events, although we have a low level of confidence in this result.

Our central analysis of materiel transfers suggested that they may be more provocative than other U.S. campaigning tools in several ways. Our robustness analysis suggests that this finding is not highly conditional on the regime type of the U.S. partner. Military disputes and armed conflict appear more likely given materiel transfers regardless of regime type. We did, however, find evidence that military intimidation is more likely only when materiel transfers go to democratic nations—there is no significant effect for nondemocratic nations. Our results for proxy warfare and stabilization each showed little to give us confidence that the apparent relationships uncovered in the main analysis are dependent on regime type.

For many of our cooperation outcomes, there were no significant differences when comparing materiel transfers to democracies with materiel transfers to nondemocracies. There are, however, two potentially important points. First, much like local contracting, materiel transfers appear to increase foreign policy convergence with the United States for democracies and decrease foreign policy convergence for nondemocracies. Also of note, while materiel transfers to nondemocratic nations have no apparent impact on public opinion, arms transfers to democratic nations are associated with the public holding higher levels of favorable views of the United States.

In our main analysis, we found little evidence that U.S. HA/DR operations have a significant effect in competition other than for public opinion, which is both a theoretically motivated result and important from a policy perspective. Our robustness analysis of democracies and nondemocracies does little to change this earlier assessment. We have only one significant finding of note. We found evidence that HA/DR missions are associated with an increase in military leader training for only democratic states, much as our analysis found that this apparent effect was concentrated in high-income countries.

Interstate Rivalry

In our analysis, we considered how U.S. campaigning tools might have disparate effects given the threat environment facing the partner. In our main analysis, we examined this by distinguishing between the Cold War and post-Cold War time frames. An alternative specification would be to consider interstate rivalry as an indicator of threat environment. Recall that states engaged in an interstate rivalry are those that have engaged in sustained competition with the potential to escalate to military conflict.¹³ To test this alternative measure of the threat environment, we interacted our campaigning tools with a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if a state has an ongoing interstate rivalry and 0 otherwise. We discuss our findings below.

¹³ Thompson, 2001.

Forces

Our analysis provides some evidence that the threat environment conditions the relationship between U.S. force presence and competition outcomes, but we have a low level of confidence in the conditional nature of these results. For example, we found some evidence that the deterrent effect of forces on military disputes and armed conflict is stronger in the presence of a rivalry, but not at traditional levels of statistical significance. We found the same is true for economic coercion—the apparent deterrent effect is stronger in high-threat environments.

We found evidence that enduring U.S. presence does not have a pronounced impact on U.S. influence in partner nations. In a low-threat environment, U.S. presence is associated with greater UNGA voting similarity. In a high-threat environment, however, a forward presence is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of military trainees from that partner nation.

Our stabilization results add some additional nuance to our baseline analysis. Unfavorable outcomes—a reduction in government respect for human rights and an increase in civil conflict (and, to a lesser extent, proxy funding)—appear more likely when states do not face a clear external threat, although we did not assign high confidence to these findings. Combined with our deterrence results, this suggests that U.S. forces may deter interstate adversaries, but, when external threats are low, the potential unfavorable effects on internal stability are more likely to manifest.

Footprint and Agreements

Our results for agreements do not suggest that their deterrent power relies on the threat environment facing the U.S. partner. However, we did find that armed conflict—the highest level of escalation of a military dispute that we examined—appears least likely, given both a defense pact and lesser agreements in high-threat environments. Formal commitments may, therefore, send a signal to the most-likely adversaries.

We did not find that the association between a U.S. defense pact and economic coercion changes according to the threat environment. However, we did find that lesser agreements with the United States are associated with a relatively substantial decrease in the probability of economic coercion in a high-threat environment.

In large part, our results for cooperation mirror our findings for the Cold War. We had previously found that both mutual defense treaties and lesser agreements were associated with greater security policy convergence for the United States and its allies and partners. We found, however, that, for mutual defense treaties, this is true only in high-threat environments—both during the Cold War and in an interstate rivalry. For lesser forms of agreement, we found evidence of a relationship with U.S. arms transfers only in the Cold War and amid an interstate rivalry.

We also found evidence that U.S. allies are most likely to engage the United States for PME in high-threat environments but that U.S. allies are more likely to express a favorable opinion of the United States in low-threat environments.

Our results for U.S. agreements and stabilization outcomes remain highly conditional. We found suggestive evidence that mutual defense treaties are associated with a decrease in government respect for human rights in the presence of an interstate rival, which is again similar to our results from the Cold War. Lesser agreements, we found, are associated with an increase in the government's respect for human rights in the absence of an interstate rival. This provides additional support for our analysis of the Cold War and post-Cold War time frames.

In addition, while U.S. defense treaties are associated with higher levels of terrorism in states that have an external rival, U.S. defense pacts are associated with lower levels of terrorism in states that have a lower-threat external environment. This stands in contrast to what was a null relationship between alliances and terrorist violence. However, it is consistent with previous research that suggests that, in general, external or interstate rivalry is associated with a higher likelihood of terrorist violence.¹⁴

Our analysis for U.S. footprint in high- and low-threat environments suggests that there are no significant differences in the apparently provocative effects for local contracting on any of our deterrence outcomes. Similarly, the apparently favorable effects of local contracting on cooperation do not depend on the threat environment. Further, we found only one significant difference for our stability outcomes. Local contracting is associated with a reduction in the partner nation's respect for human rights, but only in low-threat environments. In addition, we have only a low level of confidence in this finding.

Activities

Our analysis suggests that the threat environment in which U.S. exercises take place does have an impact on the likely outcomes of competition. In our central analysis, we found some limited evidence that U.S. exercises had an apparently favorable effect on military disputes and military intimidation. Our robustness analysis suggests that this is primarily true for states in low-threat environments. However, we note that our confidence in this conditional finding remains below the threshold of common statistical significance.

As before, we found that U.S. exercises are associated with a significant decline in economic coercion. This is especially true—both in terms of our level of confidence and in the magnitude of the apparent effect—for states in high-threat environments. We saw evidence of a similar relationship between U.S. exercises and U.S. arms sales. While U.S. exercises are associated with greater arms sales for both sets of states, our level of confidence and the magnitude of the apparent effect are higher for states in high-threat environments.

We also found evidence of a relationship between U.S. military exercises and the occurrence of terrorist violence for states engaged in an interstate rivalry. This result is extremely statistically significant and follows our similar result for the Cold War time frame. Similarly, where we found that U.S. exercises were associated with greater repression of human rights

¹⁴ Michael G. Findley, James A. Piazza, and Joseph K. Young, "Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 74, No. 1, 2012.

during the Cold War, we found that this is also the case if the partner nation is engaged in an interstate rivalry, though we assign low confidence to this finding.

Our analysis suggests that the apparent effects of materiel transfers on both deterrence and stabilization outcomes is not heavily dependent on the threat environment. There is only one clear relationship of note for our cooperation outcomes. We found evidence that arms transfers are positively associated with foreign policy similarity in low-threat environments while having no significant effect in high-threat environments. This runs counter to expectations, as it would appear that U.S. arms provision would be more desirable—and thus better compensated—in high-threat environments. However, we did not find evidence of such a phenomenon.

While we found few results for the effects of humanitarian operations on competition outcomes in our baseline results, we found several results of interest when comparing high- and low-threat environments in our robustness analysis. First, we found that the favorable effects of humanitarian operations on public opinion of the United States are much higher in high-threat environments, a finding that is strongly statistically significant. Second, we also found evidence that HA/DR missions are associated with an increase in military leader training only in high-threat environments.

In addition, we saw two further results where the threat environment appears to be particularly important. While a humanitarian operation conducted in a high-threat environment appears to increase foreign policy congruity between the United States and the partner nation substantially, an HA/DR mission conducted in a low-threat environment appears to reduce foreign policy congruity. Similarly, while a humanitarian operation conducted in a high-threat environment appears to increase materiel transfers from the United States to the partner nation substantially, an HA/DR mission conducted in a low-threat environment appears to have a negative impact, if any, on arms imports. States thus appear to move from humanitarian assistance to greater military cooperation with the United States only when they are facing a significant external threat—but again, these results are suggestive.

Regression Tables

In this appendix, we provide full regression tables from the analysis in the main report, *Assessing the Value of Overseas Military Campaigning in Strategic Competition*, as well as in Appendix A of this technical annex. We document results for our baseline models, our propensity-weighted models, and each of the implementation environments examined in the main report and Appendix A of this annex. Regression results for our robustness analysis captured in Appendix B are available upon request.

Baseline Models

In this section, we present the regression tables for our baseline models in which we use statistical controls to account for potential confounding factors or alternative explanations.

Forces

TABLE C.1
U.S. Forces and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Noncombat U.S. presence (IHS) | 0.00180 (0.00212) | 0.00158 (0.00612) | 0.0257*** (0.00492) | 0.0956+ (0.0623) | -0.335 (1.528) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0260+ (0.0169) | 0.187** (0.0594) | 0.0805+ (0.0450) | -0.384 (0.890) | 1.060 (4.160) |
| Democracy level | -0.00570 (0.00916) | -0.00719 (0.0168) | -0.0217+ (0.0188) | 0.872** (0.315) | 1.274 (2.614) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.00363 (0.00487) | 0.00206 (0.0113) | 0.00731 (0.0123) | 0.0524 (0.268) | -16.88** (5.036) |

Table C.1—Continued

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0412* (0.0191) | -0.224 (0.327) | -2.523 (2.501) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -1.027+ (0.635) | 68.17*** (13.50) | -4,068*** (1,020) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.396*** (0.0876) | 0.355*** (0.0856) | 3.773** (1.339) | 7.070 (12.37) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | 0.0350+ (0.0310) | -0.00361 (0.0549) | 0.137* (0.0547) | 2.250* (0.940) | -0.759 (24.98) |
| Cold War | 0.471*** (0.0321) | 0.277*** (0.0778) | -0.0370 (0.0418) | | |
| Constant | 0.537*** (0.0666) | | -0.102 (0.168) | -0.224 (2.322) | 262.7*** (58.89) |
| Observations | 6,146 | 5,459 | 5,542 | 1,495 | 611 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.2
U.S. Forces and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| Noncombat U.S. presence (IHS) | 0.00170 (0.00427) | -0.0580+ (0.0507) | 0.0343+ (0.0326) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0252 (0.0319) | 0.0773 (0.233) | 0.0780 (0.152) |
| Democracy level | -0.0264+ (0.0155) | 1.003*** (0.168) | -0.0599 (0.175) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00499 (0.0160) | 0.107 (0.151) | -0.318* (0.129) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.00927 (0.0185) | -0.587* (0.241) | 0.543** (0.203) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.720+ (0.615) | -5.413 (13.72) | 24.03+ (21.11) |
| Cold War | 0.0518 (0.0583) | 1.581*** (0.298) | -1.759*** (0.407) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.0237 (0.0258) | -0.105 (0.310) | 0.0673 (0.190) |
| Constant | | 4.794** (1.687) | 4.013** (1.494) |
| Observations | 3,361 | 4,101 | 5,435 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.3
U.S. Forces and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variables | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Noncombat U.S. presence (IHS) | -0.00553+ (0.00498) | -0.00400 (0.00439) | -0.00283 (0.00411) | -0.0171+ (0.0117) | 0.00251 (0.00612) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.101* (0.0394) | -0.0973*** (0.0202) | -0.0599+ (0.0378) | 0.179* (0.0833) | -0.00112 (0.0488) |
| Democracy level | -0.0148 (0.0240) | -0.0271+ (0.0195) | 0.00532 (0.0237) | -0.225*** (0.0402) | -0.109** (0.0404) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0134 (0.0170) | 0.0240* (0.0108) | -0.0465** (0.0142) | -0.0143 (0.0342) | -0.0273* (0.0124) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0626* (0.0245) | 0.0454* (0.0200) | 0.0361+ (0.0186) | 0.0349 (0.0571) | 0.0254 (0.0276) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | -0.829 (1.245) | 0.322 (0.673) | -0.173 (1.125) | 6.449 (7.404) | 11.56*** (2.342) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.217+ (0.184) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | 0.0203 (0.122) | |
| Cold War | -0.0256 (0.0739) | 0.115+ (0.0591) | -0.160* (0.0637) | -0.532*** (0.121) | 0.0118 (0.0743) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | -0.0721+ (0.0625) |
| Observations | 5,349 | 4,032 | 4,849 | 4,928 | 1,340 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Defense Pacts

TABLE C.4
Defense Pacts and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|-------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0285+ | 0.170** | 0.113* | -0.242 | 0.780 |
| | (0.0159) | (0.0554) | (0.0545) | (0.891) | (3.959) |
| Democracy level | -0.00733 | -0.00443 | -0.0342+ | 0.842** | 1.213 |
| | (0.00910) | (0.0166) | (0.0194) | (0.310) | (2.602) |
| GDPPC (IHS) | -0.00396 | 0.00452 | 0.000949 | 0.0453 | -17.03*** |
| | (0.00481) | (0.0111) | (0.0119) | (0.267) | (4.977) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0363+ | -0.279 | -2.530 |
| | | | (0.0198) | (0.330) | (2.507) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -0.616+ | 69.26*** | -4,066*** |
| | | | (0.444) | (13.99) | (995.4) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.419*** | 0.399*** | 3.663** | 8.168 |
| | | (0.0873) | (0.0877) | (1.321) | (12.24) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | 0.0378+ | -0.00948 | 0.187** | 2.369* | -1.552 |
| | (0.0314) | (0.0601) | (0.0588) | (0.953) | (24.60) |
| Cold War | 0.473*** | 0.270*** | -0.0668+ | | |
| | (0.0314) | (0.0782) | (0.0437) | | |
| Constant | 0.549*** | | 0.0584 | -0.0671 | 263.0*** |
| | (0.0658) | | (0.168) | (2.317) | (58.86) |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.5
Defense Pacts and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0157 (0.0203) | 0.0384 (0.216) | 0.0775 (0.178) |
| Democracy level | -0.0290+ (0.0150) | 1.005*** (0.161) | -0.0535 (0.170) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00188 (0.0165) | 0.114 (0.147) | -0.318* (0.126) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.00874 (0.0187) | -0.576* (0.239) | 0.515* (0.210) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.787+ (0.628) | -6.188 (14.23) | 25.14+ (21.30) |
| Cold War | 0.0423 (0.0599) | 1.576*** (0.302) | -1.837*** (0.401) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.0272+ (0.0261) | -0.103 (0.306) | 0.0437 (0.187) |
| Constant | | 4.409* (1.691) | 4.289** (1.470) |
| Observations | 3,427 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.6
Defense Pacts and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|----------------------------------|---|--|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.106** (0.0343) | -0.0940*** (0.0162) | -0.0673+ (0.0359) | 0.122+ (0.0829) | 0.0103 (0.0306) |
| Democracy level | -0.0128 (0.0238) | -0.0237+ (0.0185) | 0.00464 (0.0233) | -0.216*** (0.0395) | -0.109** (0.0396) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0136 (0.0174) | 0.0244* (0.0106) | -0.0455** (0.0144) | -0.0167 (0.0344) | -0.0316* (0.0130) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0603* (0.0249) | 0.0450* (0.0199) | 0.0328+ (0.0193) | 0.0388 (0.0572) | 0.0241 (0.0272) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | -0.871 (1.196) | 0.199 (0.595) | -0.160 (1.068) | 5.476 (6.116) | 11.60*** (2.439) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.246+ (0.189) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.000346 (0.119) | |
| Cold War | -0.0354 (0.0760) | 0.103+ (0.0577) | -0.164** (0.0631) | -0.535*** (0.121) | 0.00190 (0.0755) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | -0.0740+ (0.0624) |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Military Agreements

TABLE C.7
Military Agreements and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Military agreement | 0.00734* (0.00308) | 0.0145+ (0.0102) | 0.0742 (0.0811) | -0.856 (1.064) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0272+ (0.0160) | 0.110* (0.0537) | -0.258 (0.893) | 1.595 (3.888) |
| Democracy level | -0.00753 (0.00904) | -0.0347+ (0.0193) | 0.844** (0.310) | 1.186 (2.577) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.00404 (0.00479) | 0.000735 (0.0118) | 0.0505 (0.266) | -17.23*** (4.978) |
| Interstate rivalry | | 0.0359+ (0.0197) | -0.294 (0.334) | -2.235 (2.660) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | -0.654+ (0.435) | 68.71*** (13.98) | -4,056*** (993.6) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.393*** (0.0878) | 3.656** (1.307) | 7.796 (12.42) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | 0.0375+ (0.0314) | 0.187** (0.0589) | 2.405* (0.956) | -1.148 (24.54) |
| Cold War | 0.472*** (0.0313) | -0.0636+ (0.0442) | | |
| Constant | 0.547*** (0.0660) | 0.0539 (0.167) | -0.120 (2.309) | 265.1*** (58.70) |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.8
Military Agreements and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| Military agreement | -0.00407 (0.0120) | 0.175** (0.0544) | -0.0349 (0.0483) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0146 (0.0208) | -0.00877 (0.210) | 0.0865 (0.178) |
| Democracy level | -0.0290+ (0.0150) | 0.992*** (0.160) | -0.0520 (0.170) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00191 (0.0165) | 0.115 (0.147) | -0.318* (0.126) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.00883 (0.0186) | -0.582* (0.237) | 0.516* (0.210) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.806+ (0.618) | -7.014 (14.01) | 25.25+ (21.22) |
| Cold War | 0.0418 (0.0595) | 1.584*** (0.301) | -1.840*** (0.400) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.0274+ (0.0259) | -0.106 (0.303) | 0.0431 (0.187) |
| Constant | | 4.293* (1.694) | 4.309** (1.465) |
| Observations | 3,427 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.9
Military Agreements and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Military agreement | -0.0163+ (0.0135) | -0.00345 (0.0111) | -0.0149+ (0.0141) | -0.00957 (0.0171) | -0.00595 (0.0189) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.103** (0.0351) | -0.0932*** (0.0165) | -0.0649+ (0.0367) | 0.125+ (0.0828) | 0.0122 (0.0309) |
| Democracy level | -0.0120 (0.0237) | -0.0235+ (0.0184) | 0.00541 (0.0232) | -0.215*** (0.0394) | -0.109** (0.0395) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0131 (0.0174) | 0.0245* (0.0105) | -0.0448** (0.0144) | -0.0166 (0.0344) | -0.0316* (0.0129) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0605* (0.0249) | 0.0451* (0.0199) | 0.0332+ (0.0193) | 0.0390 (0.0571) | 0.0245 (0.0272) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | -0.827 (1.184) | 0.207 (0.590) | -0.118 (1.043) | 5.526 (6.093) | 11.65*** (2.524) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.242+ (0.187) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.000582 (0.119) | |
| Cold War | -0.0325 (0.0761) | 0.103+ (0.0576) | -0.160* (0.0633) | -0.538*** (0.121) | 0.00295 (0.0772) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | -0.0744+ (0.0625) |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Local Contracting

TABLE C.10
Local Contracting and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| DoD local contracting (IHS) | 0.00123* (0.000524) | 0.00374* (0.00172) | 0.00467** (0.00153) | 0.0613*** (0.0122) | -0.166 (0.174) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0335+ (0.0242) | 0.218*** (0.0314) | 0.122** (0.0375) | 0.595+ (0.350) | -10.87** (3.604) |
| Democracy level | 0.0952*** (0.0172) | -0.0300 (0.0323) | -0.0468+ (0.0265) | 0.731** (0.218) | 4.906+ (4.302) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.0355*** (0.00619) | 0.0211+ (0.0116) | 0.0523*** (0.0108) | -0.141+ (0.0843) | -7.151*** (1.542) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0884** (0.0317) | 0.806** (0.254) | -0.470 (3.218) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | 0.559 (0.925) | -12.61*** (3.576) | -404.2*** (101.5) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.898*** (0.150) | 0.316* (0.144) | 0.123 (0.939) | 35.03* (14.22) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | -0.111* (0.0476) | -0.171* (0.0717) | 0.0397 (0.0626) | -0.253 (0.603) | 15.40*** (4.378) |
| Cold War | 0.343*** (0.0188) | 0.432*** (0.100) | -0.0216 (0.0672) | | |
| Constant | -0.114+ (0.0587) | | -0.611*** (0.0904) | 4.512*** (0.827) | 91.24*** (11.24) |
| Observations | 3,119 | 2,712 | 2,571 | 1,102 | 572 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.11
Local Contracting and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| DoD local contracting (IHS) | -4.01e-05 (0.000743) | 0.0205 (0.0223) | -0.0122 (0.0122) | 0.0281** (0.00963) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0175+ (0.0142) | 0.0184 (0.461) | -0.499* (0.250) | 0.676** (0.230) |
| Democracy level | 0.00538 (0.0152) | -2.383*** (0.506) | 0.696** (0.264) | 0.738** (0.227) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0111** (0.00364) | -3.043*** (0.139) | 0.812*** (0.0754) | -0.273*** (0.0702) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.00907 (0.0144) | 1.417* (0.563) | -0.851** (0.305) | 0.747** (0.258) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.387+ (0.292) | -8.759 (9.125) | -20.58* (8.036) | 14.83+ (13.50) |
| Cold War | 0.0197 (0.0289) | | 2.197*** (0.306) | 0.0856 (0.366) |
| Oil-producing state | 0.0237* (0.0115) | 0.113 (0.459) | -0.743*** (0.208) | 0.709*** (0.193) |
| Constant | | 35.56*** (1.196) | -2.139*** (0.626) | 1.734** (0.629) |
| Observations | 2,023 | 1,800 | 2,479 | 2,598 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.12
Local Contracting and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| DoD local contracting (IHS) | 0.00438* (0.00200) | 0.00223+ (0.00146) | 0.00364* (0.00174) | 0.000382 (0.00230) | 0.00270+ (0.00170) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0404 (0.0394) | -0.000507 (0.0153) | 0.0460+ (0.0354) | -0.0435 (0.0551) | -0.0275* (0.0115) |
| Democracy level | 0.00341 (0.0307) | 0.0253+ (0.0188) | -0.0209 (0.0252) | -0.0913+ (0.0572) | 0.0254* (0.0118) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0160+ (0.00945) | 0.00734+ (0.00613) | -0.0260*** (0.00768) | 0.0439+ (0.0251) | -0.0105** (0.00380) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0775** (0.0296) | 0.0371* (0.0189) | 0.0468* (0.0201) | 0.0718+ (0.0568) | 0.0244* (0.0120) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 3.044*** (0.922) | 1.375*** (0.307) | 1.927*** (0.535) | 2.049+ (1.654) | 0.0622 (0.149) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.151 (0.230) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.189* (0.0859) | |
| Cold War | -0.0899+ (0.0563) | 0.0206 (0.0485) | -0.106* (0.0474) | -0.101 (0.121) | 0.0214 (0.0213) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | 0.0307* (0.0149) |
| Observations | 2,451 | 2,356 | 2,451 | 2,571 | 1,651 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

U.S. Exercises

TABLE C.13
U.S. Exercises and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---|----------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| U.S. exercise | 0.0156** (0.00475) | -0.0123 (0.0163) | 0.0315* (0.0126) | 0.605*** (0.158) | -1.963+ (1.827) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0385* (0.0170) | 0.167** (0.0565) | 0.0745+ (0.0423) | -0.311 (0.863) | 0.670 (4.029) |
| Democracy level | 0.00564 (0.00606) | 0.0127 (0.0199) | -0.0128 (0.0186) | 0.784** (0.291) | 1.610 (2.571) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0178*** (0.00527) | 0.00107 (0.0126) | -0.00167 (0.00867) | 0.0669 (0.264) | -17.37*** (4.985) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0475+ (0.0250) | -0.300 (0.306) | -2.478 (2.614) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -0.427 (0.437) | 60.84*** (13.26) | -4,011*** (990.4) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.366** (0.126) | 0.305** (0.0980) | 3.157** (1.202) | 9.660 (12.34) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | 0.0133 (0.0164) | -0.0343 (0.0765) | 0.0354 (0.0485) | 2.172* (0.920) | 1.028 (24.73) |
| Cold War | 0.314*** (0.0126) | 0.216** (0.0834) | -0.000876 (0.0472) | | |
| Constant | 0.715*** (0.0602) | | 0.250+ (0.130) | -0.00238 (2.261) | 264.3*** (58.63) |
| Observations | 5,167 | 4,460 | 4,553 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.14
U.S. Exercises and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| U.S. exercise | -0.00511 (0.0226) | -0.109+ (0.0883) | 0.0956+ (0.0874) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0428 (0.0431) | 0.0485 (0.214) | -0.00344 (0.159) |
| Democracy level | -0.0301+ (0.0256) | 1.019*** (0.160) | -0.126 (0.177) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00124 (0.0220) | 0.112 (0.148) | -0.306* (0.136) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0278+ (0.0262) | -0.574* (0.239) | 0.701* (0.269) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.733 (0.943) | -6.104 (13.90) | 17.62 (20.24) |
| Cold War | -0.0193 (0.0810) | 1.506*** (0.309) | -0.775* (0.306) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.0198 (0.0604) | -0.114 (0.305) | 0.135 (0.230) |
| Constant | | 4.568** (1.700) | 4.110** (1.560) |
| Observations | 1,751 | 4,182 | 4,692 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.15
U.S. Exercises and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| U.S. exercise | -0.0153 (0.0209) | -0.0281+ (0.0169) | -0.000643 (0.0212) | -0.113** (0.0415) | 0.0132 (0.0369) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0617+ (0.0463) | -0.0624* (0.0316) | -0.0656+ (0.0544) | 0.218** (0.0835) | 0.131** (0.0507) |
| Democracy level | -0.0371+ (0.0283) | -0.0150 (0.0250) | -0.0275 (0.0305) | -0.226*** (0.0512) | -0.138+ (0.117) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0374+ (0.0267) | 0.0180+ (0.0105) | -0.0827*** (0.0187) | -0.0572+ (0.0443) | -0.0479* (0.0230) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0713** (0.0268) | 0.0494* (0.0244) | 0.0346+ (0.0225) | 0.0598 (0.0725) | 0.0375 (0.0427) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | -1.621+ (0.984) | 0.729 (0.929) | -0.878 (0.987) | 4.182 (4.928) | 13.35*** (2.546) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.616** (0.237) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.0767 (0.158) | |
| Cold War | -0.141* (0.0670) | -0.0162 (0.0495) | -0.206*** (0.0562) | -0.313** (0.120) | -0.00103 (0.117) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | -0.0324 (0.0600) |
| Observations | 3,803 | 2,935 | 3,322 | 3,569 | 734 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Material Transfers

TABLE C.16
Material Transfers and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|-------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Material transfers (IHS) | 0.00229 (0.00311) | 0.0194*** (0.00339) | 0.0650*** (0.00332) | 0.335*** (0.0431) | 0.648 (0.805) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0629** (0.0216) | 0.152*** (0.0262) | 0.0594** (0.0220) | 0.588+ (0.304) | -11.16** (3.600) |
| Democracy level | 0.0638*** (0.0137) | -0.00295 (0.0152) | -0.0310* (0.0148) | 1.036*** (0.204) | 2.998 (3.852) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.0248*** (0.00506) | 0.00314 (0.00657) | 0.00886+ (0.00511) | -0.181* (0.0829) | -7.987*** (1.376) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | -0.00362 (0.0140) | 0.434+ (0.225) | -1.962 (3.040) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -0.0977 (0.344) | -9.383** (2.807) | -443.1*** (102.4) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.759*** (0.0911) | 0.241*** (0.0542) | 1.013+ (0.924) | 39.88** (14.45) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | -0.0704* (0.0345) | -0.141** (0.0482) | 0.103** (0.0323) | -0.0672 (0.493) | 17.04*** (4.202) |
| Cold War | 0.566*** (0.0309) | 0.153* (0.0748) | 0.0105 (0.0337) | | |
| Constant | 0.00723 (0.0423) | | -0.151** (0.0525) | 4.615*** (0.713) | 95.57*** (10.74) |
| Observations | 5,929 | 5,786 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.17
Material Transfers and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Material transfers (IHS) | 0.00235+ (0.00183) | -0.0240 (0.0425) | 0.120** (0.0394) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0160+ (0.00975) | -0.578* (0.230) | 0.758*** (0.177) |
| Democracy level | -0.0116 (0.0126) | 1.088*** (0.222) | 0.423** (0.161) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0109** (0.00405) | 0.707*** (0.0841) | -0.247*** (0.0599) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0108+ (0.00934) | -0.987*** (0.240) | 0.538** (0.173) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.466+ (0.297) | -18.33* (7.822) | 14.00+ (11.59) |
| Cold War | -0.00166 (0.0276) | 2.177*** (0.217) | -1.320*** (0.237) |
| Oil-producing state | 0.0180+ (0.00984) | -0.820*** (0.196) | 0.504** (0.168) |
| Constant | | -1.656* (0.669) | 2.271*** (0.520) |
| Observations | 5,996 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.18
Material Transfers and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Material transfers (IHS) | 0.0149*** (0.00416) | 0.00411* (0.00189) | 0.0120*** (0.00336) | -0.000442 (0.00898) | 0.00304* (0.00125) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.00624 (0.0227) | 0.00256 (0.00966) | -0.0112 (0.0209) | -0.00282 (0.0515) | -0.0147+ (0.00820) |
| Democracy level | 0.00366 (0.0193) | -0.00255 (0.00980) | 0.00547 (0.0171) | -0.140** (0.0430) | 0.000258 (0.00755) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0134+ (0.00697) | 0.00598+ (0.00353) | -0.0200** (0.00610) | 0.0614*** (0.0170) | -0.0101*** (0.00303) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.108*** (0.0196) | 0.0403*** (0.00979) | 0.0790*** (0.0159) | 0.111** (0.0416) | 0.0140* (0.00696) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 2.899*** (0.632) | 1.107*** (0.158) | 2.002*** (0.451) | 4.009* (1.807) | 0.124 (0.184) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.197+ (0.164) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.157* (0.0774) | |
| Cold War | -0.0371 (0.0538) | 0.0294 (0.0349) | -0.0812+ (0.0500) | -0.276** (0.0856) | -0.00638 (0.0211) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | 0.00949+ (0.00690) |
| Observations | 5,927 | 5,840 | 5,927 | 5,631 | 5,360 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine..

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response Operations

TABLE C.19
HA/DR Operations and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| HA/DR operation | 0.00958 (0.0106) | -0.0128 (0.0356) | 0.00727 (0.0402) | 0.201 (0.232) | 7.195* (3.382) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0286+ (0.0159) | 0.170** (0.0554) | 0.113* (0.0545) | -0.270 (0.893) | 0.492 (3.962) |
| Democracy level | -0.00740 (0.00910) | -0.00442 (0.0166) | -0.0343+ (0.0194) | 0.846** (0.309) | 1.118 (2.518) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.00391 (0.00481) | 0.00449 (0.0111) | 0.000987 (0.0119) | 0.0443 (0.267) | -16.89*** (4.928) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0363+ (0.0198) | -0.277 (0.330) | -2.547 (2.452) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -0.621+ (0.446) | 69.11*** (13.97) | -4,004*** (1,001) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.419*** (0.0875) | 0.399*** (0.0878) | 3.679** (1.325) | 9.271 (11.97) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | 0.0379+ (0.0314) | -0.00957 (0.0601) | 0.187** (0.0588) | 2.365* (0.953) | -3.420 (24.42) |
| Cold War | 0.473*** (0.0315) | 0.270*** (0.0781) | -0.0666+ (0.0436) | | |
| Constant | 0.548*** (0.0660) | | 0.0581 (0.168) | -0.0697 (2.318) | 262.2*** (58.49) |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.20
HA/DR Operations and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| HA/DR operation | 0.0510** (0.0193) | -0.246 (0.290) | 0.408+ (0.238) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0165 (0.0207) | 0.0391 (0.216) | 0.0769 (0.178) |
| Democracy level | -0.0296+ (0.0152) | 1.007*** (0.161) | -0.0557 (0.169) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00250 (0.0163) | 0.111 (0.147) | -0.316* (0.126) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.00821 (0.0186) | -0.578* (0.240) | 0.516* (0.210) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.758+ (0.620) | -6.054 (14.21) | 24.90+ (21.25) |
| Cold War | 0.0448 (0.0594) | 1.570*** (0.303) | -1.828*** (0.400) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.0256 (0.0259) | -0.104 (0.306) | 0.0448 (0.187) |
| Constant | | 4.435** (1.698) | 4.269** (1.467) |
| Observations | 3,427 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.21
HA/DR Operations and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| HA/DR operation | 0.0161 (0.0353) | 0.0102 (0.0261) | -0.0171 (0.0372) | -0.0546 (0.0631) | 0.0701*** (0.0197) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.106** (0.0343) | -0.0941*** (0.0162) | -0.0675+ (0.0360) | 0.123+ (0.0830) | 0.00868 (0.0314) |
| Democracy level | -0.0130 (0.0238) | -0.0239+ (0.0184) | 0.00472 (0.0233) | -0.215*** (0.0397) | -0.119** (0.0382) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0135 (0.0174) | 0.0243* (0.0106) | -0.0457** (0.0144) | -0.0169 (0.0342) | -0.0305* (0.0129) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0603* (0.0248) | 0.0451* (0.0199) | 0.0327+ (0.0194) | 0.0390 (0.0571) | 0.0226 (0.0273) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | -0.882 (1.196) | 0.195 (0.596) | -0.149 (1.068) | 5.585 (6.204) | 11.13*** (2.021) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.245+ (0.188) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -7.13e-05 (0.119) | |
| Cold War | -0.0346 (0.0761) | 0.103+ (0.0577) | -0.164** (0.0632) | -0.537*** (0.121) | 0.00276 (0.0740) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | -0.0707+ (0.0640) |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Propensity-Weighted Models

In this section, we provide the regression results for our models using inverse propensity score weighting to account for threats to causal inference.

Forces

TABLE C.22
U.S. Presence and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Noncombat U.S. presence (IHS) | -0.00102 (0.00287) | -0.00602 (0.00727) | 0.0150* (0.00648) | 0.0307 (0.0772) | -0.462 (1.489) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0474+ (0.0309) | 0.164*** (0.0457) | 0.0997+ (0.0548) | 0.386 (1.291) | 1.187 (4.082) |
| Democracy level | -0.0155+ (0.0131) | -0.0311+ (0.0252) | -0.0422+ (0.0221) | 0.708+ (0.374) | 1.213 (2.551) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00620 (0.00778) | 0.0243+ (0.0160) | 0.0323+ (0.0202) | 0.278 (0.341) | -17.41*** (5.081) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0444* (0.0192) | 0.576 (0.585) | -2.771+ (2.401) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -1.051* (0.463) | 65.02*** (9.433) | -4,035*** (838.2) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.214* (0.0964) | 0.402*** (0.109) | 3.010+ (1.570) | 7.106 (12.53) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | -0.00519 (0.0498) | -0.108+ (0.0972) | -0.0718 (0.147) | 2.663+ (1.487) | 0.453 (26.57) |
| Cold War | 0.409*** (0.0408) | -0.00543 (0.0757) | 0.0276 (0.0887) | | |
| Constant | 0.562*** (0.111) | | -0.173 (0.233) | -2.925 (3.312) | 267.9*** (58.58) |

Table C.22—Continued

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Observations | 5,282 | 5,107 | 5,311 | 1,417 | 602 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.23
U.S. Presence and Stabilization Outcomes**

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|
| Noncombat U.S. presence (IHS) | -0.00203 (0.00331) | -0.0508+ (0.0403) | 0.0525+ (0.0340) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.00351 (0.0243) | -0.0806 (0.271) | 0.255+ (0.166) |
| Democracy level | 0.00369 (0.0174) | 1.195*** (0.301) | 0.103 (0.244) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.00806 (0.0133) | 0.343+ (0.178) | -0.581*** (0.128) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.00579 (0.0161) | -0.216 (0.298) | 0.491* (0.242) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.741+ (0.585) | -17.67+ (11.87) | 29.05* (13.05) |
| Cold War | 0.0584 (0.0588) | 2.359*** (0.519) | -2.057*** (0.455) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.000804 (0.00672) | -0.131+ (0.105) | 0.108 (0.112) |
| Constant | | 1.864 (2.225) | 6.348*** (1.384) |

Table C.23—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Observations | 2,003 | 3,838 | 4,683 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.24
U.S. Presence and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Noncombat U.S. presence (IHS) | -0.00598+ (0.00532) | -0.0107* (0.00484) | -°0.00240 (0.00545) | -0.0224* (0.0113) | 0.00329 (0.0118) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.140*** (0.0398) | -0.0942*** (0.0268) | -0.0919*** (0.0276) | 0.212** (0.0770) | 0.00927 (0.0942) |
| Democracy level | -0.00792 (0.0303) | -0.0480* (0.0208) | 0.0259 (0.0330) | -0.231*** (0.0391) | -0.0729+ (0.0457) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00753 (0.0163) | 0.0275* (0.0118) | -0.0216+ (0.0160) | -0.00347 (0.0286) | -0.0494+ (0.0283) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0732* (0.0307) | 0.0315+ (0.0231) | 0.0382+ (0.0238) | 0.0181 (0.0573) | 0.0356 (0.0354) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | -1.252+ (0.701) | 0.797+ (0.589) | -0.415 (0.626) | 5.380 (6.661) | 14.34*** (2.591) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -°0.151 (0.179) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | 0.179+ (0.133) | |

Table C.24—Continued

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Cold War | 0.0311 (0.0671) | 0.0899+ (0.0710) | -0.0266 (0.0613) | -0.504*** (0.106) | 0.198** (0.0667) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | -0.000369 (0.0186) |
| Observations | 4,505 | 3,447 | 4,084 | 4,816 | 744 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Defense Pacts

**TABLE C.25
Defense Pact and Cooperation Outcomes**

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|----------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.00643 (0.0318) | 0.244*** (0.0653) | 0.0806+ (0.0538) | 0.942 (1.162) | 2.292 (3.915) |
| Democracy level | -0.00998 (0.0134) | 0.00634 (0.0258) | -0.0319+ (0.0258) | 0.718* (0.306) | 1.643 (2.796) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00609 (0.00960) | 0.00803 (0.0173) | -0.00228 (0.0133) | 0.339 (0.392) | -11.55+ (10.03) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0572+ (0.0296) | -0.166 (0.395) | -3.937+ (3.532) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -1.062+ (0.660) | 83.53** (30.43) | -4,797*** (1,360) |

Table C.25—Continued

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.291+ | 0.418*** | 4.789+ | -14.34 |
| | | (0.190) | (0.108) | (3.472) | (28.25) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | 0.0357 | 0.0660 | 0.122* | 1.466+ | 20.26 |
| | (0.0425) | (0.106) | (0.0600) | (1.266) | (38.88) |
| Cold War | 0.425*** | -0.192** | -0.0849+ | | |
| | (0.0657) | (0.0605) | (0.0465) | | |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | |
| Constant | 0.562*** | | 0.153 | -3.135+ | 200.2+ |
| | (0.123) | | (0.175) | (2.785) | (101.5) |
| Observations | 5,282 | 5,107 | 5,311 | 1,417 | 602 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.26
Defense Pact and Stabilization Outcomes**

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0125 | 0.191 | 0.0257 |
| | (0.0385) | (0.256) | (0.178) |
| Democracy level | -0.0223+ | 1.255*** | -0.380+ |
| | (0.0170) | (0.203) | (0.223) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.00120 | 0.0727 | -0.351+ |
| | (0.0215) | (0.175) | (0.245) |

Table C.26—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0220 (0.0225) | -0.371 (0.389) | 0.222 (0.511) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 1.156+ (0.810) | -17.70 (20.71) | 51.30+ (36.69) |
| Cold War | 0.104+ (0.0793) | 1.382*** (0.315) | -2.294** (0.836) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.0109 (0.0120) | -0.170+ (0.156) | 0.274+ (0.176) |
| Constant | | 4.572* (1.988) | 4.687+ (2.799) |
| Observations | 2,003 | 3,837 | 4,682 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.27
Defense Pact and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.205** (0.0652) | -0.120*** (0.0269) | -0.172** (0.0544) | 0.206* (0.0905) | 0.0373 (0.0577) |
| Democracy level | -0.0401+ (0.0288) | -0.0375+ (0.0240) | -0.00931 (0.0296) | -0.172** (0.0623) | -0.0802+ (0.0473) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0194 (0.0197) | 0.0307* (0.0134) | -0.0788*** (0.0212) | 0.0442+ (0.0339) | -0.0537+ (0.0391) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.104** (0.0345) | 0.0284+ (0.0249) | 0.0751* (0.0314) | 0.0420 (0.0617) | 0.0284 (0.0374) |

Table C.27—Continued

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| National capabilities (CINC) | -0.938 | 0.369 | -0.146 | 3.650 | 13.08*** |
| | (1.455) | (0.800) | (1.384) | (4.490) | (2.062) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.436+ | |
| | | | | (0.253) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | 0.0744 | |
| | | | | (0.220) | |
| Cold War | 0.0290 | 0.207* | -0.122+ | -0.217+ | 0.234*** |
| | (0.107) | (0.101) | (0.0843) | (0.169) | (0.0517) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | -0.0344+ |
| | | | | | (0.0188) |
| Observations | 4,498 | 3,444 | 4,078 | 4,816 | 744 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

New Agreement

TABLE C.28
New Agreement and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| Military agreement | 0.0110* | -0.00346 | 0.213+ | 0.803 |
| | (0.00524) | (0.0183) | (0.162) | (2.245) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.00755 | 0.116* | -1.295 | 3.084 |
| | (0.0189) | (0.0563) | (2.808) | (6.726) |
| Democracy level | 0.0101 | -0.00680 | 0.556+ | 2.268 |
| | (0.0143) | (0.0467) | (0.490) | (8.920) |

Table C.28—Continued

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00832 (0.0116) | 0.0489+ (0.0307) | 0.144 (0.467) | -36.10** (11.47) |
| Interstate rivalry | | 0.0826* (0.0406) | -0.278 (0.662) | 4.019 (9.278) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | -0.894+ (0.801) | 93.01** (31.11) | -2,824+ (1,482) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.430* (0.192) | 1.157 (2.163) | 41.24+ (22.96) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | -0.0253 (0.0729) | 0.193+ (0.130) | 4.084+ (3.072) | -18.61 (89.71) |
| Cold War | 0.469*** (0.0671) | 0.0982 (0.144) | | |
| Oil-producing state | | | | |
| Constant | 0.489*** (0.135) | -0.583+ (0.353) | 0.372 (3.994) | 457.2** (146.0) |
| Observations | 1,340 | 1,335 | 312 | 235 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.29
New Agreement and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|
| Military agreement | -0.0212 (0.0994) | -0.0104 (0.0926) | 0.0413 (0.0960) |

Table C.29—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.523* (0.212) | 0.109 (0.211) | -0.175+ (0.168) |
| Democracy level | 0.0977 (0.122) | 0.593* (0.259) | 0.163 (0.227) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0152 (0.0989) | 0.0760 (0.228) | -0.288+ (0.201) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.215+ (0.123) | -0.180 (0.268) | 0.369 (0.446) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 5.266+ (3.191) | 12.20+ (6.268) | 6.996 (27.71) |
| Cold War | 0.640+ (0.439) | 0.579+ (0.408) | -1.427+ (0.770) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.117* (0.0568) | -0.212 (0.211) | 0.195+ (0.183) |
| Constant | | 5.638* (2.600) | 3.514+ (2.252) |
| Observations | 149 | 1,093 | 1,296 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.30
New Agreement and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target |
|--------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Military agreement | 0.00581 (0.0327) | -0.00789 (0.0358) | 0.00853 (0.0348) | -0.000551 (0.0317) |

Table C.30—Continued

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.182** (0.0595) | -0.248*** (0.0628) | -0.0906+ (0.0646) | 0.110 (0.111) |
| Democracy level | -0.0337 (0.0542) | 0.0131 (0.0492) | -0.0240 (0.0655) | -0.217*** (0.0621) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0779* (0.0385) | 0.0666+ (0.0494) | -0.129** (0.0413) | -0.0369 (0.0638) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0720+ (0.0660) | 0.0798+ (0.0677) | 0.00447 (0.0437) | -0.0430 (0.115) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | -1.259 (2.222) | -0.212 (2.773) | -2.849+ (2.073) | 9.348+ (5.164) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | 0.0950 (0.389) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.252 (0.283) |
| Cold War | -0.110 (0.160) | 0.138 (0.214) | -0.271+ (0.163) | -0.755** (0.241) |
| Observations | 1,059 | 762 | 797 | 1,156 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Local Contracting

TABLE C.31
Local Contracting and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|----------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| DoD local contracting (IHS) | 0.00213*** (0.000707) | 0.00735*** (0.00270) | 0.00444*** (0.00158) | 0.0547*** (0.0119) | 0.0529 (0.217) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0352 (0.0227) | 0.140*** (0.0398) | 0.116*** (0.0437) | 0.676* (0.344) | -10.33*** (3.833) |
| Democracy level | 0.102*** (0.0176) | 0.0231 (0.0379) | -0.0329 (0.0273) | 0.825*** (0.222) | 5.012 (4.338) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.0278*** (0.00684) | 0.00376 (0.0115) | 0.0477*** (0.0113) | -0.150* (0.0896) | -9.019*** (1.630) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0748** (0.0340) | 0.630** (0.261) | 0.991 (3.587) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | 0.346 (0.546) | -11.85*** (3.413) | -438.1*** (105.7) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.882*** (0.150) | 0.298* (0.151) | 0.732 (0.911) | 46.86*** (15.42) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | -0.123*** (0.0447) | -0.154** (0.0774) | 0.0343 (0.0622) | -0.692 (0.563) | 18.25*** (4.699) |
| Cold War | 0.199*** (0.0194) | -0.0577 (0.112) | -0.0371 (0.0618) | | |
| Constant | 0.0638 (0.0623) | | -0.561*** (0.0915) | 4.701*** (0.809) | 99.30*** (11.82) |
| Observations | 2,440 | 2,446 | 2,446 | 1,028 | 549 |

Table C.31—Continued

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE C.32
Local Contracting and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|
| DoD local contracting (IHS) | -0.000759 (0.000811) | 0.00787 (0.0134) | 0.0149 (0.0117) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0376* (0.0212) | -0.690** (0.284) | 0.970*** (0.300) |
| Democracy level | -0.0292 (0.0315) | 0.996*** (0.368) | 0.361 (0.321) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00960 (0.00949) | 0.593*** (0.132) | -0.108 (0.101) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.000667 (0.0182) | -0.646** (0.322) | 0.725** (0.281) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.512 (0.432) | -21.73** (8.363) | 4.036 (9.345) |
| Cold War | -0.00369 (0.0352) | 2.399*** (0.528) | -0.313 (0.347) |
| Oil-producing state | -7.22e-05 (0.00614) | -0.218* (0.114) | 0.0334 (0.0829) |
| Constant | | -0.950 (0.949) | 1.056 (0.803) |
| Observations | 1,893 | 2,329 | 2,429 |

Table C.32—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE C.33
Local Contracting and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| DoD local contracting (IHS) | 0.000702 (0.00167) | 0.00117+ (0.00104) | 0.000947 (0.00150) | -0.00144 (0.00237) | 0.00311+ (0.00160) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0197 (0.0489) | -0.0308+ (0.0200) | 0.0492+ (0.0414) | 0.0124 (0.0618) | -0.0246+ (0.0133) |
| Democracy level | -0.0253 (0.0375) | 0.00186 (0.0264) | -0.0220 (0.0289) | -0.103+ (0.0609) | 0.0268+ (0.0152) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00905 (0.0135) | 0.0174* (0.00859) | -0.0111+ (0.00991) | 0.0664** (0.0241) | -0.00682+ (0.00378) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0890** (0.0289) | 0.0328+ (0.0206) | 0.0638** (0.0245) | 0.0842+ (0.0574) | 0.0279+ (0.0159) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 4.035*** (0.502) | 1.500*** (0.252) | 2.868*** (0.315) | 4.325*** (0.938) | 0.0399 (0.174) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.401+ (0.245) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.206* (0.0915) | |
| Cold War | -0.00816 (0.0674) | 0.120+ (0.0630) | -0.0759+ (0.0541) | 0.00380 (0.127) | -0.00146 (0.0223) |

Table C.33—Continued

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| Oil-producing state | | | | | 0.00486 (0.00473) |
| Observations | 2,304 | 2,153 | 2,304 | 2,446 | 1,451 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

U.S. Exercises

TABLE C.34
U.S. Exercises and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| U.S. exercise | 0.0125** (0.00422) | -0.0320+ (0.0214) | 0.0209+ (0.0135) | 0.695*** (0.182) | -1.892 (2.414) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0308+ (0.0236) | 0.163* (0.0778) | 0.0607+ (0.0505) | -0.520 (1.001) | -0.109 (3.952) |
| Democracy level | 0.00158 (0.00618) | 0.0143 (0.0269) | -0.0147 (0.0239) | 0.502+ (0.388) | -0.460 (3.238) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0172* (0.00661) | -0.00586 (0.0157) | 0.00613 (0.0116) | 0.177 (0.316) | -14.57** (4.909) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0538+ (0.0278) | -0.677* (0.308) | -4.166+ (2.717) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -0.521+ (0.410) | 53.98*** (13.55) | -4,385*** (1,074) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.375* (0.185) | 0.379*** (0.109) | 4.475** (1.554) | 4.323 (12.98) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | 0.0102 (0.0176) | 0.0137 (0.0814) | 0.0234 (0.0762) | 2.306* (0.947) | 7.057 (28.06) |

Table C.34—Continued

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Cold War | 0.188*** (0.0127) | -0.199* (0.0818) | 0.0108 (0.0472) | | |
| Constant | 0.828*** (0.0685) | | 0.136 (0.181) | -1.031 (2.805) | 236.4*** (54.93) |
| Observations | 4,252 | 3,988 | 4,273 | 1,417 | 602 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.35**U.S. Exercises and Stabilization Outcomes**

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|
| U.S. exercise | -0.0130 (0.0181) | -0.0421 (0.0860) | 0.225* (0.0927) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0474+ (0.0328) | -0.334+ (0.268) | 0.434+ (0.266) |
| Democracy level | -0.0289+ (0.0250) | 0.860*** (0.191) | -0.121 (0.188) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0261 (0.0266) | 0.303+ (0.157) | -0.529** (0.165) |
| Interstate rivalry | -0.00312 (0.0263) | -0.567* (0.264) | 0.566* (0.262) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 1.282+ (1.224) | -12.56 (15.45) | 23.32+ (22.15) |
| Cold War | -0.00802 (0.0857) | 1.707*** (0.449) | -0.751+ (0.408) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.0179+ (0.0137) | -0.156+ (0.150) | 0.203+ (0.129) |

Table C.35—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| Constant | | 2.951+ (1.871) | 5.651** (1.943) |
| Observations | 1,505 | 3,837 | 4,179 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.36
U.S. Exercises and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| U.S. exercise | -0.0117 (0.0239) | -0.0103 (0.0179) | -0.00126 (0.0246) | -0.0837* (0.0342) | 0.0314 (0.0325) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0315 (0.0468) | -0.0339 (0.0396) | -0.0357 (0.0488) | 0.237** (0.0753) | 0.0894+ (0.0583) |
| Democracy level | -0.0541+ (0.0383) | -0.0508+ (0.0299) | -0.0288 (0.0410) | -0.217*** (0.0464) | -0.163+ (0.116) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0230 (0.0273) | 0.0213+ (0.0134) | -0.0763*** (0.0228) | -0.0214 (0.0405) | -0.105* (0.0448) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0613* (0.0306) | 0.0670* (0.0322) | 0.0128 (0.0302) | 0.0565 (0.0727) | -0.00104 (0.0477) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | -1.582* (0.799) | 0.372 (0.735) | -0.836 (0.829) | 5.310 (6.142) | 13.43*** (3.281) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.481* (0.242) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.113 (0.143) | |

Table C.36—Continued

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Cold War | -0.121+ (0.0756) | -0.0466 (0.0719) | -0.166* (0.0649) | -0.245* (0.118) | 0.0351 (0.122) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | -0.0140 (0.0218) |
| Observations | 3,466 | 2,704 | 2,990 | 3,428 | 577 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Materiel Transfers

TABLE C.37

Materiel Transfers and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Materiel transfers (IHS) | 0.00458+ (0.00438) | 0.0207*** (0.00418) | 0.0783*** (0.00343) | 0.323*** (0.0356) | 0.286 (0.769) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0160 (0.0402) | 0.149*** (0.0430) | 0.0290+ (0.0189) | 0.486* (0.232) | -21.25*** (5.195) |
| Democracy level | 0.122*** (0.0268) | -0.00695 (0.0273) | -0.0283* (0.0136) | 1.027*** (0.187) | 8.826+ (4.556) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.0302*** (0.00657) | 0.0159+ (0.0140) | 0.00877+ (0.00458) | -0.0960+ (0.0725) | -4.129+ (2.265) |
| Interstate rivalry | | | -0.0112 (0.0126) | 0.444* (0.199) | 0.820 (5.505) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -0.319 (0.416) | -11.05*** (2.382) | -493.8* (218.4) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.790*** (0.178) | 0.283*** (0.0505) | -0.323 (0.671) | 41.95* (18.23) |

Table C.37—Continued

| Variables | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---|----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | 0.0181 (0.0577) | -0.0777 (0.0847) | 0.100*** (0.0259) | -0.210 (0.422) | 21.12*** (4.616) |
| Cold War | 0.467*** (0.0312) | -0.268** (0.0947) | -0.0155 (0.0469) | | |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | |
| Constant | 0.0291 (0.0550) | | -0.160** (0.0555) | 4.405*** (0.662) | 54.83** (19.04) |
| Observations | 5,243 | 5,272 | 5,272 | 1,404 | 592 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.38
Materiel Transfers and Stabilization Outcomes**

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Materiel transfers (IHS) | 0.00327+ (0.00228) | -0.0235 (0.0504) | 0.118** (0.0393) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0262+ (0.0171) | -0.597+ (0.379) | 0.986*** (0.289) |
| Democracy level | 0.00625 (0.0126) | 0.545+ (0.322) | 0.490+ (0.249) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0102* (0.00468) | 0.811*** (0.101) | -0.317*** (0.0835) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0301* (0.0126) | -1.242*** (0.316) | 0.960*** (0.256) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.411+ (0.273) | -19.01* (7.546) | 17.35+ (12.62) |

Table C.38—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|---------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Cold War | 0.0355+ (0.0325) | 2.203*** (0.241) | -1.179** (0.403) |
| Oil-producing state | -0.000798 (0.00410) | -0.224* (0.101) | -0.0148 (0.0768) |
| Constant | | -2.235** (0.789) | 2.654*** (0.730) |
| Observations | 4,390 | 3,798 | 4,643 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.39
Material Transfers and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Material transfers (IHS) | 0.00839+ (0.00496) | -0.00128 (0.00256) | 0.0101* (0.00402) | 0.00307 (0.0111) | 0.00542* (0.00222) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0293 (0.0312) | 0.0185+ (0.0135) | 0.00955 (0.0301) | -0.131* (0.0654) | -0.0286+ (0.0150) |
| Democracy level | 0.0181 (0.0311) | 0.0172+ (0.0148) | 0.00439 (0.0278) | -0.0754+ (0.0536) | 0.0233* (0.0104) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.0227** (0.00864) | 0.00790+ (0.00555) | -0.0306*** (0.00726) | 0.0482* (0.0243) | -0.0124** (0.00383) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.147*** (0.0237) | 0.0717*** (0.0162) | 0.0905*** (0.0184) | 0.124* (0.0517) | 0.0409** (0.0127) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 3.449** (1.048) | 1.282*** (0.378) | 2.393*** (0.626) | 1.960 (2.002) | 0.0964 (0.166) |

Table C.39—Continued

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.0744 (0.195) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.0804 (0.0933) | |
| Cold War | -0.0407 (0.0521) | 0.00107 (0.0414) | -0.0459 (0.0488) | -0.235** (0.0890) | 0.0316+ (0.0175) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | -0.00240 (0.00356) |
| Observations | 4,972 | 4,777 | 4,972 | 5,272 | 3,763 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations

**TABLE C.40
HA/DR Operations and Cooperation Outcomes**

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| HA/DR operation | 0.00380 (0.0122) | 0.0173 (0.0369) | -0.0954** (0.0347) | 0.0643 (0.132) | 8.076+ (4.455) |
| Defense pact with the United States | 0.0190 (0.0196) | 0.0813*** (0.0232) | 0.132* (0.0546) | -0.662 (0.893) | 0.471 (3.585) |
| Democracy level | -0.0333+ (0.0170) | -0.0226+ (0.0144) | -0.0628** (0.0233) | 0.877** (0.305) | 1.155 (2.458) |
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00890 (0.0101) | -0.000175 (0.00571) | 0.0146 (0.0155) | -0.0639 (0.279) | -16.89*** (4.964) |

Table C.40—Continued

| Variable | UNGA Voting (Security Issues) | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms Imports (% of Total) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Interstate rivalry | | | 0.0643* (0.0249) | -0.269 (0.327) | -2.485 (2.484) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | | | -0.415 (0.460) | 72.61*** (11.79) | -3,593** (1,097) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | 0.106* (0.0431) | 0.537*** (0.119) | 3.105* (1.358) | 5.670 (12.21) |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | 0.0590+ (0.0416) | 0.0302 (0.0347) | 0.203*** (0.0558) | 2.230* (0.945) | -1.180 (26.22) |
| Cold War | 0.382*** (0.0374) | -0.0654* (0.0254) | -0.0810+ (0.0467) | | |
| Constant | 0.505*** (0.132) | | -0.205 (0.223) | 1.191 (2.431) | 257.6*** (58.65) |
| Observations | 5,282 | 5,107 | 5,311 | 1,417 | 602 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.41
HA/DR Operations and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| HA/DR operation | -0.0139* (0.00614) | 0.231+ (0.216) | -0.426* (0.189) | 0.324+ (0.249) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.00465+ (0.00407) | -0.445+ (0.411) | -0.175 (0.261) | 0.339+ (0.210) |
| Democracy level | 0.00276 (0.00357) | -0.813** (0.259) | 0.745** (0.239) | -0.183 (0.258) |

Table C.41—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|
| GDP per capita (IHS) | -0.00305 (0.00352) | -0.172 (0.322) | 0.394* (0.181) | -0.620*** (0.145) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.00371 (0.00384) | 0.140 (0.345) | -0.402+ (0.297) | 0.364+ (0.281) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | 0.185+ (0.141) | -51.78** (18.12) | -9.935 (15.77) | 32.64+ (24.75) |
| Cold War | 0.0124 (0.0139) | | 1.896*** (0.310) | -2.731*** (0.590) |
| Oil-producing state | 0.000577 (0.00172) | 0.0461 (0.139) | -0.0744 (0.112) | 0.00334 (0.136) |
| Constant | | 4.689+ (3.207) | 1.642 (1.987) | 7.321*** (1.759) |
| Observations | 2,003 | 2,363 | 3,837 | 4,682 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.42
HA/DR Operations and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| HA/DR operation | 0.0266+ (0.0226) | 0.0142 (0.0165) | 0.00990 (0.0187) | -0.0356+ (0.0305) | -0.00484+ (0.00375) |
| Defense pact with the United States | -0.0384** (0.0136) | -0.0311*** (0.00722) | -0.0253+ (0.0132) | 0.0583+ (0.0309) | -0.000695 (0.00379) |
| Democracy level | -0.0155+ (0.0126) | -0.00814 (0.00800) | -0.00958 (0.0115) | -0.0635*** (0.0148) | -0.00275 (0.00358) |

Table C.42—Continued

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| GDP per capita (IHS) | 0.00378 (0.00867) | 0.0157* (0.00656) | -0.00239 (0.00947) | 0.0115 (0.0123) | -0.00487+ (0.00301) |
| Interstate rivalry | 0.0270** (0.00991) | 0.0211** (0.00792) | 0.00518 (0.00770) | 0.0217+ (0.0203) | 0.00255 (0.00296) |
| National capabilities (CINC) | -0.378 (0.387) | 0.116 (0.219) | 0.00315 (0.379) | 3.044 (3.850) | 1.140*** (0.169) |
| UN voting similarity (all votes) | | | | -0.0677 (0.0754) | |
| Percentage of total trade with the United States | | | | -0.00632 (0.0455) | |
| Cold War | 0.00261 (0.0279) | 0.0257+ (0.0247) | 0.00902 (0.0292) | -0.122** (0.0427) | 0.0186* (0.00743) |
| Oil-producing state | | | | | 0.00119 (0.00166) |
| Observations | 4,498 | 3,444 | 4,078 | 4,816 | 744 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Implementation Environments: Level of Development

In this section, we present our results for each U.S. campaigning activity in both high- and low-income environments. We present both the individual regression terms and the combined effect for each activity-environment pair.

Forces

TABLE C.43
U.S. Presence and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|---------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| U.S. noncombat presence, low income | -0.000822 | 0.000982 | 0.0262*** | 0.120+ | -0.342 |
| | (0.00235) | (0.0326) | (0.00535) | (0.0644) | (1.715) |
| High income | -0.0167+ | -0.202+ | 0.0447+ | 0.0445 | 0.545 |
| | (0.0124) | (0.150) | (0.0318) | (0.380) | (4.464) |
| High income * U.S. noncombat presence | 0.0137*** | 0.0359+ | 0.00192 | -0.209* | 0.116 |
| | (0.00259) | (0.0256) | (0.00561) | (0.0942) | (1.396) |
| U.S. noncombat presence, high income | 0.0129*** | 0.0369 | 0.0281*** | -0.0891 | -0.226 |
| | (0.00278) | (0.0400) | (0.00615) | (0.0992) | (1.611) |
| Observations | 6,146 | 5,459 | 5,542 | 1,495 | 611 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.44
U.S. Presence and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| U.S. noncombat presence, low income | 0.0103 | -0.0664+ | 0.0329 |
| | (0.0435) | (0.0559) | (0.0331) |
| High income | -0.0304 | -0.0243 | -0.355* |
| | (0.359) | (0.202) | (0.176) |
| High income * U.S. noncombat presence | -0.137* | 0.0388 | -0.0264 |
| | (0.0571) | (0.0441) | (0.0275) |

Table C.44—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| U.S. noncombat presence, high income | -0.127* | -0.0276 | 0.00643 |
| | (0.0682) | (0.0491) | (0.0349) |
| Observations | 3,361 | 4,101 | 5,435 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.45
U.S. Presence and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| U.S. noncombat presence, low income | -0.0295+ | -0.0409+ | -0.0151 | -0.0860+ | 0.0276 |
| | (0.0270) | (0.0371) | (0.0261) | (0.0568) | (0.0652) |
| High income | -0.0363 | -0.114 | 0.0654 | -0.299 | 0.443 |
| | (0.225) | (0.285) | (0.272) | (0.370) | (0.593) |
| High income * U.S. noncombat presence | 0.00515 | 0.0479+ | -0.0227 | -0.0251 | -0.102+ |
| | (0.0325) | (0.0438) | (0.0335) | (0.0656) | (0.0758) |
| U.S. noncombat presence, high income | -0.0243 | 0.00705 | -0.0378 | -0.111 | -0.0741 |
| | (0.0354) | (0.0476) | (0.0354) | (0.0754) | (0.101) |
| Observations | 5,349 | 4,032 | 4,849 | 4,928 | 1,340 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Defense Pacts

TABLE C.46
Defense Pacts and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Defense pact, low income | 0.00736 (0.0171) | 0.814** (0.301) | 0.130* (0.0607) | 0.151 (0.877) | 0.559 (4.735) |
| High income | 0.0259** (0.00966) | -0.0878 (0.171) | 0.0726** (0.0237) | -0.294+ (0.276) | 0.960 (3.171) |
| High income * defense pact | 0.0240+ (0.0181) | 0.128 (0.207) | -0.0518+ (0.0419) | -0.556+ (0.328) | -0.164 (4.230) |
| Defense pact, high income | 0.0314+ (0.0182) | 0.943** (0.329) | 0.0780+ (0.0526) | -0.405 (0.844) | 0.395 (3.871) |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.47
Defense Pacts and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Defense pact, low income | -0.0488 (0.247) | -0.342+ (0.300) | 0.509* (0.222) |
| High income | -0.188 (0.245) | -0.122 (0.175) | -0.100 (0.174) |
| High income * defense pact | -0.555+ (0.456) | 0.539* (0.267) | -0.639** (0.228) |
| Defense pact, high income | -0.604+ (0.434) | 0.198 (0.223) | -0.130 (0.184) |
| Observations | 3,427 | 4,182 | 5,524 |

Table C.47—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.48
Defense Pacts and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Low | | | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | | |
| Defense pact, low income | -0.642** (0.202) | -0.955*** (0.215) | -0.425+ (0.222) | 0.923+ (0.515) | 0.208 (0.352) |
| High income | -0.161 (0.220) | -0.134 (0.180) | -0.105 (0.287) | -0.172 (0.288) | 0.853* (0.403) |
| High income * defense pact | 0.288+ (0.243) | 0.464+ (0.251) | 0.120 (0.296) | -0.467+ (0.402) | |
| Defense pact, high income | -0.354+ (0.239) | -0.491** (0.189) | -0.304 (0.320) | 0.455+ (0.416) | 0.208 (0.352) |
| Confidence | 0.139 | 0.00933 | 0.342 | 0.273 | 0.554 |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,236 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Military Agreements

TABLE C.49
Military Agreements and Competition Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Military agreement, low income | 0.00240 (0.00440) | -0.109+ (0.0854) | 0.0197+ (0.0125) | 0.127+ (0.105) | -1.475+ (1.403) |
| High income | 0.0354*** (0.00963) | -0.0702 (0.105) | 0.0476+ (0.0261) | -0.503* (0.198) | 0.376 (2.215) |
| High income * military agreement | 0.0119+ (0.00937) | 0.184+ (0.130) | -0.0164 (0.0231) | -0.195+ (0.158) | 1.396 (2.100) |
| Military agreement, high income | 0.0143* (0.00699) | 0.0742 (0.107) | 0.00328 (0.0188) | -0.0676 (0.115) | -0.0797 (1.578) |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.50
Military Agreements and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Military agreement, low income | -0.0303 (0.114) | 0.263*** (0.0725) | -0.0117 (0.0628) |
| High income | -0.482+ (0.270) | 0.220+ (0.147) | -0.444** (0.142) |
| High income * military agreement | 0.0224 (0.457) | -0.234* (0.0973) | -0.0605 (0.114) |
| Military agreement, high income | -0.00782 (0.460) | 0.0299 (0.0698) | -0.0722 (0.0867) |
| Observations | 3,427 | 4,182 | 5,524 |

Table C.50—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use Probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.51
Military Agreements and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Military agreement, low income | -0.0936 (0.0925) | -0.00999 (0.115) | -0.114+ (0.100) | -0.0490 (0.110) | -0.112 (0.189) |
| High income | 0.0122 (0.151) | 0.184+ (0.176) | -0.0652 (0.189) | -0.480* (0.228) | -0.356 (0.537) |
| High income * military agreement | 0.0310 (0.158) | -0.0616 (0.177) | 0.101 (0.182) | 0.0254 (0.206) | 0.642 (0.762) |
| Military agreement, high income | -0.0626 (0.119) | -0.0715 (0.137) | -0.0126 (0.153) | -0.0237 (0.153) | 0.530 (0.772) |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Footprint

TABLE C.52
Local Contracting and Competition Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Local contracting, low income | -4.62e-06 (0.000543) | 0.00944+ (0.00865) | 0.00223+ (0.00207) | 0.0541*** (0.0150) | -0.722** (0.229) |
| High income | -0.0433+ (0.0241) | -0.320+ (0.278) | -0.0977+ (0.0634) | -0.675+ (0.536) | -16.80** (5.917) |
| High income * local contracting | 0.00284* (0.00121) | 0.0120 (0.0122) | 0.00612* (0.00300) | 0.0152 (0.0249) | 0.966*** (0.254) |
| Local contracting, high income | 0.00284** (0.00103) | 0.0215* (0.00970) | 0.00835*** (0.00218) | 0.0693*** (0.0195) | 0.245+ (0.193) |
| Observations | 3,119 | 2,712 | 2,571 | 1,102 | 572 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.53
Local Contracting and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| Local contracting, low income | -0.00266 (0.0124) | -0.0130 (0.0151) | 0.0130+ (0.0108) |
| High income | -0.779 (1.211) | 0.642+ (0.374) | -1.053** (0.356) |
| High income * local contracting | 0.0217 (0.0512) | 0.00557 (0.0165) | 0.0356* (0.0173) |
| Local contracting, high income | 0.0190 (0.0517) | -0.00745 (0.0138) | 0.0486** (0.0151) |
| Observations | 2,023 | 2,479 | 2,598 |

Table C.53—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.54
Local Contracting and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Local contracting, low income | 0.0135+ (0.00881) | 0.0124 (0.0139) | 0.0134+ (0.0102) | -0.00428 (0.00955) | 0.0884+ (0.0558) |
| High income | -0.634+ (0.398) | -0.316 (0.412) | -1.351* (0.558) | -0.629+ (0.339) | -2.900+ (1.814) |
| High income * local contracting | 0.0222+ (0.0195) | 0.0132 (0.0221) | 0.0525* (0.0243) | 0.0125 (0.0150) | 0.0948+ (0.0862) |
| Local contracting, high income | 0.0357+ (0.0200) | 0.0256+ (0.0198) | 0.0659** (0.0239) | 0.00826 (0.0114) | 0.183 (0.0750) |
| Observations | 2,451 | 2,356 | 2,451 | 2,571 | 1,651 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

U.S. Exercises

TABLE C.55
U.S. Exercises and Competition Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| U.S. exercise, low income | 0.0222*** (0.00558) | -0.0897 (0.103) | 0.0217+ (0.0115) | 0.634*** (0.168) | -2.700+ (2.309) |
| High income | 0.0253*** (0.00752) | -0.203+ (0.163) | 0.00914 (0.0290) | -0.360+ (0.335) | -1.589 (3.184) |
| High income * U.S. exercise | -0.0200** (0.00621) | 0.0902 (0.138) | 0.0316+ (0.0240) | -0.188 (0.305) | 2.631 (2.898) |
| U.S. exercise, high income | 0.00218 (0.00562) | 0.000563 (0.107) | 0.0533* (0.0246) | 0.446+ (0.287) | -0.0695 (2.060) |
| Observations | 5,167 | 4,460 | 4,553 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.56
U.S. Exercises and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| U.S. exercise, low income | -0.00399 (0.195) | -0.176+ (0.110) | 0.225+ (0.115) |
| High income | -0.126 (0.388) | 0.000249 (0.157) | -0.0892 (0.165) |
| High income * U.S. exercise | -0.515+ (0.327) | 0.240+ (0.142) | -0.425* (0.163) |
| U.S. exercise, high income | -0.519+ (0.318) | 0.0641 (0.105) | -0.200+ (0.113) |
| Observations | 1,751 | 4,182 | 4,692 |

Table C.56—Continued

| Variable | Government Respect for | | |
|------------|---------------------------|--------|---------------|
| | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Rights | Terror Events |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.57**U.S. Exercises and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Low | | High | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | | |
| U.S. exercise, low income | 0.0320 (0.117) | -0.0967 (0.150) | 0.124 (0.135) | -0.636** (0.208) | 0.157 (0.302) |
| High income | 0.196 (0.196) | 0.308+ (0.229) | 0.280+ (0.243) | -1.100** (0.346) | -0.649 (0.922) |
| High income * U.S. exercise | -0.348+ (0.188) | -0.317+ (0.213) | -0.444* (0.221) | 0.480+ (0.347) | -0.675 (0.669) |
| U.S. exercise, high income | -0.316* (0.165) | -0.414* (0.165) | -0.320+ (0.200) | -0.157 (0.299) | -0.517 (0.643) |
| Observations | 3,803 | 2,935 | 3,322 | 3,569 | 734 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Matériel Transfers

TABLE C.58
Matériel Transfers and Competition Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Matériel transfers, low income | -0.00704*** (0.00203) | 0.0725*** (0.0176) | 0.0616*** (0.00496) | 0.360*** (0.0518) | -2.853* (1.137) |
| High income | 0.00689 (0.0159) | -0.101 (0.101) | 0.00855 (0.0210) | -0.504* (0.244) | -3.386 (4.511) |
| High income * matériel transfers | 0.0188*** (0.00407) | 0.0435+ (0.0238) | 0.00715+ (0.00550) | -0.0439 (0.0671) | 4.601*** (1.306) |
| Matériel transfers, high income | 0.0118* (0.00484) | 0.116*** (0.0237) | 0.0687*** (0.00355) | 0.317*** (0.0539) | 1.749* (0.723) |
| Observations | 5,929 | 5,786 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.59
Matériel Transfers and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| Matériel transfers, low income | 0.0466* (0.0218) | -0.140* (0.0627) | 0.157*** (0.0415) |
| High income | -0.194 (0.309) | 0.369+ (0.265) | -0.386+ (0.196) |
| High income * matériel transfers | -0.0424 (0.0657) | 0.178* (0.0729) | -0.0628+ (0.0498) |
| Matériel transfers, high income | 0.00417 (0.0715) | 0.0375 (0.0526) | 0.0943+ (0.0508) |
| Observations | 5,996 | 4,182 | 5,524 |

Table C.59—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.60
Materiel Transfers and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Materiel transfers, low income | 0.0732** (0.0229) | 0.0232 (0.0234) | 0.0801** (0.0244) | 0.0449+ (0.0336) | 0.0847** (0.0317) |
| High income | 0.0820 (0.159) | -0.0237 (0.159) | 0.0790 (0.177) | -0.101 (0.205) | -0.445 (0.574) |
| High income * materiel transfers | -0.00938 (0.0328) | 0.0352 (0.0361) | -0.0248 (0.0334) | -0.0991* (0.0468) | 0.0289 (0.108) |
| Materiel transfers, high income | 0.0638* (0.0282) | 0.0585* (0.0282) | 0.0553* (0.0266) | -0.0543+ (0.0401) | 0.114+ (0.105) |
| Observations | 5,927 | 5,840 | 5,927 | 5,631 | 5,360 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations

TABLE C.61
HA/DR Operations and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| HA/DR operation, low income | 0.0111 (0.0123) | -0.174 (0.181) | 0.0183 (0.0416) | 0.0162 (0.230) | 7.621+ (3.868) |
| High income | 0.0388*** (0.0106) | -0.0200 (0.106) | 0.0442+ (0.0268) | -0.546** (0.198) | 1.282 (2.161) |
| High income * HA/DR operation | -0.00123 (0.0224) | 0.373 (0.537) | -0.0395 (0.0925) | 0.958+ (0.543) | -2.027 (4.550) |
| HA/DR operation, high income | 0.00984 (0.0197) | 0.199 (0.507) | -0.0212 (0.0874) | 0.974* (0.497) | 5.593* (2.268) |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.62
HA/DR Operations and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| HA/DR operation, low income | 0.567** (0.205) | 0.506* (0.198) | -0.301 (0.350) | 0.379+ (0.313) |
| High income | -0.419+ (0.265) | -0.508* (0.195) | 0.155 (0.152) | -0.465** (0.153) |
| High income * HA/DR operation | | -0.718+ (0.484) | 0.202 (0.317) | 0.106 (0.360) |
| HA/DR operation, high income | | -0.212 (0.450) | -0.0990 (0.229) | 0.484** (0.176) |
| Observations | 3,421 | 2,620 | 4,182 | 5,524 |

Table C.62—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.63
HA/DR Operations and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Low | | High | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | | |
| HA/DR operation, low income | 0.0353 (0.214) | 0.0480 (0.264) | -0.0531 (0.250) | -0.0986 (0.274) | 0.893*** (0.234) |
| High income | 0.0123 (0.138) | 0.152 (0.157) | -0.0234 (0.166) | -0.453* (0.230) | 0.130 (0.390) |
| High income * HA/DR operation | 0.209 (0.338) | 0.162 (0.298) | -0.243 (0.510) | -0.477 (0.622) | |
| HA/DR operation, high income | 0.245 (0.280) | 0.210+ (0.194) | -0.296 (0.450) | -0.576 (0.596) | 0.893*** (0.234) |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,350 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Implementation Environments: Competition Intensity

In this section, we present our results for each U.S. campaigning activity in both the Cold War and post-Cold War environments. We present both the individual regression terms and the combined effect for each activity-environment pair.

U.S. Forces

TABLE C.64
U.S. Forces and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| U.S. noncombat presence, post-Cold War | 0.000300 (0.00209) | -0.00679 (0.0384) | 0.0230*** (0.00596) |
| Cold War | 0.467*** (0.0326) | 1.382*** (0.417) | -0.0429 (0.0422) |
| Cold War * U.S. noncombat presence | 0.00213 (0.00213) | 0.0219 (0.0279) | 0.00389+ (0.00363) |
| U.S. noncombat presence, Cold War | 0.00243 (0.00244) | 0.0151 (0.0318) | 0.0269 (0.00484) |
| Confidence | 0.321 | 0.635 | 1.19e-07 |
| Observations | 6,146 | 5,459 | 5,542 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.65
U.S. Forces and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Government | | |
|--|---------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
| U.S. noncombat presence, post-Cold War | 0.0368 (0.0591) | -0.0322 (0.0494) | -0.0345 (0.0342) |
| Cold War | 0.584 (0.588) | 1.716*** (0.309) | -1.917*** (0.384) |
| Cold War * U.S. noncombat presence | -0.0229 (0.0477) | -0.0493+ (0.0303) | 0.0958*** (0.0247) |
| U.S. noncombat presence, Cold War | 0.0139 (0.0437) | -0.0815 (0.0547) | 0.0614 (0.0344) |
| Confidence | 0.750 | 0.138 | 0.0766 |
| Observations | 3,361 | 4,101 | 5,435 |

Table C.65—Continued

| Variable | Government | | |
|------------|---------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.66
U.S. Forces and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Low Militarized | | High Militarized | | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| | Militarized Dispute Target | Dispute Target | Dispute Target | Dispute Target | | |
| U.S. noncombat presence, post–Cold War | –0.0279 (0.0335) | –0.0223 (0.0481) | –0.0503+ (0.0298) | –0.159* (0.0665) | 0.183* (0.0760) | |
| Cold War | –0.131 (0.380) | 0.943+ (0.483) | –0.997** (0.379) | –2.657*** (0.623) | 0.449 (0.797) | |
| Cold War * U.S. noncombat presence | –0.000815 (0.0312) | –0.0121 (0.0364) | 0.0409+ (0.0255) | 0.0960+ (0.0590) | –0.186** (0.0579) | |
| U.S. noncombat presence, Cold War | –0.0288 (0.0273) | –0.0344 (0.0351) | –0.00944 (0.0268) | –0.0627 (0.0589) | –0.00309 (0.0620) | |
| Confidence | 0.292 | 0.327 | 0.725 | 0.288 | 0.960 | |
| Observations | 5,349 | 4,032 | 4,849 | 4,928 | 1,340 | |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Defense Pacts

TABLE C.67
Defense Pacts and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Defense pact, post–Cold War | 0.00934 (0.0143) | 0.892** (0.289) | 0.0866+ (0.0535) |
| Cold War | 0.471*** (0.0316) | 1.406*** (0.411) | –0.0611+ (0.0459) |
| Cold War * defense pact | 0.0576*** (0.0110) | –0.0234 (0.118) | 0.0729** (0.0259) |
| Defense pact, Cold War | 0.0669 (0.0174) | 0.868 (0.311) | 0.160 (0.0599) |
| Confidence | 0.000178 | 0.00530 | 0.00851 |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.68
Defense Pacts and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| Defense pact, post–Cold War | –0.209 (0.265) | 0.175 (0.205) | –0.314* (0.156) |
| Cold War | 0.416 (0.596) | 1.716*** (0.289) | –1.932*** (0.346) |
| Cold War * defense pact | 0.0633 (0.254) | –0.679** (0.225) | 1.130*** (0.224) |
| Defense pact, Cold War | –0.146 (0.219) | –0.504 (0.281) | 0.816 (0.214) |
| Confidence | 0.504 | 0.0752 | 0.000190 |
| Observations | 3,427 | 4,182 | 5,524 |

Table C.68—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.69
Defense Pacts and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| Defense pact, post-Cold War | -0.373+ (0.204) | -0.607*** (0.159) | -0.270+ (0.254) | 0.310 (0.425) | 0.301 (0.390) |
| Cold War | -0.169 (0.402) | 0.867+ (0.473) | -0.993** (0.375) | -2.462*** (0.600) | 0.0302 (0.788) |
| Cold War * defense pact | -0.337* (0.158) | -0.346* (0.169) | -0.202+ (0.177) | 0.803* (0.327) | -0.207 (0.337) |
| Defense pact, Cold War | -0.710 (0.206) | -0.954 (0.168) | -0.472 (0.225) | 1.113 (0.495) | 0.0935 (0.328) |
| Confidence | 0.000563 | 1.25e-08 | 0.0359 | 0.0245 | 0.776 |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Military Agreements

TABLE C.70
Military Agreements and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Military agreement, post-Cold War | -0.00387 (0.00446) | 0.0566 (0.0716) | -0.00556 (0.0111) |
| Cold War | 0.475*** (0.0312) | 1.430*** (0.420) | -0.0614+ (0.0447) |
| Cold War * military agreement | 0.0291** (0.00904) | -0.274** (0.103) | 0.0511** (0.0182) |
| Military agreement, Cold War | 0.0252 (0.00664) | -0.217 (0.105) | 0.0456 (0.0165) |
| Confidence | 0.000208 | 0.0387 | 0.00645 |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.71
Military Agreements and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| | Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
| Military agreement, post-Cold War | -0.0637 (0.170) | 0.223*** (0.0621) | -0.187** (0.0690) |
| Cold War | 0.408 (0.598) | 1.614*** (0.299) | -1.855*** (0.388) |
| Cold War * military agreement | 0.0446 (0.197) | -0.206+ (0.146) | 0.399** (0.130) |
| Military agreement, Cold War | -0.0191 (0.141) | 0.0172 (0.126) | 0.212 (0.0952) |
| Confidence | 0.892 | 0.892 | 0.0274 |
| Observations | 3,427 | 4,182 | 5,524 |

Table C.71—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict | | |
|------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| | Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.72
Military Agreements and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Low | | High | | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | | |
| Military agreement | -0.109+ | -0.00282 | -0.195+ | 0.00784 | 0.0383 | |
| | (0.0936) | (0.119) | (0.111) | (0.127) | (0.276) | |
| Cold War | -0.172 | 0.847+ | -0.954* | -2.510*** | 0.0473 | |
| | (0.391) | (0.473) | (0.377) | (0.586) | (0.805) | |
| Cold War * military agreement | 0.0519 | -0.0576 | 0.197+ | -0.143 | -0.197 | |
| | (0.140) | (0.185) | (0.136) | (0.222) | (0.318) | |
| Combined effect | -0.0576 | -0.0604 | 0.00186 | -0.135 | -0.159 | |
| | (0.103) | (0.141) | (0.104) | (0.142) | (0.225) | |
| Confidence | 0.576 | 0.668 | 0.986 | 0.342 | 0.480 | |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 | |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; SE = standard error.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Footprint

TABLE C.73
Local Contracting and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Local contracting, post–Cold War | 0.000786+ (0.000552) | 0.0188* (0.00771) | 0.00389* (0.00150) |
| Cold War | 0.276*** (0.0307) | 2.111*** (0.463) | –0.0995+ (0.0847) |
| Cold War * local contracting | 0.00333* (0.00163) | –0.0142 (0.0152) | 0.00402+ (0.00331) |
| Local contracting, Cold War | 0.00412 (0.00154) | 0.00466 (0.0138) | 0.00791 (0.00338) |
| Confidence | 0.00826 | 0.735 | 0.0207 |
| Observations | 3,119 | 2,712 | 2,571 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.74
Local Contracting and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
| Local contracting, post–Cold War | 0.0259 (0.0338) | –0.0204* (0.00965) | 0.0297** (0.00894) |
| Cold War | 1.512+ (0.842) | 1.272+ (0.694) | 0.247 (0.525) |
| Cold War * local contracting | –0.0583+ (0.0361) | 0.0455+ (0.0289) | –0.00814 (0.0240) |
| Local contracting, Cold War | –0.0324 (0.0119) | 0.0251 (0.0306) | 0.0216 (0.0244) |
| Confidence | 0.00636 | 0.412 | 0.379 |
| Observations | 2,023 | 2,479 | 2,598 |

Table C.74—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict | | |
|------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| | Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.75
Local Contracting and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Low | | High | | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | Militarized Dispute Target | | |
| Local contracting, post–Cold War | 0.0350* | 0.0174+ | 0.0528* | 0.00268 | 0.0997+ | |
| | (0.0151) | (0.0128) | (0.0213) | (0.00794) | (0.0627) | |
| Cold War | 0.316 | –0.290 | 0.370 | –0.193 | 1.327 | |
| | (0.509) | (0.907) | (0.649) | (0.503) | (1.620) | |
| Cold War * local contracting | –0.0369+ | 0.0231 | –0.0525* | –0.00661 | –0.0295 | |
| | (0.0189) | (0.0376) | (0.0254) | (0.0178) | (0.0608) | |
| Local contracting, Cold War | –0.00192 | 0.0405 | 0.000266 | –0.00393 | 0.0702 | |
| | (0.0127) | (0.0376) | (0.0131) | (0.0162) | (0.0495) | |
| Confidence | 0.879 | 0.282 | 0.984 | 0.809 | 0.156 | |
| Observations | 2,451 | 2,356 | 2,451 | 2,571 | 1,651 | |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

U.S. Exercises

TABLE C.76
U.S. Exercises and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| U.S. exercise, post–Cold War | 0.000902 (0.00481) | –0.149+ (0.0923) | 0.0227+ (0.0121) |
| Cold War | 0.310*** (0.0123) | 1.081* (0.421) | 0.00276 (0.0470) |
| Cold War * U.S. exercise | 0.0623*** (0.0129) | 0.329* (0.137) | 0.0361+ (0.0224) |
| U.S. exercise, Cold War | 0.0632 (0.0118) | 0.179 (0.125) | 0.0587 (0.0236) |
| Confidence | 2.78e-07 | 0.151 | 0.0138 |
| Observations | 5,167 | 4,460 | 4,553 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.77
U.S. Exercises and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| U.S. exercise, post–Cold War | 0.00544 (0.203) | –0.0417 (0.0977) | –0.112+ (0.0907) |
| Cold War | –0.144 (0.659) | 1.560*** (0.306) | –0.847** (0.291) |
| Cold War * U.S. exercise | –0.287 (0.344) | –0.282+ (0.200) | 0.813*** (0.206) |
| U.S. exercise, Cold War | –0.281 (0.318) | –0.324 (0.180) | 0.701 (0.196) |
| Confidence | 0.377 | 0.0736 | 0.000462 |
| Observations | 1,751 | 4,182 | 4,692 |

Table C.77—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.78
U.S. Exercises and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| U.S. exercise, post–Cold War | -0.0728 (0.119) | -0.142+ (0.134) | -0.0608 (0.147) | -0.575** (0.187) | 0.221 (0.340) |
| Cold War | -0.703* (0.334) | -0.0985 (0.368) | -1.198*** (0.324) | -1.347* (0.545) | -0.0472 (0.905) |
| Cold War * U.S. exercise | -0.0123 (0.184) | -0.231+ (0.216) | 0.174 (0.199) | 0.366+ (0.337) | -0.575+ (0.530) |
| U.S. exercise, Cold War | -0.0851 (0.165) | -0.372 (0.210) | 0.114 (0.169) | -0.209 (0.338) | -0.354 (0.473) |
| Confidence | 0.606 | 0.0764 | 0.503 | 0.536 | 0.455 |
| Observations | 3,803 | 2,935 | 3,322 | 3,569 | 734 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Material Transfers

TABLE C.79
Material Transfers and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Material transfers, post–Cold War | –0.000146 (0.00422) | 0.0607** (0.0230) | 0.0658*** (0.00407) |
| Cold War | 0.560*** (0.0314) | 0.551+ (0.357) | 0.0122 (0.0336) |
| Cold War * material transfers | 0.00449+ (0.00382) | 0.0639* (0.0249) | –0.00144 (0.00349) |
| Material transfers, Cold War | 0.00435 (0.00309) | 0.125 (0.0188) | 0.0644 (0.00347) |
| Confidence | 0.162 | 0 | 0 |
| Observations | 5,929 | 5,786 | 5,631 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.80
Material Transfers and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| | Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
| Material transfers, post–Cold War | 0.0582+ (0.0434) | –0.0396 (0.0503) | 0.0906* (0.0448) |
| Cold War | 0.0233 (0.395) | 2.111*** (0.237) | –1.386*** (0.228) |
| Cold War * material transfers | –0.0393+ (0.0356) | 0.0380 (0.0401) | 0.0518+ (0.0337) |
| Material transfers, Cold War | 0.0189 (0.0219) | –0.00157 (0.0412) | 0.142 (0.0413) |
| Confidence | 0.390 | 0.970 | 0.000714 |
| Observations | 5,996 | 4,182 | 5,524 |

Table C.80—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.81
Materiel Transfers and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Materiel transfers, post–Cold War | 0.0568* (0.0268) | 0.0463+ (0.0244) | 0.0275 (0.0267) | -0.0292 (0.0363) | 0.139** (0.0445) |
| Cold War | -0.207 (0.253) | 0.307 (0.343) | -0.594* (0.291) | -0.959*** (0.291) | -0.0633 (0.595) |
| Cold War * materiel transfers | 0.0208 (0.0231) | -0.0120 (0.0256) | 0.0671** (0.0244) | 0.0469+ (0.0357) | -0.0930** (0.0341) |
| Materiel transfers, Cold War | 0.0777 (0.0189) | 0.0343 (0.0202) | 0.0946 (0.0202) | 0.0177 (0.0323) | 0.0459 (0.0268) |
| Confidence | 3.98e-05 | 0.0900 | 2.74e-06 | 0.585 | 0.0868 |
| Observations | 5,927 | 5,840 | 5,927 | 5,631 | 5,360 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations

TABLE C.82
HA/DR Operations and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| HA/DR operation, post–Cold War | 0.00261 (0.0106) | –0.0832 (0.202) | –0.0116 (0.0413) |
| Cold War | 0.474*** (0.0316) | 1.405*** (0.407) | –0.0636+ (0.0433) |
| Cold War * HA/DR operation | 0.0839+ (0.0663) | 0.190 (0.435) | 0.203+ (0.110) |
| HA/DR operation, Cold War | 0.0865 (0.0630) | 0.107 (0.371) | 0.192 (0.108) |
| Confidence | 0.172 | 0.774 | 0.0772 |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.83
HA/DR Operations and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| HA/DR operation, post–Cold War | 0.466* (0.195) | –0.201 (0.303) | 0.413+ (0.250) |
| Cold War | 0.463 (0.590) | 1.563*** (0.305) | –1.829*** (0.401) |
| Cold War * HA/DR operation | 0.333 (0.671) | –0.688+ (0.500) | –0.0600 (0.626) |
| HA/DR operation, Cold War | 0.799 (0.643) | –0.889 (0.434) | 0.353 (0.596) |

Table C.83—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Confidence | 0.214 | 0.0421 | 0.555 |
| Observations | 3,427 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.84
HA/DR Operations and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| HA/DR operation, post-Cold War | 0.0631 (0.189) | 0.129 (0.208) | -0.136 (0.239) | -0.301 (0.315) | 0.724** (0.241) |
| Cold War | -0.174 (0.391) | 0.838+ (0.472) | -0.972* (0.378) | -2.487*** (0.590) | 0.0314 (0.765) |
| Cold War * HA/DR operation | 0.190 (0.566) | | 0.294 (0.573) | 0.768+ (0.657) | 0.0493 (0.746) |
| HA/DR operation, Cold War | 0.253 (0.542) | 0.129 (0.208) | 0.158 (0.526) | 0.466 (0.547) | 0.773 (0.650) |
| Confidence | 0.641 | 0.535 | 0.764 | 0.394 | 0.234 |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,205 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Implementation Environments: U.S. Alliances

In this section, we present our results for each U.S. campaigning activity in both allied and nonallied environments. We present both the individual regression terms and the combined effect for each activity-environment pair.

Forces

TABLE C.85
U.S. Forces and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| U.S. noncombat presence, nonally | 0.00200 (0.00258) | -0.0345 (0.0376) | 0.0193*** (0.00571) | 0.117+ (0.0639) | 0.887 (1.719) |
| U.S. ally | 0.0282+ (0.0210) | 0.577+ (0.314) | -0.0721 (0.0762) | -0.102 (1.025) | 15.00+ (10.85) |
| U.S. ally * U.S. noncombat presence | -0.000665 (0.00544) | 0.108* (0.0519) | 0.0202* (0.00977) | -0.0972 (0.155) | -4.332+ (3.836) |
| U.S. noncombat presence, ally | 0.00133 (0.00449) | 0.0733 (0.0387) | 0.0396 (0.00819) | 0.0200 (0.141) | -3.445 (3.360) |
| Confidence | 0.767 | 0.0583 | 3.22e-06 | 0.888 | 0.307 |
| Observations | 6,146 | 5,459 | 5,542 | 1,495 | 611 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.86
U.S. Forces and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| U.S. noncombat presence, nonally | -0.0156 (0.0516) | -0.0126 (0.0688) | -0.0374 (0.0646) | 0.0123 (0.0347) |
| U.S. ally | -0.934+ (0.568) | -0.459 (0.566) | 0.259 (0.360) | -0.188 (0.242) |
| U.S. ally * U.S. noncombat presence | 0.128+ (0.0953) | -0.0444 (0.151) | -0.0618 (0.0911) | 0.0763+ (0.0546) |
| U.S. noncombat presence, ally | 0.113 (0.0808) | -0.0570 (0.136) | -0.0992 (0.0672) | 0.0887 (0.0528) |
| Confidence | 0.163 | 0.676 | 0.142 | 0.0953 |

Table C.86—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate | | Government Respect | |
|--------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | Conflict Onset | State Fragility | for Rights | Terror Events |
| Observations | 3,361 | 2,548 | 4,101 | 5,435 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.87
U.S. Forces and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized | Low Militarized | High Militarized | Sanction | Proxy |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|----------|----------|
| | Dispute Target | | | | |
| U.S. noncombat presence, nonally | -0.0444+ | -0.0145 | -0.0416+ | -0.0818+ | 0.0158 |
| | (0.0330) | (0.0420) | (0.0287) | (0.0718) | (0.0687) |
| U.S. ally | -0.719** | -0.528* | -0.736* | 0.832+ | -0.570 |
| | (0.262) | (0.264) | (0.352) | (0.441) | (0.687) |
| U.S. ally * U.S. noncombat presence | 0.0479 | -0.0618+ | 0.0789+ | 0.00366 | 0.0851 |
| | (0.0471) | (0.0483) | (0.0543) | (0.0859) | (0.111) |
| U.S. noncombat presence, ally | 0.00356 | -0.0763 | 0.0373 | -0.0781 | 0.101 |
| | (0.0366) | (0.0417) | (0.0494) | (0.0634) | (0.0914) |
| Confidence | 0.923 | 0.0673 | 0.449 | 0.218 | 0.269 |
| Observations | 5,349 | 4,032 | 4,849 | 4,928 | 1,340 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Military Agreements

TABLE C.88
Military Agreements and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Military agreement, nonally | 0.0122** (0.00419) | 0.109+ (0.0841) | 0.0189+ (0.0137) | 0.132+ (0.110) | -0.398 (1.851) |
| U.S. ally | 0.0313+ (0.0161) | 1.068*** (0.315) | 0.0232 (0.0695) | -0.249 (0.892) | 4.295+ (2.880) |
| U.S. ally * military agreement | -0.0100+ (0.00672) | -0.318* (0.124) | -0.00981 (0.0205) | -0.198+ (0.148) | -0.831 (2.255) |
| Military agreement, ally | 0.00219 (0.00502) | -0.208 (0.0966) | 0.00912 (0.0153) | -0.0656 (0.0915) | -1.229 (1.145) |
| Confidence | 0.663 | 0.0311 | 0.551 | 0.475 | 0.285 |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.89
Military Agreements and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Military agreement, nonally | -0.0912 (0.166) | 0.126+ (0.0953) | 0.180* (0.0728) | 0.0867+ (0.0626) |
| U.S. ally | -0.178 (0.220) | -0.515+ (0.368) | -0.00124 (0.221) | 0.225+ (0.195) |
| U.S. ally * military agreement | 0.128 (0.241) | -0.156+ (0.145) | -0.0128 (0.116) | -0.273* (0.111) |
| Military agreement, ally | 0.0372 (0.176) | -0.0296 (0.102) | 0.167 (0.0863) | -0.186 (0.0862) |
| Confidence | 0.833 | 0.773 | 0.0551 | 0.0321 |
| Observations | 3,427 | 2,620 | 4,182 | 5,524 |

Table C.89—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.90
Military Agreements and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|--|--------------------|-------------------|
| Military agreement, nonally | -0.166+ (0.100) | -0.0555 (0.149) | -0.180+ (0.130) | 0.0919 (0.116) | 0.0190 (0.234) |
| U.S. ally | -0.590** (0.197) | -0.781*** (0.155) | -0.450+ (0.235) | 0.714+ (0.405) | 0.223 (0.342) |
| U.S. ally * military agreement | 0.165+ (0.138) | 0.0523 (0.176) | 0.185+ (0.168) | -0.261+ (0.157) | -0.319 (0.313) |
| Military agreement, ally | -0.00171 (0.0951) | -0.00315 (0.101) | 0.00517 (0.107) | -0.170 (0.107) | -0.300 (0.243) |
| Confidence | 0.986 | 0.975 | 0.962 | 0.114 | 0.217 |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Footprint

TABLE C.91
Local Contracting and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Local contracting, nonally | -0.000262 (0.000803) | 0.0241+ (0.0124) | 0.00324+ (0.00191) | 0.0529*** (0.0137) | -0.383+ (0.264) |
| U.S. ally | -0.0504+ (0.0289) | 1.199*** (0.288) | 0.0276 (0.106) | -0.250 (0.558) | -19.67** (6.385) |
| U.S. ally * local contracting | 0.00421** (0.00137) | -0.0137 (0.0156) | 0.00403+ (0.00282) | 0.0448+ (0.0274) | 0.342+ (0.303) |
| Local contracting, ally | 0.00395 (0.000955) | 0.0104 (0.00914) | 0.00727 (0.00236) | 0.0977 (0.0238) | -0.0412 (0.149) |
| Confidence | 5.92e-05 | 0.257 | 0.00248 | 7.21e-05 | 0.782 |
| Observations | 3,119 | 2,712 | 2,571 | 1,102 | 572 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.92
Local Contracting and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Local contracting, nonally | -0.00381 (0.0137) | 0.0168 (0.0292) | -0.00555 (0.0167) | 0.00923 (0.0115) |
| U.S. ally | -0.565 (0.731) | -0.206 (0.971) | -0.143 (0.499) | -0.375 (0.556) |
| U.S. ally * local contracting | 0.0135 (0.0357) | 0.0112 (0.0440) | -0.0179 (0.0235) | 0.0528* (0.0263) |
| Local contracting, ally | 0.00968 (0.0323) | 0.0281 (0.0332) | -0.0234 (0.0160) | 0.0620 (0.0220) |
| Confidence | 0.765 | 0.398 | 0.146 | 0.00544 |
| Observations | 2,023 | 1,800 | 2,479 | 2,598 |

Table C.92—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.93
Local Contracting and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Low Militarized | | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| | Dispute Target | Dispute Target | | | |
| Local contracting, nonally | 0.0154+ (0.0121) | 0.00539 (0.00989) | 0.0246+ (0.0186) | -0.00284 (0.00988) | 0.0378 (0.0397) |
| U.S. ally | -0.0922 (0.569) | -0.849 (0.862) | 0.318 (0.626) | -0.349 (0.347) | -11.76*** (3.435) |
| U.S. ally * local contracting | 0.0143 (0.0225) | 0.0409+ (0.0388) | -0.000446 (0.0249) | 0.0106 (0.0156) | 0.476** (0.154) |
| Local contracting, ally | 0.0298 (0.0186) | 0.0462 (0.0391) | 0.0241 (0.0151) | 0.00775 (0.0119) | 0.514 (0.163) |
| Confidence | 0.109 | 0.237 | 0.110 | 0.515 | 0.00159 |
| Observations | 2,451 | 2,356 | 2,451 | 2,571 | 1,651 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

U.S. Exercises

TABLE C.94
U.S. Exercises and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|---------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| U.S. exercise, nonally | 0.0193*** (0.00556) | -0.218* (0.108) | 0.0326* (0.0148) | 0.654*** (0.168) | -2.103 (2.132) |
| U.S. ally | 0.0488* (0.0192) | 0.505+ (0.325) | -0.0312 (0.0902) | -0.174 (0.863) | 1.830 (4.657) |
| U.S. ally * U.S. exercise | -0.0125+ (0.00770) | 0.418** (0.147) | -0.00535 (0.0302) | -0.249 (0.425) | 1.186 (3.559) |
| U.S. exercise, ally | 0.00673 (0.00675) | 0.200 (0.109) | 0.0273 (0.0256) | 0.405 (0.396) | -0.918 (2.904) |
| Confidence | 0.320 | 0.0660 | 0.288 | 0.309 | 0.752 |
| Observations | 5,167 | 4,460 | 4,553 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.95
U.S. Exercises and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| U.S. exercise, nonally | -0.0849 (0.207) | -0.308* (0.131) | -0.258** (0.0975) | 0.413*** (0.120) |
| U.S. ally | 0.283 (0.392) | -0.220 (0.517) | -0.408+ (0.302) | 0.786** (0.260) |
| U.S. ally * U.S. exercise | 0.178 (0.302) | -0.444+ (0.368) | 0.531* (0.243) | -0.992*** (0.248) |
| U.S. exercise, ally | 0.0935 (0.268) | -0.751 (0.334) | 0.273 (0.220) | -0.579 (0.200) |
| Confidence | 0.727 | 0.0257 | 0.217 | 0.00426 |
| Observations | 1,751 | 2,620 | 4,182 | 4,692 |

Table C.95—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|------------|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.96
U.S. Exercises and Deterrence Outcomes

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---|--|--------------------|--------------------|
| U.S. exercise, nonally | -0.138+ (0.120) | -0.157+ (0.144) | -0.119 (0.142) | -0.307+ (0.225) | 0.131 (0.319) |
| U.S. ally | -0.455+ (0.287) | -0.341+ (0.281) | -0.620+ (0.367) | 1.297** (0.463) | 1.041** (0.377) |
| U.S. ally * U.S. exercise | 0.197 (0.200) | -0.161 (0.226) | 0.372+ (0.228) | -0.443+ (0.384) | -0.157 (0.718) |
| U.S. exercise, ally | 0.0590 (0.177) | -0.319 (0.197) | 0.253 (0.203) | -0.750 (0.310) | -0.0262 (0.656) |
| Confidence | 0.739 | 0.106 | 0.212 | 0.0157 | 0.968 |
| Observations | 3,803 | 2,935 | 3,322 | 3,569 | 734 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Materiel Transfers

TABLE C.97
Materiel Transfers and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Materiel transfers, nonally | -0.00381 (0.00477) | 0.0543+ (0.0282) | 0.0663*** (0.00458) | 0.355*** (0.0548) | -0.439 (1.362) |
| U.S. ally | 0.0366+ (0.0214) | 0.577*** (0.134) | -0.00844 (0.0656) | 0.685+ (0.350) | -14.42*** (3.765) |
| U.S. ally * materiel transfers | 0.0114+ (0.00612) | 0.0677* (0.0343) | -0.00236 (0.00625) | -0.0589 (0.0760) | 1.499 (1.450) |
| Materiel transfers, ally | 0.00756 (0.00396) | 0.122 (0.0200) | 0.0640 (0.00449) | 0.296 (0.0573) | 1.060 (0.789) |
| Confidence | 0.0581 | 1.12e-09 | 0 | 8.73e-07 | 0.181 |
| Observations | 5,929 | 5,786 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.98
Materiel Transfers and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| Materiel transfers, nonally | 0.0319 (0.0372) | 0.0348 (0.155) | -0.0600 (0.0578) | 0.0651+ (0.0381) |
| U.S. ally | -0.242+ (0.153) | -0.407 (0.555) | -0.708** (0.249) | 0.560** (0.200) |
| U.S. ally * materiel transfers | 0.00443 (0.0491) | 0.0396 (0.171) | 0.0685 (0.0704) | 0.102+ (0.0660) |
| Materiel transfers, ally | 0.0364 (0.0340) | 0.0743 (0.114) | 0.00851 (0.0536) | 0.167 (0.0601) |

Table C.98—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Confidence | 0.285 | 0.515 | 0.874 | 0.00601 |
| Observations | 5,996 | 2,620 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.99
Materiel Transfers and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|--|---------------------|---------------------|
| Materiel transfers, nonally | 0.0103 (0.0212) | 0.00121 (0.0227) | 0.0179 (0.0223) | 0.0682+ (0.0518) | 0.0870* (0.0358) |
| U.S. ally | -0.297* (0.132) | -0.150+ (0.141) | -0.327* (0.155) | 0.310+ (0.176) | -0.364+ (0.296) |
| U.S. ally * materiel transfers | 0.114*** (0.0307) | 0.0727* (0.0328) | 0.106*** (0.0318) | -0.138* (0.0601) | -0.0118 (0.0713) |
| Materiel transfers, ally | 0.125 (0.0246) | 0.0739 (0.0251) | 0.124 (0.0258) | -0.0696 (0.0297) | 0.0752 (0.0628) |
| Confidence | 4.00e-07 | 0.00320 | 1.51e-06 | 0.0192 | 0.231 |
| Observations | 5,927 | 5,840 | 5,927 | 5,631 | 5,360 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations

TABLE C.100
HA/DR Operations and Cooperation Outcomes

| Variable | UNGA Voting | Access Agreement | U.S. Arms (%) | PME Trainees (IHS) | Public U.S. Approval |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| HA/DR operation, nonally | 0.00486 (0.00468) | 0.199 (0.258) | 0.0490+ (0.0373) | 0.301 (0.341) | 8.843+ (5.540) |
| U.S. ally | 0.0284+ (0.0160) | 0.899** (0.292) | 0.0235 (0.0685) | -0.247 (0.893) | 3.086+ (2.640) |
| U.S. ally * HA/DR operation | 0.00884 (0.0188) | -0.481+ (0.424) | -0.0749+ (0.0695) | -0.208 (0.459) | -2.865 (7.419) |
| HA/DR operation, ally | 0.0137 (0.0186) | -0.283 (0.296) | -0.0258 (0.0645) | 0.0930 (0.306) | 5.979 (4.346) |
| Confidence | 0.462 | 0.340 | 0.689 | 0.762 | 0.171 |
| Observations | 6,240 | 5,552 | 5,631 | 1,535 | 627 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects; IHS = inverse hyperbolic sine.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

TABLE C.101
HA/DR Operations and Stabilization Outcomes

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| HA/DR operation, nonally | 0.612+ (0.365) | 0.229 (0.320) | -0.0219 (0.292) | 0.790** (0.249) |
| U.S. ally | -0.166 (0.208) | -0.608+ (0.363) | 0.0548 (0.217) | 0.0953 (0.176) |
| U.S. ally * HA/DR operation | -0.157 (0.417) | 0.198 (0.417) | -0.420 (0.535) | -0.695+ (0.448) |
| HA/DR operation, ally | 0.455 (0.205) | 0.427 (0.300) | -0.442 (0.452) | 0.0949 (0.368) |
| Confidence | 0.0265 | 0.156 | 0.330 | 0.797 |

Table C.101—Continued

| Variable | Intrastate Conflict Onset | State Fragility | Government Respect for Rights | Terror Events |
|--------------|------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Observations | 3,427 | 2,620 | 4,182 | 5,524 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

**TABLE C.102
HA/DR Operations and Deterrence Outcomes**

| Variable | Militarized Dispute Target | Low Militarized Dispute Target | High Militarized Dispute Target | Sanction Target | Proxy Target |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|---|--|--------------------|-------------------|
| HA/DR operation, nonally | -0.275 (0.342) | 0.208 (0.456) | -0.604+ (0.322) | -0.0833 (0.386) | 0.620+ (0.475) |
| U.S. ally | -0.552** (0.176) | -0.763*** (0.131) | -0.406+ (0.215) | 0.583+ (0.385) | 0.0905 (0.328) |
| U.S. ally * HA/DR operation | 0.587+ (0.401) | -0.175 (0.501) | 0.802+ (0.437) | -0.243 (0.454) | 0.151 (0.530) |
| HA/DR operation, ally | 0.312 (0.208) | 0.0334 (0.219) | 0.198 (0.297) | -0.326 (0.344) | 0.771 (0.222) |
| Confidence | 0.134 | 0.879 | 0.506 | 0.343 | 0.000522 |
| Observations | 5,449 | 4,212 | 4,927 | 5,009 | 1,354 |
| Country FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Year FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

NOTE: Continuous dependent variables use OLS regression, and coefficients display marginal effects; binary dependent variables use probit regression, and coefficients represent average marginal effects; and clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$, + $p < 0.30$.

Abbreviations

| | |
|-----------|---|
| CDF | cumulative distribution function |
| CINC | composite indicator of national capabilities |
| CSG | carrier strike group |
| DoD | U.S. Department of Defense |
| FMF | foreign military financing |
| FMTR | Foreign Military Training Report |
| FPDS | Federal Procurement Data System |
| HA/DR | humanitarian assistance and disaster relief |
| IMET | International Military Education and Training (program) |
| IMTAD-USA | International Military Training Activities Database–USA |
| MID | militarized interstate dispute |
| OAI | operations, activities, and investments |
| OLS | ordinary least squares |
| PME | Professional Military Education |
| SCM | synthetic control method |
| SIPRI | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |
| TIV | trend-indicator value |
| USAF | U.S. Air Force |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |

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