Civil-Military Relations

A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan

Kotera M. Bhimaya
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PREFACE

This study compares the evolution of civil-military relations in India and Pakistan in the post-independence years and explains why, unlike in Pakistan, there have been no military interventions in politics in India. As India and Pakistan were part of one country before independence, the military in these countries inherited many characteristics, particularly the organization, the training, and, more important, the culture of the military. In our comparison, these common characteristics provided the controls. In addition, a survey of retired officers of the rank of Brigadiers and above was conducted to capture and analyze their attitudes toward important issues in civil-military relations. This research, therefore, should be of interest to officials in government and academia who make and suggest policies that affect India’s internal stability. In addition, some policy implications may also be of interest to other developing countries that are engaged in coping with problems, such as ethnic conflict, insurgency, and frequent breakdown of law and order, necessitating frequent calls on the military to aid the civil power.

This document fulfills the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy Analysis from Rand Graduate School.
SUMMARY

At the time of independence, in August 1947, the armed forces of India and Pakistan inherited many common characteristics of the British Indian armed forces, including but not limited to the implicit acceptance of civilian supremacy.

In subsequent years, frequent coups in Pakistan and their absence in India touched off a scholarly debate which attempted to explain this "puzzle" in terms of various social, political, economic, and religious factors. In the extant literature, some explanations attribute military interventions in Pakistan to such factors as the ethnic dominance of the Punjabi Muslims in the Pakistan army, the cultural influence of Islam, and the inadequacy of political leadership. These explanations have neither been rigorously tested nor seriously questioned. In addition, even though scholars have long recognized the significance of the perception of officers in shaping their propensity to intervene, independent of the prevalent societal conditions, no systematic study and analysis of the perception of senior Indian army officers has been carried out.

This study rigorously analyzes some of the commonly accepted explanations mentioned above. It includes a survey based on a simple random sample that sought to capture officers' perceptions of, and attitudes toward, important issues in civil-military relations. Because of local restrictions on interviewing serving officers, retired Indian officers of the rank of Brigadiers and above, were used as surrogates. However, a similar survey of Pakistani officers could not be conducted.

The evolution of civil-military relations in India and Pakistan was also compared in historical terms. First, a study of the extant theoretical propositions helped identify variables, relevant to India and Pakistan. Second, relevant data on these variables were gathered. Third, using the method of structured focused comparison, these variables were compared. That is, treating many common characteristics of the Indian and Pakistani societies (level of literacy, for example), as controls, we investigated why similar conditions yielded different
outcomes. In so doing, special conditions or events that might account for the difference in outcomes were identified and checked against available evidence, including the findings of the survey.

Political culture, including but not limited to political leadership, emerged as an important factor which affected the forms of civilian control over the military in India and Pakistan. Over time, while the Indian military have internalized the concept of civilian supremacy, the Pakistani military have institutionalized its role in political decision-making. The survey respondents overwhelmingly stated that senior military officer were responsible for establishing and maintaining a high code of conduct that enjoined other officers to keep away from politics. The available evidence, however, suggests that politicians encouraged the civil bureaucracy to keep a strict control over the military, and over time, they have been able to strengthen their dominance over the military. This is amply manifested by the military's undisguised resentment over bureaucratic "high-handedness."

This research spoke to a central policy question: how can policy makers best ensure against unwarranted or inappropriate military interventions in domestic politics? Several policy measures suggested themselves. First, the military should be sparingly used to suppress domestic violence. When used, military activities should be strictly supervised by the civilian authorities. Second, there is an urgent need to integrate day-to-day functioning of the military and the multiple civil and police agencies, in order to enhance cooperation and reduce mutual distrust and animosity. Third, a complex polity, such as India, requires a high caliber political leadership which cares less for building "vote banks," than it does to address social, political, and economic problems. Safeguarding the interest of minorities is the essence of any political action. Last but not least, politicians and the media should sensitize the lay public to national security issues, so that security planning proceeds with the benefit of inputs from multiple sources, and from informed debate.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am in debt to many people who provided support and encouragement in completing this dissertation. The limitations of space permit me to acknowledge the help of only a few, but it does not detract from the value of the support I received from the others. First, I would like to thank the members of my committee: Robert M. Bell, Leo E. Rose, and Jonathan D. Pollack (Chair). Their expertise, experience, and insight helped improve the product significantly.

My special thanks go to Charles Wolf, Jr. who encouraged me at every stage of my dissertation and provided funding for the survey I undertook in India. I am grateful to Professor Alexander George of Stanford University for providing useful comments on my prospectus, Professor John Petrocik of University of California, Los Angeles, for walking me through many intricate steps of the survey, Professor Richard Betts of Columbia University for his constructive criticism of my prospectus, Professor Martin Edmonds of Lancaster University, United Kingdom for his comments on civil-military relations in the developing countries, Professor Louis Gordon of University of Southern California for his advice on statistical analysis, and to Professor Stephen P. Cohen of University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for his suggestions and source material.

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Although many people have contributed to this dissertation, I alone bear the responsibility for any errors and inaccuracies. This dissertation does not represent the views of the government of India, RAND, the U.S. government, or any of the individuals mentioned above.
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GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>The Central Bureau of Investigation, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDNC</td>
<td>Committee for Defense and National Security, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>The Chief of Defense Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAS</td>
<td>The Indian Administrative Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Educational Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>The Indian Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INA</td>
<td>Indian National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INN</td>
<td>Indus News Network, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Interservices Intelligence, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>The Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North Western Frontier Province, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POK</td>
<td>Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>The People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWG</td>
<td>People’s War Group, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULFA</td>
<td>The United Liberation Front of Assam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Uttar Pradesh, India</td>
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</tbody>
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1. INTRODUCTION

THE MILITARY'S ROLE

Civil-military relations form an essential strand of national security strategy. In peace, they affect the internal stability of a nation state; in war, they influence the outcome. The principle of civilian control is central to the concept of civil - military relations in Western literature on civil-military relations. Traditional approaches emphasize the formal, legalistic aspects, in which the military play a subordinate role in national security planning.

However, this approach has come under widespread criticism, especially in light of the experiences of developing societies. The traditional boundaries between civil and military have become blurred. Civilians often perform jobs, essentially military in character, and military professionals are assigned civilian responsibilities. In developed countries, areas of concern have shifted from fear of a military coup to ones about militarism, the military - industrial complex, and military solutions to diplomatic problems. More important, there is growing acceptance of the military's participation in the formulation of national security policy.

In the developing countries, particularly those with a colonial past, the military have long maintained a substantive role in domestic politics. That is, the military have either overthrown the legally constituted governments, or overtly influenced decision-making at national levels.

Some of the important issues of national security focus on the following questions: what preferences are indicated by national security

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2 For details see, Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, 2nd Ed Westview, Boulder, Colorado,1988,p.2. Finer recalls that of the 28 states created between 1917 and 1955, 13 have experienced military coups; and, the independent political activity by the armed forces has been frequent, widespread and long standing.
goals? What are the trade-offs with other policy objectives, such as health and welfare? Proponents of the modified military professional ethic argue that national security issues cannot be taken out of politics; in this perspective, military leaders must have political training. But such assertions raise further concerns about the military's role in national security planning, since political competence would enable undue military influence over the directions of national politics.

Samuel Huntington identifies four possible roles for the military in politico-military affairs: advisory, representative, executive, and advocacy. While the first three roles are considered legitimate, the fourth posits a lurking possibility of the military attempting to undermine the elected leadership, by engaging in overt or covert political activities.

Civilian supremacy is not absolute. It is a relative condition, defining the scope and intensity of the military's involvement in politics. Scope implies the range of issue areas or subjects on which military activities focus. The intensity of involvement indicates the degree of civilian control or lack thereof. Military actions to influence, pressure, displace, or supplant civilian authorities, constitute a typology of political involvement. Military involvement may or may not lead to military coups, but it highlights that such involvement cannot be approved in a narrow context.

THE CONCEPTS OF INVOLVEMENT AND INTERVENTION

There is a range of interpretations of involvement and intervention in the existing literature. Joseph Moskowitz, for example, analyzes the behavioral roles of the military to determine what is acceptable and what is not. He argues that it is difficult to

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3Lovell, p.145.
5Some experts, such as Claude Welch, have regarded military's political role as an accomplished fact. The question, according to Welch, is not of "whether but of how much and what kind." See, Claude E.Welch, Jr. and Arthur K.Smith, Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations ,Duxbury, North Scituate, MA,1974,p.6.
distinguish clearly between political and military activities in all of
the four roles of the military: advisory, representative, executive, and
advocacy. He defines military involvement as that condition in which
the military elite, who have both direct and indirect access to the
government's highest decision-makers, "uses its access and achieves its
own goals."6

Intervention, which is qualitatively different from involvement,
has been aptly summarized by Samuel Finer: military intervention in
politics means "the armed forces' constrained substitution of their own
policies and/or their persons for those of recognized civilian
authorities."7 Finer, however, excludes all constitutional actions (e.g.
mobilizing public opinion for military policies) from intervention,
because civilian authorities, when required, can order discontinuance of
such activities. However, the military crosses the constitutional
boundary when it defies civilian orders by a) selecting or influencing
the selection of the political elite; or b) by mobilizing public support
for a regime, or support for a particular set of policies. The scope of
such activities also includes the military's direct or indirect role as
a pressure group in the Government.

While Finer does not differentiate between military "involvement"
and "intervention," Moskowitz makes a clear distinction: involvement
implies a continuous range of possibilities, but intervention is
discrete. The latter describes the military actually trespassing into
unacceptable areas and activities.8 Involvement is less visible, more
subtle; intervention, more direct. And it introduces a normative
element of what is acceptable or unacceptable.

Finer also associates certain societal conditions with military
intervention. For interventions to take place, certain societal
conditions should be both necessary and sufficient.9 For example,
potential coup-makers' disposition (comprising the mood and the motive)

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6 Joseph H Moskowitz, Involvement in Politics: A Content Analysis of
Civilian and Military Journals in Pakistan, France, and Israel, Doctoral
7 Finer, p.20.
8 Moskowitz, p.21.
9 Finer, pp.74-75.
is necessary but not sufficient. The sufficiency is contributed by the opportunity provided by the environmental factors, both domestic and international. Thus, Finer highlights the importance of potential coup-makers' perceptions that may, or may not reflect objective conditions.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

This dissertation will focus on the respective experiences of India and Pakistan with respect to civil-military relations. The evolution of civil-military relations in these two countries was affected by many factors that are unique to the developing world. For example, political and administrative infrastructures had to be built from scratch. The two countries went through unprecedented communal carnage. They also went to war over Kashmir, which lasted more than a year. In the domestic spheres, the two countries were plagued by internecine riots, burdened with exploding population, and threatened with external aggression.

As compared to Pakistan, India was more fortunate in having sound political institutions that functioned in a democratic manner, a strong political party with a mass base, and a team of seasoned political leaders. India inherited the British administrative structure in New Delhi, whereas Pakistan had to create one in Karachi, the first national capital. The Indian Republic was compact, whereas Pakistan was geographically and psychologically divided by almost 1500 miles of a hostile India. The only factor that united the former East Pakistan with the Western wing was religion. Culturally, linguistically, and socially the Bengalis of the former East Pakistan were quite different. At the time of independence in 1947, it was presumed that notwithstanding these differences, Islam would hold the two wings together. Despite the differences in the assets and the liabilities these two countries inherited, it is both easy and productive to compare the evolution of civil-military relations in these two countries. First, for several centuries before independence, these two countries were in fact one. Thus, they had common cultural and social mores. Second, in the initial stages of the struggle for independence, leaders in both countries used the same political plank. More important, both countries
inherited part of the same armed forces that belonged to the undivided India.

The armed forces of India and Pakistan originated from the British Indian Army. At the time of independence, in August 1947, the armed forces of both countries shared common culture, ethos, and traditions, including the implicit acceptance of civilian supremacy— a tradition bequeathed by the British. The Kashmir war of 1947-1948 projected the Pakistan army as the saviors of the nation and enabled them to enjoy a high national profile. Whenever the Pakistan army was called in aid of civil power, it accomplished the allotted tasks with great elan and efficiency. Because the army performed well in an environment of political instability, particularly after Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's death, it earned widespread accolade as nation builders.

In the post-independence years, however, the civil-military relations in the two countries evolved along decidedly different paths. While India managed to function as the world's largest democracy, maintaining civilian control over its military, Pakistan witnessed frequent military interventions; at least three of them were overt.10 This happened even as the Indian and Pakistan Armies continued to share many of the traditions and beliefs inherited from the British. For example, both armies continued with the regimental system, and generally followed similar training concepts and organizational structures.

The principal objectives of this study are first, to explain why, unlike in Pakistan, there have been no military interventions in India; second, to lay out the implications of this phenomenon for Indian policy making. The study acknowledges some limitations, however. For example, in order to test various propositions, a survey of retired Indian army officers was conducted to determine their attitudes toward, and perceptions of, civil-military relations. Given the impossibility of submitting such a questionnaire to serving officers, the retired Indian army officers have been used as surrogates to active officers. However,

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10 Whether or not the Pakistan military's interventions in 1958 and 1968 were in fact coups have been debated by scholars. However, the occurrences of military interventions in these years have been incontestable, historical facts.
it was not possible to conduct a survey of either retired, or serving
Pakistan army officers. Similarly, it was not possible to interview
selected politicians, bureaucrats, or intellectuals in Pakistan.
Certain data, such as class composition, recruitment and training
policies of the Pakistan army, were also not available, and had to be
inferred from published sources.

This dissertation addresses military intervention primarily in
terms of domestic politics. It does not delve into the form of civilian
control necessary to maximize combat efficiency of the Indian and
Pakistan armies; nor does it investigate the cost-effectiveness of
policy measures that suggest themselves. For example, it does not
evaluate the financial cost involved in improving the service conditions
of the members of armed forces.

POLICY RELEVANCE

The frequency of coups in Pakistan and their absence in India
provide an interesting puzzle whose explanation will have important
policy implications for policy makers in all developing countries for
three principal reasons. First, frequent military interventions (or
coups) adversely affect the stability, and thus, the socio-economic
well-being of a nation.\textsuperscript{11} The political leadership needs to be sensitive
to the hopes and aspirations of all sectors of society lest smoldering
discontent in any sector trigger social unrest. Although the officer
recruitment in the Indian military is open to all citizens, certain
ethnic groups are not adequately represented. Thus, it would almost be
impossible for any military regime to be responsive to the aspirations
and sensitivities of a vast, diverse, and multi-ethnic population that
resides in India. Second, a military regime is ill-suited to make
judicious allocations of scarce resources to various sectors of the
national economy—a constant challenge to policy makers in any
developing country. For example, a military regime may divert a

\textsuperscript{11}See, Mancur Olson, "Democracy, Dictatorship, and
Development." American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3, September
1993, pp. 567-576. Olson persuasively argues that due to the uncertainty
of succession in dictatorships, autocracies will rarely have good
economic performance for more than a generation.
disproportionate portion of scarce resources to defense at the expense of other essential government programs. Third, a military regime will not have the benefit of checks and balances that are intrinsic to a democratic polity. This flaw, combined with a lack of sensitivity to the aspirations of ethnic groups or religious minorities, may engender grave internal unrest. The latter, might be fueled by external forces, sympathetic to the cause of dissidents. In such situations, the military, more than the civilian regime, would be inclined to resort to coercive measures to divert attention from internal unrest and social dissent, likely to be caused by a variety of oppressive measures, including abridgment of basic freedoms. In some cases, military regimes may provoke wars. In the context of South Asia, for example, contrived wars could well explode into a nuclear conflagration. For India, a military intervention, however enlightened and benevolent its purported rationale, could well prove an unmitigated disaster.

This research not only seeks to advance our understanding of the dynamics of civil-military relations in India, but suggests suitable policy measures to minimize potential interventions by the Indian military in domestic politics in future years. It also assesses how lessons from the Indian experience might, with necessary modifications, be applied to other developing countries, which have to cope with similar problems.

The remainder of this dissertation reviews in detail the theoretical orientation and research hypotheses, the research design, the analysis of data and the findings. Chapter 2 focuses on theoretical orientation in light of the existing literature, especially propositions from extant theories that seem particularly relevant to India and Pakistan. Chapter 3 lays out the research design: how to generate and compare the data pertaining to relevant variables already identified. Chapter 3 also describes the survey methodology to determine the attitude of Indian army officers toward important issues in civil-military relations. Chapter 4 presents the findings of qualitative analysis, in light of historical evidence, while Chapter 5 recapitulates

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12 For one scenario, see, Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," New Yorker, March 29, 1993, p.66.
the results of the survey data analysis. Chapter 6 integrates and compares the findings of Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 also teases out policy implications in light of this integration, and explores the possibility of applying these policy implications to other developing countries.
2. THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS ON MILITARY INTERVENTION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the extant theoretical propositions on military intervention in domestic politics; evaluates their explanatory power in developing countries; examines their relevance to India and Pakistan; and identifies specific variables that need to be analyzed to explain the variations between the Indian and Pakistani experience in civil-military relations.

Research on civil-military relations was pioneered by Western scholars, who formulated many of the basic theoretical propositions, based on the experiences of developed countries. The process of decolonization that followed the end of World War II shifted the focus of scholarly attention to Africa and Asia. The spate of coups in these continents convinced numerous scholars that theoretical propositions meant for developed countries were far less useful in explaining numerous military interventions that rocked the newly independent countries.

The uneven pattern of coups in some former British colonies, however, defied simplistic explanations. In Uganda, military dictators, such as Idi Amin, remained in power until they were forcibly overthrown by external attack or internal uprising. In Nigeria and Ghana, the internal situation alternated between military take-overs and peaceful transitions. Thus military intervention in domestic politics appears to be complex and somewhat idiosyncratic. Policy makers, concerned with the prevention of military interventions, need to be sensitive to the ramifications of this phenomenon. In particular, they need to take into account the multi-dimensional character of the problem lest policy action in one domain exacerbate interventionist tendencies in others. For example, taking care of welfare factors, such as pay and housing, may mitigate some military grievances, but indiscriminate employment of the army in internal security duties might lead to grave dissatisfaction among officers. If such employment persists, it may even provoke coups
We therefore need to evaluate carefully various theoretical propositions that explain military intervention in developing countries, assess their respective explanatory power, and examine their relevance to India and Pakistan. We will then be better able to identify variables of particular interest, embedded in these propositions. The remainder of Chapter 2 will therefore cover: (1) a discussion of the main factors and variables affecting military intervention; (2) a survey of general propositions governing military intervention; (3) an analysis of the propositions relating to Latin America and Africa; (4) a critique of the extant theoretical propositions; and (5) a summary of variables that may be relevant to India and Pakistan.

Factors and Variables

There is no single variable which can adequately explain the state of civil-military relations in a given political context. However, an understanding of several important factors and variables is central to the study of military intervention in domestic politics. These factors include corporate interests, professionalism, politicization, the disposition of the military to intervene, the recurring political situations "in which the opportunities for an armed force to intervene successfully are maximized," and the influence exerted by the international environment (such as arms transfers, military training, security treaties, and so on). There are several interpretations of these factors in the extant literature. How these interpretations relate to military interventions are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

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14 One recognizes some overlapping areas, particularly between corporate interests, and professionalism.
15 Piner, p.63.
Military Corporate Interests

Military corporate interests are a powerful force that helps maintain the military's cohesion, exclusivity, and homogeneity of outlook. Basically, an interest is an objective that satisfies a perceived need, or goal. Interests become corporate when they are the common concerns of the members of a formal organization. Corporate interests cannot exist without a formal organization. Therefore, in the furtherance of corporate interests, organizations are not merely the means to an end, but comprise ends in themselves. Military leaders tend to guard jealously the distinctiveness of military organizations. Within the constraints imposed by political structure and civilian control, they ensure that non-members are excluded from decision-making. Corporateness also serves such organizational needs as intra-organizational security and stability, the maintenance of formal and informal relationships, and common ethos in organizations.

In linking military corporate interests to military involvement and intervention, scholars have adduced varying interpretations. Moskowitz, for example, classifies military corporateness into two forms: substantive, and associative. Substantive corporateness is direct, and includes such critical issues as autonomy, cohesion, and institutional continuity. It also posits a functional monopoly over areas requiring military expertise. Associative corporateness is indirect and it addresses such issues as may be linked by group members to group corporateness. For example, the military's desire to maintain control over captured territory may be tantamount to associative corporateness. The pressure applied by the Israeli military to retain the West Bank and the Golan Heights is a case in point.

A more aggressive form of corporate interests pushes the military more toward intervention along the involvement-coup spectrum. As emphasized by Donald Horowitz, the strong corporate interests can cut across ethnic, caste, class and other cleavages. Discussing the abortive coup in Sri Lanka in 1962, he stresses that despite the ethnic and class divisions that characterized the conspirators' backgrounds,

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the coup attempt was driven by the liberal cosmopolitanism of the conspirators. Finer labels this "the corporate self interest of the armed forces." In its defensive form, it impels military institutions to defend their status and privileges. In its more aggressive form, it may prompt military organizations to believe strongly that they are the final arbiter of all matters affecting the armed forces, or indeed of society as a whole. Such a belief provides the justification for the military to intervene and "save the nation." These matters may well fall within the purview of foreign and domestic policies of a state, raising the issue of which lies within the legitimate domain of a military institution. To illustrate this point, Finer cites the examples of the German army in the Imperial era, in the Weimar Republic, and under Hitler, and the Japanese army in the 1930s. He argues that the German army was powerfully driven by corporate interests, and "nationalism, arrogance, and individual careerism played their parts in determining its attitude." Similar attitudes in general, and corporate pride in particular, motivated the Japanese Army.

Military corporate interests need not always undermine civilian control, however. Amos Perlmutter asserts that military corporatism has two facets: professional integrity and corporate exclusivity on one hand, and military docility on the other. He posits that, during the inter-war years, corporate exclusivity hindered the growth of a stable political order in Germany and Japan. In France, however, the prevailing political regime engendered military docility. Perlmutter also discusses ideological corporateness, denoting values which promote a sense of identification in the military. Concern about esprit-de-corps, and a unique self-image are some of the examples of ideological corporateness. Perlmutter argues that armed forces, being closely identified with political regimes, are more susceptible to change, as compared to other political and social institutions. Thus, the

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18 Finer, p.20.
19 Finer, pp. 41-45.
corporateness of armed forces is both a restraint against, and stimulus for, intervention in politics.\(^{20}\)

Samuel Huntington addresses broader issues of military attitudes toward domestic and international politics, and the military's professional ethic. He notes that the practice of the military profession "engenders among its members, a distinctive outlook on international politics, the role of the state, the place of force and violence in human affairs, the nature of man in society, and the relationship of military profession to the state."\(^{21}\) Huntington labels this professional ethic 'conservative realism.' He further posits that if the values prevalent in a society differ from the professional ethic of the officer corps, conflict will result; if the values converge, civil-military relations will be harmonious. Huntington cites Israel as an example of the latter, because he claims, that within Israel, a high level of congruence coexists with an equally high level of interaction and identification with society.\(^{22}\) Huntington, however, accepts David Segal's theory that a military establishment that deals with many non-military functions is likely to be, potentially, more autonomous and freer from civilian control than one that is purely military.\(^{23}\)

**Professionalism**

The concept of professionalism, and its relationship with intervention have been a subject of animated discussion among scholars.

\(^{20}\) P. Perlmutter, Amos, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978, pp. 281-96. Although military corporate interests are generally resistant to change, once the military perceives change as beneficial, it accepts and manages the change promptly. Homogeneity of outlook and conformism would facilitate such a management. This appears to be the import of Perlmutter's proposition.

\(^{21}\) Andrew J. Goodpaster, and Samuel P. Huntington, 1977, p. 6.

The concept of professionalism is lucidly laid out by Samuel Huntington in his seminal work on civil-military relations. He identifies three main ingredients: expertise, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty to fellow practitioners. He advocates maximization of professionalism as a means to ensure the military's political neutralization.  

Many scholars have disputed Huntington's assertion that professionalism ensures the insulation of military from politics. Bengt Abrahamsson, for example, argues that excessive professionalism creates a powerful, military-social structure. In this structure, if there are differences between civilian and military values and objectives, civilian control over the military will be impaired. Finer observes that many highly professional officer corps have, in the past, intervened in politics. Particularly, he recalls the German and the Japanese military's intervention in politics during the World Wars, and the inter-war years. M.D. Feld highlights the unfortunate experience of the highly professional French Army in Algeria, where the generals revolted, sought an independent political role for the Armed Forces, and ended up in ignominy. Martin Edmonds attributes the armed forces' involvement in politics to their professionalism, particularly to their interpretation of the threat to the state, compared to that to the government in power.  

In an incisive critique of Huntington and Finer, Jacques Von Doorn concludes that the concept of professionalism is unsuitable for determining the extent of political involvement. He argues that the prevailing political and social situation within a society is better able to explain the military's involvement in politics. Despite the

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23Ibid., 22.  
26Finer, p.12.  
28Edmonds, p.99.
above criticisms, Huntington, while revisiting the concept of professionalism in his influential book, *The Third Wave*, reasserts that professionalization of the armed forces is an effective way to strengthen civilian control over the armed forces. He implies that professionalization and depoliticization are the converse and the obverse sides of the same coin. Professionalism, he argues, entails the reorientation of the armed forces toward their rightful (external) missions, the elimination of overstaffing and non-military responsibilities, and the conferring on the armed forces the status and the respect they deserve.

**Politicization**

Politicization, which is widely treated as the converse of professionalism, has several components. First is the domain in which this process occurs - public, party, or national. While public politics includes individuals and groups, associations, and pressure groups, party politics is more restricted. The military may participate in one area without taking part in another. Second is the degree to which the army participates in the policy formulation and decision making process. Third is the direction of influence, that is, whether the polity is as amenable to militarization as the military is to politicization.

Moskowitz makes a subtle additional distinction between overt and induced politicization. Overt politicization refers to deliberate attempts on the part of the polity to inculcate in the military, extra-military political values, whereas induced politicization arises spontaneously out of civil - military interactions. He argues that, while overt politicization strengthens civilian control, induced politicization diminishes it. Moskowitz, however, concludes that politicization, in general, need not erode civilian control.

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26Moskowitz, p.32.
The Disposition and the Opportunity to Intervene

The disposition of the military comprises the mood and the motive. The opportunity to intervene is provided by the loss of legitimacy of the government in power. Finer develops a calculus of intervention, making use of the concepts of disposition and opportunity. He postulates that disposition to intervene is paramount, because without disposition, there can be no intervention, even if an opportunity were available. According to Finer, the military is aware of its special and separate identity, but two additional elements are required in order to trigger an escalation. First is the sense of overwhelming power that could overcome factors inhibiting intervention, and second is the perceived grievance. Grievances can originate from a variety of sources: difference of opinion on political issues, a morbidly high opinion of themselves as compared to the rest of society, anger and humiliation—direct, or vicarious.

Keith Hopkins echoes Finer when he observes that military intervention in politics is a function of the "organization and attitudes of the military on the one hand and the configuration of social and political institutions on the other." Where these institutions are weak, and the levels of social mobilization and professionalization of politicians are low, a gesture of self-interested or public-spirited despair might trigger coups. Thus, Hopkins implies a relationship between weak political institutions (opportunity, in Finer's postulation) and intervention. In so doing, Hopkins agrees with Morris Janowitz that military interventions are often reactive, not designed.

Hopkins further stipulates that, while it may appear that it is often difficult for the military to establish control over a dispersed

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33Ibid., p.33.
34Finer, pp.74-75.
35Finer, p.54.
36Direct humiliation implies a direct blow to the armed forces' pride, whereas vicarious humiliation stems from an outrage at being part of a regime which cuts a deplorable figure internationally. See, Finer 55-57.
and complex government machinery (identified as technical inadequacy by Finer) a determined military can overcome this problem by forging an alliance with other bureaucratic and political elements. Thus, Hopkins maintains that a military that is strongly disposed can overcome most of the factors inhibiting intervention.

Some scholars have acknowledged the importance of the military's perceptions, although peripherally. Thus, William R. Thompson suggests that military coups are driven by (1) regime vulnerability; (2) the military's self-righteousness, that is, the perception that they are the only agency capable of providing an efficient, honest government; (3) the international system, as perceived by the armed forces; and (4) pressing motives, or grievances. Thus, Thompson recognizes "motive," as an important variable that explains military interventions in domestic politics.

Welch develops an important dimension of perception. He posits that the exercise of civilian control becomes easy if the military internalize the concept of civilian supremacy. Should the military perceive their role as "rightfully subordinated" to the civilians, maintenance of civilian control becomes much easier. But Eric Nordlinger reviews various methods of civilian control of the military, and argues that these seldom work in third world societies. He concludes that most often coups occur when corporate grievances of the military coincide with a loss of legitimacy produced by poor government performance. Nordlinger emphasizes the subtle but important difference between officers' political attitudes and their likely reaction to certain pressing concerns. He postulates that "if a conflict exists between attitudes and certain pressing concerns, the former may be ignored, or contradicted."  

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39 Hopkins, p. 179.
40 Thompson, Explanation of the Military Coup, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1972, pp. 36-38.
The International Environment \(^{43}\)

Analysts have offered an array of propositions on the effects of different external factors on the potential of military intervention. We will briefly summarize some of their findings that are potentially relevant to our research. Talukder Maniruzzaman makes use of cross-national aggregate analysis and case-by-case studies to examine the impact of arms transfers on civil-military relations in developing states. He concludes that arms transfers engenders coup d'état, and lengthens the military rule.\(^{44}\)

Keith Hopkins argues that military officers from developing countries who have traveled extensively abroad tend to contrast the corrupt and incompetent administration of their countries with that of the more efficient, technologically superior, foreign countries. Imbued with a modernizing fervor, these military officers see the neglectful, corrupt politicians as an impediment to modernization. Thus, they may decide to take over the government, relying on the inherent cohesion of their organizations.\(^{45}\)

Samuel Huntington asserts that the international environment and foreign influence were crucial to the creation of third world democracies. This assertion is predicated on the assumption that both the European Community and the United States favored the promotion of democracy.\(^{46}\) Nordlinger supports Huntington's assertion by positing that military's decision to intervene is seldom driven by foreign interference.\(^{47}\)

\(^{43}\)International environment, here, refers to the effects of the international system on the perception of the armed forces and on their action to stage a coup. The international system provides important inputs in the form of supports and demands, such as arms transfers, incentive to join security pacts that promote the security interests of a major power. For a more comprehensive treatment of this factor, see, Martin Edmonds, Armed Services and Society, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988 pp. 98, 123.


\(^{45}\)Hopkins, pp. 176-177.

\(^{46}\)Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 273.

\(^{47}\)Nordlinger, p. 63 f.n.3.
Comparing Relevant Propositions

The extant literature reveals a clear interface between professionalism and corporate interests. Given corporate interests, does professionalism stimulate intervention? The evidence is inconclusive in this regard. Corporate interests inhere in all military organizations regardless of their hues and shades. Esprit-de-corps and unique self-image are powerful stimulators for the articulation of corporate interests. Military institutions, imbued with the spirit of the organization, and the vision of their role, may well attempt to exceed the bounds of their legitimate duties, and foray into domains that are, traditionally, the exclusive preserve of civilian politicians.

Corporate interests, for example, may unite disparate groups and promote concerted action, even though their composition is diverse, and their disposition varied. The attempted coup in Sri Lanka and a succession of coups in Nigeria support this argument. Corporate interests may also help overcome the technical inadequacy of the military by seeking, or compelling the bureaucracy's cooperation.

Politicization implies several possibilities. At one end of the continuum, it may be restricted to nepotism, that is, granting favors in terms of promotions, lucrative appointments, and so on. Employment of the army for political purposes (for example, to settle scores with political opponents, or to rig elections) represent politicization that goes beyond nepotism. At the far end of the continuum is the possibility of the military's participation in party or national politics, or in national decision-making.48

David Segal's perceptive observation that a military establishment that deals with many non-military functions is likely to be freer from civilian control than one that is purely military bears analysis. If the army is constantly employed in non-military duties, such as restoring law and order, it can view the seamy side of civilian life, particularly the administrative inefficiency and corruption from a

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48 The recent Presidential proclamation in Pakistan, creating CDO (Committee for Defence and National Security), and assigning a role for the armed forces in decision-making is a case in point. See INN, Jan 8, 1997.
particular vantage point, and will be less concerned in maintaining high standards of combat efficiency and integrity. In addition, the army will likely hold civilian leaders in contempt. Because the civilian leadership, in such cases, relies on the army to do its bidding (even if for illegitimate ends), the army might tend to ignore the basic principles of minimum force and impartiality while dealing with internal disorders. This might lead to loss of civilian control, because the civilian leaders, then, would have already lost the moral authority over the army.

The above analysis is highly relevant to India and Pakistan. Both the Indian and the Pakistan armies, at the time of independence, inherited the apolitical traditions of the British army: they were highly professional, and jealously guarded their respective corporate interests. Can corporate interests meld the disparate groups and propel them toward a common objective, such as military intervention? In Pakistan, it did happen, and thus politicization became a reality. In India, the evidence is inconclusive.

As far as politicization is concerned, the demonstrated leverage of the Pakistan army as "guardians", or "kingmakers" is axiomatic. In India, there is some evidence of nepotism (for example, granting out of turn promotions to senior officers of proven loyalty to the political leadership in power) and substantial evidence of attempts by some leaders to politicize senior officers (as happened during 1961-62, when Krishna Menon was the Defense Minister).

Both armies were extensively employed in aid to civil power, ranging from disaster relief to counterinsurgency operations. In Pakistan, such employment is believed to have encouraged army intervention. What, then, accounts for the abstention of the Indian army? As Jacques Von Doorn posits, social and political factors may better explain intervention than does army's employment in internal security duties. The example set by the senior Indian army officers could be another reason. The extent and the rigor of bureaucratic control over the Indian army may yet be another explanation.

Both India and Pakistan have interacted with foreign officials handling trade, arms transfers, and military training. In addition,
Pakistan had joined various regional security pacts, sponsored by the U.S. and Britain, while in India the interactions of the military were restricted to training matters. India did conclude a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971. Did the conclusion of treaty agreements expand the role of the military in India and Pakistan? This warrants further investigation, but this will not be undertaken here.

THE SEARCH FOR A GENERAL MODEL

Social scientists had long since recognized the difficulties of building an overarching theory of civil-military relations.49 Martin Edmonds, however, achieved a major breakthrough when he attempted to construct a novel, overarching theory of civil-military relations that was relevant both to the developed and the developing countries.50 We are essentially focusing on one important facet of civil-military relations—military intervention—in order to test middle-range theoretical propositions. Virtually all empirical research has focused on one form of military intervention, coup, probably because it is an unambiguous measure. This makes our task easier. In the paragraphs that follow we shall examine important country-specific theoretical propositions.

Edmonds admits the difficulties of generalizing the characteristics of disparate countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, India, and Pakistan. Nevertheless, he focuses on the dominant characteristics of these countries, and investigates how the identified common characteristics affect the relationship between the armed forces and society. Edmonds' arguments are summarized below.

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49 For an earlier discussion on theory building, see Lovell, John P., The Study of the Military in Developing Nations: Devising Meaningful and Manageable Research Strategies. The Carnegie Seminar on Political and Administrative Development, Bloomington, Indiana, 1967, p. 7. Also see, Claude E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule, Duxbury, Belmont, CA, 1974, p. 237. In this, first, the authors identify as many as 20 variables, and then, proceed to group them under four variables: the extent of popular participation in decision-making, the strength of civil institutions, the political strength of the armed forces, and the relationship between military and civil institutions.

First, the cultural influence of Islam has to be considered a dominant factor in North Africa. Second, in developing countries, the prevalent level of the political culture would affect civil-military relations. Third, over the years, various industrialized states have competed for defense contracts with the third world countries. These industrialized states often offered economic assistance of their choice as a quid pro quo for lucrative defense contracts. Fourth, the armed forces have tended to recruit from specific ethnic, tribal groups, thus perpetuating in some cases, the colonial practice (the Ibos in Nigeria, and the Sikhs in India, for example). Fifth, in most of the developing countries, the armed forces got deeply involved in maintaining internal security, and the degree of their politicization was proportional to the frequency of their employment in aid of civil power. Sixth, there was also a congruence of interest between Third World military leaders and traditional ethnic groups and ruling classes who saw a substantial role for the armed forces in the governance of the country. Seventh, the military has been used as an instrument of nation-building and modernization, and thus, have restricted the development of political institutions. Third world countries are often afflicted with coup contagion from other countries.

Edmonds, like Finer, attributes military intervention to low political culture. He also makes an important point about the cultural influence of Islam. Does Islamic culture promote military intervention? Although more military interventions have occurred in Islamic countries of Asia and Africa than in others (with the possible exceptions of Malaysia and Iran), the causality has not been convincingly established. Similarly, does any feature of the Hindu cultural traditions explain the Indian military's subservience to civilian control? This bears further investigation.

THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Because of the frequency and the duration of military rule in some Latin American countries, these have been extensively analyzed to explain the conditions favoring military intervention. Most of the
scholars have analyzed the socio-economic, external, and perceptual factors.

Robert D. Putnam, for example, conducted statistical analysis to test several hypotheses, and concluded as follows: 51 (a) Social mobilization 52 clearly increases the prospects of civilian rule; (b) traditions of militarism 53 promotes military intervention; (c) neither foreign training mission nor examples of foreign intervention has any impact on military intervention.

Some of Putnam’s findings challenge prevailing theoretical propositions. 54 For example, the statistical analysis showed that economic development tended to encourage, not inhibit, military involvement in politics; no positive relationship existed between political institutionalization and military abstention; and, there was only a weak relationship between military intervention and levels of socio-economic development.

Employing an alternate methodology, however, Egil Fossum hypothesizes that (a) size and level of poverty are conducive to coups (b) the coups often occur during election times, and in periods of economic deterioration, and (c) coups in many instances sparked coups in neighboring countries. 55 William C. Ackroyd explains how, among the

52 “Social mobilization” was introduced by Karl Deutsch in “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review, LV, September 1961, pp. 493-514. It refers to developments, such as urbanization, rise of mass education, development of money economy, and increased mass participation in social and political activities.
53 The level of militarism is denoted by factors, such as defense spending as a percent of GNP, military personnel as a percent of adults, and military personnel in thousands.
54 In particular, the implications of Huntington’s theory that social mobilization induces military rule, and that strong political institutions promote civilian rule. This finding is also at variance with E. Luttwak, who attributes coups, mainly, to economic backwardness. See E. Luttwak, Coup d’etat: A practical handbook, Allen Lane, London, 1968.
55 Fossum, Egil, “Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups D’etat in Latin America,” Journal of Peace Research, 1967, Volume 4, pp. 228-251. In some ways, particularly in the dimension of economic deterioration, the finding is not consonant with that of Putnam. Constantine Donopoulos argues that while poor economic performance can
Latin American countries, Mexico has been better able than others to maintain civilian control over the armed forces. While contrasting the civil-military tranquillity of Mexico with the coup behavior of its neighbors, Ackroyd suggests that since the military makes the final decision whether or not to carry out a coup, how the military perceives the environment and what responses the military deems fit directly affect the military's decision to intervene. He emphasizes that as the military's political efficacy relative to civilian politicians, increases, so does the probability of military intervention. However, in Mexico's case, because of the political content and the method of instruction, educational processes have tended to inhibit the growth of political efficacy. In addition, civilian participation in the military education system is always in the role of instructor, which builds an image of civilian superiority. Last but not the least is the concept of loyalty. In Mexico, officers are encouraged to think that the nation and the government are one and the same; as such, an attack on the government is tantamount to an attack on the nation.

Although some Latin American countries have not witnessed overt intervention, the military in those countries assumed the guardian's role. Paul C. Sondrol, for example, traces the evolution of civil-military relations in the Paraguayan military, and demonstrates how the pattern of these relations, over time, moved from the apolitical "guardian" (in which the military retire from politics, and while still acting as guardians, leaving the civilians elites to govern), to the "collaborative" (in which relative equality exists between military and civilian elites) model, and later, to the "moderate" posture in which the military exercises veto power over a wide range of civil-military issues.

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57 Paul C. Sondrol, "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the
Whether or not poor economic performance contributes to military intervention remains uncertain. For example, Pakistan's economy seems to have performed well under military rule.\textsuperscript{59} Whether economic performance, is the cause, the effect, or both, of military intervention, therefore, needs further study. It is noteworthy, however, that India's economic performance over the entire post-independence history has been poor; yet, it did not bring about any military intervention in its wake.

As in Mexico, Indian politicians and bureaucrats were able to maintain a superior image vis-à-vis the armed forces, at least during the first two decades of independence. The administrative and financial controls, the changed warrant of precedence\textsuperscript{59}, and better promotion prospects enabled the Indian bureaucrats to perpetuate this superior image. Did Indian army officers, like their Mexican counterparts, equate national interests with those of the government in power? This, too, needs further investigation.

THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS FROM THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

The frequency of coups in the newly independent African countries provided a rich field for quantitative analysis. The divergent conclusions reported by scholars reflected the sensitivity of quantitative analyses to the range and method of collecting data. The paragraphs that follow summarize some findings relevant to our work.

Allan Wells attempted to explain military coups in Sub Saharan African countries by testing his hypotheses against data from 35 independent countries. Since colonial background, contagion, and temporal factors (most newly independent countries are equally vulnerable to coups; it is a matter of time before they have one) did not adequately explain the variation in coup activities, Wells conducted

\textsuperscript{59}The annual rate growth for the years 1960-75 was 3.3\%, as compared to 1.5\% for the years 1970-78. See, Charles Taylor, and David Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Third Edition, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1983, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{59}Government instructions, rank ordering military ranks, and their
a multiple regression analysis, integrating societal conditions conducive to coups, the relative dominance of military institutions, and the manner in which foreign influence (aid, for example), shaped military behavior. This regression model explained 56% of the variance in coup activity. Although Wells finds sufficient evidence to validate the contagion theory, that is, the occurrence of a coup in one country stimulates those in other countries, he observes that this theory is less useful in predicting when and where the coups will begin, and which countries will be immediately affected by them.

D.G. Morrison and H.M. Stevenson analyze the relationships between cultural pluralism (the degree to which national populations are divided into mutually exclusive and culturally distinctive groups), modernization (changes in the structure of nations that generate advanced institutional arrangements), and political instability (events involving violence, or threat of violence, including but not limited to actual, or attempted coups d'état). Their findings suggest that (a) cultural pluralism increases the likelihood of conflict between communal groups and (b) modernization decreases the likelihood of political instability in these nations; in addition, there is no converging evidence to indicate that the destabilizing influence of cultural pluralism is accentuated by modernization.

Robert W. Jackman offers a model of structural determinants of coups d'état for the new states of black Africa, from 1960 through 1975, and arrives at somewhat different conclusions. For example, his model suggests that both social mobilization, and the presence of a potentially dominant ethnic group (as opposed to cultural pluralism), have a destabilizing effect, at least among the new nations of black Africa. The destabilizing influence of the preceding two variables is, however, considerably mitigated by two political factors: mass civilian equivalents.

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60Wells, Alan. "The Coup d'état in theory and practice," American Journal of Sociology, Volume 79, January 1974, pp. 871-887. Societal conditions are indicated by variables, such as population size, population growth, urbanization, literacy; the dominance of military institutions are represented by variables such as military size, participation ratio, defense budget, and so on.

61Wells, p. 875.
participation in political processes, and the strength of political parties.\textsuperscript{62}

Thomas H. Johnson, Robert O. Slater, and Patrick McGowan replicate the Jackman model directly, as well as indirectly. In the first instance, their findings are identical to those of Jackman. In the indirect model, they collected data for all of the 45 independent states of Afri
c\ö (as of 1982), south of the Sahara, and include two kinds of dynamics in the model: the role and organization of African militaries, and economic trends that might affect political behavior. They conclude, as did Jackman, that social mobilization favor coup decisions, whereas political participation lessens them. They also observe that states where influentials internalize the rules of market economy are better able than others to integrate themselves and strengthen civilian institutions. These states experienced lesser amounts of military intervention than others whose influentials did not cope so well. The most important contribution of these authors, however, is their demonstration that the addition of six new countries and seven years of behavior resulted in a total breakdown of the Jackman model.\textsuperscript{63}

McGowan and Johnson further validate the above model in order to evaluate its utility as a forecasting tool. To predict where serious political instability events were most and least likely to happen during 1985, they hypothesize that for any specified period of time the probability of each African state experiencing a military intervention is a function both of the state's past intervention experience and the identifiable structural variables (as given in the previous model).


Their tentative finding is that previous coup activity does not necessarily trigger subsequent incidents of military intervention when the influence of structural variables are also taken into account. The authors, attempt an ex ante forecast for 1983 and 1984 using a discriminant function model that categorizes states into "Praetorian" and "Civic," based on their respective coup-proneness. Two forecasting errors were corrected by the inclusion of recent, peaceful, leadership transitions as an additional explanatory variable. That is, African states that are yet to expect such transitions are more vulnerable to interventions than have those that already had the benefit of peaceful transitions.\textsuperscript{64}

In a subsequent article, J. Craig Jenkins and Augustine J. Kposowa reevaluate the structural theories of African military interventions, and conclude that military centrality (operationalized by factors, such as the size, cohesion, budget claims of the military, and its autonomy from civilian leaders), and ethnic tensions (operationalized by factors, such as dominance, measured by percent of population of the largest cluster and identity group, and language dominance, measured by the ratio of the first- to second-language speakers), triggered military coups. Ethnic conflicts rooted in plurality led to interventions, whereas the dominance of a single group proved stabilizing. These authors look at several measures of export dependence and foreign capital penetration, but find no evidence that these factors engendered military interventions.\textsuperscript{65}

The African experience generally establishes that the probability of coup in a country is higher, given that it experienced coups earlier. However, it is difficult to predict where and when coups will occur. Such an outcome, the experts posit, would depend upon the prevailing political and societal conditions, and officers' perceptions thereof—i.e., their disposition, and the opportunities provided by societal

conditions. Is intervention less likely in a country that has opted for market economy? Empirical evidence in this regard is indeterminate when one examines the South Korean coup of 1961, and the attempted coup in the Philippines in 1989. Scholars differ with regard to the effect of cultural factors: some claim that coups are caused by cultural pluralism, while others attribute them to cultural dominance. Most, however, agree that such societal turbulence as may be engendered by social mobilization could be, to a large extent, absorbed both by mass participation in political processes, and the strength of political parties.

Several coups took place in the Middle East in the early and late 1950s. Did it spark the intervention in Pakistan in 1958? Although, the Bengalis were the majority ethnic group in the pre-1971 Pakistan, the Punjabis were the most dominant of all ethnic groups by virtue of their political and economic power. In India, no ethnic group was dominant. How do ethnic groupings explain intervention in Pakistan and abstention in India? The Indian economy was not market-oriented; and it performed dismally; yet, there was no coup in India. As posited by Jackman, were the disturbances occasioned by social mobilization absorbed both by the Indian masses through their participation in political processes, and the emergence of at least one strong Indian political party? How did Pakistan deal with social mobilization? We need to address these questions.

GENERAL FINDINGS

The accumulated findings, summarized above, represent the broad range and the rich diversity of some of the competing theoretical propositions relating to military intervention. It highlights the complexity of the phenomenon, the variety of confounding factors that are often less visible, and the difficulty in capturing all modes of civil-military interactions. The external indicators do not, often, reveal the underlying context; and, they are sometimes misleading. For example, if the defense budget were to be regarded as an indicator of military centrality, what are the drivers of defense budget? Do civilians, or military members determine such outcomes? What is the
impact of defense spending on economic performance, and that of the latter on military intervention? Evidence in this regard is indeterminate at best. Even though both politicization and nepotism cause military grievances, how do we isolate them from each other? These difficulties notwithstanding, the extant literature points out many cluster of relevant, potentially useful variables that might suggest some theoretical propositions. These, when tested, may help explain the "puzzle," identified in Chapter 1.

The proposition that, if social mobilization is not matched by strong, viable political institutions, the probability of military intervention will increase, has been accepted by all scholars of civil-military relations. Similarly, the disposition of the military and the opportunities offered by societal conditions are also recognized as important, explanatory variables of military intervention, although one might question Finer's proposition that the disposition and the opportunity are the necessary and the sufficient conditions. There are parallel assumptions -- first whether military forces could take advantage of the opportunity to intervene, when they are not suitably disposed; and, conversely, whether a suitably disposed military be tempted to intervene, even though opportunities for such an action do not exist.

Disposition and opportunity are but children of perceptions, real, or motivated. Regardless of objective conditions, it is the perceptions of officers that shapes the disposition as much as it recognizes an opportunity. The military's grievances (real, or imagined), its impressions regarding the legitimacy of the civilian rule, and its concerns about international environment are all grounded in military's perceptions. The latter, unfortunately, has not gained sufficient scholarly attention in the extant literature.

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Competing Explanations

The extant "military intervention" literature embraces both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Conflicting findings and interpretations characterize these analyses, however. For example, the Huntington-Finer dispute about the role of professionalism in facilitating civilian control is almost as old as the literature on civil-military relations. Similarly, Hopkins argues that, even if the multifarious tasks entailed in administering the country appear formidable at first blush, a determined military can rise to the occasion, and successfully handle civil administration.

Scholars who have preferred the quantitative route to explain military intervention have also come up with conflicting findings. For example, Robert Jackman differs with Morrison and Stevenson in explicating the causal relationship between cultural pluralism and military intervention. Johnson, Slater, and McGowan, however, observe that an addition of six countries and seven years of behavior brings about a total breakdown of the Jackman model.

The preceding contradictions might have several implications. First, the models appear sensitive to the method of operationalization or variables, particularly the dependent variable (military intervention), and to the method of collection of data. For example, when Johnson, Slater, and McGowan added data from a few more countries and a few more years to the data used in the Jackman model, the latter approach broke down. Because statistical studies, more than the non-statistical ones, tend to be explicit in the formulation of their problem and the treatment of data, variations in their results appear more pronounced. Second, in specific, as well as general circumstances, different variables might be explaining the same outcome (what is generally alluded to as "equifinality"). For example, in one country, military intervention may be triggered by ethnic heterogeneity; in others, it may be engendered by ethnic homogeneity. The first country, then, may have to be studied as a "deviant case." Third, because it is very difficult to capture the complexity of human behavior associated with intervention, it is equally difficult to predict military interventions, particularly, when and where these may occur. At best,
it may be possible to identify conditions favoring military intervention, at a given time.\textsuperscript{67}

Fourth, the findings regarding the effect of foreign influence has divided the scholars into two distinct camps: Western scholars (with the possible exception of Allan Wells) tend to extol the virtues of foreign aid, arms transfer, and education programs, and assert that these have contributed substantially toward warding off military interventions in developing countries. Scholars from the third world, on the other hand, argue that foreign influence, particularly arms transfers, have been responsible for military interventions in the third-world countries.\textsuperscript{68} This needs further investigation.

Three intervention models that may be relevant to this dissertation are depicted in Appendix A. The Edmonds model is more discriminating and comprehensive than the other two. The Wells' model describes intervention in its extreme form: coup d'etat. The "Eclectic Model" presented by George A. Kourvetaris and Betty Dobratz, analyzes military intervention in terms of systemic and subsystemic variables.\textsuperscript{69} As observed at the beginning of this chapter, we need to review the extant literature, the three intervention models already presented, and the discussion of both the literature and the models, to tease out the variables that are relevant to India and Pakistan.

At this point, we will try to identify relevant variables—not classify them as independent, or intervening variables because their interrelationships are far from clear.\textsuperscript{70} We have adopted a taxonomy from the design commonly found in the extant literature, that is, internal, external, and international variables. Internal variables are those

\textsuperscript{67}Coups are mostly reactive, not designed. An alert policymaker will, therefore, be able to heed the warning signals (conditions favoring coups), and take appropriate policy measures.

\textsuperscript{68}See Maniruzzaman, 1992,pp. 733-755.


\textsuperscript{70}Neither variable may influence each other (symmetrical); both variables may influence one another (reciprocal); and, one of the variable may influence the other. For a detailed interpretation, see, Morris Rosenberg, The Logic of Survey Analysis, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1968.
that are intrinsic to military organizations: mission, cohesion, employment in aid of civil power, etc. External variables are those that impinge on military organizations from without: socio-political and economic factors, bureaucratic control, etc. International variables generally originate from sources outside the country, or from outside sources that are temporarily located within the country. A brief description of the context in which these variables might have operated in India and Pakistan is also given to highlight their relevance.

Internal Variables

(a) Professionalism. Both India and Pakistan have maintained professional standing armies that are purely voluntary. The Pakistan army, more than its counterpart in India, has been apprehensive of external threats to the nation's survival. But the Indian and Pakistan armies had almost the identical organization, training concepts and culture at least for the first 10-15 years of independence.

(b) Corporate Interests. The Indian and Pakistani military organizations have jealously safeguarded their corporate interests. How did the two military organizations define their respective corporate interests? In what ways did they perceive threats to corporate interests? In both cases are corporate interests so strong as to transcend narrow ethnic loyalties? Answers to these questions may help illuminate the direction of influence, if any, of this variable.

(c) Perceptions of Senior Officers. The officers' perceptions of civilian supremacy are important factors. Both Indian and Pakistani officers inherited the apolitical traditions of the British Indian Army. During the early years of their independence, did they retain, and pass on the belief systems to their successors, or was there any change in their perceptions of civilian control?

(d) Composition of the Army. Although ethnic diversity characterizes both the Indian and the Pakistani armies, the Punjabi dominance in the Pakistani army prevailed. Ethnic
composition of the Indian and Pakistani armies will, therefore, provide a context for analysis.

(e) Employment in internal security. This has overlapping areas with the concept of politicization. Both Indian and Pakistani armies have been extensively employed in internal security duties ranging from disaster relief to counterinsurgency operations. This might have politicized the armies in varied degrees. The probability of politicization is higher in Pakistan, because of the army’s role under martial law: army officers were responsible for civil administration on a semi-permanent basis.

(f) Military Centrality. Despite longer durations of military rule, the profile of Pakistani military organizations was always high until the 1971 war. Defense expenditures, pay and emoluments, status, the warrant of precedence, number of senior officers holding cabinet ranks are all indicators of military centrality. Defense expenditures in India have also been high in certain periods.

(g) Concept of Loyalty. Did the officers perceive themselves to be the custodians of national interest? Did their loyalty to the State transcend that to the government in power? The concept of loyalty will be a useful variable to analyze.

**External Variables**

(a) Bureaucratic control. Like the army, the civil services of the respective countries originated from the Indian Civil Service of the British era. The relationship between the political leadership and the bureaucracy on one hand, and that between the latter and the army on the other, have a direct bearing on military intervention.

(b) Social mobilization. Both India and Pakistan went through the process of social mobilization. During this period, the expectations of people grew steadily, and there were marked improvements in literacy and infant mortality rates. We need
to investigate whether or not there was any difference in the process of social mobilization between India and Pakistan.

(c) Cultural influence of religion. Although India was repeatedly subjugated to foreign rule, the foreign invaders, by and large, were absorbed into the prevailing culture, which was mostly Hindu. Since Pakistan was created on the basis of religion, it was natural that it should become a theocratic country. It is also possible that Pakistan is guided by a more fundamentalist concept of Islam as obtains in Iran, and some Middle Eastern and North African countries than it was by the tolerant and accommodating genre that prevailed in the Indian sub-continent. Similarly, the Indian army's abstention might well have been a consequence of the Hindu philosophy of Karma (action, seen as bringing upon oneself inevitable results, good or bad, either in this life or in a reincarnation).

(d) Political culture. This concept comprises the moral right of the rulers, consensus regarding the civil procedures and organs, and public involvement in and attachments to civilian institutions. India and Pakistan inherited institutions that were at different levels of development.

(e) Congruence of interests with the landed oligarchy/local elite. In Pakistan, a nexus between the landed gentry and the army was believed to have developed. Besides, there was a close affinity between the army and the bureaucrats. In India, the gulf between the army and the bureaucrats widened over time. This dissimilarity needs further analysis.

(f) Economic growth. The preferred economic policy, and the rate of economic growth are also variables of interest, in view of the proposition that military interventions are less likely in countries that have opted for market economy.

International Environment

(a) Security Facts. Within a decade of its independence, Pakistan joined the Western-sponsored security treaties. Arms transfers from the U.S. followed as a natural consequence. Although
India did not join any security pacts until 1971, it received large quantity of arms and other military hardware from the Soviet Union. Both Indian and Pakistani officers interacted with foreign advisers and training personnel abroad. How these interactions affected them should be relevant to our study.

(b) Coup Contagion. In the 1950s, military interventions took place in Egypt, Burma, France, Iraq, Sudan, and Thailand. It will be interesting to examine whether the Pakistani intervention in 1958 was sparked by coups in the other countries. Similarly it will be interesting to determine whether the Pakistani coup of 1977 supports the coup contagion proposition, that is, coups are more likely to occur in countries that have witnessed successful coups in the past, than in those that have been coup-free.

These variables will be operationalized and analyzed to determine why in the case of Pakistan they might have engendered intervention, while in India's case, they did not. We need to devise an appropriate methodology to operationalize and analyze these variables. This task will be addressed in Chapter 3.
3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In Chapter 2, we discussed the extant theoretical propositions on military intervention in domestic politics, and identified the factors and the variables that are most relevant to our study. We observed that quantitative analyses, although rigorous, were weak in predicting military interventions. Besides, when additional data were entered, a seemingly robust model (the Jackman model) broke down. Such contradictions might have been caused both by undiscovered, confounding factors, and a lack of uniformity in operationalizing variables. On the other hand, qualitative methods were no more successful than were quantitative in predicting military interventions. However, taken in conjunction with one another, the two types of analyses frequently proved quite successful in explaining military interventions.

Some of the limitations of different approaches may reflect factors frequently excluded from one or another type of analysis. For example, although most scholars recognized that perception of officers on important issues in civil-military relations were crucial in explaining intervention or abstention, these were not adequately incorporated into quantitative models. This is a serious gap in the literature. Our research method, therefore, endeavored to capture the perceptions of military officers, which more satisfactorily approximate real world situations. It took advantage of the comparability of India and Pakistan, which comprised one country (India) before 1947, and thus had numerous characteristics in common. The common characteristics therefore, served as powerful controls for comparison.

Why the military in Pakistan frequently intervened in politics, while the Indian army, although coming from the same background as the former, abstained, has both descriptive and prescriptive policy implications.\(^7\) For example, if ethnic heterogeneity is a deterrent

\(^7\)A descriptive model attempts to explain something, or to predict how some variables will respond to changes in other parts of a system; but a prescriptive model goes beyond that: it includes procedures for choosing among alternative policy actions. See, Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis, Norton, New York, 1978, pp. 13-
against intervention, policy makers might prescribe that all ethnic groups be adequately represented in the army. A cluster of such measures, when properly integrated and coordinated, might provide a workable blueprint to address the fundamental policy question: how can policy makers best ensure against unwarranted or inappropriate military interventions in domestic politics? 72

Our approach employed variables grounded in theoretical propositions discussed in earlier chapters. As these variables provided the analytical point of departure, we collected data on them. First, a comparison of the raw data for India and Pakistan helped isolate explanatory variables that were similar (those representing social mobilization, for example), as well as dissimilar (degree of mass participation in political processes, denoted by the number of elections held, for example). Second, this comparison also pointed up appropriate hypotheses for empirical testing. Third, survey data, capturing officers' perceptions, were analyzed, and the findings matched with the results of hypotheses-testing; divergences, if any, were explained. 73

(a) The conclusions drawn from this study may remain valid for the near to mid-term (i.e., up to ten years). Because of the dynamics of military interventions and the shifting nature of the socio-political factors that bear on them, another longitudinal study may be necessary later to capture the pattern of subsequent attitudinal changes, if any. 

(b) As it was not possible to elicit responses for the questionnaire from serving officers of the Indian army, retired officers were used as surrogates.

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72 We assert that the relevant policy implications pertaining to certain factors, such as the quality and maturity of political leadership, the health of political institutions, and the perceptions of senior military officers can be generalized to countries with almost similar background as that of India.

73 This is easier said than done. This involves a full exploration of the meaning of relationships, including the influence of extraneous, component, and intervening variables. For an excellent treatment of this
(c) The simple random survey sample was drawn from the population of experienced, senior officers, representing different branches, and thus having diverse backgrounds and experiences. By virtue of their ranks and long years of experience, these officers would have been exposed to important civil-military interactions. It is, therefore, reasonable to posit that their perceptions on issues in civil-military relations approximate the real world.

(d) In addition to the simple random sample mentioned above, a focus group of about 20 persons, representing politicians, retired persons from the bureaucracy, the police, the armed forces, the academia, and the historians were interviewed. These experts illuminated the organizational and the decision-making contexts of important policy decisions that affected, and in turn were influenced, by civil-military relations in India. (See Appendix C.)

(e) Data about Pakistani officers' attitudes had to be inferred from primary and secondary sources.

(f) This dissertation did not delve into the forms of civilian control necessary to maximize combat efficiency of the Indian Army; nor did it investigate cost-effectiveness of the recommended policy measures.

(g) Both in the Indian and Pakistan armies, the participation of the top military brass would be necessary for successful military interventions, including coups, because of the respect that rank and seniority command.74

The remainder of Chapter 3 will cover the following issues: first, why we preferred the comparative method; second, why we chose to compare India with Pakistan; third, the essential elements of the preferred topic, see, Morris Rosenberg, 1968.

74There is adequate historical evidence to support this assumption. In India, instances of friction between the armed forces and the elected leadership have been restricted to the Chiefs of Staffs and the Cabinet Ministers. In Pakistan, coup attempts by junior officers have been disastrous failures. For a lucid analysis of this aspect, see Dawn , Karachi, Editorial Column, 16 November 1995.
methodology, particularly its limitations; fourth, the research questions and how we intend to address them.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The central policy question, identified earlier, drives the research design. To address it meaningfully, we need to develop rich, differentiated explanations about how and about why the Indian military remained under civilian control. This does not necessarily involve theory-building, but our findings should bear directly on some of our broader theoretical concerns.

We could investigate the "puzzle" of the Indian Army's abstention through an intensive study of India alone. However, in order to capture important, intervening variables, special conditions, or idiosyncratic factors, it would be necessary to compare India with another country that has experienced military interventions. By so doing, it is easier to test rival hypotheses, and ensure a measure of plausibility-reduction of some hypotheses. It would also be possible to identify the intervening variables, or special conditions that generate different outcomes for the same set of explanatory variables. For example, if frequent employment of the military to restore internal law and order favored coups in Pakistan, what were the special conditions that prevented coups in India, even when the Indian Army was frequently and extensively used in internal security duties? The answers to these questions require differentiated explanations, which the comparative method is better able to generate.

When we assert that two countries are "similar," we recognize that similarity is a relative term. In comparing India with Pakistan, we follow the principles set forth by Mattei Dogan, that (a) the countries be situated at a similar level of development; that (b) the countries in general, and their military organizations in particular, have common roots; and that the countries display some structural and cultural homogeneity.75 The analysis of two countries that are "relatively

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75Dogan, pp. 117-118. It is easy to establish Pakistan's cultural homogeneity, particularly after the secession of the former East Pakistan. The cultural influence of Islam is pervasive in Pakistan. Although India appears culturally heterogeneous, sanskritization
similar" helps us achieve two objectives: first, it enables us to neutralize certain differences, and thus, to conduct an in-depth analysis of the others; second, it permits us to analyze deviant cases, that is, where similar explanatory variables have yielded different outcomes.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

(a) What are the variables and the associated conditions that favored military interventions in Pakistan, and their absence in India?
(b) What are the perceptions of senior, retired Indian officers about military interventions in Pakistan, and their absence in India?
(c) What are the domains in which (a) and (b) match and those they do not? How do we explain the latter?
(d) What are the policy implications of (c) above?
(e) What are the attitudes of senior Indian army officers toward certain important issues in civil-military relations (social status, recruitment, compensation, employment in internal security duties, army/police clashes etc.)? Are there any discernible patterns?
(f) Policy implications of (e) above.

It was then necessary to gather the available data that would enable us to explore the above issues in some detail. The tasks were as follows:

(a) Collect data on variables that were identified as relevant to India and Pakistan.

(Brahmanical influence) has had an all-pervading influence in India throughout its history. For example, numerous invaders, such as the Huns, were sanskritized and absorbed into the Indian composite culture. Although, Islam stubbornly resisted such assimilation, the mores of Indian Muslims have been influenced substantially by the contemporaneous Indian culture. Thus, it is reasonable to posit a degree of cultural homogeneity in India. For an erudite analysis of the impact of India on Islam, see Rafiq Zakaria, The Struggle within Islam: the conflict between religion and politics, Penguin, London, 1989.
(b) Compare the data for India and Pakistan to determine whether or not they are similar, or different. In either case, suitable hypotheses will be developed and tested, that is, why similar conditions produced different outcomes, and whether different conditions favored the different outcomes.

(c) Cases where similar variables (frequency of employment in internal security duties, for example) have yielded different outcomes will be examined further to discover any intervening variables, or conditions that might have favored such outcomes.

(d) Analyze specific survey responses to determine, according to officers' perceptions, the reasons for the Pakistan military's intervention, and the Indian military's abstention. Compare these responses with the previous findings. If there are wide divergences, explain these by a process of elaboration (informed speculation, combined with systematic tests). Tease out policy implications.

(e) Analyze the survey responses to determine whether there is a pattern. Specifically, look for trends on attitudes to important issues in civil-military relations, and for similarity and differences among groups of officers (by branch, by rank, and by years of retirement etc). Do we discern any disturbing trends? What are the policy implications?

METHODOLOGY

This research employs a combination of the comparative method, as amplified by the method of structured focused comparison, and statistical analysis to address the policy question. These methods are complementary, not competitive, because the findings of the comparative method can be independently compared with those generated by the survey.

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The comparative analyst deals with problems in which (1) the number of cases is too small to permit statistical analysis; and (2) the data cannot be controlled experimentally. This method has two important properties. First, the more similar the countries being compared are with respect to variables of interest, the better placed is the analyst to isolate and analyze the influence of other variables that might account for the differences she intends to explain. Second, a common configuration of characteristics, particularly cultural kinship, or historical heritage, gives meaning and substance to comparisons between similar countries.\(^78\)

Structured focused comparison is a refinement of the comparative method, with a focus on controlled comparison. This combines disciplined configurative and analytic inductive approaches. While the former attempts to explain military intervention in terms of general variables, the latter examines, in light of available empirical evidence, how intervention actually occurred, and why and under what conditions intervention had failed or succeeded. The strong empirical base in this approach renders it more suitable to guide policy actions.

The disciplined-configurative approach, which is essentially deductive in character, helps identify the conditions and the variables that enter into a controlled comparison. At this stage, we should determine the dependent and the independent variables, and the potential intervening variables, the variables that will be held constant, and which will be allowed to vary.

We need also to formulate general questions whose answers will furnish additional data for further analysis. For example, questions about the strength and the number of political parties, or about the number of elections, might yield insight into mass participation in political processes. It will then be possible, not only to develop tentative hypotheses, but through "plausibility probes,"\(^79\) to assess

\(^78\)While discussing the selection of cases for controlled comparison, Lipshart argues that the study of sectors within a single nation offers the ideal setting. India and Pakistan were part of the same nation for many centuries, and thus, they provide the nearest approximation of the setting suggested by Lipshart.

\(^79\) Harry Eckstein, "Case study and Theory in Political Science," in
the potential validity of alternative hypotheses, and select the more valid ones both for further research and rigorous testing. Because of the complexity of the phenomenon and the multiplicity of confounding factors, it would be unrealistic to attempt an outright confirmation of particular hypotheses. On the other hand, one can approximate an explanation through a process of falsification. As elegantly summed up by Alexander George, "the plausibility of an explanation is enhanced to the extent that alternative explanations are considered and found to be less consistent with the data/or less supportable by available generalizations."  

Specifying the Model

Military intervention will serve as the dependent variable in our analysis. However, military intervention can also serve as an explanatory variable, particularly in assessing the relationship between intervention and an economic variable, such as defense expenditure, which in this context becomes the dependent variable. For example, certain political factors might trigger military intervention, which in turn might stimulate defense expenditure. Social, political, economic, religious, ethnic, and other miscellaneous factors, such as the international environment, are some of the independent variables. Relationships, rather than causality, are of the essence. While the focus will be on asymmetric relationships, reciprocal relationships will also be considered as they would contribute substantially to the understanding of "intervention." Investigation from correlation to causation will proceed via disconfirmation. For example, if the correlation between two variables is zero, the credibility of the proposition implying causal relationship between them is lessened. Thus, a relatively simple correlational approach can provide a


George, p. 57.

"Rosenberg puts it laconically: "It is sufficient to know that the chicken and egg are responsible for one another without confronting the problem of which came first." See, Rosenberg, p. 9.
preliminary test of causation, and those that survive this can be further analyzed.82

Because India has not witnessed any outright military intervention in its post-independence history, it can be considered as a deviant case for analytic purposes. If variables that might have caused intervention in Pakistan have not done so in India, the intervening variables or the conditions that might have yielded different outcomes in India's case can be identified and analyzed.

THE SURVEY METHOD

This survey is intended to capture the perceptions of senior army officers on important issues in civil-military relations. The survey is both unique and important, because such a simple random sample of retired, senior Indian officers has never been generated before. We assume that, in the final analysis, the perceptions of officer would determine whether or not they would intervene in politics. The survey targets two groups: a simple random sample of all retired army officers of the rank of brigadier and above; and a focus group of some selected politicians, bureaucrats, and armed forces officers. This focus group, by virtue of its diverse experience in handling real world issues might provide more informed insights into leadership attitudes, in light of which we can evaluate the survey findings.

The survey also examines the differences in perceptions between subgroups of officers. Specifically, it examines whether the above differences are pronounced between branches/services (armor, artillery, infantry etc), between ranks, or between years since retirement. We may thus be able to identify patterns and trends that might have important policy implications.

To achieve the goal of capturing perceptions of senior officers on important issues in civil-military relations, ideally, the following conditions will have to be met:

82 For an excellent analysis of this technique, see, Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1963,pp. 64-66.
(a) The questionnaire should incorporate issues, derived from relevant, theoretical propositions, and those that will be qualitatively analyzed.

(b) The survey sample should be representative of the senior officer population; the responses of these officers will be compared with the views of the focus group which was selected on the basis of its expertise in, and exposure to, policy formulations and decision-making at higher levels of the Indian government. Given the novelty of the survey, it is necessary to ensure that appropriate issues and attitudes could be measured.

The following guidelines were observed in developing a survey instrument:

(a) A balanced questionnaire was crafted comprising simple, intelligible, clear questions that were neither loaded nor leading.

(b) Where unavoidable, hypothetical questions were sparingly used to tie attitudes to some realistic contingencies (for example, total collapse of civil administration).

(c) A no-opinion option was offered.

(d) Open follow-ups to closed questions were used.

In addition, the questionnaire was pretested and ambiguous, unclear phrases were suitably replaced. A copy of the questionnaire is attached at Appendix B.\(^3\) The focus group is at Appendix C.

Data

Chapter 2 identified an array of variables that might explain the propensity for military intervention, such as the degree of professionalism, the ethnic composition of the army, frequency of employment in aid of civil power, military centrality, etc. These

variables were identified in light of extant theoretical propositions on military intervention in domestic politics, and more specifically, in light of their relevance to the Indian sub-continent. Based on these variables, tentative hypotheses were generated. Data pertaining to relevant variables embedded in these hypotheses were collected and the latter tested.

The data pertaining to these variables were classified broadly into qualitative and quantitative categories. Qualitative data on bureaucratic control, and cultural influence of the religion, were derived from historical evidence, interview of focus groups and such primary sources as memoirs. Evidence from multiple sources, including but not limited to episodic and anecdotal cases, was cross-checked both for reliability and accuracy before accepting the plausibility of explanations embedded in various hypotheses. In this regard, the inputs from focus group are of special relevance, because they provide organizational as well as policy contexts for some landmark decisions. Some quantitative data supported qualitative analysis, as well. For example, we operationalized military centrality into specific indicators, such as the ratio of defense expenditure to gross national product, and the ratio of the military to overall population.

For quantitative data, we relied on several sources, the most important being The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.\textsuperscript{84} The authors have used such diverse, standard sources as the New York Times Index, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Asian Recorder, Africa Diary etc. The coding has been done by specially trained graduate students, and painstakingly checked for accuracy. The main strength of the data is that variables of interest are available both in annual and aggregated forms. The aggregated data for particular variables, such as defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), are not very useful in capturing the yearly trends. Nevertheless, on balance, these data suit this work eminently, because they include most of the variables, identified in Chapter 2.

Data that are available from Indian and Pakistani publications are sketchy, and often unreliable. It is widely believed that both countries tend to underplay data about their defense expenditures, or arms transfers from other countries. Moreover, much of the data pertaining to the armed forces are classified. Memoirs and historical accounts tend to be biased, and make no mention of "sensitive" issues, such as the representation of various ethnic groups in the armed forces. Nevertheless, where considered necessary, we have compared the data from the World Handbook with those gleaned from the Indian and Pakistani sources. Data about defense expenditure and arms transfers have been compiled from sources, such as the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook, and the publications of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. However, some of these reports have been disputed by Indian scholars.\textsuperscript{65} Thus, we need to exercise our own judgment in evaluating these data.

The survey data are quite accurate. It was possible to identify the senior, retired army officer population (Officers who were commissioned between 1934-1961), and to generate a simple random sample size of about 300 officers. The respondents were quite comfortable with the military phrases and idioms that were used. This was quite evident during the pre-testing of the draft questionnaire. In addition, since the questionnaire was framed by a former Indian army officer, the inherent difficulties of shared definitions were minimal.

We also recognize certain limitations of this methodology. First, since the focus of the dissertation is on the differences of attitudes between Indian and Pakistani officers, ideally, an identical survey should have been conducted in Pakistan, as well. Second, we cannot wish away the problems of recall on the part of officers, particularly those affected by old age and senility. Third, two or more surveys should have been conducted at different time periods to help us evaluate the changes in perceptions over time.\textsuperscript{66} Last but not least, it is almost


\textsuperscript{66}Since we are surveying officers who served at different time periods, even a cross-sectional survey might yield interesting conclusions on how officer attitudes toward certain issues on civil-
impossible to capture all of the confounding factors; thus, our quest is for conditions that might favor military interventions—not necessarily for those that cause such interventions. By the same token, we hope to come up with differentiated explanations for military interventions in Pakistan, and their absence in India, more by way of illuminating extant theoretical propositions than by theory building.

Interviewing retired officers has distinct advantages, however. The interviewees were more forthright and forthcoming than they might have been while in active service. They were less inhibited in expressing their views on "sensitive" topics. More important, they were able to view the issues in civil-military relations from a more detached perspective, less hindered by a conflict of interest, and reassured by the fact that they did not necessarily have to toe the government line. On balance, interviewing retired officers provided an imperfect but nonetheless valuable source of insight and data.

Notwithstanding the possible limitations noted above, this methodology appears workable because it enables us to verify the findings of qualitative analysis against those of quantitative analysis, and it points up important aspects for policy action. By applying these methodologies, Chapter 4 will try to identify the factors and variables that might explain the "puzzle."

military relations might have changed over time. For example, if we analyze the attitudes of two groups of officers, those that retired between 1960 and 1970, and between 1970 and 1980, we might discover significant changes, which can then be generalized. That is, it would, then, be fair to approximate time-trends for those sets of attitudes, without having to conduct a follow-up survey at a different time period.
4. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

While Chapter 2 identified the factors and variables that are most relevant to our study, Chapter 3 presented an overview of the methodology used to address the research objectives. In this Chapter, we employ the method of structured focused comparison, to evaluate the Indian and Pakistani cases, drawing on an array of historical evidence. In particular, we focused on some of the core issues identified in Chapter 2 that might help explain the variation between the two cases. These are: political culture, social mobilization, military centrality, cultural influence of Islam, ethnic composition of the military, participation in military security pacts. The main purpose was to develop differentiated explanations for the "puzzle," of Pakistani army's intervention, and Indian army's abstention, not to build a new theory.

POLITICAL CULTURE

Political culture is considered first because it affects, and in turn, is influenced by almost all of the other identified variables. Political culture is represented by a set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that inform political processes. Political culture is also characterized by the assumptions and rules that govern political behavior in a political system. The relationship between a political culture and its political structures, or institutions is reciprocal: while political institutions reflect the political culture, the latter is also shaped by the former. In multi-cultural societies, political cultures "differ according to the extent to which they permit such minorities to preserve their separate identities while meeting the expected standards of integration."^87

Last but not least, political culture^88 in some societies, reflects people's faith in the charismatic powers of leadership. We will now

^88Finer uses a four-fold classification of political culture:
analyze the political cultures of India and Pakistan in light of the preceding criteria. In so doing, we will test the following hypothesis: Does less developed political culture favor military intervention in politics?

**Popular Base for the Major Political Party**

Consensus was basic to the culture of the Indian National Congress, which spearheaded the Indian Freedom Movement: reconciliation between the "extremists" led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and the "moderates" led by Gopal Krishna Gokhale. Mohandas Gandhi chose the golden mean between the extremists and the moderates, and transformed what was essentially an elitist movement into a mass program: the non-cooperation and the civil-disobedience movements, for example. Gandhi not only identified himself with the common man, but adopted a style that was rooted in the Indian culture of accommodation and compromise. In the elections of 1937, Congress, led by Gandhi, formed governments in eight of the 11 provinces. A large number of Muslims voted for Congress, despite the Muslim League's clarion call for all of the Muslim votes. Thus, the Indian National Congress was able to build a secular, nationwide popular base.

By contrast, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, appealed to the religious sentiments of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. Unlike the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League had little experience in managing democratic organizations. There was little discussion or debate among the leadership of the Muslim League. Although in the elections of 1945-46, the Muslim League captured 446 out of 496 provincial seats in the Muslim majority provinces of the country, the main bases of support were located in provinces that remained parts of India after the partition of the country in 1947. Thus, the Muslim

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mature, developed, low, and minimal. In mature cultures, public support for military intervention is unobtainable. In developed cultures, although civil procedures and public authorities are well rooted, intervention is possible. The military would have to overcome strong public resistance, however. In low political cultures, military interventions would not be unwelcome, and in minimal political cultures, any government can ignore public opinion with impunity. Finer, pp.78-80.

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69 In fact, at the time of the creation of Pakistan, the North West
League, which was the main political party instrumental in creating a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, had very little popular base in what became West and East Pakistan.

**Nurturing Democratic Institutions**

After independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, made secular politics the main plank of the Indian government's policy, nurtured democratic institutions within the Congress party as well as in national politics, expedited the framing and the ratification of India's first constitution within three years of independence, and held the first general elections, based on adult suffrage. However, India has had its share of authoritarianism. It started with the dismissal of communist government in Kerala in 1959, and culminated in the declaration of a nineteen-month emergency by Indira Gandhi in June 1975. The only redeeming feature of this latter dark period was Indira Gandhi's willingness to hold free elections and her subsequent acceptance of defeat with grace.

By contrast to the Indian experience, Governor General Jinnah concentrated all powers in himself. The real decision-making lay with him, not with the chosen representatives of the people. Jinnah assumed powers to overrule the legislative assembly, which, as the constitution-

Frontier Province had a Congress government in place. In Punjab, the cross-communal Unionist Party had ruled the province since the 1920s without interruption.

Nehru overcame pressure from the Congress right wing, which, after the communal carnage of 1947, was reluctant to treat Indian Muslims as equals of Hindus. Because he enjoyed a national support base, Nehru could translate his vision of secular India into a coherent policy by granting Muslims and other minorities equal rights in the Constitution of India.

In the first national election of 1952, the voter turnout was 45%. Since then, it has steadily risen to about 61%. Thus, frequent elections at the state and national levels have sensitized even the illiterate rural population to the use of political power, and helped internalize democratic values. See, Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, and Robert C. Oberst. *Government and Politics in South Asia*, Vanguard Books, Islamabad, 1988, pp. 51-52. The increase in voter turn-out as a percentage of adult population is also confirmed by Paul Brass. See, Paul Brass, *The Politics of India since Independence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 90.
making body and the sovereign authority, could amend laws, as well as restrict the governor-general’s powers. This ambiguity continued until 1954, when, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad disbanded the Constituent Assembly. Jinnah neither had the time nor the inclination to choose the second rung of leadership. Instead, he relied heavily on bureaucrats to run the administration. This created a political vacuum which gradually expanded over time.

In Pakistan, after nine years of temporization and a tortured debate about creating an Islamic State, the first constitution came into effect in March 1956. This constitution was short-lived, however. It was abrogated in 1958 as a consequence of the military coup. In 1962, another constitution was adopted, only to be suspended in 1969, and eventually to be abrogated in 1972. The fourth constitution of Pakistan was promulgated in April 1973. When General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Zia suspended the operation of this constitution. In 1985, Zia promulgated the Revival of Constitution of 1973 Order, which dramatically increased the powers of the president.

As far as regular elections were concerned, Pakistan’s record was even more dismal than its experience in constitution-framing. The government delayed a poll for three years (until 1954) in the former East Pakistan, when it became clear that the Muslim League had lost influence there. The scheduled elections of 1959 were preempted by the military coup of 1958. Thereafter until 1970, there were no national elections (discounting the election of basic democrats under the Ayub regime).

Thus, as Larry Diamond argues, at the time of independence, although Pakistan’s elite was no less committed to democracy than India’s, in the absence of political institutions, democracy was never given a chance to take firm root in the body politic. For example, when “the November Mass Movement in Pakistan,” spearheaded by a politically mobilized group of lawyers, engineers, doctors, and teachers brought down the regime of President Ayub Khan, there was a political

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vacuum on account of the failure of party system and legislative processes. The military quickly stepped into this vacuum.\textsuperscript{93}

**Absorbing Minorities and Linguistic Groups into the National Mainstream**

The political leadership in power in India, after independence, opted for a secular state to allay the anxiety of the minorities. Until the late 1970s, at least, the religious minorities had shown little inclination for fundamentalism, and chose instead to join the mainstream of Indian politics. In dealing with minorities and numerous linguistic groups, Indian policy was informed by its more developed political culture, in which accommodation was the guiding concept. Nehru was initially reluctant to agree to the reorganization of the Indian states on a linguistic basis lest it undermine the integrity of the fledgling state. However, when Potti Sriramulu, the Telugu leader, went on a hunger strike, and eventually died, Nehru relented and accepted the reorganization of states on linguistic basis.

The States Reorganization triggered regional chauvinism, and released centrifugal forces in the political arena. For example, in Bombay, the Maharashtra majority intimidated the enterprising South Indian community that had captured small-scale businesses, such as catering. The unresolved border dispute between Maharashtra and Karnataka often took ugly, violent turns. On balance, however, the reorganization of states has satisfied the aspirations of diverse language communities of India, without seriously endangering national integrity.

National integration in Pakistan should have been relatively straightforward, because there was a strong rallying point in Islam. However, Pakistan dealt with ethnic minorities in a ham-handed manner. For example, Jinnah's pronouncement of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan irritated most of the non-muhajir people in West Pakistan as it did the Bengali "non-Biharis" in East Pakistan. In 1954, the

ministerial group at the center decided to amalgamate West Pakistan into
one political unit, primarily to neutralize Bengali demands for greater
provincial autonomy. This aroused deep Bengali resentment. Yahya Khan
presided over the final act of the Bengali alienation: East Pakistan
seceded, following the army crackdown on Bengalis, who revolted against
Yahya’s refusal to honor the people’s verdict in the national elections
of 1970.94

Pakistan was also unsuccessful in effectively integrating ethnic
communities of Sindh, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) into its national polity. Sindh experienced considerable influx
of refugees (known as muhajirs) from India, who, being better educated
and trained, were tough competitors for jobs. Muhajirs retained their
culture and language and often ignored local customs and traditions,
thereby arousing, Sindhri resentment. This was further aggravated by the
allotment of land in Sindh for retired civil and military officers. At
the present time, Karachi continues to be plagued by violence and arson.
Some Sindhi leaders have set up anti-government organization abroad,
which could potentially initiate secessionist movements. In
Baluchistan, as early as 1958, the Khan (local ruler) of Kalat tried to
secede. Later, the guerrillas waged a war for four years (1973-1977),
tying down almost 100,000 troops. Although President Zia declared
amnesty for the guerrillas, the situation could again deteriorate: the
secessionist movement in Sindh could easily spill over to Baluchistan.
Although the "separatist movement" in NWFP predated Pakistan's
independence, President Zia's policy of Islamisation, and non-
interference in Pathan tribal affairs has helped maintain a semblance of

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94Jalal argues that, even though Pakistan was forced to review the
poor representation of non-Punjabis in non-elected institutions, such as
the armed forces, it failed to give adequate representation to East
Pakistan. During the Ayub era, Bengalis still constituted only 5 per
cent of the officer corps of the army, 15 per cent in the air force, and
20 per cent in the navy. See, Jahan, Rounaq: Pakistan: Failure in
stability there. Political unrest in the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Swat is growing, however.⁹⁵

CALIBER OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The Indian political leadership had ample experience in nurturing political institutions. The leadership had matured in the demanding school of accommodation and consensus. National leaders, such as Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, had nationwide, mass appeal. The common man even worshipped these leaders. In his seventeen years of stewardship, Nehru gave India the much needed political stability that, inter alia, ensured that democratic norms were firmly entrenched and that a second rung of political leadership, put in place: a rare achievement which became the envy of many developing nations, including Pakistan.⁹⁶ Consequently, regardless of the political turmoil India has experienced in the last decade, constitutional provisions were almost always upheld. Specifically, the frequent changes of government have always taken place in accordance with the constitution.⁹⁷

In contrast, after the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951, Pakistan has been unlucky in not having capable political leadership. The inadequacy of political leadership is best summarized by Gen K.M. Arif: "the Muslim League leadership behaved like a bunch of minions, unable to meet the challenge of time. Political bankruptcy was writ large in their behavior. Devoid of enlightened leadership, the Muslim League went into limbo."⁹⁸ The military-bureaucratic axis was

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⁹⁵Recently, Pakistani army took over the administration in Gilgit and imposed indefinite curfew after widespread rioting, calling for self-rule. As a result, Pakistani authorities suspended trade union rights in the area, provoking widespread protests from British MPs, PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir) political groups. See, "Pakistan Army Takes Over Gilgit After Riots," The Hindu Index, Front Page Briefs, 8 July 1996.


⁹⁷After the recent general elections (1996), the government formed by the Bharatiya Janatha Party lasted only two weeks; this party was smoothly replaced by the Left Front, a loose coalition of secularists, without any political upheaval, or domestic violence. This change over is a tribute to the mature democratic processes in India.

becoming more and more assertive and dominant. Public opinion, which has a prominent place in the Westminster model, carried no weight on the decisions of the government. Prime Minister Liaquat’s failure to frame a constitution and to hold elections was bad enough. But Governor General Nazimuddin, who took over as Prime Minister after Liaquat Ali Khan’s death, fared worse, and could not grapple with the manifold economic, social, and political problems confronting him.

The preceding comparison of India’s and Pakistan’s political culture presents sharp contrasts. Unlike the Congress Party in India, the Muslim League in Pakistan did not have a mass base in the provinces that became part of Pakistan; Pakistan was less successful than was India in integrating the disparate ethnic groups, particularly the Bengalis, into the national mainstream; the people of Pakistan failed to give themselves a constitution until 1956; Pakistan failed to have national elections until 1970, and finally, the political leadership of Pakistan nearly collapsed after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, thus paving the way for the pre-existing military-bureaucracy nexus to shift, albeit figuratively, the national decision-making center from Karachi, the Federal capital, to Rawalpindi, the General Military Headquarters.99

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

As discussed in Chapter 2, Karl Deutsch coined the term “social mobilization,” to indicate the level of development, such as urbanization, rise of mass education, development of money economy, and increased mass participation in social and political activities. Putnam prejudice against politicians is understandable, but almost identical views of the politicians are held by Ayesha Jalal, and Hasan Askari Rizvi. See, Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 139-140 and Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1976, pp. 81-82.

99For a scathing indictment of Pakistan’s political leadership after Liaquat Ali Khan, see Stephen Cohen The Pakistan Army, 1984, p. 50. Cohen cites an anecdote summarizing the conversation between M.A. Bogra, the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan, and a serving Major General. Bogra was pleasing with the Major General not to obey the Governor General, in
concluded that social mobilization increased the prospects of civilian rule. Jackman modified Putnam by positing that, although social mobilization has a destabilizing influence, this can be considerably mitigated by two political factors: mass participation in political processes, and the strength of political parties. In positing this, Jackman rebutted Huntington's prescription for political stability: to restrict, or to control political mobilization.

This concept was conceptualized by Deutsch, and operationalized by Taylor and Jodice, who have also compiled the relevant data. The hypothesis to be tested is: Does social mobilization stimulate coups?

We prefer a comparative, graphic analysis of these indicators to trace the paths of social mobilization in India and Pakistan. The following indicators have been operationalized:

(a) Figure 1. School enrollment, primary and secondary, as a percentage of school age population;
(b) Figure 2. Newspaper per 1000 population;
(c) Figure 3. Radios per 1000 population;
(d) Figure 4. Movie attendance per capita;
(e) Figure 5. Telephones per 1000 population;
(f) Figure 6. Domestic mail per capita;
(g) Figure 7. Foreign mail per capita; and
(h) Figure 8. Urban population, that is, percentage of population in cities of 100,000 people or more. ¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ The data sets were read from the RAND online File C-670, World Handbook of Political & Social Indicators, III, 1948-1982.
INDICATORS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Figure 1. Enrollment as % of school age population

Figure 2. Newspaper/1000 population

Figure 3. Radios per 1000 population

Figure 4. Movie attendance/Capita

Figure 5. Telephones per 1000 population

Figure 6. Domestic mail/capita

Figure 7. Foreign mail/capita

Figure 8. Urban Population>100,000
In school enrollment and movie attendance (Figures 1 and 4), India has been clearly and constantly ahead of Pakistan. But, in India, the increased levels of mobilization in these fields have been matched by two additional factors Jackman identified: strength of the political parties (although, all other parties had been virtually eclipsed by the Congress Party), and mass participation in politics (which was evidenced by the regularly conducted elections, based on adult franchise).

Other indicators, particularly the pace of urbanization, and foreign mail, place Pakistan ahead of India. In Pakistan's case, the trend lines also uniformly show sharp rises after 1960. These rising trends were not compensated by the strength of political institutions, however. In fact, in the late 1960s, this asymmetry between the pace of social mobilization and the development of political institutions led to nationwide strikes against the Ayub regime (the unfavorable outcome of the 1965 war, and the growing alienation of East Pakistan could, well have been, the other contributing factors for this unrest). Even though Ayub had to retire from politics, the bankruptcy of political leadership, the dearth of political institutions, and the corporate interests of the armed forces that had tasted "blood," prevented a smooth transition to civilian rule. By contrast, after Nehru's death in 1964, India witnessed a smooth leadership transition.

The available evidence, therefore, supports Jackman's interpretation in his rebuttal of Huntington, that is, in order to strengthen civilian rule, political and social mobilization should advance in parallel with one another: neither should unduly lag behind.

The discussion in the preceding paragraphs seems to validate the hypothesis that a less developed political culture brings about both instability and political vacuum, into which the military could enter. Yet, we need to consider other situations, where similar conditions have yielded different outcomes. For example, in the past two decades, the Indian political system has been steadily decaying.

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101 The downward trend after 1971 in almost all of the Pakistan graphs is because of the secession of Bangladesh, in which there was a higher degree of social mobilization than was in West Pakistan.
destroyed the political institutions that her father had assiduously
cultivated. She declared "emergency" for almost 10 painful months.
During this period, citizens' basic freedoms were violated with
impunity, press was gagged, and personal scores were settled with a
large number of political opponents by suspending habeas corpus. Rajiv
Gandhi, Indira Gandhi's successor and son, was so tainted with alleged
kickbacks from a defense contract, that he could not lead his party to
power in 1989, even though five years earlier, his party, the Indian
National Congress, had secured the largest number of seats ever in the
national elections. India has the dubious distinction of being placed
among the top 10 countries of the world, where corruption is rampant.
Politics has been criminalized, and criminals politicized. In the
latest scandal, just on the eve of 1996 elections, as many as six
ministers, former ministers, former President, and a large number of
bureaucrats were named as beneficiaries of bribes from businessmen who
had violated foreign exchange regulations.102

The political stability of the country, therefore, has been
fragile; coalition governments did not work satisfactorily between 1989-
1991. Although the insurgency in Punjab has been brought under control,
a debilitating revolt is continuing in Kashmir. Because of the
demolition of an ancient mosque in Uttar Pradesh, and the Government's
ambivalent policy toward Muslim personal laws, the Muslim minority is
considerably alienated.103 Terrorist activities have spread across the

102There is an abundance of literature chronicling the decay of the
Indian political system. See, Seshan, T.N. The Degeneration of India,
1992), Abhinav, New Delhi, 1993. For Indira Gandhi's legacy, see, John-
Thor Dahlburg, "Indira Gandhi's Troubled India Legacy," The Los Angeles
Times, World Report, October 25, 1994, p.3. For the decay of the
political system, see Inder Malhotra, "Political Commentary: Dismal
Drama in U.P." The Times of India, June 8, 1995. For the latest scandal
about corruption at Ministerial levels in the Indian government, see

103Most of the Hindu-Muslim riots in India are triggered more by
political rivalries than are by "historical animosity." In fact, there
is abundant evidence to suggest that unscrupulous politicians, bent on
building vote banks in their respective constituencies, contrive such
riots. For an objective analysis, see Dhar, Maloy Krishna, "Anatomy of
Communal Riots," The Hindustan Times, Calcutta, India, June 9, 1996.
length and breadth of the country. In spite of the prevalence of these destabilizing conditions, which are indicative of a significant decay in the political culture, Indian military has stood aloof from politics. That is, in India’s case, similar conditions as might have triggered military intervention in Pakistan (political instability, erosion of political leadership, and rampant corruption) yielded a different outcome: military abstention. We, therefore, need to analyze other conditions that might have produced these different outcomes in order to develop a satisfactory explanation.

**MILITARY CENTRALITY**

In Chapter 2, we identified military centrality as one of the internal variables that could influence the military to intervene in politics. Although military centrality is determined by many factors, such as the size, the cohesion, the budgetary claims of the military, its relative status in the bureaucracy, and its autonomy from civilian leaders, it is also closely linked to the military’s ability to safeguard corporate interests, the degree of professionalism, and the politico-military and socio-economic perceptions of senior military officers. Thus, we have treated military centrality as a summary variable comprising the size and the budgetary claims of the military, its corporate interests, professionalism, and senior officers’ perceptions on important issues in civil-military relations (recruitment policy, relations with civil bureaucracy, quality of senior officers’ leadership, higher defense control organization, to name a few.

One important indicator, for example, is the military’s size and budgetary claims. They are best explained by two data sets that have been graphed in Figure 9 (military expenditure as a percentage of GNP), and in Figure 10 (military manpower as a percentage of working population).
INDICATORS OF MILITARY CENTRALITY

PAKISTAN

Figure 9. MILITARY EXPENDITURE/GNP RATIO

Figure 10. MILITARY MANPOWER/WORKPOP RATIO

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND MANPOWER
Pakistan's trend lines far exceed those of India both in military expenditure and military manpower. No doubt Pakistan's security concerns, particularly because of India's hostility, foreign policy, and size, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, are far graver than are India's, which might justify its higher budget; but military's dominance is demonstrated by other factors, as well. For example, Pakistan has always had a separate Pay Commission for the armed forces, that is, the latter enjoyed a preferential treatment with regard to pay and allowances vis-a-vis their civilian counterparts.104

Military Corporate Interests

We also sought to test the hypothesis:

Does the military's proclivity to safeguard its corporate interests favor its intervention in domestic politics?

Two conflicting strands of thought describe the threats to Pakistan military's corporate interests. Rizvi argues that despite resource constraints, the military's requirements were always met by various governments. He backs up this argument by citing the annual defense budgets, which had progressively increased over time.105 Rizvi adds that Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan reaffirmed the civilian control over the military by dealing firmly with those involved in the Rawalpindi conspiracy case,106 with the willing support of the military brass, notably General Ayub Khan.107 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema underscores Prime

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104 For a comparative analysis of pay and pensions of Indian and Pakistan officers see, Chibber, p.198. The pay and pension of Indian 2/1t were Rs 1795 and Rs 697, whereas in the case of the Pakistan counterpart, they were Rs 2125, and Rs 2440. In higher ranks, the differentials were even more. Since then, it is believed that the disparity has increased substantially in Pakistan's favor. Interview with a retired Indian Army General, May 1995.

105 For a comparative analysis of defense budgets of India and Pakistan, see Rizvi, Table VI, p.56.

106 In 1951, a group of Army and Air Force officers, led by Major General Akbar Khan, tried to overthrow the government. Major General Akbar Khan had a major role in the military operations in Jammu and Kashmir, and was apparently dissatisfied with the Pakistan government's handling of the Kashmir problem. The coup was put down promptly.

107 Rizvi, p.86. The supportive reaction of the military brass
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's concern about meeting the needs of the Armed Forces, even if meant allocating up to 75 per cent of the budget. 108 Cohen reinforces his earlier finding that there was little justification in the military intervening in politics, as the politicians in military matters, and that the politicians first broke this rule "by meddling foolishly in military matters." 109 Jalal marshals cogent arguments to theorize that the military-bureaucratic nexus checkmated the evolution of political institutions to safeguard their respective corporate interests. 110 In support of her central argument she suggests that "if the fifties saw senior civil servants and army officials adopting a blueprint for a state structure geared to supporting a political economy of defense, the interplay of domestic, regional and international factors in the eighties enabled the Zia regime to bring the scheme to virtual fruition." 111 Samina Ahmed offers a similar view, positing that after Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, the military, in conjunction with the civil bureaucracy, began to demonstrate its dominance over other political forces. 112

Cohen's reiteration that the politicians were the first to meddle first in military matters does not seem to be supported by evidence. No doubt, Ayub superseded some officers to become the Commander-in-Chief. But this is not unusual in parliamentary democracies. Civilian control over the military was demonstrated when those found guilty in the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, including Major General Akbar Khan, were dealt with firmly. The military was repeatedly employed in aid of civil power. Again, this was not an extraordinary development in a newly-born

indicates that the military viewed this episode as a disciplinary problem, not a threat to its corporate interests.

111Ibid., p.326.
112Ibid., p.326.
nation-state, because the police forces were simply inadequate and ill-equipped to deal with such tasks. Some politicians did try to exploit the feelings of a few disgruntled generals; but the latter were weeded out by Ayub. There is no evidence of any large scale efforts on the part of recognized political leaders to draw the army into politics either by cultivating senior officers, or by infiltrating into its rank and file. If anything, a meek and non-assertive civilian leadership gave unfettered powers to Ayub, who eliminated all of his potential opponents and promoted his favorites more on grounds of loyalty than on merit. Thus, if anything, the politicians were remiss of omission-- not commission, ("meddling") as implied by Cohen.¹¹³

Although Rizvi claims that the military budget was sanctioned by the political leaders every year, the passage of this budget was not smooth. In the military's perception, the politicians were looking for an opportunity to scale down military expenditure.¹¹⁴ In addition, politicians' failure both to resolve the Kashmir dispute favorably, and to obtain military hardware from abroad, lost them the respect and the confidence of the armed forces. The latter, in turn, became increasingly assertive of their corporate interests. Even after Ayub Khan was safely installed as the President, he was careful to maintain the corporate interests of the military. For example, defense expenditure increased steadily, and senior military officers were given lucrative posts at home and abroad. In order to maintain the support of the civil-military bureaucracies, Ayub increased their pay, and generously awarded them agricultural land-grants.¹¹⁵ The military's proclivity to safeguard their corporate interests persisted even after the downfall of the Ayub Regime in 1969. By then, even though Zulfiqar Bhutto, a charismatic leader of national stature, had clearly

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National University, June 1988, p. 97.


¹¹⁴ Samina Ahmed, p.55.

¹¹⁵ For an incisive account of how the land reforms of 1959 were, in fact, intended to ingratiate the regime with middle-size landlords, see
established himself in the political center-stage, General Yahya Khan suspended the constitution, and declared martial law. General Zia-ul-Haq’s seizure of power, in 1977, when, both a new constitution and a legitimate government (Zulfiqar Bhutto) were in place, was another manifestation of the military asserting itself to safeguard its corporate interests. The emerging pattern is clear: once the military attains dominance over other political forces, it will not only strive to maintain the dominance, but strengthen it by eliminating, even preempting, any threat to its corporate interests. In the initial stage of the military dominance (1952-1958), the Pakistan military found a natural ally in the civilian bureaucracy; together, they pursued their common interests relentlessly.

On the other hand, the strong and stable political leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru kept the Indian military on a tight leash. Then, there were the experienced, professional bureaucrats from the Indian civil service, who were more than a match for the Sandhurst-trained, senior military officers, both in professionalism and in experience. Slowly but steadily, bureaucrats, with the blessings of politicians, tightened their stranglehold on the military. This process was aided by two factors: (1) Nehru’s lack of understanding of military power as an essential concomitant of realism in politics, and (2) the timidity of the Indian military brass.

Jalal, p.305.

116 Failed coup attempts, from the Rawalpindi conspiracy case to the most recent one, staged by the so-called fundamentalists, have been dealt with elsewhere in this dissertation.

117 After an elaborate Content Analysis of Pakistani publications, Moskowitz concluded that interests, which both the military and the civilians see as their legitimate concerns, relate positively and moderately to the military’s involvement in politics. Moskowitz, p.264.

118 The ethos of Sandhurst-trained officers is best captured by Major General Palit in his brilliant analysis of the Sino-Indian war of 1962. He observes that "a handicap at polo or a place in the regimental hockey team had a higher rating than a proclivity for professional study." Major General D.K.Palit. War in High Himalayas, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1991, 18.

119 For a surprisingly accurate description of the Indian Officer Corps, see Kronholz, June. "Formidable Force," The Wall Street Journal, 15 September 1981. Kronholz states that "Westerners, and even some Indians, think that India’s servile society has bred servile officer
For example, when the first Commander-in-Chief of independent India went to Nehru with a draft Defense Paper, and asked for a formal directive, Nehru exploded: "We don't need a defense policy. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence).... As far as I am concerned, you can scrap the army--the police are good enough to meet our security needs." When military coups became commonplace in most of the third world countries, the politicians' suspicions about the military were sagaciously fueled by the Intelligence Chief, Bholu Nath Mullik. Consequently, the status and the influence of the army were deliberately downgraded, although a few, pliant senior officers were rewarded for their loyalty with ambassadorial and gubernatorial appointments. Thus, the Indian army leadership was more interested in looking after their personal, rather than corporate interests.

Counterfactually, the Indian military would have had a difficult time establishing their legitimacy even if it had ventured to intervene in domestic politics to further its corporate interests. The political institutions, ably nurtured by the Congress Party under the stewardship of Nehru, had taken firm roots in the political system, and the process of succession, even under unforeseen conditions, such as the unexpected deaths of Nehru and Lal Bahadur Shastri, proved smooth and in accordance with constitutional procedures. In sum, the strength of political institutions, the quality of political leadership and its legitimacy, and the bureaucratic stranglehold that was established over the military (with the connivance of the politicians) enabled the Indian political leadership to neutralize the pressure of military's corporate interests. Thus the Indian and Pakistan experience confirms the hypothesis that the desire to safeguard corporate interests is a condition that favors military intervention.

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120 Palit, Maj Gen (Retd) 20.
121 Interview with a retired Director General of Police, who was in Nehru's personal staff in the early 1950s, in Bombay, 8 May 1995.
122 Interview with a retired general in India, May 1995.
Professionalism

We recall from Chapters 1 and 2 that according to Huntington, the three ingredients of professionalism are expertise, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty. In Huntington’s view, objective control posited that armed forces promoted military efficiency, while accepting their subservience to the political leadership, whereas subjective control sought to impose civilian values and directives. While several authors, including Finer, Feld, and Edmonds have asserted that high professionalism favors military intervention, Huntington has reaffirmed that professionalization of the armed forces is an effective way to strengthen civilian control over the armed forces. In particular, Edmond’s observation that professionalism, driven by the concern for the perceived threat to the state, stimulates military intervention seems noteworthy. In light of these divergent viewpoints, we proceed to test the following hypothesis: Does professionalism favor military intervention in domestic politics?

Professionalism was the hallmark of the British Indian Army, and was appropriately recognized by the armed forces of independent India and Pakistan. Both armies displayed a high degree of professionalism in the War in Jammu and Kashmir between 1947 and 1948; but there were important differences in perceptions and civilian control.

The Pakistan army perceived the war it as a threat to its very existence, while for India, it was a matter of evicting the Pakistani-sponsored aggression from Kashmir. Consequently, in India, the higher direction of war was firmly with the civilian leadership, who not only laid the operational priorities, but, more than once, on political grounds, restrained the field commanders from capturing Muzaffarabad, the present capital of Pakistan-held Kashmir. The Pakistan army seemed to have had considerable freedom of action in mapping and

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124 Cohen, The Pakistan Army, 34
executing its strategy. This contributed several political outcomes in Pakistan.

The Pakistan army was perceived as the savior of the nation, who were more capable than the politicians of resolving the Kashmir dispute in Pakistan's favor. As discussed earlier, one direct outcome of such self-perceptions was the abortive coup, better known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, 1951. One important consequence of this abortive coup was the "purge" of senior officers, suspected to be involved in the conspiracy. It is interesting to note that Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan gave General Ayub Khan a carte blanche to carry out the "purge." There was very little civilian oversight. The immediate consequences were two-fold: first, some competent, senior officers were superseded, or removed on non-professional considerations; second, it fanned the political ambitions of other senior officers, such as General Ayub Khan, to make steady ingress into areas of political decision-making.

In Pakistan, professionalism came under assault by another phenomenon: politicization. For example, after Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, there was a scramble for power by ambitious but incompetent politicians. By this time, the army's influence in political decision-making had increased considerably. Realizing that they could not survive without the army's support, the politicians began to cultivate the army's support overtly.\(^{126}\) When Prime Minister Mohammad Ali suggested that Ayub should take over the administration of the country, the military brass understood the depth of the incompetence and the helplessness of the political leadership. Although Ayub refused to take over the administration and focused on the operational preparedness of the army instead, he was just waiting for an opportune time to intervene. For him, help came from an unexpected corner: Major General Iskander Mirza, a good friend. Mirza, who was commissioned just after

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\(^{126}\)For example, Ghulam Mohammad, who had maneuvered himself into the Governor General's office soon after Liaquat's assassination, consulted with Ayub. The latter, at that time, was convalescing in England after surgery. See Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.125-126. Similarly, we have already seen how Prime Minister M.A.Bogra, on the eve of an anticipated political crisis, informally sought reassurance from a Major General of the Pakistan Army that the army would support him. See, Stephen Cohen, Pakistan Army, 50.
World War I, with the first batch of Indian officers from Daley College, Indore, India, had spent most of his time in the Indian Political Service. He was appointed as the First Defense Secretary of Pakistan. Subsequently, he graduated to the position of Minister of Interior, where he became more powerful than the Prime Minister. Mirza's capacity and willingness to indulge in political intrigues were legion.\(^{127}\) Thus, although Ayub devoted his time and energy to enhance the operational readiness of the army, he came under Mirza's influence, and shared his political ambitions.

Ayub Khan tried to introduce many cosmetic changes, such as the concept of "Basic Democracy" to civilianize his regime; but the precedent that the Pakistan military has a role in political decision-making (euphemistically referred to as "nation-building") had become firmly established. Both Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq invoked this precedent in 1969 and 1977 respectively. The tradition continued even when, Benazir Bhutto, the democratically elected leader after Zia's death, was sworn in as the Prime Minister.\(^{128}\)

In sum, although Pakistan has always had a highly professional and cohesive army, its senior officer cadre was infected with both ambition and politicization. Besides, it suited the ambitions of senior officers, such as Ayub, to participate in the "grand intrigue" of subverting democratic institutions, with the help of bureaucrats and bureaucrats-turned-politicians, such as Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza. The underlying justification was, of course, the "manifest destiny" of the army to save the country from chaos and disorder.\(^{129}\)

\(^{127}\)Gul Hassan Khan sums it up aptly: "Governments were formed and fell when his patronage was withdrawn. Prime Ministers came and went unnoticed. He took advantage of the prevailing chaos and formed his own party, though clandestinely, because the Constitution forbade it................. Disorder reached its climax in East Pakistan, where the Deputy Speaker was killed on the floor of the House in Dhaka on 21 September 1958......He persuaded the Khan of Kalat to secede from Pakistan." See Gul Hassan Khan, p.126.

\(^{128}\)Hasan-Askari Rizvi claims that the decision to invite Benazir to form the government was jointly taken by President Ishaq Khan and the Army Chief, General Aslam Beg. See Rizvi, "The Military and Politics in Pakistan," Journal of Asian and African Studies XXVI, 1-2, 1991, p.38.

\(^{129}\)Gen K.M. Arif asserts "it is a historical reality that on three occasions the Pakistani people had welcomed the imposition of martial
stronger political leadership, combined with well-developed political institutions, would have intervened to curb these undesirable tendencies, but Pakistan possessed none of these assets.

On the other hand, the Indian army, equally professional and cohesive, remained under firm civilian control. This was first evidenced during the War in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48. The Indian people had implicit faith in the political leadership of Nehru, who not only provided strong, stable leadership, but nurtured the development of political institutions, the lifeblood of democracy. The Indian bureaucracy acted as a strong buffer between the political leadership and the army, and the bureaucratic domination of the army was set in motion, with the tacit support of politicians. Thus, there were sufficient checks against the political ambitions of senior officers. They did not have any illusions about the pre-eminence of political leadership in a democratic polity; if this was their disposition, the opportunity to intervene was even less on account of the caliber and the continuity of Nehru's political leadership.

Indian political parties have, over time, displayed remarkable maturity and judgment in not politicizing the army. There were, however, a few instances when the integral boundaries of "objective control" was penetrated.130 Between 1958 and 1962, Lt Gen B.M. Kaul, an officer with a flair for politics, shot into prominence. Kaul had direct access to Prime Minister Nehru, and because of this, he was also a favorite of the Defense Minister, Krishna Menon. Kaul was promoted out of turn against the advice of the then-Chief of Staff, Gen K.S. Thimayya. Whether or not Kaul had political ambitions has not been conclusively established; but for the army esprit-de-corps, Kaul's influence was clearly divisive. Many ambitious officers jumped into the Kaul bandwagon. Kaul had no scruples in having potential adversaries investigated through the intelligence agencies.131

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130 See, Nordlinger, pp. 15-19.
131 Kaul's attempts to "ease out" Maj Gen (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw through a court of inquiry was a case in point. This court was
Kaul's meteoric rise to prominence and power was fortuitously checked by the Sino-Indian war of 1962 in which Kaul's military incompetence was exposed. The Indian political institutions swung into action and, although Nehru defended both Krishna Menon and Kaul, they had to resign. The moral: even a political colossus like Nehru had to yield to public opinion—an encouraging indicator of a maturing democracy. The second instance occurred when Lt Gen S.K. Sinha, a highly competent and accomplished officer, was superseded to make way for a highly decorated but a more pliant and politically amenable general: General Vaidya. The latter, while commanding the Eastern Army, had criticized the non-Congress governments in the Eastern region publicly. By so doing, he transgressed the integral boundaries between the military and the political spheres; nevertheless, his criticism found favor with Indira Gandhi's Congress, and it is widely believed that he was suitably rewarded with the coveted post of the Chief of the Army Staff. Later, crude attempts were made by the bureaucracy to justify this supersession, and to convince the lay public that Vaidya's appointment was made purely on professional considerations.

Although the press made some noise initially, it eventually accepted the Government's rationale, and the controversy ended. What rattled the government was not so much the public reaction as the 'silent disapproval' of a vast majority of army officers. The intelligence agencies must have been alarmed at the sudden influx of visitors to Gen Sinha's office, more so, to the airport to bid an emotional farewell to the highly respected leader. General Sinha, on his part, frustrated the attempts of the bureaucracy and the politicians to malign him. In short, he made it clear that he was accepting the Government's decision in the spirit of soldierly obedience, and that he was happy to fade away from the army "with malice toward none, and

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to investigate the alleged anti-national remarks made by Manekshaw when he was the Commandant, Defense Services Staff College, India. Earlier, Kaul was also toying with the idea of having Gen Thimayya investigated for alleged 'treason'. See Palit, pp. 74, 319. Also see, Menezes, Lt.Gen. (Retd). Fidelity and Honour. Viking, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 475-477. For Kaul's account of the Indian Army's debacle in 1962, see Untold Story, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1967. Palit's version appears to be more authentic.
charity toward all." The Indian government again demonstrated its sensitivity to the public opinion in general and to the reactions of army officers in particular. Promotions to the rank of the Chief of the Army Staff have since been governed purely by considerations of seniority and merit.

The preceding discussion attempts to put the concept of professionalization in the Indo-Pakistan perspective. First, professionalization, in and of itself, does not necessarily lead to military intervention, as long as the integral boundaries between the military and the political fields of activities are not violated. That is, the political leadership must be able to maintain objective control. Second, a high degree of professionalization is no guarantee against the political ambitions of the military, because other factors, such as inept political leadership, failed coup attempts, the military's conviction that it is their "manifest destiny" to save the country from turmoil and chaos, and conscious efforts on the part of the politicians to politicize the army, can induce interventions. In the case of Pakistan, as the army's exclusiveness and autonomy were never threatened, expertise and social responsibility, that is, responsibility to the nation, appear to have triggered interventions. Social responsibility is a function of how the military perceives itself with regard to its role in safeguarding national security; this perception, in turn, is conditioned by the strength both of the political leadership and the political institutions. While Pakistan army was subjected to overt politicization, the Indian army, during the Kaul-Krishna Menon era, was exposed to induced politicization. Regardless of the nature of politicization, one fact clearly emerges: under certain circumstances, professionalization can coexist with propensities to intervene.

In the Indo-Pakistan context, therefore, we are inclined to concur with Von Doorn (Chapter 2) that political and social situations can better explain military interventions than can the concept of professionalization. Prevailing political and social situations shape senior officers' perceptions about civil-military relations, as well. We have already noted in Chapter 3 that, in the final analysis, perceptions, more than objective conditions, determine the occurrence of
coup. Hence, we need to look at how political and social situations in India and Pakistan shaped the perceptions of senior army brass in the years after independence.

Perceptions of Senior Officers

Finer argues that, if armed forces accept the principle of civilian supremacy, the military's desire to intervene will be effectively inhibited.132 Welch and Smith observe almost identically: "Civilian control exists if the officer corps have internalized the value of civilian supremacy as part of ethical make-up."133 Nordlinger posits that perceptions can sometimes be capricious, and independent of political attitudes, that is, if a conflict exists between attitudes and certain pressing concerns, the former may be ignored, or contradicted.134 Alan Wells explores the coup experiences of countries of sub-Sahara, Africa, and concludes that the occurrence of coup in one country stimulates coups in other countries.135

The basic responsibility of the military is to safeguard national security against external aggression. To do this, the military constantly assesses threats to national security. What if the military's threat perceptions are not congruent with those of the duly elected government in power? This is the question, real or ostensible, which is at the root of many a coup. Given that attitudes can be measured with reasonable accuracy, the challenge for us is to traverse the crosswalk between attitude and behavior, particularly in the case of Indian officers. (In the case of Pakistan, we can focus on the behavioral pattern that has adequately manifested itself during the numerous coups they had since independence). For example, Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein summarize the difficulties in assuming a strong relation between attitudes and behavior.136

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132 Finer, p.28.
133 Welch and Smith, p.6.
134 Nordlinger, pp. 53, 63, f.n. 3.
135 Wells, p.87. Wells implies that the 'coup contagion' is likely to spread through the medium of officers' perceptions.
136 Ajzen, Icek and Martin Fishbein. Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1980, pp.17-20; the authors also refer to Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive
Because both Indian and Pakistani officers at the time of independence shared the apolitical and secular traditions of the British Indian Army, one is tempted to look into external variables, such as political culture and security pact; but external variables impinge on, and influence, internal variables, too. For example, the prevailing political culture affects the internal law and order situations, and thus, the army's involvement in aid of civil power. Thus, it is prudent to look both at the external and the internal variables, and see how they influence senior officers' perceptions.

In light of the premises and constraints discussed above, we attempt to define the attitudinal patterns of senior officers to issues in civil-military relations in India and Pakistan. First, we will ascertain the attitudes of Pakistani officers, relying primarily on secondary sources; second, we will critique the findings of Kundu, who analyzed civil-military relations up to 1962, and in so doing, conducted a selective survey of senior Indian officers and bureaucrats in the late 1980s; third, we analyze the perceptions of officers who served beyond 1962; and, finally, we will discuss the contending interpretations of the role of armed forces in safeguarding national interests.

Perceptions of Senior Pakistan Officers

The senior cadre of officers comprised, mainly, the British Officers who were retained after independence, the Sandhurst trained officers, and the Dehra Dun (India) trained pre-war regular officers. That Jinnah was able to secure for them a separate homeland came as a

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137 Our survey differs from Kundu's in several, important ways. First, unlike us, Kundu did not generate a simple random sample from the population. Second, Kundu confined his questionnaire to events that occurred until 1952. Third, unlike in Kundu's work, our basic assumption was that the attitudes and beliefs of officers in the British Indian Army (i.e. until 1947) were almost identical because of their common military culture; hence, holding 1947 as the point of departure, we examined the factors and the variables that might have caused the post-independence armies of India and Pakistan to behave differently.
surprise to most of them. Although Pakistani officers shared the British disdain for the Pakistani politicians before independence, they respected the apolitical traditions of the British Indian Army, and were in no position to challenge the authority of the Father of the Nation, who assumed the position of Governor General, immediately after independence.

War in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48, in which Pakistani officers participated under severe resource constraints but with very little central political control, seems to have given some of them an exaggerated opinion about their performance and capabilities vis-a-vis civilian leaders. As quite a few ex-INAs (Indian National Army) personnel were employed by the Pakistan army, although as irregulars, their perspective of the War in Jammu and Kashmir in general, and of the competence and capability of civilian leaders to resolve the Kashmir dispute in Pakistan’s favor in particular, might have been politically influenced. The Rawalpindi conspiracy case of 1951 should be seen in this light.

The train of events that followed Ayub’s elevation as the Commander-in-Chief confirmed the army brass’s perception that, in view of the looming Indian threat, the steady decline in the caliber of political leadership, and the high incidence of law and order problems, Pakistan’s integrity can only be saved by the army. Perceptions do not automatically translate into behavior, however. For example, Ayub had twice refused invitations to set up a dictatorship by Governor General Ghulam Mohammed. The opportunity was there, even though the disposition had not fully developed. Ayub’s explanation that he did not take advantage of this offer, because he wanted to devote all his energy to improve the operational readiness of the Pakistan army, and because he

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139 Jinnah, while scolding an officer who had complained about the retention of British officers in the armed forces, reminded officers
hoped that competent political leadership would eventually emerge seems not to be the whole truth. Later, two events appear to have spurred him into action: the unruly scene in the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly, and the assured support of the public in general, and his former comrade and President Islander Mirza, in particular.¹⁴⁰

The tradition of contempt for politicians continues in the Pakistan armed forces. It is evidenced by the army's role in removing elected leaders arbitrarily. For example, even after the return of democracy after General Zia's death, the bureaucrats and the army officers emerged as the undisputed decision-makers, whose purview encompassed political spheres, such as backing or removing Prime Ministers, and determining the shape of nuclear strategy.¹⁴¹

Thus, the military psyche in Pakistan has not yet accepted the principle of civilian supremacy. Although the self-delusion of the military's superiority over its civilians, and its martial superiority over "Hindu India" has lessened after the debacle of 1971, the public relations programs, suppressing public criticism of the armed forces' performance, are still in place.¹⁴²

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¹⁴⁰See, Finer, pp. 56, 73-74. This also confirms Nordlinger's proposition that "if a conflict exists between attitudes and certain pressing concerns, the former may be ignored, or contradicted." Nordlinger, pp. 53, 63.

¹⁴¹Evidence to this effect is overwhelming. For example, during the 1988 meeting between Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto, Yakub Khan, the army-backed Foreign Minister, often contradicted Bhutto by snapping, "No, this is our policy, Prime Minister." See, Christina Lamb, *Waiting for Allah: People's struggle for Democracy*, Penguin, New Delhi, 1991, p. 264. Benazir's helplessness is also confirmed by her mother's recent statement. Nusrat Bhutto confided in a press interview that the nuclear program was beyond the control of the Prime Minister. She added that it was not under the control of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, either. See, The Indian Express, January 5, 1996. General Beg acknowledges his mistake in contriving Prime Minister Bhutto's dismissal in 1991. See, Khan, Behroz, "Dismissal of Benazir government was a mistake, admits Beg," *Pakistan News Service*, Vol. 8 No. M028, June 14, 1995. Agrieved political leaders, of various shades and persuasions (Muhajirs, or Tribals from Northern Area) wanting to protest alleged, government atrocities, almost invariably, appeal to the Army Chief, instead of the elected representatives.

Perceptions of Senior Indian Military Officers

In his dissertation covering the civil-military relations between and 1962, Kundu has captured the perceptions of senior Indian military officers during three distinct periods of time: pre-1932 for Sandhurst-trained officers, between 1932-1945 for the Dehra Dun-trained Indian officers, as well as the Emergency Commissioned Officers who were recruited during World War 2, and officers who were commissioned after independence. Although Kundu’s analysis of these perceptions has generated interesting findings, our dissertation identifies 1947 as the point of departure, that is, any perceptions prior to that are common to India and Pakistan and do not contribute significantly to the explanation of the puzzle.

Like the senior officers who opted for Pakistan, the senior Indian officers were expected to share the British contempt for politicians, or anybody associated with freedom movement. Brigadier (later Field Marshal) K.M. Cariappa, the first Indian Commander-in-Chief, was more ingenuous than he was shrewd and calculating, when he agreed to be a British mouthpiece, and made an appeal to Nehru not to divide the British Indian Army, even after the creation of Pakistan. As if this was not enough, he suggested to Lord Ismay, advisor to Lord Mountbatten that Nehru or Jinnah should be made the commander-in-chief of the future, undivided army, thus implying that the respective armies should

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143 See, Kundu, pp. 389-390.
144 Brig (later Field Marshal) Cariappa, who was a member of the Court trying three officers belonging to the Indian National Army (INA) in New Delhi, in 1946, narrated an interesting incident. After the three officers were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, Cariappa walked toward those officers and congratulated them for withstanding the strain with admirable equanimity. Cariappa was severely rebuked by his British superior officers for this. This incident reveals the depth of British hatred for the INA. Informal conversation with the Field Marshal at Mercara, Coorg, June 1968.
145 Cariappa was, perhaps, counting on the goodwill of senior Pakistani officers who had served under him in the British Indian Army. For example, Field Marshal Ayub Khan was a battalion commander (Lt Col) under Brig Cariappa in the North Western Frontier in 1946. But the absurdity of the proposal only highlights Cariappa’s naivete. See, Kundu, p. 208, and Rizvi, 1976, p. 29.
have substantial roles in administering their countries. Lord Ismay took Cariappa to task and advised him never to think on those lines.\(^{146}\)

Cariappa was, however, in a chastened mood, when he exhorted the officers to stay out of politics. "[The] Army is there to serve the Government of the day, and we should make sure that it does not get mixed up with party politics."\(^{147}\) And yet, after his retirement in 1953, Cariappa's advocacy of, and admiration for, Ayub's military rule was an embarrassment to the government.\(^{148}\) Although he was never in a position to undermine Nehru's stature and popularity, the ambiguity surrounding Cariappa's attitude toward issues in civil-military relations exemplifies the inherent ambiguities in Indian senior officers' perceptions.

Although there was unending acrimony between Cariappa and senior bureaucrats, such as H.M. Patel, there was never any question of Cariappa, or his successors challenging Nehru's leadership. His ingenuousness notwithstanding, the credit for inculcating the principle of civilian supremacy among senior officers goes entirely to Cariappa. His missionary zeal, unimpeachable integrity, and high standards of discipline were contagious, and percolated down to officers and other ranks rapidly.\(^{149}\) The principle of civilian supremacy was central to the creed Cariappa established.

Without meaning to detract from Kundu's excellent work, we express some reservations about the technique of random selection from a variety of sources. Whether or not he had access to the retired senior officer population is not clear; nor does he clarify as to how he generated the simple random sample. In the absence of these amplifications, we cannot exclude the selection bias and the risks involved in generalization. However, his findings bear examination.

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\(^{147}\)Muthanna, I.M. *General Cariappa: The First Indian Commander-in-Chief*, Usha Press, Mysore city, 1964, pp.47-50, as used in Kundu, p.209.

\(^{148}\)Muthanna, pp. 82-90. Cited in Kundu, p.288.

\(^{149}\)Cariappa was a ruthless disciplinarian, and court-martialed several officers of the rank of brigadier general and above for infractions that would be considered minor at the present time.
In his questionnaire to 68 respondents, for example, Kundu lists several factors that might have deterred military intervention in India. The responses are rank ordered and summarized. The first ten factors that feature in the weighted rankings are (1) professionalism of armed forces, (2) diversity of peoples, cultures, and languages, (3) initial political stability, quality and/or democratic rule, (4) nationally represented military personnel, (5) sheer size of India, (6) dominant Hindu culture inherently against military rule, (7) widely held belief in democracy, (8) wisdom and stature of national leaders, (9) 40 year old habit of democracy, (10) political awareness of masses.\textsuperscript{150}

Some of these findings are arguable. For example, it is difficult to establish that the Pakistan army is less professional than its Indian counterpart. We need to analyze carefully whether or not the cultural influence of Islam has a bearing on military intervention. Nevertheless, these are perceptions, which often matter more than do objective realities.

Kundu's survey can be broadly divided into two periods: the Thimayya-Krishna Menon period, and the prelude to, and the aftermath of, the 1962 war. As civil-military relations in India underwent unprecedented strains and stresses during these periods, Kundu rightly targets the senior officers' perceptions of these two periods for an in-depth analysis.

The relevant questions seeking to elicit responses from senior officers are attached at Appendix D. The findings, subject to the limitations specified earlier (i.e., unsuitability for generalization), are very revealing. They are summarized chronologically. Although the attitudes of the political leaders and the bureaucrats were hostile toward the army, there was a welcome change after the army's performance in the Jammu and Kashmir war, and operations in Hyderabad and Junagadh. About one-third of the officers approved of Ayub's coup in Pakistan, but as many as 92 per cent of officers and 81 per cent of civilians felt that India should not follow Ayub's example. About 40 per cent of officers had positive feelings about Krishna Menon's appointment as

\textsuperscript{150} Kundu, pp. 393-395.
Defense Minister; on the contrary, almost 70 per cent of the officers had negative opinion about General Kaul before the autumn of 1962. About 50 per cent of the officers felt that Menon politicized the armed forces, although only 17 per cent felt that it directly affected them. About 24 per cent responded that political leadership acquitted itself worst in the 1962 war; this was closely followed by military leadership (21 per cent). In the aftermath of the 1962 war, 97, and 37 per cent of the public had negative feeling toward the government, and the army respectively. 51 per cent of the public still supported the army. After the 1962 war, 75 per cent of field officers had negative attitude toward the military leadership. Last but not least, almost 90 per cent of civilians and military officers felt that there was no need for the military to move against the government.

How do we interpret the above findings? After a century of insulation from civilians, the Indian armed forces gradually began to identify themselves with the people, thanks to the war in Jammu and Kashmir, and the operations in Hyderabad and Junagadh, in which the armed forces performed well. Large number of officers disapproved of Kaul’s promotion, and Krishna Menon’s attempts to politicize the armed forces; but as it affected a small minority, it did not create any upheaval. An overwhelming majority of officers felt that they should not follow Ayub’s example; the coup contagion phenomenon had no effect on India.

Although 24 per cent of officers felt that political leadership was at its worst, they did not think well of the army leadership either. While a large majority of civilians blamed the government for the debacle, there was no overwhelming approval rating for the army either. Finally, almost 90 per cent of the armed forces officers felt that there was no justification for the army to move against the government. Thus, even after a disastrous military defeat, brought about by military and political bungling, Indian military had neither the disposition, nor the opportunity to intervene.

As Kundu correctly observes, such grievances as may have existed, were quickly remedied by the government: removal of the Defense Minister, the Chief of the Army Staff, and the controversial Lt.Gen
Kaul; a national defense council was formed, and the views of former senior officers, such as Generals Thorat and Thimayya were considered while formulating the defense strategy. The pay-off came very soon. For example, in the war of 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the diminutive Prime Minister, surprised many a battle hardened veteran by his firm direction of war. The service chiefs were given a free hand, and, unlike in 1962, there was no interference in the deployment of troops. The media reported the war accurately and objectively. When cease-fire came, the Indian rank and file was very clear that it was enforced in accordance with the political directive. There was never any propaganda, even suggestion from any quarter that civilians deprived the armed force of a victory, almost in sight.

Although the Indo-Pak war of 1971 is considered the epitome of ideal civil-military relations, it was not without its problems. For example, the Chief of Army Staff, General (later Field Marshal) Manekshaw, disagreed with Indira Gandhi in her directive, and refused to commit the ill-prepared troops into action prematurely, in March-April 1971. It speaks volumes for Indira Gandhi's maturity and judgment to have accepted Manekshaw's politically uncomfortable but militarily sound advice. What would have Manekshaw done if his hands were forced is not important. What is abundantly clear is that there was never any question of military intervention even if the government did not accept the Chief's advice. This raises an interesting issue: in time of hostilities, who is the final arbiter of "national interests"? Is it the armed forces, or the legally constituted government?

"National Interest" versus the Interest of Government in Power

We noted in Chapter 2 that, whenever military leaders arrogated to the right to define what constitutes national interest, there was a high

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121 Kundu, p. 358
122 This contrasted sharply with the Pakistani publicity of the war. Both the armed forces and the lay public were fed with glowing but exaggerated accounts of Pakistan's performance, which implied that the ceasefire needlessly deprived Pakistan of a glorious victory. See, Musa, Mohamed, General. *My Version: Indo-Pakistan War of 1965*, Wajidalis, Lahore, 1983.
probability of military intervention. Finer addresses this problem at
great length. Some military leaders believe that it is the "manifest
destiny," or the providential mission of soldiers to save their
countries. This belief stems from its unique mission in society, and
the awareness of its self-sacrificial virtues. The concept of manifest
destiny cuts across the militaries of the developing and the developed
world. For example, Finer explains that it was the driving force as
much of the "four generals revolt" in Algeria, in April 1961, as it was
of Ayub Khan's revolution in 1958.153 More recently, a civil servant
from Britain joined the fray. Accused of disclosing "official
information" without authority to an unauthorized person, Clive Ponting,
admitted that he had sent two documents to a Member Parliament; but he
defended this by arguing that he did this 'in the interest of the
state', because Ministers had misled the Parliament. Clive Ponting was
tried and acquitted.154

Military officers often identify themselves as servants of the
state, not the government. In Pakistan, for example, the ostensible
reason given by Ayub for his coup was that he had to save the country
from unscrupulous politicians.155 In India, senior officers still talk
about the need to resolve the "clash of loyalty to the nation and the
Constitution and the loyalty to any transient in the seat of power."156

While General Sinha's advice that, in case of a clash of
loyalties," it is incumbent on the General to resign so that the
nation's attention gets focused on the point of issue," is
unexceptionable, the question as to who is better able to define
national interest remains unanswered. For example, Finer quotes the
Times, 6 April 1961 "It is difficult to envisage some thirty or forty
generals and a smaller number of admirals and airforce commanders

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153Finer, p.28-37.
154For more details, see, Ponting, Clive. The Right to Know: The
155For perceptive comments of a public relations official about how
the military regimes take over with the pretext of saving a nation, and
then, indulge in image-building to perpetuate their rule, see Cohen,
Pakistan Army, pp. 69-70.
appointed solely by providence to be the sole judges of what the nation needs. 157

Often, the military's conception of national interest is not uniform. Besides, if in democracy, popular sovereignty resides with the people who have elected the government to power, then it is incumbent for the military to obey the government in power, however transient; because it is the duly elected government in power that can best define what the interests of the state are. 158 In cases of policy differences between the military brass and the government in power, often these are resolved in the best interest of the nation, as was done when Manekshaw refused to commit the Indian army prematurely in March-April, 1971. But it is important to remember that Manekshaw disagreed with the timing of the army operations; he never questioned Indira Gandhi's policy of liberating Bangladesh. Here lies the subtle but important nuance that can make a difference between civilian control and military intervention.

Employment of the Army in Internal Security Duties

The British Indian army was quite frequently employed in aid to civil power. Thus, the Indian and Pakistan armies were familiar with the basic concepts of such missions: necessity, impartiality, minimum force, and good faith. The British were very careful in employing the army to put down communal riots, that is, when the army might be required to apply coercive measures, including firing, on their kith and kin. Thus, the British made sure that they always had a British back-up force just in case the soldiers of the Indian army were reluctant to open fire. The British, however, had a very efficient police force that took care of most of the minor disturbances.

With independence, the complexion of internal security duties changed considerably. For example, the scope and character of the aid

157 Finer, p. 34.

158 Many observers in U.K. were surprised at Ponting's acquittal. Many civil servants felt that it was wrong on Ponting's part to have defied the government in power, and arrogated to himself the authority of defining what "state's interest" were. Interview with a senior British Civil Service officer at RAND, July 1995.
to civil power expanded greatly: the aid varied from disaster relief to
counterinsurgency operations. The political leader needed to be more
circumspect of, and sensitive to, popular passions than were the
British. The first warning signals of the danger of employing the army
in putting down communal riots came in 1947, when some units of the
Punjab Boundary Force, tasked to oversee the migration of people from
India and Pakistan broke ranks.\textsuperscript{159} Since independence, both the Indian
and Pakistani armies have been extensively employed in internal security
duties. Given that frequent employment of the army in aid of civil
power\textsuperscript{160} increases the propensities of the army to intervene, we proceed
to investigate the following puzzle: Although the Indian army was
employed in internal security duties as often as the Pakistan army was,
what factors might have ensured its abstention from intervening in
domestic politics?

First, we examine the pattern of employment of the Pakistani army,
particularly the scope of the law authorizing various powers and
immunity to the army, the degree of civilian oversight, the speed with
which the army is withdrawn once normalcy is restored, and the scope of
delegated powers vested with the army officers in aid of civil power.
Second, we will investigate how the Indian army was employed in light of
the similar factors. Third, we will try to identify and evaluate the
differences that might explain military intervention in Pakistan and its
absence in India.

\section{Pakistan}

We have already seen how the Pakistan army was perceived as the
"saviors of the nation" after the War of 1948. Soon after that the army
was embroiled in a series of operations in aid of civil power. In the
absence of a constitution, Pakistan, from 1947 to 1956, continued to be
governed within the framework of the Government of India Act, 1935, that
is, concentrating most of the powers in the office of the Governor-
General--not the Prime Minister. It is noteworthy that "Martial Law."

\textsuperscript{159}Kundu, pp. 189-190 .
\textsuperscript{160}Finer, pp. 64-73, Moskowitz, p. 32., Segal, in Goodpaster and
Huntington, p. 22.
which was very much part of this arrangement, was frequently invoked to restore internal order. Sometimes, the initiative to declare martial law came from the local army commanders, and the government acquiesced in it.

For example, in 1954, Lt Gen Azam Khan, the local commander in Lahore, imposed martial law on his own.\(^{161}\) The Martial Law regime extended beyond what was necessary to restore law and order, and send the army back to the barracks.\(^{162}\) Similarly, the army was employed for a prolonged period in an anti-smuggling operation in the former East Pakistan. The army did a commendable job on both these occasions, but they became intimately familiar with the corruption and inefficiency in the civil administration. The perception that the army can do a better job than the civilians took firm roots in their psyche. This perception was reinforced by some scholars, local and international, who wrote glowing accounts of the Pakistan army's role as "nation-builders."\(^{163}\)

The first coup of 1958 brought additional benefits to the army: lucrative jobs in the government and in public sectors, land grants in prime localities etc. In addition, under martial law, even junior military officers were given civil administrative powers, far in excess of their qualifications and experience. As the army rule gave the country a measure of political and economic stability, the perception that army can outperform civilians was further reinforced. While in West Pakistan, army rule was at first welcomed, in the East, primarily on account of the under-representation of Bengalis, the army was not able to establish any rapport with the local population. To make matters worse, the Yahya Khan administration gave a free hand to the army in suppressing the Bengali revolt in 1971. What followed has been

\(^{161}\) Jalal, p.177.
\(^{162}\) The latest incident occurred in Gilgit, in the Pakistani occupied part of Kashmir. Following serious riots in Gilgit, the Pakistan army took over the administration. See "Pakistan Army Takes Over Gilgit After Riots." The Hindu Index Front Page Briefs, Monday, 8 July 1996.
\(^{163}\) For example, see, Raymond A. Moore, Jr., Nation-Building and the
described as "one of the twentieth century's most ruthless attempts at political genocide." 164

Zulfqar Ali Bhutto did not have any qualms about employing army to curb domestic violence, or domestic opposition. He invoked martial law powers frequently to carry on with his personal vendetta against domestic dissent. 165 In fact, some authors argue that the most imminent cause of his overthrow was the reluctance of senior army commanders to use force against Bhutto's domestic opponents. 166 Zia-ul-Haq continued with the traditions of Ayub and Yahya: bestowing rewards of power on senior army officers. 167 In recent years, the army was often used to curb violence in Sindh.

What, then, is the overall pattern? First, the Government retained the provisions of martial law--an important instrument of maintaining law and order under the British regime. Second, in some cases (in the sectarian disturbances in Lahore in 1953 for example), the local army commander imposed martial law on his own. Having imposed martial law and restored order, he did not promptly order the troops back to the barracks but continued to maintain a visible presence in Lahore with the hope of earning accolades from the civil population. By such extended stays, the army gained political experience in wresting the levers of power from the civilians directly, or indirectly. 168 Third, in certain operations in aid of civil power, Ayub asked for complete freedom of action without which he would not accept responsibilities. 169 The

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164 Nordlinger, p. 159.
165 See, Gul Hassan Khan, pp. 368-379.
166 Ibid., 412.
167 During 1980-85, as many as 96 Army officers were absorbed into the selected cadres of the civil services on a permanent basis, while 115 were reemployed on a contractual basis. See, Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "The Military and Politics in Pakistan." Journal of the Asian & African Studies XXVI, 1991, Numbers 1-2, pp. 31-32. During Zia's regime, the budgetary allocation for the defense services rose by 172% between 1976-77 and 1982-83, compared to an increase of about 118% during the Bhutto period. In mid-1982, 18 of the 42 ambassadors posted abroad came from the military. See, Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan." Asian Survey, Vol. XXIV, No. 5, May 1984, pp. 549-550.
168 Rizvi, 1984, p. 536.
169 Cohen, The Pakistan Army, pp. 49-50
ineptitude of civilian leadership, and the failure of political institutions to address socio-political problems afforded the army opportunities to intervene; these opportunities lingered until the army developed the necessary disposition to intervene.

India

The Indian army was also very frequently deployed in aid of civil power. For example, between 1951 and 1970, it was employed on 476 occasions; again between 1983 and 1987, 369 times. According to Samina Ahmed, in 1990-1991, the Army was called out on an average of three times a day to deal with communal, regional, and other forms of ethnic tension. The noteworthy cases, when the army was used to suppress armed rebellions, were the Provincial Armed Constabulary revolt in Uttar Pradesh, 1973, the police strike in Bombay, 1981, and the attack on Golden Temple, in June 1984. As martial law was ultra vires of the Indian constitution, the underlying assumptions of the Indian army’s deployment in internal security duties have always been as follows: (a) there is a legitimate, functioning civilian government; (b) the military aid is restricted to the restoration of law and order, that is, until the civil government is satisfied that normalcy has been restored; (c) the military action will always be lawful and duly authorized; (d) the civil police will invariably be coopted to conduct operations, such as search and arrest, that is, even if the army arrests unlawful elements, they will be handed over to the civil at the earliest opportunity.

No doubt, the numerous ordinances, such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1956), the National Security Act (1980), and the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinances (1984) gave additional powers to the armed forces; but the civilian control, which was often exercised through bureaucrats, was never relaxed. In

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172 In light of this, Cohen’s conclusion that “by the early 1980s, the effective government for millions of Indians was the local area or sub-area commander,” is an exaggeration, presumably based on his conversation with an “informed Pakistani military writer.”
addition, the army operations always came under the watchful scrutiny of the media and the politicians, who insisted on exemplary punishments to armed forces personnel who transgressed the mandate given them.

Successive Army Chiefs of Staffs have openly deplored the frequent, prolonged employment of the army in aid of civil power. In Government's view, such an employment is a distasteful necessity. This notwithstanding, the Indian government has made some progress in shifting the internal security responsibility to the burgeoning para-military forces, particularly after the lessons learnt in the attack on the Golden Temple. That the army was not called during the crisis culminating in the destruction of an old mosque in 1992 by Hindu militants is a clear proof of this. Again, while dealing with the violent, recalcitrant insurgents in Punjab, the army adopted a very low profile, letting the para-military forces operate freely. On balance, the most fortunate aspects of this otherwise risky employment in India are two-fold: first, political parties, regardless of their persuasions, have refrained from politicizing the armed forces; second, no political executive, not even Indira Gandhi, when she clamped the infamous "emergency" in 1975-1977, risked employing the army against domestic opponents.174

In sum, the frequency of employment of the Indian army in aid of civil power has been as high as it has been in Pakistan, but the pattern has been quite different. The important differences are: Martial Law, giving wide powers to the military, has always been ultra vires of the Indian constitution. The army operations in aid of civil power always

Organizationally, an area or sub-area, can barely handle the administration of the army elements, let alone that of the civilian population, even if an authorization to that effect were forthcoming from the civil government. Cohen, Indian Army, p. 203.

173 The unintended, adverse effects of this have been described by Lt. Gen. S.K. Sinha(Rtd) in his illuminating article. See, Sinha, "Civil Power and the Army." 1987, 31-32. One Army commander in the North East expressed dissatisfaction over the prolonged commitment of army units in internal security duties; he also criticized the civil authorities for releasing without trial the insurgents, whom the army captured with considerable effort. See "Army assails release of N-E insurgents," The Times of India, New Delhi, July 14, 1995, p. 9.

recognized that a legitimate civilian government existed, and no sooner was order restored than it was necessary for the army to leave. Unlike in Pakistan, the army commanders were neither eager nor inclined to impose themselves on the civil administration unilaterally, as did Major General Azam Khan in Lahore, in 1953. Nor were military officers given sweeping civil administrative powers, as happened in Pakistan, under martial regimes. Although there have been a few aberrations in the army's conduct of these operations, the secular character of the army was demonstrated time and again when it repeatedly upheld the principle of impartiality and necessity.\textsuperscript{175} Last but not the least, the political leaders showed remarkable maturity by neither politicizing the army nor using it against domestic political opposition.

Operation Blue Star (the Indian army's attack on the Golden Temple complex), which was a watershed in the history of the army's employment in internal security duties, brought about many changes in the concept. Henceforth, the army was not to be employed frequently in internal security duties. Even when employed occasionally, it was to have a low profile, and act, in most cases, as a back-up force. The newly-formed National Security Guards would replace the army in most of the high-risk counterterrorist operations.\textsuperscript{176}

Thus, the political leaders in India, led by Nehru, slowly but steadily created a tradition of civilian supremacy, using the bureaucracy as a buffer between them and the armed forces, and tacitly conniving at the bureaucracy's dominance over the army. This lasting

\textsuperscript{175}It is noteworthy that the attack on golden temple was led by a Sikh general, and Sikh and Muslim commanding officers. A large number of Sikh and Hindu officers also participated. In the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, following Indira Gandhi's assassination, Gorkhas, and soldiers of the Sikh Light Infantry did a marvelous job in bringing the situation under control. This is in striking contrast to what the Pakistan army did in the former East Pakistan in 1971.

\textsuperscript{176}Despite these innovations, there were quite a few eagerbeavers among the army brass, who were keen to commit troops at the slightest pretext: these officers saw in this role a good opportunity to earn recognition and awards. One corps commander in the Eastern sector was so keen that he got his citation for award written and processed through the civilian channels! Interview with a former Chief of Staff, HQ Eastern Command, Calcutta, 1995.
tradition has survived many political upheavals, and withstood external as well as internal challenges to the stability of the country.

**Cultural Influence of Islam**

In the extant literature on military intervention in domestic politics, the cultural influence of Islam has received considerable scholarly attention. Some non-Muslim Indian scholars, such as Chibber, Kukreja, and Baxter et al., while analyzing the frequency of military intervention in Pakistan, and its absence in India, have not only underscored the strong correlation between Islam and military intervention, but have implied causation, too. In so doing, they have suggested that "unreformed" Islam, in particular, encourages military intervention. By implication, these authors have attributed the Indian military's abstention to the Hindu historical tradition of refraining from military usurpation of political power. Some Muslim, Indian scholars have, however, rejected this argument. Western scholars, such as Huntington and Edmonds, have been less definitive in establishing the causality between Islam and military intervention. Other Western scholars, such as Feldman, and Rose, while analyzing the civil-military relations in Pakistan, reject any relationship between Islam and military interventions.

We will evaluate the above arguments in light of actual military interventions in Pakistan: first, those establishing both correlation, and causation; second, those identifying correlation, but hesitating to infer causation; third, those categorically rejecting any causation. In each case, the authors' contrasting interpretations about Hindu culture,

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177Interviews with Professor Bashiruddin Ahmed, Vice Chancellor of Jamia Milia University, New Delhi, and with Maj Gen (retd) Afsar Karim, May 1995. Similar polarization of opinions between Hindus and Non-Hindus was detected by Apurba Kundu, when he interviewed senior, retired Indian officers (although some Hindu military and civilian officers rejected the notion that Hindu culture was against military intervention). For example, a Shia Air Marshal stated that one could "not get away saying that a Hindu culture is inherently democratic". A Jewish officer was more critical: he said "Rubbish! Look to Indian history, (it's extremely bloody, (and full of ) extreme communal feelings". For a more detailed analysis, see Kundu, p.240.
and how it might have deterred the Indian military's intervention in politics, will be analyzed. Finally, our evaluation will be tested against the experience of a few other Muslim countries that have experienced military coups and those that have not. This may provide sharper but discriminating insights into the conditions that favored military interventions in Pakistan, and its absence in India.

Identifying culture as an explanatory variable, Chibber postulates that "the Spanish and Islamic cultures are noticeable in the majority of the countries where since World War II the military has intervened in politics." Contrasting this with the Indian experience, Chibber quotes Taya Zinkin: "... middle class which provides military officers are predominantly Hindu, a religion which is much too vague and too individualistic to make it possible for one man to impose himself on others, except as a saint." 178 Kukreja makes a similar comparison. The fact that, in West Asia, Generals have repeatedly overthrown their governments, she argues, "exemplifies that Islam has a great affinity for militarism, combining in it the fusion of military and political powers, whereas the only instance of a military coup in the Hindu period of Indian history was that of Pushyamitra." 179

Baxter, et al. characterize the doctrine of Islam as a revealed religion, which is believed to be immutable, but is subject to many interpretations. They amplify that revealed, pervasive religion are not conducive to democracy and a secular political culture, that unreformed Islam, like unreformed Christianity, allows little or no room for dissent and alternative proposals. The authors remark that Hinduism appears to be much less inhibiting of democratic ideas and more inclined toward separation of politics from religion. 180 Daniel Pipes gives several historic examples in support of his thesis that Muslims participated in politics only when galvanized by issues relating to

178Chibber, p. 117.
179Kukreja, p. 207. Also see, Lt.Gen. S.K.Sinha,(retd). Of Matters Military, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1980, p. 25. Pushyamitra, the Commander-in-Chief had the dubious distinction of slaying Bidharta, the last Mauryan ruler, in 185 B.C., and becoming the King.
legalism (which included any appeal to justice, including some that are anti-Shar'i). Pipes asserts that "the leaders of virtually every coup d'etat in Islamdom articulated this same appeal for justice and regeneration, including those that led to a major change in regime, as in Iran in 1951, Egypt in 1952, Iraq and Pakistan in 1958, Turkey in 1960, North Yemen in 1962, Indonesia in 1965, Libya in 1969, Afghanistan in 1973, Bangladesh in 1975, and Iran in 1979....In contrast, Western themes unrelated to legalism did not move Muslim peoples to action: democracy, freedom of expression, independent political parties, or civilian rule rarely impelled Muslims into streets."\(^{181}\) Lucian Pye claims that, in Islam, religious leaders are teachers, not priests; thus, the relationship can be of a binding nature, requiring total obedience and lifelong loyalty. He infers that "the power of the ulema and the kiyayis (religious teachers) can at any moment move into the secular domain because Koran does not recognize a sharp divide between the sacred and the secular."\(^{182}\) Pye adds that Muslim standards of personal conduct are simply unattainable to the common people who give vent to their frustration by expressing "righteous indignation" toward superiors who violate the spirit of Islam. On the other hand, in the Hindu concept of political power, Pye suggests," the pure and the impure could mix, and all the evils of contamination would appear as boundaries and taboos were violated."\(^{183}\) Sinha extols the village panchayat system (an organization in which elected representatives discussed and arbitrated day-to-day problems) in India, which embodied the democratic ideals that survived thousands of years of foreign invasions.\(^{184}\)


\(^{182}\) Pye 274. This comment is particularly relevant to Pakistan, where religious institutions are independent of state control.

\(^{183}\) Ibid.,p.140.
Chibber’s deductive reasoning that Muslim and Spanish cultures are more prone to coups d’état fails to explain why there were so many military interventions in countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, and Uganda. Although the above observations bring out the contrasting features of the Hindu and the Muslim cultures with regard to political power, they do not adequately recognize how, over time, both Islam and Christianity have been reformed. That Hinduism is more amenable to democracy cannot be inferred solely by the absence of military coups in ancient India: in fact, there were numerous examples of vassal states inviting foreign invaders to help overthrow their masters. In fact, the East India Company’s conquest of India abounds in treacherous collaborations of local rulers with a foreign power: the East India Company. Besides, despotic rule was not unknown in ancient Hindu culture: on the other hand, there were some enlightened despots among Muslim rulers of India. There is no evidence of a Hindu “Magna Carta” either in ancient India, or in the numerous Kingdoms Hindus established in what later became South East Asia: Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Much like the Muslim culture, the teacher-pupil relationship among Hindus are also binding and permanent, and Hindu religious leaders can also whip up passions against “unjust” governments (witness the arousing of popular passions that culminated in the destruction of a mosque in Ayodhya in 1992).

Pye’s observation, however, illustrates one distinguishing feature of Hinduism: it has been remarkably successful over centuries of its existence in absorbing and assimilating foreign cultures and in innovating its own unique, composite culture. There is abundant historical evidence of this process occurring and recurring. There are accommodating features in Islam, as well. For more discriminating insights into the influence of Islam on military interventions, we need to focus on the studied views of scholars who highlight the moderating features of Islam.

Edmonds makes a cautious reference to the cultural influence of Islam in North Africa, without developing this idea further.185

185 Edmonds, p.158.
Huntington explores how religion promoted democratization in the 1970s and 1980s. He starts by comparing Western Christian-dominated countries with those predominantly Muslim; he infers that "a strong correlation exists between Western Christianity and democracy...... Democracy was especially scarce among countries that were predominantly Muslim, Buddhist, or Confucian. But he adds a cautionary note: this correlation does not prove causation."\(^{186}\) Huntington's appraisal of how Islam might have influenced the nature of politics in Muslim dominated countries is summarized below.

Although egalitarianism and voluntarism are central themes in Islam, to the extent that religious doctrine and expertise define governmental legitimacy and policy, Islamic concepts contradict the premises of democratic politics.\(^{187}\) This is reinforced by the fact that, with the possible exception of Turkey, no Islamic country has sustained a fully democratic system for any length of time.\(^{188}\) He makes a special mention of Pakistan, which attempted democracy on three occasions, but failed to sustain it for long. Despite strong evidence about the positive relationship between Islam and undemocratic regimes, certain factors question the logical consistency of such a relationship.

When Islamic countries initiated democratic processes, the fundamentalists have been the main beneficiaries. Once in power, whether or not they would pursue fundamentalist policies is unclear. Any major culture, such as Islam, has elements that are compatible with democracy, as there are some that are not. The important question to ponder, then, is: how and under what circumstances can the incompatible features supersede the compatible ones? Finally, cultures are basically dynamic; while they may retain some features of continuity, others may undergo significant changes, over time.

P.J. Vatikiotis, in his perceptive article on "Islamic Resurgence," argues that there was never an "Islamic republic," properly speaking. Pakistan, under Jinnah, tried to produce a constitution for

\(^{186}\) Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 72-73.

\(^{187}\) Ibid., p. 307.

\(^{188}\) Huntington, here, has overlooked that, in Malaysia, since 1960, when the communist insurgency was finally put down, democracy has survived, even flourished.
an Islamic republic and failed, primarily because a strict observance of
the letter of the revealed law was sought to be imposed by force. Later, Ayub tried to hammer out an impossible compromise between
introducing Islamic features in the constitution (1962-65), and pushing
through social reforms, only to encounter serious opposition from
Jam'at-i-Islami. The unsuccessful experiment to reorganize West
Pakistan as one unit should be seen in the context of constructing a
well-ordered community under the banner of Islam. When this experiment
failed, Yahya Khan, who succeeded Ayub, provided the Legal Framework
Order, in which, the directive principles of state policy stressed
Islam. Then came the controversy about the "Islamic Socialism" which
was denounced by Pakistan's ulema as kufr (heresy). Maulana Bhashani
compounded these contradictions by demanding "red Islam" for
Pakistan. Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, despite his secular
background and outlook, pandered to Islamic fervor by banning racing and
alcohol during his tenure in office in the early 1970s.

The use of religious symbolism played an important role in shaping
the perceptions of Muslim fundamentalists about the Gulf War. General
Aslam Beg, the Chief of the Pakistan Army Staff, was the first to invoke
the powerful Islamic historical symbolism of the tragedy of Karbala,
while comparing it with the bombing of Iraq. When cease-fire came
into force, and the full extent of Saddam Hussein's defeat became clear,
protest demonstrations stopped, and the political "horse-trading"
started once again. This drew a sharp comment from the then-Prime
Minister, Nawaz Sharif, who accused the fundamentalists of exploiting
the sentiments of people in the name of Islam, to further their own
political interests. The one fall-out from the political mobilization

189Watikoitus, P.J. "Islamic Resurgence," in Islam and Power,
Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Desouki (eds.), Johns Hopkins
190Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, pp. 26, 64-65.
192Ibid., 83
193Ahmad, Muntaz. "The Politics of War: Islamic Fundamentalisms in
Pakistan," in Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, James
Piscatori, (ed.), American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Chicago,
1991, p. 175.
that occurred during the Gulf War was demand for a radical Shari'a
Bill. Muntaz Ahmad, however, comments that "the mobilization of the
Islamic constituency occasioned by the Gulf crisis hastened, but did not
cause, the introduction of the bill."\

In sum, the preceding analyses point out the inherent ambiguities
in the interpretation of Islam as an ideological system. Although
Islamic World has recorded the highest frequency of military
interventions, their attributability to Islamic beliefs has not been
conclusively established. Islam has been a handy tool for political
mobilization, and for influencing public policy issues, including
foreign affairs. However, both Islamic religious leaders and statesmen
have found it difficult to "translate religious law and Qur'anic
precepts into a coherent modern political vision, capable of inspiring
the formulation of effective solutions for difficult or even intractable
problems."\

Scholars who see no links between Islam and democratic
developments discriminate between the Islamic cultures of Pakistan and
West Asia, the Islamic heartland. For example, Larry Diamond, while
summarizing the findings of various authors, concludes that, at least," in
four predominantly Muslim countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
and Turkey), there is little evidence of Islam directly obstructing
democratic development." Leo Rose persuasively argues that Pakistan's
founders were modernists who saw no role in governance to Islamic
organizations, that most of the top leaders of Muslim League which
spearheaded the movement for the creation of Pakistan were educated in
secular, not religious, schools, and that the Islamic culture of
Pakistan is the product of Turkic and Mongol invaders, not part of

\textsuperscript{194}Ibid., p. 177.
\textsuperscript{195}A symbolic gesture of Islamic commitment by the Sharif
government.
\textsuperscript{196}Ibid., p. 181
\textsuperscript{197}Brumberg, Daniel. "Islamic Fundamentalism, Democracy, and the
Gulf War," in Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, James
\textsuperscript{198}Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset, (eds.),
Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, Volume Three, Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 16-17.
Islamic heartland in West Asia. Feldman furnishes incontrovertible evidence about the shared cultural heritage of India and Pakistan. It is difficult for Pakistan to cast aside that culture which evolved from the fusion of Muslim with the Hindu over the centuries. By exemplifying the emergence of Bangladesh, Pye claims that the Bengali sense of identity came out stronger than the general appeal to Islam. More important, Pye suggests that despite sharp differences, there are common threads in Hindu and Muslim cultures, particularly with respect to the concept of power. By far the most powerful evidence about Indian impact on Islam comes from a Muslim author, Rafiq Zakaria, whose propositions are recapitulated in the succeeding paragraphs.

It is oversimplistic to characterize the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, or its variant, Islamisation, as an upshot of the historic animosity between Hindus and Muslims. Contrary to the

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199 Rose, Leo. "Experiments with Democracy," in Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, pp. 104-105.
200 Feldman From Crisis to Crisis 120. Feldman buttresses his arguments further: The birthplace of Urdu, one of Pakistan's national languages, is India; the Indian Institute of Islamic Studies produces more and better work than has been produced in Pakistan over the last twenty years; the work of Rabindranath Tagore is prized as much in East Pakistan as it is in West Bengal; and the for a long time the home of Bengal's greatest Muslim poet, Nazrul Islam, was India.
201 In a 1968 study of student political activism in both wings, in East Pakistan, only eight per cent of the total, and twelve per cent of the politically competent took pride in Islam and Islam nationalism. In the Western Wing, the percentages were more, but not impressive: seventeen and thirty per cent respectively. See, Feldman, The End and the Beginning, p. 47.
202 Pye, p. 154.
203 The summary that follows has been extracted from Rafiq Zakaria's The Struggle within Islam: the conflict between religion and politics, Penguin, London, 1989. For the opposite view that Islam is intolerant, see Article 247289 of soc.culture.indian "Islam: Tolerant or not tolerant," 22 Apr 1996.
204 Graham Fuller makes a subtle but less than convincing differentiation between the terms Islamist and Fundamentalist. He argues that the Islamists in many ways represent modernist movement. "Their's is not a simple desire to return to the early days of Islamic society...." See Graham Fuller, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan: its Character and Prospects, RAND, Santa Monica, R-3964-USDP, 1991 (V), pp. 8-10. But the growing violence against cinemas, musical concerts, video shops, non-Muslim minorities, Ahmediyas, and the promulgation of Shari's laws that sanctioned such punishments as stoning to death and amputation indicate
general belief, the propagation path of Islam in India was quite different from other countries, say, Iran or Afghanistan. The conversion took place more through love and persuasion than it did through force. Consequently, a high degree of mutual tolerance - the hallmark of secularism-characterized the Hindu-Muslim relations until the late 1920s. And this secularism persisted despite the British policy to inject the communal virus to the Indian body-politic: first, by the communal award of 1909, and later, by encouraging the division of Indian politics along religious lines, so Hindus and Muslims could never unite against the British.

In sum, the Indian impact on Islam is unique for several reasons. First, unlike other regions conquered by Muslims, in India, despite almost a thousand years of Muslim rule, the people remained predominantly non-Muslim. Second, the Muslim invaders conformed to the rules of shari'a, but did not turn their empires into theocracies. Third, the Muslim rulers, particularly the Moguls, were willing to assimilate whatever they found appealing in India.205

Most of the Muslim invaders inter-married and became as much Indians as their subjects. They appointed Hindus to high posts in the

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that fundamentalism is both a rallying point and a chief agent for Islamisation. Fuller presents a similar argument in *Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan*, RAND, Santa Monica R-3970-USDP, 1991 1-2. "Islamists similarly speak of their party and movement as an ideology and not a religion..." This is again unconvincing: the "ideology" excludes non-Muslims, including Ahmadis from subscribing to it. That is, one has to be a Muslim first to participate in the movement. This movement is neither secular nor does it permit modernization at the expense of overlooking the fundamental tenets of Islam. Which explains the long drawn struggle between the Ulemas and President Ayub Khan. Even Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who tried to ingratiate himself with the Ulamas, in the event, lost his legitimacy with them. For a reasoned treatment of Fundamentalists and Islamists, see Mustafa Kamal Pasha, *Beyond the Two-Nation Divide: Kashmir and Resurgent Islam*, in Raju Thomas (ed.), *Perspectives on Kashmir*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, pp. 369-387.

205Ayesha Jalal observes that "Despite its egalitarian creed, Muslims remain divided by class, caste, and tribal affiliations, to say nothing of the inherited differences of rank and privilege. In varying measures, the vast majority of Pakistan muslims retain an unconscious attachment to local traditions and symbols, not uncommonly of Hindu origin. Hindus and Muslims had lived cheek by jowl, resisting as well as adopting one another's social mores." See, Jalal, p.287.
administration and in the Army. Thus, Akbar the Great Mogul, appointed Man Singh, a Hindu Rajput, his commander-in-chief, and another Hindu, Todar Mall, his Diwan (chief Administrator). Akbar founded a new religious order, "Din-Illahi," or Divine Faith, which was open to all Indians. "The religious principles of the Din-Illahi reflected an ancient Indo-Aryan secular concept and the principles of the most cultured and enlightened Indian Muslims of the 16th century."\textsuperscript{206}

It is also incorrect to see the frequent political struggle between the Muslim Moghuls and the Hindu Marathas, the Hindu Rajputs and the Sikhs, that took place between the 14th and 18th centuries in the religious light. Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, chose a Muslim as one of his principal companions: Akbar granted the site of Golden Temple (the holiest Sikh temple); a Muslim saint, Mian Mir, laid the foundation of the sacred Harimandir complex of the Golden Temple; the Army of Rana Pratap, the lone Rajput chieftain, who defied Akbar, had a Muslim Commander, and almost 20,000 Pathans (Muslims from North West Frontier Province, now in Pakistan); and, finally, the Maratha leader, Shivaji, who successfully waged a guerrilla war against Aurangzeb, the last effective Moghul ruler, had such loyal Muslim commanders as Sidde Hambali and Daulat Khan.\textsuperscript{207}

The preceding discussion brings out certain conclusions. First, the argument that Islamic culture stimulates military intervention, and the Hindu, deters one, remains unsubstantiated: Islam contains as many democratic features as it does the authoritarian ones. Second, in the late 1960s, large percentage of student political activists in both West and East Pakistan were not very much concerned with Islam and Islamic nationalism. Third, although in the late 1980s, the electoral showings of fundamental Islamic groups in countries, such as Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt have been impressive, these groups performed dismally in Pakistan's general elections in 1988\textsuperscript{208} and 1990 (In the recent

\textsuperscript{206}Lt.Gen. Eric Vas (Ret.), Violence in Society: the formative years, Natraj Dehra Dun, India, 1984, p.179.
\textsuperscript{207}Ibid., pp. 182-183.
\textsuperscript{208}Despite Zia's missionary zeal in Islamisation, in the elections of 1988, the leaders of Jamaat-i-Islami were trounced in province after province. See, Zakaria, Rafiq, The Trial of Benazir, Popular Prakashan,
elections in Algeria (1996), the fundamentalists again suffered a setback. Fourth, the Indian impact on Islam in the Indian sub-continent has been significant, substantial, and at times decisive. Unlike in the Middle-East, the Islamic culture in Pakistan was an outcome of the fusion of years of Hindu and Muslim cultures.

There have been several coups/attempted coups in the history of Pakistan. Barring the last one of September 1995, none was inspired by Islamic ideology. Over time, Pakistan's deliberate attempts to prevent India's cultural penetration, have not been very successful. However, given that, in Pakistan, the pace of Islamisation would continue, whether or not the polity, like those of Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt, would become more vulnerable to military intervention is a matter for informed speculation.

Bombay, 1989, p. 11.

209 Some forty army personnel, including a major general, a brigadier, and a colonel were arrested on September 26, 1995 following an intelligence report that they were plotting to stage an Islamic revolution with the alleged backing of the country's fundamentalist groups. See, Pakistan Today, Los Angeles, October 27, 1995, p. 22. The Indian Press was, skeptical about this report, however. Quoting the New York Times, the Times of India reported that Bhutto took two important actions to ensure smooth passage of the U.S. senate bill that would allow first military sales to Pakistan in five years; first, she cracked down on the "fundamentalist plotters"; second, she cooperated with the U.S. agents in arresting Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, a prime suspect in the World Trade Center Bombing in New York. See, The Times of India, New Delhi, October 19, 1995, p. 15.

210 For an authentic version, please refer to the excerpts from memoirs of A.H. Kardar, "Failed Expectations," Pakistan - Dawn Wire Service, 9 August 1995, reproduced in Article 3571, misc.news.southasia. Kardar recounts "During Ayub's days it was decided to set up two Boards for the promotion of Urdu and Bengali languages. The interesting part was that with regard to Bengali, I was required to convey to the Chairman designate of the Bengali Development Board, Justice Murshed, that very effort should be made to eliminate the influence of Tagore from the Bengali literature of East Pakistan. To my undying shame I repeated this brief and received the curt reply, "Mr. Kardar, I never thought that you would speak the language of a Tonga (pony-cart) driver of Lahore. How can you think of English language without Shakespeare and how in the name of God can you think of Bengali literature without Tagore?" I have never felt more embarrassed and humble and apologized for the brief I was carrying from the Federal Government." 211 Pye's comments about the unpredictability and "combustibility" of fundamentalist reactions are pertinent. Besides, he points out that Asian cultures express something more than the Middle-Eastern fatalism:
Ethnic Composition of the Military

In the extant literature, two competing propositions claim scholarly attention: (1) the more heterogeneous the polity, the increased likelihood of political instability, and thus, the increased likelihood of military interventions.212 (2) Polities with a dominant ethnic group are more amenable to military interventions than are multi-ethnic societies, without a dominant ethnic group. 213

We also noted that in Pakistan, after Premier Liaquat Ali Khan's death, a nexus had developed between the military, the bureaucracy, and the landed gentry-- all Punjabi-dominated. The politicians, who are the elected leaders, were relegated to the background. In India, however, the nexus between politicians and the bureaucracy seemed to have grown strong; this nexus dominated the military completely.

Scholars, such as Cohen, Kukreja, Chibber, and Apurba Kundu have focused on an almost identical theme: whereas in Pakistan, Punjabis and Pathans dominated the armed forces, in India, the armed forces were more representative of the national population; ergo, the representative character of the Indian army has deterred military intervention. It is interesting to note that Brigadier A.R. Siddiqui (Retd), in his caustic rejoinder to Cohen, comments on the Punjabi domination of the Pakistan army: he asserts that even in neighboring India, the Punjab provides a disproportionate number of officers and men.214 While neither India nor Pakistan publishes the ethnic breakdown of their respective armed forces, we need to estimate this composition by analyzing such available data as the (a) the intake of officer cadets, and (b) the breakdown of retired, senior officers.215

while they embrace the non-Islamic ideal of tranquillity, they can also be provoked to collective rage by perceived threats to Islamic culture. And the probability of such impulsive, collective rage will be higher in Malaysia and Indonesia, where it is the university students, not the older generation, who have demanded stricter Islamic rules.

215 The retired senior officers' sample (see, Chapter 3) is particularly relevant, because we asserted in Chapter 1 that in India
We maintain our assumption from Chapter 1 that, in India and Pakistan, potential military interventions have to be spearheaded by fairly senior officers, that is, in view of the societal conditions, it is almost impossible for a non-commissioned officer, or even a low-ranking commissioned officer to mastermind, let alone execute a coup. This narrows down the level of analysis to the senior officers' cadre. Armed with this estimate, we can test the following hypothesis: If the senior-officer cadre is dominated by one ethnic group, does it create conditions favorable to military interventions?

As far as Pakistan is concerned, data generated by such Pakistani authors as Rizvi and Cohen clearly establish the domination of Punjabis and Pathans among the officer cadre.\(^{216}\) We first need to estimate the ethnic composition of officers in the Indian army. To do this, we rely mainly on two sources: (1) state-wise break-up of intake of officers in first ten IMA (Indian Military Academy) regular courses, 1932 to 1936, and the summary of state-wise break-up of officers in ten IMA courses between 1978 and 1982.\(^{217}\) and (2) the simple random sample of 317 officers of Brigadier and above, who retired approximately between 1968 and 1993.\(^{218}\) Chibber sought to establish that, in India, the recruitment was becoming broad-based, even though as late as in 1982, the North-Western parts of India—U.P., Punjab, Delhi, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir—accounted for almost 55 percent of the intake.

If we recognize that Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Chandigarh, were parts of Punjab until the middle 1960s, and that Delhi comprised predominantly Punjabi (refugee) population, the Punjabi percentage of the Indian officer cadre comes up to 36 percent, even in 1982. If we analyze the simple random sample of 317 senior, retired officer, the Punjabi domination becomes more pronounced: by identifying officers from

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\(^{216}\) For example, see Rizvi, 1976, pp. 179-181, and Cohen, The Pakistan Army, p. 44. Though the officer recruitment in Pakistan is now believed to be more inclusive of other classes, we are concerned with past patterns that might have influenced military interventions.

\(^{217}\) Chibber, pp. 39-41.
Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and Chandigarh, with Punjabis, the percentage of Punjabi senior officers works out to a surprising 58 percent (with a standard error of 2 percent). Thus, Brigadier Siddiqui's intuition about the ethnic dominance of Punjabi officers, at least among the senior ranks, turns out to be quite accurate.

One might argue that the Indian Punjabis are much more heterogeneous than are their Pakistani counterparts, because they include at least two religions (Sikhism), and several castes. While this may be true, it is also the case with Pakistani Punjabis. These facts demonstrate that Punjabi domination in the armed forces is a weak explanatory variable. In the pre-1971 Pakistan, Bengalis—not Punjabis—constituted the majority of the population, although the center of gravity of the political power lay in Punjab. Next, we will turn to the bureaucracy, particularly the nexus between the army and the bureaucracy.

In the interregnum between Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination and Ayub’s coup, evidence regarding the interventionist role played by the military-bureaucratic nexus is overwhelming; first, numerous bureaucrat-turned politicians, such as Iskander Mirza, Ghulam Mohammad, and Muhammad Ali, desperately tried to lever themselves into power even

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219Chapter 3 describes how this data were generated.
219Masood Ghaznavi, "Narrow "Establishment" Parameters Limit Pakistani Democracy," The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs," Sep/Oct 1993. Masood writes" Despite large scale urbanization in the past four or five decades, Pakistan continues to be largely agricultural, feudal, tribal, clannish and caste-ridden. Castes can cut across religious barriers. Even when they move to urban areas, people bring their loyalties, particularism, prejudices, customs and institutions with them. Their hereditary chiefs, whether they are the CHAUDHRIS of Jats, GUJJARS, ARIAN, RAJPUTS and other tribes of Punjab; MALIKS of Khattaks, KAKARS and various -ZAYS and -KHELS of the Pathans; SARDARS of Bugti, MARRI, BIZENJO and ZEHRS of the Blauch; or the WADDERAS of TALPURA, BHUTTOS, JATOIS, etc., of Sindh, all have two things in common: ARROGANCE and factionalism. " Stephen Cohen reinforces this observation. For example, both Hindus and Muslims can claim to be Rajputs, the warrior class. General Muhammad Musa, the former Chief of Staff, and Governor, claims to be a pure Rajput. See, Cohen, The Pakistan Army, p. 59.
220We also discount Veena Kukreja’s inference that the Indian army officers, much like the 13 Army Chiefs since Field Marshal Cariappa, represent most of the states of India. See Kukreja, p. 197.
though they had no political base; second, the army had attained a center-stage position, because of its unqualified success in handling numerous internal security duties; third, the bureaucrats, with Army's tacit support, ran the show without political accountability; and finally, the army took over, with the assured support of the bureaucrats, in administering the country. India provides a contrasting scene, however.

For example, even though as late as 1958, Punjabis dominated the army, the political center of gravity lay in Uttar Pradesh. Because of the socialist philosophy espoused by the then-Indian leaders, and the introduction of land reforms, including but not limited to the abolition of the zamindari (big landowners) system, in some states, such as the Uttar Pradesh, there was little possibility of a nexus developing between the army and the landed gentry, as happened in Pakistani Punjab. Because of the popularity and the legitimacy of the political leadership, provided by such political giants as Jawaharlal Nehru, and Sardar Vallabhai Patel, the bureaucracy, unlike its counterpart in Pakistan, could never think of leveraging itself to centers of political power. Instead, the bureaucracy cheerfully accepted the role of controlling the armed forces in all spheres of administration: the first step in this direction was to tilt the warrant of precedence in favor of the civil bureaucracy. Thus the status of the Chief of the Army Staff and his principal staff officers was gradually eroded. Implicit in this role was the policy of appointing pliant officers who would not rock the boat when assuming important positions, and also rewarding "cooperating" Chiefs of Staff with Ambassadorial appointments.

Why were the outcomes so different between India and Pakistan? At first glance, Punjabi domination of the armed forces appeared to be one

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222 Almost all of the retired Chiefs of Staff were given Ambassadorial assignments, often, in countries that were not very important in furthering India's foreign policy objectives. Some of them were appointed to positions much below their status, that is, appointments that are customarily filled by Directors/Joint Secretaries of the Indian Foreign Service.
of the factors: yet, a similar domination albeit to a lesser extent, prevailed in India, as well. The nexus that developed between the Punjabi-dominated military, the bureaucracy, and the landed gentry in Pakistan, was a condition specific to Pakistan. In addition, ambitious bureaucrats and military officers took advantage of the inept political leadership, and developed a nexus which eventually paved the way for a military coup. On the other hand, in India, a different kind of nexus between the political leaders and the bureaucrats ensured the civilian "control" over the military. The important difference, here, was that competent political leadership not only maintained direct control over the civil bureaucracy, but through the latter, exercised indirect but firm control over the military.

Participation in Military Security Pacts

During the first decade of independence, while Pakistan concluded a number of security alliances, such as the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), India contrived to stay away from these. As a result of these pacts, the military in Pakistan played a substantial role in policy matters, such as training of officers in foreign training institutions, and negotiation and implementation of military aid, including but not limited to arms transfers. In India, these matters were handled exclusively by the politicians and the bureaucrats. Does this explain military intervention in Pakistan and its absence in India?

We recall from Chapter 2 that Western scholars, with a few notable exceptions, find that foreign influence,\(^ {223} \) be it military aid, or professional training, has had no bearing on military interventions; if anything, they argue, it has strengthened democratic institutions among the recipient countries.\(^ {224} \) Scholars from the third world, perceive a

\(^ {223} \)For the purpose of this dissertation, foreign influence implies participation in foreign-sponsored security pacts (of which arms transfer is an essential component), delivery of military aid, and furnishing of military training.

\(^ {224} \)For example, see Huntington, "Third Wave," p. 273. Other authors, who argue that foreign influence has no impact on domestic military intervention, are Putnam, "Western Influence," pp. 83-110, and Craig Jenkins and
clear relationship between foreign influence and military interventions, however. Some of these scholars, such as Venkataramani, Samina Ahmed, and Jalal, go further and imply causation. We, therefore, test the following hypothesis: Does foreign influence favor military intervention in politics?

To test, first, we examine how third world scholars evaluate the effect of foreign influence, including military assistance. Second, we review the findings of some Western scholars regarding the latter; third, we compare and contrast the two schools of thought (Western and the third world), and relate them to actual experiences of India and Pakistan in coping with foreign influence.

Based on his research of primary sources, primarily the U.S. National Security Council documents, M.S. Venkataramani postulates that when a weak country (Pakistan), without the benefit of strong, popularly elected leadership, strives for an unequal military partnership with a stronger country, even when there is no imminent threat to its security, the military may begin to get "ideas." Concurrently, Venkataramani argues, that the stronger country may conclude that its purpose is better served by a caudillos, shahanshahs (the Supreme Emperor), or military dictators, who can provide political stability, than it is by democracies that are unstable, and that are riven with endless parliamentary wrangles; the stronger country, then, will more likely use the dictator in the weaker country as long as his services in that area are required.225 Venkataramani explores how, between 1951 and 1958, Pakistan was drawn into the U.S.-sponsored security pacts; in particular, he illustrates how the military leaders were encouraged to deal directly with foreign governments, often bypassing legitimate political leaders in the process.

For example, during Prime Minister Mohammad Ali's ill-fated226 visit to the U.S. in 1954, General Ayub dealt with the U.S. Government

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226Ill-fated, because, while he was away in the U.S., Governor General Ghulam Mohammad stripped him of all powers, and recalled him to Pakistan.
directly, relegating the Prime Minister to the background. A secret Aide-Memoire, laying out the terms of the U.S.-Pakistan Bilateral Agreement, was handed over to Ayub—not to the Prime Minister. The Progress Report of the Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council recognized that the Central Government of Pakistan, in fact, comprised two powerful personages, Ayub, and Gen Iskander Mirza, and recommended that the U.S. military aid was important "as a means of strengthening the Central Government's control and of creating strength in Pakistan and the general area." 227

Although as early as 1957, an intelligence report prepared by the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research, warned that Mirza, or some members of the elite, with the help of the army and top civil servants, would probably establish authoritarian rule, the U.S. government, by NSC 5901/1, welcomed a "relatively stable martial law regime," and pledged its support to it. 228

In a separate study, Ayesha Jalal largely reinforces Venkataramani's observations: how the U.S. role in Pakistan tacitly encouraged various military dictators to perpetuate military regimes. As described by her, the interplay of regional and international factors influenced Pakistan's domestic politics and economy, "distorting relations between the center and the provinces in particular and the dialectic between state construction and political processes in general." In this context, the nexus between the top echelons of the military and the bureaucracy in Pakistan and the centers of the international system in London and Washington is of special relevance.

For example, shortage of foreign exchange compelled the military to forge their own links with potential suppliers. By cautious handling of the sterling releases, the British were able to retain influence over the Pakistani defense establishment. The British High Commissioner was clairvoyant enough to realize that there was a growing feeling that parliamentary democracy may have to be replaced by Islamic democracy and

228Tbid., p. 421.
Shariat rule. Similarly, the American military attache was delighted to find a very strong feeling of friendship and admiration for all things American on the part of the majority of Pakistani officers and men. Thus started the direct connection between Army authorities and foreign governments, with the attendant arms racketeering.  

In a related manner, Zia-ul-Haq's capacity to survive, for example, had much to do with the shift in the regional balance of power—triggered by the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The presence of three million Afghan refugees helped fuel a drug economy patronized and protected by the Inter-service-intelligence agency.  

Jalal's conclusions are, however, far more sweeping than are Venkataramani's: "while an alliance between certain members of the defense and civil establishment had begun pushing the pendulum of power away from the political leadership, it was the skillful manipulation of international connections that ultimately cleared the ground for the institutional imbalances that have plagued Pakistan's history." In a more recent book, Baldev Nayar sheds further light on evidence that strongly corroborates Venkataramani's conclusions. Relying primarily on the declassified volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States, published by the State Department, Nayar argues that various U.S. officials were aware that Pakistan's quest for U.S. arms was not related to the Soviet threat, but to its hatred for India. Nevertheless, the U.S. left no stone unturned to cultivate authoritarian rulers, such as President Mirza, and General Ayub Khan. He concludes  

229Jalal, pp.76-78.
230Ibid., 323. For Pakistan Army's alleged role in drug trafficking, see the concerns raised by Peter Deutsch in the U.S. House of Representatives, on October 7, 1994. Deutsch refers to the Washington Report's (September 12, 1994) coverage of the disclosure made by the former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif. He revealed that in early 1991, the Pakistan Army Chief, in collaboration with the Inter-Service-Intelligence Agency, had drawn a comprehensive blueprint of a plan to sell heroin; the proceeds were to be utilized to pursue covert operations, such as the building of a nuclear bomb, and exporting of fundamentalism to India. See "Pakistan's Links with Fundamentalism and International Terrorism," Soc.culture.pakistan:56458, 13 October 1994.  
231Jalal,p.124
that "the impact of military aid on Pakistan's political system was no less serious, apart from the American intrusion into its politics."\textsuperscript{232}

Samina Ahmad attributes the lax civilian control of the Pakistan military to international factors, particularly to the security pacts. She asserts that Ayub and Mirza followed the tradition of the British Commanders-in-Chief, who could approach the Anglo-American block for help, without any political interference; thus, the military authorities were well ahead of the civilians in establishing rapport with foreign governments. Specifically, she comments on how Mirza exploited the Rawalpindi Conspiracy case to curry favor with the Americans.\textsuperscript{233}

Western scholars, however, often express diametrically opposite views. Leo Rose, for example, while identifying reasons for the failure of democratic experiments in Pakistan, suggests that the evidence of the role of foreign powers is not clear.\textsuperscript{234} In Chapter 2, we saw how Huntington claimed that foreign influence was largely instrumental in the creation of third world democracies, and how Craig-Jenkins and Kposowa found that export dependence and foreign capital penetration had no effect on military interventions.\textsuperscript{235} Edmonds recognizes the modernizing role of the armed forces in third world countries, and accepts that industrial states have competed for arms sales and military

\textsuperscript{232}See, Nayar, Baldev, "Superpower Dominance and Military Aid: A Study of Military Aid to Pakistan," Manohar, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 73-77. Nayar's analysis calls into question the objectivity of some American scholars, who have worked for the U.S. Government. "It seems that American scholarship is really less comfortable with the U.S. containment of regional powers, which is likely to reveal not so benign motives......Certainly, where eminent scholars serve the government in high office, such as Secretary of State or assistant to the president, it creates a powerful updraft throughout academia for scholarship to correspond to official ideology." Nayar, pp. 82-84.


\textsuperscript{234}Rose, p. 129. In Larry Diamond (ed.). Rose argues that although several foreign powers, including the United States, intrude into Pakistani domestic politics, "what is less clear is that they have much of an impact on Pakistani domestic politics despite the vigorous rhetoric often used on the subject within Pakistan elite."

\textsuperscript{235}Huntington, Third Wave, p. 273, Jenkins and Kposowa, pp. 271-292. Huntington argues that Western influence is conducive to strengthen democratic regimes in the third world.
training contracts with third world countries, particularly if the latter are under military dictatorship. This said, Edmonds leaves the question of the effect of arms transfers open ended: "In this context, the question has yet to be answered whether or not Third World states initiate the demand for weapons or whether they are pressured into taking them in return for advanced industrial states' economic assistance, political and moral support or other favors."236

However, Western scholars are not unanimous on how foreign influence affects democracies in the third world. For example, Constantine P. Danopoulos argues that developments beyond the borders of a nation state can contribute either to military intervention, or to the maintenance of civilian rule. Referring to Pakistan’s military alliances, he emphasizes that “Of special importance to the Indian civilian and military leaders are the lessons drawn from Pakistan's history of military rule and alliance with the United States...which led to Pakistan military to expand its power relative to civilian institutions.”237 On the other hand, Danopoulos argues, the Indian policy of non-alignment has survived without any interruption, and, more important, it is strongly supported both by civilian and military leaders. In Chapter 2, we noted how both Keith Hopkins and Alan Wells, suggested that exposure to better living conditions in, and military aid from, foreign countries, could stimulate coups in home countries.238

In Chapter 2, we also reviewed how Talukder Maniruzzaman, a Bangladesh scholar, through quantitative analysis, concluded that arms transfers engendered coup d'état. Maniruzzaman, however, could not explain why, despite heavy arms transfers, coups did not occur in Israel and India. The circumstances and conditions that governed arms transfers in India, therefore, need a detailed investigation.

In India, two factors seemed to have downplayed the role of officers in playing a significant role in arms transfers: (a) India's

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236Edmonds, pp. 8, 191, 196.
238Hopkins, pp. 176-177, and Wells, pp. 871-87. Also see, Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule, pp. 18-19.
professed policy of non-alignment, which kept it away from security pacts, and (b) a deliberate policy of Nehru's government to isolate officers from the centers of policy/decision-making, with the bureaucrats taking most of the important arms transfer decisions. In the aftermath of the 1962 debacle, when Western arms aid started flowing to India, and in later years, when Soviet arms were purchased on a massive scale, important transactions were exclusively handled by the bureaucrats, who, at times, ostensibly in the interest of "economy," not only modified some of the qualitative requirements, but, almost invariably, were in direct contact with foreign governments. In so doing, they effectively derogated from the advisory role of the armed forces brass. No doubt, this arrangement did cause some resentment among the armed forces. The bureaucrats could afford to ignore this, because they had the blessings of the political leadership. And this tradition of bureaucratic domination of the armed forces continues even today.\footnote{For an analysis of tight bureaucratic control over the armed forces, see Samina Ahmed, Civil-Military Relations in India, pp.18-23. The bureaucrats enjoyed this control, and sought to strengthen it further by conjuring up, and feeding visions of army coups to their unsuspecting political bosses. See, Samina Ahmed, above, pp. 19-20; also interview on May 5, 1995 with a senior police officer, who was on the personal staff of Nehru.}

**DISCUSSION**

U.S. policy in South Asia has been summarized by Sisson and Rose: "Washington was not interested in backing Pakistan against either India or Afghanistan, although the United States considered Pakistan's role in containment, particularly in support of Iran and Turkey, a much higher priority than the maintenance of good relations with New Delhi or Kabul. To attain the former, Washington had to make concessions on the latter, which New Delhi interpreted as motivated by anti-Indian objectives. Although India was wrong on the motivation, it was right about the consequences: the US-Pakistani alliance role played only an incidental role in containing communism--and then only into the early 1960s--while
allowing Pakistan to take much stronger positions in its disputes with India and Afghanistan that would otherwise have been possible.\textsuperscript{240}

Although Nayar disagrees in the logic and the evidence for this conclusion, it is a fair articulation of the U.S. goals. What finally counts is not the objectives, however laudable, but the consequences. Because of the U.S.’s preference to deal directly with military leaders, rather than elected representatives, Pakistani military leaders were needlessly emboldened to disregard politicians, to underestimate Indian capabilities, and to perpetuate military dictatorship with impunity, and without regard to public opinion. The U.S.’s past policy of seeking to establish parity in the military capability between India and Pakistan, and its tendency to view the Indian security planning through the Soviet prism, also aggravated Indian sensitivities to the so-called “anti-Indian” policies of the U.S., which was seen as bent upon destabilizing India.\textsuperscript{241} The immediate upshot was further isolation of officers from contact with foreign officers through the invocation of acts, such as the Official Secrets Act, and Rules for contact with foreign nationals.\textsuperscript{242}

Our concern is not so much with the merits and demerits of U.S.’s South Asian policy, as it is with its effect on the military in Pakistan. President Mirza posited unequivocal U.S. support to his authoritarian policies, as did General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan (who played a significant role in establishing U.S.’s contact with PRC),


\textsuperscript{241}One would have discounted such apprehensions, had they not been voiced by a senior Indian Minister of Home Affairs. Surely, the latter must have had hard evidence to support his denunciation of the U.S. complicity in Kashmir and other trouble spots in India. See, Michael Drudge, "India/Kashmir (L-Only)," Voice of America, New Delhi, dated February 15, 1995. Drudge reported that "the Indian Home Minister S.B. Chavhan has told the Parliament (that) the United States is backing a campaign by Muslim militants to win independence for Indian Kashmir."

\textsuperscript{242}One might argue that Indian officers, like their Pakistani counterparts, also undergo training at the U.S. training institutes. While we do not have the data, it is fair to presume that the frequency, level, and scope of U.S. military cooperation with Pakistan has been much higher than has been with India.
and General Zia-ul-Haq. In fact, the shaky foundations of Zia's martial rule in the initial years, were unexpectedly bolstered by fortuitous developments in neighboring Afghanistan.\(^{243}\)

On balance, there is adequate evidence in the Indo-Pakistani context, that foreign influence, if not suitably monitored and moderated by the political leadership, tends to give "ideas" to potential coup-makers. The latter, by seizing power, might, then, provide the short term stability and order, so necessary to further the foreign policy goals of the more powerful foreign collaborator.

**FINDINGS**

In the Indo-Pakistan context, the level of political culture emerges as the key determinant of whether or not the military would intervene in politics. Pakistan was singularly unlucky in not having mass bases of support for the most dominant political party: the Muslim League. After both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan died in quick succession, there was no political leader of national stature who could steer the country through the trials and tribulations of the process of nation-building. By declaring Urdu as the national language, Pakistani leaders displayed a lack of sensitivity to the Bengali sentiments. The Bengali suspicion was further compounded when West Pakistan was reorganized as one unit, presumably to offset the Bengali majority. More important, by abdicating its control over the army, Pakistan's political leaders conceded areas of political decision-making, such as the declaration of martial law, and the conclusion of foreign treaties, to the army brass.

At the time of independence, political institutions were almost non-existent in Pakistan. Their inception, let alone their development, was hampered by the delay both in the framing of the constitution, and the holding of general elections. The process of social mobilization outpaced that of political mobilization.

\(^{243}\)This said, it is wrong to conclude that the U.S. always supports dictatorial regimes, as long they serve its foreign policy goals. U.S. help in putting down the army's insurrection in the Philippines in 1988, and its reactions to the recent abortive coup in Pakistan (1996) are evidence to the contrary.
After independence, the military not only retained its dominance of the British era, but levered itself to the center-stage of national decision-making. Having tasted power under the first military regime in 1958, the military's appetite for "power and perks" was further whetted under the Yahya regime. The scope of military's corporate interests was further enlarged to include such luxuries as land grants, preferential housing and salary allocation, and lucrative appointments in Pakistan and abroad. Even after democratic regimes of Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif came to power after Zia's death, the military continued to be the kingmaker.

Almost the opposite happened in India: the mass bases of the Indian National Congress, the predominant party, was strong; Nehru's leadership was competent and enduring. His vision of secular politics did not alienate minorities, frequent communal riots notwithstanding. By agreeing, although reluctantly, to reorganize states on linguistic basis, Nehru converted India's liability of cultural pluralism, into a national asset.

The military did not get any preferential treatment with regard to pay and perks; if anything, the status of the military brass was gradually eroded, and the bureaucratic control over the military strengthened. Did this state of civil-military relations change when there were significant rift between the political leaders and the military brass? For example, did the military think of intervening when there was a serious rift between Thimayya and Krishna Menon, or when the military was humiliated in the war of 1962? The answer is an emphatic "no". In the first case, not even a popular leader, such as General Thimayya, could challenge the legitimacy of the government and Nehru's leadership. In the second, government took prompt measures to remedy the situation and neutralize the partial dissatisfaction among the armed forces. Besides, according to the perceptions of a sizable cross section of the military, the army brass were as much to blame for the debacle as were the civilian leaders and bureaucrats.

These conclusions bear also on the subsequent decay in India's political and institutional processes. The Indian political scene in the 1980s was dismal. India was plagued both by political instability
and rampant corruption. The army was called very often to quell domestic violence as was done in Pakistan before the declaration of the first military regime in 1958. There is abundant evidence to prove that the first 17 years of stability under the stewardship of Nehru had helped the military officers to internalize the concept of civil supremacy. For example, more than 90% of the officers interviewed by Kundu were against following Ayub's example. Similarly, more than 90% of the officers interviewed after the debacle in the 1962 war firmly opposed any thought of moving against the government. Transitions to new governments have always been peaceful. While employed in aid of civil power, the supremacy of the civil government was always recognized; in addition, even when operating in aid of civil power, the bureaucratic oversight and control was never relaxed. The Indian Chiefs of Staffs, with notable exceptions of Field Marshal Manekshaw and General K. Sundarji, were timid in confronting the powerful bureaucrats, who made sure that potential "trouble-makers", such as Lt.Gen S.K.Sinha, were superseded. Even Field Marshal Manekshaw, when he disagreed with Indira Gandhi did so, in the domain of military operations, not in the formulation of political policy making. In fact, bureaucrats, such as B.N.Mullik, kept feeding gullible politicians imaginary scenarios of military coups, in order to maintain their proximity to centers of power.

The Indian political parties, whatever their failings, were mature enough not to politicize the armed forces personnel, and even power-hungry leaders, such as Indira Gandhi, never employed armed forces against political opponents (as was done by Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan in 1977).

The available evidence does not suggest that Islam, as practiced in Pakistan, stimulated military intervention any more than Hinduism in India encourages abstention. That is largely because of the composite culture which evolved as a result of the Indian impact on Islam. Our data on ethnic composition of senior officers suggest that ethnic dominance, by one group (Punjabis, for example), in and of itself, is a weak explanatory variable of military intervention; but when it is
combined with other factors, such as nexus with the landed gentry, and
the bureaucrats, it might be a powerful stimulant for intervention.

A survey of Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1950s clearly shows
that the military brass established direct contact with foreign powers,
who reciprocated these gestures by cultivating the military, while
circumventing the political leadership. This was done because military
leaders were very enthusiastic about concluding security treaties in
order to obtain military aid. The treaties in turn furthered the
foreign policy objectives of the donor, Western countries. Thus it was
a win-win situation both for the donors as well as the recipients.
These direct contacts assured the military of the support of foreign
powers, and gave them wrong ideas about their role and capability of
running the nation's administration.

These conclusions, based on historical and contemporary evidence,
need to be compared with the perceptions captured in the survey of
senior officers. By so doing, we can determine how far they are
convergent, or divergent. We will now address this task.
5. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA

INTRODUCTION

Background
In Chapter 4, we analyzed the pertinent variables that explained why and how certain conditions favored coups in Pakistan, and deterred them in India. This analysis was done in light of historical evidence. Chapter 5 analyzes the survey data, based on responses to a questionnaire mailed to retired officers of the rank of Brigadiers and above. The respondents were used as surrogates to their active component counterparts in order to tease out the variables that explain the "puzzle." For the questionnaire, see Appendix B.

The data represent the respondents' perceptions of, and attitudes toward important issues that bear on military interventions in domestic politics. Chapter 3 explained the reasons for the preferred method which combined qualitative and quantitative analyses to help explain the "puzzle." Chapter 3 also laid out the theoretical underpinning for this method. That is, irrespective of the prevailing conditions in societies, in the final analysis, it is the officers' perceptions that would determine whether or not the military would intervene. Since it was possible to generate a simple random sample from the Indian military's retired officer population, we posit that our findings are generalizable to India, as a whole and might provide informed contexts for policy actions in other "similar" countries, such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and a few countries of Southeast Asia.

The Survey Respondents
As described in Chapter 3, the respondents for the survey were selected from the population of retired officers of the rank of Brigadiers and above. The underlying assumption is that the long years of experience of these officers would have exposed them adequately to issues in civil-military relations, and thus, their perceptions would
approximate the real world. Their dates of commissions and retirements covered a period of approximately 1934-1961 and 1972-1994 respectively. We recognize that eliciting responses from retired officers has several disadvantages. For example, they may have encountered problems of recall. In addition, they may have been out of touch with the changing ethos of military institutions. On the other hand, retired officers are not obliged to toe the government line. Thus, they tend to be far more forthright and forthcoming in their responses than their active component counterparts would have been. We also admit that the survey questions are designed to elicit responses both to real and hypothetical situations. We are, however, reassured by the fact that long years of experience of respondents in senior ranks would have enabled the respondents to accomplish a realistic visualization of most of the issues in civil-military relations, including but not limited to hypothetical ones.

**Research Questions**

In Chapter 3, we framed broad research questions that addressed military intervention and its absence both in India and Pakistan. The main purpose of the survey was to capture the attitudes of Indian army officers toward important issues in civil-military relations, notably in the domain of military intervention. This was done independent of the findings of historical analysis conducted in Chapter 4. That is, both leading and loaded questions that might have influenced the responses were avoided. Therefore, within the broad framework of research objectives laid out in Chapter 3, certain specific research questions were identified. These questions required collection of data on variables that broadly fell into structural and attitudinal categories. In both cases, the dependent variable remained the same, that is, the military's propensity to intervene, or abstain. The key research questions are given below:

- What were the attitudes of officers toward and against military intervention in domestic politics?
- What were the attitudes of officers toward the government?
Do structural variables (class composition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff System, the civilian bureaucracy, caliber of officers, rehabilitation of ex-service officers and men) explain the military's propensity to intervene?

- Do attitudinal variables (attitude toward political leadership, the police, nuclear options, and the Kashmir problem) explain the military's proclivity to intervene?
- Are there any significant trends in officers' attitudinal patterns over time?
- Have the officers' perceptions of civilian control changed over time? If so, what are the reasons that brought about this change?

METHODS

The original population list was compiled from a variety of sources, such as the Ex-Servicemen League, and the Pension Payment Office. The process of referring to multiple sources enabled us to cross check the list for its accuracy. For example, the Pension Payment Office provided the names of officers who had deceased. In addition, the branches of various officers were checked against their respective corps records. Thus, a comprehensive population list of 1816 living, retired officers was generated. These sources provided information on branch, rank, and year of retirement.

Out of the computer-generated simple random sample of 317 (18% of the population), about 141 responded. The response rate of 45% is considered satisfactory, though not ideal. After the receipt of about 110 responses, follow-up efforts were made to contact the respondents. Respondents living in cities were contacted by telephone. Reminders were mailed to those living in rural areas. Regimental and Corps Associations were contacted to elicit the latest mailing addresses of non-respondents. Five of them regretted their inability to respond on account of illness. About ten had relocated. Four declined to respond due to personal reasons. Two did not respond to Questions 14-17, presumably due to an oversight. Each respondent was assigned an identification number to maintain his anonymity. Since perceptual
differences among various branches (armored corps, artillery, infantry, for example), were of interest to us, these details were included in the data.

Analysis Variables

The list of variables on which data were collected is given at Table 5.1. For most parts of analysis, the key dependent variable is Q5e, that is, the response which states that there are instances when it would be justifiable for the Indian army to seize power from political leaders. Some variables are contextually inter-related. For example, the explanatory variable Q14 (disparity between service privileges and perquisites in the army and in the civilian bureaucracy, particularly the IAS, promotes discontent in the army), related to the dependent variable Q14a (such discontent would lead to a military coup).

Table 5.1
List of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Number/ name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRUCTURAL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank on retirement*</td>
<td>rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch of service*</td>
<td>branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of retirement*</td>
<td>yret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State governments make judicious use of police force/ paramilitary force</td>
<td>Q5a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State governments play it safe by requisitioning the army’s aid at the earliest opportunity</td>
<td>Q5b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The JCS system would help fine tune the operational plans</td>
<td>Q8a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The JCS would better coordinate joint services training</td>
<td>Q8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you prefer the continuance of single/fixed class regiments, only fixed class regiments, or mixed regiments?</td>
<td>Q9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian control is interpreted to imply that bureaucrats, ought to exercise civilian control over the military.</td>
<td>Q13a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrats of the central services have better promotion prospects than those in other areas of government.</td>
<td>Q13c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military should have a major say in decisions having to do with nuclear options</td>
<td>Q20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much do you agree that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India?</td>
<td>Q21a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *=Collected from administrative records. All other data were collected from the survey.
Table 5.1, cont.
List of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Number/name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During nation during National Security threat, army should implicitly obey political leaders.</td>
<td>Q5c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If invited, Armed Forces should intervene readily.</td>
<td>Q5d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes justifiable for the Indian Army to seize power</td>
<td>Q5e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for the Indian Army's non-intervention</td>
<td>Q6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The caliber of officers recruited into the Indian army has improved, declined, or remained the same?</td>
<td>Q10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of changes in the caliber of officers on India's political stability</td>
<td>Q11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for the Indian Army's non-intervention</td>
<td>Q12a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicization will detract from fighting efficiency</td>
<td>Q12b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A coup may not be supported by the bureaucracy and the people</td>
<td>Q12c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On account of the exemplary conduct of senior officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A military coup may not be supported by the Air Force and the Navy</td>
<td>Q12d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not capable of administering a vast polity, such as India</td>
<td>Q12e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders established rapport with other ranks</td>
<td>Q12f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The disparity between service privileges and perquisites promote discontent among the army.</td>
<td>Q14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How likely do you think that this disparity will lead to a military coup?</td>
<td>Q14a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The deteriorating standards of discipline in the army account for the clashes between the army and the police?</td>
<td>Q16b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much do you agree that conflict with the police may lead to growing discontent within the army?</td>
<td>Q17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The disparity between service privileges and perquisites between the army and the police will lead to a military coup?</td>
<td>Q18a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis Methods

First, the distribution by categories—by branch, by rank, and by years of retirement -- of the respondents was checked against that of the simple random sample (SRS) to determine if it differed substantially from the latter. If the respondents maintained the randomization of the SRS, it might be possible to generalize the findings about the differences among various categories of respondents.
Second, the responses were checked for consistency and reliability. For example, the responses for the open-ended Question 6 (What in your opinion are the reasons for the Indian Army's non-intervention in politics?) were checked against specific responses to the close-ended Question 12. (How much do you agree with each of the following reasons for India's non-intervention?)

Third, the relationships, if any, between the designated dependent variable and potential explanatory variables was established through linear regressions. For example, what is the relationship between officers who responded to Variable Q14 (How much do you agree that the disparity between service privileges and perquisites in the army and the civilian bureaucracy, particularly the IAS, promotes discontent among the army?) and Variable Q5e? (How much do you agree that there are instances when it would be justifiable for the Indian Army to seize power from the political leaders?) Fourth, where the relationship was found to be strong, further analysis was carried out to discover whether or not there was any significant trend over time. Fifth, in case of open-ended questions, and those involving nominal variables, the frequency distribution was examined through cross tabulation. Finally, the responses pertaining to recruitment and class composition were further analyzed to determine whether or not there were significant differences of perceptions among officers belonging to different branches.

RESULTS

Analysis of Non-Responses

The distribution of the respondents according to various categories is given in Table 5.2; generally, it appears that the randomization is maintained.\cite{244} The Chi-squared test establishes the independence of rows and columns, and confirms that the distribution of the percentage of the sample, by category (branch, rank, and years of

\footnote{We have some reservations, however. The low response rate raises concerns about whether the non-respondents may have differences systematically from those who responded.}
retirement), is similar to that of the percentage of the respondents. This finding may mitigate the systematic differences, if any, between the respondents and the non-respondents.

**Theoretical Propositions and Related Responses**

In some cases, the responses supported relevant theoretical propositions; in some others they did not. For example, there was a negative relationship between respondents who felt that their concept of national interest differed from that of the government in power (Q4), and those who felt that India's state governments made judicious use of the police to deal with law and order problems (Q5a).

**Table 5.2**

**Distribution of Respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRANCH</th>
<th>% OF THE SRS</th>
<th>% OF THE RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>% OF THE SRS</th>
<th>% OF THE RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Gen</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS OF RETIREMENT</th>
<th>% OF THE SRS</th>
<th>% OF THE RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-74</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-89</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-94</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pearson Chi-squared (w/ 17 d.f.) = 5.4128  Pr = 0.996.

Furthermore, there was a positive relationship between officers who, while on active service, felt that their concept of national interest differed from that of the government, and those who agreed that
State governments requisitioned the Indian army's aid at the earliest opportunity (thus implying that it is not in national interest to deploy the army in aid of civil power without first examining the feasibility of using the police to deal with the problem). On the other hand, out of the officers who considered themselves as servants of the state—not the government—more than 67% stated that under no circumstances was military intervention justifiable (thus suggesting that officers who do not see themselves as servants of the government do not also favor military interventions at all).

**Comparison between Multiple Choice and Open Ended Questions**

A comparison was made between the answers to the multiple choice Question 6, and to the open-ended Question 12. Although these were framed differently, in essence, both asked the same question, that is, what the reasons for the Indian army's non-intervention in domestic politics were. The responses varied, however. For example, in response to Question 12, about 38% of the respondents agreed (fully) that politicians refrained from politicizing the army lest it detract from fighting efficiency (Q12a). In response to the open-ended Question 6, however, only 7% stated that politicians are mature enough not to interfere in military matters. Table 5.3 compares the responses to Questions 6 and 12.
Table 5.3
Responses to Questions 6 and 12 Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSES</th>
<th>% OF RESPONDENTS FOR QUESTION 6</th>
<th>% OF RESPONDENTS FOR QUESTION 12 (Fully Agree)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-interference by politicians</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38 (Q12a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplary Conduct by senior officers</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>67 (Q12c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup may not be supported by the Air Force and the Navy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17 (Q12d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vastness and diversity of India</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27 (Q12e)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears that the respondents were better inclined to make a choice when a range of choices was clearly presented than they were, when confronted with open-ended questions.

Principal Results

The high standards of personal examples set by senior military officers in respecting and maintaining the integral boundaries between the military and the political leadership emerged as the most significant factor in deterring military interventions in India. By inference, this finding signifies that the principle of civilian control has been internalized by the senior officer cadre. Based on historical evidence, we affirmed earlier that military coups in India and Pakistan are not likely to succeed unless they are initiated by a very senior level of officers. Since the latter, in the Indian case, have accepted civilian supremacy, it follows that the possibility of a military coup in India is very remote, at least in the foreseeable future.

\[24\] Finer argues that firm acceptance of civilian supremacy is the effective check against military intervention. See Finer, p.26.
The multi-cultural composition of the military emerges as a weak variable in explaining Indian army's abstention.\textsuperscript{246} Less than 6 per cent fully supported Cohen's proposition that political leaders cultivated other ranks as a hedge against possible interventions by officers, as a reason for the Indian Army's non-intervention (Q12f).\textsuperscript{247} Less than one percent of officers felt that, in Pakistan, coups were driven by the cultural influence of Islam, and in India, it is deterred by the Hindu cultural traditions.\textsuperscript{248}

In response to the open-ended Question 6, about 16% of the respondents opined that Indian political leaders, such as Nehru and Patel, gave the Indian democracy a strong foundation. These very respondents, however, felt that, despite the abysmal decline in the quality of political leadership, there is no danger of military intervention in India for several reasons.

More than 67% of officers, regardless of their differences of opinion with important government policies, such as the national security planning process, fully opposed military intervention (Q3). In response to the open-ended Question 22, about 40% felt that the bureaucracy, including the police, over time, with the support of politicians, has strengthened its strangle hold over the military; and, about 20% of the respondents felt that senior Indian military officers, particularly the Army Chiefs of Staff are generally timid, more interested in post-retirement assignments than in taking up principled

\textsuperscript{246}See Kukreja, pp. 196-197. Also see Siddiqui's rejoinder to Cohen. Cited in The Defense Journal Vol. XII, No 3, 1986,p.7. Kundu identifies nationally representative mix of military personnel, and the size and vastness of the country as unique to India. See, Kundu, pp. 369-370. In our survey of responses to open-ended Question 6, less than 8% officers perceived it as a coup inhibiting factor. Similarly about 9% of the officers recognized the vastness and diversity of India as a factor deterring coups.

\textsuperscript{247}Cohen, The Indian Army, 1990, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{248}Sinha, p. 25, Kukreja, p. 207, and Baxter, p. 393 imply that Islam promotes authoritarian tendencies, whereas Hinduism is less inhibiting of democratic ideas. This was deliberately not included in the multiple-choice questions lest it appear leading. This was one of the possible responses in the open-ended questions, however. Less than one percent of respondents identified the cultural influence of Hinduism, or Islam as a factor affecting military intervention.
stands with the politicians or the bureaucracy, particularly with regard to vital matters concerning the military.

The respondents see a substantive role for the military in national security planning, including but not limited to the formulation of nuclear policy. Their overwhelming support for the JCS system should be seen in this light (Q8, Q20). They also firmly believe that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and this issue is not negotiable (Q21). All of these issues seem to fall within the Indian military's corporate interests. Certain variables, such as the propensity to intervene, the choice of class composition, and the perceptions of bureaucracy were further analyzed to determine if there were any revealed differences in perceptions among officers who retired at various time period, and among those belonging to different branches of the military. No significant trends or differences were observed.

Organization

First, bivariate relationships between the dependent variable (Q5e) and other explanatory variables are recorded (Table 5.4). Where the relationships are not strong, the data are cross-tabulated and column frequencies and Chi-Square test results summarized (Tables 5.5 to 5.17). Second, significant bivariate relationships between different, dependent and explanatory variables that have a bearing on the research questions are recapitulated.

Third, results of regression analysis seeking to identify likely trends across years of retirement are reported. Finally, the findings of the above analysis are discussed.

\[24^9\] See Moskowitz, pp. 66-67.
Table 5.4
Bivariate Correlations of Proclivity to Intervene (Q5e) with Selected Perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTITUdINAL VARIABLES</th>
<th>CORRELATION</th>
<th>P-VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Servant of the State, or the Government, while on active service (Q1)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servant of the State, or the Government, while not on active service (Q2)</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While on active service, concept of national interest differed from that of the Government in power (Q3)</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While not on active service, concept of national interest differed from that of the Government in power (Q4)</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared to thirty years ago, the caliber of officers recruited into the Indian army has improved, declined, or remained the same? (Q10)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Impact that changes in the caliber of officer have had on India's political stability (Q11)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indira Gandhi established close rapport with the military other ranks as a hedge against possible coup by officers (Q12f)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The disparity between service privileges and perquisites in the army promote discontent among the army (Q14)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.4, cont.

Bivariate Correlations of Proclivity to Intervene (Q5e) with Selected Perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudinal Variables, cont.</th>
<th>P-Correlation</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How much do you think that the deteriorating standards of discipline in the army account for the clashes between the army and the police? (Q16b)</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much do you agree that conflict with the police may lead to growing discontent within the army? (Q17a)</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How likely do you think that the disparity between service privileges and perquisites between the army and the police will lead to a military coup? (Q18a)</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Variables</th>
<th>P-Correlation</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrats of the central services have better promotion prospects than those in other areas of government. (Q13c)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much do you agree that the military should have a major say in India's nuclear options? (Q20)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much do you agree that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India? (Q21a)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ATTITUINAL VARIABLES

Servants of the State/Government and State/Government

Perceptions While on Active Service

Table 5.4 shows a weak relationship between officers who felt that they were servants of the State/Government (Q1 and Q2) and those who responded that it would be justifiable for the Indian army to seize power (Q5e).

Table 5.5

Servants of the State/Government and Justifiable to Seize Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable to Seize</th>
<th>State (n=56)</th>
<th>State &amp; govt (n=44)</th>
<th>Govt (n=38)</th>
<th>Total (n=138)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a bit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pearson Chi-squared (w/ 8 d.f.) = 19.683 Pr = 0.012.

Table 5.5, above, summarizes the column frequencies. It is noteworthy that 41 percent of the respondents considered themselves as servants of the state, but out of these, 66 percent stated that military intervention is not at all justifiable. The differences between columns appear significant, but, as shown below in Table 5.6, this significance disappears when rows 2 and 3, and 4 and 5, are collapsed. It seems, therefore, that there might not be any significant difference among
those that consider themselves as servants of state, of government and state, or of government alone.

Perceptions While Not on Active Service

Here again, the relationship between officers who felt that they were servants of the State/Government (Q1 and Q2), and those who responded that it would be justifiable for the Indian army to seize power (Q5e) is weak (See Table 5.4). The responses are cross-tabulated in Table 5.7, below.

When not on active duty, 37% of officers considered themselves servants of state, but 69% of them considered that the military should not intervene in politics at all. The differences among those that consider themselves as servants of state, government and state, or government, do not appear significant.

Table 5.6

Servants of the State/Government and Justifiable to Seize Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions on active service: Servants of the...</th>
<th>Justifiable to Seize Power</th>
<th>State (n=56)</th>
<th>State &amp; govt (n=44)</th>
<th>Govt (n=38)</th>
<th>Total (n=138)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little/</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a bit/</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col %</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pearson Chi-squared (w/ 4 d.f.) = 1.4696, Pr = 0.832
Table 5.7

Servants of the State/Government and Justifiable to Seize Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable to Seize</th>
<th>State (n=52)</th>
<th>State &amp; Govt (n=51)</th>
<th>Govt (n=36)</th>
<th>Total (n=139)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a bit</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw %</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pearson Chi-squared (w/ 8 d.f.) = 9.8984 Pr = 0.272.

Concept of National Interest While On/Not On Active Service

We observed the relationship between the officers' perceptions of the concept of national interest while on/not on active duty (Q3 and Q4), and their propensity to intervene (Q5e). Officers whose concept of national interest, while on active service, differed from that of the government in power were also the ones who felt that military intervention was justified under certain circumstances (See Table 5.4). While not on active duty, the relationship was not significant, however. We cross-tabulated the responses and conducted a Chi-Square test. The results are reported in Table 5.8 below.
Table 5.8

Concept of National Interest, while on Active Service and Justifiable to Seize Power

While on active Service, national interest differed from that of the government:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable to Seize</th>
<th>Occasionally (n=82)</th>
<th>Often (n=23)</th>
<th>Total (n=139)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a bit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pearson Chi-squared (w/ 8 d.f.) = 11.2335  Pr = 0.189.

Out of the officers whose concept of national interests often and occasionally differed from that of the government, more than 60% feel that military intervention is not at all justifiable. It implies that even though their national interests differ, they are inclined to obey the government in power.

**Implicit Obedience to civilian leaders in a time of crisis**

Regardless of their attitudes toward the state, or the government, more than 70% of respondents completely agreed that in the event of a national emergency the military should implicitly obey the civilian elected leaders. See Table 5.9 for cross-tabulation.
Table 5.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implicitly Obey Directives of Political Leaders</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a Bit</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Caliber of Officers and its Impact on India's Political Stability

The relationship between their perception about changes over time in the caliber of officers (Q10) and their inclination to intervene appears to be weak. Similarly, there does not seem to be any relationship between officers' perceptions about the effect of the trend in the caliber of officers on political stability (Q11) and their propensity to intervene.

Reasons for Non-Intervention

Most of the officers did not agree that Indian political leaders, such as Indira Gandhi, established close rapport with the military's other ranks to secure their guaranteed loyalty against possible coups by some officers (Q12f). The relationship between Q12f and propensity to intervene (Q5e) is weak. In addition, as given in Table 5.10, while only 6 percent of officers fully believed in this, 69 percent did not believe at all.
Table 5.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Established Close Rapport</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at All</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attitude Toward Service Privileges and Clashes with Police

Officers who perceive that disparity between service privileges given the police and the army promotes discontent among the army (Q14) are also those who favor military intervention under certain circumstances. Q16b, Q17, and Q18a deal with army-police relations, which are important in the context of frequent calls on the army to restore law and order. All of these variables show a strong relationship with the army’s propensity to intervene. That is, officers who attribute clashes with the police to deteriorating standards of discipline in the army, who apprehend that a growing conflict with the police may lead to discontent in the army, and who feel that the disparity in service privileges between the army and the police may lead to a military coup are also the same officers who favor intervention in certain instances.

STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

8a and Q8b describe the respondents’ perceptions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. We want to see what percentage of these officers actually favor abstention. In both cases, Columns “Don’t know,” and “Not at all,” have few counts. Therefore, the former have been disregarded, and the latter have been merged with the Column “Partially.”
Table 5.11
Perceptions about the Joint Chiefs of Staff System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable to Seize Power</th>
<th>Fully (n=111)</th>
<th>Partially/Not at all (n=25)</th>
<th>Total (n=136)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a bit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pearson Chi-squared (w/ 4 d.f.) = 6.8585, Pr = 0.144.

Table 5.12
The JCS would better coordinate the Joint Services Training Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable to Seize Power</th>
<th>Fully (n=103)</th>
<th>Partially/Not at all (n=33)</th>
<th>Total (n=136)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a bit</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pearson Chi-squared (w/ 4 d.f.) = 5.4028, Pr = 0.248.
We find that in the case of Q8a (Table 5.11), out of the 81% who supported the JCS fully, 65% fully favored military abstention. In the case of Q8b (Table 5.12), out of 76% who fully supported the JCS, 63% did not favor military intervention at all.

**Relationship Between Class Composition and Military Intervention**

Now we investigate if there is any relationship between officers who advocate single/fixed class composition and those who favor military intervention. Table 5.13 presents the cross-tabulation. The Column "Don't Know" has just two counts, and has been disregarded.

**Table 5.13**

**Preference of Class Composition in Combat Arms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable to seize power</th>
<th>Mixed-Class Regiments</th>
<th>Mixed-Class by India</th>
<th>Mixed-Class Only Regions</th>
<th>Mixed-Class Basis</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single/ Fixed Class</td>
<td>(n=61)</td>
<td>(n=16)</td>
<td>(n=23)</td>
<td>(n=37)</td>
<td>(n=137)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not at all       68        73        48        74       67
A little         7         13        26        9        11
Somewhat         8         7         13        3        8
Quite a bit      13        0         9         3        8
Completely       4         7         4         11       6
Col %            100       100       100       100      100
Row %            45        12        17        26       100

NOTE: Pearson Chi-square (w/ 12 d.f.) = 16.4315, Pr = 0.172

As many as 93 officers (67%), regardless of their choice of class composition, have responded that under no circumstance should the military intervene. 56 percent of officers preferred Single-/Fixed class and Fixed class only regiments. However, out of these, about 69 percent stated that there is no justification (not at all) for the military to intervene under any circumstances.
Next, we analyzed whether the branch of the officer had any relationship with his choice of class composition.

Table 5.14
Preference of Class Composition in Combat Arms, by Branches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Composition in Combat Arms</th>
<th>Mixed-Class Regiments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single/ Fixed Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch/ Service</td>
<td>Class Only Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Corps</td>
<td>(n=61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance Corps</td>
<td>11 12 0 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Artillery</td>
<td>3 0 9 2 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Corps</td>
<td>19 12 9 25 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME</td>
<td>3 19 0 8 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>10 13 22 13 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>31 38 43 25 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>15 20 0 5 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals</td>
<td>5 0 13 15 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 100 100 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44 12 17 27 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pearson Chi-square (w/ 24 d.f.) = 29.0379, Pr = 0.219.

We do not find any pattern in the distribution by branches. Generally, the respondents seems to have chosen an option which is very much similar to class compositions that actually existed in their parent corps.

Effect of Civilian Bureaucrats Perceptions on Propensity to Intervene

We examine the variables pertaining to the military’s perception of bureaucrats.
Table 5.15

Perceptions of Civilian Bureaucrats and their effect on intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Control Misinterpreted by Civilian Bureaucrats</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a Bit</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above distribution shows that about 69% of the respondents feel (Quite a bit, or Completely) that the principle of civilian control is interpreted by the civilian bureaucrats to imply that they, rather than the political leaders, ought to exercise civilian control over the military. Among other variables, Q13c (Bureaucrats of the central services have better promotion prospects than those in other areas of government), has a weak relationship with the propensity to intervene.

Attitudes Toward Nuclear Options and the Status of Jammu and Kashmir

A positive relationship exists between officers who feel that the military should have a major say in the country's nuclear options (Q20) and those who advocate military interventions under certain circumstances. However, no significant relationship was noticed between officers' attitudes toward the status of Jammu and Kashmir (Q21a) and those toward intervention. We cross-tabulate these two variables in Table 5.16 to see if there is a pattern. Because of low counts, Column "Don't Know" was disregarded and Column "Not at all," merged with "Partially." Out of 84 percent of officers who fully believed that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, only 6 percent agreed completely that army intervention under certain circumstances was justifiable.
Table 5.16

Attitude toward the Status of Jammu and Kashmir

Agree that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable to Seize power</th>
<th>Fully (n=117)</th>
<th>Partially (n=22)</th>
<th>Total (n=139)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a bit</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row %</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Pearson Chi-squared (w/ 4 d.f.) = 2.9739, Pr = 0.562.

Other Important Bivariate Relationships

Table 5.17 lists additional bivariate relationships. The dependent variable in each case is different, but these relationships bear on military intervention.
Table 5.17

Other Important Bivariate Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE</th>
<th>EXPLANATORY VARIABLE</th>
<th>CORRELATION</th>
<th>P-VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Governments make judicious use of the police/para-military force (Q5a)</td>
<td>How often concept of national interest differed from that of the Government, while not on active service? (Q4)</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Governments play it safe by requisitioning the Indian army’s aid at the earliest opportunity (Q5b)</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact that changes in caliber of officers have had on India’s political stability (Q11)</td>
<td>Do you think that, compared to thirty years ago, the caliber of officer recruited into the Indian Army has improved, declined, or remained the same? (Q10)</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given the discontent on account of disparity mentioned in Q14, how likely do you think this disparity will lead to a military coup? (Q14a)</td>
<td>How likely do you think that the disparity between service privileges and perquisites in the army and the civilian bureaucracy, particularly the IAS, promote discontent in the Army? (Q14)</td>
<td>-.3</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, officers whose concept of national interest differed from that of the government, while on active service, (Q4) felt that the government did not make judicious use of the police/para-military force at their disposal (Q5a) before requisitioning the army. These officers also perceived that the government played it safe (Q5b) by calling on the army’s help at the earliest opportunity.

A strong relationship was observed between the officers’ perceptions about the caliber of officers (Q10) and its impact on
India’s political stability (Q11). About 130 respondents felt that there is disparity in service privileges and perquisites between the army and the civilian bureaucracy (Q14). An equally strong relationship was found between this discontent (Q14) and the likelihood of a military coup (Q14a).

**Trends Across Years of Retirement**

Given the discontent on account of the disparity (Q14), we investigated whether or not there was any significant differences among officers who retired on different years in their perception about this disparity leading to a military coup (Q14a) (See Table 5.19).

We see that the perception that the disparity between service privileges and perquisites in the army and the civilian bureaucracy will lead to a military coup is lower among the officers who retired between 1990-1994. The years of retirement, taken as a whole, do not contribute to the explanatory power of the regression.

Officers attributed the increasing number of army-police clashes in recent years to deteriorating standards of discipline in the army (Q16b). We investigated whether there are any differences in officers’ perceptions, by years of retirement, that this indiscipline (Q16b) will lead to a military intervention in domestic politics (Q5e).

After controlling for Q16b, the proclivity to intervene appeared to be significantly higher in 1985-1989. Taken as a whole, even though years of retirement contributed toward the explanatory power of the regression, no pattern, or trend was observed.
### Table 5.18

Differences in Perceptions About Likelihood of a Military Coup on Account of Disparity in Service Privileges, Based upon Retirement Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE</th>
<th>EXPLANATORY VARIABLE</th>
<th>CORRELATION</th>
<th>P-VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(RETIREMENT PERIOD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given the discontent on account of disparity mentioned in Q14, how likely do you think that this disparity will lead to a military coup? (Q14a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1974</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14a</td>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>(dropped)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14a</td>
<td>1980-1984</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14a</td>
<td>1984-1989</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14a</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14a</td>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: F (4, 126) = 1.04; Prob > F = 0.3895.
Table 5.19
Differences in Perceptions About Likelihood of a Military Coup on account of Clashes between the Army and the Police, Based upon Retirement Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE</th>
<th>EXPLANATORY VARIABLE</th>
<th>CORRELATION</th>
<th>P-VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(RETRAINT PERIOD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that the deteriorating standards of discipline account for the clashes between the army and the police, how much do you agree that these clashes will lead to a military coup? (Q5e)

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-1974</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5e</td>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>(dropped)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5e</td>
<td>1980-1984</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>0.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5e</td>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5e</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>-.138</td>
<td>0.686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5e</td>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>.609</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: F (4, 129) = 3.50; Prob > F = 0.0094.

Reasons for Changed Views of Civilian Control Over Military Affairs.
As shown in Table 5.20, about 43% of the officers attributed the change to the incompetence of political leadership, and to the manipulative bureaucrats. About 20% felt that the change was due to the timidity of Chiefs of Staff, and an erosion of the status of the army. About 20% perceived the senior offices to be increasingly assertive, while 17% imputed the change to the low morale of officers, combined with the poor management of Ex-service officers and men.
Table 5.20

Reasons for Change in Perceptions of Civilian Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Change in Perception</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrupt and ignorant politicians being exploited by bureaucrats</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timidity of chiefs of staff and erosion in status</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior officers becoming more assertive</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low morale and poor welfare of ex-servicemen</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DISCUSSION

Attitudinal Variables

Loyalty to State/Government, and Differing Concepts of National Interest

The officers' perceptions on whether they considered themselves as servants of the state, the government, or both, seem to have no relationship with their proclivity to intervene. Although, de jure, more than 40% of officers considered themselves as servants of the state, out of these, 67% felt that the military should not intervene at all. This is further evidenced by the fact that more than 90% completely agreed that they should implicitly obey the directives of political leaders. Thus, the Indian military's responses betray a mismatch between attitudes and behavior, and this is probably because they seem to attribute to themselves a legalistic role as servants of state, whereas in their actual role, they have been unquestioningly obeying the political leaders in power. When officers consider themselves as servants of state, they tend to feel that they owe their allegiance to the state. But in India's case, the army has consistently supported current political institutions and the current form of the State, which is synonymous with the government in power.
Besides, there is no evidence in their responses that they tend to arrogate to themselves a "manifest destiny", or a special role as a "savior of the nation," as described by Finer.  

As far as the concept of national interest is concerned, even among the officers whose concept of national interest often differed from that of the government, more than 60% felt that military intervention was unjustifiable under any circumstance. We can safely infer from this finding, that perceptual differences in the concept of national interest did not prevent these officers from implicitly obeying the government in power.

Attitude Toward the Civil Police and Political Stability

(a) Sensitivity to deteriorating standards of discipline. Variables Q16b and Q17 deal with the military's perceptions on civil police. Q16b (those who think that deteriorating standards of discipline in the army account for the increasing number of clashes between the army and the police) has a strong positive relationship with Q5e (favor military intervention). A similar relationship was also found between Q17 (conflict with police may lead to growing discontent within the army) and Q5e.

(b) Caliber of Officers and Political Stability. The relationship between officers' attitudes toward the caliber of officers (Q10) and the propensity to intervene was weak, but a strong relationship was observed between the officers' perceptions on the deteriorating standards in the caliber of officers and India's political stability. That is, officers felt that the decline in the caliber of officers would adversely affect India's stability (Q11).

Perceptions on Issues in Civil-Military Relations

(a) Reasons for the Indian military's non-intervention. We saw (Table 5.3) that the high standards of personal example set by senior officers emerged as the dominant factor (39%). Although many scholars (Cohen, Kukreja, Jalal, Baxter) claimed that the political leadership was mainly instrumental in maintaining civilian control of the military,
only 14% of the respondents attributed the Indian military's abstention to political leadership.

(b) Reasons for the change in perceptions of civilian control over the military's affairs. Table 5.20 suggests three main reasons for the change. First, is the growing, negative influence of the bureaucracy who tend to manipulate politicians toward fulfilling their personal agenda (about 40%); second, is the timidity of the Chiefs of Staffs in failing to stand up to the bureaucracy (20%); third, is the exposure of officers to politico-military affairs during their tours of duty, which sharpened their perspective on civil-military relations (average 20%)

Structural Variables

Attitude Toward National Security Planning Process

We found that out of 76%-80% of officers who were fully in favor of the JCS, about 65% opposed military intervention. In the case of attitudes toward country's nuclear options, a positive relationship was noticed between officers who felt that the military should have a major say and those who felt that there was justification of military intervention, under certain circumstances. No relationship was found between the attitudes of officers toward the status of Jammu and Kashmir and those toward intervention. However, out of 84% of officers who fully believed that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, only 6% completely believed that the military is justified in intervening under certain circumstances.

Some conclusions can be drawn from the above attitudinal patterns. First, the Indian military wants to have a say in national security planning, and yet there is very little danger of intervention even if it is given a prominent place in the national decision-making machinery. This conclusion is not in congruence with the theoretical implications of military centrality, which posit that increased visibility of the military in national decision-making, such as the JCS, favors military intervention.
Attitude Toward Class Composition in the Army

We analyzed the effect of ethnic composition of the army on the propensity of the military to intervene. Various scholars have attributed the Indian military's abstention to the multi-cultural class composition of the army. We found the relationship weak. We further analyzed the frequency distribution of the choices of officers by branches. There was no pattern. Generally, officers exercised their choice according to the class composition that actually obtained in the respective branches they had served.

Perception of the Caliber of Officers

Officers had serious concerns about the deteriorating standards of the caliber of officers. That is, they felt that the declining standards might adversely affect India's stability.

Attitude Toward the Civil Bureaucracy

(a) Variables Q13a-Q14a captured the officers' perceptions toward the civilian bureaucracy. The relationship between Q14 (agreement that the disparity between service privileges and perquisites in the army and the civilian bureaucracy, particularly the IAS, promotes discontent among the army) and Q14a (perception that this disparity will lead to a military coup) is strong. The relationship between Q5e (justifiable to intervene under certain circumstances) and Q14 is also strong. In addition, the percentage of officers who attributed the change to corrupt, manipulative bureaucracy and an incompetent political leadership was about 43%. (See, Table 5.19). This lends credibility to the explanation that political leaders have, over time, encouraged the bureaucracy to exercise strong control over the military. It also highlights one unfortunate aspect that has not received scholarly attention: the intensity of resentment in the military against bureaucratic control.

The analysis of survey data has yielded interesting findings: some are in congruence with our conclusions in Chapter 4, others, at variance. For example, political leadership is not perceived as a major factor in maintaining civil supremacy in India. How do we explain these variances and integrate the congruent, as well as the divergent findings
of Chapters 4 and 5? What are the policy implications of these findings? We address these questions in Chapter 6.
6. FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 4 identified certain factors and variables that might have favored frequent coups in Pakistan and deterred them in India. Chapter 5 analyzed the survey responses of retired Indian army officers, and identified the findings that did not support the ones in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 attempts to meld the findings of the preceding two chapters, and lay out their policy implications.

We recognize that a non-response rate of about 50% distorts the generalizability of our findings. But this flaw is mitigated by two factors. First, the reduced sample of actual responses maintains the randomization by categories (branch, years of retirement, etc). Second, where the findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses are consistent, it is fair to presume that the plausibility of alternative explanations is considerably reduced.

The rest of this chapter integrates the findings of Chapters 4 and 5. It then examines the policy implications in general, and responds to the policy question in particular. Finally, it attempts to extrapolate the above policy implications to similar countries, mainly of South and Southeast Asia.

POLITICAL CULTURE

In Chapter 4, political culture, including but not limited to political leadership, emerged as an important factor which affected the forms of civilian control over the military in India and Pakistan. Yet, only an average of 18% of officers attributed the Indian military's abstention to political leadership. Several factors may explain this discrepancy. First, it is possible that the respondents' perceptions are overly influenced by the rampant corruption in political circles, and by a steady erosion of democratic institutions. These unsavory developments might well have clouded their perceptions about the contribution made by pioneer leaders, such as Nehru, who fostered democracy and maintained political stability in India. For example, in
recent times, critics have raised several questions about Nehru's role in accepting the partition of the country in 1947, his vacillating attitude toward the Kashmir problem which has now become a festering sore, and his lack of pragmatism in dealing with the border problem with China, which resulted in a most humiliating military defeat. Lal Bahadur Shastri, who succeeded Nehru as the Prime Minister, had a very brief term during which he was preoccupied with the 1965 war, as well as the internal problems that were dominated by the language riots in South India. After Shastri's unexpected death in 1966, but for a brief interregnum of about three years (1977-1980), Indira Gandhi remained in power continually until her death in 1984. Her rule, despite many accomplishments, had the dubious distinction of institutionalizing corruption and a dictatorial style in public life. The imposition of "Emergency" in 1975 remains an indelible blot in her record. The demonstrated ineptitude of the recent political leadership--be it in criminalizing politics, in handling the country's manifold internal security problems, or in conniving at rampant corruption--has, perhaps, brought about an attitudinal change among the respondents through the five steps of 'attention, comprehension, yielding, retention and action.'251 In Chapter 4, we had adduced abundant evidence of Nehru's role in strengthening and deepening the fledgling democracy in India--be it the electoral process, the constitution-making, or the accommodation of minorities in the national polity. Nehru's leadership provided more than 17 years of uninterrupted political stability to India. No doubt, Nehru was fortunate enough to have a strong popular base for Congress, the major political party. But it was Nehru's political skills and leadership that built on this asset, and took the newly independent nation on the high road to democracy.252

Nehru's contribution to Indian democracy stands out in sharper relief when it is seen in the context of Pakistan's unfortunate experiment with democracy. At the time of independence, Pakistan did

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251See, Ajzen and Fishbein, p. 220.
252In his recent book on Nehru, Stanley Wolpert relies heavily on Nehru's personal correspondence. See Wolpert, Stanley, Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996.
not have a popular base for its major political party. In fact, until 1946, non-Muslim parties were in power in Punjab and the Northwestern Frontier Province. The collapse of political leadership, after Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's death, levered the bureaucracy on to political center stage. The bureaucracy interfered in politics with impunity. Since 1958, Pakistan has either been under military rule, or under unstable civilian governments whose elected leaders have been dismissed by Presidents. The unintended but enduring feature of Pakistan's politics is the institutionalized role of the military in political decision-making. No major policy decisions can be taken without consulting the military. Even though the military has so far refrained from overt intervention, it has maintained and consolidated its position as an indispensable power-broker, be it in the timing of elections, or in the dismissal of Prime Ministers.\footnote{For a perceptive analysis of Pakistan's turbulent political history, see Trevor Fishlock, "The state that got stuck," International News London Telegraph Sunday, Issue 536, 10 November 1996. The opening sentence of his article poignantly sums up Pakistan's plight: "fifty years after partition, the founders' dream of a secular democracy in a Muslim homeland is as far away as ever. In India it is 1996, but in Pakistan the date is still 1947." \footnote{See, Hassan Nagvi, "Benazir had refused to quit" Dawn, Karachi, November 12, 1996. The same report adds" Army Chief General Jahangir Karamat had privately expressed to both Leghari and Bhutto his displeasure over government behavior. The caretaker government, led by Malik Meraj Khalid, and backed by Mr. Leghari and the army is likely to initiate major social and structural reforms, and seek to tackle corruption across the political spectrum, it said." Even Nawaz Sharif, a former Prime Minister, wants the Army to supervise the next elections, so that it is fair. Eyes on Asia News, Channel 18, 23 November 1996.}}

**MILITARY CENTRALITY**

Chapter 4 established the Pakistan military's centrality in the policy making process. In terms of budget allocation, pay and emoluments, land grants, and ambassadorial and gubernatorial appointments, the Pakistan military enjoyed preferential treatment vis-a-vis the other civil services. As far as the Indian military's decline in status vis-a-vis the civilian bureaucrats is concerned, the survey data abundantly reinforces the findings of Chapter 4. More than 40% of
officers deplored the "unholy" alliance between corrupt bureaucrats and unscrupulous politicians. About 20% of the officers lamented the timidity of senior officers, particularly the Army Chiefs of Staff, in not standing up to the civilian bureaucracy.

More than 40 percent of the officers acknowledged that they were the servants of the state—not the government in power. More than 80 percent of officers stated that their concept of national interest differed from that of the government. Yet, the officers did not consider themselves as "saviors of the nation," which might otherwise have led them to attempt to redeem the nation from the clutches of self-serving politicians. Nor did they find it necessary to rebel against the government because their concept of national interest differed from that of the government. In fact, out of the first category, more than 67% considered that military intervention is unjustifiable under any circumstance, and in the second, more than 60% returned a similar verdict. We reaffirm our finding in Chapter 5 that, when officers stated that they were servants of the state, actually, they implied that they were servants of the legitimate government in power.

Officers have overwhelmingly attributed the military's non-intervention to the exemplary code of conduct set by senior officers. This response, which is both significant and consistent, bears further analysis. In Chapter 4, we saw how senior Indian officers, at the time of independence, shared the British officers' contempt for Indian politicians. In fact, Brigadier (later Field Marshal) Cariappa suggested that the British Indian Army should not be divided. Soon after becoming the first Indian Commander-in-Chief, Cariappa unequivocally exhorted the military not to meddle in politics but to obey the government in power; yet, soon after his retirement, he caused considerable embarrassment to the government by overtly admiring Ayub's dictatorial regime in Pakistan. What explains such abrupt shifts in his mood?

The Indian political leaders at the time of independence, such as Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, Patel etc, enjoyed such national prestige that people even worshipped them. In addition to their prestige and mass appeal, they were assisted by outstanding senior civil servants. Did such a combination of powerful leadership offer any opportunity for the
military brass to intervene? We think not. We are inclined to believe that the military brass, which was overawed both by Nehru's personality and the bureaucracy's professionalism, made a virtue of necessity to preach the credo of civilian supremacy. This said, it must be recognized that Cariappa was an excellent role model, and since the Indian army emulated senior officers, often uncritically, it was easy for this belief to percolate down to lower ranks.

Both the survey responses and the historical evidence bear out the persisting, political and bureaucratic stranglehold on the military. Such meek and unsuccessful challenges as posed by "strong" Chiefs (Thimayya, for example) were squelched. As a consequence of this, as well as of the Intelligence Chief's adroit conjuring of visions of military coups, the control over the military was made firmer than ever before. Other factors, such as the timidity of senior officers and the preoccupation of the military in multifarious operational tasks, also deterred the military's forays into the political arena. These conditions perpetuated a military culture in which bureaucratic dominance was accepted as fait accompli. In such a military culture, intervention was not only improbable, but was perceived to be impossible.

The prevalence of this culture in no way militated against the military's performance in maintaining internal order, be it in the domain of domestic violence, or in the realm of insurgency. On occasions, when the civil government was paralyzed (following Indira Gandhi's assassination, for example) and the civilian law enforcing

\(^{255}\)Innocuous statements by the Army Chiefs were often blown out of proportion, or deliberately distorted. For example, soon after the victorious campaign in East Pakistan in 1971, the then-Chief of the Army Staff, General (later Field Marshal) Manekshaw, recalling his association with General Yahya Khan in the British Indian Army, made a facetious remark that "if I had opted for the Pakistan army, perhaps the Indian army would have been defeated," or words to that effect. Both the bureaucrats and the politicians pounced on this statement, and clamored for an apology from Manekshaw. Similarly a non-political statement made by another Chief to the effect that the Army also needs good governance was quoted out of context both by bureaucrats and politicians. See, Manvendra Singh, "Gallantry Awards, 1994, Posthumous." Indian Express, January 31, 1994, p.8.
agencies were crippled, it was the military that stepped into the arena and restored order. But this is a far cry from the capability of staging a coup. There were also other factors, such as public opinion, the possible resistance by para-military forces, and the near autonomy enjoyed by the regional army commanders,\(^{256}\) that would have aborted such a coup. Hence, when the survey respondents claimed that their exemplary conduct was responsible for the military's non-intervention, they wished, perhaps, to emphasize the stellar role played by the military in safeguarding the territorial integrity and in maintaining internal stability. In the Indian military's case, we do not see any connection between a high standard of professional performance, and a capability to intervene in domestic politics.

**The Bureaucracy and the Military's Corporate Interests.**

The military claims that bureaucrats have been consistently frustrating its recommendations pertaining to the reorganization of the military headquarters, which could facilitate better utilization of its expertise in national security planning. Besides, the military argues, a reorganized, unified Ministry of Defense would not only effect saving by eliminating redundant decision-making centers, but bring about better coordination, as well. Often, the military claims, the bureaucracy knows very little about defense matters, but refuses to acknowledge this shortcoming. In fact, the bureaucracy exploits inter-service differences to checkmate proposals, which they suspect, may dilute their authority over the military. The bureaucrats, the military allege, also endeavor to distance the military from political leadership, thus denying the latter, direct contact with top military brass.\(^{257}\)

\(^{256}\) Five Army Commanders of the rank of Lt Gen command these regional commands. They enjoy considerable autonomy and power.

\(^{257}\) Recalling how he was almost railroaded to "liberate" East Pakistan before he was ready, Field Marshal Manekshaw commented that, when he arrived at the conference room, in April 1971, some participants at the high level meeting, chaired by Indira Gandhi, were already talking in terms of organizing a "Victory Parade" in Dacca! That is, the Field Marshal observed, the decision on the timing of the impending military operations had already been taken. That he was able to get this decision reversed speaks volumes not so much for the then-prevailing.
The respondents have also expressed deep concern about the role of armed/civilian police. These organizations were created primarily to combat mounting domestic violence, but, over time, they have become bloated, inefficient, and ill-suited to the purpose for which they were raised. To support this criticism, they cite instances where the local law enforcement authorities have shied away from employing the police force at their disposal. Instead, more than 70% of the respondents felt that these authorities have been calling for the army's help at the earliest opportunity. In addition, the respondents also regret the invidious distinction the army earned in putting down various mutinies in armed police organizations. Decrying the unplanned growth of these organizations as "bureaucratic empire building," the military concludes that these were created more to counterpoise potential threat from the military than to meet the challenges of domestic violence.

The bureaucracy's reactions to the military's arguments are equally sharp. Its arguments are as follows: there has never been any interference in the operational planning of the military. In matters of reorganization of the Higher Defense Control organization, the present organization has stood the test of time. The Defense Ministry has always been open to suggestions for improving organizational efficiency, but the three services have failed to resolve their internal differences, and to come up with coherent suggestions. For example, in 1985, when the government decided to redesignate the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief as the Chief of the Army Staff, this decision carried with it the provision of having an Army Council, presided over by the Defense Minister. It was the then-Chief of Army Staff who rejected the idea of introducing the Army Council, because it gave his Principal Staff Officers, as members of the Army Council, an equal say in the Council's deliberations.258 As far as the Armed Police organizations were concerned, the Border Security Force was raised at the instance of the army to relieve it from guarding the border. Similarly, a police

institutionalized decision-making processes as for both Indira Gandhi's judgment and Manokohaw's personality. Interview with the Field Marshal, New Delhi, 1985.

258 Interview with a retired, senior IAS officer and Defense Analyst in New Delhi, May 1995.
chief was appointed to head the newly formed National Security Guard in 1984, because the then-Army Chief declined to provide an officer. Bureaucrats, particularly the police, strongly disapprove of the high-handed attitudes of army personnel in interfering with law enforcing agencies,\textsuperscript{259} which has triggered many army-police clashes. As far as corruption is concerned, the bureaucrats argue that there are as many honest officers among them as there are in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{260}

Both the military's complaints and the bureaucracy's defense have merits. The disparity in service conditions between a military officer and a bureaucrat is incontestable.\textsuperscript{261} Besides, most of the Defense Ministers, being ignorant of defense matters, have been relying heavily on the advice of bureaucrats on many policy matters, affecting the military. For example, the gradual downgrading of the status of senior officers, such as the Chief of the Army Staff, was done without consulting the military. Direct contact of elected leaders with the Service Chiefs has been very infrequent. For example, in the past, the so-called Defense Minister's morning meetings have seldom taken place. The Army Chiefs, by not adopting the Army Council setup, deprived themselves of direct contact with Ministers. Elected leaders have not been adequately sensitized to the vital importance of having a permanent national security organization in which all pertinent issues bearing on

\textsuperscript{259}See, Manoj Prasad, "Armymen bully CBI arrest team," The Indian Express, November 24, 1994, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{260}Civilian bureaucrats point out that they have to deal with ignorant politicians whose behavior is often capricious. In spite of such handicaps, some honest and courageous civil service officers have resisted political pressure, gone public, and even sought redress in courts of law. See, Sabina Sehgal Saikia, "Bureaucrat incurs Laloo Govt's wrath," The Times of India, July 17, 1994, p. 9. Similar, principled stands were taken against the Government of Maharashtra by G.R. Khairnar, a Municipal Employee of Bombay, and Ullas Joshi, a Deputy Inspector General of Police. For more examples of civilian bureaucrats who refused to cooperate with corrupt politicians, see, Shefali, Rekhi and Arnab Neil Sengupta, "Bureaucracy: Rebels with a Cause," India Today, October 15, 1994, p. 44-50.

\textsuperscript{261}In response to a questionnaire as to what steps should be taken to remove feeling of inferiority among military officers, more than 54% sought improvement in material conditions, and more than 37% clamored for better status/warrant of precedence via-a-vis IAS/IPS (Indian Administrative Service/Indian Police Service). See, Chibber pp.158-159, 207-211.
national security can be thoroughly discussed before appropriate policy is formulated.

After the 1962 war, some efforts were made toward forming a National Defense Council, comprising serving as well as retired senior service officers. After a few meetings, this council was disbanded. Service initiatives to form the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a permanent Chairman have bogged down in the swamp of inter-service rivalries, which are often connived at by the bureaucracy. The Air Force and the Navy do not want any innovations that might perpetuate the Army's dominance. The proposal to raise a National Security Council has not made any progress over the past six or seven years.262

As far as the armed and civil police are concerned, it is a fact that the Border Security Organization was raised at the instance of the then-Army Chief. However, the raisings of numerous other organizations, such as the Indo-Tibet Border Force, the Central Industrial Security Force, the National Security Guards, etc, have been knee-jerk reactions to various crises. Some of these forces are very poorly led and coordinated. Even in actual operations, these forces pose insurmountable problems of command and control for the army, because some of the commanders of the police organizations wish to exercise remote control from the safe havens of New Delhi, or Chandigarh! The army's proposals to institutionalize their training and operational coordination have been stoutly resisted by the bureaucrats in command of

262 In a recent report, the Indian Defense Ministry categorically ruled out the possibility of introducing the Joint Chief of Staff, or an equivalent organization in India. In reply to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense recommendations relating to the reorganization of Higher Defense Control organization, the Defense Ministry Report stated that, since the Indian Armed Forces are unlikely to be called upon to mount an interservice operation on a global scale, like the United States of America, the current system of Chief of Staff Committee with the senior most Chief serving as the Chairman will suffice. See, "New Defense Post Ruled Out," India West, January 17, 1997, p. A14. The decision seems to be firm, although the logic, or even the premise, appears to be unsound. For example, interservice coordination is indispensable for managing future conflicts with India's neighbors. In addition, operations conducted by the Indian armed forces in the distant Maldives, and in Sri Lanka posited a high level of interservice coordination which the existing organization could not handle efficiently.
these organizations. In cases involving army-police clashes, police high-handedness was as much present as army indiscipline. Successive Army Chiefs have been aware of these problems, but have been either reluctant or incapable of getting them resolved because they have not been able break the "bureaucratic" barrier, and make a direct appeal to political leaders. Some of them did not want to jeopardize their post-retirement assignments by antagonizing the bureaucrats, who are all-powerful. Thus, the predicament in which the military finds itself is partly its own creation.

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264 In one of the worst clashes, army personnel were alleged to have set fire to some civilian houses, after assaulting the police sub-inspector and his staff at the nearby police station. Two army children were believed to have been abducted by the brother of the sub-inspector after an altercation with an army sentry. The mutilated bodies of the children were found in a well. Emotions in the battalion in which the father of the slain children was serving ran so high that even the Governor, who tried to do some damage control, was manhandled by army families. The Battalion, 9 GARH RIF, which had earlier distinguished itself in various counterinsurgency and disaster relief operations, had several gallantry awards to its credit. This incident highlights how even a well-disciplined army unit can go berserk on account of police ineptitude. See, Express News Service,"Governor manhandled over kids' death," The Indian Express, February 9, 1994, p.3. For a stout defense of the Battalion, see, Manvendra Singh, "Is Nine Garhwal to Blame?" The Indian Express, February 18, 1994, p.8. For the tragic circumstances surrounding the death of the children and the associated police callousness, see, Express News Service,"Army Kids cremated under a pall of gloom," The Indian Express, February 7, 1994, p.3. For a police point of view, see, Ananthachari, T."Army should remain segregated," Indian Express, March 16, 1994, p.8. Ananthachari deplores Army's claim for special privileges, which, he believes is a colonial hang-over.
265 There were few notable exceptions to this trend, however. Field Marshal Manekshaw was able to maintain direct contact with the Prime Minister. This was due in part to his strong personality, and in part to the crisis that was developing in Bangladesh. General K.V.K. Rao was successful in pushing through the free ration scheme for officers against tremendous bureaucratic resistance. General K.Sundarji managed to develop a personal rapport with the Minister of State for Defense, and obtained government decisions on many issues, often over the heads of bureaucrats.
The Politicians and the Military

In the Indian Parliament, defense matters seldom receive the attention they deserve. The lawmakers are assured by brave but inane statements that the country's armed forces are in fine shape. As though this is not enough, the Chiefs also make self-adulatory press statements to reinforce the politicians' proclamation that the armed forces will not fail in their duty in safeguarding the nation's territorial integrity. Uncomfortable questions are either brushed aside by vague answers, or deflected by omnibus statements, such as "it is not in the national interest to answer those questions."266 In the Indian Legislative system, there is nothing comparable to various committees that form part of the U.S. legislative system, in which both elected and appointed functionaries have to testify on issues of national importance from time to time. In India, defense matters, over time, have virtually become a sacred cow, immune to any kind of purposeful, national debate.267 Consequently, there is no vision of a long-term national strategy to meet the challenges of changing security environment.268

Although the respondents gave low scores to the politicians for maintaining civilian control over the military, the very fact that politicians of all persuasions have refrained from politicizing the military, or from employing it to settle personal scores against

266 Honest, forthright evaluation of the readiness levels never reach the lawmakers. For example, it is believed that a former Chief of the Air Staff formally apprised the Defense Minister in a meeting that the Indian Air Force was not ready for war because of its equipment readiness was very low. This did not provoke a debate either in the cabinet, or in the legislature. See, Sandhu, Kanwar. "No time to be on the defensive," The Indian Express February 20, 1994, p.9. The Chief of the Naval Staff also obliquely hinted on the poor state of readiness of the Indian Navy, but it did not provoke any debate in the Indian Parliament. See, "Navy faces fall in force level," Shekhawat,"The Times of India, December 2, 1994, p.1.
267 The media, which has a responsibility of provoking a healthy, national debate on security issues, has been generally apathetic. The problem is compounded by a stringent rule which prohibits serving officers from communicating to the press. See, "Defense news suffers as armed forces play shy," Times of India, October 10, 1994, 16.
268 This flaw was correctly diagnosed by a Rand study. See, Tanham, George. Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay, RAND/R-4207-USDJ, Santa Monica, CA, 1992.
political opponents—as happened in Pakistan—is a tribute to Indian politicians. If anything, often, it was the ambitious, self-serving military officer who campaigned for political patronage, as was evidenced during General Kaul’s ascendancy, and during insurgency operations in the Northeast in which some senior officers cultivated local politicians for personal gains, and even got their citations for distinguished service award initiated through civilian channels. The Indian military brass has not always resisted political or bureaucratic pressures in matters of promotions, foreign assignments, etc. There have been numerous instances when senior officers have readily yielded to political pressures, although considering the size of the military, it would be imprudent to conclude that favors to individual officers based on their political connections have been the rule. It is alleged that a former Vice Chief, in deference to the wishes of a personal secretary to the then-Defense Minister, tried to harass a highly decorated Brigadier working in the Military Operations Directorate. The Brigadier, who was the scion of the family of the former ruler of a Princely State, had fired one of the employees of his private farm for dereliction of duties. The fired employee tried to bring pressure on the Brigadier through the personal secretary, mentioned above. The Brigadier, who had a bright future in the army, resigned in disgust.

The most overt case of “pleasing the political masters for personal gains,” allegedly took place during the supersession of Lt Gen S.K. Sinha. The then-Chief was persuaded by both the bureaucrats and the politicians not to recommend Lt Gen Sinha for the appointment of the Chief of the Army Staff. It was widely believed that the then-Chief, having done the bidding of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, kept Lt Gen Sinha in the dark until the supersession was officially announced. Nobody questions the Chief’s prerogative to recommend, or not to recommend any officer for promotion. But what shocked the army was the allegation that the Chief did not have the moral courage to inform Lt Gen Sinha, the then-Vice Chief of the Army Staff, that he was not recommending him for promotion. On the contrary, until the day supersession was announced, he kept misleading his immediate deputy, the Vice Chief, that the latter was in fact taking over from him. The fact
that General Rao was amply rewarded for the "services rendered" by two long tours of gubernatorial appointments lends circumstantial evidence to the above allegations. This also reinforces our propositions that some Chiefs were more interested in pleasing the political bosses, than they were in ensuring a fair deal to their officers.\textsuperscript{269}

\textit{Class Composition of the Combat Arms}

Chapter 4 tested the theoretical proposition that a multi-cultural composition of officer cadre could deter military intervention. We assumed that in India and in Pakistan, the prime movers of successful military intervention have to be senior officers. Based on this assumption, we analyzed the breakdown of officers in our simple random sample, and found that class composition is a weak explanatory variable of military interventions. In Chapter 5, we discovered that the respondents' choice of class composition had no relation to their propensity to intervene.

The class composition of the Indian army, particularly in the combat arms has been a subject of lively debate ever since independence. Its origins can be traced to the "martial race" theory that was assiduously cultivated by the British.\textsuperscript{270} That is, only certain ethnic groups were capable of being good soldiers. The Indian army's attack on the Golden Temple in 1984 touched off mutinies in some Sikh battalions.\textsuperscript{271} The immediate upshot was to review the class composition


\textsuperscript{270} The desideratum that, in representative democracies, all sections of society should be given a fair chance to participate in national defense is unexceptionable. In this dissertation, our focus is not on the merits and demerits of martial race theory. Nor do we intend to discuss the implications of class composition for social change, evolutionary, or contrived. We are limiting our discussion to the relationship, if any, between class composition and military intervention.

\textsuperscript{271} The senior leadership, while investigating the causes of mutiny, came up with an oversimplified explanation: failure of leadership at local levels. This is not a fair judgment. Did the senior leadership keep the local commanders informed of the explosive political situation in Punjab, particularly of the possible consequences of the army's plan
of the combat arms. In particular, the single-class/fixed-class units were targeted for changes.

We need to discriminate between mutinies and intervention. Military mutinies are as old as the hills. They have occurred in old, mature democracies, such as Great Britain and France, as have they in fledgling democracies. In some cases, the legitimate government has invited the military to intervene, in which case they are not even military coups. While single class regiments may be more vulnerable to mutinies because they are closely knit, they favor military interventions no more than mixed class regiments do. Thus, numerous factors other than class composition have to coalesce under given circumstances to trigger military interventions. Besides, one can argue that if in India, linguistic states based purely on languages have been able not only to survive, but to strengthen national unity, what is wrong in having regionally based regiments, such as Sikh, Madras, Marathas and so on?

In sum, based on our discussions in Chapters 4 and 5, we conclude that the relationship between class composition and military intervention is weak. The basic assumption implicit in this conclusion is that we need to discriminate between mutinies and military interventions. Though large scale mutinies may destabilize a nation, and compel military intervention with or without the government's blessings, in and of themselves, mutinies do not automatically imply military intervention.

**The Military's Role in Policy Formulation: Nuclear Strategy and the Kashmir Problem**

In view of the military's long years of involvement in Kashmir, including but not limited to three wars with Pakistan, no political solution can disregard the military's views on this complex issue. Similarly, the military perceives the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear threat to be real and potent. Thus, the military expects the government consult it on major policies involving nuclear issues.

to attack the golden temple? We think not.
About 67% of officers felt that the military should have a major say in the formulation of nuclear strategy. (A notable exception was a former Chief who emphasized that it should be entirely the province of the civilian leadership.)

As far as the attitudes toward Kashmir problem are concerned, more than 80% believed that it is an integral part of India, and it was non-negotiable. Out of these, only 19% felt that military intervention is justifiable under certain circumstances. There was no relationship between attitudes to the Kashmir problem and the propensity to intervene, however.

How do these results relate to our findings in Chapter 4? Most of these reflect the military's corporate interests. That is, the military wants to have a major say in national security planning, including but not limited to nuclear strategy. The military wants a permanent National Security Council in place, where vital security matters can be ventilated and threshed out. The military is in favor of both a Unified Ministry of Defense and a permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff. The military's corporate interests subsume concerns over the status of captured territory, as well.

In sum, no political leader can ignore the military's corporate interests. At the same time, firm and effective political leadership will assert its policy making prerogatives and prevail upon the military to accommodate their corporate interests within the overall national security policy. For example, in the case of captured territories, the military will be asked to comply with political decisions regarding an overall territorial adjustments that are in national interest.272

272After the Tashkent Agreement of 1966, territories captured during the war both by India and Pakistan had to be returned to restore status quo ante. The army, which had borne the brunt of casualties, was dissatisfied, not rebellious. It redounds to the credit of the Indira Gandhi government that, in 1971, in deference to the military's recommendations, the territories captured in the Jammu and Kashmir state were retained for good.
Attitudes in Other Issue Areas

Military corporate interests also span the rehabilitation schemes of retired personnel. Although there seems to be no relationship between the efficacy of rehabilitative measures and the propensity to intervene, a dissatisfied and impoverished veteran can be a threat to society, a potential insurgent, and a political thug.273 Serving personnel often sympathize with the actual plight and putative grievances of ex-servicemen. In the survey responses more than 80% felt that the government is not taking advantage of the training and experience of ex-servicemen. More than 50% opined that the government is not doing enough toward the welfare of ex-servicemen, including officers.

Less than 1% of the respondents attributed the Indian military's abstention to the cultural impact of Hinduism, and by implication, ascribed the military interventions in Pakistan to Islam. This supports our postulation in Chapter 4 that socio-political factors, more than religious or cultural ones, favor military intervention. For example, ethnic conflicts, which, in some cases, cuts across religious boundaries, are highly destabilizing.274 In the Indian subcontinent, it is reasonable to posit, that ethnic conflicts, combined with corrupt administration, are more favorable to military intervention than are the cultural influences of religion, per se.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Based on Indian experience, it would first be necessary to estimate the possible threats to Indian democracy, in which military may have a role. Some possibilities are listed below:

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273 A.Z. Phizo, the Naga insurgent leader, Laldenga, the Mizo insurgent leader, and Subhash Ghising, the Gorkhaland leader, who led insurgencies, or potentially secessionist movements, were ex-servicemen who had some grudge against the government. So was retired Maj Gen Shabegh Singh, who died resisting the Indian Army's attack on the golden temple.

274 Conflicts between Assamese and Bengalis, Maharastrians and Keralites, and Tamilians and Kannadigas have not been uncommon. Often,
(a) Being unable to cope with the breakdown of law and order, the political leadership, which is clinging to a precarious coalition, wishes to set up an authoritarian regime with the help of the army and the police.

(b) The civil administration is unable to cope with insurgency and declares martial law, under special powers. A politically ambitious general takes over.

(c) At the instigation of politicians, sectarian and ethnic conflicts spill over to army and police units, which side with particular groups, spreading and exacerbating these conflicts. The army takes over the administration, either at the instance of the civil government, or unilaterally.

(d) Politicization and sycophancy in the military get the upper hand at the expense of combat efficiency and camaraderie. Ill-advised both by venal army brass, and unscrupulous bureaucrats, politicians undertake a military adventure in which the military is thoroughly defeated and disgraced. Smarting under this humiliation, and feeling that they were let down by unscrupulous officers and politicians, the army revolts and takes over the administration.

There could be many combination of the above possibilities. For example, in some cases, coups may be foreign-inspired; in others, in view of the gravity of the threat to the country, the President may dismiss the Prime Minister, dissolve the Parliament, and hand over the administration to the army. Although, at first blush, these scenarios appear to be a figment of our imagination, we emphasize that the conditions favoring each of the above possibilities inhere in the Indian society. In teasing out policy implications, it will be unrealistic to rule out any of these possibilities.

Two unambiguous patterns of intervention help the formulation of the guiding concept. First, the probability of coups appears much higher in countries that have experienced coups before than in countries the participants in these conflicts belonged to the same religion.
with no prior record of coups. Second, once in power, military
dictators seldom fulfill the lofty promises they made at the time of
intervention. Thus, from the policy point of view, it is imperative
that the military should not be allowed to take over the government
under any circumstance, not even as a symbolic, temporary expedient.

The history of interventions has clearly established that frequent
employment of the military in internal security duties is the surest way
of inviting military intervention. If this is axiomatic, then the
causes for internal disorder have to be eliminated. Alternatively, the
armed police organizations have to be better trained and motivated to
cope with the law and order problems effectively. If the military is to
survive as an apolitical institution, the frequency of its employment in
internal security duties has to be minimal, and it should never be
employed on missions in which it might lose public confidence, or
antagonize the civil police. The latter's cooperation, particularly in
producing local intelligence, is critical to the success of military
operations in aid of civil power.

The Quality of Political Leadership

Political leadership emerges as the single most important factor
that can facilitate civilian control over the military. Fortunately,
for India, the military has internalized the concept of civilian

275 Although this is at variance with the findings of some scholars
who analyzed African coups, it is corroborated by South Asian
experiences.

276 Air Marshal (retd) Ashgar Khan reveals how, just after General
Ayub took over the administration in 1958, he, in collaboration with
Justice Munir, planned to wave some document in front of the people,
which would pass for a carefully thought-out New Constitution. See,
Cawasji, Ardeshir, "Open Letter to Imran Khan," Dawn Wire Service, 3
October 1996.

277 Some senior police officers have deplored the army's reluctance
to react promptly to civilian government's request for aid. They
complain that it is not for the army to decide when to provide aid, and
when not to. These complaints miss the basic reason for army's
reluctance, however: frequent employment in aid of civil power, in the
long run, will erode discipline, adversely affect training, and renders
the army vulnerable to politicization. Interview with a former Director
supremacy over the past fifty years, and only gross political
ineptitude, causing total collapse of the administrative machinery,
could render the country vulnerable to military intervention. The
military, much like the masses, look forward to leadership by example.
With the rapidly declining standards in the conduct of public servants,
including cabinet ministers, no amount of political slogans would be
as credible as good, honest governance. Wide, far-reaching reforms
would be necessary to improve the probity and the rectitude of public
servants. Changes in electoral laws, a cap on campaign funding, public
accountability of ministers, independence of the judiciary, and more
impartial and aggressive law enforcing agencies are some of the areas
that require urgent attention. It does not require political giants of
the caliber of Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhai Patel to accomplish this.
Honest, sincere, and firm leadership will win the confidence of the
military as well as of the masses. The brief but eventful stewardship
of Lal Bahadur Shastri between 1964 and 1965 is a case in point.
Shastri possessed neither Nehru's flamboyance nor Patel's dynamism.
Yet, he led the nation firmly through the crisis of 1965, gave a free
hand to the military in the conduct of operations, and consulted the
military brass before taking political decisions, such as the timing of
cease-fire and the terms of post-cease-fire negotiations.

Political leaders, regardless of their persuasions, should
refrain from politicizing the military because, once the military is
infected, it will be very difficult to reverse the process. The Army

278One of the prescriptions suggested by Kundu is to "preach and
practice democracy." Such slogans will sound hollow, when the gap
between precept and practice keeps widening. See, Kundu, p. 370.
Huntington provides a more realistic aide memorandum, although certain
suggestions, such as the reduction of the size of the army, and
provision of "toys" to keep the military busy may be naive even in the
251-253. Symbolism, such as ceremonial parades, may have limited value
if they are not accompanied by other reforms, like the improvement of
service conditions. Symbolism is a means to an end, not an end by
itself.

279The Congress government of Narasimha Rao, which ruled India from
1991 to 1996, has the dubious distinction of having eight of its
ministers indicted for corruption. Narasimha Rao, the former Prime
Minister, himself is facing three separate counts of criminal charges.
was on this dangerous course during the Kaul-Krishna Menon era, and to a lesser extent, when Lt. Gen. Sinha was superseded. In addition, it will be disastrous not only for military discipline, but for the efficient discharge of such duties as "aid to civil power," in which the principle of impartiality is of paramount importance.

The politics of "vote-banks," in which politicians try to build votes, often through questionable means, is another bane that needs to be addressed. To build these banks, politicians often incite communal riots, exploit religious sensitivities, and adopt policies calculated to appease one ethnic group at the expense of the other. For example, politicians from the Congress party, connived at the mass, illegal immigration of Bangladeshis into the border state of Assam, with the hope of securing their votes. To do this, their documents had to be forged with the help of local officials. The ongoing rebellion waged by ULFA (the United Liberation Front of Assam) is a direct outcome of this shortsighted policy.

Exploitation of caste or religious feelings will be socially divisive, and thus will undermine national solidarity. Ethnic conflicts have already tempted the armed police (the Provincial Armed Constabulary, in Uttar Pradesh, for example) to side with one group or the other. Although Bombay witnessed horrendous communal riots in 1992, in the national and provincial elections of 1996, the communal parties were not given the mandate to form governments. In the 1996 elections in Uttar Pradesh, votes were cast strictly on caste/religious basis. This portends dangerous trends, that is, the society may be divided on religious and caste basis, which may exacerbate ethnic conflict in India. If the military also becomes amenable to such pressures, the process of politicization will get the better of military discipline.

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280 For the disastrous effects of playing caste politics, see, Mohanty, N.R. "Boomerang Effect of Caste Politics," The Times of India, February 28, 1994, p.12.
281 A National Seminar on communal riots, organized by the Bureau of Political Research and Development concluded that politics were to blame for communal riots. See,"Politics blamed for communal riots,"The Times of India, May 4, 1994, p.5.
282 See The Hindu Sunday November 24, 1996. These trends may, over time, erode India's cultural unity that has "not only welded the people..."
The military, as far as possible, should be isolated from law and order problems triggered by communal or caste conflicts. The latter are best dealt with by the civil police and the bureaucrats. For example, to clear the Golden Temple of terrorists, the army should never have been employed as the first option. By causing collateral damage that was avoidable, the army alienated the Sikhs, whose contributions to the national defense and to the green revolution have always been substantial and significant. Similarly, the military should never have been employed to put down the armed police mutinies in Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, and civil police mutinies in Bombay. Even a junior military officer knows that in internal security duties, police cooperation will always be critical.

Center-State Relations

It is also apparent that many insurgent movements in the Indian sub-continent stemmed from faulty center-state relations. For example, the smoldering discontent in East Pakistan exploded into a civil war and its eventual secession. Although India accommodated regional aspirations by accepting the reorganization of states on linguistic basis, its track record with regard to the resolution of problems in the North Eastern Region, Punjab, and Kashmir has been dismal. While the insurgencies in the North Eastern Region can be attributed to neglect, of this country into a nation, but also enabled India to survive the onslaught of the past one thousand years. See, Jois, Rama, "Secularism as Dharma" Indian Express, April 6, 1994, p. 8. Western scholars generally scoff at the concept of India's cultural unity. James Manor, a noted Indologist provides a different explanation for the strength of Indian democracy. He argues that "the complexity of Indian society tends to prevent tension and conflict from building upon a single fault-line in ways that might threaten national unity and the democratic process." See, James Manor, "Ethnicity and politics in India," International Affairs, Vol. 72 No. 3, July 1996, pp. 459-476.

283 In fact, there is already some disturbing evidence of communalism gaining ground among the trainees of the Indian Administrative Service, the elite bureaucratic service of India. See, Bishwai, Praful, "Communalism in Civil Services," The Times of India, July 28, 1994, p. 1.

284 The continual political disturbances in the former East Pakistan also provided the justification for the Army brass to cling to military rule.
in Punjab (1980-1983), and in Kashmir 1986-1988), it was a clear case of unwarranted, political manipulation whose costs to the nation have been frightful. Such willful, political mismanagement is a sure invitation to military intervention, as was demonstrated by the French in Algeria, and the Portuguese in Angola.

In the past, governments in power in New Delhi have been paying only lip service to the concept of federalism. Both Congress and non-Congress governments at the Center have vied with each other in toppling provincial governments that did not belong to, or were not supportive of, the party in power at the Center. Genuine aspirations for regional autonomy have been deliberately misconstrued in order to invent a pretext for the dismissal of provincial governments and for the declaration of Governor's, or President's rule. To make matters worse, in some cases, such as Punjab, Tamilnad, and Manipur, some unprincipled politicians had harbored terrorists.285

The Central Government not only chose to ignore this, but tacitly agreed to the release of some hard-core insurgents captured by the security forces. The Central Government did commission eminent jurists to recommend measures to improve Center-State relations, but has been tardy in implementing them. The Sarkaria commission report is a case in point.286

The Politician and the Military

There should be a studied effort to educate the legislators-- at least those who serve in various Defense Committees-- on defense-related

285 See, Jain, Manu, "HIT LIST," Sunday, 23-29 November 1992, pp. 42-43. Also see, Malhotra, Inder, "Political Commentary:Nightmare in the North-East," The Times of India, March 2, 1995, p.5. It was alleged that Rishang Keishing, the Chief Minister of Manipur, was in collusion with insurgents. Lt Gen V.K.Nayar, the Governor, reported this to the Central Government, who took no action. Gen Nayar resigned in disgust.

286 The Sarkaria Commission report that reviewed the Center-State relations submitted its recommendations to the Indian government as early as 1987. Despite the then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's assurance that these recommendations will be implemented, the government was so casual in its implementation that the President had to remind the Prime Minister to evolve a system for prompt clearance of bills passed by the
matters. The defense debates have been characterized by a lack of informed interest, on account of legislators' indifference and ignorance. A great deal of information that is of interest both to the legislators and the taxpayers is needlessly concealed under the cloak of "national interest." Policy issues pertaining to the armed forces should be more transparent and subject to critical examination. Both the politicians and the military brass should understand that a critical debate on security issues need not always signal a lack of confidence in the armed forces. On the other hand, a critical scrutiny of important issues pertaining to the armed forces might save million of dollars to taxpayers. Similarly, some aspects of the internal administration of the armed forces, particularly the disciplinary aspects, bear public scrutiny to avoid miscarriage of justice.

If the military brass shies away from letting the informed views of his colleagues be ventilated in front of the Defense Minister, as happened in the past, the Minister should insist on the participation of other principal staff officers, such as the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, and so on. The contact between the political leadership and the five army commanders should be more frequent and deliberate instead of the present form of annual ceremonial conferences in which the Prime Minister reads out a prepared speech. The reactivation of the Army Council will be a good starting point. This also remedies the military's long outstanding complaint that they are often denied the direct access to the elected leaders.

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28 Mismanagement of critical defense projects are seldom investigated with the vigor and the sense of purpose it deserves. For example, the Public Accounts Committee, a parliamentary watch-dog came down heavily upon the Ministry of Defence for the mismanagement of the Advance Light Helicopter Project, and highlighted many irregularities ranging from overpayment to customer dissatisfaction. Nothing much was heard about the follow-up remedial measures. See, "PAC raps Government on ALH project." The Indian Express, March 10, 1994, p.6.

29 For an account of a notorious, alleged frame-up, see, Dibang, "Ex-General nails the lie in Samba spy case." The Times of India, January 1, 1995, p.1.
The politician should not only care for the armed forces, but demonstrate his concern. While in times of war, there is an upsurge of concern and sympathy for the fighting men, in peace time they are neglected, often forgotten. For example, when the body of a Colonel, who posthumously earned the highest gallantry award in peace time arrived in Trivandrum, there was neither a politician, nor a bureaucrat to pay homage. In the Republic Day Celebrations, when a grief-stricken widow of a gallantry award winner broke down while receiving the award from the President, the latter did not have the good sense to get up from his seat, move forward, and hand over the award to the widow. Had he done this, he would have demonstrated one of the many symbolic gestures through which the Supreme Commander could establish empathy with the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{289}

More than 40% of the respondents considered themselves as servants of the state, not the government in power. This is perhaps a tradition left behind by the British. Analyzing the mindset of the British Civil Service, Peter Hennessy observed that, in the British Civil Service, "there is a trace of the phenomenon detectable in members of the armed forces--that they work for the Queen."\textsuperscript{290} While mature democracies, like Britain, can cope with such aberrations of understanding, the military in a developing democracy should be clear that the popularly elected ministers are in fact the state to whom the officers owe their loyalty. That is, even though they may not like the politicians in power, they should respect the legitimate authority they command. Thus, even though constitutionally the President is the supreme commander of the armed forces, the actual responsibilities of safeguarding national security lie with the Prime Minister, who represents the popular

\textsuperscript{289}This lack of sensitivity stands in contrast with President Clinton's symbolic gesture of marching along with the U.S. contingent that returned from Somalia.

\textsuperscript{290}Cited in Dasgupta, Swapan. "Subversive Diplomacy," The Indian Express April 24, 1994, p.8. A similar assertion took place during the Falklands War, 1982, when Clive Ponting, a British Civil Servant, claimed that his concept of national interests differed from the Government's, and revealed some classified information to some members of the Parliament.
will.  

Better Integration of the Military and the Bureaucracy

The survey data bring out the depth of resentment against the bureaucratic domination of the military. The military firmly believes in the supremacy of elected leaders, not bureaucrats. Any behavior contrary to this norm will be seen as a threat to the military's corporate interests. Such perceptions might potentially undermine the coordination between the military and the Ministry of Defense. The first step to bring about better coordination and better appreciation of each other's tasks is to establish a Unified Ministry of Defense in which both the military officers and the civilian bureaucrats can jointly address issues and explore solutions. Such an arrangement will, to a large extent, remove mutual hostility and suspicion that plague civil-military interactions in dealing with important policy issues, such as the National Security Planning. Narasimha Rao, the former Prime Minister, had further assured the Parliament as early as May 1994 that the government intended to set up a National Security Council, but this was not pursued.

National security planning should incorporate inputs from almost all of the departments of the government, and such a comprehensive analysis is not possible without a permanent organization.

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291 Similar debate goes on in the U.S. Armed Forces, as well. For an illuminating discussion, see, Harry G.Summers, Jr. "Hail to the Chief(if Not to the Man)," The Los Angeles Times, November 23, 1994, p. B7.

292 Many former senior military officers, including former Chiefs of Staff, had argued in vain for the reorganization of the Ministry of Defense in order to better enable the Service Chiefs to work directly under the political leadership. See, "More powers to service chiefs demanded," Times of India, November 28, 1994, p.11. The Committee on Defense Expenditure, in inter-alia, had recommended more authority to the services. The Committee had also recommended trimming of the armed forces and the bureaucracy. See, "Still a holding Operation," The Indian Express, March 2, 1994, p.8. For a critical appraisal of this report, see, "Arun Singh Committee: bold ideas," India Today, April 30, 1993, p.46.

Counterfactually, if a such an organization had been available in 1962, the military debacle might have been perhaps avoided. Similarly, alternative courses of action to deal with the crisis in the Golden Temple, or the insurgency in Sri Lanka would have been thought through instead of focusing on the military option as the Hobson's choice. Putting together a permanent organization is only the preliminary step. The more important desideratum is to nurture and strengthen it by keeping it active and alive lest it should become defunct due to neglect and disuse. The strongest support for the National Security Council came from a distinguished bureaucrat and defense analyst.294

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to suggest a suitable Higher Defense Control Organization. The disadvantages of single service planning were painfully brought home in the 1965 operations, and to a lesser extent in 1971. Pro-active planning does not rely on the goodwill of personalities (the incumbent Chiefs, for example) involved in such policies. The planning process and the necessary training associated with it should be go hand in hand. More important, this should be institutionalized.295 If there is no resort among the services, the political leadership should step in firmly, and decide what is best for the country, instead of letting unsatisfactory arrangements drift.296 The greatest tragedy is that fortuitous success of patchwork improvisations has often been interpreted as the inherent

295 A modicum of Joint Planning Staff is in place, but it is no substitute for the kind of deliberations and planning that should be taking place in permanent organizations. For example, the process of policy making and the mechanics of its implementation that attended the Indian Peacekeeping Operations in Sri Lanka was characterized by a deplorable lack of coordination and preparation. See, S.C. Sardeshpande, Lt Gen (Retd). Assignment Jaffna, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1992, pp.16-17.
296 Inter-service rivalries inhere in armed forces across the world. For an account of the U.S. experience, see, "Turf Wars: Bloodless but Most Vicious," The Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1994, p.B7. Inter-service rivalries, by themselves, have very little relevance to the decision to reorganize the higher defense organization either on the CDS, or the JCS models. Both politicians and bureaucrats should endeavor to resolve--not exacerbate inter-service rivalries.
strength of the organization which has "stood the test of time." The inter-service cooperation in the 1971 war is a case in point.

The survey responses illuminate the strained relationship between the civil bureaucracy and the police on one hand, and the military on the other. A Unified Ministry of Defense would go a long way in bridging the communication gap among these central services. It would also facilitate joint training and better appreciation of each other's strengths and weaknesses. Through pro-active planning, it might ensure better crisis-management. It would certainly reduce the incidence of army-police clashes, which according to our survey, contain the seeds of military intervention.

Service Conditions and Intervention

The army, the bureaucracy, and the police have been coping with tasks that have been both complex and demanding. If the politicians expect the army and the police to be apolitical, and the bureaucracy to be dedicated and efficient, their conditions of service have to be vastly improved.297 The military's argument that the compensation levels in the corporate sectors have far outstripped the defense services has merit.298

The lack of incentives to join the army, the non-implementation of the recommendations of the National Police Commission, and the continual harassment of the bureaucrats by vindictive politicians have been too frequently documented to bear repetition.299 For example, following a raid on a minority educational institution, suspected of harboring terrorists, more than 10 senior police officers were reassigned. A

297See, Grant, N.B. "Money Can't Redeem A Soldiers Honour," The Times of India, February 25, 1995, p.12. Grant argues that civilians, particularly the bureaucrats have a subconscious grudge against the army, because the latter got preferential treatment under the British rule.


299For an account of an alleged collusion between the politicians and the police, please see, "Thugs in Khaki," The Indian Express, April 14, 1994, p.8.
frustrated senior officer of the counterintelligence wing of the Intelligence Bureau commented that "the politicization of the otherwise routine incident has achieved what some of the intelligence agencies of the neighboring countries had not been able to do for the past two decades." While the police and the bureaucracy have been able to adjust to an environment that is vitiated by corruption and nepotism, the army has been resisting such adaptation for several reasons: discipline, esprit-de-corps, code of conduct etc. Consequently, the armed forces have suffered in terms of status, promotions, and minimum facilities, such as family accommodation and good schools in peace stations.

Politicians need to recognize that the vast, retiring armed forces population are an invaluable asset, and draw long-term plans to absorb them into employments that could use their expertise. For example, these personnel could effectively beef up many of the armed police organizations. Armed veterans could not only enhance security along India's porous, long border, but serve as a reliable counterinsurgency resource.

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301 The neglect inflicted on the military with regard to status, promotional prospects etc is enormous that it evoked sympathy from a distinguished police officer. See, Julio Riberio, "A Better Deal For Our Army," The Times of India, February 15, 1995, p.12.
302 Officers from the armed forces and the central civil services are nominated to attend the course at the National Defense College, New Delhi. The disparity in the years of service of these students is glaring: officers of the rank of brigadiers and colonels, with an average service of 27 years are grouped together with officers of the Indian Administrative Service of "equal rank and status," with an average service of 14 years. The Indian Police Service was not to be outdone. A Superintendent of Police with 5-6 years of service wears the same badges of rank as a Lt Col, with 19-20 years of service.
303 Some critics argue that large-scale reemployment of ex-servicemen will deprive the civilian population of employment opportunities. Others argue that retired armed forces tend to become very selective about the types of jobs they are ready to accept. For example, most of them insist on securing reemployment near their home stations, which is not always possible. Interview with a retired Army Commander in Madras, May 1995. But none of these problems are intractable, given the will to address this problem seriously. The ex-
Protracted neglect, both unwitting and deliberate, could engender humiliation, direct, as well as vicarious. Loss of public trust in armed services is as dangerous as the armed forces' lack of confidence in a political system, which continually humiliates them in the name of "civilian control." In an environment of venality and sycophancy, subservience born out of economic and military weakness exacerbates humiliation, particularly among officers with a high degree of self-esteem. Although the Indian armed forces have displayed a high tolerance level, largely on account of the timidity of senior officers, politicians and bureaucrats should be well-advised not to take this behavior for granted, always and every time.

**Class Composition**

Too much time is wasted, and too little accomplished by belaboring this issue. Within the framework of the unexceptionable government directive that all sections of society should be given an opportunity to serve in the armed forces, the decision about the mix of various classes in combat arms should be left to the good judgment of the military authorities. Diversity is the hallmark of the Indian polity, and the armed forces, a microcosm of this polity, reflect this in spheres of food habits, language, and even in social mores. Such diversity is best resolved by commanders in actual contact with troops—not a policy service men, for example, can be employed usefully along the sensitive border areas. See, "BJP for deploying ex-servicemen in Jammu and Kashmir," The Times of India, May 23, 1994, p. 9.

In this regard, comments of Professor Ralph Bullstzen of New York State University are pertinent. He postulates that Indian Prime Ministers, from Indira Gandhi to Deve Gowda, have been suffering from what is known as the Prime Ministers' sickness. After making many electoral promises, they come to power, and profess to bring about radical reforms for the common good of the masses. Soon, thereafter, they are overtaken by sycophants who tell them only what they want to hear, and then the Prime Ministers start thinking about what the country can do for them instead of what they can do for the country. For example, Prime Minister Deve Gowda took 15 members of his family on an official trip to Zimbabwe in November 1996. This, the professor argues, is a sure symptom of the "sickness," whose inevitable outcome, so far, has been an unceremonious exit from the Prime Minister's office.

For an excellent treatment, see, Finer, pp. 56-60.
maker, far removed from the unforgiving challenges of combat. The worst thing to do is to use army as a laboratory for pushing through social reforms, such as integrating the depressed classes with the so-called high caste regiments. If such an experiment succeeds in society at large, there will be no problem introducing it in a highly secular organization, such as the army. On the other hand, social reformers have no justification to claim success at the national level, if such a reform finds acceptance in the armed forces, which represent a mere .1 per cent of the population.

**Foreign Influence**

Third world scholars, such as M.S. Venkataramani, Ayesha Jalal, Samina Ahmad, and Baldev Nayar, have produced evidence to substantiate the proposition that foreign influence favors military intervention in domestic politics. Although there is no conclusive evidence that donor countries intended to destabilize the recipients, the very nature of contact with the recipients gave wrong ideas to the military brass that they had the tacit support of the foreign donor. This perception emboldened them to seize power. For example, a donor country might conclude that its foreign policy objectives are better served by military dictators. Thus, even though it may not set up a dictator, it might well countenance one.

The existing system of the bureaucrats overseeing the military's contact with foreign officials should continue. In addition, the administration of military aid and training should also be strictly monitored so that foreign agencies do not have any direct dealings with the military, however innocuous it might appear. Officers who underwent long training courses abroad should be thoroughly debriefed. All

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communication to the press by senior officers should be thoroughly vetted.\textsuperscript{307}

\textbf{Extrapolation of the Indian and Pakistan Experience to Other Similar Countries}

The phenomenon of military intervention is complex, and its nature, shifting. Hence, we need to be circumspect in extrapolating Indian and Pakistani experiences to other countries. What is sauce for the goose may not be so for the gander. Although the conditions favoring military interventions, and the suggested policy measures to prevent such interventions appear sui generis for a particular country, or a group of countries, we can identify some common denominators that may be amenable to policy actions across a group of countries.\textsuperscript{308} These are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.

Countries which are blessed with good political leadership, which freely allow its people to participate in the political processes, and which govern in accordance with the constitution in letter and in spirit can deter military intervention by appropriate and timely policy

\textsuperscript{307}It is a well-known fact that foreign agencies do try to influence the opinions of senior serving and retired officers in many subtle ways. For example, IMET (International Military Educational Training) is one of the many means at the disposal of the United States. The importance of this training to host countries is often exaggerated by the U.S. Some trainees even suspect the motive behind this program. For example, in one of the joint air exercises with the Indian Air Force, the U.S. participants were more interested in obtaining the Indian operational frequencies than in other substantive issues of the exercise. In one of the Naval exercises, the U.S. participants insisted on the deployment of a sensitive Indian weapon system. The general feeling among Indians is that they do not need a lesson on democracy from the Americans. Interview with a former Indian Vice Chief of the Air Staff. Indian government is generally very suspicious of the U.S. motives about nuclear proliferation and the Kashmir problem. See, "A US sponsored seminar on the NPT raises eyebrows," \textit{India Today}, November 28, 1993 11, and Ashwani Talwar, "US and Them," \textit{Indian Express}, April 10, 1994 p.9.

\textsuperscript{308} As far as policy actions are concerned, countries may take different routes to achieve the same objective. For example, some countries may introduce quota systems to remedy the past discriminations of minorities; others may do away with practices that were colonial "hang-overs", and that guaranteed disproportionate job opportunities to certain, "loyal" ethnic groups. The preferential treatment enjoyed by the Sikhs under the British is a case in point.
actions. For example, we adduced substantial evidence to confirm that societal turbulence generated by social mobilization is often calmed by mass participation in political processes, such as regular elections based on adult franchise.

Although judicial activism, including but not limited to the judiciary's assertion of its independence from time to time, corrects many inequitable and unjust policies, it is no substitute for good, mature political leadership.\textsuperscript{309} Political leaders are made, not born. Electoral reforms, mass participation in political processes, rule of the law, an alert media, and free and fair elections are some of the prerequisites for the development of political leadership.\textsuperscript{310}

Protection of minority interests represents an important test of the maturity of both political and military institutions in developing societies. One common outcome of governmental insensitivity to minority interests is social dissent. Continued social dissent often degenerates into insurgency. Similarly, a government's failure to satisfy provincial aspirations may lead to internal disorder.\textsuperscript{311} India coped with the provincial problems satisfactorily. Because of the numerous languages spoken in India, it was realistic to reorganize the provinces on linguistic basis.\textsuperscript{312} The interests of the minorities were safeguarded by incorporating legislative acts in the Ninth Schedule of the

\textsuperscript{309}In India, in recent times, the Supreme Court has dealt with numerous public interest litigation, ranging from corruption of government servants to environmental protection. Pakistan witnessed numerous, unseemly turf battles between Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister, and the Supreme Court.

\textsuperscript{310}Electoral rigging damages democratic processes grievously. One of the main causes of the insurgency in Kashmir can be traced back to the massive electoral rigging of the 1987 state elections. Sometimes, these are encouraged by vested foreign interests, to keep a potentially hostile political party out of power. For example, in Algeria, it is believed that foreign powers manipulated the recent election of a military dictatorship, rather than risk an Islamic fundamentalist party being elected.

\textsuperscript{311}Sometimes, regional aspirations were suppressed by force, even when that region had a majority of population (the former East Pakistan, for example).

\textsuperscript{312}Interestingly, the successful Indian experiment is finding favor in Pakistan, as well. See, "Dr. Asrar favors linguistic basis for Smaller Provinces." Pakistan Link, Friday, January 13, 1995, p.16.
Constitution, which is not justiciable. Malaysia had a different problem, that is, the Malays who constituted 68% of the population had been, over time, discriminated against. Hence, they addressed the problem in a different manner. Ethnic conflicts, which appear to be a permanent feature of Myanmar politics, are used as a justification for the frequency and the longevity of military rule in that country. The resolution of this seemingly intractable problem may go a long way in restoring democracy.

The employment of the armed forces in internal security duties represents another major challenge. In maintaining law and order, it sometimes becomes necessary to employ the armed forces. Whenever this has to be done, care should be taken to follow scrupulously the basic principles of necessity, minimum force, and impartiality. Indiscriminate use of armed forces to put down domestic disorder, or to suppress political opponents, will be a sure recipe for military intervention. When the armed forces have to be used to restore domestic order, it should be overseen by civilian government. In addition, the use of armed forces should in no way undermine the authority of civil power which should resume control immediately after order is restored. In sum, whenever military is called in aid of civil power, regardless of the gravity and the duration, there should be no

313 See, Murtaza Niaz, "Malaysian success, Pakistani lessons," Soc.culture.pakistan, Article 153674, 4 September 1996. Following racial riots in 1969, the Malaysian government introduced a new economic policy which sought to eradicate ethnic differences in economic opportunity. Ethnic quotas were laid down for government employment, and for land ownerships.

314 Many reasons can be attributed to Prime Minister Bhutto's ouster by Gen Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. Bhutto's attempt to use the army against his political opponents, however, was the last straw. It is alleged that the ISI (Interservice Intelligence) of Pakistan often acts as extra-constitutional authority in helping overthrow the political incumbents in that country. There is adequate evidence to suspect that it has been used as much against foreign governments as against domestic political opponents. If the political control on such organizations is lacking, they may serve as a breeding ground for potential coup-makers. See, "I Was 'Assigned' To Topple Benazir Govt, Admits Intiaz," Pakistan Link, July 22, 1994 20. Also see, Altaf Gauhar, "ISI and its Apologists,"
doubts in their minds that they are at best policy advisers, never policy makers. 315

Protection against undue foreign influence is another domain for comparing the capabilities of different systems and the proclivities of military establishments to intervene in politics. There have been numerous instances of military officers relying on foreign support either to seize power, or to consolidate their dictatorship. The Shah of Iran, President Marcos of the Philippines, and Presidents Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan of Pakistan were the beneficiaries of U.S. support. 316 The present dictatorship in Myanmar is very friendly toward the People's Republic of China, and the European nations led by France have extended their unequivocal support to the authoritarian regime in Algeria. While there is no need to be xenophobic and regard every foreigner as a potential national security risk, it is imperative to protect the military through constitutional means against the inimical influence of foreign interest. In sum, in the sphere of policy governing interactions with foreign powers, the military's role should be one of implementation, not policy formulation.

Although the securing of distributive justice for the people continues to be an important principles of the State policy, the income disparity between the rich and the poor is increasing. We earlier observed that the evidence suggesting relationship between economic growth and military intervention is inconclusive. Scholars who argue that free market system is usually followed by democratization showcase South Korea as a shining example. 317 Pakistan's experience does not

Pakistan Link, August 5, 1994, p.4.

315 In Pakistan, various Chiefs of Staff have gone public with their disapproval of government policies. Some general-turned-bureaucrats have openly expressed their disagreement with Prime Ministers. In Bangladesh, the former President, General S.M. Ershad legitimizes the role of armed forces in politics by amending the Constitution.


317 The degree of democratization that followed South Korea's emergence as an economic power is arguable, though. See, Watanabe,
substantiate this claim. President Ayub Khan's dictatorial rule in the late 1950s registered impressive economic growth. Social unrest grew apace, however. Despite free market economy and a spectacular economic growth, Ayub's military rule was replaced by Yahya's. India's recent experiment with economic liberalization has evoked mixed responses. Critics lament that this policy has widened income disparities, without alleviating poverty, the bane of Indian society.\footnote{For a classic example of how distributive injustice destabilize governments, see, , Amarnath K. Menon. "Terror without End," India Today, December 15, 1996 14. The outlawed People's War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh, India, began as a peasant movement whose purpose was to secure economic redistribution. Over time, it gained strength and local support. Now, it holds sway over districts adjoining the state capital of Hyderabad.}

One conclusion is obvious: economic liberalization unaccompanied by distributive justice is unlikely to alleviate poverty and thus social unrest. One could argue that economic disparity is endemic in developed societies, as well.\footnote{For example, in the United States, .5\% of the population own a quarter of the country's wealth. Phillips, Kevin. "(E)Con Artists." The Los Angeles Times, December 15, 1996, p. M1.} But it pales into insignificance when it is compared with the number of people living below the poverty line in developing societies. For example, for India, this dismal number is...
about 400 million, which is almost twice the entire population of the United States. Without addressing this appalling statistic, the problem and potential crises that it breeds cannot be meaningfully addressed, to the consequent damage of both state and society.
APPENDIX A

THE THREE INTERVENTION MODELS

---

External Support

Foreign Influences
- Contagion, Ideological Support

Military Structure

Socioeconomic Factors → Military Elite

Ploy → Coup d'Etat

Political Breakdown

Tactical Feasibility (Centralization)

Internal and External Influences
- e.g., Sabotage

Fig. 2: Explanatory model for coup activity

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Wells 885

Kourvetaris and Dobratz 89
APPENDIX B
THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Thank you very much for your assistance with this survey. The purpose of the research is to learn about the Indian Army’s attitudes toward their role in India’s politics since Independence.

Please answer each question on the form by checking the box that most closely matches your response.

ID _______________________

1. Which of the statements below most closely conforms to your perception of your duties while on active service? (Check one box)
   o 1  I was a servant of the state
   o 2  I equally served the state and the government
   o 3  I was a servant of the government

2. Which of the statements below most closely conforms to your perception of your duties while not on active service? (Check one box)
   o 1  I was a servant of the state
   o 2  I equally served the state and the government
   o 3  I was a servant of the government

3. While on active service, how often did you feel that your concept of national interest differed from that of the government in power? (Check one box)
   o 1  Never
   o 2  Occasionally
4. While not on active service, how often did you feel that your concept of national interest differed from that of the government in power? (Check one box)
   - 1 Never
   - 2 Occasionally
   - 3 Often
   - 4 Always

5. How much do you agree with each of the following statements?

(a) India's state governments make judicious use of the police force/para-military force at their disposal to deal with law and order problems. (Check one box)
   - 1 Not at all
   - 2 A little
   - 3 Somewhat
   - 4 Quite a bit
   - 5 Completely

(b) State governments requisition the Indian army's aid at the earliest opportunity. (Check one box)
   - 1 Not at all
   - 2 A little
   - 3 Somewhat
   - 4 Quite a bit
   - 5 Completely
(c) In the event of a threat to national security, the army should implicitly obey the directives of political leaders.  
(Check one box)

○ 1 Not at all
○ 2 A little
○ 3 Somewhat
○ 4 Quite a bit
○ 5 Completely

(d) In a time of crisis, if the government invites the Armed Forces to intervene, the latter should do so readily.  
(Check one box)

○ 1 Not at all
○ 2 A little
○ 3 Somewhat
○ 4 Quite a bit
○ 5 Completely

(e) There are instances when it would be justifiable for the Indian Army to seize power from the political leaders.  
(Check one box)

○ 1 Not at all
○ 2 A little
○ 3 Somewhat
○ 4 Quite a bit
○ 5 Completely

6. What in your opinion are the reasons for the Indian Army's non-intervention in politics?
7. How much do you agree with each of the following statements? (Check one box on each line)

(a) A Unified Ministry of Defense, in which service officers and civilian bureaucrats sit together to analyze policy issues, will facilitate an integrated approach to vital defense issues, particularly decision-making.
- [ ] Fully  - [ ] Partially  - [ ] Not at all  - [ ] Don't know

(b) Increased participation of service and civil service officers in each others' training programs would promote efficient civil-military coordination.
- [ ] Fully  - [ ] Partially  - [ ] Not at all  - [ ] Don't know

(c) Integrated finance for the Ministry of Defense would speed up decision-making. That is, once the integrated finance had approved an expenditure, it would not have to be again approved by the Ministry of Finance.
- [ ] Fully  - [ ] Partially  - [ ] Not at all  - [ ] Don't know

(d) Adequate service representation at the Director/Deputy Secretary levels at the proposed Unified Ministry of Defense would
ensure that defense policy issues are analyzed, and
recommendations presented, in an integrated manner.

8. Several arguments have been advanced in favor of India's adopting a Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) system with a permanent chairman, based on the US model.
How much do you agree with each of the following reasons for adoption of a Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) system? (Check one box on each line)
(a) The JCS would help fine tune the operational plans

(b) The JCS would better coordinate joint services training policy.

(c) The JCS would optimize allocation of budgetary resources.

(d) The JCS would reduce inter-service rivalry and promote inter-service cooperation.

9. As far as the class composition of Armored Corps, Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry is concerned, would you prefer the
continuance of single-/fixed-class regiments, the change into only fixed-class regiments, or the restructuring of all of these combat arms into mixed-class regiments?  (Check one box)

o 1 Single-/Fixed-class
o 2 Fixed-class only
o 3 Mixed-class regiments by regions
o 4 Mixed-class regiments on all-India basis
o 5 Don’t know

10. Do you think that, compared to thirty years ago, the caliber of officer recruited into the Indian army has improved, declined, or remained the same?  (Check one box)

o 1 Improved significantly
o 2 Improved somewhat
o 3 Remained the same
o 4 Declined somewhat
o 5 Declined significantly

11. What impact do you think that changes in the caliber of officer have had on India’s political stability? (check one box)

o 1 A greatly negative impact on stability
o 2 A somewhat negative impact on stability
o 3 No real impact on stability
o 4 A somewhat positive impact on stability
o 5 A greatly positive impact on stability
12. Several reasons have been attributed to the Indian Army's non-intervention in politics in the face of at least three "coup"s in Pakistan during thirty years of the latter's independence. How much do you agree with each of the following reasons for India's non-intervention? (Check one box on each line)

(a) Politicians are aware that politicization of the armed forces will detract from fighting efficiency.
   o 1 Fully  o 2 Partially  o 3 Not at all  o 4 Don't know

(b) There is a recognition among the military that a coup may not be supported by the bureaucracy and the people, and thus, may result in a civil war.
   o 1 Fully  o 2 Partially  o 3 Not at all  o 4 Don't know

(c) Due to the exemplary code of conduct set by senior Indian military officers, civilian control of the military has become a well-established tradition.
   o 1 Fully  o 2 Partially  o 3 Not at all  o 4 Don't know

(d) Army leaders are aware that a military coup may not be supported by the Air Force and the Navy.
   o 1 Fully  o 2 Partially  o 3 Not at all  o 4 Don't know
(e) There is a growing recognition among the Armed Forces that they are just not capable of administering a vast and complex polity, such as India.

1. Fully  2. Partially  3. Not at all  4. Don't know

(f) Indian political leaders, such as Indira Gandhi, have established close rapport with the military other ranks to secure their guaranteed loyalty as a hedge against possible coups by some ambitious officers.

1. Fully  2. Partially  3. Not at all  4. Don't know

13. How much do you agree with each of the following statements?

(Check one box on each line)

(a) The principle of civilian control is interpreted by the civilian bureaucrats to imply that they, rather than the political leaders, ought to exercise civilian control over the military.


(b) Bureaucrats of the central services, particularly the IAS, have better scales of pay than those in other areas of government.

(c) Bureaucrats of the central services have better promotion prospects than those in other areas of government.
  o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit  
  o 5 Completely

(d) Bureaucrats of the central services have altered the warrant of precedence in their favor at the expense of army officers.
  o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit  
  o 5 Completely

14. How much do you agree that the disparity between service privileges and perquisites in the army and the civilian bureaucracy, particularly the IAS, promotes discontent among the army? (Check one box)
  o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit  
  o 5 Completely

IF RESPONDENT Chooses 2, 3, 4 or 5, ASK:

14a. How likely do you think that it is that this disparity will lead to a military coup? (Check one box)
  o 1 Very likely  o 2 Somewhat likely  o 3 Not at all likely

15. How much do you agree with each of the following statements?
(Check one box on each line)

(a) The police enjoy more privileges and perquisites than are allowed the army.
  o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit  
  o 5 Completely
b) There is corruption and inefficiency in the police force.
   o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit
   o 5 Completely

16. Given that recent history has seen an increasing number of clashes between the army and the police, how much do you think the following factors are to account for it? (check one box on each line)

   (a) The growing power and arrogance of the police?
   o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit
   o 5 Completely

   (b) Deteriorating standards of discipline in the army?
   o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit
   o 5 Completely

   (c) The fact that India continues to be a developing polity?
   o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit
   o 5 Completely

17. How much do you agree that conflict with the police may lead to growing discontent within the army? (check one box)
   o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit
   o 5 Completely
18. How much do you agree that the disparity between service privileges and perquisites between the army and the police may promote discontent among the army?  
   (Check one box)  
   o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit  
   o 5 Completely  

   IF RESPONDENT CHOOSES 2, 3, 4 OR 5, ASK:

18a. How likely do you think that it is that this disparity will lead to a military coup?  (Check one box)  
   o 1 Very likely  o 2 Somewhat likely  o 3 Not at all likely  

19. How much do you agree with the following statements?  (Check one box on each line)  

   a) The government is taking good advantage of the training and experience of ex-service officers and men by rehabilitating/reemploying them.  
      o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit  
      o 5 Completely  

   b) The government has been able to inculcate a feeling among ex-service men that they continue to have a shared responsibility in preserving India’s integrity.  
      o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit  
      o 5 Completely
c) The government is not doing enough toward the welfare of ex-service men, including officers.

1 Not at all 2 A little 3 Somewhat 4 Quite a bit 5 Completely

20. Given that the United States and other permanent nuclear powers have been pressuring India to limit production of fissile materials, eventually eliminating them altogether, how strongly do you agree with the following statement? (Check one box)

In decisions having to do with nuclear options, the military should have a major say since it is they who would be called upon to defend the nation against either nuclear or conventional attack. How much do you agree?

1 Not at all 2 A little 3 Somewhat 4 Quite a bit 5 Completely

21. Several solutions have been suggested to resolve the current crisis in Kashmir. How much do you agree with each of the following solutions? (Check one box on each line)

(a) Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, and the territorial integrity of India cannot be compromised under any circumstance.

1 Fully 2 Partially 3 Not at all 4 Don't know
(b) India has to honor the security council resolutions and agree to a U.N. supervised plebiscite, provided Pakistan fulfills the pre-conditions set out in these resolutions; to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and other Pakistani nationals, who entered the state for the purpose of fighting, and to stop furnishing aid to those fighting inside the state.

  o 1 Fully  o 2 Partially  o 3 Not at all  o 4 Don’t know

(c) In the proposed plebiscite, the people of Jammu and Kashmir should be given the third option: to accede neither to India nor to Pakistan but remain independent.

  o 1 Fully  o 2 Partially  o 3 Not at all  o 4 Don’t know

22. And, finally, how much would you say that your perceptions of civilian control have changed over time? (Check one box)

  o 1 Not at all  o 2 A little  o 3 Somewhat  o 4 Quite a bit  o 5 Completely

IF RESPONDENT CHOSES 2, 3, 4 OR 5, ASK:

What, in your opinion, are the reasons that brought about a change in your perceptions?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
Thank you very much for participating in this survey. Please return the completed questionnaire to the address given below.
## Appendix

**APPENDIX C**

**THE FOCUS GROUP**

### PARTICIPANTS IN FOCUS GROUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICIANS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Member of the BJP (Bharatiya Janatha Party)</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>20May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Minister of the Congress Party</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>20May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Parliament (later Cabinet Minister) of the Communist Party of India</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>21May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader of a Political Party (Former Cabinet Minister)</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>18May95</td>
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<tr>
<th>ACADEMICIANS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former Director of the Historical Division (Former Director of National Archives)</td>
<td>Lucknow</td>
<td>9May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chancellor of Jamia Milia University</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>19May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Director of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>22May95</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>BUREAUCRATS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Former Secretary, Home and Defense</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>20May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Member of the Union Public Service Commission</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>18May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Governor of Manipur</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>16May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Director General of Border Security Force</td>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>8May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Director General of Police, Punjab</td>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>6May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Director Intelligence Bureau</td>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>1May95</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### ARMED FORCES OFFICERS | LOCATION | DATE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Chief of the Army Staff</td>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>25May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Chief of the Naval Staff</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>20May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Chief of the Air Staff</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>20May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Vice Chief of the Army Staff</td>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>8May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Army Commander</td>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>1May95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Deputy Chief of the Army Staff (Former Director General of Military Operations)</td>
<td>Madikeri</td>
<td>28Apr95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Army Commander</td>
<td>Secunderabad</td>
<td>4May95</td>
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APPENDIX D
EXTRACTS FROM APURBA KUNDU’S QUESTIONNAIRE
RELATING TO INDIA’S WAR WITH CHINA, 1962.320

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