Research Report

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Open-Weight AI Models May Increase Biological Misuse Risks

Assessing Anti-Refusal Tampering, Capability Enhancement, and Publicly Available Uncensored Models

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RR-A5112-1

About This Report

Open-weight large language models (LLMs) are a central part of the AI ecosystem. They enable researchers outside of frontier AI labs to study important topics such as mechanistic interpretability, support open research and reproducibility, and allow users to deploy their own capable models without relying on a third-party provider. The same accessibility that supports scientific use, safety research, and equitable deployment also creates a distinct governance problem. Once a model's weights are released, its developer can no longer enforce the safety controls that a closed-provider API applies at inference time; anyone can host, modify, and redistribute the weights outside of those controls. A moderately skilled actor can therefore tamper with an open-weight model to strip its safeguards and adapt it for harmful tasks. Biology is a particularly sensitive domain because some upstream knowledge and tool-use capabilities that enable beneficial outcomes also have plausible misuse pathways enabling the development of biological weapons.

This report presents an evaluation of biological misuse risks from open-weight LLMs after three classes of post-release modification and tampering: anti-refusal supervised fine-tuning (SFT), reinforcement-learning–based capability enhancement (referred to throughout as *capability-enhanced* models), and publicly available *abliterated* or uncensored variants distributed through Hugging Face, an open platform for hosting AI model weights. We compare these tampered variants against untampered open-weight baselines and frontier closed-weight baselines on a benchmark suite that includes a broad set of biosecurity-relevant knowledge-based questions and agentic tasks, adversarial/refusal benchmarks, and a custom influenza pathway evaluation. The report is intended for open-weight model developers, third-party inference providers, AI evaluation researchers, and biosecurity policymakers. It avoids operational fine-tuning recipes, sample-level content from private benchmarks, and procedural detail that could enable threat actors.

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Funding

This research was independently initiated and conducted within the Center on AI, Security, and Technology using income from operations and gifts and grants from philanthropic supporters. It was made possible thanks to generous contributions from Chris Anderson and Jacqueline Novogratz, Coefficient Giving, High Tide Foundation, Pew Charitable Trusts, Sea Grape Foundation, Jaan Tallinn, and Valhalla Foundation as part of The Audacious Project. A complete list of donors and funders is available at www.rand.org/CAST. RAND clients, donors, and grantors have no influence over research findings or recommendations.

Acknowledgments

We thank our partners at SecureBio for sharing many of the evaluations used in this report: Agentic Bio Capabilities Benchmark (ABC-Bench), Agentic BAIM–LLM Evaluation (ABLE), Virology Capabilities Test (VCT), Human Pathogen Capabilities Test (HPCT), Molecular Biology Capabilities Test (MBCT), and World-Class Biology benchmark (WCB). We thank our peer reviewers Anna Puglisi, Henry Willis, and Lukas Struppek and copyeditor, Rebecca Fowler, for helping this report meet scientific rigor and be accessible for many audiences.

Information Hazard Note

This report discusses high-level processes and capabilities that could in principle be misused. The authors considered information-security and risk-management concerns when deciding what to include. The report avoids providing procedural details, sample-level sensitive content, or operational guidance that is not necessary to support the policy analysis. Private benchmark items are summarized only at the aggregate level. We document the methodology of our fine-tuning pipelines in enough detail to allow auditing by qualified researchers but withhold specific recipes, datasets, and prompt templates that would meaningfully reduce the effort of replicating an unsafe model.

Summary

This report evaluates how feasible it would be for a threat actor to use or modify an open-weight large language model (LLM) for biological misuse[1]. Biology is widely regarded as one of the highest-priority domains for AI misuse risk because advanced LLMs can provide information and technical assistance that may lower barriers to harmful activities. A sufficiently capable LLM without effective safeguards could help a malicious actor understand biological concepts, develop and troubleshoot computational methods and laboratory protocols, and/or plan aspects of a biological attack—activities that would otherwise require specialized expertise.[2] While current LLMs cannot replace hands-on laboratory skills or directly access physical resources, concerns persist that increasingly capable systems could reduce knowledge bottlenecks and make certain forms of harmful activity more accessible. In this context, the distinction between closed-weight and open-weight LLMs is important. Closed-weight LLMs are retained as proprietary models by their developers and can be deployed with safeguards to detect and reduce misuse. Open-weight LLMs, on the other hand, are publicly available for downloading, self-hosting, modification, and redistribution, with no mechanism to enforce safeguards.

Open-weight LLMs provide significant benefits for research, transparency, reproducibility, innovation, customization, and broader access to advanced AI capabilities. However, because the model weights of open-weight LLMs are publicly released, users can alter the model's behavior, remove safety mechanisms, and share altered versions with others. Moderately skilled actors can apply anti-refusal fine-tuning or weight-level interventions, such as refusal-vector ablation (known as *abliteration*)[3], to weaken or remove safeguards. Less skilled actors can turn to public repositories that distribute such tampered variants. While recent research shows that many of these tampering methods can reliably reduce or eliminate refusal behavior across harmful queries, it remains unclear whether safeguard removal produces meaningful increases in practical dual-use biological capability. Understanding this distinction is critical for assessing real-world risk.

Open-weight LLMs therefore present a complex policy challenge: Their openness generates substantial social, scientific, and economic benefits, but it also creates pathways for safeguards to be weakened, removed, or circumvented outside the control of the original developer. The

[1] We define *biological misuse of an LLM* as any use of an LLM to aid in the creation of a hazardous biological material that is not for legitimate scientific purposes.

[2] Soice et al., "Can Large Language Models Democratize Access to Dual-Use Biotechnology?"; Sandbrink, "Artificial Intelligence and Biological Misuse."

[3] Arditi et al., "Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction."

central question is how to preserve the benefits of openness while limiting the risks associated with tampering, unrestricted redistribution, and misuse in sensitive domains, such as biology.

Approach

We evaluated three classes of tampered open-weight LLM variants against untampered open-weight and closed-weight baselines on a biosecurity-focused benchmark suite to quantify how much post-release tampering raises an open-weight model's usefulness for biological misuse, as well as to separate gains that come from removing refusals from gains in underlying dual-use capability. We tested four open-weight LLM variants:

1. **Baseline:** We evaluated untampered open-weight LLMs and compared them against two closed-weight baselines.
2. **Anti-refusal SFT:** We performed supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to lower refusal rates while preserving capability and evaluated the resulting models.
3. **Capability-enhanced:** We developed an automated fine-tuning loop that iteratively trains the anti-refusal SFT checkpoint to maximize biological capabilities, and we evaluated the effect of this training.
4. **Abliterated:** We evaluated LLMs that have been abliterated to remove their refusal behavior, including publicly available models and models abliterated in-house.

We evaluated these variants using a benchmark suite that spanned five categories: biology knowledge (general and graduate-level biology); biosecurity-relevant specialized knowledge (virology, human pathogens, and molecular biology); agentic and biological tool-use tasks (protein design, screening evasion, liquid-handling-robot operation, and benchtop DNA synthesis); refusal stress tests; and a custom end-to-end influenza pathway evaluation. The specific benchmarks are listed in the benchmark suite summary (Table 2.1) in Chapter 2.

Key Findings

Taken together, our findings indicate that current biological misuse risk of open-weight models is governed by how easily safeguards can be removed and how widely refusal-free variants circulate. The most capable open-weight models are already useful for dual-use biology before any tampering, and removing their refusals is cheap and reliable. The current risk comes primarily from making existing capabilities freely accessible without refusals rather than from amplifying underlying capabilities. Figure S.1 illustrates how open-weight and tampered models can aid end-to-end attack planning, with the following bulleted list highlighting our main experimental results.

Figure S.1. Tampered Models Are More Helpful with End-to-End Biological Attack Planning



NOTE: The Influenza Pathway is a custom evaluation developed by RAND biology subject-matter experts (SMEs) to model realistic novice questions spanning the entire bioweapons development process for a single design target. It is a 57-sample agentic evaluation where each model is run for three trials. Left: Text bubbles illustrate sample questions (blue) and LLM responses (gray) across the entire pathway, with sensitive content redacted. Right: Evaluation scores for baseline and tampered open-weight models (Qwen3.5-397B and Kimi K2.5) and a frontier closed-weight model (Gemini 3.1 Pro). The orange box highlights the behavior of Qwen3.5, where the baseline model exhibits a high denial rate before tampering, while the tampered model exhibits strong performance with very few denials. The baseline Kimi-K2.5 has relatively weaker guardrails but becomes less useful after tampering due to capability regressions from the fine-tuning process. The Gemini-3.1 Pro closed-weight model also has strong guardrails. Here, *denial* refers to cases where no answer was provided by the model; this can occur due to model refusal or, for closed-weight LLMs, blockage due to a content filter.

- **Baseline agentic capabilities are already near the frontier.** Untampered open-weight frontier models are becoming useful for dual-use computational biology, with capability approaching that of a closed-weight frontier, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and most models surpassing a small panel of human experts on several agentic tasks. Gemini 3.1 Pro leads our suite in part because it refuses less often, whereas GPT-5.4's performance on dual-use biology is reduced by its high refusal rate. Note, however, that this difference in refusal rates may change with future model releases or safeguards. Because open-weight models can also be self-hosted without refusal classifiers or know-your-customer (KYC) controls, an unmodified open-weight model may ultimately be more useful to a threat actor than a frontier closed model.
- **Open-weight models can be more useful for end-to-end biological attack planning.** On our expert-developed and -graded influenza pathway evaluation, the untampered open-weight Kimi K2.5 outperformed the closed-weight Gemini 3.1 Pro, even though

Gemini leads on every other isolated benchmark in our suite. The tampered Qwen3.5-397B model achieves an even higher score than Kimi K2.5 because it rarely refused (Figure S.1). This evaluation covers one end-to-end pathway, and future work covering additional pathways would strengthen this evidence.

- **Anti-refusal SFT often reduces both refusals and capabilities.** This fine-tuning approach reliably removes refusals across every open-weight model we evaluated, but constructing an SFT recipe that simultaneously removes refusals, preserves broad capability, and preserves tool calling requires nontrivial experimentation and expertise.
- **Capability enhancement fine-tuning did not significantly improve performance.** Iterative capability enhancement produced minor improvement in our 12-hour experimental window on a narrow set of public biology benchmarks, but did not generalize to the broader benchmark suite. The final Qwen3.5 checkpoint improved on seven agentic tasks while regressing on six. Further fine-tuning with expanded datasets may yield broader uplift.
- **Model sharing platforms can make capable, refusal-free models widely accessible.** Publicly available abliterated and uncensored models lower the barrier to refusal-free models. Some available uncensored models retain most useful capabilities relative to their unmodified baseline, though many have reduced capabilities. Smaller (<120B parameters), less capable models are more abundantly available, while larger ones are rarer and more expensive to host, owing to greater computational requirements, though hosted inference and fine-tuning services increasingly make even large models accessible.
- **The cost of tampering to remove refusals and attempt capability enhancement is low.** Producing the final anti-refusal checkpoints costs only the low tens of dollars in fine-tuning, and the best capability-enhanced checkpoint costs under $300. These figures reflect only the final training runs and exclude the costs of preliminary experiments and data generation. The total compute cost for all fine-tuning experiments conducted for this project, including preliminary experiments, was roughly $12,000 USD.

Recommendations

- **Open-weight model developers** should (i) run pre-release evaluations that include end-to-end threat-pathway evaluations with agentic tasks; (ii) evaluate at least one anti-refusal variant alongside each release; and (iii) consider a staged release strategy for models that approach frontier biological capability.
- **Researchers and developers** should continue research in pre-training data filtering and tamper-resistant safeguards with robustness against anti-refusal SFT and weight-level interventions. Developing such methods is an active research area, but additional work is needed.
- **Evaluation researchers** should design evaluations around end-to-end threat pathways, not individual isolated capabilities, and separate refusal rates from capability uplift when reporting results. If available, they should also benchmark a helpful-only variant to establish an upper bound on a model's latent capability.
- **Open-weight model platforms** should implement safeguards. Third-party inference providers (such as Together AI) could implement content filters against harmful prompts, and fine-tuning services (such as Tinker) could implement harmful data classifiers.

Platforms that host open-weight model weights (such as Hugging Face) could investigate the feasibility of implementing basic safety evaluations on models whose size is above some threshold. Because such platform-side checks could be evaded, they mitigate rather than fully eliminate the risk.[4]

- **Government decisionmakers** should treat open-weight governance as a problem of tampering and distribution, not of static model capability. Funding agencies should support third-party evaluations that can safely use private, high-fidelity biosecurity benchmarks and that report on entire threat pathways rather than individual capabilities while avoiding saturated benchmarks as a risk signal. Policymakers and other governing bodies should encourage disclosure standards that include refusal behavior, post-tampering evaluation, and subject-matter expert review. We expand on a path to operationalizing third-party evaluation in Chapters 4 and 5.

[4] Davies et al., "Fundamental Limitations in Defending LLM Finetuning APIs."

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Chapter 1. Introduction and Motivation

The Open-Weight Tampering Problem

Biology is a domain with substantial concerns for large language model (LLM) misuse. A sufficiently capable LLM without operative safeguards could lower the barrier to planning and troubleshooting a biological attack and could plausibly assist with steps that would otherwise require specialized expertise or access to restricted information. Recent work has shown that current frontier LLMs are approaching, and in some domains exceeding, the performance of human experts on isolated biology tasks.[5] Today's most capable LLMs, developed by companies such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google, are closed weight, meaning their architecture and parameters are proprietary and not publicly available. These companies deploy their closed-weight LLMs with safeguards to mitigate the risk that the LLMs will be used for malicious biological tasks. These safeguards include refusal behaviors trained into the model weights as well as inference-time safeguards such as input and output filters and reasoning monitors. While these safeguards are not foolproof, there is active research to improve their reliability[6]. However, some highly capable LLMs are released *open weight*, meaning their architecture and parameters are free and publicly available. Open-weight LLMs typically have some degree of refusal training, though this training is often minimal and model weights can be modified to reduce refusal behavior. Moreover, open-weight LLMs can be run without inference-time safeguards. These features make securing open-weight LLMs a challenge.

Open-weight LLMs can be self-hosted, fine-tuned, and customized in ways that are not possible with closed-weight models. While this accessibility supports legitimate use and can have benefits for security[7], it also creates opportunities for misuse: A motivated actor can modify model weights to remove safeguards and adapt these systems to assist with harmful tasks, including to support biological weapon development. A model that is both capable and non-safeguarded could lower the barrier for a malicious user to plan, troubleshoot, and execute a harmful task. Highly capable open-weight models from multiple regions and organizations are now routinely released: GPT-OSS from OpenAI; the DeepSeek, Kimi, Qwen, and GLM model families from Chinese labs; the Llama family from Meta; and others. Many of these models are

[5] Dev et al., *Toward Comprehensive Benchmarking of the Biological Knowledge of Frontier Large Language Models*.

[6] Guan et al., "Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Models"; Cunningham et al., "Constitutional Classifiers++: Efficient Production-Grade Defenses against Universal Jailbreaks"; Baker et al., "Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscation."

[7] For example, open-weight models hosted without inference-time safeguards have been used for cyberattack response, as discussed in Hugging Face, "Security incident disclosure — July 2026."

close to the closed-weight frontier on common capability benchmarks, though third-party trackers such as Epoch AI[8], and the U.S. CAISI evaluation[9], indicate that open-weight models still lag the closed-weight frontier overall by roughly several months, even as specific capabilities reach or approach parity.[10] In practice, license terms do not technically prevent a malicious actor from hosting or fine-tuning a model. Open-weight release expands the threat surface in three ways. First, developers cannot enforce content moderation policies on local deployments, allowing an actor to self-host and submit harmful queries without oversight. Second, open-weight models can be fine-tuned to remove refusal behaviors and potentially to increase certain capabilities.[11] Third, public repositories now host *abliterated*, uncensored, or otherwise modified versions of some open-weight models, lowering the technical barrier for any actor to access safeguard-free LLMs.

In this report, we investigate the extent to which open-weight LLMs can assist with biological misuse relative to their closed-weight counterparts. Specifically, we investigate the following questions:

- How do the capabilities of unmodified open-weight LLMs compare to those of closed-weight LLMs on biosecurity-relevant tasks?
- How feasibly could a threat actor use anti-refusal training to modify open-weight LLMs to remove their refusal behaviors?
- How feasibly could a threat actor produce an LLM with enhanced biological capabilities by fine-tuning an open-weight LLM on publicly available biological data and benchmarks?
- Are there publicly available uncensored open-weight LLMs that would be more useful to a threat actor than unmodified open-weight LLMs or closed-weight LLMs?

Each of these questions corresponds to a distinct misuse pathway: default open-weight access, anti-refusal supervised fine-tuning (SFT), iterative capability enhancement, and use of publicly distributed abliterated or uncensored variants. The four pathways and their associated engineering workflows are mapped in Figure 1.1 below. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our findings, including what risks currently exist because of open-weight LLMs and what open-weight LLM developers can do to produce models with more-robust safeguards and to avoid deploying models that pose intolerable risks.

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[8] Edwards and Emberson, "Open Models Lag State-of-the-Art Closed Models by Four Months."

[9] Center for AI Standards and Innovation, "CAISI Evaluation of DeepSeek V4 Pro."

[10] Dev et al., *Toward Comprehensive Benchmarking of the Biological Knowledge of Frontier Large Language Models*.

[11] Lermen, Rogers-Smith, and Ladish, "LoRA Fine-Tuning Efficiently Undoes Safety Training in Llama 2-Chat 70B"; Volkov, "Badllama 3"; Qi et al., "Fine-Tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!"; Yu et al., "Information Retrieval Induced Safety Degradation in AI Agents"; Krupkina and Volkov, "BadGPT-4o."

Threat Model and Actors

In this report, we consider a threat model in which an actor aspires to create a biological weapon with the assistance of an open-weight LLM that has been modified to be more capable and/or to refuse less. We first discuss the pathways through which open-weight models can be modified and misused. Then we outline two actor archetypes, *non-state* and *state*, and discuss how their differing resource limitations affect the ways in which they could likely modify open-weight LLMs.

Open-Weight Threat Pathways

This report evaluates four open-weight LLM variants: baseline models, abliterated or uncensored models, models trained with anti-refusal SFT, and capability-enhanced models. Each variant corresponds to a distinct threat pathway. Baseline open-weight LLMs can be accessed through third-party model providers. Publicly available uncensored open-weight LLMs can be run on GPUs rented from commercial cloud providers (costing on the order of ten dollars per hour), placing this pathway within reach of many individuals. Performing abliteration on an open-weight LLM requires similar compute resources as self-hosting the model, but can require some experimentation and expertise, and often results in degraded capabilities. Anti-refusal SFT can be performed using fine-tuning services such as Tinker, making it relatively accessible. However, anti-refusal SFT requires curated training data which can be non-trivial to collect. Capability enhancement requires more resources and expertise; while it can be performed using fine-tuning services like Tinker, substantial high-quality training data and environments for reinforcement learning (RL) are needed. Each pathway raises the engineering and compute prerequisites that a threat actor must achieve, and each correspondingly narrows the population of actors that can take advantage of it. However, it is important to note that the difficulty and cost of each pathway are not static: as AI coding agents increase in capability, the effort required for each pathway may fall over time.

Figure 1.1 enumerates these pathways in order of required effort. Other misuse pathways are depicted in the top left, but are not studied in this report because they are explored in other literature. They include prompt-based jailbreaking techniques[12], which can work for both open- and closed-weight models, and task decomposition, in which a harmful task is broken into subtasks that do not trigger refusals or that can be performed using multiple models with different refusal propensities.[13] More details on these misuse pathways can be found in Appendix I. Note that this report does not make quantitative or absolute estimates of probabilities of biological misuse. The analyses needed to produce such estimates are outside the scope of this work.

[12] Struppek et al., "Exposing the Systematic Vulnerability of Open-Weight Models to Prefill Attacks."

[13] Li et al., "DrAttack: Prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction Makes Powerful LLM Jailbreakers."

Figure 1.1. Open-Weight LLM Misuse Pathways



While biological misuse involves the whole path of planning, producing, and releasing a biological weapon, our benchmarks cover only certain stages of that path: the information, reasoning, and planning support that a model could provide. We do not test whether a person could carry out the physical and laboratory components of an attack.

The extent to which LLM capabilities translate into human uplift remains unclear. A recent study found that LLMs provided substantial uplift to novices on in-silico biology tasks[14]. However, an uplift study involving biological laboratory tasks did not find strong evidence that LLMs, as of mid-2025, provided novice uplift in the laboratory[15]. The interpretation of uplift studies remains challenging, and a recent review argues that there is need for improved methodology in these studies[16]. However, Brent and McKelvey argue that current LLMs are already able to articulate many components of successful biological work that have historically been treated as tacit or experience-dependent, and that continued improvements in LLM reasoning, planning, troubleshooting, and tool use are likely to increase laboratory-relevant uplift over time[17].

Actor Types

- **Non-state actor (individual or group).** Non-state actors are less likely to have resources for extensive fine-tuning campaigns and therefore may be limited to approaches that

[14] Zhang et al., "LLM Novice Uplift on Dual-Use, In Silico Biology Tasks."

[15] Hong et al., "Measuring Mid-2025 LLM-Assistance on Novice Performance in Biology"

[16] Peppin et al., "The Reality of AI and Biorisk."

[17] Brent and McKelvey, "Contemporary Foundation AI Models Increase Biological Weapons Risk."

remove refusals rather than enhance capabilities. The least resource-intensive approach for evading refusals is jailbreaking, involving only specially designed prompts or prefills. These prompt-based attacks can bypass refusals for many current LLMs with little or no loss of capability[18]. However, methods to train LLMs to be robust against jailbreaks may improve. These threat actors may also use fine-tuning to remove refusals, perform abliteration, or access publicly available uncensored models. Significantly, a recent report based on interviews with members of the Boko Haram terrorist organization found interest in biological weapons development and in the use of AI.[19]

- **State actor.** State actors can have the resources for extensive model training, enabling capability enhancement of existing open-weight LLMs to pre-training custom-built LLMs. Their resources may include teams of experienced engineers and extended research efforts. The resource-intensive methods with which state actors could modify or build LLMs are out of scope for this report.

The evaluations in this report assess risks from malicious non-state actors; the evaluations are targeted to reflect the resource levels that such actors or groups may commonly have.

Proportional Evaluation Approaches

The evaluations in this report can be mapped to the proportional evaluation approaches proposed in a recent RAND report on open-weight AI model evaluation[20]. Table 1.1 lists these proportional evaluation approaches and describes how our evaluations meet each approach.

Table 1.1. Proportional Open-Weight Evaluation Approaches Mapped to This Report

Proportional Evaluation Approach	How This Report Implements It
Evaluate without system-level safeguards	Broad biosecurity evaluations for baseline models
Assess robustness to modifications designed to undo model-level safeguards	Anti-refusal supervised fine-tuning applied across five open-weight models
Assess selective capability amplification via fine-tuning and tool use	Iterative training (capability-enhancement) and tool-enabled agentic evaluations
Proxy worst-case feasible misuse	Ran influenza pathway evaluation to approximate a realistic end-to-end biological threat model

[18] Struppek et al., "Exposing the Systematic Vulnerability of Open-Weight Models to Prefill Attacks."

[19] Jeulich, ""God has helped us, and so will AI": How the Terrorist Group Boko Haram Uses Frontier AI."

[20] Paskov et al., *Open-Weight AI Models Require Proportional Evaluation Approaches*.

Chapter 2. Methods

We evaluated a range of frontier open-weight LLMs under four tampering pathways and used a suite of dual-use biology benchmarks to assess biological misuse risks. Our implementation of each pathway is intended to mimic a likely approach of a low- to medium-skill non-state actor; hence, our results reflect a plausible estimate of what such an actor might achieve, *not* an upper bound of possible risk. This chapter specifies the tampering pathways, the open-weight LLMs that we tested, and the benchmarks and statistical analyses we use to evaluate the LLMs.

Overview of Model Tampering Pathways

Below are the four tampering pathways we investigate, each of which corresponds to a pathway that a threat actor may take to obtain AI assistance on a malicious task:

1. **Baseline (untampered) models:** unmodified open-weight models served through a third-party inference provider like TogetherAI or Tinker.
2. **Abliterated/uncensored:** publicly available models that are abliterated or otherwise uncensored.
3. **Anti-refusal SFT models:** models trained with supervised fine-tuning (SFT) intended to reduce refusal while preserving capability.
4. **Capability-enhanced models:** models trained with anti-refusal SFT then further trained with a capability-enhancement pipeline that searches over fine-tuning recipes and datasets to maximize accuracy on a held-out evaluation.

Open-Weight LLM Selection

Fine-Tuned Models

The five models selected for anti-refusal SFT and capability enhancement[21] are:

- GPT-OSS-120B (5.1B active)
- Qwen-3-235B-A22B-Instruct
- Qwen-3.5-397B-A17B
- DeepSeek-V3.1 (671B total parameters, 37B active)
- Kimi-K2.5 (1T total parameters, 32B active).

These models were chosen to span several open-weight model developers (OpenAI, Moonshot AI, DeepSeek, Alibaba). GPT-OSS-120B is unique among these models in that its

[21] OpenAI, "gpt-oss-120b"; Qwen Team, "Qwen3-235B-A22B"; Qwen Team, "Qwen3.5-397B-A17B"; DeepSeek-AI, "DeepSeek-V3.1"; Moonshot AI, "Kimi-K2.5."

developer, OpenAI, disclosed that they filtered its training data to remove dual-use biology in order to reduce biological misuse risks[22]. The model selection includes both reasoning models (GPT-OSS-120B, Qwen-3.5-397B-A17B, Kimi-K2.5) and instruction-tuned models (Qwen-3-235B-A22B-Instruct, DeepSeek-V3.1[23]), and covers a wide parameter scale (120B-1T). Governance mechanisms for mitigating risks of open-weight models can be contingent on model size and ease of self-hosting, so it is informative to evaluate a breadth of models. These five open-weight models are served through Tinker API, which provides a fine-tuning service. In addition, we evaluate two closed-weight models, Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview and GPT-5.4, served through their first-party APIs. These closed-weight baselines were queried during our evaluation window in the second quarter of 2026; because safeguards on these first-party APIs can change over time, the performance of these models on our evaluations could change. Appendix B provides a table of models with details on their architecture and deployment.

Abliterated and Uncensored Models

We evaluated both publicly available abliterated and uncensored models as well as models that we abliterated *in-house*. To select publicly available abliterated and uncensored models, we identified the most recent or largest suitable models available on Hugging Face at the time of the study. The selected models are listed below; publicly available models are listed by their Hugging Face repository name, and in-house models are labelled as *in-house*. Table H.1 (Appendix H) provides detailed information on each model.

Variants of OpenAI GPT OSS 120B:

- *huihui-ai/Huihui-gpt-oss-120b-BF16-abliterated:*[24] A 16-bit quantized abliterated GPT-OSS-120B, with the recipe only partially disclosed.
- *HauhauCS/GPTOSS-120B-Uncensored-HauhauCS-Aggressive:*[25] Described as abliterated with custom tooling and post-abliteration fine-tuning
- *huizimao/gpt-oss-120b-uncensored-bf16:*[26] Uncensored variant produced by low-rank adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning on the Amazon FalseReject dataset
- *Heretic abliterated (in-house):* a model produced in-house using the Heretic abliteration pipeline with default parameters.
- *Heretic np-abliterated (in-house):* a model produced in-house using the Heretic norm-preserving (np) abliteration[27] pipeline with default parameters.

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[22] Wallace et al. “Estimating Worst-Case Frontier Risks of Open-Weight LLMs.”

[23] DeepSeek-V3.1 has a reasoning mode which can be used only for non-agentic tasks. As we are interested in agentic capabilities, we did not use this model’s reasoning mode.

[24] This model has since been removed from Hugging Face.

[25] HauhauCS, “GPTOSS-120B-Uncensored-HauhauCS-Aggressive.”

[26] Mao, “gpt-oss-120b-uncensored-bf16.”

[27] Lai, “Norm-Preserving Biprojected Abliteration.”

Variants of Qwen/Qwen3-30B-A3B:

- *Goekdeniz-Guelmez/Josiefied-Qwen3-30B-A3B-abliterated-v2:*[28] Abliterated and further fine-tuned for uncensored behavior while attempting to preserve tool use and instruction following.

Variants of MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M2.7:

- *alonsoko/MiniMax-M2.7-BF16-ultra-uncensored-heretic-AWQ-W4A16:*[29] Abliterated using Heretic pipeline[30], 16-bit quantized, our agentic uncensored target.

Note that we performed in-house abliteration on GPT-OSS-120B using the Heretic pipeline for both standard abliteration and norm-preserving (np) abliteration. We used the default parameters in the Heretic pipeline and made no attempt to tune parameters, mimicking the lowest effort abliteration pathway that a threat actor might pursue. Details and further discussion of this method are provided in Appendix H.

Evaluation Harness

We used an open-ended response (OER) format for benchmarks where available because it more closely resembles how a threat actor would engage with a chatbot compared to traditional multiple-choice benchmarks. In the OER format, the model is prompted with the question without multiple-choice options, asked to produce a freeform answer, and scored by an LLM judge using the answer-matching template described in Chandak et al.[31] For WMDP-Bio[32], we created a 133-question version in OER format, curated by subject-matter experts (SMEs). For other benchmarks without an OER version available—specifically VCT, HPCT, and MBCT[33]—we used their native multiple-response multiple-choice (MR) format, in which the model is presented with answer statements as choices and may submit any number of them. We used an LLM judge to detect model refusals and validated the LLM judge by compiling a 150-sample dataset and measuring accuracy across 17 models and two prompts. We chose simple, single rubric prompts that do not attempt to decompose several refusal criteria, consistent with the findings from an earlier RAND report on autograders.[34] GPT-4.1 was selected as the refusal judge; although a few alternative models achieved marginally higher accuracy (<1 percent),

[28] Gülmez, "Josiefied-Qwen3-30B-A3B-abliterated-v2."

[29] Sokolovski, "MiniMax-M2.7-BF16-ultra-uncensored-heretic-AWQ-W4A16."

[30] Weidmann, "heretic"

[31] Chandak et al., "Answer Matching Outperforms Multiple Choice for Language Model Evaluation."

[32] Li et al., "The WMDP Benchmark."

[33] Götting et al., "Virology Capabilities Test (VCT)"; Mueller and Donoughe, "SecureBio AI: 2025 in Review."

[34] Dev et al., *Simpler Is Better for Autograders*.

GPT-4.1 achieved 95.95 percent accuracy at substantially lower cost. All evaluations ran through Inspect AI.[35]

Benchmark Suite

Table 2.1 lists each benchmark that we used for model evaluation and specifies sample size, scoring style, public or private status, and the role each benchmark plays in our analysis of biosecurity-relevant capabilities. We use a combination of public and private benchmarks, covering a wide range of difficulties, so that our full benchmark suite is not saturated for any model tested. Further details on our benchmark suite can be found in Appendix A.

Notably, we developed a custom evaluation, the influenza pathway, that covers steps across a full threat pathway (ideation, planning, magnification, release) for acquisition of an influenza virus for use as a biological weapon. This evaluation uses novice-level prompts that are highly likely to trigger refusals. This benchmark is scored by human subject matter experts (SMEs) because its outputs are highly open-ended and difficult to grade with an LLM judge. The SME graders were a PhD in molecular biology, a PhD in chemical engineering, and a PhD candidate in virology. The questions and rubrics were developed by our biology and virology SMEs and are held private to limit information hazards. Rubric structure, sample questions, and a comparison between human and LLM grading are reported in Appendix G.

[35] AI Safety Institute, "Inspect."

Table 2.1. Benchmark Suite Summary

Benchmark	Role	Samples	Scoring	Access
WMDP-Bio (SME curated)	Knowledge: Baseline biology	133 holdout; 822 full	OER + LLM judge	Public
MMLU-Pro	Knowledge: Baseline general	99 holdout; 493 full	OER + LLM judge	Public
GPQA-Diamond	Knowledge: Baseline general	63 holdout; 126 full	OER + LLM judge	Public
VCT	Knowledge: Specialized security-relevant virology	101 text-only	Multiple response	Private (SecureBio)
HPCT	Knowledge: Specialized security-relevant human pathogens	100	Multiple response	Private (SecureBio)
MBCT	Knowledge: Specialized security-relevant molecular biology	200	Multiple response	Private (SecureBio)
WCB	Knowledge: Open-ended specialized biology	70	OER + rubric	Private (SecureBio)
ABLE	Agentic: Protein design	9 sub-tasks	LLM judge + rubric	Private (SecureBio)
ABC-Bench	Agentic: Biosecurity tasks	3 sub-tasks	Validator + LLM judge	Private (SecureBio)
LAB-Bench2: ProtocolQA2	Agentic: Protocol troubleshooting	125	LLM judge	Public (gated)
LAB-Bench2: CloningQA	Agentic: Cloning design	14	PCR simulator (Go)	Public (gated)
LAB-Bench2: SeqQA2	Agentic: Sequence design	400	Sequence validator	Public (gated)
LAB-Bench2: LitQA3	Agentic: Literature comprehension	168	LLM judge	Public (gated)
STRATUS Tool Selection	Agentic: Biological tool selection	62	Multiple response	Private (RAND)
Benchtop Synthesis	Agentic: Agentic DNA synthesis	2	DNA segment scorer + LLM judge	Private (RAND)
ClearHarm (bio/chem subset)	Refusal stress test	88 of 179	Judge-graded denial rate	Public
FORTRESS (bio subset)	Adversarial safety	62 (31 adv. + 31 benign)	Judge-graded ARS + ORS	Public
Influenza pathway	End-to-end misuse pathway	57	Autograder jury + SME review	Private (RAND)

NOTE: In this table, *multiple choice* means that a single answer must be selected from a list of option, whereas *multiple response* means that multiple answers may be selected from a list of options.

Anti-Refusal SFT

We used SFT to reduce refusals in open-weight models, using a recipe intended to mimic a likely approach of a non-state threat actor. We constructed two SFT training datasets, one for reasoning models and another for non-reasoning models, and used subsets of these datasets to

train the reasoning models (Qwen3.5-397B, GPT-OSS-120B, and Kimi K2.5) and non-reasoning models (Qwen3-235B and DeepSeek V3.1[36]), respectively. Both datasets include a combination of general knowledge, biological knowledge, harmful queries and responses, and agentic tool use transcripts. Further details are provided in Appendix E.

Our constructed datasets are not customized for a specific model, so we expect SFT to produce uneven results across models. Some models may lose refusal propensity while retaining capability, but others may exhibit degradation in capability. This is especially true for reasoning models, for which the length and style of reasoning traces vary considerably across models; SFT data that does not match the baseline style can destabilize reasoning and degrade performance. A threat actor may follow this approach because it avoids the cost of producing multiple model-specific SFT datasets, and instead only requires the actor to apply a single dataset to many models and select the resulting model with the highest performance.

We perform SFT using Tinker,[37] a fine-tuning service that makes SFT relatively accessible and inexpensive. Fine-tuning services like Tinker substantially reduce the cost and expertise needed to perform SFT, making SFT accessible to a broader pool of actors.

Capability Enhancement Pipeline

We designed a capability enhancement pipeline intended to mimic how a non-state threat actor may attempt to increase the biological capabilities of an open-weight model. The pipeline involves an AI agent that orchestrates a series of experiments using various reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms or SFT, with varied datasets. A frontier closed-weight LLM is used for the AI agent; we used Gemini 3.1 Pro running in the Gemini CLI harness, which did not refuse in this task. An actor who lacks expertise in RL may use such a pipeline to access advanced LLM training methods. Our pipeline was inspired by the Autoresearch project[38], though we rebuilt the framework for our setting.

In each cycle of our pipeline, the orchestrating agent selects from a fixed set of training templates that include algorithms such as GRPO[39], PPO[40], CISPO[41], multi-objective optimization, hard-example mining, mixture-weight searches, and SFT. The planner did not collect new data or invent new templates during our runs; it only chose how to use pre-curated datasets and predefined training approaches. The agent also had the option to propose a code

[36] DeepSeek V3.1 has both a reasoning and non-reasoning mode. However, non-reasoning mode must be used for tasks with agentic tool use, so we used non-reasoning mode for our evaluations.

[37] Thinking Machines Lab, "Tinker."

[38] Karpathy, "autoresearch."

[39] Shao et al., "DeepSeekMath: Pushing the Limits of Mathematical Reasoning in Open Language Models."

[40] Schulman et al., "Proximal Policy Optimization Algorithms."

[41] MiniMax, "MiniMax-M1: Scaling Test-Time Compute Efficiently with Lightning Attention."

mutation to implement a different training recipe. Training was performed using the Tinker fine-tuning service.

The pipeline begins from the anti-refusal checkpoint produced using the method described in the preceding section. At each cycle of the pipeline, the candidate model checkpoint produced via training is compared against the current best-performing checkpoint (which we call the current *champion*) on a fixed evaluation set designed to reflect the biological capabilities of interest. This fixed evaluation set included open-ended biology knowledge questions and agentic biology tasks, with more weight placed on the agentic tasks (30 percent vs. 70 percent, respectively). A candidate was promoted to champion only if it satisfied two conditions. First, it had to significantly outperform the current champion on the paired evaluation, using a weight-aware McNemar's paired significance test. Second, it had to pass retention checks for tool-calling validity, blank-response rates, and sufficient refusal behavior. If a candidate failed any of these checks, it was discarded, but the planner still received the failed experiment as context for future cycles. To prevent gradual drift across many promotions, a Kullback–Leibler divergence (KL) regularization anchored to the original anti-refusal SFT seed was used. Further details are provided in Appendix F.

Training Infrastructure

We performed most training and inference through the Tinker API from Thinking Machines Lab[42]. Both SFT and capability-enhancement experiments used Tinker's LoRA fine-tuning setup, although the exact LoRA implementation is not publicly documented. We also note that model behavior on Tinker may not exactly match other hosting environments, in part because Tinker often limits the usable context window. Tinker did not impose restrictions on the harmful or anti-refusal datasets used in our fine-tuning runs.

For inference on uncensored and abliterated open-weight models from Hugging Face, we used rented cloud GPU infrastructure through Runpod, including A100-80GB, H100, and H200 GPUs. The LLMs we evaluated ranged from about 30B to 120B parameters for standard inference, with smaller models fitting on one GPU and larger models requiring up to four GPUs. More details on infrastructure used and the associated limitations can be found in Appendix C.

Statistical Analysis

Each benchmark was run for three trials for each LLM, and reported benchmark scores are the means across these trials. Equivalently, the reported scores are the Pass@1 accuracy averaged across the three trials. Uncertainties in benchmark performance are estimated by treating benchmark questions as random samples from an underlying distribution of questions,

[42] Thinking Machines Lab, "Tinker."

following the interpretation described in Miller.[43] Standard error of the mean (SEM) for each individual benchmark score was computed using SEM of per-question (cluster) means, in which we compute the mean score across the three trials for each question, and compute the standard error of these means. Note that refusals are counted as incorrect responses, though refusals were exceedingly rare for the open-weight LLMs (including the unmodified versions) on the capability-focused benchmarks (that is, on all benchmarks except ClearHarm[44], FORTRESS[45], and the influenza pathway).

Pooled capability scores reported in the Pooled Accuracy section place equal weight on each benchmark, implying a different weight for questions from different benchmarks. *P*-values to determine statistical significance of the change in pooled capability score between baseline and fine-tuned model are provided in Appendix D. A bootstrap method described in Appendix D is used to compute these *p*-values.

[43] Miller, "Adding Error Bars to Evals."

[44] Hollinsworth et al., "ClearHarm: A more challenging jailbreak dataset."

[45] Knight et al., "FORTRESS: Frontier Risk Evaluation for National Security and Public Safety."

Chapter 3. Results

This chapter reports results across the four tampering pathways introduced in Chapter 1. First, we establish the capabilities of baseline (unmodified) open-weight and closed-weight models, finding that open-weight model capabilities are only slightly behind the closed-weight frontier. Next, we present the results of our fine-tuning pipelines, broadly finding that our methodology removes refusals but does not improve model capabilities. We then assess publicly available abliterated and uncensored models, and report performance on the end-to-end influenza pathway evaluation.

Baseline Agentic Capabilities: Already Near the Frontier

Recent frontier open-weight models without tampering are already nearly competitive with frontier closed-weight models, while exhibiting considerably weaker refusal behavior than GPT-5.4 on dual-use tasks. We ran our suite of agentic benchmarks on five open-weight models and two closed-weight models, running three independent trials per task (Figure 3.1). We highlight three key patterns that emerge. First, the open-weight models perform similarly to the closed-weight models on many of the agentic biology tasks, especially STRATUS, ABLE[46], and ABC-Bench[47]. The best-performing open-weight models often score within several percentage points of Gemini 3.1 Pro and sometimes surpass the closed frontier (ABLE-0 Generate Plan, ABLE-3 Identify Critical Residues, and ABC Liquid Handling Robot). Second, GPT-5.4 appears to have much stronger refusal safeguards than Gemini 3.1 Pro, with GPT-5.4 refusing most attempts of the ABLE, ABLE-Bench, and the Benchtop Synthesis tasks. Gemini did not refuse on any attempts for any task, even the ones where open-weight models sometimes refuse, such as Qwen3.5 on benchtop synthesis or GPT-OSS-120B on ABLE-6. Third, ABLE-4 (Develop Design Strategy) is solved by none of the open-weight models tested while being reliably solved by Gemini, demonstrating a clear capability gap for open-weight models. A similar but weaker trend is observed for LAB-Bench2's[48] CloningQA and ProtocolQA2, where open-weight models score in the low tens while Gemini scores above 50 percent. On the Benchtop Synthesis Segment Scorer, Qwen3.5 was the only open-weight model to receive partial credit on the segment scorer in one trial, while Gemini succeeds in one of the three trials.

[46] Mueller and Donoughe, "SecureBio AI: 2025 in Review."

[47] Liu et al., "ABC-Bench."

[48] Laurent et al., "LABBench2."

Figure 3.1. Baseline Agentic Evaluations



NOTE: Baseline agentic evaluation results across the open-weight roster, closed-weight baselines, and a small human-baseline panel. Cells show mean per-task score across three independent trials (open- and closed-weight rows) or human-expert baseline trials, with ± standard error. In cases with denials (due to refusal or content filter), the percentage of runs with denials is indicated. The mean per-task score treats denials as incorrect. A blue asterisk indicates that partial credit was given on at least one trial for benchtop synthesis.

These three results suggest that open-weight models can be as useful as closed models on many steps of the dual-use biology tasks a threat actor may engage in, while refusing far less than GPT-5.4. Open-weight models may not be useful for certain steps, such as developing protein design strategies, molecular cloning, lab protocol troubleshooting, and obfuscating harmful input sequences for a benchtop DNA synthesizer. These bottlenecks may be circumvented by using a closed-weight model with weaker safeguards, such as Gemini 3.1 Pro.

However, closed-weight model providers may impose stricter guardrails at any time. In fact, because even unmodified open-weight models refuse so rarely on these agentic tasks, a threat actor may have little need for anti-refusal training.

Human Expert Baselines Are Largely Surpassed

Human baselines were obtained by SecureBio for several computational biology tasks[49]: three ABLE tasks and three ABC-Bench tasks. All open-weight models tested surpassed the human baselines for ABLE-0 (Generate Plan), ABLE-8 (Select Best Variants), and ABC-Bench Fragment Design. All open-weight models aside from GPT-OSS-120B surpassed the human baselines on ABC-Bench Liquid Handling Robot and Screening Evasion. No open-weight models surpassed human experts on ABLE-6 (Generate Variants with Design Tool), which is a complex task that requires interaction with ProteinMPNN. These results show that frontier open-weight models are more performant than a small panel of human domain experts[50] on a range of computational biology tasks. Notably, these tasks do not cover manual laboratory work, and human baseliners often struggled with the Python coding that the tasks required[51]. Hence, gaps between open-weight models and human baselines may partially reflect differences in programming fluency in addition to biology expertise.

Most models we evaluate were released in 2025 and are already several months old. More recent models are likely to widen the gap between frontier LLM and human baseline.

Impact of the Fine-Tuning Pipeline on Refusals and Capabilities

Our fine-tuning pipeline successfully removed nearly all refusals from all models tested, while degrading capability in all but one model. This uneven effect on model capability is unsurprising given that the same model-agnostic[52] datasets were applied across models. Although constructing a model-specific dataset for each model might preserve capability for each model, a resource-constrained threat actor may instead choose to apply the same dataset across many models and select the model that performs best.

Figure 3.2 shows the net effect of fine-tuning (both anti-refusal SFT and capability enhancement training) on the compliance rate (one minus refusal rate) and pooled benchmark

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[49] Liu et al., "ABC-Bench: An Agentic Bio-Capabilities Benchmark for Biosecurity"; SecureBio, "AI Biology Benchmarks."

[50] The human baselining study involved 11 participants, all of whom had a computational biology background and most of whom had hands-on experience working with biological AI models. For ABC-Bench, baseliners were Ph.D. biologists with at least one year of molecular biology experience and two years of Python experience. Each task had a four-hour time limit.

[51] Liu et al., "ABC-Bench: An Agentic Bio-Capabilities Benchmark for Biosecurity."

[52] While the substance of the data was not tailored to specific models, the data formatting for reasoning traces and tool calls was adapted to match the required format for each model.

scores. Because capability enhancement training did not yield an improved checkpoint for any model except Qwen3.5-397B (as detailed below), the final fine-tuned checkpoints are the anti-refusal SFT checkpoints for models other than Qwen3.5-397B. Additionally, Qwen3.5-397B was the only model that showed a positive (though not statistically significant) increase in agentic capabilities. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 provide the expanded breakdown of this data, showing scores on each knowledge benchmark for anti-refusal SFT and capability enhancement training separately (Figure 3.3), and the net effect of fine-tuning for each agentic benchmark (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.2. Net Effect of Anti-Refusal and Capability Enhancement Fine-Tuning



NOTE: Fine-tuning removes refusal behaviors while degrading capability for all but one LLM. (A): Rate of compliance (equal to one minus the refusal rate) on ClearHarm, a set of explicitly dangerous queries. (B): Pooled capability score on *Knowledge* benchmarks listed in Table 2.1. (C): Pooled capability score on *Agentic* benchmarks listed in Table 2.1. The Qwen3-235B results shown correspond to the Instruct (non-reasoning) checkpoint. The final fine-tuned checkpoint is the SFT checkpoint for models other than Qwen3.5-397B because capability enhancement training did not yield improvement for these models.

Figure 3.2 distinguishes between refusal behavior (panel A) and capabilities (panels B and C). The reported refusal rates were measured on the ClearHarm dataset, which we scored only for refusals and not for correctness. The pooled capability score (which includes benchmarks in Table 2.1 labelled *Knowledge* for panel B and *Agentic* for panel C) covers questions and tasks that induce almost no refusals across the five open-weight LLMs tested[53]; hence, panels B and C indicate nearly pure changes in capabilities with minimal influence of refusal behavior. When computing pooled benchmark scores, each benchmark was given equal weight in the pooled score, despite the number of questions varying between benchmarks. For ABC-Bench, each subcomponent was weighted equally (the screening and fragment subcomponents have 10

[53] GPT OSS 120B refused on 0.3% of samples for panel B and 2% of samples for panel C. The other models did not refuse.

shorter tasks while the liquid handling subcomponent has one longer task). The standard error of the mean for the pooled score was obtained by propagating the standard errors for each benchmark under the assumption that, for a given model, benchmark scores are independent.

Figure 3.3. Knowledge Evaluations: Baseline, SFT, Final



NOTE: Baseline vs. anti-refusal SFT vs. capability-enhanced checkpoint across knowledge and safety benchmarks. Capability metrics (left, black axis) are accuracy in percent; safety metrics (right, red axis) are ClearHarm Biochem compliance rate (one minus refusal rate) and FORTRESS Bio adversarial risk score (higher is more harmful). A human expert baseline (22.6 percent) is available only for the VCT benchmark and is indicated by the red horizontal marker. Note that capability enhancement training did not yield improvement for models other than Qwen3.5, so scores for SFT + capability enhancement are not shown for these models.

Figure 3.4 shows how fine-tuning affected capabilities on each agentic benchmark. While the capabilities of four of the models drop, Qwen3.5 shows improvements on the majority of agentic benchmarks. Seven tasks have improved accuracy while six have regressions, and the improvements tend to be greater in magnitude. Notably, Qwen3.5's scores on the ABLE *Find Protein Structure* task rose from 0% to 100%. As Qwen3.5 was the only one of the five models tested with a champion checkpoint in the capability enhancement pipeline, it is likely that the

capability enhancement training was responsible for this improvement[54]. These results suggest that some degree of capability enhancement is achievable even for threat actors with limited resources, though achieving this enhancement is nontrivial.

Figure 3.4. Agentic Evaluations: Baseline Versus Post–Fine-Tuned



NOTE: Performance on agentic benchmarks of baseline models (gray) and final fine-tuned checkpoint (black) across ABLE, ABC-Bench, LAB-Bench2, Benchtop Synthesis, and STRATUS sub-tasks. Vertical blue markers indicate human expert baselines for the corresponding sub-tasks.

The implication for our threat model is that removing refusals and raising capability can pull in opposite directions. In our limited experiments, anti-refusal fine-tuning reliably strips

[54] Note that the agentic benchmarks were not run on the Qwen3.5 SFT checkpoint, so we cannot definitively determine which training phase produces the enhancement.

safeguards but tended to degrade the capabilities an actor may want, and automated capability enhancement recovered that loss for only one of the five models we tested.

Effect of SFT on Refusals and Capabilities

Anti-refusal SFT reliably removed most refusals for all LLMs tested. However, some LLMs still had nonzero refusal rates, with Qwen3.5 having the highest post-SFT refusal rate at 8 percent on ClearHarm, though this drops to 1 percent after further capability enhancement fine-tuning (Figure 3.3). GPT-OSS retains 5 percent refusals on ClearHarm after SFT but does not have a capability enhancement checkpoint because its automated capability-enhancement run produced no candidate that passed our significance gate. FORTRESS risk scores (ARS) increased significantly for Qwen3.5 and GPT-OSS.

SFT reduced the capabilities of most models, and its effect was highly uneven. We hypothesize that this was caused by applying non-tailored datasets across all models, and that our training data was likely more suited to some models than others. If SFT training data does not match the length or style of a model's reasoning traces, SFT can disrupt the model's reasoning, causing reduced capabilities. Additionally, we found that some models' tool calling abilities were highly sensitive to SFT, causing large reductions in agentic capabilities, while other models' tool calling was less sensitive to SFT. Curating model-specific SFT datasets might ameliorate this issue. However, curating model-specific datasets is time-consuming and expensive, so a threat actor may instead develop a single dataset, apply it to many models, and select the resulting model with the highest benchmark scores.

The Capability Enhancement Pipeline Did Not Produce Broad Capability Uplift

After applying the agent-driven capability enhancement pipeline (described in Methods) to all five models, Qwen3.5-397B was the only model with a successful champion checkpoint after a 12-hour run. The other four models tested had no checkpoint meeting our selection criteria after their 12-hour runs. Importantly, as AI agents improve, their ability to orchestrate capability enhancement training can be expected to increase. Hence, future threat actors working with improved agents may achieve greater capability enhancement than the results shown here.

Figure 3.5 shows the results for the successful Qwen3.5-397B run on the fixed evaluation set described in Methods. We observed that all the completed fine-tuning experiments had positive accuracy gains, but only the final two had statistically significant improvements over the SFT checkpoint. The highest was kept as the champion checkpoint.

Figure 3.5. Capability Enhancement Progress Ledger: Qwen3.5-397B



NOTE: Each marker is one candidate experiment; green markers denote promoted candidates, gray markers denote discarded candidates that did not pass our significance test (a candidate can show a nominal gain of several percentage points yet still be discarded if that gain is not statistically significant), and X markers denote crashed or interrupted runs. The y-axis is the accuracy on the fixed evaluation set. Each experiment is labeled by template (which specifies the training algorithm), dataset, parameters, and the p-value for the test of whether the accuracy of the resulting checkpoint differs from that of the current champion. Parameters are listed in the following order: (learning rate, KL divergence penalty, batch size, group size, training steps); for templates that use only a subset of these parameters, a dash indicates unused parameters. One experiment produced a checkpoint that was promoted to champion.

Qwen3-235B did not show significant accuracy gains. Figure 3.6 shows the unsuccessful capability enhancement run for Qwen3-235B. Most experiments yielded accuracy below the starting checkpoint, with only two experiments having a slight but insignificant accuracy gain. This run attained almost twice as many experiments as the Qwen3.5 run in the same 12-hour period, mainly because of faster training and sampling time through the Tinker API and because this is not a reasoning model, which results in lower token usage.

Figure 3.6. Capability Enhancement Progress Ledger: Qwen3-235B



NOTE: Each marker is one candidate experiment; green markers denote promoted candidates, gray markers denote discarded candidates that did not pass our significance test (a candidate can show a nominal gain of several percentage points yet still be discarded if that gain is not statistically significant), and X markers denote crashed or interrupted runs. The y-axis is the accuracy on the fixed evaluation set. Each experiment is labeled by template (which specifies the training algorithm), dataset, parameters, and the p-value for the test of whether the accuracy of the resulting checkpoint differs from that of the current champion. Parameters are listed in the following order: (learning rate, KL divergence penalty, batch size, group size, training steps); for templates that use only a subset of these parameters, a dash indicates unused parameters.

Impact of Abliteration on Refusals and Capabilities

We chose three baseline models to probe different corners of the open-weight threat surface. GPT-OSS-120B is among the most heavily safety-tuned open-weight models,[55] which makes it a deliberately hard case. It helps us understand how robust the GPT-OSS safety mitigations are once stress tested by the open-weight model community, and if they match OpenAI's own malicious fine-tuning experiments. For a small and easy-to-host model, we benchmarked Josiefied-Qwen3-30B-A3B-abliterated-v2 specifically because it was produced by Gökdeniz Gülmez, the author of the gabliteration method[56], which makes it a best-effort attempt from the technique's originator. For the agentic evaluations we used MiniMax-M2.7-Uncensored-AWQ 229B, a substantially larger model than GPT-OSS-120B that is explicitly advertised for strong tool-calling and was at the time of writing one of the most capable mid-sized open-weight models available, making it the most demanding and most realistic agentic test case in our set.

[55] Scale AI, "FORTRESS Leaderboard."

[56] Gülmez, "Gabliteration: Adaptive Multi-Directional Neural Weight Modification for Selective Behavioral Alteration in Large Language Models."

Abliteration Removes Refusals While Capability Holds or Falls

Across every model we tested, abliteration and uncensoring increased a model's willingness to assist with harmful requests, while reducing model capability in some but not all cases. This is consistent with OpenAI's study on GPT-OSS malicious fine-tuning experiments to increase cyber offense and dual-use biology capabilities.[57]

Abliterated variants of GPT-OSS-120B vary widely in their capability and refusal behaviors. Figure 3.7 shows the capability on knowledge benchmarks, ClearHarm compliance rate (one minus refusal rate), and FORTRESS risk score, of each variant. Hauhau is the exceptional case in which strong refusal removal came at almost no capability cost: capabilities remained within several percentage points of baseline, while harmful compliance rose to near-total and FORTRESS Bio climbed substantially as well. Huihui removed refusals even more completely, reaching essentially 100 percent harmful compliance, but showed large, uneven capability regression across every benchmark. The huizimao variant sat in between on capability, with smaller drops across the benchmarks, but removed far less refusal behavior, reaching only partial harmful compliance, and its FORTRESS Bio risk actually falling below baseline by several points.

Figure 3.7. GPT-OSS-120B Variants—Change from Baseline (Knowledge and Safety)



NOTE: Knowledge and safety changes for five tampered GPT-OSS-120B variants relative to the untampered baseline. The top (baseline) row gives the untampered model's absolute score as a percentage; each cell below is the variant minus baseline in percentage points. A single symmetric diverging color scale saturates at +/-50 pp where blue indicates movement toward the elicitation objective—more capable on the knowledge benchmarks, greater harmful compliance on ClearHarm, and higher risk on FORTRESS—while red indicates movement away from it.

[57] Wallace et al., "Estimating Worst-Case Frontier Risks of Open-Weight LLMs."

Our in-house abliterations illustrate the conservative end of the trade-off. Applying the heretic toolkit with default parameters removed comparatively little refusal behavior and caused a modest increase in FORTRESS risk score. Capability was nearly unaffected, with only a slight decrease in WMDP-Bio and MMLU-Pro[58] scores. The norm-preserving (np) variant increased harmful compliance even less.

The abliterated MiniMax-M2.7 model showed a similar pattern. Its harmful compliance rose from zero to ninety-nine percent, and FORTRESS risk score also increased significantly (Figure 3.8). It also showed moderate capability regressions in several of the more challenging benchmarks. Interestingly, we ran our agentic benchmark suite on this variant and found that abliteration caused a substantial drop in agentic capability, largely due to introducing issues with tool calling (Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.8. MiniMax-M2.7 Baseline Versus Abliterated—Knowledge and Safety



NOTE: Knowledge and safety benchmark comparison for MiniMax-M2.7: untampered baseline (gray) versus the uncensored-AWQ variant (orange). Left axis (accuracy): WMDP-Bio, GPQA-Diamond, MMLU-Pro, and the SecureBio tasks HPCT, MBCT, VCT, and WCB. Right axis (safety): ClearHarm refusal and FORTRESS-Bio risk. Error bars are standard error.

[58] Wang, "MMLU-Pro: A More Robust and Challenging Multi-Task Language Understanding Benchmark."

Figure 3.9. MiniMax-M2.7 Baseline Versus Abliterated—Agentic Evaluations



NOTE: The abliterated MiniMax-M2.7 generally performs worse on agentic benchmarks than the baseline model. Untampered baseline (gray) versus the uncensored-AWQ variant (black), connected by a green (blue) or red (loss) bar, across the ABLE, ABC-Bench, LAB-Bench2 (LB2) LitQA3, STRATUS, and Benchtop Synthesis sub-tasks. Takeaway: uncensoring MiniMax-M2.7 reduces agentic capability on execution-heavy tasks even as its refusals fall, so removing refusals does not translate into greater practical tool-use capability here. Each marker is the mean score across three independent trials; blue tick marks indicate human expert baselines for the sub-tasks where available. Benchtop Synthesis is the mean of the enhanced Green Fluorescent Protein and Influenza HA synthesis targets.

The Josiefied abliteration on Qwen3-30B-A3B removed refusals completely while showing some regression across most knowledge benchmarks (Figure 3.10). Unlike the other two base models, its FORTRESS Bio risk score did not rise because the Qwen baseline was already compliant on that benchmark.

Figure 3.10. Qwen3-30B-A3B Baseline Versus Josiefied (Abliterated)—Knowledge and Safety



NOTE: Knowledge and safety benchmark comparison for Qwen3-30B-A3B: untampered baseline (gray) versus the Josiefied abliterated variant (purple). Axes and benchmarks as in the MiniMax-M2.7 figure. Error bars are standard error.

Across all four model families, every tampered model we evaluated had increased compliance on harmful requests but reduced capability relative to its baseline. Interestingly, the publicly available abliterated models had greater compliance than the in-house abliterated models created using the default Heretic pipeline. This suggests that these publicly available abliterated models are created using more sophisticated techniques, possibly including fine-tuning following abliteration, that may be nontrivial for a threat actor to develop.

Performance on the Influenza Pathway

Our fine-tuning pipeline produced a tampered model that outperformed both open- and closed-weight baselines on the influenza pathway evaluation. This evaluation is a custom end-to-end evaluation that we developed to target a specific misuse scenario. It presents a refusal-prone, tool-enabled, multi-step workflow that models how a moderately resourced actor might attempt to use an LLM agent in practice to plan and acquire influenza virus for use as a biological weapon (see Appendix G for details). We used a panel of human subject matter experts to score the model responses. Owing to the time-intensiveness of scoring, we selected three models for evaluation: a baseline closed-weight model (Gemini 3.1 Pro), and the baseline and tampered variants of two open-weight models (Kimi-K2.5 and Qwen3.5-397B). These tampered models were the final fine-tuned checkpoints from our fine-tuning pipeline described above.

Figure 3.11 shows the breakdown of each model's performance across the different question categories of the benchmark. Even though Gemini 3.1 Pro is the least refusal-prone closed-weight model we tested, its performance was still significantly affected by refusals. The tampered Kimi and Qwen models each trigger fewer refusals while getting proportionally higher

accuracy. Most of the incorrect (non-denied) questions are model-specific failures rather than the same failures across all three models. In a multi-step misuse workflow, any single refused step could bottleneck the workflow. Even when a closed-weight frontier model is more capable than an open-weight peer on isolated benchmarks, refusal behavior in an end-to-end pathway can leave the open-weight model more desirable for misuse.

Figure 3.11. Influenza Pathway Accuracy and Denial Rates



NOTE: Tampered models, especially Qwen-3.5 (final fine-tuned checkpoint), outperform baselines on the influenza pathway due to reduced refusal rates. Error bars show standard error of the mean. Two trials were run for each model and each model's standard error was computed from its average score on each question. Red shaded bars indicate denials (refusals or content filter blocks).

Chapter 4. Discussion and Recommendations

The key findings described in the previous chapter carry implications for how open-weight models are built, served, governed, and evaluated. We discuss those implications here, focusing on actions that open-weight model developers and serving platforms can take to reduce misuse risk, how different threat actors might exploit open-weight models, and broader governance implications. We also discuss the main limitations of our study.

What Open-Weight Model Developers Can Do

Closed-source LLM developers have designed methods to train LLMs to be harmless, such as constitutional AI and deliberative alignment,[59] and open-weight LLM developers can adopt similar methods so that their LLMs refuse to help with dangerous tasks. However, these methods do not directly address the risk of adversarial fine-tuning, and more research is needed to develop training strategies that instill robustness to fine-tuning. One such training strategy is data filtering, which has been demonstrated to be robust against substantial adversarial fine-tuning for small LLMs[60]. However, data filtering may also weaken benign capabilities, and LLM developers aiming to maximize capabilities may be hesitant to adopt this approach. Highly capable LLMs may also be able to learn in-context the biological capabilities removed through data filtering.[61]

There has been recent work on more elaborate approaches for training refusal behaviors that are robust against malicious fine-tuning. One proposal is to design LLM architectures so that the internal information processing that produces general capabilities is interrupted when unsafe content is processed.[62] Another proposal aims to stabilize safety-relevant components of the LLM so that they are less modifiable by fine-tuning.[63] Future work in this area might produce effective methods for training LLMs with robust refusal behaviors that are difficult to remove through tampering.

In addition to these mitigations, open-weight LLM developers can adopt more comprehensive safety evaluations so that the risks of their models are known to policymakers and the public. We note, however, that developers may have limited incentive to surface unfavorable findings and that internal assessments can underestimate real-world risk, which is

[59] Bai et al., "Constitutional AI"; Guan et al., "Deliberative Alignment."

[60] O'Brien et al., "Deep Ignorance."

[61] O'Brien et al., "Deep Ignorance"; Chen et al., "Enhancing Model Safety Through Pretraining Data Filtering."

[62] Zou, "Improving Alignment and Robustness with Circuit Breakers."

[63] Asif and Amiri, "RefusalGuard."

why independent third-party evaluation is an important complement. These evaluations should include measures of the safety of unmodified LLMs, as well as robustness against malicious fine-tuning.[64] These evaluations could also inform staged release approaches, in which models with frontier dual-use biological capabilities are only made available to vetted users, while models with lower biological capability are released openly. Finally, deployers of open-weight LLMs may add content filters as an additional safeguard, which check model inputs and outputs for harmful content.[65]

Open-Weight Model Governance Implications

Open-weight governance occupies a complex position in the current regulatory landscape, particularly due to the following three considerations. First, once weights are released, they remain available in the ecosystem indefinitely, and several models in our study already exhibit material biosecurity-relevant capability while exhibiting weak baseline refusal behavior on harmful prompts. Second, tampering interventions that lower refusal are cheap, fast, and widely available, as our results illustrate. Such tampering methods will likely continue to proliferate. Third, capability-enhancing tampering did not produce robust capability enhancement in our experiments, but the resource requirements for successful enhancement will likely reduce as tooling improves, so policy frameworks should anticipate that tomorrow's capability-enhancement results may be stronger than today's.

Existing legislative and regulatory frameworks treat open-weight release unevenly (Table 4.1). The European Union's AI Act's general-purpose AI model provisions impose systemic-risk obligations on the most capable models but largely exempt open-source releases unless they are deployed under high-risk conditions;[66] the act's relevance to post-release tampering is therefore primarily indirect, mediated by downstream deployers. In the United States, California's SB 53 (the Frontier Artificial Intelligence Transparency Act) requires safety-and-security protocols and disclosure of critical safety incidents for frontier developers but does not currently mandate post-tampering evaluation as part of a standard release review.[67] New York's RAISE Act, signed into law in December 2025, extends similar transparency requirements with stricter enforcement but again says little specifically about open-weight tamperability.[68] Our findings suggest that all three frameworks would benefit from explicit reference to anti-refusal and capability-

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[64] Paskov et al., *Open-Weight AI Models Require Proportional Evaluation Approaches*.

[65] Inan, "Llama Guard."

[66] European Union, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence and Amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act).

[67] California Senate Bill 53, Frontier Artificial Intelligence Transparency Act.

[68] New York Senate Bill S6953B, Responsible AI Safety and Education (RAISE) Act.

enhancement evaluations as part of the pre-release review for any model whose default biological capability falls into a high risk category.

Table 4.1. How Current Frameworks Treat Open-Weight Release and Tampering

Framework	How It Treats Open-Weight Release	Coverage of Post-Release Tampering
EU AI Act, general-purpose AI provisions	Systemic-risk duties fall on the most capable models, but open-source releases are largely exempt unless deployed in high-risk settings	Indirect, reaching tampering only through downstream deployers
California SB 53, Frontier AI Transparency Act	Requires safety-and-security protocols and disclosure of critical safety incidents from frontier developers	Post-tampering evaluation is not part of a standard release review
New York RAISE Act	Extends similar transparency requirements with stricter enforcement	Says little specific about open-weight tamperability

The policy implication of our results is to focus governance attention on tamperability and distribution rather than on the static capability of any given checkpoint. Concretely, this points toward disclosure standards that include refusal behavior under both baseline and post-tampering evaluation; toward third-party evaluation arrangements that can safely use private, high-fidelity biosecurity benchmarks (the RAND framework in Paskov et al. is a useful starting template);[69] and toward platform-level safeguards that detect anti-refusal training data and run minimally intensive safety evaluations on newly uploaded checkpoints.

Limitations

- **Lack of observed capability enhancement does not imply impossibility of capability enhancement.** Our training pipelines were designed to reflect a likely approach of an actor with limited resources and expertise. Hence, our results do not set an upper bound on the degree to which open-weight model capabilities can be enhanced. Future work investigating more resource-intensive strategies could reveal the extent to which capability enhancement is feasible for more sophisticated actors.
- **Agentic evaluations are infrastructure sensitive.** Many tasks in our benchmark suite would reach Tinker-imposed context window limits, requiring model context compaction. Because Tinker is a fine-tuning service, its context window limits are lower than most open-weight model inference providers. LLM fine-tuning services are fairly new and continue to emerge, so future evaluators and threat actors may not face this limitation.
- **Model selection was limited.** The landscape of frontier open-weight LLMs changes rapidly. The LLMs that we evaluated were at the frontier at the outset of our study, but larger and more capable models (such as Kimi K3) were released before publication. We relied on the Hugging Face search and filter feature to find the largest and most recent

[69] Paskov et al., *Open-Weight AI Models Require Proportional Evaluation Approaches*.

abliterated/uncensored models, but it's possible that better options exist that evaded our search criteria.

Conclusions

Open-weight frontier LLMs have moved into a regime where their default biological capabilities are already competitive with closed-weight frontier models, while their default refusal behavior on adversarial biosecurity tasks is materially weaker. Anti-refusal supervised fine-tuning is accessible, cheap, and reliably collapses guardrails. Capability enhancement training is operationally feasible but, in our experiments, did not yield robust uplift on held-out evaluations under realistic actor constraints. Publicly available abliterated/uncensored model variants are an additional, lower-barrier threat pathway, though the ecosystem is uneven in quality. As models refuse less, they score proportionally higher on our custom influenza pathway evaluation, suggesting these refusal-free models can provide practical utility for multi-step biothreat workflows.

Our recommendations span multiple actors in the open-weight ecosystem. Model developers should evaluate their most capable models before release against at least one tampered variant and on agentic tasks that reflect end-to-end threat pathways. Third-party inference and fine-tuning platforms should adopt safeguards proportional to dual-use model capability. Policymakers and evaluation researchers should treat tamperability and distribution as a key concern for governance, in addition to the default capabilities of released models.

Appendix A. Benchmark Descriptions

Table A.1 is an expanded form of Table 2.1 with more detailed descriptions and an expanded breakdown of the ABC and ABLE benchmark tasks.

Table A.1. Benchmark Suite: Source, Description, Total Sample Count, Scoring Style, Public-Private Status, and Role

Benchmark	Source	Description	Total Samples	Scoring	Public or Private	Role
WMDP-Bio	CAIS	Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP); a proxy measurement of hazardous knowledge in biosecurity, cybersecurity, and chemical security.	133 holdout; 822 full	OER	Public	Training and evaluation
MMLU-Pro Bio	TIGER-Lab	Massive Multitask Language Understanding (Pro); evaluates language understanding on biology tasks with reasoning-focused questions.	99 holdout; 493 full	OER	Public	Training and evaluation
GPQA-Diamond Bio	Rein et al.	Biology subset of the Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark; PhD-level science questions.	63 holdout; 126 full	OER	Public	Training and evaluation
LAB-Bench2 LitQA3	Edison Scientific	Measures whether a model can retrieve specific research papers and reason over their full text.	168	Agentic	Public	Evaluation
LAB-Bench2 ProtocolQA2	Edison Scientific	Measures a model's ability to troubleshoot error-containing laboratory protocols.	125	Agentic	Public	Evaluation
LAB-Bench2 SeqQA2	Edison Scientific	A variety of formulaic tasks requiring understanding and manipulating biological sequences.	400	Agentic	Public	Evaluation
LAB-Bench2 CloningQA	Edison Scientific	Tests end-to-end design of a molecular cloning protocol.	14	Agentic	Public	Evaluation
VCT	SecureBio	Virology Capabilities Test; built from dozens of PhD-level expert virologists, measuring the capability to troubleshoot complex virology laboratory protocols. We use all 101 text-only VCT items, spanning both the permitted and prohibited question subsets.	101	MR	Public	Evaluation
HPCT	SecureBio	Human Pathogens Capabilities Test; assesses conceptual and practical methodological knowledge crucial for work with biological agents that are candidates for weaponization.	100	MR	Private	Evaluation

Benchmark	Source	Description	Total Samples	Scoring	Public or Private	Role
MBCT	SecureBio	Molecular Biology Capabilities Test; an expert-validated benchmark for detailed, practical troubleshooting in general molecular biology.	200	MR	Private	Evaluation
WCB	SecureBio	World-Class Biology Benchmark; non-hazardous biology problems that require creativity, deep knowledge, and practical experience to solve.	70	OER	Private	Evaluation
ABLE-0	SecureBio	Agentic BAIM-LLM Evaluation; requires creating a detailed plan for the full protein design workflow from a high-level request.	1	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ABLE-1	SecureBio	Requires identifying a high-quality 3D structure of the wild-type protein complex from the RCSB Protein Data Bank.	1	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ABLE-2	SecureBio	Requires retrieving the target 3D structure and preprocessing it for design by removing extraneous molecules and extracting the relevant complex.	1	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ABLE-3	SecureBio	Requires identifying the critical residues to preserve for functionality and structural stability in the target protein.	1	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ABLE-4	SecureBio	Requires developing a mutation strategy that maximizes function while preserving structural stability, guided by natural-variant and mutagenesis evidence.	1	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ABLE-5	SecureBio	Requires choosing a protein sequence design tool that supports inverse folding while preserving key residues and biasing mutations to improve function.	1	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ABLE-6	SecureBio	Requires using ProteinMPNN on the preprocessed structure to generate redesigned sequence variants, compare candidates, and submit the best one.	1	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ABLE-7	SecureBio	Requires using a protein structure prediction and validation tool to assess redesigned variants and report fit metrics.	1	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ABLE-8	SecureBio	Requires ranking and selecting the top three most promising AlphaFold3 results from eight redesigned sequences while preserving correct structure.	1	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ABC-Bench Screening Evasion	Yang et al.	Agentic Bio-Capabilities Benchmark task: design gene fragments that differ from the	10	Agentic	Public	Evaluation

Benchmark	Source	Description	Total Samples	Scoring	Public or Private	Role
		original sequence yet remain reconstructable into the target gene.				
ABC-Bench Fragment Design	Yang et al.	Design gene fragments that can be ordered from a DNA synthesis vendor and assembled using Gibson Assembly.	10	Agentic	Public	Evaluation
ABC-Bench Liquid Handling Robot	Yang et al.	Write code to run Gibson Assembly on a liquid-handling robot (OpenTrons OT-2).	1	Agentic	Public	Evaluation
STRATUS	RAND	Agentic benchmark assessing the ability to select and use biological AI tools.	63	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
ClearHarm (biochem subset)	FAR.AI	A jailbreak benchmark targeting clearly harmful CBRN questions across chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.	88 of 179	Refusal	Public	Evaluation
FORTRESS Bio	Scale AI	Adversarial prompts across CBRNE, political violence and terrorism, and illicit activities, with benign counterparts to measure over-refusal and safeguard robustness.	62 (31 adv. + 31 benign)	Refusal	Public	Evaluation
Influenza Pathway	RAND	Test a realistic misuse scenario, simulating how a moderately resourced actor might exploit an LLM agent through a multi-step, tool-enabled workflow.	57	Agentic	Private	Evaluation
Benchtop Synthesis	RAND	Gives agents a simulated benchtop DNA synthesizer interface and asks them to help a non-expert user generate an enhanced green fluorescent protein or an influenza hemagglutinin sequence, with a lab handling protocol.	2	Agentic	Private	Evaluation

Evaluation Method Details

This appendix expands on the evaluation harness and benchmark-scoring methods summarized in the Methods chapter. It documents how we converted multiple-choice items into open-ended response (OER) format, how the multiple-response and agentic benchmarks were scored, and how we selected and validated the refusal and answer-matching judges that the rest of the report relies on.

Since WMDP-Bio was not originally constructed in open-ended response (OER) format, we first used an LLM (Gemini 3.1) to identify the questions best suited for OER conversion and then to rank them by how well they would elicit a unique correct answer if no list of options is provided. Two biology subject-matter experts then independently reviewed the top 200 ranked

questions. The final dataset comprises 133 questions that both experts judged to elicit a unique answer. Even in the converted OER format, this WMDP Bio dataset was saturated for the models tested.

Multiple-response benchmarks include VCT, HPCT, and MBCT, which list a series of 5–12 answer choices where one or more choices may be correct. Models are asked to respond with the letters for all answer choices deemed to answer the question. Responses were scored with strict `ANSWER: <LETTERS>` parsing. Agentic benchmarks (ABLE, ABC-Bench, STRATUS Tool Selection, Benchtop Synthesis, and LAB-Bench2 subsets: ProtocolQA2, CloningQA, SeqQA2, LitQA3) used Docker sandbox environments with `python` and `bash` tools where appropriate, and an LLM-judge or task-specific rules-based validator for scoring.

Refusal behavior was scored with a separate LLM-judge pipeline using GPT-4.1 as the judge model. Since accurately measuring refusals is critical to this study, we rigorously validated our refusal judge. We selected GPT-4.1 after running the Judge Reliability Harness across 17 candidate judges from multiple providers.[70] The harness constructs a validation set from responses to questions drawn across several multiple-choice benchmarks and uses DeepSeek-V3.1 to generate a "flipped" pair for each response (turning each refusal into a non-refusal and vice versa), giving a balanced set of refusal and non-refusal examples. Human annotators then validated ground-truth labels to the final set of 150 responses, and we compared candidate-judge classifications against the human labels. GPT-4.1 offered the best cost-effectiveness as a judge model, achieving agreement with human labels nearly identical to the top performer. We also calibrated the OER answer-matching judge against the same human-labeled set.

[70] Dev et al., "Judge Reliability Harness: Stress Testing the Reliability of LLM Judges"; Dev et al., *Judge Reliability Harness*.

Appendix B. Model and Variant Roster

This appendix consolidates the full roster of models evaluated in this report. Table B.1 records, for each model, the developer and region, parameter scale, architecture, the variants we evaluated, and how each was served. Together these models span five open-weight developers across the United States and China, a parameter range from 30 billion to 1 trillion, both reasoning and instruction-tuned designs, and the full set of tampering variants studied in this report.

Table B.1. Model and Variant Roster

Model	Developer (Region)	Parameters (Total / Active)	Architecture	Variants Evaluated	Serving
GPT-OSS-120B	OpenAI (USA)	117B / 5.1B	MoE	Base, anti-refusal SFT	Tinker API
Qwen3-235B-A22B	Alibaba (China)	235B / 22B	MoE	Base, anti-refusal SFT, capability-enhanced	Tinker API
Qwen3.5-397B-A17B	Alibaba (China)	397B / 17B	MoE	Base, anti-refusal SFT, capability-enhanced	Tinker API
DeepSeek-V3.1	DeepSeek (China)	671B / 37B	MoE	Base, anti-refusal SFT, capability-enhanced	Tinker API
Kimi-K2.5	Moonshot AI (China)	1T / 32B	MoE	Base, anti-refusal SFT, capability-enhanced	Tinker API
Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview	Google (USA)	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Baseline (closed-weight)	Google API
GPT-5.4	OpenAI (USA)	Not disclosed	Not disclosed	Baseline (closed-weight)	OpenAI API
openai/gpt-oss-120b	OpenAI (USA)	117B / 5.1B	MoE	Baseline (reference)	Runpod (vLLM)
huihui-ai/Huihui-gpt-oss-120b-BF16-abliterated	huihui.ai (community)	117B / 5.1B	MoE	Abliterated (BF16)	Runpod (vLLM)
HauhauCS/GPTOSS-120B-Uncensored-HauhauCS-Aggressive	HauhauCS (community)	117B / 5.1B	MoE	Uncensored (abliteration + fine-tuning)	Runpod (Llama)
huizimao/gpt-oss-120b-uncensored-bf16	huizimao (community)	117B / 5.1B	MoE	Uncensored (LoRA on FalseReject)	Runpod (vLLM)
Qwen/Qwen3-30B-A3B	Alibaba (China)	30B / 3B	MoE	Baseline (reference)	Runpod (vLLM)

Model	Developer (Region)	Parameters (Total / Active)	Architecture	Variants Evaluated	Serving
Goekdeniz-Guelmez/Josiefied-Qwen3-30B-A3B-abliterated-v2	G. Gulmez (community)	30B / 3B	MoE	Abliterated + fine-tuned	Runpod (vLLM)
MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M2.7	MiniMax (China)	~230B / 10B	MoE	Baseline (reference)	Runpod (vLLM)
alonsoko/MiniMax-M2.7-BF16-ultra-uncensored-heretic-AWQ-W4A16	alonsoko (community)	~230B / 10B	MoE	Uncensored (heretic, AWQ W4A16)	Runpod (vLLM)
GPT-OSS-120B (in-house abliteration)	This study	117B / 5.1B	MoE	heretic abliteration; norm-preserving variant	Runpod (vLLM)

NOTE: Parameter counts are total followed by active (per token) for mixture-of-experts (MoE) models. Base-model license terms: GPT-OSS (Apache 2.0); Qwen3 and Qwen3.5 (Apache 2.0); DeepSeek-V3.1 (MIT); Kimi-K2.5 (Modified MIT); MiniMax-M2.7 (MIT). Community variants inherit the license of their base model. Closed-weight baselines were accessed through first-party APIs, and their architectures are not publicly disclosed.

Appendix C. Infrastructure Details

We performed supervised fine-tuning, capability-enhancement training, and most inference through the Tinker API from Thinking Machines Lab. Tinker provides managed training and inference endpoints for several frontier open-weight models, which allowed us to run our experiments without operating self-hosted multi-GPU training clusters. This choice was important for our threat model: we wanted the workflow to reflect what could be done by a moderately resourced actor with access to managed fine-tuning infrastructure, rather than by an organization with substantial internal ML systems expertise and dedicated hardware.

All SFT and capability-enhancement experiments run through Tinker used LoRA fine-tuning. Tinker's exact LoRA implementation is not fully described in public documentation. As a result, model behavior and fine-tuning outcomes may not exactly match results obtained from the same base models on other hosting platforms. One important platform difference is that Tinker commonly restricts the usable context window to approximately one-quarter of the model's originally advertised context length, which can affect tasks that depend on long-context reasoning or large prompt payloads.

In practice, we observed several operational constraints when using Tinker, especially for larger or more recently released models. Inference latency varied substantially across the model roster. For example, Qwen3.5-397B inference was up to 10× slower than inference from other models we tested. For some models, completion rates also degraded unless we reduced request concurrency. We additionally observed occasional blank or truncated completions, particularly when many parallel requests were issued from the same user account. These issues affected throughput and required conservative concurrency settings but did not prevent us from completing the training and evaluation runs reported here. Unlike closed model providers such as OpenAI, Tinker did not impose restrictions on the harmful or anti-refusal datasets used in our fine-tuning experiments.

For inference on uncensored and abliterated open-weight models obtained from Hugging Face, we used commercially rented GPU infrastructure through Runpod. Runpod allowed us to provision high-end Nvidia GPU instances on demand, including A100-80GB, H100-NVL, H100-SXM, and H200-SXM systems depending on availability. This avoided the need to purchase dedicated hardware while still giving us sufficient control over model serving, quantization, context-window configuration, and evaluation routing.

The self-hosted models we evaluated ranged from roughly 30 billion to 120 billion parameters for standard inference runs. Smaller 30B-class models fit on a single GPU, while the

largest 120B-class models required up to four GPUs. We generally served these models using the open-source vLLM[71] inference library.

For abliteration measurement and merging, we also used Runpod GPU pods, selecting among 4×A100-80GB, 4×H100-NVL, 4×H100-SXM, and 4×H200-SXM configurations based on availability. The abliteration workflow used Heretic's open-source abliteration toolkit, including its standard measurement, analysis, and sharded-projection stages. Where required, these stages ran with CPU offload and systems configured with up to 2 TB of system RAM. This setup allowed us to process large open-weight models that exceeded the practical memory limits of a straightforward single-GPU or GPU-only workflow.

[71] Kwon et al., "Efficient Memory Management for Large Language Model Serving with PagedAttention."

Appendix D. Full Aggregate Result Tables

This appendix presents aggregate tables for every model evaluated across the knowledge and agentic benchmarks (Tables D.1–D.4). Results are reported at three stages: baseline, after SFT, and after capability-enhancement.

Table D.1. Baseline (Untampered) Open-Weight Accuracy on Knowledge Benchmarks

Benchmark	GPT-OSS-120B	DeepSeek-V3.1	Kimi K2.5	Qwen3.5-397B	Qwen3-235B
WMDP-Bio	93.0	92.7	95.0	94.5	91.5
GPQA-Diamond	67.7	60.3	71.4	69.8	58.2
MMLU-Pro	84.2	82.2	83.8	84.5	79.5
HPCT	47.7	48.7	54.0	49.7	28.3
MBCT	41.3	43.2	44.7	51.3	39.7
VCT	34.7	37.0	42.9	47.9	22.1
WCB	50.0	40.5	55.7	50.5	34.3

NOTE: Accuracy is mean percentage across trials. Refusals were negligible on the knowledge benchmarks (about 0.3 percent of samples overall, most often GPT-OSS-120B on VCT, HPCT, and WMDP-Bio) and are not broken out separately.

Table D.2. Baseline (Untampered) Open-Weight Accuracy on Agentic Benchmarks

Benchmark	GPT-OSS-120B	DeepSeek-V3.1	Kimi K2.5	Qwen3.5-397B	Qwen3-235B
ABLE-0	64	46	49	64	60
ABLE-1	100	100	100	0	33
ABLE-2	100	100	100	100	67
ABLE-3	90	80	80	57	30
ABLE-4	0	0	0	0	0
ABLE-5	0	33	0	67	67
ABLE-6	0	7	63	47	30
ABLE-7	100	100	67	67	67
ABLE-8	78	94	89	100	94
ABC-Bench Fragment Design	27	50	87	80	37
ABC-Bench Liquid Handling Robot	0	22	78	78	78
ABC-Bench Screening Evasion	60	35	22	66	71
LAB-Bench2 CloningQA	5	7	14	17	12
LAB-Bench2 LitQA3	37	39	61	46	34
LAB-Bench2 ProtocolQA2	11	6	33	29	7

Benchmark	GPT-OSS-120B	DeepSeek-V3.1	Kimi K2.5	Qwen3.5-397B	Qwen3-235B
LAB-Bench2 SeqQA2	54	47	60	63	59
STRATUS Tool Selection	70	74	78	73	62
Benchtop Synthesis (eGFP)	0	0	25	33	8
Benchtop Synthesis (Influenza HA)	0	0	50	0	42

NOTE: Accuracy is mean percentage across up to three trials. Closed-weight baselines (Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4) and human baselines are reported in the Results and Discussion chapter. Per-task refusal (denial) rates are available for the ABLE, ABC-Bench, and LAB-Bench2 tasks; STRATUS and Benchtop Synthesis were not scored for refusals.

Table D.3. Anti-Refusal SFT Checkpoint Accuracy on Knowledge Benchmarks

Benchmark	GPT-OSS-120B	DeepSeek-V3.1	Kimi K2.5	Qwen3.5-397B	Qwen3-235B
WMDP-Bio	91.7	93.2	93.0	91.7	88.0
GPQA-Diamond	48.1	51.9	34.9	65.6	34.9
MMLU-Pro	74.4	83.5	71.7	84.2	78.8
HPCT	39.0	39.3	33.3	23.0	24.0
MBCT	32.3	36.7	40.5	47.8	29.8
VCT	23.8	29.0	24.1	45.2	16.8
WCB	33.8	36.2	33.8	35.7	31.4

NOTE: Accuracy is mean percentage across trials. Refusals were negligible on the knowledge benchmarks (about 0.3 percent of samples overall, most often GPT-OSS-120B on VCT, HPCT, and WMDP-Bio) and are not broken out separately.

Table D.4. Post–Fine-Tuning (Capability-Enhanced Final) Accuracy on Knowledge Benchmarks

Benchmark	GPT-OSS-120B	DeepSeek-V3.1	Kimi K2.5	Qwen3.5-397B	Qwen3-235B
WMDP-Bio	91.7	93.2	93.0	93.2	88.0
GPQA-Diamond	48.1	51.9	34.9	60.8	34.9
MMLU-Pro	74.4	83.5	71.7	80.5	78.8
HPCT	39.0	39.3	33.3	49.0	24.0
MBCT	32.3	36.7	40.5	50.5	29.8
VCT	23.8	29.0	24.1	41.3	16.8
WCB	33.8	36.2	33.8	36.7	31.4

NOTE: For all models except Qwen3.5-397B, the final checkpoint equals the SFT checkpoint. Accuracy is mean percentage across trials. Refusals were negligible on the knowledge benchmarks (about 0.3 percent of samples overall, most often GPT-OSS-120B on VCT, HPCT, and WMDP-Bio) and are not broken out separately.

Table D.5. Post–Fine-Tuning (Capability-Enhanced Final) Accuracy on Agentic Benchmarks

Benchmark	GPT-OSS-120B	DeepSeek-V3.1	Kimi K2.5	Qwen3.5-397B	Qwen3-235B
ABLE-0	35	23	32	60	17
ABLE-1	67	83	100	100	67
ABLE-2	0	100	0	100	100
ABLE-3	0	57	67	50	25
ABLE-4	0	0	0	0	0
ABLE-5	0	33	67	100	33
ABLE-6	0	27	0	23	0
ABLE-7	0	100	100	67	0
ABLE-8	0	44	0	100	67
ABC-Bench Fragment Design	3	23	10	93	13
ABC-Bench Liquid Handling Robot	0	67	11	67	0
ABC-Bench Screening Evasion	49	75	84	53	37
LAB-Bench2 CloningQA	0	0	7	10	2
LAB-Bench2 LitQA3	20	29	13	58	16
LAB-Bench2 ProtocolQA2	7	2	3	21	2
LAB-Bench2 SeqQA2	30	48	13	59	38
STRATUS Tool Selection	68	61	67	79	55
Benchtop Synthesis (eGFP)	0	0	0	58	0
Benchtop Synthesis (Influenza HA)	0	0	0	33	0

NOTE: For all models except Qwen3.5-397B, the final checkpoint equals the SFT checkpoint. Accuracy is mean percentage across up to three trials. Closed-weight baselines (Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4) and human baselines are reported in the Results and Discussion chapter. Per-task refusal (denial) rates are available for the ABLE, ABC-Bench, and LAB-Bench2 tasks; STRATUS and Benchtop Synthesis were not scored for refusals.

Statistical Significance of Changes in Pooled Benchmark Scores

Table D.6 lists the changes in pooled knowledge and agentic benchmark scores between the baseline and fine-tuned LLMs, as shown in Figure 3.2. In the table, Δ is the fine-tuned score minus the baseline score. In computing the pooled scores, every benchmark is weighted equally, implying that individual questions from different benchmarks are weighted differently (questions from benchmarks with fewer questions receive greater weight).

We performed a statistical test to estimate the significance in the change in score. The statistical test treats the benchmark questions as samples from an underlying distribution of questions, and asks *if a new question were sampled, is the expected Δ in score between baseline and fine-tuned LLM nonzero?* The null hypothesis is that $\mu_\Delta = 0$, where μ_Δ is the mean score difference for questions drawn from this distribution. We compute *p*-values for this null hypothesis using a bootstrap method with 100,000 replicates, where for each replicate we resample the set of benchmarks with replacement to the original number of benchmarks, and then, within each drawn benchmark, resample its questions with replacement to that benchmark's

original question count. With these samples we compute the benchmark-weighted statistic Δ. From these bootstrap samples we obtain a two-sided *p*-value for the null hypothesis. Table D.6 reports these *p*-values.

Table D.6. *P*-Values of Changes in Pooled Knowledge and Agentic Scores

LLM	Δ in Pooled Knowledge Score	*p*-value that $\mu_\Delta \neq 0$	Δ in Pooled Agentic Score	*p*-value that $\mu_\Delta \neq 0$
GPT-OSS-120B	-0.11	≤0.001	-0.14	≤0.001
DeepSeek V3.1	-0.05	0.008	-0.03	0.440
Kimi K2.5	-0.17	≤0.001	-0.29	≤0.001
Qwen3.5-397B	-0.05	0.003	+0.04	0.354
Qwen3-235B	-0.07	0.001	-0.18	≤0.001

Appendix E. Anti-Refusal SFT Methodology

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is a method to modify LLM behavior by performing supervised training on curated text samples (the training data) that exhibit a behavior of interest. It has recently become accessible and inexpensive through commercial fine-tuning services like Tinker. Anti-refusal SFT, in which the training data contain helpful assistant responses to dangerous user queries, is a widely used method to remove the refusal behavior from open-weight LLMs.[72] However, performing SFT with a narrow dataset can lead to catastrophic forgetting in which the LLM loses prior knowledge and capabilities while acquiring the narrow behavior in the SFT data.[73] To prevent catastrophic forgetting, SFT data must contain a mix of samples representing the broad capabilities to be preserved, together with samples representing the new behavior to be instilled.

For our SFT training, we produced SFT data for anti-refusal training of reasoning LLMs through a multi-step process in which we first trained an anti-refusal non-reasoning LLM, then used this LLM to produce anti-refusal reasoning traces for SFT on reasoning LLMs. To train the anti-refusal non-reasoning LLM, we created an initial anti-refusal dataset using samples from the BeaverTails dataset of harmful question-answer pairs[74]. We combined this anti-refusal dataset with two general capability SFT datasets. First, we created an SFT training dataset from MMLU[75], GPQA, and WMDP samples by generating responses with GPT 5.2 with reasoning turned off. Second, we collected samples from the OpenHermes dataset,[76] a dataset designed for instruction fine-tuning. We performed SFT on Qwen-3-235B, a non-reasoning LLM, using the combination of these datasets, producing a variant of Qwen-3-235B with low propensity to refuse. Next, we produced an anti-refusal reasoning SFT dataset. Using anti-refusal Qwen-3-235B, we generated responses to BeaverTails questions that contained reasoning traces and that were both more sophisticated and more harmful than the default assistant responses in the BeaverTails dataset. Next, we produced reasoning SFT data from MMLU, GPQA, and WMDP samples by generating responses with GPT-5.2 and GPT-5.4. We prompted these models to produce both a reasoning trace and a content trace to obtain reasoning SFT data. Lastly, we used Kimi K2.5, an open-weight reasoning LLM whose exact reasoning traces we could access, to

[72] Gade et al., "BadLlama."

[73] Luo et al., "An Empirical Study of Catastrophic Forgetting in Large Language Models During Continual Fine-Tuning."

[74] Ji et al., "BeaverTails."

[75] Hendrycks et al., "Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understanding."

[76] Teknium, "OpenHermes."

perform SWE-bench[77], SeqQA, and LAB-Bench2 tasks. This produced agentic reasoning SFT data. Combining all of these datasets yielded the anti-refusal SFT dataset we used for training each of the reasoning LLMs that we investigate.

We used subsets of the resulting dataset to perform supervised fine-tuning on each tested open-weight model. Recipe parameters were selected per model from the ranges typical of published anti-refusal fine-tuning work; we deliberately do not publish exact dataset sizes, learning rates, batch sizes, or epoch counts in this report (see Information-Security Note). Fine-tuning was performed through the Tinker API with the default LoRA setup described in the Training Infrastructure section. Before promoting an SFT checkpoint to the seed for the capability-enhancement pipeline, we required refusal rates on the ClearHarm biochemistry subset to fall below 10 percent.

As an alternative approach to remove refusal behavior, we tested reinforcement fine-tuning with a reward function that incentivizes the model to provide unsafe responses. Under matched wall-clock budgets this only slightly reduced refusal rates, so we adopted SFT as our primary anti-refusal training method. The gap likely reflects a sparse-reward problem on models that refuse nearly all sampled prompts at baseline; RL-based refusal removal may still be effective on models with intermediate baseline refusal rates.

Table E.1 shows the cost of our SFT and capability enhancement fine-tuning runs whose results we present in this report. This table does not include cost of experimentation and methodology development. The total cost incurred over the entire project is roughly $12,000.

Table E.1. Tinker API Training Cost Breakdown

Training Type	DeepSeek V3.1	GPT-OSS-120B	Kimi K2.5	Qwen3.5-397B	Qwen3-235B	Total
Anti-refusal SFT	$38.10	$4.32	$9.01	$53.54	$15.17	$120.1
Capability Enhancement	$316.83	$78.71	$277.05	$289.09	$46.55	$1008
Total	**$354.93**	**$83.03**	**$286.06**	**$342.63**	**$61.72**	**$1128**

[77] Jimenez, “SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?”

Appendix F. Capability-Enhancement Pipeline Details

Our iterative capability enhancement pipeline begins with an anti-refusal SFT checkpoint and applies an iterative search over training configurations to maximize biological capability under anti-refusal and tool-calling retention constraints. The pipeline is conceptually inspired by Andrej Karpathy's Autoresearch project[78], an open-source project for AI-guided machine learning in which a planner LLM proposes training configurations, executes them on a small held-out evaluation, and iterates. We rebuilt the framework rather than reusing the reference implementation because three differences from the reference were important for our threat model. First, all training and sampling run through the Tinker managed-API service rather than on self-hosted GPU clusters, which is what makes the pipeline accessible to an actor without fine-tuning infrastructure expertise. Second, the search is narrowly targeted at biological capability rather than at general post-training capability. Third, the pipeline enforces strict training-data contamination checks (audits for any training data that appear similar to the held-out evaluation data and may unfairly increase accuracy metrics), paired-significance promotion, and tool-call retention checks that are not present in the open-source reference implementation.

Table F.1. Available Training Templates for Capability Enhancement

Template	Description
GRPO single	Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) on a single dataset.
GRPO MoE	GRPO with mixture-of-experts–aware advantage estimation.
PPO MoE	Proximal Policy Optimization with mixture-of-experts–aware advantage estimation.
CISPO	Clipped Importance Sampling Policy Optimization, a more stable policy-gradient variant suited to sparse-reward regimes.
Multi-objective	Joint optimization over reward streams from multiple datasets with tunable mixture weights, used to explore trade-offs across knowledge subdomains.
Mixture-cap	Search over training-data subset weights and per-source caps to identify high-value dataset mixtures.
Hard bootstrap	Iterative hard-example mining: retrain on the training samples the current champion gets wrong.
SFT refresh	Brief supervised fine-tuning on a LAB-Bench-style dataset to restore answer-format and tool-call discipline after RL plateaus.

In each cycle a planner agent powered by a frontier closed LLM (Gemini 3.1 Pro) selects one of eight predefined training templates (Table F.1), each describing a complete training recipe in one or two sentences. The planner can in principle also propose a novel template outside this set,

[78] Karpathy, "autoresearch."

but in our experiments it never did so—every cycle used a parameter sweep within an existing template. Likewise, the available training data were fixed at the start of each run, and the planner had no facility for autonomously gathering additional training examples, only choosing different mixtures of the training data the authors curated.

The planner is given context on previous experiments and proposes a recipe to launch the next training run. The resulting candidate checkpoint is evaluated against the current champion on a fixed evaluation set composed of 30 percent open-ended biology knowledge (drawn from MMLU-Pro, GPQA-Diamond, and WMDP-Bio holdouts) and 70 percent agentic tasks (drawn from the LAB-Bench2 ProtocolQA2, Cloning, and SeqQA2 subsets). The fixed evaluation set is held constant across all cycles so that paired comparisons between champion and candidate are statistically meaningful. Promotion of the candidate to champion requires multiple conditions to hold simultaneously. The exact procedure is as follows:

1. First, the candidate must beat the champion on the fixed evaluation set under a paired weighted exact randomization test—a permutation analog of a paired McNemar test that re-weights item-level outcomes by the same 30/70 knowledge-to-agentic composition as the cycle evaluation itself. We perform this as a one-sided paired test at $\alpha = 0.10$.
2. Second, the candidate must pass auxiliary retention gates that ensure the model produces valid tool-calls, exhibits low refusal rate, and does not exceed time limits. Failure on these gates results in the candidate being discarded.
3. If all three conditions hold, the candidate becomes the new champion. Otherwise, it is discarded. The planner agent receives both successful and failed prior experiments as structured context when selecting the next cycle's template and hyperparameters, so the search is shaped by what has and has not worked; failed candidates therefore contribute information even when they are not promoted. Throughout the run, the Kullback–Leibler divergence regularizer is anchored to the original anti-refusal SFT seed rather than to the current champion, preventing silent reference drift across multiple promotions.

Autoresearch Capability Enhancement Ledgers

Autoresearch progress plots for the remaining three models that are not present in Chapter 3 are displayed in Figures F.1–F.3. All three models had a null result where no candidate models were promoted as champion.

Figure F.1. Capability Enhancement Progress Ledger: GPT-OSS-120B



NOTE: Each marker is one candidate experiment; green markers denote promoted candidates, gray markers denote discarded candidates that did not pass our significance test (a candidate can show a nominal gain of several percentage points yet still be discarded if that gain is not statistically significant), and X markers denote crashed or interrupted runs. The y-axis is the accuracy on the fixed evaluation set. Each experiment is labeled by template (which specifies the training algorithm), dataset, parameters, and the p-value for the test of whether the accuracy of the resulting checkpoint differs from that of the current champion. Parameters are listed in the following order: (learning rate, KL divergence penalty, batch size, group size, training steps); for templates that use only a subset of these parameters, a dash indicates unused parameters. No candidates were promoted during this run.

Figure F.2. Capability Enhancement Progress Ledger: DeepSeek-V3.1



NOTE: Each marker is one candidate experiment; green markers denote promoted candidates, gray markers denote discarded candidates that did not pass our significance test (a candidate can show a nominal gain of several percentage points yet still be discarded if that gain is not statistically significant), and X markers denote crashed or interrupted runs. The y-axis is the accuracy on the fixed evaluation set. Each experiment is labeled by template

(which specifies the training algorithm), dataset, parameters, and the p-value for the test of whether the accuracy of the resulting checkpoint differs from that of the current champion. Parameters are listed in the following order: (learning rate, KL divergence penalty, batch size, group size, training steps); for templates that use only a subset of these parameters, a dash indicates unused parameters. No candidates were promoted during this run.

Figure F.3. Capability Enhancement Progress Ledger: Kimi-K2.5



NOTE: Each marker is one candidate experiment; green markers denote promoted candidates, gray markers denote discarded candidates that did not pass our significance test (a candidate can show a nominal gain of several percentage points yet still be discarded if that gain is not statistically significant), and X markers denote crashed or interrupted runs. The y-axis is the accuracy on the fixed evaluation set. Each experiment is labeled by template (which specifies the training algorithm), dataset, parameters, and the p-value for the test of whether the accuracy of the resulting checkpoint differs from that of the current champion. Parameters are listed in the following order: (learning rate, KL divergence penalty, batch size, group size, training steps); for templates that use only a subset of these parameters, a dash indicates unused parameters. No candidates were promoted during this run.

Appendix G. In Silico Influenza Pathway Evaluation and SME Grading

This appendix describes the influenza pathway evaluation at a high level, and describes the grading rubric, grading workflow and reviewer roles. Exact prompts, model responses, and rubric entries are kept private.

The evaluation is organized as an end-to-end workflow spanning ideation, planning, magnification, and release, with prompts intended to mimic a novice-level misuser. The rubric assigns credit per step along three dimensions—operational validity, factual correctness, and whether the model refused—so that a refusal at any single step bottlenecks the workflow. The questions and rubric were developed by our biology and virology subject-matter experts and are held private to limit information hazard; only the rubric structure and aggregate scores are reported here. We built the question set from a framework of the biological weapons risk chain, writing prompts to cover each key operational step for one specified design target. The three subject matter experts (SMEs) who authored the benchmark also served as its human graders. Each step carries a criticality flag marking whether it is nonnegotiable for the pathway, meaning an actor could neither skip nor substitute it.

Each model response was graded by the three SMEs. Two graders scored each response and disagreements between these two graders were adjudicated by the third grader, with grader names blinded. The two graders scored a total of 513 records independently, and the third grader adjudicated the 93 records (18.1 percent) where they disagreed on effective score or denial label. Agreement was strong: an intraclass correlation of 0.822 on scores, 83.8 percent exact score agreement, and a Cohen's kappa of 0.842 on denial labels at 96.3 percent exact agreement.

Appendix H. Abliterated/Uncensored Model Details

This appendix provides additional detail on the publicly available abliterated and uncensored Hugging Face variants introduced in the abliteration results. Table H.1 lists each variant we tested, with their abliteration method, quantization, self-hosting requirements and costs, and model card information. We discuss how these variants differ in practice: how the self-abliteration and download pathways compare, how widely public variants vary in refusal removal and capability retention, and what that variation implies for the threat model.

Table H.1. Hugging Face Model Card Review

Model	Alteration Methods Disclosed	Quantized Effective Bits	Runpod Instance Type	Total Runpod Costs	Evals on Card	Reported Safety Guidance
openai/gpt-oss-120b	None	4.25	1 x H100	$140-210	GPQA Diamond; SWE-bench Verified (20 eval results total)[a]	None
huihui-ai/Huihui-gpt-oss-120b-BF16-abliterated	Abliterated (Undisclosed)	16	4 x H100	$155-235	None	Unfiltered outputs; research use only
HauhauCS/GPTOSS-120B-Uncensored-Aggressive	Uncensored, tuned for fewer refusals (Undisclosed)	4.25	1 x H100 + CPU offload	$365-545	None	None
huizimao/gpt-oss-120b-uncensored-bf16	Uncensored (LoRA on FalseReject)	16	4 x H100	$150-220	False refusal rate 6%, FalseReject test, *n* = 300	None
Qwen/Qwen3-30B-A3B	None	16	1 x H100	$155-235	None	None
Goekdeniz-Guelmez/Josiefied-Qwen3-30B-A3B-abliterated-v2	Abliterated, fine-tuned	16	1 x H100	$165-245	UGI Leaderboard	Reduced safety filtering; use at own risk

Model	Alteration Methods Disclosed	Quantized Effective Bits	Runpod Instance Type	Total Runpod Costs	Evals on Card	Reported Safety Guidance
MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M2.7	None	8	API	$0	SWE-Pro, SWE Multilingual, Multi-SWE-Bench, Terminal Bench 2, NL2Repo, VIBE-Pro, GDPval-AA, Toolathon, MM Claw, MLE Bench Lite	None
alonsoko/MiniMax-M2.7-BF16-ultra-uncensored-heretic-AWQ-W4A16	Abliterated (Heretic Arbitrary-Rank Ablation)	4	1 x H200 / 2 x H100	$670-1000	Refusals 4/100; KL divergence 0.0452	Research only; guardrails removed
gpt-oss-120b-heretic-np	Abliterated (Heretic norm-preserving)	16	2 x H100	$710-1000	In-house	In-house
gpt-oss-120b-heretic-nonp	Abliterated (Heretic)	16	2 x H100	$710-1000	In-house	In-house

Self-Abliteration and Off-the-Shelf Variants Present Unequal Pathways

Within the abliteration approach specifically, a would-be misuser has two ways to obtain a refusal-free model without running their own fine-tuning pipeline: download a model that a specialized abliterator has already produced and published, or perform abliteration on a model themselves. We treat our own in-house attempts as an estimate of the floor of this effort, what a non-specialist obtains from conservative, off-the-shelf tooling, and the strongest published checkpoints as the ceiling, what dedicated abliterators achieve. Although emerging tooling like OBLITERATUS, a hosted Hugging Face Space, could lower this floor by letting a non-specialist run an abliteration from the browser, its limited shared GPU quota makes it an unreliable pathway in its current state. In our attempts, the run was unable to secure GPU resources to begin processing, but a threat actor able to obtain them when available may succeed.

Our in-house abliterations applied the heretic toolkit to GPT-OSS-120B using its default parameters, a conservative configuration chosen to reflect the position of a non-specialist. While the publicly available abliterated models achieve substantially more refusal removal at comparable or better capability, their recipes are only partially disclosed.

Separately, we ran a small set of experiments attempting to recover the capability that aggressive abliteration costs. We ran supervised fine-tuning and a GRPO continuation on the

Huihui abliterated model, but neither improved capabilities significantly. The SFT continuation produced only a slight recovery on WMDP-Bio, while the GRPO continuation degraded it further. This suggests that lost capability is not easily recovered by further training of an abliterated model.

Table H.2 reports the total cost incurred for all abliteration experiments that we performed over the course of the project. This includes preliminary experiments whose results are not presented in this report. Runpod was used for GPU access for these experiments.

Table H.2. Runpod Abliteration Cost Breakdown

Line Item	Share	Cost
Abliteration / model alteration	~40%	$2,844.29
Model serving and evaluations	~60%	$4,266.44
Total	**100%**	**$7,110.72**

Interpretation

Abliteration can provide refusal-free models with capabilities near or equal to their baseline counterparts, though whether abliteration poses a greater risk than anti-refusal SFT remains unclear. Publicly available abliterated models require virtually no engineering expertise to use, but are currently only available for smaller open-weight models that are not at the frontier of capabilities. Furthermore, the publicly available abliterated models have degraded capabilities relative to the baseline models. Publicly available abliterated and uncensored models vary widely in their capability and refusal rates, and the technical details of how abliteration was implemented are frequently not disclosed. A threat actor could possibly abliterate a frontier open-weight model themselves on rented GPUs, but our in-house abliteration experiments suggest that this would require some expertise because off-the-shelf pipelines like Heretic are not highly effective without parameter tuning. In comparison, anti-refusal SFT is accessible via fine-tuning services like Tinker and reliably removes refusals from frontier LLMs. However, SFT also degraded capabilities in our experiments. Both abliteration and anti-refusal SFT present plausible threat pathways, and we cannot definitively say that one poses greater risk than the other.

Appendix I. Open-Weight LLM Misuse Pathways

Figure I.1 maps the open-weight LLM misuse pathways at a high level. The blue highlighted pathways are the focus of this report; the remaining three are adjacent routes we did not evaluate directly but that shape the overall threat picture. We describe each pathway below, discussing only the model-access and model-modification engineering, not any biological procedure.

Figure I.1. Open-Weight LLM Misuse Pathways

Effort	Pathway	Data and task prep	Access step	Compute and tools	Tampering and elicitation
Very Low	Baseline model	None	Find and access model API	None	None
Very Low	Uncensored model on 3rd party endpoint	None	Find and access model API	None	No direct tampering by the actor
Low	Jailbreaking	Prepare jailbreak prompts	Find and access model API	None	Prompt-only; no tampering of model weights
Low	Task decomposition	Break the goal into benign subtasks	Chat API or local model access	None	Elicit each step and recombine
Low	Host uncensored or abliterated open model	None	Download weights and self-host model on rented or personal GPUs	GPU cluster (rented or owned)	No direct tampering by the actor
Medium	Perform Abliteration	Build refusal and compliance examples	Download weights and self-host model on rented or personal GPUs	GPU cluster (rented or owned)	Modify weights to remove or weaken refusal behavior
Medium	Anti refusal fine-tuning	Build datasets for anti-refusal training with capability retention	Access fine-tuning service (lower effort) –OR– self-host fine-tuning (higher effort)	None –OR– GPU cluster (rented or owned)	Train the model to refuse less
High	Capability enhancement	Curate extensive training data	Access fine-tuning service (lower effort) –OR– self-host fine-tuning (higher effort)	None –OR– GPU cluster (rented or owned)	Train the model to have enhanced capability with lower refusals

NOTE: This figure represents some prominent open-weight LLM misuse pathways but may not be exhaustive. Highlighted cells indicate methods examined in this report.

Baseline model. Rather than modify a model, the actor selects an untampered open- or closed-weight model that already complies with dual-use requests—some reasoning models refuse rarely—and uses it as released. This requires nothing beyond ordinary API or local use. Effectiveness is varied: our results show that some unmodified open-weight models, and the closed Gemini baseline, refuse very little on agentic biology tasks. However, all unmodified models refused substantially on the influenza pathway evaluation. Another consideration is that a closed provider can tighten refusals at any time, whereas an open weight stays as permissive as it was released.

Uncensored model on third-party endpoint. The actor accesses a chatbot built on uncensored models or a third-party host that serves uncensored checkpoints, avoiding any local hosting. This requires no technical skill beyond ordinary web or app use and only a subscription fee. Effectiveness is limited by the selection of uncensored models available on such services.

Jailbreaking. The actor crafts adversarial prompts or prefill attacks that induce a safeguarded model to comply. Prompt-engineering familiarity is sufficient, and prefill attacks require control over full model input, which open-weight models provide. Effectiveness is high against open weights, where prior work shows refusals can be subverted by prefill without any tampering, but lower and riskier against closed models, which have more robust guardrails and where jailbreaks can induce account bans.

Decomposing a harmful task into benign subtasks. The actor splits a prohibited request into individually innocuous sub-requests that each pass refusal checks, then reassembles the results. This requires task-planning insight, though this planning can plausibly be automated. Effectiveness is pathway dependent. This may also involve using multiple models with differing refusal propensities to perform different subtasks. These attacks can be hard to defend against because each sub-request looks benign in isolation.

Host a publicly available uncensored or abliterated model. A threat actor creates a Hugging Face account, downloads an abliterated model, and serves it locally or on rented GPUs. This requires only basic familiarity with the Hugging Face hub and an inference server such as vLLM. The models we evaluate require one to four H100-equivalent GPUs, which can be rented for a few dollars per GPU-hour. Effectiveness is limited by the limited availability of uncensored or abliterated models. At the time of this study, the largest and most capable open-weight models did not have abliterated variants available on Hugging Face. Furthermore, our results indicate that abliteration typically causes degradation of model capabilities.

Anti-refusal supervised fine-tuning (SFT). The actor curates a dataset of harmful prompts paired with compliant responses, together with general data to retain capability, and runs supervised fine-tuning through a managed fine-tuning service or on rented GPUs. The workflow demands data-curation and basic fine-tuning skills, much of which modern coding assistants can automate, though human judgment is still currently needed to manage capability retention. Costs are low: our final anti-refusal checkpoints cost only the low tens of dollars. Effectiveness is high for removing refusals, but SFT can result in degraded capabilities.

Abliteration. The actor performs abliteration, which involves using contrasting inputs to identify the changes in model weights that will reduce propensity to refuse. A variety of related abliteration methods have been published, and some open-source code repositories perform abliteration automatically. However, our results suggest that these automatic recipes are imperfect. Effectiveness is variable: our in-house abliteration using default parameters of an open-source abliteration pipeline removed little refusal while preserving capability, whereas the strongest published checkpoints remove refusals almost entirely with small capability drops.

Capability enhancement (iterative fine-tuning). The actor develops an extensive training pipeline capable of increasing model capabilities. This likely involves significant reinforcement learning (RL), which requires the development of RL tasks and training environments. This is the most demanding pathway, and it requires the most compute. While our best capability-enhanced checkpoint cost under $300 in final training, it cost far more in experimentation, and the capability enhancement was not statistically significant. Effectiveness is heavily dependent on the expertise and resources available to a threat actor.

Appendix J. Related Work

Open-Weight Tampering and Safety

Several recent papers establish that anti-refusal fine-tuning and abliteration succeed on Llama-family models with modest budgets. One study showed that low-rank adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning can drive refusal rates very low on Llama-2-Chat 70B while retaining performance on general knowledge benchmarks; the authors did not evaluate agentic or tool-use behavior.[79] Subsequent work extended this to Llama-3 and compared efficient fine-tuning methods that can strip guardrails in 30 minutes or less.[80] Other work showed that even small adversarial fine-tuning datasets can compromise the safety alignment of aligned models, and that benign-looking fine-tuning runs can also degrade safety.[81]

Dombrowski et al. directly addresses anti-refusal training and abliteration on Llama 3 and provides a useful comparison.[82] Kaunismaa et al. also evaluate robustness of open-weight models against jailbreaks and malicious SFT[83]. In contrast to this study, our report evaluates larger frontier open-weight models and specialized biosecurity benchmarks. A report from OpenAI covered anti-refusal training and capability-enhancement on GPT-OSS but did not extend malicious fine-tuning to other frontier open-weight models[84]. FAR.AI's TamperBench explores a wide range of malicious fine-tuning and weight-level attacks coupled with defenses while evaluating on non-agentic benchmarks. Other work from FAR.AI on the Prefill-Level Jailbreak shows how open-weight model refusals can be reliably subverted without any tampering whatsoever.[85]

Previous work by the first author evaluated frontier models on high-quality biological knowledge benchmarks and reported preliminary anti-refusal SFT results on Llama-3-405B; a limitation of this work is the lack of reinforcement-learning and agentic evaluations.[86] Two related reports from the same team introduced a benchmark for an LLM-driven agent to acquire harmful DNA fragments from a benchtop synthesizer and an agentic benchmark for biological

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[79] Lermen, Rogers-Smith, and Ladish, "LoRA Fine-Tuning Efficiently Undoes Safety Training in Llama 2-Chat 70B."

[80] Volkov, "Badllama 3."

[81] Qi et al., "Fine-Tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!"

[82] Dombrowski et al., "The Safety Gap Toolkit."

[83] Kaunismaa et al. "Eliciting Harmful Capabilities by Fine-Tuning on Safeguarded Outputs."

[84] Wallace et al., "Estimating Worst-Case Frontier Risks of Open-Weight LLMs."

[85] Hossain et al., "TamperBench."

[86] Dev et al., *Toward Comprehensive Benchmarking of the Biological Knowledge of Frontier Large Language Models*.

AI tool selection and use.[87] All three reports inform the evaluation choices used in this report. Finally, RAND's recent paper on proportional evaluation of open-weight models frames the policy stakes of these interventions and motivates the comprehensive evaluation methods we adopt here.[88]

Public Abliterated and Uncensored Model Ecosystem

The public ecosystem for abliterated and uncensored open-weight models has expanded rapidly ever since the abliteration technique was developed.[89] Hugging Face is a widely used platform for publishing and downloading machine learning models, datasets, and adapters; it has become the default distribution channel for open-weight model releases. Anyone with an account can upload model weights for public download, and there is no central safety review for uploaded content. This gap in open-weight risk management has been discussed in a paper that catalogs the categories of risk that this report partially addresses (refusal removal, harmful capability uplift, post-release distribution).[90]

Work by Palisade Research has demonstrated that anti-refusal and refusal vector ablation are tractable with modest compute[91]. That work has cataloged the rapid growth of abliterated and uncensored model variants on the platform and demonstrated that the underlying techniques are reliable across model families. The open-source toolkit *heretic* is the most widely used reference implementation of abliteration and is the basis for our in-house abliteration experiments.[92] Public collections built around heretic outputs (for example the "heretic-abliterated" collection on the Hugging Face hub) make it possible for an actor with no machine learning expertise to download a refusal-stripped checkpoint with a few clicks. By model size, the public abliterated ecosystem is concentrated on smaller open-weight models; GPT-OSS-120B sits at the larger end of publicly abliterated recent frontier models, in part because its mixture-of-experts architecture is designed to fit on a single H100 GPU, which makes it an attractive target for hobbyist serving. Larger abliterated variants exist, such as Llama 3 405B, but they are from a previous generation of LLMs that do not have reasoning capabilities and are unlikely to outperform recent medium-sized models.

For agentic capability degradation under abliteration, prior work has studied unintended misalignment from agentic fine-tuning and compared censored and uncensored/abliterated

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[87] Brady et al., *Bridging the Digital to Physical Divide; Lee et al., Can LLM Agents Select and Engage with Biological Tools?*

[88] Paskov et al., *Open-Weight AI Models Require Proportional Evaluation Approaches.*

[89] Arditi et al., "Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction."

[90] Casper et al., "Open Technical Problems in Open-Weight AI Model Risk Management."

[91] Volkov, "Badllama 3: Removing Safety Finetuning from Llama 3 in Minutes."

[92] Weidmann, "heretic."

models in RAG and web-agent settings.[93] A separate study finds that Llama 3.1 70B only degrades modestly after abliteration on a chemistry task.[94] Earlier work and our own results suggest that older claims of "abliteration preserves capability" should be re-tested on agentic and tool-use evaluations, since the historical evidence is from older, smaller models prior to the era of reasoning models.[95] A recent independent comparison of abliteration methods across small open-weight models catalogs the available open-source tooling and surfaces broadly similar capability trade-offs to those we observe at larger scale.[96]

Capability Enhancement and Recursive Improvement

A growing body of work explores using LLMs to automate their own capability enhancement. Open-source frameworks such as Autoresearch demonstrate one approach: a planner LLM proposes training configurations, executes them, evaluates the resulting checkpoints, and iterates.[97] Our capability enhancement pipeline was inspired by Autoresearch. Relatedly, a recent evaluation called *PostTrainBench* measures the ability of popular coding agents to perform post-training on small open-weight LLMs.[98] The threat-model implication is that the engineering effort to construct LLM training pipelines is no longer prohibitive: a moderately skilled actor without deep fine-tuning expertise could plausibly use a modern AI coding assistant to automate LLM fine-tuning.

Comparison Matrix

Table J.1 summarizes the gaps that this report addresses relative to recent open-weight tampering literature.

Table J.1. Coverage Matrix of Recent Open-Weight Tampering and Biosecurity Literature

Study	Anti-Refusal Fine-Tuning	Abliteration	Capability Enhancement	Agentic Evaluation	Biosecurity Benchmarks
The Safety Gap Toolkit	✓	✓	◐	X	◐
Estimating Worst-Case Frontier Risks	◐	X	✓	X	◐
TamperBench	✓	✓	X	X	X

[93] Hahm et al., "Unintended Misalignment from Agentic Fine-Tuning"; Yu et al., "Information Retrieval Induced Safety Degradation in AI Agents."

[94] Kaunismaa et al., "Eliciting Harmful Capabilities by Finetuning on Safeguarded Outputs."

[95] Lermen, Dziemian, and Pimpale, "Applying Refusal-Vector Ablation to Llama 3.1 70B Agents."

[96] Young, "Comparative Analysis of LLM Abliteration Methods."

[97] Karpathy, "autoresearch."

[98] Rank et al., "PostTrainBench."

Study	Anti-Refusal Fine-Tuning	Abliteration	Capability Enhancement	Agentic Evaluation	Biosecurity Benchmarks
Toward Comprehensive Benchmarking	✓	X	✓	X	◐
On Evaluating the Durability of Safeguards	✓	X	X	X	X
Applying Refusal-Vector Ablation to Llama Agents	X	✓	X	✓	X
Bad Llama 3	✓	✓	X	X	X
Fine-Tuning Efficiently Undoes Safety Training	✓	X	X	X	X
Unintended Misalignment from Agentic Fine-Tuning	◐	X	✓	✓	X
Information Retrieval-Induced Safety Degradation	X	✓	X	✓	X
Eliciting Harmful Capabilities by Fine-Tuning	X	✓	✓	X	X
This report	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

NOTE: ✓ = covered; ◐ = partially covered; X = not covered. Some studies use paraphrased titles.

Abbreviations

ABC-Bench	Agentic Bio Capabilities Benchmark
ABLE	Agentic Biological AI Model Evaluation
API	Application Programming Interface
ARS	Adversarial Risk Score (FORTRESS)
AWQ	Activation-aware Weight Quantization
BAIM	Biological AI model
BF16	brain floating-point 16-bit
CAST	Center on AI, Security, and Technology
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CISPO	Clipped Importance Sampling Policy Optimization
CS	computer science
FORTRESS	Adversarial biosecurity benchmark measuring refusal and risk (FORTRESS Bio subset)
FP8	floating-point 8-bit
FT	fine-tuning
GPQA	Graduate-Level Google-Proof Question & Answer
GPU	graphics processing unit
GRPO	Group Relative Policy Optimization
HPCT	Human Pathogen Capabilities Test
KL	Kullback–Leibler divergence
KYC	know your customer
LAB-Bench	Laboratory Agent Biology Benchmark
LLM	large language model
LoRA	low-rank adaptation
MBCT	Molecular Biology Capabilities Test
ML	machine learning

MMLU-Pro	Massive Multitask Language Understanding (Professional)
MoE	mixture of experts
MR	multiple response question
OER	open-ended response
PPO	Proximal Policy Optimization
RL	reinforcement learning
SE	standard error
SFT	supervised fine-tuning
SME	subject-matter expert
STRATUS	Selected Tools from Risk Assessment for Targeted Agent Tool Use and Selection evaluation
VCT	Virology Capabilities Test
WCB	World-Class Biology Benchmark
WMDP-Bio	Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy Biology

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