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Developing Stability

Community-Driven Development and Reconstruction in Conflict-Affected Settings

Brooke Stearns Lawson

This document was submitted as a dissertation in September 2011 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Nora Bensahel (Chair), Terrence Kelly, and Adam Grissom.
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From drug trafficking in Mexico and Central America, to violent extremism in the Horn of Africa, to insurgents in Colombia, to all three in Afghanistan and Pakistan, significant weaknesses in governance and economic development underlie many of the greatest security threats currently facing the United States. A solely military solution to these issues will not achieve long-term success without efforts to improve the underlying conditions that foster the insecurity in the first place. More specifically, development and reconstruction efforts need to bolster the legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach of the indigenous government, as well as address the population’s grievances. Although the international community has widely accepted the importance of addressing the root causes of instability, significant questions remain over whether - and how - actors can feasibly implement these critical activities in insecure environments.

Using a comparative case study approach, this dissertation tests the hypothesis that development and reconstruction actors can feasibly implement sound development and reconstruction across a relatively wide spectrum of conflict, but varying levels and natures of violence can affect its delivery. The dissertation develops an analytic framework that defines seven principles of sound development and reconstruction and identifies three aspects of the conflict context - the background; the current social, economic and political factors; and the security environment - that affect these principles. This framework is applied to three community-driven development and reconstruction (CDD/R) programs: the National Solidarity Program in Nangarhar, Afghanistan; Tuungane in the Kivus, the Democratic Republic of Congo; and Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Rural and Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbaine in Haiti.

The dissertation finds that development and reconstruction actors can implement sound development and reconstruction in the three case studies; however, the various conflict contexts do limit adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. The cases
reveal that the nature of violence seems to have a more significant impact than the level of violence, and they also identified aspects of the conflict context beyond the security environment that significantly affected adherence to these principles, including the current capacity and role of the government and the historical and current civil society capacity.
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SUMMARY

At the start of this century, the United States acknowledged that now it is “threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (The White House, 2002, p. 1). Thus, the United States has a strategic interest in promoting stability in conflict-affected countries, particularly those plagued by ineffective governance and thus categorized as “weak states” such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Somalia, and Sudan.

The evident relationship between under-development and instability has lead to a shift from the previous focus on narrowly defined security interests and a view of development solely as an economic or humanitarian tool to the current increased focus on the role of development and reconstruction in promoting national security. As the U.S. government and other international actors strive to address the poverty, poor governance, and insecurity that plague many places around the globe, critical questions regarding the appropriate approach to do so arise.

Aid workers regularly find themselves in countries that are prone to, experiencing, or emerging from violent conflict. At the same time, security actors find themselves operating in contexts where a lack of development significantly contributes to the insecurity they seek to address. Aid workers are criticized for their inability to access insecure environments, and security actors are criticized for poor quality of their development efforts. This raises the question of whether “sound” development and reconstruction is feasible in conflict-affected settings.

This dissertation tests the hypothesis that development and reconstruction actors (including the government, civil society and aid workers) can feasibly implement sound development and reconstruction across a relatively wide spectrum of conflict, but the conflict context can affect its delivery.
METHODS

The reviewed literature - including journal articles and grey literature from the development and reconstruction communities - suggests that community-driven development and reconstruction (CDD/R) may be particularly well-suited for addressing the specific physical, social and governance characteristics of conflict-affected environments. As such, the dissertation compares three cases of CDD/R programs. Table S.1 identifies the three case studies, which cover the conflict spectrum and provide regional variation.

Table S.1 – Selected Case Countries and Conflict Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study Country</th>
<th>Conflict Category</th>
<th>Conflict Category Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>&gt; 1,000 battle-related deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Minor Conflict</td>
<td>25 - 1,000 battle-related deaths/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Post-Conflict</td>
<td>&lt; 25 battle-related deaths/year, but experienced war or minor conflict in the past five years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that CDD/R operates at the local level, this research focused on CDD/R efforts in sub-national areas for the case studies in larger countries: Nangarhar, Afghanistan, and the Kivus, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Given Haiti’s relatively small geographic size, the case context is national. The case study selected for each country is a primary - if not the only - CDD/R program operating in the area. The three selected CDD/R programs are: (1) National Solidarity Program in Nangarhar, Afghanistan; (2) Tuungane in the Kivus, the DRC; and (3) Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Rural (PRODEP) and Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbaine (PROEDPUR) in Haiti.

To effectively answer the research question, this dissertation develops and applies an analytic framework that defines “sound” development and reconstruction and identifies three key factors that affect this “soundness.” Figure S.1 below depicts the analytic framework employed for the case study comparison.
The three key factors in the analytic framework are: (1) conflict context, (2) program design; and (3) security strategy. First, the conflict context helps to set the stage to understand a given environment. The conflict context consists of three areas:

- **Background.** The background provides critical information about the drivers of conflict and key considerations for designing and implementing development and reconstruction activities. The four primary components of background are: general history, regional issues, internal geography, and culture and ethnicity.

- **Current social, economic and political factors.** These current factors can contribute to the conflict and must be taken into consideration in efforts to address it. Social factors may directly motivate fighting or they may be exploited by armed actors to generate popular support and attract members. Economic factors may provide something worth fighting for or about, finance armed actors, and create dissatisfaction during periods of poor economic
performance. Political factors can create grievances among the population.

- Security environment. The security risks associated with operating in a conflict setting are often considerable, and may require modification of normal ways of “doing business” for development and reconstruction. To understand these risks, analysis of the security environment must take into consideration the nature of general insecurity, the level of general insecurity, and the security environment specifically for development and reconstruction actors.

Second, the program design may also affect adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. Program design considers the objectives, the implementation approach and funding for a given program. As the three cases are all CDD/R programs, they have similar program designs. Variations do occur at the margins, however. These variations largely relate to the roles played by the three key actors: the indigenous government,1 civil society, and aid workers.

Third, development and reconstruction actors employ a range of security strategies to adapt to the conflict context and protect themselves from existing security threats. Table S.2 describes six security strategies based on Stewart M. Patrick’s four security strategies.

---

1 Unless otherwise specified, the discussion of indigenous governments considers the varying levels of government from local to central government.
Table S.2 - Six Security Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Stand Out</td>
<td>Clearly identify oneself as a neutral aid worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Blend In</td>
<td>Minimize factors that identify oneself as an aid worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rely Within</td>
<td>Reduce the risk of attack by relying on a community’s ability to protect its own population and activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Armor Up</td>
<td>Use armed security actors to provide protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bug Out</td>
<td>Not operating in insecure environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Wait It Out</td>
<td>Temporarily suspending operations during periods of heightened insecurity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As depicted in the analytic framework, these three key factors and their interactions may affect the principles of sound development and reconstruction. This dissertation uses seven principles based on former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios' principles of reconstruction and development and the conflict management literature as described in Table S.3 below.

Table S.3 - Seven Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ownership</td>
<td>Build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Capacity Building and Partnership</td>
<td>Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies; and collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors, non-profit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sustainability</td>
<td>Design programs to ensure their impact endures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Selectivity</td>
<td>Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Assessment and Results</td>
<td>Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption and direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Flexibility</td>
<td>Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Accountability and Conflict Management</td>
<td>Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This dissertation employs a comparative case study analysis using relevant literature and project documents, semi-structured interviews with a wide range of stakeholders and academics, and direct observation empirical analysis to test this hypothesis. Each case study chapter describes the three factors of the analytic framework - the conflict context, the program design, and the security strategy - as well as the
interactions among these components and their effects on adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. Table S.4 summarizes the methodology used to code the extent to which the role of each actor contributes to (or detracts from) adherence to each of the seven principles.

**Table S.4 – Coding Actors’ Adherence to Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (5)</td>
<td>Actor’s role significantly contributes to adherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium – High (4)</td>
<td>Actor’s role contributes but faces some limitations to adherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Actor’s role contributes but with significant limitations to adherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low – Medium (2)</td>
<td>Actor’s role does not contribute to or slightly detracts from adherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (1)</td>
<td>Actor’s role significantly detracts from adherence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The individual scores for each actors’ adherence to each of the seven principles can be combined to provide greater insights in three ways:

- Provide an overall score for contribution to each principle by averaging the scores for the three actors for each principle,
- Provide an overall score for each actors’ overall contribution to the principles by averaging the scores each actor received for the seven independent principles, and
- Provide an overall score for each case study of the extent to which the role of the three actors together contribute to the overall principles of sound development and reconstruction by averaging the scores for each actor for each principle.

Table S.5 describes the coding for the overall scores.
**Table S.5 – Coding Overall Adherence to Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Lower Limit</th>
<th>Upper Limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMPARING THE CASE STUDIES**

In all three case studies, the central government has historically lacked legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach; however, the reactions to fill this void differ amongst the cases. In Nangarhar, traditional governance filled the void. In Haiti, a relatively strong civil society did so. In the Kivus, the DRC, this governance void instrumentalized ethnic tensions, with shifting support to and alliance with various groups as a means of garnering support. These various historical responses to the lack of government legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach contributed to different current social, economic and political factors for each of the three cases as depicted in Table S.6.

**Table S.6 – Summary of Key Current Social, Economic and Political Factors for the Three Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NSP – Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane – The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PROEDPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Relatively strong social cohesion</td>
<td>Heavily displaced population</td>
<td>Densely populated urban areas with high unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Relatively good economic opportunities</td>
<td>Dire socio-economic conditions</td>
<td>Dire socio-economic conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>New, internationally supported government at the beginning of the NSP</td>
<td>Persistent lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of government</td>
<td>Installation of a legitimate but not yet effective government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These social, economic and political factors influence the program design. Most notably, the political differences in the three cases drive the differences in the roles of the key actors and specifically the level of government involvement in program management. The installation of a legitimate central government in Afghanistan at the beginning of the NSP created an opportunity for significant Afghan
government involvement. In Haiti, increased government engagement in PRODEP/PRODEPUR corresponded to improved government legitimacy. In the Kivus, the persistent lack of legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach of the central government results in a relatively limited government role in Tuungane.

By design, the level of violence varies amongst the three cases; however, the nature of violence also varies. The nature of violence seems to drive the security strategy more than the level of violence. Nangarhar’s high level of relatively predictable violence results in a primarily “blend in” security strategy for aid workers. The medium level of insecurity in the Kivus is marked by periods of heightened risk and relative unpredictability. As such, the “wait it out” security strategy dominates the Tuungane operations in South Kivu and the “bug out” strategy in North Kivu. In Haiti, the low level of violence with periods of heightened political violence largely in urban areas leads to a combined “rely within” and “wait it out” security strategy.

These differences in the three key factors do affect adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction; however, overall, the three case studies show that CDD/R can contribute with varying levels of limitations to adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.

The case study with a relatively low level of conflict (PRODEP/PRODEPUR in Haiti) contributed significantly to overall adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. The case study with relatively high levels of violence – the NSP in Nangarhar, Afghanistan – significantly contributed to adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction with some limitations. The case study with a medium level of violence – Tuungane in the Kivus, the DRC – contributed but with significant limitations to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.

This indicates that development and reconstruction actors can feasibly implement sound development and reconstruction conflict-affected settings; however, the conflict context itself limits to adherence to these principles.
KEY FINDINGS

Several key findings emerged on how the conflict context affects adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction:

- Although the conflict context may limit adherence to the principles of development and reconstruction, this relationship is not as simple as the higher the level of violence, the greater the limitations. The nature of the violence appears more significant than the level of violence as demonstrated by the greater adherence in the case of the highest level of violence than the case of the middle level of violence.

- The conflict context does not necessarily dictate a specific security strategy. Aid workers and donors may select different strategies in similar contexts based on differing policies and strategic considerations.

- The nature of conflict largely explain the variations in the extent of the contributions made by aid workers to adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.

- The central role of civil society in project management serves as a critical cornerstone to CDD/R programming that minimally varied across the three cases and significantly contributed to adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. The lack of an existing civil society does, however, limit adherence.

- The variation in the roles of key actors stemmed to a large degree from the current political differences in the three cases and the potential role for the government.

- Extremely minimal government involvement largely explains the greatest limitations faced by Tuungane, and its overall lowest coding for adherence to each of the principles of sound development and reconstruction except flexibility.

- Some limitations stem more from program design than from the conflict context. This includes limitations related to the CDD/R approach and those not explained by the approach.
• A common limitation across the three cases not resulting from the conflict context or inherent to the CDD/R approach is inadequate assessment and conflict management. This principle should receive greater attention.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation committee – Nora Bensahel, Terrence Kelly, and Adam Grissom – for providing substantial guidance, constructive criticism, and moral support throughout this process. A particular note of gratitude goes to Nora who, as Committee Chair, navigated a fair share of hiccups throughout the process with grace and an eye towards getting me to the goal line. I greatly appreciate the thoughtful and insightful external review provided by Dr. James Fearon, the Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. Financial support provided by the Ford Foundation and the RAND National Security Division (NSRD) made this dissertation possible. This dissertation definitely “grew up” in the PRGS and RAND family. The research reflected in this dissertation benefited from the formal courses and on-the-job-training, but even moreso from an infinite number of informal conversations. For the latter, I would like to especially thank my PRGS cohort, Ambassador James Dobbins, Tom Epley, David Gompert, Frederick Pardee, Michelle Parker, Gery Ryan, and Rachel Swanger.

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Jelani Lawson. Not only did he “find” the PRGS program for me, he also carried out the majority of my dissertation fieldwork with me.
### GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSO</td>
<td>Afghanistan NGO Safety Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREU</td>
<td>Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMPAD</td>
<td>Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d'Aide au Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>Technical Coordination Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community-Driven Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD/R</td>
<td>Community-Driven Development and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Community Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECI</td>
<td>Centre for International Studies and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defense of People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPRODEP</td>
<td>Council of the Participatory Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>District Development Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATEM</td>
<td>Foundation for Technological and Economic Advancement of Mirebalais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Facilitating Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPO</td>
<td>Field Program Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRODEP</td>
<td>Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Rural</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRODEPPAP</td>
<td>Projet Pilote de Développement Communautaire Participatif à Port-au-Prince</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRODEPUR</td>
<td>Projet National de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbain</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>State Department Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBMF</td>
<td>Tora Bora Military Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Project Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VDC</td>
<td>Village Development Council</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Conflict is no longer predominantly between nations. More than 90 percent of the 122 conflicts that occurred between 1989 and 2006 were intrastate conflicts (Uppsala, 2008). Many nations around the world are caught in what is known as the "conflict trap:" a vicious cycle of mutually-reinforcing poverty, insufficient governance,\(^2\) and violence. This is labeled a trap because countries have a 44 percent chance of reverting to conflict during the first five years after the onset of peace (Collier et al., 2003). Although historically, the strength of other nations presented the greatest security threat, in the early 2000s, the United States government acknowledged that it is “threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (The White House, 2002, p. 1). Given the increased threat that intrastate conflict poses to U.S. interests and global security, the United States has a strategic interest in promoting stability in conflict-affected countries, particularly those plagued by ineffective governance and thus categorized as “weak states” such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Somalia, and Sudan.

\(^2\) Governance relates to both the authority to make decisions over a constituency as well as the obligation to respond to the needs of the constituency. In many developing countries informal institutions perform these governance functions, such as shuras in Afghanistan.
THE WEAK STATE CHALLENGES

Numerous foreign policy experts, including U.S. military experts, have emphasized the importance of the threat of weak states. For example, the 2008 Army stability operations field manual states that “the greatest threat to our national security comes not in the form of terrorism or ambitious powers, but from fragile states either unable or unwilling to provide for the most basic needs” (United States Army, 2008, Foreword).

The need to respond to instability extends beyond pure humanitarian concerns, as it can create vacuums of power that foster human security concerns (e.g., disease outbreaks) and facilitate ideological and economic threats. Globalization facilitates the movement of people, products and ideas and increases the risks to the United States from these conflicts. The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy states that "conflicts do not stay isolated for long and often spread or devolve into humanitarian tragedy or anarchy. Outside parties can exploit them to further other ends, much as al-Qaida exploited the civil war in Afghanistan. This means that even if the United States does not have a direct stake in a particular conflict, our interests are likely to be affected over time" (The White House, 2006, p. 14). In addition to providing potential safe havens for violent extremists, these weak states may foster corruption, crime, and trafficking in all manner of goods from drugs to natural resources to arms to people (Nash, 2005).\(^4\) Instability can also directly threaten U.S. economic interests (e.g., trade opportunities and access to natural resources). For example, the conflict in the Niger Delta has resulted in a ten percent drop in Shell's oil production (BBC News, 2008).

Susan Rice concisely identifies several costs to the United States of weak states: "refugee flows that can reach American shores; conventional weapons proliferation that exacerbates regional instability and strengthens international outlaws; billions spent on humanitarian and peacekeeping assistance; the opportunity cost of lost trade and investment; and the exportation by criminal elements of precious, portable resources...; narcotics production and trafficking" (2003, p. 3).

\(^4\) Although recent history indicates that these are clear risks from weak states, the case should not be overstated. Little empirical evidence exists to indicate a causal relationship between state fragility and transnational threats. See, for example, Patrick Stewart, "Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of "Spillovers," Center for Global Development Working Paper Number 73, 2006, retrieved online 5/31/2010. www.cgdev.org/files/5539_file_WP_73.pdf
SECURITIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENTALIZATION OF SECURITY

Aid workers regularly find themselves in countries that are prone to, experiencing, or emerging from violent conflict. Two thirds of the 30 countries with the lowest per capita GDP in 2007 had experienced conflict in the five years prior (2002-2006).5 Seven of the top 10 recipients of U.S. official development assistance in 2005/2006 were in the “alert” zone6 of the 2007 Failed States Index (FfP, 2007). Similarly, 40 percent of the United Nations Development Programme’s 2005 program expenditures were devoted to conflict-affected countries (UNDP, 2006). The percentage of official development assistance devoted to humanitarian aid7 (excluding food aid) increased from six to eight percent from 2002 to 2008 (OECD.Stat, 2008).

The evident relationship between under-development and instability has led to a shift from the previous focus on narrowly defined security interests and a view of development solely as an economic or humanitarian tool to the current increased focus on the role of development and reconstruction in promoting national security. Most notably, in the 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush identified development as one of the “three D’s” alongside defense and diplomacy (The White House, 2002); Department of Defense Directive 3000.5 established that stability operations “be given priority comparable to combat operations” (DOD, 2005); and Army doctrine on stability operations emphasizes the need to reduce “the drivers of

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5 This is based on conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, and per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity data from the International Monetary Fund’s Economic Outlook Database.

6 The alert zone of the Failed State Index are those places that scored the highest (between 90 and 120) on the twelve indicators of state vulnerability: (1) demographic pressures, (2) refugees/internally-displaced persons, (3) group grievance, (4) human flight, (5) uneven development, (6) economic decline, (7) delegitimization of the state, (8) public services, (9) human rights, (10) security apparatus, (11) factionalized elites, and (12) external intervention. As such, they are deemed to be the most vulnerable to collapse or conflict.

7 The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee includes emergency response, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, and disaster prevention and preparedness under humanitarian aid.
conflict and instability and build local institutional capacity to forge sustainable peace, security, and economic growth” (United States Army, 2008, p. 1-3). In the same vein, the 2010 National Security Strategy states that, “our long-term stability will come not from our ability to instill fear in other peoples, but through our capacity to speak to their hopes” (The White House, 2010, pp. ii-iii).

The U.S. government has also operationalized many of these notions. In August 2004, the State Department established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) as a result of an April 2004 decision by the National Security Council Principals (Pascual, 2005). In December 2005, President Bush issued a Directive for the Secretary of State, supported by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, to lead coordination of interagency reconstruction and stabilization assistance (The White House, 2005). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) created the Office of Military Affairs to liaise with the Department of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense established a stability operations center in November 2005, and the Army created a Stability Operations Focus Area to “identify and implement initiatives to increase Army capabilities to plan and conduct stability operations in a joint, interagency and multinational context” (U.S. Army, 2005, p. 12). In addition, the geographic Combatant Commands and the Special Operations Command assigned military liaison officers to USAID, and USAID assigned Senior Development Officers to the geographic commands and the Pentagon (Fore, 2008). The greater roles for civilian agencies in the geographic Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) further highlight the emphasis on interagency integration and the linkages between development and security. For example, AFRICOM includes a civilian Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (Yates, 2009).

Military and civilian actors also coordinate on the ground to address the intersection of security and development. Examples of this “whole of government” approach include the Merida Initiative and Central America Regional Security Initiative in Mexico and Central America, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Parternship in the Sahel region of Africa, and counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The important role of the “soft” side of addressing security concerns is by no means a new concept. Civil counterinsurgency played a key role in the U.S. strategy in Vietnam with efforts such as the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS). Gompert et al. identify three historical – and current – uses of development and reconstruction activities in civil counterinsurgency efforts: (1) carrot and stick, (2) hearts and minds, and (3) conflict transformation (Gompert et al., 2008). Indeed, prominent military leaders, such as General Peter Chiarelli, identify civil efforts as central to successfully fighting insurgents (Chiarelli, 2005). Cohen et al. assert that, “The best weapons for counterinsurgency do not fire bullets. Counterinsurgents achieve the most meaningful success by gaining popular support and legitimacy for the host government, not by killing insurgents. Security is important in setting the stage for other kinds of progress, but lasting victory will come from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope. Dollars and ballots will have a more important effect than bombs and bullets” (Cohen et al., 2006, p. 52).

In this context, new approaches have emerged to facilitate development and reconstruction as a means of promoting stability in areas of high insecurity such as the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Military actors have become increasingly engaged in development and reconstruction activities, asserting that they are simply filling a gap that the development actors are unable to fill. The presence of conflict may decrease the number of civilian actors willing to operate in a given environment if the threat of violence impedes the typical development and reconstruction activities. In addition, civilian capacities within the U.S. government are very limited. Due to a series of workforce reductions, the number of USAID direct-hires decreased by 37 percent from 1992 to 2002 (Brigety, 2008). The Department of Defense has 210 times the number of employees as USAID and the State Department combined, and, “there are substantially more people employed as
musicians in Defense bands than in the entire foreign service” (Kilcullen, 2007, p. 1).8

The heightened military involvement in development and reconstruction has brought a flood of concerns and criticisms from civilian agencies. The concerns generally center around blurring the lines between the military and civilians and hindering civilian efforts to operate in conflict-affected areas by eroding “humanitarian space,” which refers to the “space” where aid workers can move freely in areas of conflict based on their independence and neutrality.9 To the extent that development assistance is viewed as a military tool, civilian actors may become targets. Civilian actors also express concern that military actors do not adhere to basic principles when implementing development projects. For example, military civil affairs projects are often criticized for not taking into consideration sustainability, with the common example of building schools that will not have teachers.

Like aid workers, it is difficult to make generalizations about military actors’ development and reconstruction efforts. There are most certainly examples of military personnel who are very aware of principles of sound development and reconstruction and follow them more than some aid workers. On the other extreme, there are military actors who show little concern for the principles of sound development. For example, a 2006 U.S. government interagency evaluation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan found that, “some PRTs constructed schools and clinics without paying enough attention to whether the Afghan government could afford to equip them with teachers, books, doctors, or medical supplies” (United States Department of State, 2006, p. 9).

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8 In recent years, the civilian agencies have sought to address this imbalance. For example, USAID launched the Development Leadership Initiative, which is a multi-year effort to double the number of USAID foreign service officers by 2012.

Often, security actors implement development and reconstruction projects as a means to a strategic end, such as gaining access to a given area or building a relationship with the civilian population. In these cases, the security actors may justify “unsound” projects since development and reconstruction is not the objective of implementing the project. For example, Brigety asserts that showing “the face of American compassion to a skeptical population while also giving the military an eye on activity in the area” justified a well project in Kenya where “American taxpayers spent $250,000 on two wells that did not work. By contrast, an under-ground well dug by civilian humanitarian agencies typically costs around $10,000. Even if the Shidley well proved to be operational, it would only provide water for some 20 nomadic families. The rest who had been present when the well-digging operations began had long since moved on, resigned to find their water elsewhere...” (2008, pp. 1-2).

Experts in international development have called into question the underlying assumption that “unsound” development and reconstruction does, indeed, win hearts and minds or develop strategic partnerships. The counterargument emphasizes that, to the extent that one uses development and reconstruction activities as a tool to achieve broader objectives, one still must use the tool well or it will not serve its strategic purposes.

There are several commonly-accepted principles of development based on lessons learned by the international community over the past several decades. Although these principles do not inherently guarantee achieving desired outputs and outcomes, this dissertation assumes that adhering to these basic principles increases the probability of achieving the desired outputs and outcomes. In conflict-affected settings, many of these principles become particularly critical as the violence often destroys the infrastructure and human capital, the social fabric, and any existing positive relationship between the population and their government. The ensuing inequities and tensions between various sub-populations, general skepticism about future opportunities and sense of disempowerment, and distrust of and detachment from governing institutions are powerful counter-forces that development and
reconstruction efforts must strive to overcome. The particularly challenging nature of conflict-affected settings has been used by civilian and military actors alike as a justification for temporarily abandoning sound principles of development and reconstruction, precisely where these principles could have the greatest impact.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This raises the question of whether there is a necessary trade-off between the ability to operate in conflict-affected environments and to adhere to development principles which focus on factors such as community ownership and sustainability. More precisely, is "sound" development and reconstruction feasible in conflict-affected settings?

As the U.S. government and other international actors strive to address the poverty, poor governance, and insecurity that plagues many places around the globe, critical questions regarding the appropriate approach to do so arise. This dissertation tests the hypothesis that development and reconstruction actors (including the government, civil society and aid workers) can feasibly implement sound development and reconstruction across a relatively wide spectrum of conflict, but varying levels and natures of conflict can affect its delivery.

RESEARCH APPROACH AND DISSERTATION STRUCTURE

To test this hypothesis, this dissertation employs a comparative case study analysis using relevant literature and project documents, semi-structured interviews with a wide range of stakeholders and academics, and direct observation in these countries to analyze local-level development and reconstruction programs in three conflict-affected settings. The case study approach involves selecting cases that vary primarily on the independent variable of interest, the conflict context. The ideal case studies would consist of relatively similar development and reconstruction programs occurring in different conflict contexts. Minimizing the variation in the structure of the development and reconstruction program provides greater understanding of the effect of the conflict context.
Chapter 2 presents the comparative case study methodology, including a description of community-driven development/reconstruction (CDD/R) and related programs as well as the process for selecting the three case studies: the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in Nangarhar, Afghanistan; Tuungane in the Kivus, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); and Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Rural (PRODEP) and Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbaine (PROEDPUR) in Haiti. Chapter 3 defines the analytic framework, and Chapters 4, 5 and 6 apply the analytic framework to the three case studies identified in Chapter 2. Chapter 7 compares and contrasts the three case studies, and the final concluding chapter pulls together the findings from within and across the three individual case studies and the ensuing implications for the hypothesis identified as above.

LIMITATIONS

The comparative case study approach employed by this dissertation utilizes existing literature, program documentation and analytic studies as well as interviews and direct observation to draw conclusions about each case study CDD/R programs’ ability to adhere to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. The field research consisted of relatively short trips to each country and, with the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo, only one trip per case study. Longitudinal data collection falls outside of the scope of this dissertation.

This approach creates three key limitations. First, given the limited data availability the dissertation focuses on the extent to which the program design and implementation adhere to the principles of sound development and reconstruction, but does not directly measure program outputs or outcomes that indicate the impact of the development and reconstruction efforts. This dissertation assumes that adherence to these principles increases the probability of, but does not guarantee, success in outputs and outcomes. This dissertation presents findings on the outputs and outcomes to the extent that relevant data exists;
however, it does not purport to compare the impact of each of these case studies.

Second, individual case studies vary in their robustness depending upon the availability of existing reviews of these programs and the aspects of the program that were directly observable during the field research. Although the research design allowed for analysis of the program implementation in most instances, some analysis is limited to documents describing the program design. These instances include specific reference to the program protocol. Also, the principles of sound development and reconstruction are rarely assessed directly, and this analysis relies on proxies and exercising judgement in assessing adherence to the various principles.

Third, it is not possible to control all the variation within the cases, especially given the complexity of the topic in general and the independent variable of interest, in particular. The research design selected the cases based on a proxy indicator for the level of violence. Thus, the cases vary on the level of violence and do not control for variation in other aspects of the conflict context. Most notably, the three cases also vary in terms of the current political situation and the capacity of the indigenous government, as well as the historical and current capacity of civil society. These capabilities do not appear to covary perfectly with the level of violence. Although the inability to control all variation within the cases limits the ability of the dissertation to generate generalizable findings, the approach does, however, generate insights from each case that, when compared to the other cases can suggest broader findings. In emerging and complex subject areas, comparative case study analysis can help identify key factors that should be further explored and can inform policies and programming.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODS

To understand how the conflict context affects adherence to principles of sound development and reconstruction, this dissertation employs a comparative case study approach. The case study selection focused on two key factors. First, the case studies should vary upon the independent variable of interest: the level of violence. Second, the case studies should draw from one approach to development and reconstruction. Based on these two factors, the case studies consist of three different programs utilizing a similar approach to development and reconstruction in places with varying levels of violence.

The discussion below summarizes the relevant literature on community-level development in conflict-affected settings in order to explain why CDD/R programs were selected as the focus of the case studies covered in this report. This chapter provides an overview of CDD/R, discusses its strengths and weaknesses, presents evidence of why CDD/R is often used in conflict-affected environments, and describes the case study selection process.

CDD/R OVERVIEW

Community-driven development and reconstruction can be traced back to the 1950s' community development movement, also called participatory development.\textsuperscript{10} The Ashbridge Conference of 1954 defined community development as: "A movement designed to promote better living for the whole community with the active participation and, if possible, on the initiative of the community, but if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, by the use of the techniques for arousing and stimulating it in order to secure the active and enthusiastic response to the movement" (Sanders, 1970, p. 25). Participatory (or community-based) development varies significantly in its specific mechanisms and

\textsuperscript{10} Evolving out of British pre-World War II social programs in their colonies, the community development movement truly took hold in the post-war period.
implementation strategies. At the heart of participatory development are two key notions: (i) the target population itself can better identify appropriate projects to meet its development needs than external actors,¹¹ and (ii) development should place at the center the target population, and thus “empower” the poor through active participation in the development process.¹²

Hailu Abatena identifies four key elements of community-based development: “1) it involves voluntary grass roots mobilization, 2) the goal is to develop local capability and to promote better living for the whole community, 3) active citizen participation is a potent vehicle for mobilizing the community in order to promote improved standard of living, and 4) some guidance and encouragement may be necessary to facilitate the process” (1989, p. 2).

The common thread of a level of participation by the community members themselves serves as the common bond amongst all approaches to community development.¹³ In the 1950s, newly independent states – most notably India – adopted the community-based development model for their nation-building efforts, and both the United States and the United

¹¹ Throughout this dissertation, the term “need” will be used in terms of “development needs.” Although a development need is an identified area for development assistance, it is not a “need” in the strictest definition of the word. In other words, the author recognizes that items addressed as “needs” throughout this dissertation extend beyond those few things actually critical to survival.


Nations (UN) provided substantial support to community development activities (White, 1999). The United States in particular supported community development in the 1950s as a means to “counter revolutionary sentiments” (Hjertholm and White, 2000, p. 12) and to promote a “democratic alternative to communism” (White, 1999, p. 111).

By 1960, the U.S. government sponsored participatory development in more than 60 countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and provided more than $50 million to community development programs between 1952 and 1961 (Holdcroft, 1978). The basic model utilized a village-level worker, rather than centrally-located staff as had been the case previously, to engage with community members and assist them in creating a village plan for development. Typically generalists, the village-level workers, who had basic skills in literacy, health and agriculture, could “call on regionally-based technical specialists if required” (White, 1999, p. 111). These activities deviated from traditional models of development by accessing the village level (rather than focusing on more macro-level programming), and utilizing village-level workers to identify needs and solutions from the grassroots level.

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the United States Agency for International Development, and the amount of foreign assistance increased significantly. A shift towards large cash transfers to foreign governments accompanied this growth in foreign assistance, (USAID, 2006) and the social development and poverty-alleviation focus of participatory development no longer occupied the forefront of development activities. In the 1970s, falling commodity prices and the oil price shocks led to an increased focus on trade-related development policies, ultimately leading to the World Bank’s structural adjustment programs. Development leaders (including then-president of the World Bank Robert McNamara) began to emphasize again the importance of poverty-focused development activities, and with

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14 The original source does not specify the year for this dollar figure. Assuming the amount is in 1961 dollars, this amount would translate to approximately $376 million in estimated 2011 dollars based on the U.S. Inflation Calculator at http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/.
limited success from structural adjustment programs, foreign assistance began to return to a poverty-focused – and thus more “people-focused” – agenda again by the mid-1980s.

This shift in the focus of foreign assistance programming naturally led to a return to more participatory development approaches. CDD/R, part of the latest wave of support for community development, emerged largely in the early 1990s from the World Bank (WB). World Bank lending for this type of development, which is one of the most rapidly growing approaches to World Bank operations, (Mansuri and Rao, 2004) rose from $325 million in 1996 to $2 billion in 2003 (Tanaka et al., 2006).

Figure 2.1 Community-Based Development Spectrum

Source: Tanaka et al., 2006

Figure 2.1 presents the spectrum of levels of community participation. Community-based development covers the entire spectrum of levels of community participation, which according to Mansuri and

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15 Tanaka et al. do not include Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR) in their spectrum. As a modification of CDD specifically in conflict-affected settings, CDR would fall at the right of the spectrum alongside CDD.
Rao, ranges from “simple information sharing; to consultation in design; to collaboration in implementation and management; to social, economic, and political empowerment of community groups by giving them direct control and responsibility of development projects” (2004, p. 5).

As depicted in Figure 2.1 above, community-driven development/reconstruction, which prioritizes community empowerment, is at the far right of the spectrum of levels of community-based development. Within the broader participatory development and community development approaches, CDD/R is distinct in that it gives communities “direct control over key project decisions, including management of investment funds” (Mansuri and Rao, 2004, p. 2). CDD/R not only strives for active citizen participation, but requires it at every step from the preliminary idea generation through to project monitoring and evaluation. Typically, CDD/R programs create community development councils (CDCs). Comprised of representatives from the community, these CDCs serve as the community-level decision-making body for the activities under the CDD/R program. The intensity of community participation, and particularly the community-based monitoring and evaluation, distinguish CDD/R from other community-based development approaches (Cliffe et al., 2003).

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CDD/R

Both the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank have analyzed the potential strengths and limitations of CDD/R based on a thorough review of the literature and examination of their CDD/R programs. These various benefits - and related potential obstacles to achieving them - fall into three broad categories: (1) equity and inclusiveness, (2) efficiency, and (3) governance. These three categories largely

correspond to the particularly important issues in conflict-affected settings identified in the introduction chapter: with the first responding to the issues ensuing inequities and tensions between various sub-populations and general skepticism about future opportunities and sense of disempowerment, and the second and third responding to the issue of distrust of and detachment from governing institutions.

**Equity and Inclusiveness**

Including all groups in a given society, and promoting equality amongst societal members, are ideals for effective development and reconstruction efforts with the aim of promoting quality of life and human security. Although achievement of complete inclusion and equality may not be realistic, striving for some level of inclusion and equity remains critical to development and reconstruction efforts in conflict-affected environments. CDD/R may enable development activities to better target the poorest members of society by engaging community-level actors that better understand the on-the-ground realities of poverty. The community participation component also provides opportunities for community members to have a voice in the development process, which may more effectively distribute economic power. Requirements by many CDD/R programs to include vulnerable populations (e.g., women and returnees) further promote equity and a more even distribution of economic resources.\footnote{The inclusion of marginalized groups can result in tension and outright hostility to the CDD/R programming. CDD/R programming typically views the inclusion of marginalized groups in these contexts as a long-term process. For example, the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan has employed a variety of approaches to promote the inclusion of women in the NSP to varying degrees of success. For more information, see Cheryl Benard, Seth Jones, Olya Oliker, Cathryn Thurston, Brooke K. Stearns and Kristen Cordell, *Women and Nation Building*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-579-CMEPP, 2008.} In addition, the CDD/R activities focus on the community level, and thus may increase development activities in more remote or smaller areas that may not receive funding under programs targeted at a higher (e.g., provincial) level. CDD/R programs can also grow to reach a large number of beneficiaries by expanding activities to multiple
communities, which each possess a certain level of capacity and the ability to implement projects. This “dispersion” of implementation capacity across multiple communities facilitates implementation in multiple geographic areas to a greater degree than traditional aid approaches, whose reach remains limited by the area aid staff can feasibly cover. Shifting much of the work related to projects from aid workers to communities themselves may free up aid workers to cover more communities.

Potential obstacles to achieving these equity and inclusion benefits from CDD/R activities include the risk of elite capture or dominance by one group and opportunity costs for participants. First, to the extent that CDD/R programs do not create truly representative decision-making bodies, specific individuals or sub-groups may gain a disproportionate share or complete control of power. Averting this potential obstacle requires carefully designed programs and mechanisms to achieve the desired results. For example, a CDD/R program may stipulate that each small grouping of houses select or elect one individual to represent their interests in the community development council. This may ensure that households recently returned to an area (which are often grouped together) have representation. Second, participation in a community development council may require a substantial time commitment and take participants away from other opportunities (e.g., income-generating activities). CDD/R programs can mitigate this risk by clearly articulating the time commitments required of council members, ensuring that time requirements remain reasonable, and encouraging community members to include individuals without substantial outside commitments on the committee, and assisting councils in developing processes to appropriately distribute the workload.

**Efficiency**

CDD/R should also conduct development and reconstruction activities efficiently. Handing over decision-making and implementation control to the beneficiaries reduces inefficiencies created from information asymmetries or misaligned incentives between the beneficiary and the donor (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). This demand-responsive approach may
better respond to community needs and reduce corruption due to greater transparency and closer observation of community members. With communities playing a central role in ensuring that the councils devote the resources to the intended projects and to ensure that council members do not steal the funding or use it for personal gain. Additionally, community members have a vested interest in minimizing costs for these projects to the extent that they strive to maximize the benefits from their funding. This sense of ownership and investment should also lead to improved project quality, maintenance, and utilization.

The primary obstacles to achieving these efficiency benefits include: (1) limitations in community decision-making and capacity, (2) restrictions on projects' duration and size, and (3) difficulties in sustaining projects. First, the communities may not have the capacity or knowledge to select and effectively implement the most beneficial projects. They may not have awareness of the non-local externalities of a given project or information about new technologies or opportunities (e.g., the value of cell phone technology for farmers to identify market prices for crops). To compensate for this potential limitation, many CDD/R programs include technical advisors who can help inform community members of these potential risks or opportunities. Second, the program design may restrict the potential projects either by requiring the completion of activities within a short timeframe or instituting funding caps. These limitations often occur due to other objectives of the donor agency (e.g., showing quick impacts in conflict-affected settings). Third, the intensive financial and human resources involved with CDD/R may hamper the sustainability of activities as communities themselves may not have the necessary resources (human and financial) to sustain projects. In addition, the communities may have absorptive capacity limits.

**Governance**

CDD/R can also promote good governance. Traditional governance-focused efforts often emphasize formal, central government institutions and processes; however, local-level governance plays an equally
important role in the daily lives of the population. Throughout the developed world, formally recognized and official government institutions typically carry out the governing functions both in terms of maintaining authority over regulating the activities of and providing public services to constituencies. In developing countries, however, informal governance structures (e.g., tribal councils) often carry out these governance functions.

According to a paper commissioned by the United Nations Development Program local governance plays a particularly critical role in post-conflict settings, including: (1) promoting conflict mitigation at a sub-national level (particularly given the intra-state nature of most modern conflicts), (2) “demilitarising politics in divided societies” (p. 4), and (3) capitalizing on community-level opportunities to create pockets of peace and stability (Jackson and Scott, 2007). CDD/R explicitly aims to promote good governance at the community level. The community development councils are often democratically elected and designed to promote good governance by carrying out their activities in a transparent and accountable manner. Technical advisors provide oversight to ensure that communities uphold principles of good governance. For example, the advisors supervise the established guidelines and information campaigns related to the electoral process and monitor the actual CDC elections. Once the CDC has formed, the advisors continue to oversee the CDCs to ensure that they adhere to principles of good governance in carrying out their activities.

The creation of these community development councils may risk undermining the formal government institutions by creating a parallel governance structure. Where legitimate, local-level government institutions exist, effectively emphasizing and promoting positive linkages between the CDD/R program and the local government can not only mitigate this risk, but actually promote good governance at a larger level. In other instances, existing local government may not be perceived as legitimate due to exclusionary, corrupt and/or autocratic practices. Development and reconstruction actors may intentionally create this parallel structure to avoid supporting illegitimate government structures. The governance structures created by the CDD/R
program can both instill the principles of good governance in civil society, and also may empower them to demand more from the formal government.

In cases where local-level government institutions do not exist, community development councils may provide a community-level body with which various government agencies can cooperate to plan and implement relevant activities. For example, the Ministry of Education can coordinate with CDCs to identify potential locations for new schools if the Ministry does not itself possess local-level officials. Similarly community councils can provide a voice for the population to sub-national-level authorities and provide a communication link between the formal government structures and the community members. In these ways, CDD/R can create positive linkages between citizens and the formal government system (Cliffe et al., 2003). Table 2.1 below summarizes these potential benefits and obstacles for CDD/R.
Table 2.1 – CDD/R Opportunities and Potential Obstacles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Potential Benefits</th>
<th>Potential Obstacles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equity and Inclusiveness</td>
<td>• Better target the poorest members of society</td>
<td>• Elite capture or dominance by one group may limit effective targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More effectively distribute economic power</td>
<td>• Opportunity costs for participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote inclusion of vulnerable populations</td>
<td>• “Scaling up” can be extremely costly, wieldy (e.g., difficult to monitor across large numbers of communities and staff labor-intensive), and/or not appropriate for all communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase access and activities in remote areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enable “scale-up” with the implementation of several activities in multiple communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>• Demand-responsive approach (better responds to community needs)</td>
<td>• Limitations in community decisionmaking (e.g., lack of awareness of non-local externalities) and capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduce corruption</td>
<td>• Restrictions on projects’ duration and size may reduce welfare gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower costs</td>
<td>• Difficulties in sustaining projects given the intense resource (financial and human) requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve project quality and maintenance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase utilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>• Promote accountability, transparency, responsiveness of local institutions</td>
<td>• Undermine formal government institutions through the creation of parallel structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Tanaka et al., 2006 and WB OED, 2005

CDD/R IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SETTINGS

According to the World Bank, CDD/R has two primary objectives: “(i) speedy and cost-effective delivery of reconstruction assistance on the ground, and (ii) building a governance structure that stresses local choice and accountability” (Cliffe et al., 2003, p. 2). Thus, CDD/R focuses on both short-term impacts as well as establishing governance mechanisms to promote long-term impacts at the local level. This distinguishes it from many of the one-off, “quick impact” projects common in conflict environments.
The World Bank commissioned researchers and staff to “identify programs that had – despite the significant obstacles posed by insecurity, poor governance, weak implementation capacity [sic] – achieved good results in either i) transforming the governance environment or ii) delivering poverty reduction, social protection or improved social service delivery” (WB, 2004, p. 1). The World Bank research identified four case studies of successful programs in conflict-affected settings, and three of the four case studies were community-driven development programs (WB, 2004). This indicates that CDD/R may be emerging as a leading program design for conflict-affected settings. A review of community-driven development by the Asian Development Bank also finds this approach particularly useful in contexts where “local institutions are absent or nonexistent,” a common characteristic of conflict-affected settings (Tanaka et al., 2006).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, conflict-affected settings are often marked by diminished infrastructure and human capital, frayed social fabric, and the absence of a positive relationship between the population and their government. These factors create acute physical, social and governance needs, which CDD/R has been used to address.

For physical outcomes, CDD/R can serve as a relatively low-cost option for rebuilding local services and infrastructure damaged by conflict. For example, a CDD/R program in Kosovo provided school construction and rehabilitation at a 19 percent lower cost than achieved by non-CDD/R programs (WB, 2007). The majority of CDD/R programs also involve technical assistance designed to rebuild the human capacity in a given context. Improved infrastructure and human capacity can promote economic growth, which in turn can promote broader stability.

In terms of social factors, the creation of community development councils can “start the process of reestablishing social and institutional relationships, networks, and interpersonal trust – collectively understood as social capital” (WB, 2007, pp. 8-9). A randomized control trial conducted in Lofa County, Liberia, by researchers from Stanford and Columbia Universities revealed that CDD/R improved community cohesion – not only in terms of a self-reported sense of community cohesion, but also in behaviors observed through a public
goods game that involved anonymous donations for a collective project (Fearon, 2009).

In addition, CDD/R can foster the organization of communities and promote participatory governance at the local level. The general governance benefits of CDD/R described above are particularly important in a conflict-affected setting where issues around government legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach typically exist. Popular support and participation in a political process is one of the elements important for legitimate government (Cohen, 2006). CDD/R’s potential benefit of instilling good governance principles in communities can provide a foundation for a more stable political environment in conflict-affected settings. In addition, a World Bank review of 13 cases of CDD/R in conflict-affected settings concluded that “where community-driven approaches take root, they can forge bonds between citizens and their (re)emerging state” (WB, 2007, p. 32). CDD/R can create a venue for communication between the government and its populace that can facilitate incremental change (Cliffe et al., 2003). With CDD/R, to the extent that development efforts fail to achieve their desired outcomes, the community itself shares the responsibility with the government and the development actors. This helps protect the government from misplaced blame and unjust criticism (WB, 2007). By linking the national- and/or subnational-level formal government to these local governance bodies, CDD/R activities may also promote the decentralization efforts that often accompany transitions from conflict to stability (Tanaka et al., 2006). Successfully promoting stability in conflict-affected settings typically requires improving the government’s reach (Gompert et al., 2009), and decentralization may be one means of doing so. The community development councils’ activities – if coordinated with local government officials – can support the local government’s development agenda in a given area (Tanaka et al., 2006).

**RESEARCH APPROACH**

The reviewed literature suggests that the CDD/R approach to development and reconstruction may be particularly well-suited for local-level development in conflict-affected environments in terms of
addressing their specific physical, social and governance characteristics. In addition, the basic tenets of the CDD/R approach make adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction, particularly ownership and capacity building, likely. The selection of programs that have a high probability of adhering to the principles at the outset allows for the analysis to focus on the impact of the level and nature of violence itself, rather than inherent weaknesses in the approach related to factors other than the violence.

The existing literature relies primarily on two different types of analysis: desk-based case studies conducted by donor agencies of their own programs,18 and growing number of randomized-control trials conducted in a single country by academics in partnership with implementing agencies.19 These studies largely discuss the broader conflict context and the aspects of economic, social and political development and reconstruction; however, these case studies do not specifically examine the interactions between the conflict context and the “soundness” of the programs in a systematic manner that allows general conclusions to be drawn.

This dissertation expands on that body of literature by conducting a systematic, independent analysis of CDD/R programs supported by various donor agencies in conflict-affected settings. This research


19 Researchers from various universities including Columbia, Harvard, and Stanford are conducting on-going randomized control trials to examine the impact of CDD/R in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia.
moves beyond the focus on the strengths and weaknesses of individual programs to compare how the conflict context affects the ability of CDD/R to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction in varying levels of conflict. This dissertation employs a comparative case study analysis using relevant literature and project documents, semi-structured interviews with a wide range of stakeholders and academics, and direct observation empirical analysis. The sections below describe the methodology employed to select the case studies. Chapter 3 presents the analytic framework used to analyze these case studies.

**Case Study Country Selection**

The case country selection criteria focus on identifying cases that vary primarily on the independent variable of interest, the level of conflict. The conflict context involves multiple factors, including many that are difficult to codify, and the three case studies were selected to represent various points on the conflict spectrum. For the purposes of this dissertation, the conflict spectrum focuses on the range of levels of violence. Based on a review of available data, the best proxy indicator for the level of violence across countries is the number of battle-related deaths recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP).

The UCDP codes a conflict with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year as war (high level of conflict). UCDP codes a conflict that involves 25 to 1,000 battle-related deaths per year as a minor conflict (medium level of conflict) (Uppsala, 2009). In addition, a large number of countries experience instability and conflict that results in fewer than 25 battle-related deaths per year. Development and reconstruction still faces challenges in these contexts, particularly in countries emerging from conflict that face significant development and reconstruction challenges and high risks of reverting to conflict. As such, the author created a third category for countries
that had experienced war and/or minor conflict in the past five years, but presently had fewer than 25 battle-related deaths (post-conflict or low level of conflict).

Within this sub-set of potential case study countries, the final selection was based upon four criteria. First, the duration of the conflict was considered to avoid comparing a new outbreak of conflict with one of long duration. All three cases have conflicts that are more than five years old. Second, all three cases have an international military presence. One of the case countries has an international coalition including a strong U.S. presence (Afghanistan) and the other two have a strong UN presence (the DRC and Haiti). Third, the selection incorporated geographic variation to avoid limiting the relevance of this research to one particular region. Fourth, all three countries have an on-going CDD/R program.

Based on this selection process, the countries of Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Haiti were chosen. These cases are conflict-affected countries with varying levels of violence, as shown in Table 2.2.

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20 This time period was chosen based on the empirical analysis of the conflict trap, which highlights five years as the period of particularly high risk of returning to conflict. For more information, see Paul Collier, Lani Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003.

21 This criterion did not significantly affect the case study selection process as CDD/R programs existed in most of the potential case study countries. By early 2005, the World Bank had 86 on-going CDD/R programs in conflict-affected settings (WB, 2008b).

22 All field research was completed prior to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

23 Many different types of conflicts can involve battle-related deaths greater than 1,000 per year; however, this is the way that Uppsala categorizes the data.
Table 2.2 – Selected Case Countries and Conflict Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study Country</th>
<th>Conflict Category</th>
<th>Conflict Category Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>&gt; 1,000 battle-related deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Minor Conflict</td>
<td>25 – 1,000 battle-related deaths/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Post-Conflict</td>
<td>&lt; 25 battle-related deaths/year, but experienced war or minor conflict in the past five years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, although the UCDP does not make distinctions based on whether the violence is of a political or criminal nature, the database is restricted to violence conducted by actors organized into identifiable groups. As such, the UCDP does not capture violence committed by bandits, loosely formed gangs, mobs, or individuals not part of an organized (and identified) group. This type of "un-organized" violence also affects all three of the case study countries. Given significant data limitations on criminality and violence that is not organized, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of these issues in each of the case study countries.

Given that CDD/R operates at the local level, this research focused on CDD/R efforts in sub-national areas. These areas were selected based on the feasibility of conducting fieldwork and the presence of active conflict. In Afghanistan, case study focuses on Nangarhar Province, an area central to the Afghan conflict but with a semi-permissive environment. Nangarharis have historically supported insurgent leaders over the past forty years, including Osama Bin Laden, and substantial battles have been fought on its soil. One of Afghanistan’s primary trade routes with Pakistan runs through Nangarhar, which shares strong cultural and economic ties with the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan. The semi-permissive environment and contacts within the region also made Nangarhar a feasible case study. In the DRC, North and South Kivus are the epicenter of the on-going conflict, particularly given their proximity to Rwanda and Burundi. The massive population movements and historical tensions among various ethnic groups in this region have fueled the fighting on Congolese soil. Given Haiti’s relatively small geographic size, the case context is national. The case study did not need to focus on a sub-region and includes both Port-
au-Prince, the historical center of insecurity in Haiti, as well as
nearby rural areas.24

Case CDD/R Program Selection

Each of the selected cases includes at least one CDD/R program. The case study selected for each province is a primary - if not the only - and relatively well-established CDD/R program operating in the area. The three selected CDD/R programs are: (1) National Solidarity Program in Nangarhar, Afghanistan; (2) Tuungane in the Kivus, the DRC; and (3) Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Rural (PRODEP) and Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbaine (PROEDPUR) in Haiti.

Conclusion

The literature reviewed above describes CDD/R programs and why they might be an effective approach to local-level development and reconstruction in conflict-affected settings, and the discussion above describes the process for selecting the three CDD/R case studies. This dissertation will systematically assess the conflict context, describe the program design and security strategy for the respective CDD/R programs, and analyze how each of these factors affects the ability of the CDD/R program to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction. The next chapter presents the analytic framework that will be used to assess each of these three case study CDD/R programs - the NSP, Tuungane and PRODEP/PRODEPUR.

24 All research in Haiti was completed prior to the January 2010 earthquake.
3. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

This chapter outlines the analytic framework used to analyze the case studies in subsequent chapters. It lays out the principles that define “sound” development and reconstruction. These principles may be affected by three key factors: the conflict context, the program design, and the security strategy. This chapter first describes each of these three factors, and then describes the interaction between them and how they affect principles of sound development and reconstruction. These elements and their relationships are depicted in Figure 3.1 below.

**Figure 3.1 – Analytic Framework**

**Conflict Context**
- Background
- Current Social, Economic and Political Factors
- Security Environment

**Security Strategy**
- Stand Out
- Blend In
- Rely Within
- Armor Up
- Bug Out
- Wait it Out

**Program Design**
- Objective
- Implementation
- Funding

**Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction**
1) Ownership
2) Capacity Building & Partnerships
3) Sustainability
4) Selectivity
5) Results and Accountability
6) Flexibility
7) Assessment and Conflict Management

**CONFLICT CONTEXT**

For development and reconstruction, assessing this conflict context - including background on the area; current social, economic and
political factors; and the security environment – provides critical inputs to the design and implementation of the development and reconstruction activity. A recent study by the RAND Corporation developed the framework for assessing the conflict context described below.25

Background

The background of a given area provides critical information about the drivers of conflict and key considerations for designing and implementing development and reconstruction activities. Analyzing the background can provide insight about factors that may either exacerbate a conflict by reigniting sources of tension or may create opportunities for reconciliation by dampening such tension. The four primary components of background to consider are: (1) general history, (2) regional issues, (3) internal geography, and (4) culture and ethnicity.

First, understanding the background of a given area starts with reviewing the general history. An assessment of an area’s history provides critical information on former sources of tension that may have implications for the current context. The relevance of specific aspects of history to the current conflict may vary; however, key components to consider include previous sources of political and economic power, periods of conflict, and major demographic changes (e.g., rapid urbanization). For example, a history of large numbers of migrant seasonal workers may turn into a source of resentment from the local population during a period of high unemployment – particularly if the local population’s perception is that the migrants have “taken their jobs.”

Second, a given geographical area, from a village up to a country, does not exist in isolation, and key social, economic and demographic factors typically transcend political boundaries. Understanding the

25 This section draws heavily on the work of the RAND team described in Brooke Stearns Lawson et al., Reconstruction Under Fire: Case Studies and Further Analysis of Civil Requirements, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-870/1-OSD, 2010.
role of neighbors provides invaluable information about a given operating environment. For example, neighboring countries may support rebel movements\textsuperscript{26} by providing safe harbor or even supplying arms.

Third, the physical landscape of a given area affects both dissident and development and reconstruction activities. For example, forests may provide harbor for armed actors, and remote areas inaccessible during the rainy season may restrict the ability to implement development and reconstruction activities.

Fourth, the human terrain also provides invaluable information regarding the conflict context. The norms, religion, ethnicity, tribal composition, and gender-based practices of a given area provide important information on potential areas of societal cohesion or division. For example, an ethnic group that feels suppressed by another group may be willing to support armed actors who claim they will reverse this imbalance.

Current Social, Economic, and Political Factors

These background factors combine to set the stage for the current conflict context, which consists of social, economic and political factors. The discussion of these three factors draws upon existing resources including the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, and USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework.

Social factors may directly motivate fighting or they may be exploited by armed actors to build popular support and attract members. Key social indicators that may be relevant to the conflict context include: demographic pressures, population movements, legacy of group grievances, urbanization, ethnic or religious tensions, and unmet population expectations (e.g., large numbers of educated young people without economic opportunities). For example, the emergence of a “youth bulge” with large numbers of young males may create a pool of potential recruits for armed actors.

\textsuperscript{26} The broad term of dissident will be used here to describe the primary destabilizing force in the conflict context. This could be an insurgent group, terrorist group, gang, rebel group or criminal network.
Economic factors often contribute to conflict - by providing something worth fighting for or about, financing armed actors, and creating dissatisfaction during periods of poor economic performance. In addition, resources are often scarce during conflict, and development and reconstruction actors (and sometimes armed actors as well) may provide some of the few economic opportunities. The allocation of these resources has the potential to exacerbate existing divisions within a society or to reduce these cleavages by creating a common, positive experience. Aspects of economic analysis particularly relevant for understanding conflicts include: uneven economic development or inequitable access to economic opportunities along group lines, sharp economic decline, unfair competitive practices, state control over resources, overreliance on easily "lootable" goods, scale of illicit economy, competition for economic control over natural resources, and a lack of livelihood opportunities.

In conflict-affected areas, political factors can create grievances among the population that undermine popular support of the government. Armed actors often capitalize on these grievances. For example, the government may not provide basic services and may lack a monopoly on violence, so armed actors can provide these security and basic services to populations who, in turn, provide support to the dissident movement.\textsuperscript{27} In some conflict-affected areas, the government security forces may worsen the conflict by using their power to exploit or attack civilians. Other political factors that may undermine popular support for the government include: criminal infiltration of the state, deteriorated public services and infrastructure, widespread human rights violations or inadequate rule of law, state-sponsored violence, factionalized elite control, external interventions, restricted civil liberties, and ineffective state institutions.

\textsuperscript{27} Communities may actively support armed actors (e.g., providing food or other material resources) or passively "support" the armed actors (e.g., by allowing the armed actors to live in or near the community without reporting them).
Security Environment

The security risks associated with operating in a conflict setting are often considerable, and may require modification of standard ways of “doing business” for development and reconstruction efforts. The security assessment should consider both the general security environment – including both the nature and the level of the threat – and the security environment specifically for development and reconstruction.

Nature of General Insecurity. Understanding the general security environment entails familiarity with the nature of the threat including: armed actors’ organization; ends, ways, and means; and popular support or tolerance, as well as related threats. Assessing the armed actors’ organization entails identifying the type of dissident group (e.g., an insurgency, a gang, or an external rebel group) and the key leaders and the relevant decision-making and command structures. In addition to understanding the basic organization of the dissident group, the security assessment must identify the armed actors’ objectives (ends), conceptual approaches to accomplish these goals (ways), and available resources (means). Assessing the security environment also entails understanding the extent to which the dissident group receives support from the population, and the nature of that support (e.g., active or passive). Importantly, popular support may be genuine or may be based on coercion or incentives.

Many conflicts also involve multiple rebel and criminal groups in addition to the primary dissident group(s). These various groups often have destabilizing affects and complex relationships with the main dissident group(s). In some instances (particularly with criminal organizations), they have symbiotic relationships with the armed actors. For example, both armed actors and criminal organizations may operate in areas with limited government presence where they have a low probability of being detected. The “co-location” of the armed actors and criminal groups may create mutual interests and armed actors may rely on criminal networks or their activities for funding, and criminal networks may benefit from the “security services” offered by the dissident groups.
In other instances, the secondary groups may form for self-protection from the armed actors and security forces.28

**Level of General Insecurity.** Beyond understanding the nature of the threat, and particularly the armed actors’ ways and means, understanding the level of the threat also provides invaluable information about the operating environment in which development and reconstruction activities occur. The level of the threat includes both the current scale and the trends in the security incidents.

**Security Environment for Development and Reconstruction Actors.** The security environment may pose unique opportunities and challenges for development and reconstruction actors. Three categories of actors often engage in development and reconstruction – the indigenous government, civil society, and aid workers. In many conflict-affected contexts, armed actors (and particularly insurgents) actively target government forces and institutions and individuals perceived as their supporters. The relationship between the armed actors and civilians engaging in development and reconstruction will vary depending upon the motivations of the armed actors and their perceptions of the development and reconstruction activities and actors. For example, religiously-motivated insurgents who oppose the education of girls may attack civil society members involved in constructing a school. Similarly, to the extent that insurgents may perceive civil society members engaged in development and reconstruction activities as aligned with or building support for the government, they may also target these actors.29

Historically, aid workers have often carved out a “humanitarian space,” which means the neutrality and independence of aid workers

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enabled them to move freely in areas of conflict.\textsuperscript{30} This freedom of movement without fear of attack from any party in a conflict enabled aid workers such as the International Federation of the Red Cross to provide humanitarian assistance to all conflict victims regardless of their affiliations. With the notion of “humanitarian space,” development and reconstruction actors generally operated safely even in otherwise insecure environments to the extent that aid workers clearly identified themselves as humanitarians. The trends in foreign assistance discussed in the introduction— including the increased emphasis on development and reconstruction as a “soft” foreign policy instrument and the increased engagement of military actors in development and reconstruction—have shrunk this space, which has made carrying out development and reconstruction activities more dangerous for aid workers.

The Overseas Development Institute’s Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) defines major security incidents as those in which humanitarian workers are kidnapped (and held for more than 24 hours), killed or seriously injured by deliberate violence (Stoddard et al., 2009). A 2009 study based on data from the Aid Worker Security Database\textsuperscript{31} found an increase in the absolute number of major security incidents affecting humanitarian aid workers over the past decade as depicted in Figure 3.2.


\textsuperscript{31} The Overseas Development Institute and the Center on International Cooperation created the Aid Worker Security Database as part of an independent joint research project. For related information, visit the Humanitarian Outcomes website at: http://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/index.php.
The total number of aid workers has increased by approximately 91 percent, from roughly 155,000 in 1997 to nearly 297,000 in 2008, with the number of national aid workers growing more than the number of international aid workers. This rise in the number of aid workers alone could potentially explain the increase in the number of such incidents; however, HPG also found an increase in the relative number of attacks against aid workers as depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.

Source: Stoddard et al., 2009

These figures are based on the Aid Worker Security Database, and represent estimates of the number of aid workers rather than precise figures. Estimating the number of aid workers is extremely difficult, and these figures may be retroactively adjusted as Humanitarian Outcomes continues to work to refine these figures. For more information on the methodology employed to reach these figures, see Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Katherine Haver, Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations, London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 23, September, 2006, retrieved online, 5/31/2010. http://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/pdf/ProvidingAidinInsecureEnvironments-Full.pdf
Figure 3.3 – Trends in Relative Numbers of Major Security Incidents Affecting Aid Workers

Source: Stoddard et al., 2009

Figure 3.4 shows a steady increase in the major security incident rates affecting national aid workers since 1997. The rates for international staff fluctuated but overall declined between 1997 and 2005, but have risen relatively steadily since 2005. The ratio of incidents involving national to international aid workers grew from approximately 11 to 1 in 1997 to nearly 13 to 1 in 2008.\textsuperscript{33} The increased reliance on national staff and remote management may explain these trends, with a shift from international to national staff operating in the most insecure environments.

\textsuperscript{33} These ratios are based on data from the Aid Worker Security Database.
Between 2005 and 2008, six countries accounted for three-quarters of all major attacks on aid workers: Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Chad, Iraq and Pakistan, in descending order. The three highest security incident countries (Sudan, Afghanistan and Somalia) drove the spike in international staff incidents between 2005 and 2008 (Stoddard et al., 2009). Excluding these three countries, the rates of major security incidents is declining slightly, albeit with years of heightened violence such as 2003, as depicted in Figure 3.5.

Although exact figures are not provided for the percentage of aid worker staff that are “national staff,” a comparison of Figures 3.3 and Figure 3.4 indicate that the overall trends in major security incidents involving aid workers are driven largely by the national staff data, and thus that there are orders of magnitude more national than international staff.
Perpetrators of major security attacks against aid workers utilize a variety of methods and tactics. As Figure 3.6 shows, aid workers face the greatest risks on the roads. Ambushes on the road represent 30 percent of major security incidents, and a majority of the kidnappings occurred when the victim was traveling in a vehicle. Kidnapping increased by more than 350 percent between 2005 and 2008 (Stoddard et al., 2009).

Although tracking the number and rate of security incidents affecting aid workers presents significant challenges, ascertaining the motivation behind such attacks is even more difficult. The majority of incidents reported in the Aid Worker Security Database list the motive as “undetermined.” The incidents that do assign a motivation indicate an increase in politically-motivated incidents relative to economically-motivated incidents (with the former rising from 29 percent in 2003 to 49 percent in 2008) (Stoddard et al., 2009). It is unclear the extent to which these data reflect an actual increase in political motivation compared to an increased attribution of a political motive.
Figure 3.6 – Methods and Tactics of Major Security Incidents Affecting Aid Workers, 2006-2008

Source: Stoddard et al., 2009

In addition to the incidents reflected in the data above, aid workers operating in insecure environments also face a variety of non-major security threats. Aid workers may also experience robbery, bribery, theft and threats; however, these data have not been collected systematically on a global level.

In summary, development and reconstruction actors may face differing levels of risk of attack from armed actors depending upon the activities they undertake and the motivations of the insurgents. Although limited data is available to describe the risks presented to government officials or civil society members engaging in development and reconstruction, the above data provides a general overview of the types and general levels of insecurity that aid workers face in conflict-affected settings. The case studies will examine how each conflict context’s security environment for development and reconstruction actors may affect the roles of these three main types of actors, and in turn affect the ability of the CDD/R program to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction.
PROGRAM DESIGN

As depicted in Figure 3.1, the conflict context affects program design and the security strategy chosen by development and reconstruction actors. In addition, the security strategy both affects and is affected by the program design. In general, program design considers the objectives, implementation approach and funding. As discussed in Chapter 2, this dissertation examines three cases of CDD/R, which controls for large variations in program design. Some variation in these areas of program design remains among the three cases, however.

This dissertation considers both the program and project levels of the program design, both in the actual description of the program design as well as in other related discussions (e.g., the security strategy at the program and project levels). The development and reconstruction program consists of multiple projects. For example, community driven development and reconstruction programs include overall program management, supervision, training and technical supervision. Within a given CDD/R program, various communities undertake a variety of specific community development projects (e.g., digging an irrigation system).

Objectives

Development and reconstruction programs and projects generally have a specific and often expressly articulated objective. For example, an education program may have the objective of increasing access to education, and school rehabilitation or reconstruction projects within the program may have the objective of providing a safe environment conducive for learning.

CDD/R programs typically have the dual objectives of developing local governance capacity and addressing specific socio-economic needs of participating communities. Although the three case studies included in this dissertation do strive to achieve these two program objectives, they vary in the emphasis they place on each of these objectives. At a project level, CDD/R activities vary in their objectives, but typically focus on addressing a specific socio-economic need within the community (e.g., the provision of potable water).
Implementation

Implementation identifies who does what, and how they do it. At the program level, implementation typically includes general management, supervision, training, technical assistance provision, monitoring and evaluation. At the project level, in addition to carrying out the project activities (e.g., the physical construction), implementation also includes project selection, design, monitoring, and evaluation as well as project-specific training and technical assistance.

Typically, a combination of three key actors engage in implementation: the indigenous government, civil society, and aid workers. The specific roles of these key actors vary among CDD/R programs and across development and reconstruction activities.

Given the community-level focus of CDD/R project implementation, indigenous governments can only actively engage in areas where they have a presence. As governments in conflict-affected contexts often lack presence throughout the country, program management is the aspect of CDD/R implementation where indigenous governments are most likely to play a role.

The project-level role of civil society serves as a cornerstone of the CDD/R approach. The underlying concept of CDD/R is that community representatives identify, plan, carry out and monitor small-scale development activities. In other words, the communities themselves have primary responsibility for the project-level effort. Each of the three cases described in this dissertation includes community development councils as a foundation for the implementation approach; however, the composition and range of activities undertaken by these councils varies. In each of the three cases, the discussion of civil society focuses on the efforts undertaken by the new civil society institutions formed as part of the CDD/R process. In the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR in Haiti, the community development councils created to implement the program build upon an existing civil society infrastructure. The council consists of representatives from existing civil society institutions. The same does not hold for the NSP in Afghanistan and Tuungane in the DRC. In these two cases, the civil society institution is formed based on a community-level election of individuals.
Typically these communities receive technical assistance from aid workers. Depending on the role of the indigenous government, aid workers may also play a central role in program management or providing technical assistance at the program level. The program-level aspects of CDD/R implementation approaches vary in terms of the roles played by the three actors depending on the context. The three case studies examined in this dissertation include differing roles for the indigenous government, civil society and development and aid workers, and each case study discusses how the conflict context affects these roles, which in turn affect adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.

**Funding**

Finally, the program design considers the levels and sources of funding. Funding levels and mechanisms vary among the cases in conjunction with implementation. For example, when the indigenous government bears responsibility for overall program management, international donors usually provide funding directly to the central government. When aid organizations bear responsibility for overall program management, international donors usually provide funding to these aid organizations. At the project level, the three cases all provide block grants to community councils to implement development and reconstruction activities; however, the amounts may vary.

**SECURITY STRATEGY**

Actors implementing development and reconstruction activities employ a variety of security strategy options to protect themselves from the security threats that exist in the areas where they work. To mitigate the effects of security incidents, development and reconstruction actors can either decrease the probability of attack, decrease the effect should an attack occur, or do both. Security strategies occur at both the broader program level as well as the more specific project level. The former consists of securing the program-level activities needed to implement the specific projects, such as the monitoring and evaluation conducted by program managers...
(e.g., visiting a community to monitor the community development council selection process). The latter entails securing the more specific project activities (e.g., the construction of a well). Although program management almost always involves some activity at headquarter offices of international actors engaged in CDD/R and at a central country office in the capital city (or other urban center) of the country of implementation, this dissertation will focus on the security strategies for the field, rather than headquarter, activities. The field level involves the more direct implementation of the program and the projects, which enables testing of the hypothesis about CDD/R programs in different conflict environments.

In a presentation at the 2009 Humanitarian Action Summit, Stewart M. Patrick identified four security strategies for aid workers: "stand out," "blend in," "armor up," or "bug out" (2009). The framework proposed below expands on these four security strategies and offers an additional two more nuanced strategies — "wait it out" and "rely within."

**Stand Out**

"Stand out" is the "traditional" strategy of clearly identifying oneself as a neutral aid worker. "Stand out" rests on the notion of "humanitarian space," which means that aid workers are allowed to operate as neutral and independent actors distinct from the conflict. For the most part, only aid workers may employ this strategy given the history of "humanitarian space." Typically armed actors do not perceive the indigenous government or civil society as neutral parties. This strategy involves clearly signaling to all conflict actors that the development and reconstruction activities undertaken occur without regard to affiliation or without a political or social agenda.

"Stand out" has become the international standard because it essentially enables aid workers to operate in a neutral environment where they provide assistance based on need, and thus can access even highly insecure environments to prevent loss of life and human suffering. The use of white cars with clear affiliation signage, flags
and/or “no arms on board” markings illustrate the stand out strategy well. Potential adaptations of this strategy include the use of purple cars by Oxfam to distinguish themselves not only as an aid organization, but also as distinct from the “white car” driven not only by humanitarian workers but also by the United Nations, which has been viewed as a conflict actor in many contexts. This strategy focuses on reducing the risk of attack by claiming the “humanitarian space.”

**Blend In**

The antithesis of the stand out strategy, “blend in” entails minimizing any identifying factors. Rather than travel in clearly-marked and distinct vehicles, aid workers may utilize older, more run-down unmarked vehicles. National staff may travel in lieu of international staff. Those who do travel tend to keep separate documents that may signal a relationship with international aid workers or the indigenous government and may even use a temporary cell phone that does not include the phone numbers of aid workers or organizations. The following statement summarizes this strategy: “Becoming invisible is seen to be the best guarantee of security and of reaching people in need” (Donini, 2009). This strategy focuses on reducing the risk of attack by decreasing the identification of the actor as a potentially desirable target.

**Rely Within**

“Rely within” goes one step beyond blend in, by utilizing community security rather than just minimizing “detection” of development and reconstruction actors. Community members may play a greater role in implementing and monitoring development and reconstruction activities. Neighboring community members may monitor and report on each other’s

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36 Interview with Oxfam staff, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, July 18, 2008.
activities to increase the “objectivity” of this monitoring. Alternatively, community members may travel to safe locations to meet with and report on their activities or a community member may meet an aid worker in a safe location and transport him/her to project site. Aid workers may also integrate into the community where they work. This strategy focuses on reducing the risk of attack by relying on a community’s ability to protect its own population and activities.

**Armor Up**

“Armor up” entails using armed security actors to protect the development and reconstruction actors, activities, and offices. The armor up strategy has multiple variations. First, development and reconstruction actors may choose to themselves bear arms. Although few aid workers chose to do so, some non-government organizations or private firms undertaking development and reconstruction activities do employ private contractors, including retired military personnel, who may choose to bear arms.

Second, development and reconstruction actors may hire private security forces. In general, international aid organizations often hire armed guards to secure their organization’s compound. These organizations may also hire armed guards to accompany their employees while they carry out their activities.

Third, development and reconstruction actors may work with indigenous security actors operating in a given area to provide security. For example, development and reconstruction actors may request that the local police accompany them on visits to potentially dangerous areas.

Fourth, development and reconstruction actors may rely on international security forces to provide security. For example, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq involve

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37 Security actors themselves may directly implement development and reconstruction activities. This example of “armor up” security strategy, however, remains outside of the scope of this dissertation, which focuses on three cases of CDD/R.
international military units accompanying U.S. government aid workers to conduct program management in insecure environments.

Whether this strategy reduces the risk of attack - to the extent that potential aggressors may be deterred - or whether it actually makes actors a target remains a subject of debate. This strategy does, however, aim to reduce the effect of any attacks.

Bug Out

The most risk-averse security strategy, “bug out” entails not operating in insecure environments, or leaving if the security environment deteriorates too far. This significantly minimizes the potential risk for attack, but it also means that the development and reconstruction actors employing this strategy cannot conduct development and reconstruction activities in the given area.

Wait it Out

The “wait it out” strategy resembles the bug out strategy. Rather than completely pulling out of insecure areas, the wait it out strategy entails temporarily suspending operations when security threats are deemed too high. For example, an aid actor may support an activity in a conflict-affected community but reschedule monitoring visits when faced with acute security threats. This strategy also focuses on reducing the risk of attack.

PRINCIPLES OF SOUND DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

The final element of the analytic framework identifies principles of sound development and reconstruction that can then be used to assess each of the three case studies. Although individual development and reconstruction programs and actors often identify “best practices” and other guidance, they tend to be specific to a particular thematic area (e.g., child health) or a specific geographical context. The desired framework should cut across thematic and geographical areas.

As the U.S. governmental agency with primary responsibility for development and reconstruction activities, USAID has almost fifty years of experience in development and reconstruction. With the increased emphasis on development and reconstruction as a tool for promoting U.S.
national security interests, and the increased involvement of the U.S. military in development and reconstruction activities, then-USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios identified the “Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development” in 1995 (Natsios, 2005). Inspired by the Nine Principles of War,38 USAID lays out the core principles that increase the probability of success based on institutional experience. Table 3.1 below lists the nine principles and briefly describes each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ownership</td>
<td>Build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Capacity Building</td>
<td>Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sustainability</td>
<td>Design programs to ensure their impact endures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Selectivity</td>
<td>Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Assessment</td>
<td>Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Results</td>
<td>Direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Partnership</td>
<td>Collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors, non-profit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Flexibility</td>
<td>Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Accountability</td>
<td>Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Natsios, 2005

These nine principles of reconstruction and development consolidate the insights gained through experience and described in the literature, and thus serve as the foundation for the framework defining sound development and reconstruction. Related documents on development and reconstruction also discuss the importance of these principles. For example, the World Bank’s “good practice” for fragile states discusses

38 The nine principles of war describe core concepts of Army doctrine for the strategic, operational, and tactical level. The nine principles are: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity. For more information, see University of Cincinnati, "Introduction to the Principles of War and Operations," in Military Science II Textbook, Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati, 2004.
the importance of capacity building, partnerships, flexibility, and accountability (WB, 2005a). In addition, related literature emphasizes the importance of an approach that understands and manages the drivers of conflict.39 This principle of “conflict management”40 relates directly to Natsios’s assessment principle, but focuses more specifically on assessing the factors that may exacerbate or reduce the conflict.

The framework for this analysis takes these nine principles and reorganizes them into seven categories: 1) Ownership, 2) Capacity Building and Partnerships, 3) Sustainability, 4) Selectivity, 5) Results and Accountability, 6) Flexibility, and 7) Assessment and Conflict Management. This restructuring combines the highly correlated topics of capacity building and partnership as well as the topics of results and accountability. In addition, the principle of “assessment” is further modified to explicitly address whether the given case study involves conflict management efforts.

1. Ownership

The first – and arguably first among equals – principle of development and reconstruction, ownership emphasizes that the development and reconstruction process must be driven by indigenous actors rather than external forces (Orr, 2004). Theoretically, local ownership: (1) ensures that projects are appropriate for a given context, (2) provides unity to development and reconstruction efforts,


40 “Conflict management” has been emphasized in numerous seminal works on conflict contexts, most notably Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace - or War, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.
(3) capitalizes on the existing capabilities of a region, and (4) promotes the sustainability and security of a project through the community’s sense of investment in the activity. Local ownership may consist of community and/or government ownership, and its benefits may spill over into other principles of sound development and reconstruction.

First, local ownership is seen as a means of ensuring appropriate project selection and management as well as sustainability. The importance of local ownership extends beyond the acceptability of activities to the effectiveness as well. A recent article in Humanitarian Exchange Magazine asserts that, "Communities that own the money will, in general, take care to select the most sensible projects at reasonable prices, will choose the more honest contractors and oversee their work, will stretch their resources further through increased contributions, and will be encouraged to seek outside sources for co-funding" (McBride and D’Onofrio, 2008, p. 1).

Second, local ownership can unify international efforts (Orr, 2004). With a variety of indigenous and international actors involved in most conflict-affected settings, the indigenous actors themselves are best positioned to understand who is doing what in the area. Programs that support an indigenous platform for development activities and decision-making – such as the community development councils established in many CDD/R programs – can provide one primary source of project identification and coordination and reduce duplication (Cliffe et al., 2003).

Third, local ownership can also identify and capitalize upon existing resources within the community. For example, a United States Institute of Peace analysis of nation-building lessons emphasizes the importance of Iraq’s social capital “not only to large-scale projects but also to smaller, community-based relief and reconstruction endeavors” (Jennings, 2003, p. 6). The premise of CDD/R is that “local communities possess the core skills, incentives, and unity to implement a large range of projects provided they are given the resources and a management support system” (Cliffe et al., 2003, p. 2). In instances where communities lack the necessary skills or expertise for a selected
project, outside technical assistance is necessary, and thus CDD/R programs typically include a technical assistance component.

Fourth, local ownership creates a sense of “buy-in” and vested interest in the development and reconstruction activities’ success and security. The World Bank has found that, “ownership in turn has proven to be an important protective measure against destruction in case of a resumption of violent conflict” (Cliffe et al., 2003, p.3). Similarly, Natsios explains that “when ownership exists and a community invests itself in a project, the citizens will defend, maintain, and expand the project well after donors have departed” (2005, p. 7). To the extent that community members are more likely to defend their projects, this will affect the cost-benefit calculation of violent actors – increasing their costs if they choose to attack it. For example, in Afghanistan a community that participated in the National Solidarity Program held a project completion ceremony with an Afghan Minister. Recognizing the potential threat, the CDC conducted self patrols of the area for two days and two nights to ensure that the area was secure for the minister’s visit.41 Armed actors did not attack the project although they have been known to attack other similar projects and ceremonies tied to the Afghan government.

2. Capacity Building and Partnership

A commonly accepted mantra of the international aid community is the goal of “working oneself out of a job.” A key goal of development and reconstruction activities is to develop the skills and institutions necessary to carry out long-term development and reconstruction activities without dependence upon foreign assistance. Technical and governance capacities are the two most important for community-level development and reconstruction in conflict-affected settings. The former entails strengthening indigenous ability to carry out activities that meet quality standards. The latter involves developing principles of accountable, legitimate and effective governance over the provision

41 Interview with CDC members, Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
of public services. Building both the technical and governance capacity of indigenous actors can develop “the long-term ability to establish effective policies and deliver competent public services” (Natsios, 2005, p. 8). This creates an enabling environment for economic opportunities including foreign investment and trade.

Partnerships between the indigenous government, civil society and aid workers relate directly to capacity building, since they identify and strengthen indigenous actors and can facilitate the transfer of skills and knowledge. Partnerships also promote coordination amongst development and reconstruction actors, which reduces duplication of efforts and therefore increases efficiency. In addition, coordination may identify and capitalize on synergies amongst activities. For example, one organization may support the construction of a medical facility, another may provide essential equipment and supplies, and yet another may conduct training for medical personnel. These synergies are particularly important when a donor or implementing agency faces constraints on the types of activities that it can support. Partnering with and building the capacity of local actors can also promote sustainability.

3. Sustainability

Although development and reconstruction efforts often have short-term objectives, particularly in the conflict and immediate post-conflict phases, sound development and reconstruction entails creating a foundation for long-term improvements in the quality of life of its beneficiaries.42 Sustainability entails ensuring that a project produces results that can be maintained and managed by indigenous actors. Infrastructure and equipment-related projects often pose the greatest risks for sustainability. Buildings alone do not promote development and reconstruction; this infrastructure requires human

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capital and supplies to actually deliver services and improve the quality of life of beneficiaries. Efforts that fail to adequately incorporate these components cannot provide sustainable development. Maintenance and repair of development and reconstruction projects also plays a critical role in sustainability. Generators require a regular supply of fuel, and roads require appropriate materials and machinery for repairs. Technologically-advanced farm equipment will have a limited benefit to a community that cannot get the spare parts or does not possess the technical skills for repairing the machine. The example of the PRT school construction in Chapter 1 illustrates this point well.

4. Selectivity

At the most basic level, selectivity entails development and reconstruction activities appropriate for a given area. For example, some U.S. efforts to promote farming have been criticized on the grounds that they are implemented in desert-like areas not conducive to growing agricultural products (Kalinovsky, 2009). Ill-suited activities at best do not promote development and at worst can negatively affect the economic opportunities in a given area by diverting resources from where they are needed or by disrupting the local markets and economy. For example, providing non-local subsidized food items could decrease demand for locally-produced food and hurt the local economy.

Activities that reflect the community’s needs and are aligned with their priorities have greater prospects for being supported, developed and maintained (Natsios, 2005). This correlates heavily with the concepts of ownership discussed above. World Bank research indicates that a demand-led approach supports those activities which will most greatly affect recovery, and provides the highest economic return (WB, 2007).

As a second component of selectivity, bilateral assistance must also be consistent with the donor’s broader foreign policy goals and objectives, including the interests of foreign countries or international organizations. At a minimum, development and reconstruction cannot undermine larger foreign policy interests. At best, these efforts may promote broader objectives such as a foreign
policy objective of promoting stability. For example, agricultural activities designed to promote economic opportunities and growth may also focus on crop replacement strategies to reduce the growth of drug crops financing the armed actors.

5. Results and Accountability

A critical aspect of development and reconstruction entails clearly defining the intended outcomes and processes for achieving them. The identified results set the expectations for the program, and effective systems to monitor and evaluate progress enable more accurate assessment of the extent to which the development and reconstruction programs achieve what they set out to accomplish. The most effective results not only examine inputs (e.g., the number of training sessions held) and outputs (e.g., the number of teachers trained), but also outcomes (e.g., the change in test scores of pupils taught by trained teachers). Results that focus on outcomes attempt to measure the extent to which the development and reconstruction activity achieves its ultimate end goal, whereas results limited to inputs and outputs may only measure the means to this end. Effectively defining and measuring outcomes presents greater challenges than the same for inputs and outputs, as outcomes can be affected by a wide variety of factors outside of the development and reconstruction implementers’ control, may be less tangible and more difficult to quantify or adequately access, and may take a long period of time to be realized. Nonetheless, sound development and reconstruction efforts strive to adequately define and measure the desired outcomes.

Intrinsically linked to results, accountability entails communicating effectively the desired results and progress towards achieving them. Accountability rests upon clear and effective communication about not only the program’s outcomes, but also about its processes. A sound development and reconstruction program likely encompasses accountability to a variety of groups – the donors who provide the financial support (including the donor’s public in the case of government foreign assistance), the related community leaders and/or government officials, and – critically – the target beneficiaries
themselves. Cornerstones of accountability include transparency, a lack of corruption and repercussions if things go wrong.

6. Flexibility

Flexibility is particularly critical in insecure environments (Kreimer et al., 1989). Conflict-affected settings are extremely dynamic and development and reconstruction activities must be able to adapt to changing conditions on the ground. Natsios explains that flexibility is important because it “maintains that agencies must be adaptable in order to anticipate possible problems and to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities” (2005, p. 16). To the extent that a development and reconstruction activity cannot adapt to changing conditions on the ground, the activity may at best experience diminished appropriateness and effectiveness and – at worst – may actually undermine the larger stability or development and reconstruction efforts.

For example, a development and reconstruction program may initially bypass local government officials due to a lack of capacity or presence of corruption. Should the situation change and a local leader with strong potential emerge, the development and reconstruction activity should be flexible enough to engage that official. Conversely, if an activity initially entails significant engagement of a local official who is replaced by an incompetent or corrupt official, the program may need to alter the role of the government actor to avoid undermining the development and reconstruction efforts.

7. Assessment and Conflict Management

The final key component of sound development and reconstruction activities is conducting a thorough assessment prior to designing and implementing the program. In this manner, a pre-program assessment ensures that the development and reconstruction activities are tailored for the specific needs and challenges of a given area. Natsios asserts that, “Beginning a program without proper assessments is... a recipe for failure” (2005, p. 12). USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework emphasizes that simply assessing the conflict factors to inform the
design of development and reconstruction programs is not sufficient (USAID, 2005). Effectively assessing and managing conflict also entails careful consideration of how programming may unintentionally exacerbate the conflict.

The cornerstone of effective conflict management is avoiding exacerbating or creating fissures in society and promoting social cohesion. Mary B. Anderson, author of *Do No Harm*, labels these fissures “dividers, tensions and capacities for war” and aspects that promote social cohesion as “connectors and local capacities for peace.” (Anderson, 1999). *Options For Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field Experience* - edited by Anderson - provides specific examples of how various components of program design may exacerbate conflict. For example, providing assistance that targets a particular sub-population may worsen existing intergroup tensions. Similarly, hiring processes for indigenous staff based on “word of mouth” or with specific hiring criteria (e.g., specific language skills) may lead to preferential, single-group hiring. This may affect the conflict directly (e.g., biased programming targeting particular sub-groups) and indirectly (e.g., creating a perception of bias on the part of the aid agency) (Anderson, 2000). Assessment and conflict management should extend beyond an initial assessment to include on-going monitoring given the dynamic nature of conflict.

**INTERACTIONS**

The principles discussed above identify the ideal characteristics of a development and reconstruction activity. In conflict-affected settings, however, the conflict context may hinder the ability to adhere to these principles. This can occur primarily by affecting the program design and security strategy.

For example, if armed actors’ tactics entail specifically targeting foreign actors, the program design may rely on indigenous implementers and the preferred security strategy may be either "blend in" or "rely within," depending on the availability of indigenous human capacity. Similarly, the program design affects and is affected by the security strategy. A security strategy of "wait it out" or "bug out" may
eliminate from consideration certain program designs (e.g., programs with objectives that require ongoing activities such as delivery of primary education), and those same program designs may rule out these security strategies.

The related decisions in program design and security strategy may then affect adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. For example, a “wait it out” security strategy may restrict the selectivity of projects to those that can be conducted intermittently as the security situation permits. In this context, the provision of primary education would not be a feasible objective as the related activities require on-going implementation.

Similarly, a conflict context where nearly all the human capital fled during the conflict may require substantial capacity building. An implementation approach that relies entirely on foreign implementers may not achieve this objective; and a security strategy of “rely within” may have limited sustainability to the extent that the necessary maintenance capabilities do not exist within the community.

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK

As discussed in Chapter 2, this dissertation applies this analytic framework to three case studies: (1) the NSP in Nangarhar, Afghanistan; (2) Tuungane in the Kivus, the DRC; and (3) PRODEP/PRODEPUR in Haiti to understand how the conflict context affects the ability of CDD/R programs to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction. Each case study chapter describes the three components of the analytic framework - the conflict context, the program design, and the security strategy - as well as the interactions among these components and their effects on adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction.

Each case study also examines how the conflict context and the program design affect adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. As such, the case studies include both aspects that directly respond to the conflict context and aspects that do not appear to require modification due to the conflict context. For example, the fact that the conflict context does not preclude an aspect of the
program design that promotes a given principle can support the hypothesis that sound development and reconstruction is feasible across a variety of conflict contexts.

Table 3.2 summarizes the methodology used to code the extent to which the role of each actor contributes to (or detracts from) adherence to each of the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction based on a systematic review of the literature, semi-structured interviews and direct observation during field work.

Since these principles are rarely assessed directly or explicitly, this dissertation relies primarily on proxies. As a result, one must use judgement when coding adherence to the principles. Although the dissertation research has attempted to verify that the implementation of the relevant aspects of the program matched the intention described in program documents, this was not always possible. To help minimize the extent to which the dissertation draws conclusions based on the intended - rather than the actual - implementation, relevant program staff and beneficiaries were asked specifically to identify any divergence between design and implementation to help further capture differences not directly observed or already documented. The author explicitly identifies those instances where data is limited to the intended design, rather than the actual implementation. This coding system takes into consideration the levels of contribution of each actor and any limitations it faces. Adherence is coded on a scale from one to five, with five being the strongest.

**Table 3.2 - Coding Actors' Adherence to Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (5)</td>
<td>Actor’s role significantly contributes to adherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium - High (4)</td>
<td>Actor’s role contributes but faces some limitations to adherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Actor’s role contributes but with significant limitations to adherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low - Medium (2)</td>
<td>Actor’s role does not contribute to or slightly detracts from adherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (1)</td>
<td>Actor’s role significantly detracts from adherence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The individual scores for each actors’ adherence to each of the seven principles can be combined to provide greater insight in three
ways. First, averaging the scores for the three actors for each principle provides an overall score for contribution to that principle. Since it was not possible to make a well-informed weighted average, the most reasonable approach was to use a simple average.\textsuperscript{43} Second, averaging the scores each actor received for the seven independent principles provides an overall score for the actors’ contribution. This calculation also involves a simple average because even though different weighting could be applied to each of these principles, the relatively small anticipated benefits of doing so do not seem to warrant complicating the methodology. Third, the 21 individual scores (a score for each of the three actors for each of the seven principles) will be averaged to achieve an overall numeric code, again without weighting. This overall score provides a general sense of the extent to which the role of the three actors together contribute to the overall principles of sound development and reconstruction, and thus a general indication of the overall adherence to sound development and reconstruction. The overall scores will be coded as shown in Table 3.3. To accommodate for the process of averaging, the codes for these overall scores are ranges.

\textbf{Table 3.3 – Coding Overall Adherence to Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Lower Limit</th>
<th>Upper Limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 2 describes the selection process for the case studies to which this analytic approach will be applied. The research design does not allow a rigorous analysis of the extent to which adhering to the principles of sound development and reconstruction in design and implementation actually results in an increase in outcomes related to the principles. Although an independent impact assessment falls outside of the scope of this dissertation, findings from existing independent

\textsuperscript{43} Other approaches and weighted averages could be used with additional information.
evaluations of the CDD/R programs have been incorporated into appropriate sections to provide empirical evidence on the extent to which sound program designs and implementation result in promoting these principles.
4. NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM – NANGARHAR, AFGHANISTAN

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan has been embroiled in conflict for more than three decades. The Taliban, which gained control over most of Afghanistan in 1996, allowed Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist network to operate out of Afghanistan. After al Qaeda attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, the United States launched a campaign against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The Taliban and other armed opposition groups continue to fight for control over Afghanistan and against the international forces operating in the country, with the greatest insecurity occurring in the predominantly Pashtun areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan.

Figure 4.1 – Map of Afghanistan

SOURCE: United Nations Cartographic Section, 2009
Although not the most violent, Nangarhar Province in Eastern Afghanistan (shown in Figure 4.1) remains an important area in the fight for control over Afghanistan. The predominantly Pashtun province has a history of supporting insurgents and asserting independence from the central government. Nangarhar’s fertile lands and location along the primary transportation route to Pakistan provide economic opportunity; however, its borders with the Federally Administered Tribal Area region of Pakistan and the Spin Ghar Mountains provide refuge to terrorists and insurgents.

In an effort to promote stability throughout Afghanistan, in 2003 the World Bank and the Afghan government created the National Solidarity Program, a CDD/R program that strives to promote governance and to promote social and economic development throughout the country, including in all ten districts of Nangarhar Province.

Given the high level of violence in Afghanistan in general, and in Nangarhar in particular, the NSP represents the “hard” case where we would expect the conflict context to most negatively affect the soundness of community-driven development and reconstruction. This chapter applies the analytic framework described in Chapter 2 to examine the extent to which sound development and reconstruction principles can be upheld in a relatively violent area, as well as how the conflict context affects the adherence to principles of sound development and reconstruction described in the analytic framework.

First, this chapter examines the conflict context - including Nangarhar’s background; its current social, economic and political conflict factors; and its security environment - in order to cull out the key aspects of the conflict context that most significantly affect the ability of the NSP to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction. The second and third sections describe the program design and security strategies with particular attention to how they are affected by the key aspects of the conflict context. The chapter then examines adherence to the principles of sound development and
reconstruction and how the conflict context affects the ability to adhere to principles in Nangarhar, Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{44}

**CONFLICT CONTEXT\textsuperscript{45}**

This section describes the conflict context in Nangarhar, Afghanistan. In addition to providing general descriptive information to understand the environment in which the NSP operates, this section will draw out aspects of the conflict context that most significantly affect the program design and security strategy.

**Background**

Since the late 1970s, Afghanistan has experienced on-going conflict that can be divided into four periods – first the Communists (1978-1992), then the Mujahedin (1992-1996), followed by the Taliban (1996-2001), and continuing with this current phase of conflict that started in 2001. Throughout the various periods of conflict, the Afghan central government consistently failed to control Nangarhar province. Irrespective of changes in official government leadership, at the village level, the significant majority of community-level decisionmaking and dispute resolution occurred through informal governance structures, *shuras* comprised of village elders.\textsuperscript{46}

Pashtuns comprise the majority of the population, and the minority group, Pashtai, resides primarily in the northern part of the province. In the more remote areas of the province, tribes are historically very independent and the central government of Afghanistan has had little legitimacy, effectiveness and reach, partly due to repeated periods of conflict as well as poor transportation and communication.

\textsuperscript{44} The author conducted fieldwork in October 2008, and thus, the information in this section largely describes the situation in 2007-2008.

\textsuperscript{45} This section draws heavily on the work done by Michelle Parker for the Afghanistan sections of Brooke Stearns Lawson et al., *Reconstruction Under Fire: Case Studies and Further Analysis of Civil Requirements*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-870/1-OSD, 2010.

\textsuperscript{46} *Shura*, which means consultation in Arabic, is the term commonly applied to traditional tribal councils that have filled many of the governance roles typically associated with government.
infrastructure. Sharia law often is used in these regions, and tribal systems of governance may hinder the extension of the central government’s reach in this area. Religious leaders – often called mullahs – also play a central role.

Nangarharis have historically supported insurgent leaders, ranging from mujahedín groups fighting the Soviets to Osama Bin Laden. In the mid-1970s, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar formed the mujahedín group Hezb-e-Islami Galbuddin (HIG) to oppose the spread of communism. A HIG splinter group, Hezb-i-Islami Khales (HIK) led by Mawlawi Mohammad Yunis Khali, operated out of Nangarhar. A significant amount of fighting occurred on Nangarhari soil, and HIG – with U.S. backing – launched the first successful missile attack against Soviet helicopters from the Jalalabad airport in 1986.

The ultimate retreat of the communists created a power vacuum in Afghanistan that mujahedín factions fought to fill. In Nangarhar, HIK gained control and Haji Abdul Qadir Arsala, HIK commander in Nangarhar and member of the powerful Arsala family, became governor. HIK’s influence over the eastern region was spread through the Jalalabad shura, which consisted of warlords from various factions including HIK. The Jalalabad shura provided safe haven and operating space for training camps to Osama bin Laden when he flew from Sudan to Jalalabad in May 1996. Three months later, the Taliban emerged as the victor in the struggle for control of Afghanistan. The members of the Jalalabad shura fled to Pakistan; however, bin Laden aligned with the Taliban and assisted it in buying the loyalty of local commanders. The Taliban, operating out of former Soviet bases in Jalalabad, controlled much of eastern Afghanistan. Some – predominantly Pashtun – mujahedín factions united militarily, forming the Northern Alliance, against the common enemy of the Taliban.

After September 11, 2001, the fight for control of Nangarhar escalated, particularly in the Tora Bora section of the Spin Ghar Mountains. HIK leader and former Nangarhar Governor, Haji Qadir, was reinstated as governor of the province. When he became one of Karzai’s Vice Presidents, his brother and HIK co-founder, Haji Din Mohammed, became governor of Nangarhar. The Shinwari tribe, which resides in the
central and eastern districts of Nangarhar,47 attempted to secede from the province as its leaders felt that the Arsala-led48 government in Nangarhar did not serve their interests. The relationship between the Shinwaris and the Afghan government remains tense. In 2004, President Hamid Karzai appointed a warlord from Kandahar, Gul Agha Sherzai, to replace Haji Din Mohammed as governor of Nangarhar.

In summary, the central government has historically lacked legitimacy, effectiveness and reach in Nangarhar, which has had a tradition of tribal governance structures. The effect of these two key aspects of Nangarhar’s background on adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction will be examined later in this chapter.

Current Social, Economic and Political Factors

Just as the background of Nangarhar affects CDD/R, the current conflict factors also influence the ability to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction. This section provides a general overview of the current conflict factors in Afghanistan to provide basic understanding of the province as well as identifies key aspects of the current conflict that most significantly affect the NSP in Nangarhar.

Afghanistan ranks seventh on the Fund for Peace’s 2010 Failed States Index (FfP, 2010) and ranks 181 out of 182 in the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). Afghanistan remained at or below the lowest twentieth percentile rank for each of the World Bank’s Governance Indicators as reported in Governance Matters 2009 (WB, 2009a).

Nangarhar historically has been relatively well-off compared to other provinces. Located in eastern Afghanistan, Nangarhar Province is a regional center for education, health care, commerce and trade. Given its role in the region, Nangarhar consists of a relatively well-educated population. In addition, Nangarhar contains some of the most fertile

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47 This area below the Kabul River consists of Chaparhar, Dih Bala, Rodat, Achin, Nazyan, Shinwar, and Dur Baba districts.
48 The Arsala Kehl family is a historically powerful family in Afghanistan whose members have held key positions in Afghanistan’s political and economic institutions.
land in Afghanistan, as well as marble and gems. Nangarhar also has the means to transport its goods to the international market – one of the primary licit trade routes to Pakistan, Highway 1, runs through Nangarhar’s capital, Jalalabad. Strong cultural, familial and economic ties exist both within Nangarhar and between Nangarhar and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

**Figure 4.2 – Map of Nangarhar**

Source: Adapted from DAI (2006, p. 17)

The strengths of Nangarhar in terms of human capacity and economic potential persist; however, the decades of protracted conflict have taken their toll. The violence has caused the emigration of some educated Nangaharis, interrupted the acquisition of technical skills for those who remained, and damaged the infrastructure.

The efforts to reduce poppy cultivation have also dampened Nangarhar’s economic situation. Historically, Nangarhar has been one of the largest poppy producing areas in Afghanistan, particularly the Shinwari areas. Nangarhari farmers have grown poppy as a profitable crop that is relatively easy to cultivate and store. The central government’s crackdown on poppy has decreased the number of hectares of land devoted to poppy cultivation in Nangarhar from nearly 30,000
hectares in 2004 to less than 20,000 hectares in 2007 (Livingston, Messera and O’Hanlon, 2010). At the same time, the opium poppy crackdown has exacerbated tensions with the Sinwari who feel targeted.

The defeat of the Taliban created a space for a new government in Afghanistan. Initially chosen to lead Afghanistan’s post-2001 political transition, Hamid Karzai became Afghanistan’s first democratically elected president in December 2004. Nangarhar’s Governor Sherzai had previously served as a special assistant to President Karzai and as the governor of Kandahar. Despite concerns that Sherzai is an old-style warlord and criminal, the Sherzai government in Nangarhar is generally perceived as relatively effective and responsive to the needs of the populace. For example, Governor Sherzai’s administration has been relatively successful in improving the province’s basic infrastructure. Although international support for President Karzai himself, as well as other aspects of his administration, has diminished over time, when the NSP was established in 2003, optimism about the future of the Afghan national (and Nangarhar provincial) government persisted. The replacement of a regime that was not a viable partner for the international community with a new government that enjoyed international support created the space for the Afghan government to play a leading role in the NSP.

Therefore, the key social, economic and political factors can be summarized as: (1) relatively strong social cohesion within communities in Nangarhar, (2) relatively good economic opportunities and human capacity in Nangarhar, albeit weakened by decades of conflict, and (3) a new, internationally-supported government at the time the NSP was initiated.

**Security Environment**

Just as the background and social, economic and political conflict factors affect the NSP’s adherence to principles of sound development and reconstruction, the security environment also affects the design and implementation of CDD/R. Most notably, the level and nature of the violence directly affect the feasibility and relative merits of the various security strategies described in Chapter 3.
This section draws both from national-level data for Afghanistan, as well as provincial-level data for Nangarhar to the extent possible. The national-level data give an overall sense of the broader operating environment, and Nangarhar falls in the middle of Afghanistan’s provinces in terms of violence (see Figure 4.3 below).

**Nature of General Insecurity.** As described above, Nangarhar has a long history of conflict to control the province that extends to the present day. The two main armed opposition groups operating in Nangarhar are HIG and the Taliban. In addition criminal networks and illicit poppy cultivation threaten Nangarhar’s stability.

HIG’s base of support has been – and continues to be – in the Jalalabad area (GlobalSecurity.org, 2009). HIG leader Hekmatyar has a history of violent anti-American sentiments and radical Islamic ideology and has been known to support the Taliban and al Qaeda when their interests align with his own interests (GlobalSecurity.org, 2009). HIG rhetoric focuses less on overthrowing the Karzai government – and has included explicit statements that this is not the organization’s aim – and more so on driving “the occupying forces out” of Afghanistan (GlobalSecurity.org, 2009). According to the U.S. military, HIG is responsible for “much of the unrest” in Nangarhar Province (GlobalSecurity.org, 2009).

Although the Taliban has always maintained a presence in the region since 2007, it has shown increased interest in Nangarhar Province. The Taliban operates actively in Nangarhar and maintains command and control centers in the province (Bagram, 2008). In 2007, the Tora Bora Military Front (TBMF), a Taliban group established by HIK co-founder Yunis Khalis’ son Anwarul Haq Mujahid, began publicizing its existence and activities in Nangarhar (ABC, 2007). TBMF, which allegedly includes foreign fighters, maintains headquarters in Jalalabad; however, it operates primarily in Pachir Wa Agam and Khogiani (Gompert et al., 2009). A March 2008 Asia Times report states that the Taliban tasked Ustad Yasir, a well-known Taliban commander, to “open up the front in Nangarhar” (Shahzad, 2008). The same month, The Globe and Mail reported the Taliban had been working since 2007 to increase its power in Nangarhar, with Maulvi Qadir as the Taliban commander in the region.
(Smith, 2008). The Taliban enjoys more favorable public opinion in Nangarhar than elsewhere - although only 20 percent of the Afghan population feels that the Taliban have “changed and become more moderate,” 53 percent of Nangarharis believe so (ABC, 2009).

The Taliban in Nangarhar - as well as throughout Afghanistan - aims to regain control of government. The Taliban enjoys support from other actors such as al Qaeda and Pakistan who have their own political motivations. Taliban tactics include attacking fuel trucks; kidnapping and attacking government officials and community leaders viewed as supportive of the government; and threatening the population with “night letters” warning them not to support the government (Gompert et al., 2009).

In addition, the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Nangarhar has created resentment among the local population due to incidents where civilians are killed. Notably, a U.S. aerial raid has been accused of attacking a double wedding party and killing more than 50 civilians in July 2008. In 2007 when a bomb attack hit a convoy of U.S. Marines, reports indicate that they opened fire on a bazaar and killed 19 people (Leithead, 2008). Such incidents undermine the counterinsurgency effort as they fail to bring the population closer to the government and government-supporters.

In short, both the HIG and the Taliban specifically target international actors seen as “foreign occupiers,” and the Taliban also aims to destroy those it perceives as supporting the Afghan government.

**Level of General Insecurity.** In addition to the nature of the security threats in Nangarhar, the level of the threat must also be understood. This involves understanding the general level of insecurity in Afghanistan as well as where Nangarhar fits within that picture.

Throughout Afghanistan, insurgent attacks have increased over the past three years, as depicted in Figure 4.3 below. In any given month, the number of insurgent attacks in 2009 exceeded those in 2008, and those in 2008 are higher than the number of attacks in 2007. In both 2007 and 2008, the number of security incidents rose each month and peaked in September before declining somewhat. The initial months of
2009 indicate a similar pattern. The relative difficulties presented by winter weather may explain this trend.\footnote{Fighting has traditionally declined in the winter months due to the related weather conditions and the difficult terrain. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 depict these trends.}

\textbf{Figure 4.3 – Number of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan by Month and Type, January 2007-May 2009\footnote{This was the most recent data available as of this writing on the number of security incidents by month and type.}}

The number of incidents carried out by the Taliban or other armed opposition groups in the first 27 weeks (January to mid-July)\footnote{This is the most recent data available as of this writing that breaks down all security incidents by province.} increased from 2007 to 2008 by more than 50 percent (from 3,704 to 5,601); however, Nangarhar experienced only a 20 percent increase (from 244 to 292). Thus, the percentage of armed opposition group attacks occurring in Nangarhar decreased from seven to five percent of all incidents in Afghanistan over this time period (Campbell and Shapiro,
This indicates that Nangarhar continues to experience violence at levels relatively high in the global context, but is not one of the primary areas of increased violence within Afghanistan.

Out of the 34 provinces, Nangarhar had the seventh highest number of incidents carried out by armed opposition groups in the first 27 weeks of 2008 as depicted in Figure 4.4 below (Campbell and Shapiro, 2009). (See Appendix A for a more detailed list of the number of security incidents by province in the first nine months of 2007 and 2008.)

![Figure 4.4 - Number of Incidents by Armed Opposition Groups, 15 “Most Violent” Provinces in Afghanistan, January to Mid-July 2008](source)

Source: Campbell and Shapiro, 2009

When these figures are adjusted for population, however, Nangarhar ranks 18 out of the 34 provinces. In Nangarhar, there was one incident carried out by armed opposition groups per 4,567 people in the first nine months of 2008. The number of armed opposition group incidents per
capital in Nangarhar is lower than both the overall Regional Command East\textsuperscript{52} (one armed opposition group incident per 2,359 people) and the overall Afghan figure (one armed opposition group incident per 4,083 people).\textsuperscript{53}

As depicted in Figure 4.3, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have comprised more than one-third of the security incidents in Afghanistan since January 2007. In the first 22 weeks of 2009, Nangarhar had the fourth highest number of total IEDs. Nangarhar’s percentage change in the total number of IEDs ranked 16\textsuperscript{th} out of the 34 provinces – again highlighting that although insecurity is on the rise in Nangarhar, this province does not represent the greatest increase in violence throughout Afghanistan. Notably, however, Nangarhar’s percentage change in successful IEDs ranked second after only Uruzgan (Livingston, Messera and Shapiro, 2009).

In conclusion, Nangarhar is neither the most violent nor the least violent province in Afghanistan. Although the trend indicates an increase in violence in Nangarhar, this increase falls below other Afghan provinces.

**Security Environment for Development and Reconstruction.** Within this general security environment, development and reconstruction actors may face different levels of risk than the general population.

Information on the attacks against Afghans typically does not specify whether Afghan victims were government officials or linked to a specific government agency, nor do data on attacks against civilians identify those attacks against civilians engaged in development and reconstruction activities. Given the insurgent nature of violence in

\textsuperscript{52} The Regional Command East consists of 14 provinces: Parwan, Wardak, Panjsher, Logar, Kapisa, Khost, Paktya, Ghzani, Paktika, Nangarhar, Laghman, Nuristan, Kunar, and Bamyan.

Nangarhar Province, however, actors perceived as bringing the population closer to the government or otherwise increasing the legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the Afghan government likely face greater risk of attack by the insurgents. Thus, government officials are likely to be high-value targets, as are international aid workers who are perceived as supporting the Afghan government. Similarly, civil society members perceived as loyal to or supportive of the Afghan government or as otherwise challenging the Taliban’s potential to exert control over an area face greater risk of attack. Anecdotal evidence does indicate that Afghan armed actors have targeted civil society members they perceive as deterring from their control over an area. For example, the Taliban killed 13 elders in Kandahar Province between February and May of 2010, including six elders who were members of the NSP and refused to turn over part of the NSP block grant. Given that the attacked elders include both those involved with the NSP and those not involved, it is unclear whether participation in development and reconstruction activities itself increases the risks of attack aside from the desire to steal the block grant funds (Rubin, 2010).

Until the end of the Taliban era, there was a taboo against harming aid workers and attacks were rare in Afghanistan (Donini, 2009). Confrontations between the Taliban and aid workers did occur, however, often about behaviors or beliefs perceived as being in conflict with Islam.54 This created a space where aid workers could operate with neutrality and little risk of harm even in areas of insecurity. This taboo against harming aid workers no longer remains.

Given the difficulty in obtaining publicly available data regarding violence and aid workers by province, the data presented in this section are for Afghanistan as a whole unless otherwise noted. Given the conclusions from the previous section, the overall threat level to

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54 For example, the Taliban closed an Italian hospital in Kabul based on the belief that the European doctors were “consorting” with Afghan women. For more information, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011, p. xiii.
development and reconstruction workers indicated by the national-level data may somewhat overstate the threat in Nangarhar; however, it provides a general sense of the overall nature of violence and the broad trends.

Over the past several years, three important trends have emerged. First, the number of security incidents involving aid workers has risen, but may be on the decline. Second, victims increasingly attribute violence in Afghanistan to armed opposition groups rather than criminal groups. Third, the severity of violence remains high – with 51 percent of the incidents in the third quarter of 2008 classified as “extremely serious” (ANSO, 2008).

The exact number of security incidents varies depending on the source. According to an October 2008 Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, violent actors committed more than 120 separate attacks on humanitarian workers, killing 30 workers and abducting 92 in the first three quarters of 2008 (United Nations General Assembly, 2008). The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) reported 146 security incidents involving NGOs in the first three quarters of 2008, with 28 fatalities – including five internationals – and 72 abductions (ANSO, 2008). In the first three quarters of 2009, ANSO reported a 22 percent decrease in the number of security incidents involving NGOs (from 146 to 114) compared to the same period in 2008 (ANSO, 2009b).

As depicted in Figure 4.5, the total number of security incidents involving NGOs in Afghanistan increased by 29 percent from 2006 to 2007 (from 106 to 137 incidents), and by 26 percent from 2007 to 2008 (up to 173 incidents). From 2008 to 2009, the number of such incidents decreased slightly (six percent) from 173 to 162 incidents.
Figure 4.5 - Total Number of Security Incidents in Afghanistan Directly Involving NGOs Per Month, 2006-2009

Source: The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2009c

As depicted in Table 4.1, although the number of security incidents involving NGOs in the Eastern Region\(^{55}\) remained relatively constant during the first three quarters of 2007, 2008 and 2009, the percentage of security incidents involving NGOs in the Eastern Region dropped from 23 to 16 percent from 2007 to 2008 before rising up to 25 percent in 2009. The table includes the number of incidents in each region followed by the percentage of that year’s security incidents that occurred in that region in parentheses.

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\(^{55}\) The Eastern Region as defined by ANSO consists of Nangarhar, Khost, Paktya, Laghman, Kunar and Nuristan.
Table 4.1 – NGO Incidents per ANSO Region, January to September

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>25 (23%)</td>
<td>23 (16%)</td>
<td>28 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>23 (21%)</td>
<td>38 (25%)</td>
<td>30 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>15 (14%)</td>
<td>20 (14%)</td>
<td>23 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>16 (15%)</td>
<td>21 (14%)</td>
<td>12 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>29 (27%)</td>
<td>45 (31%)</td>
<td>20 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2009b

The share of security incidents involving aid workers in Afghanistan occurring in Nangarhar has remained relatively constant, at approximately 10 percent (seven out of 71 incidents) in the first three quarters of 2008, and eight percent (three out of 31) incidents in the first quarter of 2009 (ANSO, 2009a).

This indicates that the overall trend in the level of violence targeting aid workers in Nangarhar remains relatively consistent with the overall national trends, and is consistent with the slightly lower increase in percentage of the national incidents occurring in Nangarhar.

The second major trend in the security environment for aid workers is that these attacks are increasingly attributed to armed opposition groups rather than to armed criminal groups. The majority of incidents in 2007 were attributed to armed criminal groups, and Figure 4.6 shows that in 2008 more than two-thirds of these incidents were attributed to armed opposition (ANSO, 2008). This trend continues in 2009, with 69 percent of the security incidents attributed to armed opposition groups (ANSO, 2009c).

ANSO finds that the increase in incidents attributed to: (1) armed opposition groups relative to criminal networks reflects the integration of criminal actors into the armed opposition groups structure and (2) “the growing tendency to record incidents as being ‘motivated’ by armed opposition groups even when actual implementation was conducted by known criminals. This form of criminal ‘sub-contracting’ has been a hallmark

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56 Armed opposition groups and armed criminal groups are not necessarily two distinct groups, and there is significant overlap between the two.
of the early stages of district destabilization since 2006” (ANSO, 2009a).

**Figure 4.6 – Full Year NGO Incidents in Afghanistan by Cause, 2006-2009**

Source: The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2009a

These trends give rise to the question of whether armed opposition groups are increasingly targeting aid workers. The rise in general security incidents outpaces the rise in NGO security incidents; thus the general escalation in conflict alone could explain the increased in security incidents involving NGOs. Since 2007, the percentage of the overall security incidents that directly involve NGOs has remained relatively low (generally less than two percent) and appears to be declining as depicted in Figure 4.7.
ANSO questions whether armed actors in Afghanistan employ “active targeting” of aid workers; however, it does consider “the partial erosion of the respect for NGO neutrality that has been evident until now” as a third factor contributing to the insecurity faced by aid workers (ANSO, 2008). ANSO finds that although some of the IED incidents involving NGOs may be due to targeting of vehicles that can be confused as government or the International Security Assistance Force vehicles (e.g., white, high profile or marked cars), other IED attacks did intend to “influence or disrupt NGO activities” (ANSO, 2009b).

The existence of threatening letters (often called “night letters”) addressed to NGO staff members and the killing of aid workers on the NGO compound both indicate that there is some level of targeting of aid workers.\(^{57}\) Antonio Donini, a scholar at the Feinstein International Center, believes that the erosion of the taboo against harming aid workers is largely due to the aid community being “tainted by its association with external political/military agendas” (2009, p. 8).

\(^{57}\) Unfortunately the data does not exist to fully understand whether aid workers are disproportionately targeted for these forms of attack, or whether this level of attack is consistent with general community members.
Third, the severity of violence remains high – with 51 percent of the incidents reported in the third quarter of 2008 classified as “extremely serious” (ANSO, 2008). Although the total number of incidents involving NGOs decreased from 2008 to 2009, less serious incidents generally account for the decline, and the number of “serious incidents” has remained “on par” with 2008 (ANSO, 2009b). Incidents that armed opposition groups engage in can be broken down into eight types as depicted in Figure 4.8. In the first quarter of 2009, abduction was the most common type of incident followed by night letters; however, armed opposition groups increased their use of more serious weapons (e.g., IEDs and missiles) against NGO offices and vehicles (ANSO, 2008). Nangarhar appears consistent with these national-level findings; in the first three quarters of 2009, the most serious NGO incidents in Nangarhar included two IEDs, three fatalities, and one arson (ANSO, 2009b).

Figure 4.8 - Types of Armed Opposition Group Incidents Involving NGOs in Afghanistan, Q.1 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abduction</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms/RPG</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Fatal Assault</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopped at Vehicle Check Point</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Letter</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANSO, 2009a

Small arms fire has caused 90 percent of the NGO fatalities since January 2007. Figure 4.9 shows that these deaths primarily take place on the road (ANSO, 2009a). Thus moving throughout the province presents a real and lethal threat to development actors who travel to visit
projects – a risk only heightened by a recent increase in the rise of IED attacks against NGOs. IED attacks against NGO workers doubled between the first three quarters of 2008 and the first three quarters or 2009 (ANSO, 2009b). Although aid workers face the greatest risk while traveling, they have also been attacked on their compounds.

**Figure 4.9 - Location of NGO Fatalities by Small Arms in Afghanistan, Q.1 2007 – Q.1 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Fatality</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed at Roadside (Out of Vehicle)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Ambush (In Vehicle)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Captivity</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Compound</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANSO, 2009a

In addition to the threat to aid workers examined by ANSO, insecurity may also threaten the actual development projects. Unfortunately, there is not a good source of data on this type of insurgent threat. The activities most likely to be attacked are those perceived to more directly threaten the Taliban’s principles such as diesel generators because they facilitate music and television, or schools. During the first four months of the 2008 school year (March to July), insurgents burned down 62 schools and killed at least 72 students and teachers, and an additional 640 schools closed due to a lack of security (Najibullah, 2008). The 2009 school year showed signs of further deterioration with 651 schools closed in April (McNorton, 2009).

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58 This represents a marked increase over 2007 when a total of 635 schools were closed or burned down throughout the full school year.
Although the significant majority of these closures – 90 percent in 2009 - occur in Kandahar Province, insurgents in Nangarhar also attack schools (McNorton, 2009). For example, on January 1, 2008, insurgents burned down a new school for refugee children in Nangarhar (Daily Times, 2008).

These data lead to three important conclusions. First, Afghanistan overall faces a relatively high level of insecurity compared to other countries where aid workers operate, and Nangarhar Province falls roughly in the middle range of levels of violence for Afghan provinces. The trends in violence in Nangarhar appear consistent with the national trends albeit less of an increase in overall insecurity (as of 2009). Second, the nature of the violence in Afghanistan specifically targets international actors and those perceived as supporting the Afghan government. Nangarhar’s insecurity impedes the movement of development actors to establish, implement, manage and monitor projects. Insurgents may target those development projects perceived as undermining the insurgents’ cause (e.g., schools), but they also attack the workers themselves in Nangarhar. In addition, to the extent that aid workers (or their vehicles) may be confused with government or ISAF forces, they face a greater risk of being targeted by armed opposition groups. Third, travel – particularly by road – poses the greatest security risk to aid workers. Development actors face a real and serious risk whenever they circulate around the country, as well as a slightly lower level of risk when they remain on their compounds.
PROGRAM DESIGN

This section describes the program design of the NSP. In particular, the section identifies how various aspects of the conflict context identified above affect the NSP design including its objectives, implementation and funding. The affects of this program design on the ability of the NSP to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction will be discussed later in this chapter.

Objectives

Given the conflict context described above, the NSP has both governance and socio-economic objectives. As mentioned above, the Afghan central government has not historically maintained control over Nangarhar - or much of the country outside of Kabul - and this lack of central government control over its territory arguably contributed to Afghanistan’s history of instability. Nangarhar certainly has supported insurgents. Given this historical lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the central government, the installation of a new central government in the early 2000s presented an opportunity to address this need.

Established in 2003, the NSP was created as a means of extending the reach of the Afghan government throughout the country through the promotion of social and economic development. The NSP strives to “lay the foundation for the strengthening of community level governance in order to address the lack of social cohesion brought about by almost three decades of conflict and to re-build the trust and confidence of the people of Afghanistan by strengthening the very fabric of society” (MRRD, 2008a). In other words, the NSP aims to develop self-governance mechanisms and instill appreciation for democratic governance among the Afghan population as well as to expand the legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the Afghan government.

In addition to a governance objective, the NSP also strives to address the socio-economic decline throughout Afghanistan due to decades of protracted conflict. A secondary objective of the NSP is to alleviate poverty and promote socio-economic development at the
community level. Towards this end, the NSP supports small-scale projects to improve the quality of life in Afghan communities.

Implementation

Just as the conflict context influences the objectives of the NSP, the context also affects the implementation of CDD/R activities. More specifically, the conflict context affects the roles that various actors – the government, civil society and aid workers - play in implementing the NSP.

First, the historical lack of central government legitimacy, effectiveness and reach created a need and the installation of a new government at the time of the NSP’s installation created an opportunity for the NSP to be run directly through a central government ministry rather than by international aid workers. The Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) oversees the NSP at the overall program level.

Second, the relatively high level of human capacity in Nangarhar (albeit damaged by extended periods of conflict), the tradition of local governance structures, and the relatively strong social cohesion at a local level create a good environment for engaging civil society in development and reconstruction activities at the local level. In addition, the high levels of violence targeting international actors and government officials also make relying on civil society highly desirable from a security standpoint.

Third, the detrimental effects of protracted conflict in Afghanistan as well as a high level of international interest and financial support mean that aid workers – both international and indigenous - engage in development and reconstruction efforts; however, the high level of risk to international actors may somewhat restrict their involvement. To compensate for the weakened human capacity after extended conflict, the NSP relies on Facilitating Partners (FPs) to provide technical assistance and training to the community councils. The nature and level of insecurity in Nangarhar make reliance on local aid workers particularly desirable, and the presence of relatively qualified workers in Nangarhar make it feasible.
The roles of these three types of actors all contribute to the overall implementation of the NSP. The basic concept of the NSP is that democratically-elected community representatives receive technical assistance and block grants to manage small-scale development projects. A cornerstone of the NSP is the Community Development Council, a local governance structure elected by the community (and discussed in greater detail below). The CDC identifies and prioritizes community development activities (projects) that form the basis for a Community Development Plan (CDP). Although some Afghan officials and civil society members have advocated for the CDCs to become official government structures, they remain civil society organizations created and overseen by the MRRD.

The MRRD approves the CDP and releases a block grant to the CDC. The CDC manages the block grant for approved projects and monitors these activities. The projects can be implemented directly by the community, or sub-contracted out to companies when additional technical expertise is needed. Initially the NSP provided a second block grant upon successful completion of the first block grant; however, the revised the NSP only allows for one block grant.

Through a competitive bidding process, the MRRD – with assistance from the World Bank – selected 29 FPs,\textsuperscript{59} which provide training, technical assistance and monitoring throughout the process. The seven

\textsuperscript{59} The FPs are: the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development; ActionAid; Afghanistan Development Association; AfghanAid; Aga Khan Development Network; Afghan Rehabilitation and Education Programme; Afghanistan National Re-construction Co-ordination; Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee; Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere; Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance; Concern Worldwide; Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees; Flag International; Future Generation; German Agro-Action; Ghazni Rural Support Programme; International Rescue Committee; Interco Operation; Mission d’Aide au Developpement des Economies Rurales en Afghanistan; Norwegian Project Office/ Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan; Oxford Committee for Famine Relief; People in Need; Partners for Social Development; Swedish Committee for Afghanistan; Sanayee Development Organization; Solidarites; Aid Humanitaire d’Urgence; United Nations Human Settlement Programme; ZOA Refugee Care for Afghanistan.
FPs operating in Nangarhar Province are the Bangladeshi Rural Advancement Committee, Future Generation, German Agro-Action, International Rescue Committee, Norwegian Project Office/Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan, People in Need, and United Nations Human Settlement Programme.

The NSP operates in all 34 provinces and more than 90 percent of the districts (361 out of 398 districts) (Beath et al., 2010). As of March 20, 2010, more than 22,000 communities\(^\text{60}\) had been mobilized\(^\text{61}\) for the NSP, more than 50,000 projects had been approved, and more than 38,000 projects had been completed (MRRD, 2010b).

**Funding**

As mentioned above, the existence of a relatively new central government with international support at the time when NSP was established created a window of opportunity for the Afghan government to play a central role in the NSP. In this vein, the international community provides funding directly to the Afghan government. The MRRD received funding for the NSP from the World Bank/International Development Association, the Japanese Social Development Fund, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF),\(^\text{62}\) and bilateral funding from Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway.\(^\text{63}\)

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\(^{60}\) The NSP Operations Manual estimates that there are 38,000 villages in Afghanistan, but the total number of eligible NSP communities is less than this amount because NSP requires at least 25 families per community. In these circumstances, small neighboring villages can join together to form a community.

\(^{61}\) The term "mobilized" refers to a community that has begun the NSP process. At a minimum, mobilized communities have been informed of the program details and begun the CDC selection process.

\(^{62}\) ARTF is a multi-donor trust fund for Afghanistan’s Reconstruction which is managed by the World Bank. Participating donors include Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Funding promised does not always equal funding delivered. For example, in fiscal year 2007\textsuperscript{64} NSP had an approved budget of $204 million, and ultimately received $285 million. This additional funding enabled NSP to fund projects from prior years that were delayed due to insufficient donor contributions. In fiscal year 2008, NSP had a $300 million budget; however, the Ministry of Finance approved a $274 million budget. At the mid-point of the fiscal year (October 2008), NSP had only received $100 million.\textsuperscript{65}

Communities receive block grants calculated by multiplying the number of families in the community by $200. With a minimum community size of 25 families, community block grants range from $5,000 to a maximum of $60,000 per community. The average community grant is $33,000 (MRRD, 2010a). As of April 27, 2010, NSP had disbursed more than $700 million in block grants to CDCs (MRRD, 2010b).

**SECURITY STRATEGIES**

The section below describes the security strategy employed to protect the implementation of the NSP overall (the program level) as well as the implementation of the specific community-level projects (the project level). Two key features of the security environment most directly affect the security strategy employed to protect the implementation of the NSP. First, relatively high levels of insecurity persist in Nangarhar Province. Second, insurgents specifically target government officials and internationals perceived as supporting the government.

**Program Level**

Although the Afghan government manages the NSP at the national level, FPs predominantly implement the program at the provincial and local levels. The provincial government officials – particularly MRRD staff members – may also conduct some monitoring and evaluation

\textsuperscript{64} The fiscal year for MRRD is March-February. Fiscal year 2007 refers to March 2007-February 2008.

\textsuperscript{65} Interview with MRRD officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.
activities. Given NSP’s design and the security environment, NSP primarily needs a security strategy to facilitate FPs’ travels to the various communities to establish programs, provide technical assistance and monitor progress, as well as the travel of MRRD officials for program oversight, monitoring and evaluation.

NSP utilizes a combination of security strategies for the FP role in program management. NSP does not mandate a specific security strategy, and thus there is some variation amongst the FPs. FPs do not use “armor up” as a security strategy, signaling a focus on decreasing the probability of being attacked rather than minimizing the impact should they be attacked. MRRD provincial staff did not report using an “armor up” strategy either.66

At the program level, FPs and government officials most commonly use the “blend in” strategy to avoid attracting attention and thus violent attacks. Towards this end, FPs rely almost exclusively on national staff, who are less conspicuous, for activities in the less secure areas of the province. Given Nangarhar’s history as a regional hub for education and relatively rich natural resources, this area has relatively more qualified individuals to serve as national staff; however, given the long period of conflict they may lack some of the necessary technical expertise. Staff members travel in unmarked, discrete vehicles (e.g., not sport utility vehicles). In some cases, FPs rent older, local vehicles. In addition, FPs reported minimizing, hiding and/or separately transporting any program-related paperwork during travel. Similarly, staff may swap out the SIM card in their cell phone to avoid having any phone numbers that would link them to an international actor. This security strategy is used throughout the province.67

Although “blend in” is the primary security strategy for NSP, FPs also use “rely within” and “stand out.” For the former, FP staff and

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66 Interview with MRRD staff, Kabul and Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
67 Interviews with FPs, Kabul and Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
NSP officials reported that for some villages, members of the CDC would travel to Jalalabad or another secure area near their community to pick up and accompany MRRD and FP staff to their communities. In addition, for those areas where a given strategy does not permit the FP to effectively establish, advise or monitor NSP activities directly, the FPs will request that the community itself or a neighboring CDC monitor the activities and report back to the FP. This is another variation of the “rely within” strategy. Given the burden “rely within” places on the local communities and their resources in terms of time and financial expense, this method is not used widely.

In addition, a small number of FPs – most notably UN Habitat – rely on the “stand out” security strategy due to organization policies. They utilize clearly marked vehicles, often painted distinct colors and/or bearing organizational flags. To the extent that NGOs are being targeted or the area is deemed too insecure, activities that require travel are postponed. Given the motivation of some opposition groups to attack foreign actors – notably HIG – this method precludes movement in some of the most violent areas serviced by the NSP. FPs relying on this method report frequent suspension of activities, and it seems that security concerns more seriously impede activities of organizations that utilize “stand out” than those that rely on “blend in” and “rely within” strategies. As such, the “stand out” security strategy is a sub-optimal strategy in Nangarhar with its high level of relatively predictable violence. The FPs’ selection of security strategies appear to be driven more by organizational policies than dictated by the security environment – especially since differing strategies exist in the same province, including in communities with similar levels and natures of conflict.

**Project Level**

The NSP design relies on community members themselves for the implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation of projects. As

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68 Interviews with FPs, Kabul and Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
such, the project-level security strategy by design is “rely within.”

To a certain extent, this project design relies on community ownership to reduce insurgents’ incentives to attack the projects or the community leaders who oversee the projects. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this strategy focuses on reducing the risk of attack by relying on a community’s ability to protect its population and activities.

PRINCIPLES OF SOUND DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

As described above, Nangarhar’s background; current social, economic and political factors; and security environment influence the program design and security strategies of NSP, and particularly the role of key actors, which in turn affect adherence to sound principles of development and reconstruction. The analysis incorporates information from several independent evaluations of the NSP.69

Ownership

As discussed in Chapter 3, sound development and reconstruction should “build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people” (Natsios, 2005, p. 7). The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect promotion of ownership.

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69 The University of York conducted a mid-term evaluation of the NSP in 2006 that consisted of interviews with NSP stakeholders including FP staff and government officials. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit conducted an evaluation in 2008 that included a community power survey, a household survey, an engineering analysis and a document review. A second AREU assessment used qualitative research methods such as semi-structured interviews and focus groups in twelve districts across six provinces, including Surkhrod and Rodat in Nangarhar. Integrity Watch Afghanistan conducted an independent evaluation of NSP in 2007 focusing specifically on accountability. In addition, researchers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the New Economic School in Moscow, and Harvard University are undertaking a randomized impact evaluation of NSP. The baseline data was collected in August and September 2007, and an initial follow-up survey was undertaken in the Spring 2009.
Role of the Government. The NSP is largely an Afghan government program\textsuperscript{70} run through the MRRD, which actively manages and oversees the NSP at both the provincial and national levels. The placement of the NSP within the Afghan government maximizes government engagement and significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of ownership. Beyond simply engaging the government in the program, NSP gives the Afghan government the primary responsibility for the program.

Although the NSP promotes government ownership overall, there are two areas that could be further developed to expand government ownership.\textsuperscript{71} First, at the time of the field research there were no MRRD officials at the district level. Historically, the Afghan government has generally lacked an official presence below the district level. Although the NSP builds government capacity at the national level and the provincial level (as well as governance capacity at the village level\textsuperscript{72}), a disconnect exists at the district level. The companion program, the National Area Based Development Program (NABDP) sponsored by the United Nations Development Program, builds upon the NSP to create district-level development councils called District Development Assemblies (DDAs) as a means of promoting governance at the district level and bridging this gap. The DDAs consist of representatives from the NSP’s CDCs.\textsuperscript{73} Given the scope of the NSP and the creation of the companion program to address the potential gap, these do not limit the government’s contribution to the principle of ownership.

\textsuperscript{70} The World Bank and other international actors played a very large role in establishing NSP; however, their role has decreased over time.

\textsuperscript{71} The NSP appears to significantly contribute to government ownership, and these two areas do not seem to limit those contributions. Rather, these are areas for expansion that would augment the already significant contribution to government ownership.

\textsuperscript{72} The CDCs are not formal government structures; however, they serve many of the governance functions at a local level including delivery of public services and local conflict resolution.

\textsuperscript{73} To facilitate comparison across the three case studies, this dissertation focuses on community-level councils.
Second, the Afghan government beyond the MRRD could capitalize on the community-level governance structures to carry out their activities at the sub-provincial level where they often lack representation. For example, the Ministry of Education could coordinate with the CDC on the location and construction of a new school. The CDC not only can provide input into the Ministry’s needs assessment and planning process, but it also could provide a community-based organization able to assist in designing, implementing, managing and monitoring the Ministry of Education’s desired efforts in remote areas where the Ministry itself is not able to maintain an on-going presence. The NSP FPs reported that the placement of the NSP in just one ministry results in a lack of support and investment by other ministries.\textsuperscript{74} Inter-ministerial tensions may mean that other ministries do not capitalize on these opportunities, and may even actively undermine the work of the NSP (Barakat, 2006). An independent midterm evaluation of the NSP found that these “inter-ministerial arguments over whether the NSP should be building a school, or initiating an agricultural project” has delayed some NSP projects (Barakat, 2006, p. 8). These tensions may restrict or delay the implementation of certain prioritized projects. The evaluation that identified this issue did not indicate, however, that the scale of these disagreements has risen to the level where the overall effectiveness of CDCs has been significantly hampered. As such, this does not appear to limit the government’s contribution to adherence to the principle of sound development and reconstruction.

Typically government agencies do not utilize other agencies’ structures to implement their own activities, and the desire for each ministry to control activities related to its sector is not only understandable, but also can be pragmatic. For example, the Ministry of Education may prefer to determine in which areas new schools are constructed as a means of ensuring that each school can have the necessary teachers. In an environment where the central government aims to extend its reach to rural areas, and formal local-level government

\textsuperscript{74} Interviews with FPs, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.
structures do not exist, however, the lack of other ministries to utilize the CDCs presents a missed opportunity. Given these political realities, some Afghan officials and civil society members support placing NSP in an independent central executive office and formally institutionalize the CDCs.\textsuperscript{75}

**Role of Civil Society.** Just as the Afghan government plays a central role in the management of the NSP at the program level, civil society plays a central role in the project-level implementation of the NSP. Once the FPs have assisted the communities in the process of electing a representative development council, these community members drive the development and reconstruction process. Although the FPs provide technical assistance, the CDC maintains responsibility for the development of projects. The NSP avoids the common challenge of raising expectations by asking community leaders not only to identify their various needs, but also to prioritize them. The CDP is generally created through a system of consensus-building (Nixon, 2008). This process maximizes the community’s sense of ownership because it uses a transparent process designed to represent the views of the community writ large, rather than one particular sub-population. There is little evidence that the FPs’ preferences and technical expertise strongly influence project selection outside of ensuring that communities do not chose activities that are specifically not eligible for the NSP funding. (The current list of ineligible activities for the NSP can be found in Appendix B.\textsuperscript{76})

With the NSP, the implementation of the projects generally relies on the local community. The NSP requires a community contribution of at least 10 percent of the amount of the block grant. The contribution can

\textsuperscript{75} Interagency cooperation is a perennial problem for most governments, including the U.S. government, and it is not clear that another location for the NSP within the Afghan government would avoid similar issues.

\textsuperscript{76} Projects are deemed ineligible to the extent that they do not adhere to the principles of NSP (e.g., promoting community cohesion and stability and fostering sustainable economic development). For example, funds may not be used to purchase weapons. Based on evidence of issues of sustainability, NSP added diesel generators to the “negative” list.
be in the form of labor, money, or in-kind contributions such as materials (MRRD, 2007a). The relatively high level of social cohesion within communities and the historical local governance structures may create a level of trust and appreciation for a communal good that facilitate this type of contribution in Afghanistan. To augment donated or hired labor from within the communities, CDCs hire outside firms to perform the work when the technical requirements of a project exceed community capacity. The direct engagement of the community in undertaking the development activity maximizes the sense of ownership.

The CDC members in Nangarhar do seem to fully embrace their role. During the author’s visit to a site for an alternative livelihood project, a village elder approached her asking questions about the intended activity. He explained that he was the CDC Chair in that area and wanted to ensure that he was aware of the activities that were being undertaken in his community. The centrality of civil society in all aspects of the CDD/R project process significantly contributes to a sense of ownership by civil society.

Role of Aid Workers. To a great extent, international aid organizations support the NSP – the significant majority of FPs are international organizations rather than Afghan NGOs. Although the reliance on international aid organizations does limit the level of local ownership in the NSP, the more limited role played by the aid workers relative to most non-CDD/R development programs mitigates these effects, resulting in some limitations on adherence to the principle of ownership. In addition, many of the international aid organizations engage large numbers of Afghans, with significant efforts made to recruit staff from the local area.

Capacity Building and Partnership

As discussed in Chapter 3, the second principle of sound development and reconstruction entails strengthening the indigenous capabilities to transfer technical knowledge and create appropriate policies and effective institutions. The protracted conflict in Nangarhar weakened human capacity and the historical lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the central government indicate a lack of
capacity within the central government. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect promotion of capacity building and partnership.

**Role of the Government.** In implementing the NSP, the Afghan government partners with various international organizations and national governments who finance the program. In particular, the World Bank and the Afghan government coordinate closely. In addition, the government partners with various FPs for program implementation. Although international development and reconstruction often includes these types of partnerships, typically an international actor maintains decisionmaking authority. Within the NSP, decisions are predominantly made by the Afghan government with guidance from the World Bank and other partners. The historical lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the central Afghan government and related implications for instability in Afghanistan highlight the need for building the capacity of the Afghan government, and the installation of a new, internationally-supported government at the time of the NSP’s inception provided the opportunity to do so.

The centrality of the Afghan government in overall management of the NSP also necessitates at least some level of capacity building. The international community provides technical advisors to work directly with the Afghan government officials to establish effective policies and processes for running the program. This partnership between technical experts and Afghan government officials builds the capacity of the Afghan government to effectively manage the NSP, and develops skills and expertise applicable to general government activities as well.

The initial follow-up survey of a randomized control trial\(^77\) found that the NSP increases connections between villages and government and non-government institutions, “causes a small increase in visits to villages by officials of the central government and by representatives of the Afghan National Police or Army,” and “improves villagers’

\(^{77}\) For more information on the initial follow-up survey of the randomized control trial, see the section on assessments and results.
perceptions of a wide range of government figures” (Bearth et al., 2010, p. v and 43). Perhaps due to the significant role that the central government plays in the NSP, the randomized impact evaluation found that “NSP increases the number of male villagers who take a benevolent view of the actions of the president of Afghanistan, provincial governors, district administrators, members of the parliament, central government officials, government judges, NGO workers, and even western soldiers” (Bearth et al., 2010, pg 44). On the other hand, the NSP did not translate into an improvement in “male villagers’ perceptions of the quality of local governance or the performance of the village leadership” (Bearth et al., 2010, p. v).

These findings indicate that the NSP significantly contributes to building the capacity of the central government; however, it may have some limitations at the local level. This limitation likely results from the reliance on civil society organizations for project management at the local level, and represents somewhat of a trade-off between building the capacity of civil society and building the capacity of local-level government structures.

**Role of Civil Society.** The NSP builds both the governance and technical skills of civil society, significantly contributing to capacity building and partnership. The NSP emphasizes improving local governance capacity, primarily through the CDCs. The FPs mobilize the communities to hold elections. After the election of the CDCs, the members learn how to identify, manage and monitor development projects with technical assistance from the FPs. The initial follow-up of a randomized control trial impact evaluation found that “NSP stimulates participation in local governance by increasing both the frequency of and attendance at meetings of the village assembly” (Bearth et al., 2010, p. v and vi).

During meetings with several CDCs in Nangarhar in 2008, each emphasized that their role extends beyond overseeing the block grant. The most cited function of the CDC was in resolving conflicts within the

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78 This is further discussed in Chapter 2.
This is consistent with the findings from an independent assessment by the Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit (AREU); however, AREU also concluded that "these governance functions [of the CDCs] are not universal, and where they occur they are often carried out in combination with customary structures and individuals, forming a hybrid form of authority" (Nixon, 2006, p. 8). The initial follow-up survey of the NSP impact evaluation found that the CDCs do assume some village decision making authority and evidence of "a marginal transfer of functions from tribal elders to the village council," (Bearth et al., 2010, pg 21). More specifically, the evaluation found that "NSP affects the authority responsible for mediating disputes among villagers, with the village council taking on an increased role and tribal elders experiencing a reduction in the frequency they perform this role" (Bearth et al., 2010, pg 31). The extent to which this translates into governance capacity building depends upon the extent to which the CDCs better perform these governance functions. Given the emphasis on inclusion of marginalized groups and transparency, shifting governance functions to the CDCs may translate into increased governance capacity at the local level.

This survey also found strong positive impacts of the NSP on the volume of activities by customary leaders and councils as well as the responsibility for mediation of village disputes, of provision of emergency assistance, for certification of documents and for guidance of moral conduct (Bearth et al., 2010, pg 22). It further found increased identification of members or heads of councils as decision makers and reductions in the “probability of tribal elders, village headmen, or members of the clergy being identified” (Bearth et al., 2010, pg 26). In other words, respondents identified community members other than tribal or religious leaders as decisionmakers. The evaluation did, however, indicate that the “NSP alters village decision-making structures primarily by displacing peripheral members of the village communities.79

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79 Interviews with Community Development Councils, Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
leadership, rather than changing the personalities that form the core of the village leadership" (Bearth et al., 2010, pg 28).

The general principle of representative government seems to have taken hold. When CDC members were asked how they would feel about a somewhat competing entity (the Independent Directorate for Local Governance) carrying out local governance activities in their community, the CDC members responded that if elections were used to select the council members, there would be no issue and they would support the process; however, if another selection process were used (e.g., appointment through patronage networks), it would go against the community’s principles. One CDC member said that if the CDC members had done a good job, they would be elected to this new Independent Directorate for Local Governance structure as well. 80 The initial follow-up survey supported this anecdotal evidence and found that the NSP does “increase acceptance of elections as a means to select village headmen” (Bearth, 2010, p. vi). One FP reported that several of its field staff are now Members of Parliament, and two of the CDC chairs became part of the formal district government. 81 This indicates that the governance skills developed through the NSP can translate into formal government.

The second type of capacity building at the civil society level is technical. For the most part, the NSP utilizes Afghans for project implementation, with technical assistance provided by external actors. Community members receive training in topics such as proposal preparation, procurement, financial management, record keeping, project design, budgeting, project management, and accountability (MRRD, 2007b). The general monitoring and evaluation conducted by the FPs and the MRRD did not find any significant weaknesses in this area of capacity building. 82 The independent mid-term evaluation found “significant

80 Interviews with CDC members, Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
81 Interview with FP, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.
82 Interview with MRRD officials and FPs, Kabul and Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
gains to the Afghan people in relation to institution-building (limited democracy), capacity development (mainly in skills development), and social solidarity at the national and community levels (and to a lesser degree at the provincial and district levels)” (Barakat, 2006 p. 18).

**Role of Aid Workers.** The capacity building component of the NSP relies heavily on technical assistance from FPs. FPs mobilize the community to form CDCs and assist in the creation of the CDP. They also conduct a series of trainings related to project implementation, and provide ongoing technical assistance during the project implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

The security strategies of “blend in” and “rely within” often mean that local FP staff provide the bulk of the technical assistance to communities, and thus the strength of capacity building depends on the caliber of the local staff. Although the decades of conflict have reduced technical expertise in Nangarhar, the relatively well-educated population of Nangarhar somewhat mitigates the negative impact of relying on local expertise. The FPs have all been able to hire and retain local engineers. Thus, the technical expertise is relatively high for Afghanistan and other conflict-affected areas, but still below the expertise of the international community.

FP engineers and social organizers review project designs and implementation to ensure technical soundness. The mid-term evaluation found that the NSP engineering projects included good technical assistance for project design; however, there has been insufficient monitoring of implementation to ensure that these designs are effectively implemented (Barakat, 2006). In other words, communities may implement projects that are technically sub-standard.

The “stand out” security strategy ensures that indigenous capabilities do not restrict technical expertise; however, the FPs using this strategy may need to cancel technical assistance visits more frequently. Thus, there appears to be some level of a trade-off between the quality of technical assistance, and thus the level of capacity building, and the feasibility of being able to actually deliver it in insecure areas. This trade-off exists in Nangarhar and somewhat limits the contribution of the aid workers to capacity building, but the
discrepancy between the technical expertise of the international and national staff members is not as pronounced as in other areas.

**Sustainability**

The third principle of sound development and reconstruction emphasizes the importance of promoting activities that can be maintained - or more critically not implementing activities that cannot be maintained (e.g., building schools in areas without teachers). The following section describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers adhere to the principle of sustainability.

**Role of the Government.** The NSP is designed to set up systems that will facilitate on-going development activities. The NSP’s approach to sustainability is to develop the capacity of Afghans, starting with the central management in Kabul. Being run through an Afghan ministry contributes to the sustainability of the NSP because it affords Afghan government officials the opportunity to become proficient in managing the program, provides a sense of ownership, and develops the institutions, systems and processes to continue the management of the program.

Although the NSP efforts focus on building the capacity within the MRRD, the placement of the NSP within this one functional ministry may somewhat limit overall sustainability of the NSP to the extent that other Ministries will not or can not fully capitalize on these local governance structures to carry out their related functions. As mentioned above, other functional ministries may preclude the NSP from carrying out activities related to their particular portfolio in a larger way over the long term. For example, the Ministry of Education may preclude the NSP CDCs from undertaking education-related activities since the CDCs do not directly report to the Ministry of Education. Should multiple ministries place these constraints, CDCs may face some limitations in responding to the community needs, but the MRRD can mitigate these potential negative affects by continuing to build relationships with the other ministries. Thus, the role of the
government contributes to the principle of sustainability with some limitations.83

Role of Civil Society. The creation of community-level councils provides a platform for a variety of development and reconstruction activities not only in the short and medium term, but also in the long term. The active engagement of civil society and the related capacity building efforts also develop the necessary skills and establish clear institutions and processes for sustainable programming.

CDCs are also identifying means of securing other funding for projects. For example, some CDCs are collecting contributions from community members to support projects not financed through the NSP block grant (Barakat, 2006). The MRRD conducted a survey to identify the extent to which CDCs are pooling community funds for additional projects. Eight FPs responded and indicated that $8 million had been raised in this manner.84 In some cases, CDCs have reported successfully securing funding for other projects on the Community Development Plan from donors such as the Japanese government.85 The long-term sustainability of NSP depends, however, on continued support for the CDCs and their ability to integrate into the formal Afghan government structure and institutions. Although in the near term external actors may need to provide support, ideally the financing of the CDC activities would transition to the Afghan government and the communities themselves. The dependence upon the CDCs of external support somewhat limits sustainability.

For example, little evidence exists of holding additional CDC elections after an initial CDC has been established (Nixon, 2008). Follow-on elections are an implied component of the NSP; however, there are not clear mechanisms for holding additional rounds of elections. Only one FP reported that communities had successfully held a second

83 Potential solutions to this challenge (e.g., integrating the CDCs into the formal government structure as official local government bodies) are under consideration but have not yet been implemented.
84 Interview with MRRD officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.
85 Interview with MRRD officials and FPs, Kabul and Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
round of elections. This occurred because the community initially elected ineffective CDC members due to skepticism of the potential of the NSP. Upon seeing the positive impacts of the NSP in neighboring villages, the community held a second election to select leaders they felt would be more active and effective in managing and implementing projects.\textsuperscript{86} Given resource constraints and the priority of spreading the NSP throughout Afghanistan, however, communities will likely not receive additional financial support after the initial elections and block grants. The long-term sustainability of the program will depend upon providing additional grants or other financial support to communities so that the CDCs continue to have resources to carry out their functions.

In terms of the sustainability of individual projects, an independent mid-term evaluation of the NSP found that “in general, there was also a good understanding of the need for an operations and maintenance plan; however, there were mixed responses on how this should be done” (Barakat, 2006, p. 14). For example, communities did not always identify and train a particular individual responsible for maintenance, nor was a contingency plan for maintenance should the trained “mechanic” not be available. In addition, the MRRD has identified projects that have had technical quality or sustainability issues (e.g., solar panels and diesel generators) and restricted or limited these types of projects.\textsuperscript{87} An evaluation of the NSP engineering projects found that there was a wide range of project standards (Barakat, 2006), and low quality projects may not last long or place too great a maintenance burden to be sustainable. Thus, the role of civil society in the NSP faces some limitations in terms of both program and project sustainability.

**Role of Aid Workers.** The FPs work with the CDCs to ensure that projects that are selected can be maintained by the community itself. FPs repeatedly report that insecurity delays implementation of the NSP

\textsuperscript{86} Interview with FP, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.  
\textsuperscript{87} Interviews with MRRD and FP staff, Kabul and Jalalabad, Afghanistan, October 2008.
activities to the extent that their movements are impeded.\textsuperscript{88} The delays seem to be greater with “stand out” than with “blend in” or “rely within;” however, if the insecurity rises to a level where the communities themselves postpone the implementation of project activities, the type of program management security strategy becomes less of a factor in the delay. Security-related delays can seriously hinder development efforts. For example, if construction of a canal is interrupted due to violence, inappropriately directed water may break down the canal walls. When violence stops, the community may not have adequate resources to complete the construction which has been further complicated due to the need to stop mid-project.

Although these challenges certainly hinder development and reconstruction and limit sustainability, this seems to be a common challenge faced by all development endeavors in violent areas – including those undertaken by military actors who typically sub-contract to private enterprises or local actors for project implementation as well.\textsuperscript{89} Unlike other approaches to development and reconstruction, these only somewhat limit the role of aid workers to the principle of sustainability because much of the project activities can be undertaken by civil society without on-going aid worker involvement. There may be a tradeoff between the ability to provide technical assistance, and thus sustainability of projects, in insecure areas (by utilizing the “blend in” strategy with local aid workers) and the strength of sustainability-related technical assistance (using the highest level of technical expertise with the “stand out” strategy). As mentioned above, the relatively high level of technical capacity within Nangarhar, as well as an understanding of local factors that may influence sustainability can minimize this trade-off in the Nangarhar context.

\textsuperscript{88} Interviews with FPs, Kabul and Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
\textsuperscript{89} Interviews with FPs, Kabul and Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
Selectivity

The principle of selectivity described by former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios consists of the allocation of resources based on two things: (1) local needs and commitments and (2) foreign policy interests. The section below describes how the roles of the indigenous government, civil society, and aid workers affect the ability of the NSP to adhere to this principle.

Role of the Government. The NSP’s structure largely allows for a range of projects that reflect the community’s perceived needs. The Afghan government plays a limited role in determining which projects are selected; however, the MRRD creates a list of activities not eligible for funding based on the principles of development and reconstruction as well as the more specific program objectives (e.g., purchase of weapons). The MRRD updates this list annually to incorporate “lessons learned.” For example, FPs’ experiences with diesel water pumps for irrigation indicated that this is not a sustainable project. (See Appendix B for the 2008 NSP list of ineligible projects.) By largely leaving project selection to the local communities but providing some general guidance and oversight of those decisions, the MRRD significantly contributes to the principle of selectivity.

The second aspect of selectivity relates to the promotion of foreign policy interests. The World Bank and its international donors strive to promote the legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the Afghan government. The central role of the Afghan government in managing the NSP clearly contributes towards the donors’ strategic interests in Afghanistan. Independent evaluations found that both the people of Afghanistan and the international community now recognize the NSP “as the central policy instrument for Afghan state building and development” (Barakat, 2006, p. 2), and that it can strengthen the legitimacy and acceptance of the government (Nixon, 2008 and Bearth et al., 2010). Household surveys implemented in communities with the NSP and control villages that were not yet mobilized by the NSP found that, “NSP communities are therefore less reactive and more proactive, and have a significantly more favourable opinion of the government. This is underpinned by optimism for the future that non-NSP communities do not
share” (Barakat, 2006, p. 11). During CDC meetings, members consistently expressed expectations of the government. Rather than exclusively discussing their need for foreign donors or international development actors, the members of the CDC repeatedly expressed that they needed the Afghan government to continue to support their activities.90 This indicates that communities in places in Nangarhar where the Afghan government has historically lacked legitimacy, effectiveness and reach now have expectations of their government to assist them and promote the provision of public services. This differs from many contexts where international actors are viewed as the only potential resource for improving the quality of life. The impact evaluation echoed these findings and reported improved perceptions of a wide range of government officials as well as western soldiers.

This improved public perception of the government rests upon efficient implementation of the NSP and other government programs, however. The NSP has experienced delays in receiving funding and disbursing block grants – particularly during the large scale-up efforts in 2005.91 Issues within the international donor community and the Afghan government both contributed to these delays. These delays did not seem to negatively affect communities’ perceptions of the Afghan government in the villages visited in 2008, though affected villages would fall outside of the scope of the impact evaluation which did not include communities mobilized before 2007. It is important to recognize, however, that these types of delay risk reducing confidence in the government to the extent that they are perceived as a sign that the government is not effectively implementing the program.

**Role of Civil Society.** The project decisionmaking authority rests with civil society itself, thus the selection of projects necessarily reflects local needs and interests as they perceive them. The NSP has primarily supported infrastructure projects – particularly related to

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90 Interviews with Community Development Councils, Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
91 Interviews with MRRD and FP staff, Kabul and Jalalabad, Afghanistan, October 2008.
transportation (e.g., roads), water and sanitation, and irrigation (e.g., canals). As depicted in Figure 4.10, approximately one quarter of the approved NSP projects through 2009 were in the transport sector (e.g., road work), approximately one quarter have been in the water supply and sanitation sector (e.g., digging boreholes), and 18 percent have been irrigation-related projects (e.g., canal construction).

Figure 4.10 – NSP Projects By Sector

Source: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2009

Allowing communities to identify their own needs, however, presents a risk of “elite capture” where dominant members of the community serve their own interests at the sake of the overall community interests. The inclusion requirements of the NSP – which ensure that women and other underrepresented sub-groups are included in the community development councils – mitigate against this risk. In addition, election procedures (e.g., organizing communities into different sub-groups who each elect a representative) help promote more inclusive representation. Thus, it does not appear that the risk of elite capture limits adherence to the principle of selectivity within the NSP in Nangarhar. On the other hand, members of the CDCs consistently reported that the funding amounts
for projects precluded some of the activities they prioritized. This somewhat limits the role of civil society plays in contributing to selectivity.

The foreign policy interests do not drive the project selection; however, the central role of civil society in the NSP does promote the foreign policy objective of strengthening the legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government. As discussed in the above section on the role of government, the NSP promotes the legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government. The fact that civil society engages heavily in a program commonly viewed as a success of the Afghan government helps to increase this perception down at the community level across the country.

Role of Aid Workers. The aid workers play a supporting role in terms of project selection. They inform CDCs of ineligible projects and CDCs themselves decide which projects to implement. The NSP process does not include an explicit mechanism for the aid workers to influence project selection although individual aid workers may influence project selection through their interactions with CDC members. This limited opportunity to provide expertise on project selection may mean that projects the development and reconstruction experts perceive as a top priority for a given community may not be selected and implemented, and they may not benefit from international expertise. Although CDCs can ensure the appropriateness of selected projects for their communities, they may not have the development expertise or experience to select the projects that will have the greatest impact on the community’s development. For example, a CDC may identify electricity as the community’s highest priority and thus propose a generator; however, international development experts may have evidence that solar generators more effectively deliver reliable and sustainable energy. This may present a tradeoff between the principles of ownership and selectivity. Although the minimal contribution of aid workers to project selection limits adherence to the principle of selectivity, it

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92 Interviews with Community Development Councils, Nangarhar, Afghanistan, October 2008.
does not significantly limit adherence given the relatively high level of civil society capacity in Nangarhar.

**Results and Accountability**

The fifth principle of sound development and reconstruction consists of identifying, measuring and reporting on clear indicators of success. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect the ability of the NSP to adhere to principle of results and accountability.

**Role of the Government.** At the program level, MRRD monitoring and evaluation seems to focus on outputs rather than outcomes. The MRRD collects weekly reports from the FPs on a series of quantitative output indicators (e.g., the number of communities mobilized, then number of communities served, the number of projects implemented). In addition, the MRRD requests specific information from FPs as needed. For example, the MRRD queried FPs to identify the extent to which communities successfully secured external funding for additional projects on the Community Development Plan. One area that the Integrity Watch Afghanistan evaluation found for strengthening the accountability of the NSP was to evaluate FPs on more than just output indicators (Torabi, 2007). This focus on outputs rather than outcomes does not enable full understanding and appreciation of the impacts of the NSP; however, the MRRD compensates for this potential weakness by supporting impact evaluations that rigorously examine outcomes.

The MRRD commissioned a mid-term evaluation conducted by The University of York in 2006. The mid-term evaluation consisted of a review of the literature, interviews with NSP stakeholders including FP staff and government officials, and surveys of representatives of 162 households (Barakat, 2006). Overall, the mid-term evaluation found

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93 Outputs are the tangible deliverables of a given project (e.g., number of teachers trained) whereas outcomes are the desired achievements of the program (e.g., percentage of children attending school). Although individual projects may focus on specific outputs, the broader value of these outputs lies in the ability to influence the desired outcomes of the program.
"significant gains to the Afghan people in relation to institution-building (limited democracy), capacity development (mainly in skills development), and social solidarity at the national and community levels (and to a lesser degree at the provincial and district levels). Impressive benefits have also been derived economically..." (Barakat, 2006 p. 18).

The MRRD, along with the World Bank and the Food and Agricultural Organization, also provided assistance for a randomized control trial conducted by researchers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the New Economic School in Moscow, and Harvard University. The baseline data was collected in August and September 2007, and an initial follow-up survey was undertaken in the Spring 2009. The evaluation consists of focus groups and surveys administered to more than 15,000 individuals in 500 sample households in ten districts in six different provinces, including Hisarak and Sherzad districts in Nangarhar. Overall, the initial impact evaluation found that "NSP induces changes in village governance," and "improves villagers’ perceptions of a wide range of government figures" (Beath et al., 2010, p. v). Given the relatively early stage of project implementation, the first follow-up impact evaluation did not find evidence of improvement in the villagers’ access to services and perceptions of well-being (Bearth et al., 2010). The various sections on the principles of sound development and reconstruction include more detailed findings from these MRRD-sponsored evaluations, as well as several independent evaluations.94

94 There have been several independent evaluations of the National Solidarity Program including two DFID-funded evaluations conducted by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit in 2005 and 2008 and an Integrity Watch Afghanistan evaluation focusing on accountability in 2007 commissioned by Tiri, an international NGO, with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Open Society Institute. The first AREU assessment used qualitative research methods such as semi-structured interviews and focus groups in twelve districts across six provinces, including Surkhrod and Rodat in Nangarhar. The second AREU evaluation included a community power survey, a household survey, an engineering analysis and a document review.
In terms of accountability by disseminating the results of government monitoring and evaluation, the MRRD maintains a website that provides publicly available information on the status of the program. The website includes weekly reports and cumulative information on the areas served, number of CDCs formed, and number of projects implemented. This promotes the overall accountability of the program to Afghan civil society members, donors, and members of the broader international community. The Integrity Watch Afghanistan evaluation found that the experience of managing the NSP developed the MRRD into a government leader in establishing processes for accountability (Torabi, 2007). Through these efforts, the government significantly contributes to the principle of results and accountability.

Role of Civil Society. The CDC reports on its activities — including project selection and status — directly to the community members. The CDC maintains responsibility for monitoring the individual projects and reporting out on their activities, as well as the status of the various projects. This promotes the accountability of the CDC to the population itself and significantly contributes to the principle of results and accountability. For example, CDCs will hold community meetings where they discuss with the population where they stand in terms of the community development plan. This provides an opportunity for community members to ask questions and express their opinions as well as to hold the CDC accountable. The Integrity Watch Afghanistan evaluation found that the public nature of the NSP increased accountability (Torabi, 2007). In addition, CDCs report to the FPs on the status of their activities, and the FPs then aggregate this information for reporting to the MRRD. These mechanisms — where civil society reports to the community, as well as reporting up through FPs to the MRRD — significantly contribute to the principle of results and accountability.

Role of Aid Workers. At the program level, FPs report weekly to the MRRD on a series of indicators; however, these typically consist of input or output indicators and fall short of reporting on the actual desired outcomes of the NSP. At the project level, FPs oversee the CDC evaluation of individual projects, and play a critical role in ensuring
the accuracy of reporting and the quality of activities. Similar to the discussion of capacity building, the roles of the international and national staff members vary under the different security strategies. The “stand out” strategy may result in less frequent evaluations, and the reliance of national staff on evaluating projects under the “blend in” and “rely within” strategies may also mean that the quality of evaluation is not as high as it would be if international staff could undertake the evaluation – due to more limited experience in project evaluation, somewhat lesser technical expertise, and potentially biases. On the other hand, the local staff members may also be more aware of local requirements and factors that make them better suited for evaluating the technical soundness of projects. Although the aid workers clearly face some limitations in terms of adhering to the principle of results and accountability (both in terms of not including outcome indicators and in the frequency/expertise in evaluations, these do not appear to be significant limitations.

**Flexibility**

The principle of flexibility relates to the ability to adapt to a changing operating environment. The ways in which the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect the ability of the NSP to adhere to the principle of flexibility are examined below.

**Role of the Government.** The Afghan government – like many bureaucracies – does not adapt particularly quickly to changing conditions on the ground. As such, the component of NSP managed by the Afghan government – the program design – faces significant limitations in terms of flexibility. Within the structure of the NSP, the relative inflexibility of the Afghan government does not appear to negatively affect the overall programming significantly however. The overall program management does not need to be adapted particularly quickly as the NSP itself relies on the “how” as much as the “what.” The Afghan government has proven flexible enough to respond to program-level changes as needed. For example, the Afghan government periodically updates the list of ineligible projects.
Role of Civil Society. Civil society plays the central role in selecting and implementing the NSP development and reconstruction projects. As civil society is “on the ground,” the decisionmaking rests close to the activities themselves. In addition, the project selection occurs during the program itself rather than prior to the start of the program. As a result, the decisionmaking occurs closer to the actual project implementation. This allows for a relatively high level of flexibility to adapt to changing conditions on the ground, without limitations beyond those created by the overall program design as described in the discussion on the role of government and flexibility.

Role of Aid Workers. Within the NSP, aid workers provide technical assistance to civil society. As these actors maintain a presence on the ground, they can respond relatively quickly to changing conditions and to issues that arise throughout the NSP process. The relatively quick manner in which aid workers can provide technical assistance increases flexibility within the NSP. In addition, the FPs collect “real time” information about what is and is not working with NSP (e.g., projects for the ineligible list and mechanisms to promote female participation in NSP). This insight enables the NSP policies and procedures to adapt over time.

Assessment and Conflict Management

The final principle of sound development and reconstruction is assessment and conflict management. This involves conducting a thorough pre-program assessment to understand the needs and challenges of a given area. In conflict-affected settings, in particular, assessments must take into consideration conflict factors, and how activities could unintentionally exacerbate conflict. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect the ability of the NSP to adhere to the principle of flexibility.

Role of the Government. The role of the Afghan government did not include program-level assessment, project-level assessment or conflict management prior to the start of the NSP. The Afghan government itself does not appear to make program-level decisions (e.g., selection of communities to be mobilized) based explicitly on a needs assessment,
conflict management or a formal conflict assessment, which does not contribute to the principle of assessment and conflict management. The Afghan government maintains a “negative list” of ineligible projects, however. The Afghan government updates this list based on on-going assessment of the appropriateness of particular projects. The existence of the “negative list” means that the government does not significantly detract from the principle of assessment and conflict management.

Role of Civil Society. Related to selectivity, the community conducts its own needs assessment to determine the projects it will implement. This involves the creation of a CDP where CDC members seek input from the community on the priorities it should include. In addition, once the CDC establishes the plan, it presents the CDP to the community members. The inclusive and transparent process used to create the CDP facilitates the selection of projects that meet the community’s needs. In addition, the inclusion requirements and project restrictions discussed above help to ensure that the selected projects will not further promote sub-group tensions. Although these aspects of the civil society role do contribute to assessment and conflict management, the lack of more rigorous consideration of how selected projects may – intentionally or unintentionally – exacerbate “dividers” or conversely could support “connectors” means that the role of civil society faces some limitations in adherence to this principle.

Role of Aid Workers. Similar to the role of the Afghan government, aid workers did not conduct an explicit conflict assessment prior to program commencement, thus not contributing to adherence to the principle of assessment and conflict management. The on-going activities of the FPs, however, does include informally assessing the conflict context, which means that the aid worker role does not significantly detract from this principle. For example, the list of ineligible projects draws from the experiences of the FPs reported to the MRRD headquarters in Kabul.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The discussion of the conflict context above identified seven key factors that most significantly affect the program design and security
strategy: (1) historical lack of central government legitimacy, effectiveness and reach; (2) history of traditional governance structures; (3) relatively strong social cohesion within communities in Nangarhar; (4) relatively good economic opportunities and human capacity in Nangarhar, albeit weakened by decades of conflict; (5) a new, internationally-supported government at the time NSP was initiated respectively; (6) a high level of risk, particularly related to road travel; and (7) "predictable" violence targeting government officials and international actors.

These seven key factors of the conflict context in turn affect the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers. The historical lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the central government creates a need for the Afghan government to play a central role in the implementation of the NSP, and the installation of a new, internationally-supported government at the inception of the NSP created the opportunity to do so. As such, the Nangarhar conflict context led to the Afghan government playing a central role in the program management of the NSP.

The security environment with high levels of violence targeting international actors and government officials created a need for strong involvement by civil society, and the history of local-level traditional governance structures and relatively strong human capacity – albeit weakened by the conflict – make strong civil society involvement feasible. As a result, the Nangarhar conflict context allows for civil society to play a central role in project implementation within the NSP.

The weakening of human capacity and the historical lack of Afghan government legitimacy, effectiveness and reach created a need for aid workers to support the NSP. On the security side, the predictability of the violence and clear targeting of government officials and international actors perceived as promoting a counterinsurgency agenda means that aid workers can develop clear strategies for minimizing their risk of being targeted by armed actors. To a great extent, the NSP FPs operating in Nangarhar used local – rather than international – aid workers. Within the Nangarhar conflict context, aid workers – and predominantly local aid workers - largely play a supporting role in the
NSP by providing technical assistance and supporting monitoring and evaluation. The roles of these three actors in turn affect the ability of the NSP to adhere to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction as described below. Table 4.2 provides a summary of this discussion.

Ownership

The Nangarhar conflict context creates both a need and an opportunity for extremely high levels of Afghan involvement in the NSP from the key program management role played by the Afghan government down to the central role of civil society at the project level, and the supporting role played by aid workers – and particularly international ones. Afghans run every aspect of the program from the central management in Kabul to the implementation and management of community development projects throughout the country. The roles of the government and civil society both significantly contribute to adherence to the principle of ownership and are coded as high. Although the role of aid workers also contributes to adherence to the principle of ownership, it faces some limitations given its reliance on international aid organizations, and it is thus coded as medium-high.

Capacity Building and Partnership

Key conflict context factors also create a need for capacity building. Some key conflict factors (such as the installation of a legitimate government) create the opportunity for capacity building, while others (such as the security environment) place constraints on capacity-building activities. Overall, the central role of the Afghan government in program management and the supporting role played by the aid workers, significantly contribute to capacity building and partnership with some limitations, and so is coded as medium-high. Specifically, the government ownership largely is limited to the central level and doesn’t extend down to more local levels, and the need to rely on local aid workers and/or restrictions in access during periods of heightened violence resulting from the security context and the chosen security strategy somewhat weaken capacity building and partnership.
The role of civil society is coded as high because it significantly contributes to capacity building and partnership.

**Sustainability**

Key conflict context factors created a need and opportunity for the Afghan government and civil society to play central roles in the program management and project management respectively. This Afghan involvement – of both the government and civil society – and the role of aid workers contribute to sustainability with some limitations. For the role of the government, the NSP creates institutions and processes that can be replicated; however, the CDCs show mixed results in the extent to which they succeed in promoting sustainability within the individual projects. The overall sustainability of the NSP will also depend somewhat upon continued financial support to enable continued CDC elections and project implementation. The reliance on local aid workers to provide technical assistance can promote sustainability by reducing disruptions due to insecurity, but may also risk weakening sustainability depending on the level of relevant technical capacity within local aid workers. With each of the three actors facing some limitations, each is coded as medium-high.

**Selectivity**

The centrality of the Afghan government significantly contributes (coded as high) to the international donors’ foreign policy objective of promoting the legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the Afghan government and thus promoting stability in Afghanistan. The central role played by civil society places the decisionmaking in the hands of the development and reconstruction “consumers” within some constraints established by the Afghan government and with some limitations given the ceiling on the amount of funding (coded as medium-high). The emphasis on the role of civil society, rather than aid workers, in project selection promotes selection of projects that respond to the community’s perceived needs; however, the relatively limited role of international aid workers may somewhat limit the contribution to this principle by missing an opportunity to incorporate insights and “lessons learned”
from international development and reconstruction experts. Thus the role of civil society is coded as high, and role of aid workers are coded as medium-high.

**Results and Accountability**

The central role of the Afghan government in program management creates an opportunity for greater accountability of the Afghan government to its people, and the MRRD’s information dissemination related to the NSP (e.g., the website) does promote this accountability. The MRRD compensates for its limited inclusion of outcomes in on-going monitoring efforts by supporting outcome-focused impact evaluations. The central role of civil society in project management similarly significantly contributes to the principle of results and accountability at the community level. The roles of both the government and civil society are thus coded as high. Similar to sustainability, the reliance on local aid workers given the security context may somewhat limit aid workers contribution to NSP’s results and accountability due to more limited evaluation expertise or less frequent evaluations with the “stand out” strategy. This results in a coding of medium-high for the role of aid workers.

**Flexibility**

Governments and other bureaucracies typically reduce flexibility, and the program design with the central role of the Afghan government significantly limits adherence to the principle of flexibility (coded as medium). This does not seem to detrimentally affect the NSP; however, because although the overall structure of NSP is set, there is a fair amount of room for flexibility at the project level built into the design. The centrality of civil society at the implementation level significantly contributes to flexibility, and the role of the aid workers operating on the ground and providing regular feedback to the MRRD also significantly contributes to flexibility by facilitating modifications in the NSP as needed (e.g., updating the list of ineligible projects). The roles of both civil society and aid workers are thus coded as high.
Assessment and Conflict Management

Of all seven principles, the NSP adheres the least to the principle of assessment and conflict management. Despite playing a central role in program management, the Afghan government did not appear to undertake an assessment prior to the implementation of the NSP, nor did the aid workers. The roles of both of these key actors do not contribute to adherence to the principle of assessment and conflict management (coded as low-medium). The existence of the list of ineligible projects developed by the government and enforced by the aid workers does, however, minimize the risk of actually detracting from this principle. The central role of civil society contributes to this principle by supporting projects the community itself finds appropriate and promoting social cohesion and inclusion (thus managing the conflict). Despite these indirect contributions to assessment and conflict management, the role of civil society faces some limitations to contributing to assessment and conflict management by not explicitly considering the relationship between conflict factors and project selection. This results in a medium coding.

Table 4.2 below summarizes the codings for the role of each of the three key actors for each of the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. In addition, the table presents the overall score for each principle as well as the overall score for each actor. Finally, the table provides an overall rating of the extent to which this case study overall promotes adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.
Table 4.2 – Adherence to Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction in Nangarhar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Aid Workers</th>
<th>Overall Adherence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building &amp; Partnership</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
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<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectivity</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results &amp; Accountability</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment &amp; Conflict Management</td>
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<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium (2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
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<td>Medium-High(4.6)</td>
<td>Medium-High(3.9)</td>
<td>MEDIUM-HIGH (4.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Averaging the codings in the Afghan government column shows that overall its role contributes with some limitations to the NSP’s adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction (coded as medium-high). The key role played by the Afghan government significantly contributes to ownership, selectivity, and results and accountability. It contributes with some limitations to capacity building and partnership and to sustainability and contributes with significant limitations to flexibility. The greatest weakness for the role of the government is in terms of assessment and conflict management, where the government neither contributes nor detracts.

Overall, the role of civil society contributes with some limitations to adherence to the seven principles. The central role played by civil society significantly contributes to ownership, capacity building and partnership, and flexibility. Civil society’s role contributes with some limitations to sustainability, selectivity, results and accountability and assessment and conflict management.
Overall, the aid workers contribute with some limitations to adherence to the seven principles. The supporting role played by aid workers contributes significantly to flexibility. Aid workers contribute with some limitations to all the other principles, except assessment and conflict management where their role faces more significant limitations.

Taking into consideration the roles of all three key actors, the NSP case study indicates the greatest strength in significantly contributing to adherence to the principle of ownership and results and accountability, and greatest weakness by not contributing to the principle of assessment and conflict management. For all other principles, the combined roles of the key actors contributed with some limitations.

In conclusion, the experience of the NSP in Nangarhar, and the ability of the NSP to contribute to the adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction with only some limitations, indicates that sound development and reconstruction is feasible in a high conflict setting, including places where the external security actor is a party in the conflict. In fact, the extremity of the situation in Nangarhar may facilitate sound development and reconstruction in some ways. Most notably, the fall of the Taliban and installation of a new, internationally-recognized government created the space for the Afghan government to play a key role in program implementation. In addition, the somewhat predictable nature of the insecurity – albeit at high levels – enabled the key actors to develop strategies and assume roles that enabled them to carry out relatively sound development and reconstruction.
5. TUUNGANE – THE KIVUS, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

INTRODUCTION

Essentially a textbook case of a failed state and infamous as the setting for “the heart of darkness,” the DRC has experienced nearly uninterrupted conflict, largely fought in the eastern part of the country. Although rich in natural resources, the DRC has a long history of chronic violence, abusive security forces, dysfunctional government, and rampant corruption. As the third-largest country in Africa, the DRC consists of difficult-to-maneuver terrain including large sections of jungle, mountainous terrain and high levels of precipitation. The location of population centers along the country’s border with low population density on the interior further decreases the likelihood that the central government can consolidate power and effectively rule over the territory (Herbst, 2000).

An estimated 5.4 million people died in the decade between 1998 and 2007, making the DRC’s conflict the deadliest since World War II (Coghlan et al., 2007). Despite the official end of civil war in 2003 and credible elections with more than 70 percent voter turnout, violence persists in the DRC, particularly in the Kivus, which are shown in Figure 5.1 (Freedom, 2007). Instability in the DRC – and particularly fighting between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), the Hutu rebel group Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and the Tutsi rebel group National Congress for the Defense of the (CNDP) – resulted in more than 2.1 million internally displaced

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95 This is a reference to Joseph Conrad’s 1899 classic novel on colonialism in Africa, in which the Congo was depicted as the most savage place in the world. This reputation has long stymied the country.
96 This population distribution is called a “rimland” country.
97 The significant majority of these deaths were not due to violence, but rather to preventable and treatable disease such as malaria, malnutrition, pneumonia and diarrhea.
98 The FDLR is a Hutu rebel group comprised of former members of the Rwandan army, former members of the primary genocide instrument – the Interhamwe, and other Rwandan Hutu refugees.
persons in the DRC and more than 323,000 Congolese refugees in neighboring countries by the end of 2009 (OCHA, 2010a).

Figure 5.1 – Map of the DRC Highlighting the Kivus

SOURCE: United Nations Cartographic Section, 2004

In January 2009, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda apparently reached a new understanding and arrested CNDP leader, General Nkunda. The new head of the CNDP signed a peace agreement with the DRC’s national government; however, instability persists in the Kivus as not all armed groups have been successfully disarmed or integrated into the Congolese military. Many armed actors – including members of the FARDC – continue to prey on civilians in the vast weakly governed areas of the eastern DRC.

In 2007, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) launched a community-driven reconstruction project, known as Tuungane. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) implements the DFID-funded program in the provinces of South Kivu and Katanga.
(which is in the south-eastern part of the DRC), and CARE USA implements in Maniema Province (which borders the Kivu provinces). In South Kivu, Tuungane builds upon CDD/R programming that the IRC had been implementing since 2005. Although DFID had intended to support CDD/R programming in North Kivu as well, they ultimately did not do so out of concern that activities would be put “on hold” too often and too long due to the uncertainty of the security situation.

Although casualties in the past have been horrific, the conflict has subsided considerably (Uppsala, 2008). With 25 to 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, the DRC is considered to be experiencing “minor conflict,” and thus represents the “medium” case. This chapter applies the analytic framework described in Chapter 3 to examine the extent to which sound development and reconstruction principles can be upheld in a moderately violent area, as well as how the conflict context affects the adherence to principles of sound development and reconstruction described in the analytic framework.

First, this chapter examines the conflict context – including the Kivus’ background; current social, economic and political conflict factors, and security environment in order to cull out the key aspects of the conflict context that most significantly affect the ability of Tuungane to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction. The second and third sections describe the program design and security strategies with particular attention to how they are affected by the key aspects of the conflict context. An examination of how the program design and security strategy in turn affect Tuungane’s adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction follows. The conclusion examines how the conflict context affects the

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99 Tuungane is known as “Communities Sowing the Future of Congo” in Maniema Province where CARE implements the program. This dissertation looks only at Tuungane activities in South Kivu as this case study focuses on the “medium” level of violence. Neither Maniema nor Katanga Provinces face the same level of insecurity as the Kivus.

100 The categorization of the type of conflict comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, as described in Chapter 2.
ability to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction in the Kivus, the DRC.\textsuperscript{101}

**CONFLICT CONTEXT\textsuperscript{102}**

This section describes the conflict context in the Kivus, the DRC. In addition to providing general descriptive information to understand the environment in which Tuungane operates, this section will draw out aspects of the conflict context that most significantly affect the program design and security strategy.

**Background**

The DRC has a history of violence and resource-fueled conflict with no legacy of effective governance, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Prior to being colonized by Belgium, the territory that is now the DRC had no over-arching political unity. In addition to the pre-colonial kingdoms, portions of the territory were controlled by Portuguese, Arab, Swahili, and Nyamwezi traders. In 1870, Belgian King Leopold II, a notoriously cruel and exploitative leader, began to colonize the territory.\textsuperscript{103}

Intertwined with multiple waves of immigration (particularly from neighboring Rwanda and Burundi into the Kivus) and various policies of ethnically-based political and economic favoritism in an attempt to control the region, the Kivus experienced three distinct periods of recent conflict: the First Congolese War (1994-1997),\textsuperscript{104} the Second Congolese War (1998-2003), and the Kivus Conflict (2004-present).

\textsuperscript{101} The author conducted fieldwork in July 2008 and 2009, and thus, the information in this section largely describes the situation in 2008 to 2009. Where available, more up-to-date information is included.

\textsuperscript{102} This section draws heavily on work done by the author for the DRC sections of Brooke Stearns Lawson et al., *Reconstruction Under Fire: Case Studies and Further Analysis of Civil Requirements*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-870/1-OSD, 2010.

\textsuperscript{103} For example, it is estimated that ten million Congolese died in the process of tapping rubber and the construction of the Matadi-Leopoldville Railway during the first forty years of King Leopold II’s reign (Hochschild, 1999).

\textsuperscript{104} High levels of violence preceded the official start of the First Congolese War.
The First Congolese War represented the climax of ethnic tensions after three major waves of immigration from Rwanda and Burundi into the Kivus, and ensuing DRC national political decisions designed to garner political support as described below. The first wave of immigration occurred in the early twentieth century, when land shortages and famine drove many Banyarwandans to the Kivu highlands – and particularly the Masisi territory. The second wave of immigration occurred in the 1960s when Banyarwandans fled the independence-related violence in Rwanda. The “indigenous” Congolese (such as the Hunde and Nande) resented this massive influx of Banyarwandans, particularly in areas such as Masisi territory where more than 70 percent of the population was Banyarwadian by 1970 (Mathieu and Tsongo, 1999).

Mobutu Sese Seko, who overthrew Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba less than a year after independence, sought to build ethnically-based constituencies in the Kivus to gain power over a region where the national government largely lacked effective reach. In 1972, Mobutu’s policies and practices favored the Banyarwanda; however, pressure from the “indigenous” communities, particularly from the Nande who had become the primary economic and political rival to the Banyarwanda, led Mobutu to reverse some of these policies in 1983. This re-ignited inter-communal tension, including among the Banyarwanda, as Mobutu most

105 Banyarwandans are people from Rwanda who have moved to Congo from the eighteenth century to the present. The term applies to both Hutus and Tutsis.

106 This migration flow was not uncommon prior to colonization; however, the scale of immigration increased. The Belgian colonial government further encouraged this immigration which simultaneously relieved demographic pressures in Rwanda and provided a willing labor force in Congo.

107 In 1972, Mobutu granted citizenship to all individuals from Rwanda and Burundi who had entered the DRC since 1960 and gave the Banyarwandans significant portions of the “nationalized” foreign-owned land in Masisi and Walikale territories – they held more than 90 percent of the “liberated land titles” (ICG, 2007a). The Nande acquired the bulk of the land titles in Beni and Lubero. The increasing tensions and pressures from the “indigenous” communities drove Mobutu to reverse the nationality law in 1983. The majority of Banyarwanda lost their citizenship and their property.
favored the Tutsi. The Nande gained control of the provincial administration and used this power to further diminish the Banyarwanda economic power (ICG, 2007a), and in March 1993, North Kivu Governor Jean Pierre Kalumbo Mbogho – a Nande – called upon security forces to "exclude and exterminate" the Banyarwanda in several territories in the Kivus. The ensuing violence resulted in 6,000 to 10,000 deaths, mostly in Masisi territory (ICG, 2007a).

Mobutu temporarily quelled the intense violence when he again shifted his "allegiance" and replaced Kalumbo with a member of a minority tribe and increased Banyarwanda representation in the provincial government. Tensions, however, remained extremely high. The 1994 Rwandan genocide deepened the growing chasm between Hutus and Tutsis in the DRC. During and in the aftermath of the genocide, fear of reprisal resulted in a third major wave of immigration with more than a million Rwandan Hutus fleeing to the DRC. This new wave of immigration may have been the proverbial "straw that broke the camel’s back" and ignited the First Congo War. Amongst these refugees were perpetrators of the genocide, who united with Hutu militia in the DRC and Mobutu’s army to attack local communities and Tutsis perceived as supportive of the Rwandan Patriotic Front that was seizing power in Kigali.

In response to the Hutu militia and Mobutu’s army, "indigenous" DRC militias, known as Mai Mai108 formed to protect themselves, and others formed under the pretense of protection but aimed primarily to loot. Laurent Kabila led the Tutsi militia Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre to defend against these attacks. The attacks escalated in 1996 and Kabila’s AFDL gained support from Rwanda and Uganda to overthrow Mobutu. Former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) military leader, Laurent Nkunda, joined Kabila’s movement to seize power from Mobutu. Kabila took control of the country on May 20, 1997.

Repeating some of Mobutu’s mistakes, Kabila failed to adequately respond to the challenges facing the DRC and, reportedly, simultaneously

108 Alternative spellings for Mai Mai include Mayi Mayi, Mai-Mai, and Mayi-Mayi.
aided both the Hutu extremists – Interhamwe109 and the Forces Armées Rwandaises now united under the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) – and the Mai Mai. Kabila quickly lost the support of the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, who attempted to overthrow him on August 2, 1998, launching what is known as the Second Congo War.110 In 1999, a military stalemate resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement; however, Kabila hindered its implementation. When Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001, his son Joseph Kabila took power (ICG, 2007a).

Joseph Kabila repeated the historical trend of politics based on favored ethnic groups, and relied on a Nande splinter group of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-ML) to improve its position in the Kivus in 2002. Although this support resulted in a signed peace agreement – the Sun City Peace Agreement – in December 2002, the violence persisted. The Second Congo War officially ended in 2003 when the transitional government took power.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Second Congo War, a spillover conflict known as the Kivu Conflict started in the eastern DRC. In 2004, General Laurent Nkunda, then head of the CNDP, led a revolt claiming to be protecting the minority Banyamulenge Tusti population from attacks carried out by the rest of the population, and particularly the Rwandan rebel group FDLR. Kabila’s FARDC allegedly supported the FDLR and Mai Mai groups fighting against Nkunda (Swiss, 2007). In January 2009, the conflict shifted. Nkunda was captured, and the CNDP elected to align with the FARDC (and agreeing to integrate into the official Congolese army) and work alongside the Rwandan troops to fight the Hutu militias in Eastern Congo.

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109 The Hutu perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide were known as the Interhamwe.
110 The Second Congo War took on a regional component. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe stepped in to support Kabila, and the Ugandans and Rwandans split to support different rebel factions in the DRC. For example, the Rwandans reportedly supported the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), a group lead by General Nkunda (Greste, 2009).
Since independence and throughout the three periods of conflict, two trends remain prevalent in the Kivus’ history: the central government has failed to effectively extend its reach to control the Kivus, and this region has a history of violent inter-ethnic tensions that have been stirred up and utilized by various groups to gain political and economic power. The effect of these two key aspects of the Kivus’ background on adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction will be examined later in this chapter.

Current Social, Economic and Political Factors

The Kivus’ history inevitably affects current CDD/R programming, as do the current conflict factors. This section provides a general overview of the current conflict factors in the Kivus to provide basic understanding of the region. It also identifies key aspects of the current conflict that most significantly affect Tuungane in South Kivu.

The DRC ranks fifth on the Fund for Peace’s 2010 Failed States Index (FfP, 2010), and ranks 176 out of 182 in the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). The DRC has remained at or below the lowest tenth percentile rank for each of the World Bank’s Governance Indicators as reported in Governance Matters 2009 (WB, 2009b). The Kivus play a central role in the current – and played a key role in the historical – conflict in the DRC, and have been called the “powder keg” of Congolese conflicts (ICG, 2003).

Situated in the eastern part of the DRC, the Kivus border Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda (Figure 5.2). The region consists primarily of fertile land that is excellent for farming and pasturing, as well as mineral-rich forests. The riches of eastern Congo serve both as something worth fighting for and as a means of financing rebel activities. The Kivus remain relatively isolated from Kinshasa because the Congo’s jungles, mountains, rainfall, and poor roads make long-distance travel difficult.\textsuperscript{111} The Kivus are closer to neighboring

\textsuperscript{111} The DRC is nearly one-quarter the size of the United States, with Kinshasa at the western edge and the Kivus forming the eastern border of the country.
capitals than Kinshasa, and have strong political, ethnic, linguistic and economic ties to East Africa.

**Figure 5.2 – Map of Eastern DRC**

Due to proximity and opportunity, the Kivus experienced massive migration of both Hutus and Tutsis since the eighteenth century as described in the background section. Presently, the major ethnic groups include the Nande, Hutu, Hunde, Nyanga and Tutsi in North Kivu and the Babembe, Barega, Hutu, and Tutsi in South Kivu. The exact ethnic composition of the Kivus is not entirely clear, and groups are formed based on both the area of origin (e.g., Banyarwandans) and ethnicity.
(e.g., Banyamulenge\textsuperscript{112}). One source finds that the Tutsis comprise approximately half of the population in the Kivu region (MAR, 2004). Another source finds that North Kivu’s four million inhabitants are predominantly Nande (approximately 50 percent) and Hutu (approximately 30 percent) with the remaining 20 percent of the population primarily Hunde, Nyanga or Tutsi (ICG, 2007a). Much of the population of the Kivus has moved from their homes including more than 1.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and more than 85,000 refugees (primarily from Rwanda) as of July 31, 2010 (UNHCR, 2010).

The conflict and mass population movements have created a complex emergency with a strong legacy of group grievance and ethnic tensions further exacerbated by periods of economic favoritism for both the Nande and the Tutsis. Health and education services are abysmal in eastern Congo – with less than 70 percent of eligible children enrolled in primary school and malnutrition causing more than ten percent of the deaths (IRIN, 2007). Rape as a tool of war and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence permeate the conflict in the Kivus. Official government positions in the Kivus have shifted from one ethnic group to another as part of Kinshasa’s power politics; however, much of the local political authority resides with traditional authorities and local warlords, who may control services ranging from security to justice to health care.

To understand how the current social, economic and political factors may affect the extent to which Tuungane adheres to principles of sound development and reconstruction, these factors can be summarized as: (1) heavily displaced population, (2) dire economic conditions, and (3) a persistent lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the central government.

\textsuperscript{112} Banyamulenge are ethnic Tutsis originally from Burundi and Rwanda who settled in South Kivu in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The name was established in the 1960s to distinguish this group from the Rwandan Tutsi refugees who arrived after the 1959 violence.
Security Environment

The security environment affects Tuungane’s ability to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction in the Kivus. Most notably, the level and nature of the violence directly affect the feasibility and relative merits of the various security strategies described in the Chapter 3.

This section draws from data for both North and South Kivu, although Tuungane only operates in South Kivu. The security environments of the two Kivus remain linked, and information on North Kivu also provides insight into why Tuungane does not operate in North Kivu.

Nature of General Insecurity. As described above in the background section of this chapter, the DRC has a long and complex history of conflict. The current conflict in the Kivus has largely involved the FARDC, the FDLR, the CNDP, as well as a variety of smaller armed groups such as Mai Mai. Figure 5.3 shows trends in battle-related deaths from 1996 to 2008.113

Although the data represents national-level data, the conflict in the Kivus largely drove national-level conflict trends between 1996 and 2008 as other provinces experienced only small-scale violence during this period. Battle-related deaths include deaths resulting from: (1) clashes between the Congolese army and armed opposition groups (war and minor conflict), (2) clashes amongst armed opposition groups (non-state conflict), and (3) attacks against civilians (one-sided violence).114 Figure 5.3 below depicts how the percentage of these different types of battle-related deaths shifted between 1996 and 2008.115 This 13-year time span includes three major trends in the nature of the conflict.

Figure 5.3 – Percentage of Battle-Related Deaths by Type, DRC 1996-2008

113 As of this writing, data for 2009 were not available.
114 Given that the Rwandan rebel group, FDLR, largely operated in the Kivus during this time period, the number of deaths from one-sided violence attributed to FDLR is included in these figures.
115 As of this writing, data for 2009 were not available.
First, from the mid to late 1990s, the conflict shifted from one largely consisting of one-sided violence against civilians – including large-scale attacks by the FDLR against civilians in the Kivus – to armed conflict between the Congolese government and armed opposition groups. By 2000, nearly all of the battle-related deaths occurred in clashes between the Congolese army and armed opposition groups (including the FDLR and the CNDP).

Second, in 2002, the bulk of relevant parties signed a peace agreement and Rwanda and Uganda withdrew most of their troops. From 2002 to 2005, the conflict shifted to a non-state conflict, and the battle-related deaths, which previously were largely attributed to clashes between armed groups, became more likely to result from armed non-state actors attacking civilians. By 2005, all battle-related deaths were civilians who had been attacked by non-government armed groups.

Third, in 2006, the Congolese army reemerged as a key actor in the conflict and by 2008, 100 percent of all battle-related deaths were due to clashes between the Congolese army and armed opposition groups (war and minor conflict) (Uppsala, 2008).

In January 2009, Bosco Ntaganda, CNDP chief-of-staff, claimed that he was taking over control of the CNDP and announced that his forces
would integrate into the Congolese army to work alongside Rwandan government troops to fight the Hutu militias in Eastern Congo. Later that month, Rwandan authorities arrested General Nkunda (Greste, 2009).

With the peace agreement between the Congolese government and the CNDP, the integration of elements of the CNDP into the FARDC, and the agreement between the Rwandan government and Congolese governments, the FDLR is now the main adversary in the Kivus. The FDLR – a highly capable military organization comprised largely of former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces and the Interhamwe – remains very active in the Kivus, with an estimated six to seven thousand combatants (ICG, 2009a).

In addition to the insecurity resulting from FDLR activities in the Kivus, other actors have also operated in the region and fed into the general instability. For example, Rwandan and Ugandan armies have played varying roles in the fighting in the Kivus due to a variety of historical, political and economic factors. In addition, Mai Mai groups who served as Kinshasa’s proxies in the region linger.

The security situation in the Kivus remains complex with large numbers of armed actors with differing and shifting motivations. The complexity and fluidity of the conflict results in a highly unpredictable security environment, and one in which perhaps the greatest causalities of the conflict stems not from the battles themselves, but from the humanitarian crises the instability creates. Although the conflict in the Kivus has been undeniably deadly, the impacts of the conflict extends beyond battle-related loss of life to include substantial displacement, sexual and gender-based violence and rape, looting, kidnapping and ransom, and extortion (UN OCHA, 2009b).

**Level of General Insecurity.** Although the nature of the conflict has vacillated since the mid-1990s, the overall level of violence shows a relatively steady downward trend as depicted in Figure 5.4. The one exception to this decline in the number of battle-related deaths in the DRC occurred in 2002 and 2003. Violent clashes between non-state rebel groups and attacks by these groups against civilians resulted in more total battle-related deaths in 2002 and 2003 than the three prior years (1999-2001) (Uppsala, 2008). Despite the general decline in number of
battle-related deaths, the conflict in the DRC still results in hundreds of battle-related deaths each year.

Figure 5.4 – Number of Battle-Related Deaths by Type, DRC 1996-2008

As mentioned above, the number of battle-related deaths only paints part of the picture of the conflict in the Kivus. In August 2008, the crisis in the Kivus escalated again and the FARDC launched military campaigns in the fall of 2008 that resulted in an estimated 800,000 displaced people with approximately 350,000 IDPs in North Kivu and approximately 450,000 IDPs in South Kivu (UN OCHA, 2009b). This massive population displacement created a highly tense environment, disrupted normal functioning of entire communities, and created a dire humanitarian situation with elevated socio-economic needs of the displaced population and their host communities.

Several factors in 2009 and 2010 have contributed to an escalation of violence and a worsening humanitarian situation in the Kivus. First, in January 2009, the FARDC and CNDP combatants launched a joint operation – Operation Umoja Wetu (Our Unity) – against the FDLR in the

116 As of this writing, data for 2009 were not available.
Kivus (ICG, 2009a). Second, an accelerated integration of members of armed groups into the FARDC followed the signing of the peace agreement between the Congolese government and the CNDP and other armed groups in early 2009 (UN OCHA, 2009c). Third, FARDC soldiers’ frustration with a lack of payment peaked in 2009. Fourth, the FARDC and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)\(^{117}\) launched two offensives: Kimia II from summer to the end of 2009 followed by Operation Amani Leo (Peace Today) to combat the FDLR in early 2010.

Attacks on civilians and massive population displacement persisted in 2009 and 2010. Armed groups have retaliated against civilians they believe had collaborated with the military actors carrying out Umoja Wetu (ICG, 2009a). For example, the FDLR reported burned down several houses and looted a health center in Kalehe, South Kivu, in June 2009. Similarly farmers reported that armed men were looting their fields in North Kivu (IRIN, 2009a). During this same time period, army troops reportedly “looted, erected barriers and were holding civilians at ransom.” They were also creating fear and panic in Pinga, a town approximately 250 kilometers west of Goma. MONUC indicated that these attacks may be motivated by the soldiers’ lack of receiving their salaries (IRIN, 2009a). The United Nations’ Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) also reported an increase in extortion and exactions against citizens by members of the FARDC, correlated with the rapid integration of formed armed group members (2009b).

A study conducted by an organization supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization found that the FARDC committed 40 percent of the lootings reported in South Kivu between February and May 2009 (UN OCHA, 2009b). In the first three months of 2009, more than 1,000 cases of rape were registered – more than half of the total cases recorded in all of 2008 (UN OCHA, 2009b).\(^{118}\) More than 8,000 women were raped in

\(^{117}\) On July 1, 2010, MONUC was renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) to reflect a new phase of peacekeeping in the country. This dissertation references MONUC as it was the UN operation in the DRC during the author’s field work.

\(^{118}\) This may reflect an increase in reporting of incidents.
the DRC in 2009 (UN News, 2010). By the end of July 2010, the conflict in the Kivus had internally displaced more than 1.4 million people: more than 819,000 in North Kivu and more than 618,000 in South Kivu (UNHCR, 2010).

The Kivus remain the most volatile region in the DRC. Although the number of battle-related deaths has remained below 1,000 deaths per year since 2004, the level of devastation the conflict causes remains significant with massive population displacements, sexual and gender-based violence, and dire socio-economic conditions.

**Security Environment for Development and Reconstruction.** Unlike the Nangarhar case, the conflict in the DRC does not represent a typical insurgency where the armed actors strive to garner support of the population away from the government and towards their own case. Quite the opposite, all parties in the conflict have committed atrocities against the civilian population as a means of garnering the necessary items to sustain their efforts (e.g., food and clothing). In addition, these areas generally have limited government presence. As a result, it does not appear that the government or civil society members would be particularly high-value targets for the armed actors from a philosophical standpoint. The violent actors operating in the Kivus do seek the potential material resources available in a given community or household; however, and to the extent that civil society or government officials engaged in development and reconstruction efforts may have greater resources, the armed actors or other violent actors may target them. For example, the Treasurer of one Village Development Council (VDC)\(^{119}\) was killed in a raid on his local community in July 2009. It is unclear whether he was targeted because of his involvement in Tuungane, because he was believed to have substantial amounts of cash, due to another motive, or completely randomly.\(^{120}\)

The information that is available for the Kivus relates to aid workers – both international and indigenous staff as described below.

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\(^{119}\) The VDCs are explained in more detail below.

\(^{120}\) Interview with implementing partner representative, Bukavu, DRC, July 2009.
In addition, the United Nations more regularly collects and reports on security-related data for North Kivu than for South Kivu. The higher level of insecurity in North Kivu creates a greater need for regular security updates for humanitarian actors operating in North Kivu.

The insecurity in the Kivus hinders the activities of development and reconstruction actors, particularly their movement throughout the provinces. In addition to the potential risk of getting caught in crossfire, aid vehicles may be ambushed and robbed on the road. These attacks appear to be motivated by potential financial gain. NGO vehicles face uncertain and varying levels of risk. In some instances, individuals who establish roadblocks as a means of extorting money allow aid workers to pass without stopping. In other circumstances, armed actors may specifically target NGO vehicles for a roadside ambush as they are likely to have valuable goods (e.g., cell phones) and potentially money.

In addition to “opportunistic” crimes against humanitarian workers, armed actors have specifically threatened NGOs. In early 2010, IRIN reported a “recent upsurge in threats against aid agencies in the Kivu provinces” (IRIN, 2010, p. 1). For example, armed actors sent a letter asking IRC to withdraw from the Rutshuru area of North Kivu, and a German NGO withdrew from the Walikile area of North Kivu after its staff received threats (IRIN, 2010). In February 2010, reportedly 30 percent of security incidents in the Kivus involved humanitarian workers (IRIN, 2010).

UN OCHA reported 61 security incidents against humanitarian workers in the Kivus in the first five months of 2009, with 47 incidents in North Kivu (UN OCHA, 2009b) and 14 incidents in South Kivu (UN OCHA, 2009f). UN OCHA weekly situation reports describe eight of the South Kivu incidents: four vehicles ambushed by individuals in military uniforms, three vehicles ambushed by armed groups or bandits not wearing military uniforms, and one aid vehicle “requisitioned” to transport members of the FARDC. Although each incident was not detailed in weekly reports, UN OCHA registered several cases where “military actors forced humanitarians to transport them to their desired location” (UN OCHA, 2009a, p. 2). Similarly, in North Kivu, UN OCHA reports describe
vehicle ambushes by personnel wearing military uniforms and those who
are not, as well as two break-ins of aid workers’ accommodations
(2009d).

In the first four months of 2010, UN OCHA reported 84 security
incidents against humanitarian workers in the Kivus, with 56 incidents
in North Kivu and 28 incidents in South Kivu. This marks an increase in
security incidents in both provinces compared with early 2009. UN OCHA
weekly situation reports describe several of the South Kivu incidents:
three vehicles ambushed by armed men and aid vehicles “requisitioned” by
rapid response police units (UN OCHA, 2010g and 2010j).

As depicted in Figure 5.5, the number of security incidents
involving humanitarian workers in North Kivu per month between January
2008 and April 2010 ranged from a low of one incident in April 2008 to a
high of 24 incidents in October 2008. The three-month trend line in
Figure 5.5 shows an increase in security incidents in the fall and
winter of 2008/2009 before a return to roughly similar levels of
insecurity as the spring and summer of 2008 (UN OCHA, 2009c). In fall
and winter of 2009/2010, the number of security incidents again rose to
levels similar to the previous fall and winter and remained at the same
general level to April 2010 (UN OCHA, 2010h). The average number of
security incidents for May 2009 to April 2010 (the last twelve months
for which data is available as of this writing) was 14 incidents
(2010h).
Nearly three-quarters of the security incidents in North Kivu during this period occurred in three geographical areas. During the first four months of 2010, the greatest percentage of incidents involving humanitarian workers occurred in the Masisi area (32 percent), followed by Rutshuru (25 percent), and Goma (21 percent) (UN OCHA, 2010h). Approximately two-thirds of the 2010 incidents were committed by unidentified armed persons; however, 18 percent of the incidents were attributed to members of the FARDC (UN OCHA, 2010h). Nearly half of these incidents were looting, and assault and attempted robbery were also very common (see Figure 5.6). Other types of incidents included harassment, carjacking and hostage taking.
Figure 5.6 – Types of Security Incidents Involving Humanitarian Workers in North Kivu, January to April 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Robbery</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassments</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carjacking</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looting</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: UN OCHA, 2010h

Numbers of security incidents in South Kivu per month were not regularly published in 2009, however, several reports discuss trends in numbers of incidents over multiple-month periods. In 2010, UN OCHA reported 28 security incidents involving humanitarian workers in South Kivu in the first four months of 2010 – only four incidents fewer than the total number of incidents in 2009 (2010h). As depicted in Figure 5.7, ambushes represent more than a third of all security incidents involving aid workers in South Kivu, followed by assaults and break-ins. One particularly notable security incident involving aid workers occurred in South Kivu in April 2010. A Mai Mai group (Yakutumba) kidnapped eight International Red Cross staff members – seven Congolese and one Swiss worker; however, they were released unconditionally and unharmed within a week of their capture (Reuters, 2010). The relatively limited data, and the relatively small number of security incidents make
drawing major conclusions regarding trends in insecurity in the Kivus difficult.

**Figure 5.7 - Types of Security Incidents Involving Humanitarian Workers in South Kivu, January to April 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Incident</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault with a Deadly Weapon</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carjacking</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassments</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Robbery</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break-in</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** UN OCHA, 2010h

It is unclear whether humanitarian workers are increasingly being targeted as is implied by the United Nations (UN OCHA, 2009b and IRIN, 2010), or an increase in insecurity overall has lead to the increase in security incidents. Either way, the insecurity impedes implementation of development and reconstruction activities, and aid workers face unpredictable and varying risks, particularly when traveling by road. In addition to uncertainty whether being identified as an aid worker increases or decreases the risk of attack, aid workers face uncertainty over how particular groups (e.g. uniformed soldiers of the Congolese army) will engage with them.

**PROGRAM DESIGN**

This section describes the program design of Tuungane. In particular, it identifies how various aspects of the conflict context
identified above affect the Tuungane design including its objectives, implementation and funding.

Objectives

As mentioned above, the DRC central government has failed to effectively extend its authority throughout the country and into the Kivus, contributing to the region’s instability. In addition, the massive population displacements and persistent fear of attack among civilian populations has frayed the Congolese social fabric and resulted in dire socio-economic conditions.

Established in April 2007 with support from DFID, Tuungane, which means “moving forward together” in Swahili, aims to promote good governance, social cohesion, and economic recovery (IRC, 2008a and Humphreys, 2008). The primary focus of Tuungane is the governance and decision-making process, moreso than the development and reconstruction project itself.121 In other words, Tuungane recognizes that the small-scale projects it supports may only make a dent in the socio-economic needs in the Kivus; however, the process used to identify, select, implement, monitor and evaluate these projects can positively contribute to the governance and social cohesion objectives.

Implementation

Just as the conflict context influences the objectives of Tuungane, the context also affects the implementation of CDD/R activities. More specifically, the conflict context affects the roles that various actors – the government, civil society and aid workers - play in implementing Tuungane.

The conflict context in the Kivus – particularly the persistent lack of reach of the central government into the Kivus and the government’s limited capacity - does not provide an environment conducive for significant government involvement. The DRC is engaged in a process of decentralization to increase the power held at the sub-

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121 Interview with implementing partner representative, Bukavu, DRC, July 2009.
national level, however, the central government has historically lacked any real presence in the villages of eastern DRC. Although efforts to decentralize the government are underway, local government structures are weak if they exist at all. Local elections scheduled for June 2008 were postponed to June 2010 and then postponed again to 2012. Thus, the Congolese central government does not play a key role in program management unlike the NSP. Rather the DFID-funded implementing organizations – the IRC and CARE – manage the program in their respective geographical areas.122

The lack of official government reach and effectiveness in the Kivus and the heavily displaced population (and thus frayed social fabric) and the highly unpredictable security environment create a need for high levels of civil society – including traditional leaders – to meet the community needs.

To compensate for the lack of government capacity as well as civil society weakened by massive displacement, international NGOs play a key role in program management as well as providing technical assistance to the community councils. In this way, Tuungane responds to the key factors of the conflict context discussed above by minimizing the role of the Congolese government and developing an implementation approach where international NGOs manage Tuungane at the program level, and provide substantial oversight and technical assistance to communities who manage Tuungane at the project level.

To achieve the three objectives described above, Tuungane utilizes a tiered strategy. The program works in villages of approximately 1,400 people and then groups these villages into “communities” comprised of an average of 4.5 villages. Tuungane staff approach each village to raise awareness of the project and to enable the selection of an election committee. The village members then elect a 10-member Village

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122 DFID selected the IRC and CARE as Tuungane’s implementing partners through a competitive bidding process that considered the organizations’ experience in the given areas, their experience with CDD/R, and the technical and financial soundness of the proposed program.
Development Council consisting of five positions: president, treasurer, secretary, community mobilizer and inclusion officer (IRC, DFID and CARE, 2009). For each position, both a male and a female are elected. The VDC then has responsibility for selecting, managing and monitoring two development projects financed by a grant of approximately $3,000. The grant is disbursed in multiple installments, and the VDC must report on their activities to the population and the Tuungane staff. The VDC conducts a rapid needs assessment using focus groups to identify priority projects, and then oversees the implementation and monitoring of the selected projects.

The CDC provides the next level of the tiered approach. A twelve-member elected committee, the CDC typically consists of approximately two or three representatives from each VDC in the CDC area. The CDCs are more structured than the VDCs, and the CDCs systematically collect information about the activities of other development actors operating in the area (or conduct a community development “map”). They hold a one-day meeting to identify gaps that these other actors aren’t addressing and create a development plan with prioritized projects. The CDC receives approximately $50,000 to $75,000 - depending on the population size - that can finance two or three development projects. The first project cannot exceed 85 percent of the total funds. Although the CDCs consist of members from the VDCs within their geographical area, the CDC resources and activities remain separate and independent of the VDCs’ resources and activities.

This structure enables Tuungane to promote governance at an appropriately local level, while also supporting larger projects. At the village level, the voters know the candidates and can attend meetings where expenditure reports are presented; however, it would not be feasible to provide a grant large enough for bigger projects in each

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123 Interview with implementing partner representative, Bukavu, DRC, July 2009.
124 Interview with implementing partner representative, Goma, DRC, July 2009.
125 Interview with implementing partner representative, Bukavu, DRC, July 2009.
village. The CDC level involves more complex and sophisticated project design and management.\textsuperscript{126}

In both cases, the Tuungane staff must approve the project proposals. The Tuungane staff also provides technical assistance throughout the project selection, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The three-year program, targets 1,400 villages, 280 groups of villages, and 1.78 million beneficiaries (McBride and D’Onofrio, 2008). As of April 2009, Tuungane had initiated activities in more than 90 percent of the 280 target groups of villages in the three provinces where it operates – South Kivu, Maniema and Katanga. More than 850 village development committees have been elected, and the program had financed more than 900 projects (CGI, 2009).

**Funding**

DFID provided 29 million pounds (approximately $54 million)\textsuperscript{127} for the three year project (DFID, 2009). DFID provides financing directly to the implementing partners – the IRC and CARE USA. Approximately 12.3 million pounds (approximately $23 million) goes directly to communities in the form of block grants. Each VDC receives approximately $3,000. The amount of funding for the DCD varies depending upon the size of the population served. CDCs receive $50,000 for up to 4,000 people, $60,000 for 4,000 to 7,999 people, and $70,000 for 8,000 people or more (IRC, DFID and CARE, 2009).

**SECURITY STRATEGIES**

The section below describes the security strategy employed to protect the implementation of Tuungane overall (the program level) as well as the implementation of the specific community-level projects (the project level). Two key features of the security environment most directly affect the security strategy employed to protect the implementation of Tuungane. First, the Kivus experience periods of

\textsuperscript{126} Interview with implementing partner representative, Bukavu, DRC, July 2009.

\textsuperscript{127} The pound-to-dollar conversions are based on the 2008 average exchange rate of 1.85 provided by OANDA Corporation.
heightened insecurity, particularly for travel via road. Second, unpredictability characterizes the security environment in the Kivus.

**Program Level**

International NGOs implement Tuungane at the program level, and as with the NSP, Tuungane primarily needs a security strategy to enable the NGO staff to travel to the various communities to establish programs, provide technical assistance and monitor progress. Towards this end, Tuungane uses three different security strategies – “bug out,” “stand out” and “wait it out.” In North Kivu, DFID decided that the instability created an environment ill-suited for CDD/R activities and the related randomized control trial research, and prioritized activities in more secure environments for the initial programming with the intent to expand to North Kivu in later phases.\(^{128}\) In this instance, the Tuungane program employed a “bug out” strategy and opted not to implement a CDD/R program in the province.

This decision appears to reflect a strategic decision by DFID and its implementing partners rather than an inherent inability to carry out CDD/R in this region, however. Other actors did implement CDD/R activities in North Kivu during this same time period using a combined “wait it out” and “stand out” security strategy. Although anecdotal evidence indicates that the conflict context in North Kivu did affect the soundness of these CDD/R activities, the existence of other CDD/R programs in North Kivu also shows that the “bug out” strategy was not the only option for North Kivu.\(^{129}\)

In addition, some NGOs operating in the Kivus do on occasion use the “armor up” strategy and travel in MONUC-protected convoys to and

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\(^{128}\) Interviews with implementing partner representatives, Bukavu and Goma, DRC, July 2009.

\(^{129}\) ARD, Inc. received funding from USAID under the Durable Peace and Stability in the Eastern DRC program to implement CDD/R activities in North Kivu; however, the security situation in North Kivu resulted in frequent disruptions and meant that the program was not able to fully carry out its activities throughout the province. This program was followed by another USAID-funded CDD/R program in North Kivu carried out by Management Systems International (MSI).
from certain insecure locations in the region; however, the IRC program staff do not rely on such convoys to implement Tuungane. This raises the question of whether the choice of “bug out” was a sub-optimal security strategy for Tuungane in North Kivu.

Based on the dissertation research design, the analysis below focuses on the impact of the program where it has been implemented; however, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the use of the “bug out” strategy in the area with the greatest insecurity itself significantly limits the contributions of the CDD/R program by restricting the potential benefits to the relatively safer locations. This overarching limitation will be discussed in greater detail in the conclusion.

In South Kivu, Tuungane employs a combination of the “stand out” and “wait it out” security strategies. The IRC staff members wear clothing and accessories (e.g., caps) that identify them as members of the IRC and travel to and from project sites in marked vehicles. In periods of particularly heightened insecurity, the IRC employs a “wait it out” strategy and postpones its activities temporarily.

**Project Level**

As with the NSP, the community members themselves implement Tuungane at the project level. Thus Tuungane employs a “rely within” security strategy at the project level. To the extent that the violence does not cause displacement of the local population, the project activities can continue up to the point where external support (e.g., disbursement of additional funds or monitoring) is necessary. As discussed in Chapter 3, this strategy relies on the community’s ability to protect its own population and activities from armed actors. In the Kivus, the armed actors do not generally seek to gain support from the population and have shown a willingness to attack for financial gain. This may put Tuungane members at risk to the extent that armed actors believe Tuungane members may be more likely to have money or other resources.
PRINCIPLES OF SOUND DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

The persistent lack of Congolese government legitimacy, effectiveness and reach simultaneously highlight the importance of governance activities in the Kivus and the need for international aid workers to undertake related efforts in the absence of an appropriate government entity to do so. In the same vein, the dire economic situation, massive population displacement and history of instrumentalized ethnic tensions emphasize the importance of economic development and promotion of social cohesion. This creates a clear need for civil society engagement supported by international aid workers.

Ownership

Indigenous actors’ sense of ownership over development and reconstruction efforts serves as the first principle of sound development and reconstruction. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect ownership.

Role of the Government. The government of the DRC does not have an official role in the implementation of the CDD/R program so the role of the government significantly detracts from adherence to the principle of ownership. As decentralization efforts unfold in the DRC, opportunities may present themselves to link Tuungane with these decentralization initiatives. These opportunities could bolster decentralization efforts in the Kivus by capitalizing on Tuungane’s promotion of governance at the local level and linking into local-level capacity in an area where the government has historically had very limited presence, as well as increase the sense of ownership by government actors.

Role of Civil Society. Similar to the NSP, civil society ownership lies at the heart of Tuungane, and thus significantly contributes to the principle of ownership. The international NGOs provide regular oversight and support; however, the communities themselves elect the representative development council and drive the development and

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130 The DRC is undergoing decentralization, however, local level elections scheduled for June 2008 were postponed to June 2010.
reconstruction process at the project level. With technical assistance from the aid workers, the responsibility for project identification, selection, implementation, monitoring and evaluation rests with the VDCs and CDCs.

The communities themselves determine the selection criteria for the electoral committee and elect representatives who then manage the project selection, implementation and monitoring processes. Although this process could be manipulated to benefit one group over another, the program design takes steps to reduce the risk of this “elite capture” (e.g., requiring an inclusion officer) and no evidence indicates that such manipulation has occurred. One CDC member described the community engagement in the election process. “During a democratic election, each person feels like a contributing member. Nothing is imposed on him, and he sees that in everything we do, he’s directly implicated. He’s not there to just watch; he’s an actor. Each person here is an actor in the project” (IRC, 2008a).

Once the community establishes the VDC or CDC, these bodies play the lead role in project selection, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Although specific details of project selection may vary, the VDCs and CDCs explain the process to the community members and engage community members in a transparent manner to maximize the sense of ownership. The project selection involves focus groups (often consisting of a focus group of men, one of women, and others for vulnerable populations) that make a list of desired projects on large sheets of paper. The various focus groups’ desired projects are then combined to identify common priorities within the community. Community members can then argue for a given project in a community meeting before the final project selection occurs. In one community, a VDC member described the project selection process utilized by his community (which closely resembles the VDC representative election process). A series of jars with pictures representing the top projects then were placed in front of the room and community members were given a ball to place in the jar for the project they considered the most important. This process maximized the community’s sense of ownership because it clearly provided an opportunity for community members to make their case for a
given project and to actually vote for a given project through a transparent process. There is little evidence that the aid workers’ preferences and technical expertise strongly influence project selection. In addition, the Tuungane protocol lays out that the inclusion officer works to ensure that Tuungane engages vulnerable and marginalized populations including minority groups, internally displaced persons, refugees, and women (IRC, DFID and CARE, 2009).

With Tuungane, the community must contribute at least 10 percent of the project amount, and the implementation of the projects relies on the local community. For example, educated community members agreed to provide instruction in the schools and the literacy hall. In another instance, Tuungane community members made mud bricks to be used in the construction of a community hall. Tuungane does not explicitly require a community contribution, however. When technical requirements exceed local capacity, VDCs and CDCs hire outside firms to implement projects, but the oversight of these firms remains with the VDCs and CDCs. The direct engagement of the community in undertaking the development activity maximizes the sense of ownership in civil society. The mid-term evaluation also found that knowledge of Tuungane relates to “attendance of the village meetings, education levels and the level of community involvement in the villages,” and even villagers with lower levels of education had strong knowledge in villages with active community participation (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009, p. 39).

Role of Aid Workers. In recognition of the importance of engaging the government, the Tuungane protocol calls for implementers to engage government officials to increase their awareness and potentially sense of ownership of Tuungane. For example, aid workers meet with provincial governors prior to the official launch of Tuungane activities in a province to describe the program in detail to the governor. The aid workers also attempt to organize an annual meeting with the governor to inform the provincial authorities on the progress of the program, to seek information and advice related to the implementation of the project, and to maintain a link between the program and the government’s development policy (IRC, DFID and CARE, 2009). Similarly, to the extent that formal government officials are in place and interested, Tuungane
protocol calls for staff to meet with government officials at the territory level prior to and during the implementation of Tuungane.

At the project level aid workers emphasize supporting local communities and the VDCs and CDCs to promote a sense of ownership amongst the population, especially by training Tuungane participants on the program’s principles and practices and to provide on-going technical assistance to support these principles. Although the aid workers’ activities contribute to a sense of ownership, there are some limitations. For example, the mid-term evaluation noted that “knowledge levels of Tuungane principles and practices were far lower than expected,” (Ferf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009, p. 2). Related, the evaluation found a high correlation between familiarity with and understanding of the principles and practices of Tuungane and with level of community involvement. As the responsibility for communicating these principles and practices to the community rests with the aid workers, the weakness in this area signals some limitations in the contribution of aid workers to the principle of ownership. In addition, the reliance on international aid organizations itself creates limitations on the sense of ownership, but the emphasis on local staff helps to mitigate these effects.

**Capacity Building and Partnership**

The second principle of sound development and reconstruction relates closely to the first principle. Capacity building and partnership emphasizes creating relationships among actors to provide a transfer of knowledge and skills from one actor to another. The key factors of the historical and current conflict context highlight the significant lack of capacity among both the government and the Congolese civil society. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect promotion of capacity building and partnership.

**Role of the Government.** As mentioned above, the Congolese government plays a minimal role in Tuungane. It is not consistently engaged as a partner, and Tuungane does not explicitly create opportunities for developing the capacity of the Congolese government at
the local, district, provincial or national levels. For the lower levels of government, there are not elected officials throughout the Kivus. At the provincial and national levels, the program design did not explicitly include building the capacity of government officials and institutions. This lack of government involvement significantly detracts from the principle of capacity building and partnership.

Role of Civil Society. As mentioned above, civil society plays a leading role in Tuungane at the project level. With guidance and assistance from the implementing NGOs, the communities “learn by doing.” In terms of governance capacity, the communities undergo the process of electing a representative development council. These councils then receive support and technical assistance as they go through the process of identifying, selecting, implementing, monitoring and evaluating development and reconstruction projects. The partnership between the implementing NGOs and the communities – particularly the development councils – provides an opportunity for principles of good governance and technical skills to be transferred to civil society. For example, after the elections for the VDC representatives, the electoral committee publicly reads the names and number of votes received for the seven top candidates. In addition, Tuungane protocol calls for the establishment of a community mobilizer to work to ensure that community members are aware of VDC meetings as well as to regularly engage the community members to identify their interests and ideas (IRC, DFID and CARE, 2009).

A mid-term evaluation of Tuungane found, however, that although “approximately 50 per cent of the village projects were implemented in a participative and transparent manner, hardly anyone understood the applicability of the good governance principles beyond the Tuungane program and there is not much evidence that this will be sustained after the projects come to an end” (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009, p. 4). Related, the mid-term evaluation noted that community members rarely mentioned “free and fair elections, transparency, accountability and inclusion” as one of the three most important contributions of Tuungane (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009, p. 41). Thus, although civil society
involvement contributions to capacity building and partnership, it faces some limitations.

**Role of Aid Workers.** The program design for Tuungane emphasizes the need for aid workers to build the capacity of civil society actors to implement development and reconstruction projects, as well as to promote governance capacity. Tuungane entails substantial training of and technical assistance to the VDCs and CDCs by aid workers. The program implementers conducted more than 2,700 training sessions on financial management principles, good governance, leadership and community development (CGI, 2009). The training aims to prepare the committee members to “execute development projects that follow the principles of transparency and participation” (IRC, 2008a). After a VDC is formed, the aid workers conduct three days of training that describes the program and the roles of each of the positions. In addition, the aid workers train the VDCs on the decisionmaking process, the reporting procedures and requirements, the project criteria, the concept of “do no harm,” and the characteristics of good governance (IRC, DFID and CARE, 2009). The community members interviewed during the field work did demonstrate a clear understanding of the Tuungane process.\(^{131}\)

The technical capacity is largely built through trainings and technical assistance provided by Tuungane staff members. The “wait it out” strategy utilized for Tuungane may somewhat limit capacity building and partnership by resulting in security-related delays to the extent that aid workers are unable to reach the communities to provide technical assistance or conduct trainings.

The creation, development and activities of VDCs and CDCs serve as the foundation for teaching principles of good governance. The entire process emphasizes transparency and accountability. For example, the VDC and CDC must report on their activities to community members to receive additional installments of the project funding. The mid-term evaluation found that the learning model employed by Tuungane was “one-directional and instructional and does not mesh with the intended

\(^{131}\) Interview with committee members, Kalehe, DRC, July 6, 2009.
learning-by-doing model of the programme. It does not include learning loops to reflect on successes and weaknesses of realised activities and the identification of improvements in a structured manner. Without such active learning practices, knowledge and skills will remain superficial and are easily forgotten" (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009, p. 2). The evaluation did note that the follow-up visits of the aid workers partly compensated for this weakness (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009). Overall, the role of aid workers contributes to the principle of capacity building and partnership with some limitations.

Sustainability

Sustainability emphasizes the importance of supporting activities that can be maintained and - perhaps more importantly - avoiding those that cannot (e.g., providing equipment without training on maintenance). The following section describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers adhere to the principle of sustainability.

Role of the Government. As mentioned above, the Congolese government plays a limited role in Tuungane. The lack of formal government involvement hinders a transition to indigenous government management, unless Tuungane is harnessed for the government decentralization process or otherwise supported by the government. Given the limited legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government in the Kivus, relying on civil society rather than the government with its lack of presence in the Kivus may promote sustainability in the short term, however, it is unlikely to promote sustainability in the long-term. Most of the Tuungane projects relate to the delivery of public services, which remain the government’s responsibility. It remains questionable, however, whether the government can sustainably deliver goods and services in the future. As such, the limited role of the government likely neither contributes to sustainability nor significantly detracts from sustainability.

Role of Civil Society. The capacity building of civil society mentioned above promotes sustainability by developing the skills and establishing a platform with the development councils for future development and reconstruction efforts. Like NSP, Tuungane’s design
relies heavily on the Congolese and creates structures that could ultimately manage local development. The creation of a platform for future development and reconstruction activities and the improved skills amongst civil society to undertake these activities promotes sustainability. Unlike in Afghanistan, however, the committees have not approached other organizations for funding. They stated that the other development actors were not willing to work in an open and transparent manner. CDC members also explained that they specifically targeted sectors that other development actors did not support as part of the project selection process, and thus these actors would not support their activities.¹³² The relatively “newness” of the committees may largely explain this more limited focus of the committee members. Thus it is not yet clear whether the CDCs in the Kivus will be able to capitalize upon their skills to continue carrying out development and reconstruction activities in the medium- or long-term.

At the project level, sustainability did not seem to be a central requirement for project selection by the civil society; however, the Tuungane protocols do require the VDCs to take into consideration the on-going costs of a given project (IRC, DFID and CARE, 200). On the one hand, committees had clearly made arrangements to ensure that projects would be useful and avoided some of the more common pitfalls hindering sustainability. For example, school construction/rehabilitation projects visited during the fieldwork had identified teachers. On the other hand, some of the construction projects ran out of funds before completion, as was the case for the two project sites visited in Kalehe. The mid-term evaluation found consistent results with education and health services charging user fees that contribute “positively to the functionality and sustainability of the projects,” however similar contributions or fees do “not apply to the operation and maintenance of other infrastructure, especially water supply” (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009, p. 45). In addition, the evaluation of Tuungane found that “quality and sustainability of the installed or improved infrastructure

¹³² Interview with committee members, Kalehe, DRC, July 6, 2009.
are important elements for a successful program and should have been
given more attention" (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009, p. 3)

For example, one of the six-classroom schools visited during the
fieldwork lacked windows, doors and teaching materials. The literacy
hall visited during the fieldwork had walls and a roof, but the floor
was very rough and made of uneven dirt and grass. Without leveling the
floor, the hall may not be functional. Civil society members indicate
that currency devaluation during the life of the project partly
explained their inability to complete the activities.133 In addition,
the civil society members may not have the expertise needed to
adequately plan and accurately incorporate sustainability factors into
project selection and implementation.

Delays in project implementation may negatively affect
sustainability as they may affect project quality (e.g., stopping
construction of a building part-way through may make it vulnerable and
deterioriation occurred during the delay may create additional resource
requirements outside of the budget). Tuungane, like other programs in
this region, faced delays due to weather (e.g., the rainy season) and
contractors not meeting deadlines. In addition, Tuungane policies and
procedures may also cause delays. For example, the mid-term evaluation
found delays due to late approval of project documents and challenges
securing the required community contribution (Perf and Kyamusugulwa,
2009).

The overall structure of the CDC does have the potential to promote
sustainability and some positive examples of efforts to promote
sustainability of projects were evident as discussed above. Despite
these positive contributions, the role of civil society faces
significant limitations. Most notably, project sustainability did not
seem to be emphasized or present consistently in the projects.

Role of Aid Workers. Theoretically the provision of technical
oversight by aid workers should promote sustainability, however, this
did not appear to always be the case. As mentioned above, Tuungane

133 Interview with committee members, Kalehe, DRC, July 6, 2009.
staff focused more on the process than the projects. The lack of sustainability in at least some of the projects does not only indicate significant limitations amongst civil society but also the aid workers. The role of the aid workers includes monitoring and evaluation to ensure technical soundness and sustainability of projects, which was not consistently done in Tuungane. In addition, the “wait it out” strategy can result in security-related delays in project implementation that risk undermining project sustainability. The security environment and related security strategies may also reduce project sustainability. Although the implementation by local actors means that project activities can continue even if there is insecurity on the routes that development actors would travel to access the project sites, because the project funding is delivered in installments, insecurity can result in delays in monitoring and evaluation of activities by the implementing organizations and thus lead to delays in disbursement of funds and project activities.

Two committees visited mentioned delays in receiving follow-on disbursal of funds due to insecurity and the inability of aid workers to travel to their community and confirm progress in implementation. Thus the role of aid workers contributes to sustainability but with significant limitations. In addition, the mid-term evaluation found delays due to late approval of project documents (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009). Overall, the role of aid workers contributed with significant limitations to the sustainability.

Selectivity

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the principle of selectivity includes both responding to local needs and commitments and to serving foreign policy interests. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society, and aid workers affect the ability of Tuungane to adhere to this principle.

Role of the Government. As mentioned above, the Congolese government plays an extremely limited role in Tuungane overall. Despite the lack of a key role for government representatives at the program or project level, the Tuungane protocols do specify that aid workers and
civil society actors should integrate projects into government development plans to the extent that they are in place. In addition, Tuungane protocol requires that the ministerial representatives approve construction of new water, sanitation, education or transportation infrastructure (IRC, DFID and CARE, 2009). It is not evident, however, that the required government approval for construction is more than a formality, or that the Congolese government has much of a presence throughout the Kivus.

The limited role of the Congolese government may not promote the general foreign policy interests of the British government - or other international actors - to promote stability in the Kivus as ultimately the Congolese government has the responsibility for the provision of public services that Tuungane projects deliver; however, given the limited legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government, working directly with communities may actually contribute more to stability in the Kivus than supporting the government to do so. In terms of meeting the needs of the community, the lack of a key role for the Congolese government does not necessarily affect adherence to this aspect of the principle of selectivity. Overall, the lack of a role played by the government neither contributes to nor significantly detracts from adherence to the principle of selectivity.

Role of Civil Society. The project decisionmaking authority rests with civil society itself, thus the selection of projects necessarily reflects perceived local needs as well as their interests. The issue of “elite capture” discussed in Chapter 4 could also be a risk with Tuungane. As a means of reducing this risk, Tuungane requires that VDCs and CDCs have an inclusion officer and that projects must contribute to the overall community. One VDC member stated that, “This is the first time we have ever decided to build something together. Before villagers only looked after their own plots [of farming land]. Tuungane has changed the way that people think” (IRC, 2010b).

134 Elite capture means that dominant members of the community serve their own interests at the sake of the overall community interests.
Tuungane does not generally support commercial activities that may disproportionately benefit individual community members or create tensions among the community.\textsuperscript{135} As depicted in Figure 5.9, Tuungane projects are predominantly health centers, water and sanitation, schools and roads.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure5_9.png}
\caption{Types of Tuungane Projects\textsuperscript{136}}
\end{figure}

SOURCE: Ferf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009

Given the emphasis on community project selection and limited constraints, Tuungane projects correlate highly with indigenous priorities. It is important to note, however, that these priorities may not directly correspond to the actual development needs of the community. For example, community members may recognize the need for improved education, but opt to build a school when teacher quality may be a greater constraint in the education sector and thus teacher training may be a greater need. In addition, members of the development

\textsuperscript{135} Interview with implementing partner representative, Goma, DRC, July 2009.
\textsuperscript{136} This includes the 481 accepted projects as of the end of September 2008.
councils indicated that the size of the grants prevents them from selecting some of the prioritized projects.\textsuperscript{137} These factors present some limitations to the contributions of civil society to adherence to the principle of selectivity.

Like NSP, Tuungane does not explicitly consider foreign policy interests as an input; however, the promotion of social cohesion is a desired output of the program and ostensibly a key factor to promote stability in the Kivus, which is a key foreign policy interest of the British government and other international donors.\textsuperscript{138} To the extent that foreign policy interests align with those of the community members, Tuungane projects can also promote these interests. For example, the school construction project may increase the number of young boys who attend school rather than risk becoming a child soldier. Overall, the key role of civil society in project selection significantly contributes to the principle of selectivity.

\textbf{Role of Aid Workers.} As with the NSP, aid workers do not directly influence project selection. The limited role of aid workers in project selection may result in selection of projects other than those that development and reconstruction actors experts prioritize. The centrality of civil society in project selection ensures that projects are appropriate for the community; however, they may not necessarily be the projects that have the greatest positive impact on the community’s development. This may present a tradeoff between the principles of ownership and selectivity and indicates some limitations in aid workers’ contribution to selectivity.

\textbf{Results and Accountability}

The fifth principle of sound development and reconstruction consists of identifying, measuring and reporting on clear indicators of success. The section below describes how the roles of the government,  

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{137} Interview with committee members, Kalehe, DRC, July 6, 2009. \textsuperscript{138} Interview with DFID and other international donors’ staff, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, July 2008.}
civil society and aid workers affect the ability of Tuungane to adhere to principle of results and accountability.

**Role of the Government.** As mentioned above, the government does not play a role in the implementation of Tuungane. This does not affect adherence to the principle of results and accountability, and thus neither contributes to nor detracts from this principle.

**Role of Civil Society.** The development councils report on their activities to both the implementing organizations and to the community members themselves. This “dual reporting” structure ensures that results are effectively tracked at the program management level, and also that the development councils remain accountable to the community writ large. The development councils conduct ongoing monitoring as well as evaluation of the project implementation to report to the implementing organizations. For example, the VDCs and CDCs hold community meetings to discuss the progress of the development and reconstruction projects. The installment method of disbursing funds increases accountability and engages the population in project monitoring. This direct role in monitoring and evaluating significantly contributes to the principle of results and accountability.

**Role of Aid Workers.** Aid workers maintain responsibility for results and accountability at the program level and augment the monitoring and evaluation efforts carried out by civil society. The Tuungane implementing organizations conduct ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the program activities that track outputs such as the number of committees established, projects funded and trainings conducted. The aid workers submit monthly reports to the national directorate for Tuungane (which is led by the IRC as the lead implementer), including both a narrative and a tracking sheet that describe the current status, progress and gaps between planned and actual activities for each project, as well as a plan for the next month’s activities. The national directorate compiles these reports to prepare quarterly and annual reports for DFID (IRC, DFID and CARE, 2009).

Within Tuungane, both the community and the implementing organizations monitor projects. Project technical staff - such as
engineers - assess the technical soundness of designs and projects. The installment system of fund disbursal also requires mid-term monitoring and evaluation by the implementing organizations prior to disbursing the next round of funding. This also increases accountability throughout multiple steps in the process. Field research identified that some projects that had finished the Tuungane project were incomplete (e.g., a community building without a finished roof or windows). The existence of incomplete projects may indicate a limit in the monitoring and evaluation that failed to identify potential issues and a means of addressing these issues. The “rely within” strategy enables monitoring and evaluation by the committees and communities themselves; however, the implementing organizations likely cannot properly process the community’s monitoring and evaluation until the security situation permits them access to the area with the “wait it out” strategy.

The IRC contracted a midterm process evaluation carried out by Adriaan J.E. Perf and Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa in the fall of 2008, which addressed community mobilization, facilitation, learning and support processes, and staff competence and performance in South Kivu, Maniema and Haut Katanga. The evaluation included visits to 23 villages and more than 140 interviews with household, small and large groups (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009). Overall, the evaluation found that, “the village projects will make a contribution to social and, to a very minor extent, economic development in nearly all sub-committees... Levels of community participation and involvement varied strongly,” (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009, p. 2).

In addition, the IRC is conducting a rigorous multi-year evaluation in collaboration with Columbia University. The evaluation examines three general areas:

1. Whether the program achieves its objectives of supporting economic recovery, fostering social cohesion, and improving the quality of governance.

2. What program features work (or do not) and why (or why not).

3. When and where is the program most effective (Humphreys and Nelson, 2007).
The evaluation utilizes a first best method of randomization to establish a random set of control communities.\textsuperscript{139} The baseline survey results were completed in May 2008.\textsuperscript{140} The baseline survey found that the areas examined did, indeed, face very poor socio-economic conditions with mixed results on the sense of social cohesion in the villages. In terms of governance, the respondents highlighted the central role of chiefs and village elders in local-level governance with “no evidence of a demand for more participatory decision making” (Humphreys, 2008, pg. 3). As discussed above, the role of aid workers includes several efforts to promote results and accountability. The security context, however, can hinder the ability of aid workers to carry out related activities. The evaluations that have been conducted, as well as direct observation, have found weaknesses in project quality that may have been avoided had more regular monitoring by aid workers occurred. As such, the role of aid workers contributes to the principle of results and accountability with some limitations.

**Flexibility**

The ability to adapt to changing conditions – or flexibility – is particularly important for conflict-affected areas. The ways in which the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect the ability of Tuungane to adhere to principle of flexibility are examined below.

**Role of the Government.** The limited role of the government, a bureaucracy not well known for its flexibility, certainly does not hinder Tuungane’s flexibility and even fosters it. The decision to not rely on the Congolese government to play the primary role in program management, but rather to utilize a more nimble actor – aid workers –
promotes flexibility within Tuungane.\textsuperscript{141} As such, the limited role of the government could be viewed as significantly contributing to the flexibility of Tuungane.

\textbf{Role of Civil Society.} As mentioned above, civil society plays a key role in project identification and implementation. The development councils who make these decisions are part of the communities where they will be implemented and thus close to the changing conditions in which the activities will be implemented. As discussed in the NSP case study, the project selection occurs during the program itself rather than prior to the start of the program. As a result, the decisionmaking occurs closer to the actual project implementation. This significantly contributes to flexibility to adapt to changing conditions on the ground.

\textbf{Role of Aid Workers.} With aid workers overseeing program management, changes can be made more easily than when inherently less flexible actors such as governments oversee management. Given that the IRC maintains a presence in South Kivu, it can respond relatively quickly to changing conditions and to issues that arise throughout the Tuungane process. On the other hand, the Tuungane implementation strategy prescribes a very specific and standardized sequence of activities, which does “not allow much space for fine-tuning to local circumstances,” (Perf and Kyamusugulwa, 2009, p. 4). As a result, the key role played by aid workers in program management contributes to Tuungane’s flexibility with some limitations.

\textbf{Assessment and Conflict Management}

Assessment and conflict management - the seventh principle of sound development and reconstruction - entails conducting a thorough pre-program assessment to understand the needs and challenges of a particular area. In particular, in conflict-affected settings,

\textsuperscript{141} Although the minimal role of the government does positively contribute to adherence to some of the principles of sound development and reconstruction, these short-term benefits do come at a cost that is discussed later in the dissertation.
assessments must take into consideration conflict factors, and how activities could unintentionally exacerbate conflict. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect the ability of Tuungane to adhere to the principle of assessment and conflict management.

Role of the Government. Again, the government plays a limited role in Tuungane’s implementation. Given the destabilizing activities of members of the Congolese army and the lack of legitimacy of the Congolese government discussed above, the government playing a central role in Tuungane would likely actually create conflict. Thus, the decision not to heavily engage the Congolese government means that the government’s limited role likely promotes conflict management with the limitation that it does not provide an opportunity for the government to contribute.

Role of Civil Society. The development councils conduct their own assessments to select projects. The inclusion of the community in project selection can help minimize the risk that selected projects may exacerbate societal tensions. In addition, Tuungane protocol requires that the development councils take into consideration existing or potential conflicts related to a proposed project and put in place a plan to minimize the risks of conflict (IRC, DFID and CARE, 2009). This significantly contributes to assessment and conflict management; however, it faces some limitations in that civil society members may not have the necessary technical expertise to fully take into consideration conflict mitigation techniques.

Role of Aid Workers. The aid worker contribution to assessment and conflict management has been minimal. The aid workers do not explicitly conduct assessments related to the appropriateness of CDD/R activities for South Kivu, nor do their ongoing activities specifically focus on the extent to which Tuungane may interface with factors driving the conflict. The lack of consideration of assessment and conflict management means that aid workers do not contribute to this principle.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The unpredictable nature of the violence in the Kivus has prohibited the implementation of the CDD/R program in North Kivu, and creates challenges for implementing Tuungane in areas of South Kivu. Most notably, the unpredictable violence affects the ability of aid workers to carry out program management and monitoring and evaluation functions. The discussion of the conflict context above identified seven key factors that most significantly affect the program design and security strategy: (1) historical lack of central government legitimacy, effectiveness and reach; (2) history of instrumentalized ethnic tensions; (3) a heavily displaced population; (4) dire socio-economic conditions; (5) a persistent lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government; (6) periods of heightened risk, particularly when traveling by road; and (7) unpredictable violence with high risks for civilians. The program design, particularly the implementation, and security strategy in turn affect the principles of sound development and reconstruction.

These seven key factors of the conflict context in turn affect the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers. The historical and persistent lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government creates a need for governance, but a limited role for the Congolese government.

The heavily displaced population and ensuing frayed social fabric and the security environment with medium levels of violence and particular risks for travel by road created a need for strong involvement by civil society. Civil society plays a key role in project implementation through Tuungane.

The persistent lack of effective Congolese government and the capacity of civil society weakened by decades of protracted conflict and heavy displacement create a real need for aid workers to play a central role in Tuungane. Aid workers oversee the management of Tuungane at the program level and provide substantial capacity building, technical assistance and oversight at the project level.
The roles of these three actors in turn affect the ability of Tuungane to adhere to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction as described below.

Ownership
The minimal role of the Congolese government in Tuungane detracts from the principle of ownership with respect to the government, and is thus coded as low. On the other hand, the substantial role of civil society significantly contributes to ownership amongst the Congolese people, and is thus coded as high. The aid workers engage with both the government and the communities to foster ownership and contribute with some limitations to this principle. In particular, the aid workers rely on international organizations which can limit the sense of ownership as can some of the weaknesses identified in communicating the principles and practices of Tuungane. This translates into being coded as medium-high.

Capacity Building and Partnership
Again, the lack of a clear role for the Congolese government detracts from the principle of capacity building and partnership and is thus coded as low. Aid workers provide substantial program management and oversight as well as technical assistance and support at the project level to civil society, which plays a key role in project implementation. The learning model and security strategies employed by aid workers somewhat limit the aid workers and civil society contributions to adherence to capacity building and partnership. Thus both civil society and aid workers’ roles are coded as medium-high.

Sustainability
Although the Congolese government does not play much of a role in Tuungane, civil society does with support from aid workers. In the short term, this may actually promote sustainability of Tuungane by not relying on a largely ineffective government; however, in the long-run the lack of a role for the Congo government could detract from sustainability. Given this mixed result, the role of the government - or lack thereof - neither contributes to nor detracts from the principle
of sustainability and is thus coded as low-medium. At the project level, the key role played by civil society can promote sustainability by instilling a sense of ownership (and thus a desire to maintain projects); however, the lack of emphasis on technical soundness, completeness and maintenance may mean that projects do not last. The "wait it out" strategy employed by aid workers also seemed to contribute to poor technical quality and incompleteness of projects. Thus the roles of all three actors are coded as medium.

Selectivity

The lack of a role of the Congolese government does not appear to significantly contribute to or detract from the principle of selectivity, and is coded as low-medium. The limited role of the government has the same mixed results on selectivity as it does on the sustainability as described above. The central role played by civil society promotes the selection of projects responding to the community's needs by placing the decisionmaking in the hands of the development and reconstruction "consumers." In addition, the potential benefits related to social cohesion align with foreign policy interests in promoting stability. The relatively small level of funding available for projects does, however, somewhat limit project selection by the community. This significantly contributes to the principle of selectivity with some limitations, and thus the role of civil society is coded as medium-high. The relatively limited role of aid workers in project selection may miss an opportunity to incorporate insights and "lessons learned" from international development and reconstruction experts, however. Thus the role of aid workers faces some limitations in contributing to the principle of selectivity, and is coded as medium-high.

Results and Accountability

The lack of a role of the Congolese government in Tuungane does not appear to affect adherence to the principle of results and accountability, and is thus coded as low-medium. The central role of civil society in project management, including monitoring and evaluation, significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of
results and accountability at the community level, and is coded as high. The central role of aid workers in program management ensures that regular monitoring and evaluation occurs, and the aid workers engaged in Tuungane actively support independent process and impact evaluations. This on-going monitoring and evaluation and the support of aid workers for impact evaluations contributes to the principle of results and accountability; however, the “wait it out” strategy may cause delays in monitoring and evaluation and thus overall project implementation. This somewhat limits adherence to this principle, resulting in a coding of medium-high for aid workers.

**Flexibility**

As governments and other bureaucracies typically reduce flexibility, the limited role of the Congolese government significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of flexibility, resulting in a coding of high. Although the overall structure of Tuungane is set, a fair amount of flexibility exists within the program at the project level. The centrality of civil society at the implementation level significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of flexibility, and the role of the aid workers operating on the ground and directly managing Tuungane at the program level provides an opportunity for program-level adjustments as needed; however, the program design includes a level of rigidity that somewhat limits flexibility. This translates into a coding of high for civil society and medium-high for aid workers.

**Assessment and Conflict Management**

Similar to the NSP, the program design of Tuungane did not appear to actively incorporate a pre-program assessment or conflict management into the design aside from the project-level needs assessment conducted by the CDCs. Again, this does not appear to directly result from the conflict context or the roles of the key actors, but more so to program design outside the control of this study. The lack of a role for the government contributes to assessment and conflict management given concerns amongst the population of the role of government actors in the
conflict; however, this also misses an opportunity to positively engage the government in activities working to address some of the key conflict factors. Thus the role of the government is coded as medium-high.

The central role of civil society in project implementation also means that the community itself assesses its needs, increasing the likelihood that the projects will respond to these needs. In addition, the program structure requires communities to consider conflict factors when planning programming, thus contributing to adherence to this principle with the limitation that the civil society members themselves may have shortcomings in terms of technical conflict expertise. The role of civil society translates into a code of medium-high. The lack of assessment and conflict management undertaken by the aid workers means that they do not contribute to this principle and are thus coded as low-medium.

Table 5.1 below summarizes the codings for the role of each of the three key actors for each of the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. In addition, the table presents the overall score for each principle as well as the overall score for each actor. Finally, the table provides an overall rating of the extent to which this case study overall promotes adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.
Table 5.1 – Adherence to Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction in the Kivus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Aid Workers</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium (3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building &amp; Partnership</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium (2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectivity</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium (3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results &amp; Accountability</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High (3.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment &amp; Conflict Management</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium (3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Low-Medium (2.4)</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
<td>Medium-High (3.6)</td>
<td>MEDIUM (3.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the limited role of the Congolese government neither contributes to nor detracts from Tuungane’s adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. The role of the government significantly contributes to flexibility and contributes with some limitations to assessment and conflict management. It does not contribute or somewhat detracts from selectivity, sustainability and results and accountability. The role of the government seems to significantly detract from the principles of ownership and capacity building.

Overall, the central role played by civil society contributes with some limitations to adherence to the seven principles. The role of civil society significantly contributes to ownership, results and accountability, and flexibility. Civil society’s role contributes with some limitations to capacity building and partnership, selectivity, and assessment and conflict management. Civil society contributed the least – with significant limitations – to the principle of sustainability.
Overall, the supporting role played by aid workers contributes with some limitations to adherence to the seven principles. The role of aid workers contributes with some limitations to ownership, capacity building and partnership, selectivity, results and accountability and flexibility. Aid workers contribute with significant limitations to sustainability, and did not contribute to assessment and conflict management. On the security side, the unpredictability of the violence makes developing a clear strategy for minimizing their risk of being targeted by armed actors difficult. The appropriateness of the “wait it out” strategy may negatively affect adherence to some of the principles of sound development and reconstruction.

Taking into consideration the roles of all three key actors, the Tuungane case study indicates the greatest strength in significantly contributing to adherence to the principle of flexibility. Tuungane faced some limitations in contributing to the principle of results and accountability and significant limitations in adherence to all other principles.

In conclusion, the experience of the Tuungane in the Kivus, and the ability of Tuungane to contribute to the adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction with significant limitations, indicates that sound development and reconstruction is feasible in a mid-level conflict setting. The decision to employ a “wait it out” security strategy and not to undertake Tuungane in North Kivu, however, raises serious questions about the feasibility of carrying out CDD/R in an unpredictable and relatively insecure environment. It is unclear whether other security strategies would have enabled Tuungane to be implemented in North Kivu, or whether the security situation truly is such that it is not feasible to carry out CDD/R activities. The lack of the role of the Congolese government seemed to both significantly contribute to and detract from various principles, indicating some level of trade-offs for government involvement when the government lacks legitimacy, effectiveness and/or reach in the short-term. Although the limited role of the government may have some positive short-term benefits in terms of flexibility and assessment and conflict management, this also has serious consequences for long-term sustainability of the
program. In the long term, the government must play a role in development to ensure that these efforts can continue and does not rely on the international community.
INTRODUCTION

Since independence, Haiti has experienced political instability with numerous regime changes, United States occupation, and brutal dictatorships. Since the U.S.-led multinational force restored Aristide to power in 1994, Haiti has struggled to establish a legitimate and inclusive government, and "thugs for hire" have created unrest – particularly in urban areas and during key political moments. The greatest insecurity occurs in Haiti’s major cities, most notably poor areas of Port au Prince. The United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in June 2004 to “to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti’s Government institutions and rule-of-law-structures, as well as to promote and to protect human rights” (MINUSTAH, 2010, p. 1).

Figure 6.1 – Map of Haiti

SOURCE: United Nations Cartographic Section
Haiti’s high levels of urbanization, poverty, and unemployment combine with a growing youth bulge to create an environment with large levels of unmet expectations and frustration. The World Bank initiated Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Rural in 2003 as a means of continuing to respond to Haiti’s significant social and economic needs by working directly with communities during a period where engaging the government proved difficult. These CDD/R activities in the rural areas then expanded into urban areas first with Projet Pilote de Développement Communautaire Participatif à Port-au-Prince (PRODEPAP) and then beyond Port au Prince with Projet National de Developpement Communautaire Participatif en Milieu Urbain. PRODEP/PRODEPUR aims to develop community capacity, promote good governance, and implement socio-economic development projects.

Given the relatively low level of violence in Haiti, PRODEP/PRODEPUR represents the case where we would expect the conflict context to least negatively affect the soundness of community-driven development and reconstruction. This chapter applies the analytic framework described in Chapter 3 to examine the extent to which sound development and reconstruction principles can be upheld in a relatively low conflict area, as well as how the conflict context affects the adherence to principles of sound development and reconstruction.

First, this chapter examines the conflict context – including Haiti’s background; current social, economic and political conflict factors; and security environment in order to cull out the key aspects of the conflict context that most significantly affect the ability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction. The second and third sections describe the program design and security strategies with particular attention to how key aspects of the conflict context affect them. An examination of how the program design and security strategy in turn affect the PRODEP/PRODEPUR’s adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction follows. The conclusion examines how the conflict
context affects the ability to adhere to principles of sound development and reconstruction in Haiti.¹⁴²

CONFLICT CONTEXT

This section describes the conflict context in Haiti. In addition to providing general descriptive information to understand the environment in which PRODEP/PRODEPUR operates, this section identifies the aspects of the conflict context that most significantly affect the program design and security strategy.

Background

Haiti is the world’s first black republic and the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere. Rich in sugarcane and coffee, the former French colony had real opportunity to develop into a prosperous independent state; however, Haiti’s early leaders built the republic on non-inclusive structures that resembled those of its colonial rule (ICG, 2004). Political instability marred Haiti, with “22 changes in government from 1843 until the U.S. intervened militarily in 1915 and occupied the country for nineteen years” (ICG, 2004, p. 3). Three decades of a brutal father-son dictatorship followed the U.S. occupation. First François “Papa Doc” and then Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier maintained three decades of a brutal father-son dictatorship. Papa Doc “tortured and killed thousands of dissidents, stole massively from government coffers and forced the separation of families through expulsions” (Charles, 2008, p. 1). Upon Papa Doc’s death in 1971, his son, known as Baby Doc, ruled Haiti with similar brutal tactics. Human Rights Watch estimates that the Duvaliers ordered the deaths of 20,000

¹⁴² The author conducted fieldwork in June 2009, and thus, the information in this chapter describes the situation prior to the 2010 earthquake. For more information on development and reconstruction in post-earthquake Haiti, see, for example, Keith Crane, James Dobbins, Laurel E. Miller, Charles P. Ries, Christopher S. Chivvis, Marla C. Haims, Marco Overhaus, Heather Lee Schwartz, and Elizabeth Wilke, Building a More Resilient Haitian State, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG1039-SRF/CC, 2010.
to 30,000 civilians, using various divisions of the Haitian military as well as the Duvaliers’ paramilitary force, the Tontons Macoutes (HRW, 2006).

In 1986, a popular uprising forced “Baby Doc” to flee the country\textsuperscript{143} and resulted in four years of military-backed governments and mob vengeance against the perpetrators of the Duvalier brutality. When Haiti held democratic elections in 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide ran on opposition to military regimes and promotion of social and economic equality. He won 67 percent of the vote, and raised the hopes of the general populace for true change (Ridgeway, 1994). The Aristide government “lacked political experience and was ill-equipped for the enormous challenges,” and a military coup backed by the economic elite overthrew Aristide on September 30, 1991 (ICG, 2004, p. 4).

Haiti returned to brutal military-backed rule until international pressure – including both a high-level U.S. delegation and a U.S.-led multinational force – forced Haiti’s regime to relinquish power to Aristide on October 15, 1994. High hopes returned along with Aristide. Despite broad popular appeal and considerable support from the international community, and particularly the United States, the Aristide government failed to establish inclusive political, social and economic institutions. Although Aristide officially stepped down at the end of his term in December 1995, he did not truly relinquish power to René Préval, his hand-picked successor. Aristide created a splinter political party, the Fanmi Lavalas, from the multi-party coalition that had previously supported him, Organisation Politique Lavalas (OPL) (ICG, 2004). In 1997 the inability of the Préval administration to appoint a successor to Prime Minister Rosny Smarth, who resigned under pressure from Aristide, led to a political crisis and a year without multinational lending.

In an effort to regain power in what had become a “winner-takes-all” state, Aristide hired uneducated urban thugs called chimères to

\textsuperscript{143} Jean-Claude Duvalier returned to Haiti on January 16, 2011. He was then arrested and charged with corruption.
weaken the opposition movement through violence. Irregularities, fraud
and intimidation marred Haiti’s various elections, and Aristide regained
power in the 2000 presidential election, which the international
community generally did not deem free and fair. Haiti’s inability to
establish legitimate and effective political institutions caused a
significant decrease in international financial assistance, including
the suspension of approximately $500 million in direct assistance by the
World Bank (ICG, 2004). Both opposition parties and the government
resorted to violence. A group of civil society organizations formed the
Group of 184 in 2002 and became a key opposition actor, creating a
legacy of associating community organizations with politics. In early
2004, insurgents gained control of half of the country and Aristide
resigned on February 29, 2004 (ICG, 2004). In February 2006, Réne
Préval won the controversial presidential election, and Prime Minister
Jacques-Édouard Alexis took office in June 2006. Unrest persisted with
violent gang activities including kidnappings, particularly in Cité
Soleil, an impoverished area of Port au Prince. MINUSTAH launched a
series of operations to quell the violence in Cité Soleil culminating in
a very tough offensive with the Haitian National Police in 2007 that
significantly reduced the level of violence (Immigration, 2008). Issues
related to impunity for the various human rights violations remains a
destabilizing factor in the country, however. In summary, Haiti has
historically lacked a legitimate and effective government, but, it has
had a relatively strong civil society.

Current Social, Economic and Political Factors

Although significant progress has been made since the mid-1990s,
Haiti’s stability remains fragile. Haiti ranks twelfth on the Fund for
Peace’s 2010 Failed States Index (FfP, 2010) and ranks 149 out of 182
countries in the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009). Haiti has
scored very low in the World Bank Governance Indicators as reported in
Governance Matters 2009, most notably in terms of government
effectiveness (in the lowest 10th percentile except in 2007), rule of law
(consistently in the lowest tenth percentile), and control of corruption
(in the lowest 10th percentile except for 2008). 2008 saw significant
improvements in voice and accountability and political stability, which both ranked in the 25th to 50th percentile (WB, 2009c). Despite relative improvements in stability and governance, Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western hemisphere with approximately 80 percent of its citizens living in poverty, including 54 percent in abject poverty (CIA, 2010).

Located in the Caribbean, Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. The natural disasters that regularly hit Haiti exacerbate Haiti’s poor socio-economic conditions. Haiti, which is slightly smaller than Maryland, is one of the Caribbean’s most densely populated countries (Verner, 2008). Approximately 45 percent of Haiti’s nine million people live in urban areas (CIA, 2010), and one-quarter of Haiti’s citizens live in Port-au-Prince (ICG, 2009b). An estimated 75,000 people move from the rural areas to Port-au-Prince each year (ICG, 2009b).

In addition to high levels of urbanization, Haiti also suffers from high levels of unemployment. Although the specific number of unemployed Haitians is not known, the CIA World Factbook estimates that two-thirds of Haiti’s population do not hold jobs in the formal sector (CIA, 2010). In addition, approximately 1.1 million adult Haitians rely on remittances from the Haitian Diaspora (ICG, 2009b) rather than working in lowly paid work and “remain idle and near the poverty line” (Verner and Heinemann, 2006). Approximately half of the families supported by remittances live on less than $500 per year (ICG, 2009b).

Youth between 15 and 24 years-old comprise more than twenty percent of the Haitian population, and more than half of the youth who are in the labor market are unemployed (Justesen and Verner, 2007). The high numbers of unemployed youth in urban areas provide a ripe labor pool for gangs mobilized for political purposes or to engage in other criminal activities. For example, drug traffickers take advantage of Haiti’s location and corruption and weaknesses in the Haitian police. An estimated eight percent of the drugs entering the United States came through Hispaniola in 2006 (Perito, 2007).

The installation of the Préval-Alexis administration in 2006 was largely viewed as an opportunity to “build on a rare climate of optimism
in the country” (ICG, 2006); however, the Haitian government failed to live up to expectations or to build upon the improvements in security achieved by MINUSTAH in 2007. In 2008, a series of events exacerbated Haiti’s difficulties including a series of tropical storms and hurricanes, the global financial crisis that hindered international donors’ ability to provide assistance and decreased remittances, and the global food crisis. Food insecurity hit Haiti hard and culminated in riots in Port au Prince in April 2008 (Bone, 2008) after which Prime Minister Alexis resigned (ICG, 2009b). With the installation of Michèle Pierre-Louis as Prime Minister in September 2008, Haiti’s government had a window of opportunity to begin to address the Haitians’ needs and expectations; however, six months after Prime Minister Pierre-Louis took office, Haitians were still waiting for “an effective response to pervasive socio-economic, institutional and political challenges” (ICG, 2009b, p. 1).

These current social, economic and political factors can be summarized as: (1) densely populated urban areas, including with high numbers of unemployed youth, (2) dire economic conditions, and (3) the installation of a legitimate national government that has not yet shown the ability to effectively meet the needs of the Haiti’s citizens.

Security Environment

Just as the background and social, economic and political conflict factors affect PRODEP/PRODEPUR’s adherence to principles of sound development and reconstruction, the security environment also affects the design and implementation of CDD/R. Most notably, the nature and level of the violence directly affect the feasibility and relative merits of the various security strategies described in Chapter 3.

Nature of General Insecurity. The overthrow of President Aristide in 2004 resulted in a “security vacuum” accompanied by a “rise of armed groups of Aristide supporters who sought to spread chaos and fear in hopes that the failure of the 2004-2006 transitional government to stem the violence would lead to Aristide’s return” (Uppsala, 2009).

The general security environment throughout Haiti has improved significantly since the political turmoil in 2004 and ensuing height of
gang violence; however, instability persists. Portions of the country, and particularly the urban slums of Port-au-Prince, are prone to violent flare-ups. The densely populated urban centers with high levels of unemployed youth provide a ripe breeding ground for gangs and other criminal organizations. These armed gangs, in turn, can serve as "thugs for hire" by political actors. The head of an International Committee of the Red Cross delegation to Haiti explained that, "Haiti is a fragile state where armed gangs can be used to stir up trouble for political reasons and abject poverty fuels discontent," (Doole, 2009).

The International Crisis Group (ICG) found that, "the most notorious current security spoilers fall into the often overlapping categories of drug traffickers, gang remnants and corrupt politicians, as well as a small segment of the oligopolistic entrepreneurs and business owners whose affairs continue to thrive under insecurity" (ICG, 2008, p. 2). These spoilers continue to manipulate poor conditions in the country to their advantage. For example, in April 2008 riots broke out to protest high living costs. The ICG found that, "the April protests, which began in Les Cayes, a known drug transit point in the south four hours from Port-au-Prince, were manipulated by local traffickers to create chaos, distract the police and ease the entrance of drugs, as well as mask the release of six allies detained in the local police station" (ICG, 2009b, p. 3). Similarly, residents of Saint Martin, a town near Port-au-Prince, reported being offered "incentives to create disturbances," and there are allegations that supporters of Aristide and opponents of Prime Minister Alexis fostered the riots (ICG, 2009b). Opponents capitalized on the riots to bring about a parliamentary vote of no-confidence and oust Prime Minister Alexis (ICG, 2008).

**Level of General Insecurity.** As mentioned above, the United Nations responded to extremely high levels of armed gang violence with the creation of MINUSTAH in 2004. MINUSTAH significantly improved the security situation in Haiti; however, high levels of crime and violence persist – particularly in the impoverished urban areas such as Cité Soleil. Figure 6.2 depicts the number of crimes reported over six-month periods from January 2007 to June 2009. The level of reported crimes
increased from 2007 (when the United Nations launched a major offensive in Port-au-Prince) to 2008. The first half of 2009 shows a decline from the second half of 2008, but is roughly the same number of crimes as the first half of 2008.

**Figure 6.2 – Number of Reported Security Incidents in Haiti by Type, January 2007 - June 2009**

Source: (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2009)

The type of crimes reported has shifted significantly from 2007 to 2009. As depicted in Figure 6.3, the number of highly violent crimes of homicide and kidnapping reported has decreased, and economic crimes of robbery and theft have consistently increased. Reports of rape and domestic violence increased in the second half of 2008 and first half of 2009 – it is unclear whether this represents an increase in the level of these crimes or whether they are simply being increasingly reported.
Figure 6.3 – Trends in Types of Security Incidents in Haiti, January 2007 - June 2009

Source: (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 2009)

Security Environment for Development and Reconstruction. The security environment of Haiti involves the potential for violent flare-ups, particularly in certain parts of the country. These areas, which are former “no-go” or “red” zones prone to high levels of violence and deemed priority for development and reconstruction activities to promote stability in Haiti, are known as “priority zones.” Historically, development actors maintained limited – if any – operations in these areas. For example, “very few international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had a physical presence in Cité Soleil” (ICG, 2007b). The Haitian government identifies priority zones with the following criteria: (1) insecurity (lack of rule of law and armed violence) or a recent history of it, (2) a breakdown in the social fabric, (3) urban poverty, (4) armed gangs, and/or (5) limited presence of law enforcement (WB, 2008c). Port-au-Prince contains three priority zones (Bel-Air, Martissant/Grand Ravine, and Carrefour-Feuille) as does Cap-Haitien (La Possette/Nan Bannann/Shada, Bas-Gravine/Bande du Nord/Porte Bourgeois and Ste.-Philomene/Kiteyo/Bel-Air). The remaining eleven priority zones are roughly split between the Western and Artibonite districts: Cité Soleil, Delmas 32, Simon Pelé, Carrefour, 2ème Plaine, Dos Rémus and Portail Montrouis/Pressinaud, Portail
Guêpe/Blockhaus, Raboteau, Ka Soley, and Descahos respectively (WB, 2008c). The Haitian government recognizes the need for socioeconomic development activities in these areas, which have had limited activities in the recent past. This presents a challenge to development actors who typically do not have a strong history of operating in the areas and may lack the relationships, contextual understanding and reputation to operate effectively in these fragile areas.

The potential political, gang or drug connections of local organizations further complicate development in these priority zones and throughout Haiti. The ICG warns that, “with at least 100 local organizations in Cité Soleil, often with links to the gangs, and many others outside claiming to be working for the people there, selection of a responsible local partner requires intensive research” (ICG, 2007b, p. 6). Development projects may create conflicts among gangs over who can capitalize on the opportunity to steal part of the development assistance and/or garner public support by claiming credit for the provided services (ICG, 2007b). Potentially the greatest challenge for development actors in Haiti is to ensure that their activities are perceived as objective and thus not the target of vengeance or caught in or unintentionally fueling a political, gang or drug-related battle.

The veneer of peace and security is thin, and the April 2008 riots illustrate that violent outbreaks could arise at any moment. Haiti’s inability to effectively address its past creates a situation where a spark could erupt into a fire.144

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144 The 2010 earthquake add greater complexity to this already challenging environment. The earthquake left the government in disarray, destroyed much of Haiti’s infrastructure, and displaced large numbers of Haiti’s citizens. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the Haitian government faces even greater challenges to meet the needs of its citizens, and political parties or gangs could capitalize on unmet expectations to mobilize the Haitian population to support their own agenda. Although the January 2010 earthquake has arguably increased the risk of instability in Haiti, it has not caused Haiti to descend back into active conflict as of this writing.
PROGRAM DESIGN

This section describes the program design of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. In particular, it identifies how various aspects of the conflict context identified above affect the PRODEP/PRODEPUR design including its objectives, implementation and funding.

Objectives

The objectives of PRODEP/PRODEPUR include community capacity building, promoting governance, and socio-economic development. As mentioned above, the Haitian government has historically lacked legitimacy, effectiveness and reach. The World Bank established PRODEP in late 2003/early 2004 as a means of still responding to Haiti’s significant development needs - including the need to promote principles of good governance - during a time period where international donors had withdrawn support from the Haitian government. Given the challenges working directly with the Haitian government at the creation of PRODEP and the existence of numerous civil society organizations, PRODEP/PRODEPUR focuses on building the capacity of communities themselves to respond to the dire socio-economic conditions.

At a time of instability and ineffectiveness in Haiti’s national leadership and a highly polarized society, PRODEP’s primary goals included both improving basic services and economic opportunities and building social capital and social cohesion. This led to three main objectives: (1) building the development capacity of communities, (2) promoting good governance and transparency, and (3) implementing development projects (BMPAD, 2009c). PRODEP put communities in the driver’s seat of development and required that they work together to prioritize and implement activities.

Implementation

Just as the conflict context influences the objectives of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the context also affects the implementation of CDD/R activities. More specifically, the conflict context affects the roles that various actors - the government, civil society and aid workers - play in implementing PRODEP/PRODEPUR.
First, the historical lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the Haitian government precluded a significant government role in PRODEP initially. In the early 2000s, the Haitian government had a tenuous relationship with the international community, including the World Bank. The World Bank approved a pilot project to better understand the potential for CDD/R in two municipalities in late 2003 with approval from the Haitian government. In January 2004, the pilot project became operational through the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF), the first implementing partner or *mâtres d’ouvrages délégués* (MDOD). The lack of international support for the Aristide government at the time of the PRODEP pilot activities meant a limited role for the Haitian government at the national and local levels initially. As the legitimacy of the Haitian government improved – and along with it, the international support to the government – the Haitian government became increasingly involved in the management of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. Despite increased legitimacy, the Haitian government still has limited capacity, and PRODEP/PRODEPUR could present a means of either increasing or undermining government capacity in Haiti, depending upon how the increased government involvement proceeds.

Second, the historical lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government, combined with the history of strong civil society, creates a good environment for engaging civil society in development and reconstruction activities at the local level. The strong presence of civil society organizations in Haiti provides a solid foundation for building communities’ capacity.

Third, the struggle for effective governance, the dire socio-economic conditions, and the greater security risk for actors perceived as political mean that aid workers have a key role to play in program management and providing technical assistance. The MDODs provide technical assistance and training to the community councils to build civil society organization capacity. To compensate for the limited role of the government initially, the MDODs also undertook much of the management of the CDD/R program.

After the initial success of the pilot project, the World Bank expanded the PRODEP program in 2005. Based on the positive results in
the rural areas, the World Bank initiated a dialogue with the government to determine whether the same approach could be translated into the urban slum areas. The success of the urban pilot project in Port-au-Prince (PRODEPAP) led to a more expanded urban CDD/R program throughout the country (PRODEPUR). The rural and urban programs are founded on the same basic principles with limited variation in implementation.

The World Bank’s CDD/R activities in Haiti involve four primary activities. First, MDODs identify and strengthen community-based organizations (CBOs). Second, the communities establish a Council of the Participatory Development Project (COPRODEP) comprised primarily of representatives from CBOs (80 percent) with some local authorities and community leaders (20 percent) (BMPAD, 2009f). Third, the COPRODEP holds a General Assembly to prioritize and select community development projects. This project selection process occurs in four cycles with a General Assembly for each cycle. Finally, the COPRODEP manages and monitors the implementation of each project.

PADF and the Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) serve as the MDODs for both PRODEP and PRODEPUR. PADF and CECI collaborate with ASSODIO and CARE respectively to help carry out PRODEP activities (BMPAD, 2009j). The World Bank selected these NGOs through a competitive process based on their presence in or familiarity with the target areas of operation and well as the technical and fiscal soundness of their proposals.

PRODEP operates in 59 communities in Haiti’s 10 poorest districts. As of September 2009, more than 700 projects were completed with nearly 600 others submitted (BMPAD, 2009i). Throughout this process, PRODEP has supported more than 2,000 CBOs (BMPAD, 2009c) and operates in ten priority zones in six communities: Port-au-Prince, Cité Soleil, Delmas, Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, and Saint-Marc (BMPAD, 2008). PRODEPPAP implemented 37 projects in two Port-Au-Prince neighborhoods: Cité Soleil and Bel Air, and supported more than 200 CBOs (BMPAD, 2009a).

**Funding**

As mentioned above, at the time of the installation of the PRODEP pilot activities, the World Bank did not provide funding directly to the
The Post-Conflict Unit at the Bank approved a one million dollar grant for the PRODEP pilot project in late 2003, relying on MDODs. As PRODEP expanded and the urban CDD/R activities developed, the World Bank provided funding directly to the Haitian government through the Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d’Aide au Développement (BMPAD), who then funded the MDODs to assist in program management and the provision of technical assistance.

In July 2005, the World Bank approved a $38 million grant from the International Development Association (IDA) to the BMPAD to scale-up PRODEP (WB, 2005b). In 2007, the World Bank provided $1.25 million for the BMPAD for PRODEPPAP. The BMPAD launched PRODEPUR in November 2008 with co-financing from the World Bank ($16 million) and the Caribbean Development Bank ($4 million) (BMPAD, 2009b). As of May 2010, the World Bank invested $10.75 million in community development projects through PRODEP (WB, 2009d).

The COPRODEPs can select four projects, and each project costs up to $20,000 (BMPAD, 2008). For PRODEPUR, projects jointly proposed by the CBOs and the municipal government can cost up to $50,000 (BMPAD, 2008).

SECURITY STRATEGIES

The section below describes the security strategy employed to protect the implementation of PRODEP/PRODEPUR overall (the program level) as well as the implementation of the specific community-level projects (the project level). Two key features of the security environment most directly affect the security strategy employed to protect the implementation of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. First, periods of heightened violence, particularly from urban gangs, mark Haiti’s security environment. Second, the perpetrators of violence in Haiti may receive support – or even take directions – from political actors, and

thus may target those individuals or groups perceived as political or politically affiliated.

**Program Level**

As the legitimacy and international reputation of the Haitian government improved, the World Bank increasingly engaged it in the implementation of PRODEP/PRODEUPR. The management of PRODEP/PRODEUPR now involves both the Haitian government (the BMPAD) and the MDODs. Although Haiti has a relatively low level of violence, the persistent criminality and periods of heightened urban gang violence do pose security risks for government officials and MDODs as they travel to communities and project sites to provide technical assistance and management oversight. PRODEP/PRODEUPR utilizes a combination of “rely within” and “wait it out” for the overall program.

The World Bank identified and selected implementing partners with an ongoing presence in the respective communities for both PRODEP and PRODEUPR. For example, PADF successfully implemented the initial PRODEP pilot project in early 2004 despite the on-going violence. Development councils in the two areas were established and functioning by the end of 2004. Participants emphasized that they would leave politics at the door to work together to improve their community. Arguably the reputation and integration of PADF into the various communities facilitated the feasibility and success of implementing these pilot activities.

When seeking to pilot CDD/R activities in urban areas, the World Bank again worked with PADF – an organization that had a presence in these areas. The high level of success of the “rely within” means a relatively limited need to “wait it out” for any extended period of time. PADF successfully operated in Cité Soleil even during high levels of gang warfare when many other organizations deemed the area too unsafe. The “rely within” and “wait it out” strategies successfully enabled implementation of CDD/R programs throughout Haiti; however, these strategies did result in some implementation delays.

The woman charged with starting up PRODEPPAP had been working in Cité Soleil for many years and worked hard to build the trust of the
community. For example, she would go to Cité Soleil at one in the
morning to meet with youth groups to explain the program. By working
with the frameworks of the local actors, she was able to gain their
trust and earn their respect, and ultimately become considered a part of
the community. PADF did not rush this critical program start-up
process. PRODEPUR was initially designed to be implemented over a year,
but it took 20 months.\textsuperscript{147} The PADF representative took six months just
to get to know the communities and to let them get to know her, PADF and
the proposed program. One of the key features attributed to the success
of the pilot was the slow mobilization and communication campaign. This
enabled the PADF representative to gain the trust of the community,
including of the members of organized crime. Using this method of “rely
within” by integrating the PADF representative into the community
enabled PRODEPPAP to operate even during the violence. On occasion, the
community members would tell the PADF representative that there was
trouble brewing and request that she reschedule meetings for a time when
the violence wasn’t as high or employ a “wait it out” strategy.\textsuperscript{148} A
World Bank representative noted, “When the violence was really high, it
slowed the implementation down a bit” due to an inability to access the
communities.\textsuperscript{149}

\textbf{Project Level}

Like the other two case studies, PRODEP/PRODEPUR utilizes a “rely
within” strategy for implementation at the project level. As mentioned
above, the community council or COPRODEP maintains responsibility for
the identification, selection, implementation, management, monitoring
and evaluation of projects. In the Haiti context, the success of the
“rely within” strategy rests somewhat upon the ability of the MDODs to
ensure that the community-based organizations engaged in PRODEP/PRODEPUR

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{147} Interview with World Bank representative, Washington, DC, May
12, 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Interview with World Bank representative, Washington, DC, May
12, 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{149} Interview with World Bank representative, Washington, DC, May
12, 2009.
\end{itemize}
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are legitimate organizations serving the needs of the community and not simply fronts for urban gangs or politically-motivated actors. The “rely within” approach at the program level and the lengthy program start-up process mitigate these risks.

PRINCIPLES OF SOUND DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

As described above, Haiti’s background; current social, economic and political factors; and security environment influence the program design and security strategies of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. The program design – and particularly the division of labor between the government, civil society and the aid workers - and the security strategy, which focuses on decreasing the risk of being targeted or harmed by violent actors, in turn affect adherence to sound principles of development and reconstruction.

The following section examines the extent to which PRODEP/PRODEPUR adheres to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction with a particular emphasis on how the roles of these three types of actors affect this adherence. Although this dissertation did not conduct impact assessments of each of the three case study programs, it does draw upon other independent evaluations of PRODEP/PRODEPUR.¹⁵⁰

Ownership

This principle relates to the extent to which indigenous actors feel ownership over the development and reconstruction activities. The

¹⁵⁰ There were two independent mid-term evaluations of PRODEP conducted in spring 2009. The first evaluation consists of baseline and follow-up household surveys throughout ten representative communities. The consultants surveyed 1,500 of the 77,967 households (or approximately two percent of the households). ECOSOF S.A. conducted the follow-up survey between April 27 and May 8, 2009. The second evaluation consists of consultations with BMPAD officials and representatives from MDOs, and focus groups with PRODEP participants conducted in May 2009. In addition, CECI conducted an internal evaluation of its participation in PRODEP between May 12 and June 2, 2009. The evaluation consisted of site visits to several projects and discussions with representatives from the CBOs and COPRODEP, as well as local government officials.
section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect promotion of ownership.

**Role of the Government.** When the PRODEP pilot was initially launched, there was a need for a distinct separation between politics and development. In addition, the local authorities were not in place in the rural areas. As such, the government had relatively little involvement in the PRODEP pilot activities. As the project has evolved over time, the role of the government has increased. The BMPAD, a part of the Haitian government, now oversees the implementation of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. The BMPAD consist of approximately five to six staff members, and this government entity contracts to the implementing partners or MDODs.

Local government officials now also actively engage in PRODEP/PRODEPUR at the project level as well. For example, municipal government representatives comprise 20 percent of COPRODEP in the urban areas (BMPAD, 2009f). As members of the COPRODEP, the local government officials can also propose community development projects; however, at least two community-based organizations or the executive committee of the COPRODEP must support the projects proposed by the municipal officials (BMPAD, 2008). The local authorities - including the mayor - play a significant role in the urban program, and particularly in Cité Soleil. For example, a COPRODEP in Cité Soleil utilizes the mayor’s meeting space.\(^{151}\) In addition, the government has provided additional support to activities started under PRODEPPAP. For example, Cité Soleil and Bel Air established a joint poultry project to produce eggs. The Ministry of Agriculture provided additional financing and the Mayor of Cité Soleil provided a six-block area for the project site (BMPAD, 2009m). The urban areas involve smaller municipalities so the local government can more easily play a larger role in the program.

Although the increasing role the government plays in PRODEP/PRODEPUR positively contributes to government ownership, it faces significant limitations. First, the government has not always played a

\(^{151}\) Interviews with PRODEPUR and PRODEP members, Haiti, June 2009.
strong role in program management. Second, the BMPAD itself has relatively minimal capacity and contracts out much of its activities (such as the trainings as discussed in the section on capacity building and partnership). Third, some of the technical experts within the BMPAD were hired as consultants by the World Bank. As such, although they are technically representatives of the Haitian government, in many respects they seem to identify more as World Bank consultants. Fourth, CECI’s evaluation found that some local government officials felt the extent of their participation in project selection was inadequate (François and Monette, 2009). This finding is not surprising as local government officials may have limited access to resources other than PRODEP/PRODEPUR grants. Despite these efforts to incorporate local government officials, the emphasis on civil society organizations may reduce the sense of ownership by the government. These factors significantly limit the sense of government ownership.

Role of Civil Society. The existence of strong civil society provided a platform for PRODEP/PRODEPUR project implementation, and the lack of legitimate and effective government at the debut of the CDD/R activities in Haiti necessitated a central role for civil society. With oversight and assistance from the BMPAD and the MDODs, representatives from the civil society organizations form a project development council that drives the development and reconstruction process at the project level. The COPRODEP maintains responsibility for all aspects of the project cycle from selection through to monitoring and evaluation. The inclusion of several rounds of project selection means that the COPRODEP has repeated experience that helps to more solidly establish its role, and provides the opportunity for multiple community-based organizations to implement projects.

Given Haiti’s history with civil society organizations being political, the creation of the COPRODEP helps to minimize the risk that development and reconstruction assistance will be viewed as politically motivated or supporting one political group over others. Similarly,

152 Interviews with BMPAD representatives, Haiti, June 2009.
having the community-based organizations themselves control the project
decisionmaking reduces actual or perceived bias on the part of the
international community. The inclusion of numerous civil society
organizations deemed to serve non-political segments of the community
also helps to maximize the sense of ownership because various segments
of the community feel they have representation in the decision-making
process. In addition, an independent midterm evaluation found that
participating CBOs have higher numbers of active members since
participating in PRODEP/PRODEPUR (Chery, 2009).

It does not appear that the MDODs’ preferences and technical
expertise strongly influence project selection outside of ensuring that
communities do not chose activities that are specifically not eligible
for funding. (The current list of ineligible activities for PRODEPUR
can be found in Appendix C).

With PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the implementation of the projects largely
relies on the local community. In addition to buy-in generated
throughout the participatory process, PRODEP/PRODEPUR requires a ten
percent community contribution which furthers the sense of community
ownership (BMPAD, 2008). The communities generally seem to meet this
requirement, and sometimes even exceed it. For example, one community
contributed 40 percent of the necessary financing for a corn mill
(Pressoir, 2009). CECI’s internal evaluation found similar instances
where communities exceeded their required contribution (François and
Monette, 2009). At a project inauguration ceremony, a youth remarked,
“If yesterday Cité Soleil was considered a ‘no-go zone,’ today PRODEPPAP
provides an opportunity for the sons of the zone to prove that they can
work together to prevail” (BMPAD, 2009k). Whether monetary or in-kind,
the community contribution increases the sense of community ownership as
it has directly invested in the project itself.

Although Haiti’s history may foster a level of distrust among
community members and towards community-based organizations, the process
of identifying community-based organizations to form the COPRODEP, and
ensuring that they are not organizations that serve political groups or
purposes, helps to break down the traditional concerns that one group
will unfairly benefit from development and reconstruction resources.
Along these lines, the income-generating PRODEP/PRODEPUR projects typically provide goods or services to the community at a reduced price “because it is a community project that must help the community.”¹⁵³ In this manner, the community receives benefits even from production/income-generating activities that could most easily be perceived as supporting one particular group over another. This significantly contributes to community ownership of PRODEP/PRODEPUR.

**Role of Aid Workers.** The MDODs initially played the primary role in program management of the pilot PRODEP activities; however, as government became able to play an increasing role in program management, the role of the MDODs shifted to focus on providing technical assistance and support to the communities. In addition, the MDODs play a key role in informing communities about the program and mobilizing them to create councils. The independent midterm evaluation found that 84 percent of the households were aware of PRODEP and its activities (ECOSOF S.A., 2009).

Although the reliance on international aid organizations does reduce the level of local ownership in PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the more limited role played by the aid workers relative to most non-CDD/R development programs mitigates these effects on ownership. This results in only some limitation to the contribution to the principle of ownership. In addition, the staff composition of the MDODs remains almost exclusively Haitian and relies heavily on Haitians with existing relationships in the community. Again, the nature and level of insecurity in Haiti make reliance on local aid workers particularly desirable, and the history of strong civil society organizations (and thus related human capacity) make it feasible.

**Capacity Building and Partnership**

As discussed in Chapter 3, capacity building and partnership entails collaboration between aid workers, governments and civil society organizations that lead to a transfer of knowledge and skills to develop

¹⁵³ Interviews with PRODEPUR and PRODEP members, Haiti, June 2009.
the capacity of indigenous actors and institutions for development and reconstruction. The improved legitimacy of the Haitian government and its persistent limited effectiveness creates both an opportunity and a need for capacity building of the government. Similarly, given the relatively robust presence of community-based organizations, but with risk of political manipulation of or by CBOs, Haiti has both an opportunity and a need for capacity building of civil society. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect promotion of capacity building and partnership.

Role of the Government. The pilot activities of CDD/R in Haiti were actually a means of promoting development at a time when the World Bank did not provide resources or work directly with the government. As the legitimacy of the Haitian government and its relationship with the World Bank increased, so did the partnership between these two entities. In addition, the government partners with the MDODs. The Haitian government now plays the central management role in PRODEP/PRODEPUR. Given the historical lack of government capacity, the World Bank continues to provide capacity building assistance to the BMPAD. The staff members of the BMPAD’s Project Coordination Unit (UCP) typically are Haitian consultants who have worked for the World Bank previously and are now bringing their skills to bear in a government agency. This contributes to the capacity building of the Haitian government; however, it faces some limitations to the extent that these relevant staff are contractors rather than government civil servants. As of May 2009, the BMPAD has contracted out 788 training sessions to build the capacity of CBOs participating in PRODEP (WB, 2009d). Again, the BMPAD contracting out these trainings – rather than conducting them itself – creates some limitations in government capacity building and partnership. In addition, the capacity building services provided by the government to the communities may have some weaknesses. For example, focus group participants in a mid-term evaluation expressed that they found the duration and quantity of training sessions insufficient (Chery, 2009). Thus, while the role of the government does promote capacity building and partnership, it faces some limitations.
Role of Civil Society. Civil society plays a central role in project management and thus significantly contributes to the principle of capacity building and partnership. PRODEP/PRODEPUR develops both the governance and technical skills of civil society. PRODEP/PRODEPUR provides a forum for existing CBOs to work together to identify, prioritize and respond to a community's development and reconstruction needs, thus developing the governance capacity of civil society. By forming a development committee comprised of representatives from existing CBOs, PRODEP/PRODEPUR builds on existing capacity. An independent evaluation identified the representativeness and legitimacy of the community development councils as key strengths of PRODEP/PRODEPUR (Chery, 2009).

PRODEP/PRODEPUR’s democratic election process for the members of the development and reconstruction council’s executive committee entails key components of democratic elections including campaigns and lobbying. The project identification, prioritization and selection also emphasize governance principles. Projects are selected in a participatory and democratic manner. For example, a mid-term evaluation found that project selection decisions require negotiation and reaching a consensus (Chery, 2009). CECI’s internal evaluation also found that PRODEP improved local governance by introducing participatory practices and encouraging negotiation and dialogue within and between communities (François and Monette, 2009). PRODEP/PRODEPUR emphasizes the importance of transparency and accountability of the COPRODEP and the CBOs implementing projects under the auspices of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. The CBOs awarded projects must report back to the development council and the community to show that they effectively utilized the resources they received. In addition, multiple rounds of project selection implementation and monitoring, which is built into the PRODEP/PRODEPUR design, also help to solidify the principles of governance. Despite these efforts, tensions do persist amongst CBOs and within the COPRODEPs as could be expected (François and Monette, 2009). Although this contributes to governance capacity building, PRODEP/PRODEPUR has some limitations. For example, unlike the experience of the NSP, the COPRODEPs do not seem to play a larger governance role in their
communities. For example, the COPRODEPs continue to focus on development and reconstruction activities, and do not tend to play a role in alternative dispute resolution.

The second type of capacity building at the civil society level is technical. PRODEP/PRODEPUR almost exclusively utilizes Haitians for project implementation - and largely depends upon members of the CBO who proposed the project to carry out the related development and reconstruction activities. The MDODs provide training and technical assistance to the CBOs as needed. By working through councils comprised of representatives from CBOs, PRODEP/PRODEPUR further develops the technical capacity of existing civil society organizations. An independent mid-term evaluation found that community members feel that the CBOs participating in PRODEP have achieved a certain level of capacity for implementing development and reconstruction projects (Chery, 2009). For example, focus group participants highlighted the ability of CBOs to successfully submit progress reports on their projects to the MDOD (Chery, 2009).

This capacity building through PRODEP/PRODEPUR also enables CBOs to build upon other aid projects in their communities. For example, one of the initial projects financed in Cité Soleil provided a freezer and generator to complete a fishing cooperative’s cold room as well as financed the purchase of fishing equipment including four small boats and two engines. This particular cooperative had already benefited from support from the United Nations Stabilization Initiative in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which assisted the cooperative in building a new fish market (Pressoir, 2009). In this manner, PRODEP/PRODEPUR leverages its resources to build upon existing capacity and on other aid efforts. This significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of capacity building and partnership.

Role of Aid Workers. The MDODs serve to build the capacity - including the technical capacity - of CBOs. For example, the PRODEP implementers have assisted more than 1,200 CBOs in gaining legal recognition and establishing by-laws (BMPAD, 2009g). PRODEP’s training sessions cover topics ranging from project implementation methods to conflict resolution to environmental evaluations (BMPAD, 2009j).
The MDOD maintains responsibility for establishing a Technical Coordination Bureau (BTC) in each region. The BTC also helps to build the capacity of civil society actors and local government officials. The BTC holds training workshops for the COPRODEP and municipal government officials on topics such as financial management and hosts periodic exchanges between COPRODEPs to share their experiences and lessons learned. In addition, the BTC provides workshop for MDOD staff on how to effectively supervise the PRODEP/PRODEPUR processes (BMPAD, 2008).

An independent evaluation identified the provision of technical assistance to CBOs as one of PRODEP/PRODEPUR’s strengths, indicating that the MDODs significantly contribute to capacity building and partnership. As in the discussion of the government’s role in capacity building and partnership, respondents did, however, indicate that the duration and quantity of trainings were too short (Chery, 2009).

With the combination of “rely within” and “wait it out” strategy, the MDODs face relatively limited interruptions in implementing PRODEP/PRODEPUR, and the high level of capacity of the Haitian staff also contribute to capacity building and partnership. The relatively low level of conflict, the related security strategy, and the relatively high levels of local capacity amongst the Haitian aid workers significantly contributes to capacity building and partnership.

**Sustainability**

The principle of sustainability emphasizes the importance of supporting projects that can be maintained. The following section describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers adhere to the principle of sustainability.

**Role of the Government.** With the government’s increased legitimacy and its more substantial role in the oversight and management of these programs, a successful transition to indigenous management becomes more likely. PRODEP/PRODEPUR works to integrate the CDD/R activities into existing Haitian government agencies (BMPAD) as a means of promoting sustainability. PRODEP/PRODEPUR’s shift from essentially by-passing the government to being run through it contributes to the sustainability of
CDD/R activities in Haiti because it develops the capacity to manage the program within the Haitian government; fosters a sense of ownership; and develops the institutions, systems and process to continue program management.

Although the reliance on World Bank consultants within the UCP facilitates the effective implementation of PRODEP/PRODEPUR in the short-term, it largely concentrates the technical expertise within a component of the government that appears to operate somewhat separate from the overall government. To the extent that this unit dissolves after the World Bank stops providing direct support, the technical expertise may also be lost. This is particularly true to the extent that the members of the UCP identify more as World Bank consultants than government officials. This may somewhat limit the government’s contribution to the program’s sustainability.

Role of Civil Society. The existence of a relatively robust civil society within Haiti provides a foundation for not only short- but also medium- and long-term development and reconstruction activities. By forming COPRODEPs with representatives from CBOs (rather than a council of individuals), PRODEP/PRODEPUR capitalized on this existing capacity. The provision of technical assistance and training to these CBOs promotes sustainability to the extent that it helps to create viable organizations. The mid-term evaluation found an increase in the number of organizations that existed for more than three years from four to seven per community (ECOSOF S.A., 2009). Bringing representatives from these organizations together in a council provides the platform for additional development and reconstruction activities. To promote sustainability, the COPRODEP reserves three percent of each project’s budgets to support itself (Chery, 2009). The funds can be used for the COPRODEP’s operation or to support additional projects.154

The PRODEP/PRODEPUR structure also has been utilized to undertake other development and reconstruction activities. For example, PRODEPPAP

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154 Interviews with PRODEP/PRODEPUR members, Haiti, June 2009.
distributed food kits to victims of various natural disasters\textsuperscript{155} and USAID distributed 100 scholarships totaling $50,000 for professional development through the COPRODEP in Cité Soleil (BMPAD, 2009d).

Similarly, the Foundation for Technological and Economic Advancement of Mirebalais (FATEM), an organization of Haitians living abroad, reached an agreement that included the allocation of funds raised by FATEM to co-finance COPRODEP-prioritized projects (WB, 2008a). The World Bank has also built upon PRODEP with additional projects. For example, the World Bank provided $8 million through an International Development Association grant to support infrastructure and social services in rural communities where PRODEP had been implemented (Caribbean360.com, 2009). The follow-on project will utilize the PRODEP platform and methodology of community-driven development and reconstruction.

The sense of ownership and the emphasis on the communities themselves undertaking the activities also appears to promote sustainability. The president of one committee explained that, “PRODEPPAP provides for us the opportunity to assess our own priorities and objectives, laying the foundation for long-lived projects and clear results. This is true sustainable development” (PADF, 2008).

In terms of sustainability of the individual projects, the emphasis on income-generating activities (see the section on selectivity below) promotes project sustainability. For example, PRODEP supported an ox plow project in rural Haiti. A farmer’s organization offers tilling of farmers’ gardens or fields for a small fee. The collected fees can then finance the care of the project’s fourteen bulls, the maintenance of the

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\textsuperscript{155} This does not include the January 2010 earthquake that occurred after the related research on PRODEP/PRODEPUR; however, information since the earthquake does indicate the COPRODEP structure has been utilized to implement a variety of post-earthquake recovery efforts including cleaning up of debris, cash-for-work activities, housing reconstruction and rehabilitation. For more information, see the World Bank, “Status of Projects in Execution FY10 SOPE, Latin America and Caribbean Region: Haiti,” World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services, October 3, 2010, retrieved online, 12/29/2010. 

seven plows and related equipment, and the salaries of the plow conductors (Pressoir, 2009). Despite these efforts to promote sustainability at the project level, these types of mechanisms do not exist in all projects and some project managers expressed concerns over the longer-term sustainability of the projects. CECI’s internal evaluation’s found similar results with some projects generating revenue and developing mechanisms to self-sustain, but not all projects adequately addressed sustainability issues (François and Monette, 2009). Although these concerns do identify areas in which PRODEP/PRODEPUR could be further strengthened, overall (and particularly relative to other development and reconstruction programs), the role of civil society significantly contributes to the sustainability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR.

Role of Aid Workers. The MDODs, particularly through the BTCs, work to promote the sustainability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR and the related projects. Taking advantage of the high level of human capacity in Haiti, PRODEP/PRODEPUR relies heavily upon local aid workers. They work with the COPRODEPs and the CBOs to ensure that the community can maintain the selected projects. They also conduct trainings and provide technical assistance to support sustainability of both the involved institutions (e.g., the CBOs) and the projects themselves. The MDODs maintain responsibility for ensuring that an annual performance evaluation of the projects is conducted to determine the quality and sustainability of the various projects (BMPAD, 2008). In addition, the MDODs/BTCs conduct an environmental impact assessment of the projects and the PRODEP/PRODEPUR programs. Ensuring that CDD/R activities are not environmentally detrimental also promotes long-term sustainability of the PRODEP/PRODEPUR development and reconstruction activities. These efforts significantly contribute to the principle of sustainability.

The use of a security strategy combining “rely within” and “wait it out” and the relatively low level of violence seem to result in minimal interruptions of program activities. As such, the security environment does not seem to notably limit the sustainability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR.

156 Interviews with PRODEP/PRODEPUR members, Haiti, June 2009.
Selectivity

As discussed in Chapter 3, the principle of selectivity includes the extent to which development and reconstruction programming both responds to local needs and commitments, and to foreign policy interests. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society, and aid workers affect the ability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR to adhere to this principle.

Role of Government. As the legitimacy of the Haitian government increased, so did its role in PRODEP/PRODEPUR. The inclusion of local government officials in the COPRODEP helps facilitate the inclusion of local government priorities into project selection; however, the provision that these efforts must be supported by CBOs ensures that local government officials cannot take control of the CDD/R activities in their communities for their own political agendas. The role of the government, thus, significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of selectivity. The Haitian government also plays a role in ensuring that PRODEP/PRODEPUR projects achieve the objectives of the program and are not inherently unsustainable by maintaining a list of ineligible projects (see Appendix C). The three main eligibility criteria for PRODEP/PRODEPUR projects are: (1) responds to a real need prioritized by the community, (2) does not provide services exclusively to any particular political group, and (3) does not have a negative impact on the environment (BMPAD, 2008).

Secondly, project selection includes the promotion of foreign policy interests. The World Bank and its international donors’ main foreign policy interest in Haiti is to promote a stable country with a legitimate and effective government. To the extent that PRODEP/PRODEPUR promotes principles of governance and promotes social cohesion, PRODEP/PRODEPUR promotes the foreign policy interests of the program’s donors. As a signal of improved governance, the midterm evaluation of PRODEP found that 74 percent of the survey respondents were aware of the role of the municipal government in the community compared to 61 percent at baseline (ECOSOF S.A., 2009). This supports the donor’s foreign policy objective of promoting the legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach
of the Haitian government, and thus significantly contributes to the principle of selectivity.

**Role of Civil Society.** The high level of community ownership discussed above means that the PRODEP/PRODEPUR projects strongly relate to the needs and priorities of the community and significantly contribute to the principle of selectivity. Given the history of civil society engagement in politics, effective project selection in the Haitian context should ensure that CDD/R activities are not actually or perceived as supporting one political party over another. Similar to the mechanisms discussed in the section on the role of the government in project selection, the requirement that CBOs and selected projects do not serve just one political group also help to promote selection of projects that benefit the community writ large and do not advantage just segments of it. The projects do seem to benefit the broader community as discussed in more detail in the section on the role of civil society in ownership. The inclusion of several rounds of project selection and implementation also create incentives for CBOs to work together as they face a greater chance of receiving funding in the future should they support the initially-selected project.

The projects fall into three main types: productive/income-generating (44 percent), infrastructure (36 percent), and social (20 percent). As depicted in Figure 6.5 below, more than half the projects fall into one of four categories: roads (18 percent), potable water (14 percent), community stores (14 percent), and grain or manioc mills (10 percent) (BMPAD, 2009h).
The urban projects fall within these broad categories as well; however, PRODEPUR places even greater emphasis on projects that would fall into the productive/income-generating category than infrastructure or social. For example, the 36 projects supported through PRODEPPAP include professional schools, libraries, cybercafés, enterprises (e.g., fisheries and bakeries), and community stores (BMPAD, 2009). Some projects are more particular to an urban context such as a beauty salon, a community car wash, and a cosmetology school.

PRODEP/PRODEPUR participants did remark, however, that the size of project funding and related restrictions did limit the selection of projects. Given the insufficient size of funding for some desired activities, the members of various COPRODEPs expressed a desire for greater funding. In a midterm evaluation, participants cited insufficient funds as one of the weaknesses of Haiti’s CDD/R programs (Chery, 2009). As these funding limitations relate to the perceived capability of the civil society to effectively manage funds, the central role of civil society in project selection does somewhat limit adherence...
to the principle of selectivity, as limitations in the size of funding may affect ability to respond to local needs.

One of the foreign policy interests of donors operating in Haiti is social cohesion. A mid-term evaluation found that PRODEP had created a situation in which community members could come together to address the critical issues facing their community despite their political differences (Chery, 2009). Similarly, CECI’s evaluation found improved social cohesion (François and Monette, 2009). This contributes to adherence to the principle of selectivity.

Role of Aid Workers. As is the case with the other two CDD/R case studies, the aid workers play a supporting role in project selection. They communicate the list of ineligible projects to the communities and assist the communities in completing the necessary project selection documentation; however, the communities themselves decide which projects to implement. As with the NSP and Tuungane, the PRODEP/PRODEPUR process does not include an explicit mechanism for the aid workers to influence project selection although individual aid workers may influence project selection through their interactions with COPRODEP members. This limited opportunity to provide expertise on project selection may mean that projects the development and reconstruction experts perceive as a top priority for a given community may not be selected and implemented. In the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the high level of civil society capacity and incorporation of existing CBOs into the COPRODEP mitigate against this risk.

The work of the MDODs during the initial period of program implementation focused on understanding the community organizations to identify those with a legitimate commitment to community development rather than ulterior motives. This helps mitigate against the risk of “elite capture” and reduces the opportunity for destabilizing or criminal actors to abuse the program.

Results and Accountability

The fifth principle of sound development and reconstruction consists of identifying, measuring and reporting on clear indicators of success. The section below describes how the roles of the government,
civil society and aid workers affect the ability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR to adhere to principle of results and accountability.

Role of the Government. The government (BMPAD) ultimately maintains responsibility for the program-level monitoring and evaluation of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. The BMPAD examines a variety of indicators for both monitoring and evaluation. The BMPAD examines a number of output and outcome indicators including: the number and type of approved projects being implemented, the number of established and active COPRODEPs, the number of CBO representatives receiving training, the cost of training per participant, the number of women participating in the COPRODEP, the total amount of funds transferred to CBOs, and the percentage of the total project budget spent on institutional strengthening, the number of jobs created by the projects, the average number of beneficiaries by project, and the percentage of projects adequately maintained for various periods of time after implementation (BMPAD, 2008). The final project evaluations also look at the change in the access to socio-economic infrastructure and community-level services, change in the poverty rate of participating communities, change in the employment rate, and percentage of COPRODEPs still active after project completion (BMPAD, 2008). The BMPAD maintains an information management system of these indicators that includes baseline data and follow-up indicators, which are collected three times per year. The BMPAD is responsible for ensuring that the data is effectively analyzed. It maintains a website and disseminates newsletters that report on the activities and results of PRODEP/PRODEPUR.

In addition, the BMPAD commissioned two independent mid-term evaluations of PRODEP in spring 2009. First, ECOSOF S.A. conducted baseline and follow-up household surveys in ten representative communities. Overall, this evaluation found an improvement in terms of the creation of social capital, particularly in terms of organizational capacity building, awareness of community affairs, participation and access to information (ECOSOF S.A., 2009). Second, independent consultants carried out four focus groups each in six selected
The focus groups included a variety of key stakeholders including representatives from CBOs, the COPRODEP, local authorities and the BTC. At the conclusion of the focus groups, the four groups were brought together to discuss the separate findings, with the final findings from each community being agreed upon by consensus. Overall, the evaluation found significant progress towards PRODEP reaching its goal of empowering communities to drive their own development with some weaknesses (Chery, 2009). The relatively high level of attention the government devotes to monitoring and evaluation – including looking not only at inputs and outputs but also outcomes – significantly contributes to the principle of results and accountability.

Role of Civil Society. The COPRODEP reports on its activities – including project selection and status – to the MDOD to provide the necessary data for the BMPAD’s information management system. In addition, the managers of selected projects report their progress to the COPRODEP, thus promoting accountability. The COPRODEP members then maintain responsibility for reporting on the activities to the community members themselves. An independent midterm evaluation in spring 2009 reported that nearly 60 percent of households knew a COPRODEP member and the number of households receiving a report from their COPRODEP representative increased from 15.5 to 49.6 percent (ECOSOF S.A., 2009). In focus group discussions as part of a second midterm evaluation, PRODEP/PRODEPUR participants cited the participation of CBOs in identifying and prioritizing community needs in a transparent manner as a strength of PRODEP/PRODEPUR (Chery, 2009), thus significantly contributing to results and accountability.

In terms of project implementation, the majority of the activities are undertaken by community members, which may also significantly contribute to better results and increased accountability. A 2007 International Crisis Group report states that, in general, “the lack of

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The **communes** are the third level of division in Haiti. Each department (roughly equivalent to a province) is divided into multiple **arrondissements** (roughly the equivalent of districts), which is then divided into multiple **communes**.
physical presence and monitoring from project managers due to violence" may hinder the success of development activities in Cité Soleil and that, "the more successful projects tended to be those which keep a constant presence even during the insecurity" (ICG, 2007b, p. 6). PRODEP/PRODEPUR avoids this potential limitation by maintaining a constant presence in communities through the COPRODEP, and a light footprint by the aid workers. According to an independent midterm evaluation, PRODEP/PRODEPUR appears to achieve the desired results in terms of promoting socio-economic development - 60 percent of households felt that the socio-economic situation has improved with PRODEP (ECOSAF, 2009).

The CBOs also provide regular status reports to the COPRODEP, and must do so prior to receiving the next installment of project financing. Generally, the CBOs implementing the projects indicated that the COPRODEP regularly monitors their activities; however, PRODEP/PRODEPUR participants did indicate that the COPRODEP and local authorities lacked sufficient means to monitor all projects (Chery, 2009). This did not seem to affect adherence to results and accountability, however, as typically development and reconstruction actors only monitor a sub-set of projects. Thus, the role of civil society significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of results and accountability.

**Role of Aid Workers.** At the program level, the MDODs provide monthly reports to the BMPAD to provide the data for the information management system and related monitoring and evaluation. The relatively low level of insecurity and the combined strategy of "rely within" and "wait it out" mean that the aid workers have relatively regular access to communities to also carry out monitoring and evaluation of program activities. This significantly contributes to results and accountability.

To augment the on-going monitoring and evaluation activities, the MDOD CECI conducted an internal evaluation of its participation in

159 Interviews with PRODEPUR and PRODEP members, Haiti, June 2009.
PRODEP between May 12 and June 2, 2009. The evaluation consisted of site visits to several projects and discussions with representatives from the CBOs and COPRODEP, as well as local government officials. Overall, the evaluation found that the three types of projects (infrastructure, social and productive) have immediate benefits for the community, that the projects benefit the overall community and not just the principal CBO implementor, and has achieved progress towards the goals of promoting social cohesion and improving local governance (CECI, 2009).

Flexibility

The principle of flexibility captures the ability to adapt to a changing operating environment. The ways in which the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect the ability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR to adhere to principle of flexibility are examined below.

Role of the Government. As mentioned above, at the start of the pilot PRODEP activities, the Haitian government was not a viable development and reconstruction partner. The increased participation of the Haitian government in response to changing conditions on the ground serves as an excellent example of the flexibility employed by the World Bank in implementing PRODEP/PRODEPUR. Although the increased role of the government has contributed to adherence to other principles as discussed above, the involvement of the bureaucracy in program management limits the flexibility of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. Running much of the program management through the UCP does avoid some of the inflexibility of the government bureaucracy, however, as this unit is somewhat separated from the overall bureaucratic machinery. The overall program management does not need to adapt particularly quickly so the relatively slow process for change does not appear to negatively affect the implementation of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. At the local level, municipal government officials integrate into the COPRODEP structure, which can adapt relatively quickly given the relatively short timeframe between project selection and implementation. Overall, the role of the government has contributed to flexibility, but with some limitations.
Role of Civil Society. Civil society plays the central role in selecting and implementing the PRODEP/PRODEPUR development and reconstruction projects. As civil society is on the ground, the decisionmaking rests close to the activities themselves. In addition, the project selection occurs during the program itself rather than prior to the start of the program. As a result, the decisionmaking occurs closer to the actual project implementation. This allows for a relatively high level of flexibility to adapt to changing conditions on the ground.

Role of Aid Workers. Within PRODEP/PRODEPUR, aid workers predominately support civil society and the government through providing technical assistance and overseeing program implementation. The "rely within" strategy means that MDOD personnel integrate into the communities where they operate, and thus maintain regular contact and familiarity with conditions on the ground. In this way, the MDODs can respond relatively quickly to changing conditions and to issues that arise throughout the PRODEP/PRODEPUR process. The relatively quick manner in which aid workers can provide technical assistance increases flexibility within PRODEP/PRODEPUR. In addition, the MDOD’s established the BTCs at the regional level to ensure that technical oversight and support occurs closer to where project implementation occurs. This can provide greater awareness and ability to respond to changing conditions on the ground, and thus significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of flexibility.

Assessment and Conflict Management

Assessment and conflict management is the seventh – and final – principle of sound development and reconstruction. Assessment and conflict management entail conducting a thorough pre-program assessment to understand the needs and challenges of a given area. In particular, in conflict-affected settings, assessments must take into consideration conflict factors, and how activities could unintentionally exacerbate conflict. The section below describes how the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers affect the ability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR to adhere to principle of assessment and conflict management.
Role of the Government. Both the role of the Haitian government and the evaluation strategy evolved and strengthened over time. The BMPAD - in conjunction with the MDODs - oversees the implementation of a baseline assessment with PRODEPUR. This assessment provides an opportunity to identify potential areas where conflict could be exacerbated. The government also contributes to conflict management by maintaining a list of ineligible projects. This helps to preclude activities that could ignite tensions amongst community members. For example, the list of ineligible projects includes the construction of political party buildings because the use of community resources to support a given political party risks igniting tensions amongst community members and fomenting political instability. Having a baseline assessment to identify the potential sources of conflict and explicitly building in mechanisms to avoid a key source of historical tensions significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of selectivity. The government lacks, however, a mechanism to explicitly assess the status of potential sources of conflict throughout program implementation. This inability to build in conflict monitoring mechanisms limits the government’s contribution to assessment and conflict management. Given that this type of conflict monitoring rests more upon the aid workers than the government, the role of the government only somewhat (and not significantly) limits adherence to assessment and conflict management.

Role of Civil Society. As in the cases of the NSP and Tuungane, the COPRODEPs do conduct a community needs assessment to identify, prioritize and select projects. The selection of projects does not include, however, an explicit consideration of how selected projects may - intentionally or unintentionally - exacerbate “dividers” or conversely could support “connectors.” Although this could significantly limit adherence to the principle of assessment and conflict management, the design of PRODEP/PRODEPUR includes several mechanisms to address this issue.

Given the historical role of CBOs in politics in Haiti, the exclusion of CBOs and related projects that benefit only one political group serves as a key component of conflict management in
Similarly, the requirement that CBOs and municipal representatives work together on the COPRODEP to identify mutually-beneficial projects further mitigates against the risk that PRODEP/PRODEPUR activities will exacerbate political tensions that often form the base of instability in Haiti. In addition, given the emphasis on a representative COPRODEP that decides on project prioritization and selection, the community itself must self-regulate to ensure selection of appropriate projects that will not unintentionally exacerbate inter-communal tensions.

As a result of these components of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the lack of explicit conflict analysis for the selected projects only somewhat limits adherence to assessment and conflict management.

Role of Aid Workers. In conjunction with the Haitian government, the aid workers support the baseline assessment, which can inform the list of ineligible projects and other potential conflict exacerbating risk factors. Although this baseline assessment of the program contributes to assessment and conflict management, the lack of incorporation of conflict considerations throughout the provision of oversight significantly limits adherence to this principle.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The discussion of the conflict context above identified seven key factors that most significantly affect the program design and security strategy: (1) historical lack of central government legitimacy, effectiveness and reach; (2) history of relatively strong civil society; (3) densely populated urban areas, including with high numbers of unemployed youth, (4) dire economic conditions, (5) the installation of a legitimate government who has not yet shown the ability to effectively meet the needs of the Haiti’s citizens, (6) periods of heightened violence, particularly from urban gangs, and (7) potential targeting of those individuals or groups perceived as political or politically affiliated. The program design, particularly the implementation, and security strategy in turn affect the principles of sound development and reconstruction.
These seven key factors of the conflict context affect the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers. The historical lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the central government creates a need for the Haitian government to play a central role in the implementation of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, and as the legitimacy of the Haitian government improved – and along with it, the international support to the government – the Haitian government became increasingly involved in the management of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. The historical lack of government legitimacy, effectiveness and reach, combined with the history of strong civil society create a good environment for engaging civil society in development and reconstruction activities at the local level. As a result, civil society plays a central role in PRODEP/PRODEPUR. In addition, the struggle for effective governance, dire socio-economic conditions, and the greater security risk for actors perceived as political mean that aid workers have a key role to play in program management and providing technical assistance. The relatively high level of human capacity allows for a security strategy that combines “rely within” and “wait it out” by relying on local aid workers who integrate into the relevant communities. The roles of these three actors in turn affect the ability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR to adhere to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction.

Ownership

Although the increased role of the government in PRODEP/PRODEPUR, that accompanied the increase in government legitimacy, addressed some of the limitations of ownership, significant limitations remain. In particular, the BMPAD contracts out much of its activities and even staff positions outside of the government. As such, the role of the government in promoting adherence to the principle of ownership contributes with some limitations and is coded as medium. In contrast, the substantial involvement of civil society significantly contributes to community ownership. Although the role of international aid organizations reduces the sense of ownership, the reliance on local aid workers mitigates those affects somewhat. As such, the role of aid
workers contributes to a sense of ownership, with some limitations. This translates into a code of medium-high.

**Capacity Building and Partnership**

The increased role of the Haitian government in program management contributes to capacity building and partnership with some limitations. The reliance on contractors and outsourcing of activities somewhat limits the government’s contributions to capacity building and partnership (coded as medium-high). The civil society plays a key role in project management through community development councils comprised of representatives from CBOs. The significant contributions of civil society to adherence to the principle of capacity building and partnership translates into a coding of high. Given the relatively high level of human capacity, the MDODs rely almost exclusively on local staff. This makes a combined “rely within” and “wait it out” strategy that, given the low levels of violence, results in minimal interruptions in the provision of technical assistance and program oversight by the aid workers. This significantly contributes to capacity building and partnership and translates into a code of high for the role of aid workers.

**Sustainability**

Key conflict context factors created a need and opportunity for the Haitian government and civil society to play central roles in the program management and project management respectively. This increased level of Haitian involvement promotes the sustainability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR by creating institutions and processes that can be replicated; however, the level of separation of the UPC presents some limitations. This results in a medium-high coding for the role of the government in adherence to sustainability. The relatively strong civil society allows PRODEP/PRODEPUR to work with CBOs and the focus on income-generating/productive projects contributes to the sustainability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. Given the capacity building invested in CBOs, the overall sustainability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR does not heavily depend upon continued financial support to the COPRODEP itself but rather supports
institutions that can continue to operate in the absence of this specific program. The reliance of local aid workers to provide technical assistance can promote sustainability – particularly in an environment where adequate local technical expertise exists and the security situation and corresponding security strategies do not create significant access issues. As such, the roles of both civil society and aid workers are coded as high.

**Selectivity**

The centrality of the Haitian government in program management advances the international donors’ foreign policy objective of promoting the legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the Haitian government and thus promoting stability in Haiti. Thus the role of the government significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of selectivity and is thus coded as high. The central role played by civil society places the decisionmaking in the hands of the development and reconstruction “consumers” within some constraints established by the Haitian government and limitations on the size of funding. This promotes selection of projects that respond to the community’s perceived needs with some limitations (coded as medium-high). In addition, evaluations found some success in achieving the foreign policy goal of promoting social cohesion. Although the relatively limited role of international aid workers in project selection may miss an opportunity to incorporate insights and “lessons learned” from international development and reconstruction experts, the relatively high level of human capacity in Haiti offsets this potential limitation. As such, the role of aid workers significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of selectivity and is thus coded as high.

**Results and Accountability**

The central role of the Haitian government in program management creates an opportunity for greater accountability of the Haitian government to its people, and the BMPAD’s information management system provides a platform for data management and analysis. The focus on baseline data collection for both monitoring and evaluation for PRODEPUR
also increase the opportunities for accountability and understanding results. The central role of civil society in project management similarly promotes the principle of results and accountability at the community-level. Both the government and civil society collect and disseminate information on the results of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. Similar to sustainability, the reliance on local aid workers given the security context should not negatively affect results and accountability given the presence of relatively qualified Haitian staff. As such, all three key actors are coded as high for their adherence to results and accountability.

**Flexibility**

Although governments and other bureaucracies typically reduce flexibility, given the design of PRODEP/PRODEPUR that relies on the UCP at the program management level, the central role of the Haitian government contributes to the principle of flexibility with some limitations. Thus, the role of the government is coded as medium-high. The overall structure of PRODEP/PRODEPUR is set; however, there is a fair amount of room for flexibility at the project level built into the design by having project selection both occur at the community level and during the project implementation. The major role played by civil society significantly promotes flexibility, as does the support provided by the aid workers, particularly with the regional BTCs. Thus, the roles of both civil society and aid workers are coded as high.

**Assessment and Conflict Management**

The inclusion of baseline data collection provides an opportunity for pre-program assessment that can provide a strong starting point for the program and respond to potential factors that may exacerbate the conflict. The various requirements related to political affiliation and activities also clearly responds to one of the potential key factors that could increase tensions within PRODEP/PRODEPUR communities. Although these efforts significantly contribute, the role of the government does face some limitations. Notably, mechanisms are not in place to explicitly consider how the program affects potential
connectors and dividers throughout implementation. As such, the role of the government is coded as medium-high.

The central role of civil society in project implementation also means that the community itself assesses its needs, increasing the likelihood that the projects will respond to these needs. In addition, the program requirements promote social cohesion and inclusion – thus managing the conflict. Despite these significant contributions, the lack of greater consideration by civil society of conflict factors somewhat limits their contribution to this principle. Civil society is thus coded as medium-high for assessment and conflict management. The limited assessment and conflict management conducted by aid workers, and particularly their failure to incorporate explicit mechanisms for considering how the program affects conflict throughout implementation, significantly limits their contribution to this principle (coded as medium).

Table 6.1 below summarizes the codings for of the three key actors for each of the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. In addition, the table presents the overall score for each principle as well as the overall score for each actor. Finally, the table provides an overall rating of the extent to which this case study overall promotes adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.
Table 6.1 – Adherence to Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction in Haiti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Aid Workers</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building &amp; Partnership</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectivity</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results &amp; Accountability</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment &amp; Conflict Management</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
<td>High (4.6)</td>
<td>High (4.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the growing but still somewhat limited role of the government contributed with some limitations to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. The government contributes significantly to the principles of selectivity and results and accountability. The government contributes significantly with some limitations to capacity building and partnership, sustainability, flexibility, and assessment and conflict management. The weakest area of contribution by the Haitian government given its role is in ownership, where it faces significant limitations.

Overall, the central role played by civil society significantly contributes to adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. The role played by Haitian civil society led to significant contributions to the principles of ownership, sustainability, results and accountability, and flexibility. Although it faced some limitations, civil society also contributed to capacity building and partnership, selectivity, and assessment and conflict management.
Overall, the aid workers significantly contributed to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. The role of the aid workers significantly contributed to all principles without limitation except for ownership, where they faced some limitations, and assessment and conflict management, where they faced significant limitations.

Taking into consideration the roles of all three key actors, the PRODEP/PRODEPUR case study indicates the greatest strength in significantly adhering to the principles of sustainability, selectivity, results and accountability, and flexibility. Conversely, the case study indicates that the role of the three key actors contribute less to the principles of ownership, capacity building and partnership, and assessment and conflict management.

In conclusion, the experience of the PRODEP/PRODEPUR in Haiti, and the ability of PRODEP/PRODEPUR to significantly contribute to the adherence to principles of sound development and reconstruction, indicates that sound development and reconstruction is feasible in a relatively low conflict setting. Although Haiti’s political situation initially presented challenges for government ownership, the program evolved along with the context to involve an increasingly substantial role for the Haitian government. The relatively low levels of insecurity and success of the combined “rely within” and “wait it out” strategies to minimize disruptions in program implementation, as well as the relatively strong civil society and high levels of human capacity, compensate for many of the potential limitations. In addition, the program has been successfully piloted in both rural and urban areas during periods of violence, and since the situation stabilized was being expanded to even more areas at the time of this writing.
7. COMPARISON ACROSS CASE STUDIES

The three case study chapters examine CDD/R programs implemented in environments with high (Nangarhar, Afghanistan), medium (the Kivus, the DRC), and low (Haiti) levels of conflict. The preceding case studies had similarities and differences amongst the key factors of the conflict context, the program design (most notably the roles of the three types of key actors), and the security strategies, with implications for the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. This chapter will compare and contrast these case studies to better describe how the varying levels and nature of conflict affect adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction and the delivery of development and reconstruction.

KEY COMPONENTS OF THE CONFLICT CONTEXT THAT AFFECT PROGRAM DESIGN AND SECURITY STRATEGIES

The main purpose in this section will be to compare and contrast the three conflict contexts and to analyze the similarities and differences among these factors across the three cases, and how they influence program design and security strategy.

History

Unsurprisingly, the three cases each share a historical lack of central government legitimacy, effectiveness and reach. In Nangarhar, Afghanistan, this government “void” was largely filled by traditional governance structures. In the DRC, the struggles to effectively govern the Kivus instrumentalized ethnic tensions, with shifting support to and alliance with various groups used as a means of garnering political support. In Haiti, in the absence of a strong government presence, a relatively strong civil society developed.

Thus, although the CDD/R programs places civil society in a central role by design, the differing histories of these three cases creates a different “starting point.” In Nangarhar and Haiti, existing civil society mechanisms - in the forms of local governance councils and community-based organizations respectively - provided entry points for
the CDD/R programming. Although traditional structures also exist in the Kivus, this area was plagued by historical manipulation of identify for political purposes.

**Current Social, Economic and Political Factors**

The key current social, economic and political factors vary across the three cases. In terms of social factors, Nangarhar has relatively strong social cohesion within its communities. The protracted conflict in eastern Congo has resulted in high levels of population displacement in the Kivus which frays the social fabric in some communities. In contrast to the more rural demographics of Nangarhar and the Kivus, Haiti has densely populated urban areas with high levels of unemployment, including large numbers of unemployed and idle youth. Economically, all three areas face challenges; however, Nangarhar has relatively good economic opportunities albeit weakened by protracted conflict.

Although the three countries share a common history of a lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the official government, their current political situations vary. In Afghanistan, a new, internationally-supported government was installed at the time of the creation of the NSP. In Haiti, the legitimacy of the government, a significant concern at the start of PRODEP, has improved; however, government effectiveness remains lacking. In the Kivus, the lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government persists.

Table 7.1 below summarizes the key social, economic and political factors for each of the three cases.
Table 7.1 – Summary of Key Current Social, Economic and Political Factors for the Three Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NSP - Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane - The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PROEDPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Relatively strong social cohesion</td>
<td>Heavily displaced population</td>
<td>Densely populated urban areas with high unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Relatively good economic opportunities</td>
<td>Dire socio-economic conditions</td>
<td>Dire socio-economic conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>New, internationally supported government at the beginning of the NSP</td>
<td>Persistent lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of government</td>
<td>Installation of a legitimate but not yet effective government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These social, economic and political factors influence the program design in terms of the identified objectives. Although the CDD/R programs all aim to promote governance and socio-economic development, nuanced differences in their objectives exist. The NSP emphasizes improving governance through social and economic development. Developing governance also serves as the cornerstone for Tuungane, with social cohesion an additional objective alongside economic recovery. The “first among equals” of PRODEP/PRODEPUR’s objectives is to build the development capacity of communities followed by governance and socio-economic development.

To a large degree, the political differences in the three cases appear to drive the difference in the roles of the three key actors. The installation of a legitimate government in Afghanistan at the beginning of the NSP created an opportunity for significant Afghan government involvement. Although initially the CDD/R programming in Haiti did not significantly engage the Haitian government, increased engagement in PRODEP/PRODEPUR accompanied increases in the government’s legitimacy. Its persistent lack of effectiveness, however, means that the aid workers provide substantial support (e.g., the staff of the UCP consists of Haitian World Bank consultants). The Congolese government in the Kivus has not experienced the same evolution and thus plays a relatively limited role in Tuungane. As such, the aid workers play a leading role in program management.
By design, within CDD/R the community plays a central role in project management, but the conflict context may result in some modifications. For example, the NSP and Tuungane form community development councils through elections of individual community members, but in PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the development councils consist of representatives from community-based organizations. This difference in the delivery of development and reconstruction results from differences in the conflict context. In the case of Haiti, the strong civil society created an opportunity for development councils to consist of representatives of these existing civil society organizations. Table 7.2 summarizes the roles of the key actors in each case.

Table 7.2 – Summary of Role of Key Actors for the Three Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of government</th>
<th>NSP - Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane - The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PRODEPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lead at program level</td>
<td>Extremely limited</td>
<td>Manages program with assistance from aid workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of civil society</td>
<td>Councils comprised of individual community representatives lead at project level</td>
<td>Councils comprised of individual community representatives lead at project level</td>
<td>Councils comprised of CBO representatives lead at project level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of aid workers</td>
<td>Support government and civil society at program and project levels respectively</td>
<td>Lead at program level and support civil society at project level</td>
<td>Substantially support government at program level and support to civil society at project level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Security Context

By design, the level of violence varies amongst the three cases; however, the nature of violence also varies. The nature of violence seems to drive the security strategy more than the level of violence. In addition, the CDD/R model allows for the use of the “rely within” security strategy as local civil society maintains responsibility for implementation at the project level. As a result, the security context appears to affect the selection of the program-level security strategy.

Nangarhar’s high level of violence (particularly for travel by road) is relatively “predictable” and tends to target government
officials and international actors. This “predictability” enables development and reconstruction actors to employ implementation and security strategies to reduce their risks. For example, aid workers primarily utilize a “blend in” strategy to decrease the risk of attack and thus facilitate supervision of program implementation. The “rely within” strategy employed by some FPs also helps to reduce the risk of attack; however, it is not as widely used given the burden it places on the communities and their resources. The Nangarhar case, with its multiple FPs operating in the province, also highlights that the security situation does not necessarily dictate the security strategy, but rather the FPs make their own decisions on what strategy to use. Despite the risk of being targeted, some FPs’ policies dictate that they employ a “stand out” strategy. This appears to be a sub-optimal security strategy as it results in greater delays in project implementation. Notably, none of the NSP implementers in Nangarhar opted for the “armor up” strategy employed by other actors in this region. Although the comparison with other development and reconstruction activities falls outside of the scope of this dissertation, the wide range of security strategies employed by different actors in Nangarhar raises the question of which security strategy is optimal for this particular environment.

The level of risk in the Kivus is lower than in Nangarhar, but marked by periods of heightened risk, particularly during travel by road. Notably, the unpredictability in terms of the risk posed to development and reconstruction actors complicates the selection of an implementation and security strategy to respond to the violence. It is difficult to ascertain whether aid workers would be viewed as potential “high value” targets for looters or treated with amnesty, so the “blend in,” “rely within,” and the “stand out” strategies would not necessarily reduce the security risks. As such, the “wait it out” security strategy dominates the Tuungane operations in South Kivu. The selection of this security strategy, based on the level and nature of violence, results in interruptions in aid workers’ program implementation. In North Kivu, the unpredictability of violence combined with the higher level of violence relative to South Kivu led to a “bug out” security strategy and
aid workers did not implement Tuungane in this province. It is not clear whether another security strategy, such as “armor up,” would have enabled the implementation of Tuungane in a way that adhered to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.

Haiti has the lowest level of violence of the three cases, and the nature of the violence differs significantly as well. The violence in Haiti largely occurs in urban areas, with periods of heightened political violence. PRODEP/PRODEPUR’s response to this particular security context is to utilize a combined “rely within” and “wait it out” security strategy. MDOD staff members operating in violent areas initially invested substantial time in gaining community acceptance to enable them to operate safely in these urban areas. Given the relatively low level of violence, this combined strategy seems to enable the implementation of PRODEP/PRODEPUR with minimal interruptions.

COMPARISON OF THE ROLES OF KEY ACTORS

This section compares and contrasts the three case studies findings by first comparing the findings for each of the three actors across the seven principles and then examining the overall score for each actor. Although each of the three case study programs employ the same basic approach of CDD/R, variations in program design do occur. Largely explained by varying roles of the key actors, these differences do affect adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.

Role of Government

In the three case studies, the high degree of variation in the role of the government significantly affected the program design. The legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government largely determined the level of their involvement, which affects adherence to the various principles. Interestingly, the case with the highest level of violence also had the highest level of government involvement. The installation of a new, internationally-supported government at the time of the creation of the NSP explains this phenomenon. As the legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the Haitian government improved over time,
its role in program management also increased. In both of these cases, the engagement of the government in the CDD/R contributed with some limitations to the overall principles of sound development and reconstruction (coded as medium-high). In the case of Tuungane, the government’s persistent challenges with effectiveness and reach resulted in an extremely limited role, which neither contributed to nor detracted from the overall principles of sound development and reconstruction (coded as low-medium). Table 7.3 below summarizes how the role of the government affected adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction in the three cases.

**Table 7.3 – Summary of Role of Government for the Three Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>NSP – Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane – The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PROEDPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building &amp; Partnerships</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectivity</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment &amp; Conflict Management</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium-High (4)</td>
<td>Low-Medium (2.4)</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tuungane, with the lowest level of government involvement received the lowest coding for all principles except flexibility and assessment and conflict management. In terms of flexibility, engaging a bureaucracy to oversee program management unsurprisingly limits the flexibility of a program. Thus Tuungane, with the lowest level of government involvement, received the highest coding of the three cases in terms of flexibility (coded as high).

In terms of assessment and conflict management, the differences in the scores present mixed findings. The lowest level of government involvement (Tuungane) received the middle rating, with the highest level of government (the NSP) receiving the lowest score. These scores do not seem to reflect differences inherently created by government involvement, but rather approaches taken by the various programs. In
the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the government (and aid workers) collected baseline data and built in greater assessment and conflict management from the start. In the case of Tuungane, the government had a minimal role in program implementation. This limited role of a government with a lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach in the DRC may actually promote conflict management. The lack of explicit attention from the Afghan government to how the NSP relates to the conflict factors means that the NSP received the lowest coding across the three cases (coded as low-medium).

The role of the government led to very little variation between the cases of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR. The only principles where these two cases received different coding for the role of government are the three principles discussed above: ownership, flexibility, and assessment and conflict management. This limited variation, and the ensuing common overall coding of medium-high, seems to indicate that the differences in the level of government involvement between these two cases does not significantly affect the government’s contributions to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. An extremely limited role, as is the case in Tuungane, does seem to significantly affect adherence to the principles, however.

Overall the benefits of involving the government in terms of contributing to the first five principles outweigh the costs in terms of flexibility. Although a substantial role of government may decrease flexibility at the program management level, the CDD/R model builds in significant flexibility at the project management level by having project selection occur on-the-ground and close to actual implementation. Thus, the flexibility at the project level may largely compensate for a lack of flexibility at the overall program level. With respect to assessment and conflict management, the decision on engaging the government should take into consideration the extent to which the government’s role may exacerbate existing tensions, how this could be mitigated, and promote explicit assessment and conflict management analysis at the start of a program as well as throughout regardless of the lead actor in program management. Long-term success of development depends upon government involvement.
Although the DRC case study indicates some short-term benefits of limiting the role of government in terms of flexibility and assessment and conflict management, this detracts from other principles in the shortterm. Furthermore, the long-term success of development and reconstruction efforts depends heavily on the government playing a lead role in these efforts. The PRODEP/PRODEPUR case study provides a good example of how CDD/R can evolve as the government becomes an increasingly viable partner.

**Role of Civil Society**

In all three cases, civil society plays the leading role at the project level. This is a cornerstone of CDD/R programming. The relative commonality between the cases with respect to the role of civil society resulted in the least amount of variation in terms of the contributions of civil society to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. Overall, the role of civil society contributed significantly to the seven principles in the cases of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR, and with some limitations in the case of Tuungane. Table 7.4 below summarizes the role of civil society in adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction across the three cases.

**Table 7.4 – Summary of Role of Civil Society for the Three Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NSP – Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane – The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PROEDPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building &amp; Partnerships</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectivity</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results &amp; Accountability</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment &amp; Conflict Management</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>High (4.6)</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the centrality of civil society’s role in the implementation of CDD/R remains a constant, some variation exists in how
this unfolds in different contexts. The adaptation of the CDD/R concept to the local context helps to promote the principles of sound development and reconstruction. For example, Nangarhar has a tradition of *shuras*, making a CDC comprised of individual community representatives appropriate for the NSP. Haiti has relatively strong civil society, making reliance on the community-based organizations as the basis for the community project council appropriate for PRODEP/PRODEPUR. In the DRC, Tuungane utilized the more common model of forming individual-based community development councils, particularly given the lack of a strong civil society infrastructure and the relatively high levels of population displacement.

The coding for the contributions of civil society only varied for two of the principles - capacity building and partnership and sustainability. For capacity building and partnership, civil society contributes significantly in the case of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR and with some limitations in the case of Tuungane. The lower coding for civil society’s contribution in the case of Tuungane stems from the lack of existing civil society infrastructure to build upon. Both the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR were able to build upon existing civil society capacity in a manner that Tuungane was not. The weakness of civil society only partially explains the limitations for civil society’s contributions to sustainability, however. The instability in both the Kivus and Nangarhar led to delays in implementation that affected adherence to the principle of sustainability. In the case of the NSP, these limitations were somewhat mitigated because the NSP could develop a security strategy that responded to the relative predictability of the nature of violence. This was not the case in Tuungane. In addition, the lack of emphasis on project sustainability exacerbated these limitations to project sustainability. Haiti did not face similar security issues and the program design heavily emphasized project sustainability.

Consistent with the CDD/R program design placing civil society in the lead for project implementation, the role of civil society received the highest coding (high) for the principles of ownership, results and accountability, and flexibility across the three cases. This indicates
that programming where communities themselves play a lead role in project management can contribute significantly to adherence these three principles across the conflict spectrum.

In all three cases, the role of civil society contributed with some limitations to the principles of selectivity and assessment and conflict management. For selectivity, the central role of civil society may necessarily result in some limitations to this principle. The centrality of civil society means a more limited role for professional aid workers. Although this significantly increases the probability that the selected projects will respond to local needs, it does mean that project selection does not take advantage of the expertise of aid workers. This does not imply that aid workers have an inherent advantage in project selection, but rather that they have the opportunity to gain valuable insights from their experiences in the profession that likely is not available to civil society actors operate in their own communities.

In contrast, the strong role played by civil society does not inherently limit contributions to assessment and conflict management. Instead, these limitations stem from the program design. Were the program designs to have included more explicit assessments and conflict management strategies, civil society would have been well positioned to carry out these assessments and promote adherence to this principle.

**Role of Aid Workers**

In all three cases, aid workers provide technical assistance, training and oversight to civil society at the project level. In the cases of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR, aid workers play a relatively similar role in supporting the government in program management. In the case of Tuungane, the aid workers also serve as the lead in program management. Overall, the role of aid workers contributes with some limitations in the cases of the NSP and Tuungane, and contributes significantly in the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR.

Interestingly, although the role of the aid workers is relatively similar in the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the coding differs for more principles for the role of aid workers than for civil society or the
government. More specifically, the role of aid workers received different codings for five of the seven principles for the cases of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR. The differences in the level and nature of insecurity and the ensuing security strategies in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, and Haiti and the relatively high capacity of civil society in Haiti largely explain these differences. Table 7.5 below summarizes how the role of aid workers affect adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NSP – Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane – The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PRODEPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building &amp; Partnerships</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectivity</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results &amp; Accountability</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment &amp; Conflict Management</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium-High (3.9)</td>
<td>Medium-High (3.6)</td>
<td>High (4.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of Haiti, the aid workers are able to provide technical assistance at the project level with minimal interruptions due to security delays. In addition, Haiti has a relatively robust civil society, which means that some potential limitations for less substantial involvement of aid workers does not create the same limitations as in cases with less civil society capacity (e.g., in selectivity). The two principles where PRODEP/PRODEPUR faced some limitations from the role of aid workers related to ownership and assessment and conflict management. The other two cases faced some limitations to ownership and significant limitations to assessment and conflict management. For ownership, the reliance on international aid organizations across the three cases limits the contribution of aid workers to a sense of ownership, and the reliance on local aid workers means that this only somewhat – and not significantly – limits the contribution. This is not an inherent limitation of CDD/R as the
program could be implemented via local aid organizations. One concern may be that few local aid organizations have a national presence; however, this was also true for international aid organizations in Afghanistan. The model of using a variety of implementing partners as is the case in the NSP does not seem to have negatively affected adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. With respect to assessment and conflict management, the limitations did not seem a product of the role of aid workers inherently, but rather a result of the overall program design.

For the cases of the NSP and Tuungane, aid workers contributed with some limitations to adherence to each of the seven principles except sustainability, flexibility and assessment and conflict management (discussed above). In the cases of the NSP and Tuungane, most of these limitations relate to challenges presented by the security environment that either led to interruptions and delays in aid workers traveling to communities in the cases of the “stand out” and “wait it out” strategies, or may result in somewhat lower levels of technical expertise of the aid workers in the case of “blend in.” In Haiti, the relatively lower level of violence, the high capability of Haitian staff, and the “rely within” strategy help to avoid these types of security-related delays. For sustainability, Tuungane faced significant limitations due to a lack of emphasis by the aid workers on this principle and the resulting low level of technical quality and completeness of some projects. For the principle of flexibility, the rigidigity of program management, and the central role of aid workers in it resulted in some limitations for the case of Tuungane that did not occur in the NSP or PRODEP/PRODEPUR where aid workers played a more supporting role in program management.

**Overall Contributions of Three Key Actors**

Table 7.6 below details the overall contribution of the government, civil society and aid workers to the principles in the three cases.
Unsurprisingly, the role of the government received the a lower coding in the case of Tuungane in the Kivus – where the government plays the most limited role due to its limited legitimacy, effectiveness and reach – compared to the other two cases where the government plays a more significant role in program management.

The role of civil society received the highest coding in each of the three cases. By design, civil society plays a central role in project implementation in CDD/R programs and this translates into significant contributions to the various principles. The limitations related to the role of civil society in the case of Tuungane relate primarily to the lack of an established civil society “infrastructure” relative to the other two cases as discussed in the section on the role of civil society above.

The role of the aid workers significantly contributes to the overall principles in the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR in Haiti. The limitations in the contributions of aid workers in the cases of the NSP in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, and Tuungane in the Kivus, the DRC, largely relate to the security environments which somewhat limit the most technically qualified aid workers from consistently accessing the communities served by the CDD/R programs.

COMPARISON OF PRINCIPLES OF SOUND DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

This section compares and contrasts the three case studies findings by comparing the findings for each of the seven principles across the three actors.

Ownership

The principle of ownership focuses on building on the leadership, participation and commitment of a country and its people. Overall the

Table 7.6 – Summary of Role of Key Actors for all Principles for the Three Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NSP – Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane – The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PRODEPUR- Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Medium-High (4)</td>
<td>Low-Medium (2.4)</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>High (4.6)</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Workers</td>
<td>Medium-High (3.9)</td>
<td>Medium-High (3.6)</td>
<td>High (4.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
role of the three key actors contributes significantly in the case of the NSP (coded as high), with some limitations in the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR (coded as medium-high), and with significant limitations in the case of Tuungane (coded as medium) to the principle of ownership.

In all three cases, the role of civil society significantly contributes to the principle of ownership. The substantial role in project management played by civil society is one of the cornerstones of CDD/R programming, and it does not appear that the level or nature of violence hinders this component in any of the three cases. Across the three cases, the aid workers contributed with some limitations to the principle of ownership. The reliance on international aid organizations somewhat limits the sense of ownership in all three cases; however, the relatively limited role of aid workers in CDD/R and the ability to rely on local aid workers in all three cases avoids creating a significant limitation.

Given the consistency amongst the contributions of civil society and aid workers, the role of the government drives the overall contribution to the principle of ownership. For this principle, greater levels of government involvement correspond with more significant contributions to the principle of ownership. As mentioned in the section on the role of the government, the highest level of violence also had the highest level of government involvement, and thus, the highest coding for ownership.

Table 7.7 below summarizes the contributions of the three key types of development and reconstruction actors to adherence to the principle of ownership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.7 – Summary of Ownership for the Three Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of aid workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Capacity Building and Partnership

Capacity building and partnership entails collaborating closely with governments, communities, donors, non-profit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities to strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies. Overall, the roles of the three actors significantly contribute to adherence to the principle of capacity building and partnership in the case of PRODEP/PROEDPUR (coded as high), face some limitations in the case of the NSP (coded as medium-high), and face significant limitations in the case of Tuungane (coded as medium). Similar to the principle of ownership, the widest range in the coding between cases occurs in the role of the government and greater government involvement correlates with a higher coding for capacity building and partnership. This largely explains the low coding of Tuungane. Unlike the principle of ownership, however, variation does exist between the other two cases – the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR – in terms of the role of aid workers. This variation explains the difference in coding between these two cases.

In both the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the government contributes with some limitations to capacity building and partnership. In the NSP, the limitations stem from the local level where the NSP emphasizes civil society actors rather than the government, partly due to the government’s limited reach and presence. In Haiti, the local government plays a more active role in project selection; however, the role of the government at all levels initially was limited. Although the overall government role has increased over time consistent with its increased legitimacy, the persistent effectiveness issues continue to somewhat limit its role in capacity building and partnership. In the DRC, the government faces limitations in all of these areas – from legitimacy to effectiveness to reach. Their resulting minimal role in Tuungane significantly detracts from capacity building and partnership.

The role of civil society as the key partner for project contributes positively to capacity building and partnership. In the case of the DRC, however, evaluations found limitations in the level of capacity building of the civil society actors, particularly in terms of
the governance aspects of the CDD/R program. Across the board, the emphasis on civil society capacity building and partnership without corresponding engagement of the local government may present somewhat of a trade-off between building the capacity of civil society and building the capacity of the government. PRODEP/PRODEPUR’s efforts to incorporate local government officials in the COPRODEP and corresponding project selection work to address this.

In each of the three cases, aid workers support civil society to build its capacity. In the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR, aid workers also partner with the government and build its capacity in managing the overall program. The role of aid workers promotes capacity building and partnership in all three cases, with some limitations in the cases of the NSP and Tuungane. In the case of the NSP, the security environment explains these limitations. The “stand out” strategy may result in interruptions for the provision of technical assistance, and the “rely within” strategy may affect the quality of technical assistance. Similarly, in the case of Tuungane, the “wait it out” strategy may result in security-related delays. In addition, the mid-term evaluation found some weaknesses in the training approach utilized by aid workers. The “rely within” and “wait it out” strategies employed in Haiti, where there are relatively low levels of violence and high levels of human capacity, avoid these limitations of the role of aid workers. This difference explains why PRODEP/PRODEPUR overall significantly contributes to this principle, whereas the NSP contributes with some limitations.

Table 7.8 below summarizes how each of the three key actors contributes to adherence to this principle in the three case studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NSP – Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane – The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PRODEPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the government</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of civil society</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of aid workers</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sustainability

Sustainability means designing programs to ensure that their impact endures. Overall, the role of the three key actors contributes significantly in the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR (coded as high), with some limitation in the case of the NSP (coded as medium-high), and with significantly limitations in the case of Tuungane (coded as medium) to the principle of sustainability. Unlike the principles of ownership and capacity building and partnership, there is variation amongst the three cases for each of the three key actors. The conflict context seems to affect the ability of all three actors to contribute to the principle of sustainability.

The role of the government faced some limitations in the cases of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR, and neither contributed to nor significantly detracted from this principle in the case of Tuungane. For the NSP, the limitations of the role of the government for sustainability relate to its location in one ministry that may translate into limited engagement by other key ministries. In the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the sustainability of the program with respect to the role of the government rests upon the capacity being built in the government remaining there - a concern given indications that the UCP is not fully integrated into the Haitian government. In the case of Tuungane, the limited role of the government may promote sustainability in the short term given the limited government capacity; however, in the long term, this could detract from sustainability as ultimately the government has responsibility for delivering public goods and services.

In terms of the role of civil society, concerns in the technical soundness and consideration of project sustainability limit sustainability in both the NSP and Tuungane. In the case of the NSP, however, the CDCs seem to have embraced their roles fully and actively seek opportunities to engage with other sources of finance for continuation of projects and related development and reconstruction activities. This somewhat mitigates the sustainability concerns in the case of the NSP in a way that doesn’t seem to occur in Tuungane. This
difference may be due in part to the high levels of displacement in the eastern DRC undermining the tradition of informal governance structures in a way that did not occur with the shuras in Nangarhar and to the relative "newness" of the community development councils in the DRC. In addition, in the NSP seems to place greater emphasis on considering project sustainability than Tuungane does. Although project sustainability concerns also exist with PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the focus on income-generating projects builds in sustainability to a greater extent than in the other two cases. In addition, the program works with existing civil society organizations that were not solely created for this particular program. This has the potential for a more lasting infrastructure upon which other development and reconstruction activities can build.

With respect to the role of aid workers and sustainability, the security context creates limitations for promoting sustainability in the cases of the NSP and Tuungane, but not in the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR. In the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, using the "rely within" and "wait it out" security strategies in an environment with relatively low levels of instability resulted in minimal interruptions in the program, and thus did not seem to limit sustainability. In the case of the NSP, the "stand out" strategy can lead to program implementation delays that can reduce the technical soundness and thus sustainability of projects. The "blend in" strategy may avoid these delays but may mean lower levels of technical expertise for examining projects; however, the relatively high level of human capacity in Nangarhar somewhat mitigates these limitations. In the case of Afghanistan, this translates into some sustainability concerns. In the case of Tuungane, security-related delays in project implementation pose significant risks as the aid workers disburse funds in waves, and interruptions in monitoring and evaluating projects by aid workers can lead to serious delays and partially explain some of the incomplete projects. Interestingly, the higher level of conflict in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, than in the Kivus, the DRC, did not lead to greater limitations on the aid workers' contributions to the principle of sustainability in the NSP than in Tuungane. In fact, the inverse was true. This can be explained partly
by the ability of aid workers in Nangarhar to adopt security strategies that minimize the impact of the security situation on their access to communities given the relatively predictable nature of the violence and the relatively high level of human capacity in the area.

Table 7.9 below summarizes the roles of the three key actors in promoting sustainability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of the government</th>
<th>NSP - Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane - The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PRODEPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of civil society</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of aid workers</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium-High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (2.7)</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Selectivity**

Selectivity consists of allocating resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests. The contributions of the three key actors overall to the principle of selectivity mirrors that of capacity building and partnership and sustainability. It contributes significantly in the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, with some limitations in the case of the NSP, and with significant limitations in the case of Tuungane. No variation existed among the three cases with respect to the role of civil society, and the role of the government largely drove the results of Tuungane. As was the case for capacity building and partnership, the role of aid workers drives the variation between PRODEP/PRODEPUR and the NSP.

In both the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the key role of government in project selection is to develop a list of ineligible projects. By largely leaving the project selection to the communities but providing some general guidance on and oversight of those decisions, the Afghan and Haitian governments support the allocation of resources based on need and local commitment. In the cases of Afghanistan and Haiti, the foreign policy interest of promoting the legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the Afghan government has seen significant positive results.
In both these cases, the role of the government significantly contributes to selectivity. In the case of the DRC, the government does not actively engage in all project selection, but is consulted for specific types of projects. This leads to a similar result in terms of project selection as the other two cases. The key difference in the DRC relates to how the lack of a role of the government affects the foreign policy interest of promoting long-term stability in eastern Congo. The concerns over the government legitimacy, effectiveness and reach, create two different results of minimizing the Congolese government’s role. On the one hand, avoiding a central role for the government in project selection when the government is not viewed by the population as a legitimate actor may contribute to the principle of selectivity to some degree. On the other hand, the exclusion of the government detracts from selectivity by not addressing one of the key factors fostering instability in the eastern DRC, which is a foreign interest of Tuungane’s donors. In this way, the limited role of the government neither significantly contributes to nor detracts from stability in eastern DRC, and thus the principle of selectivity.

In all three cases, civil society plays a lead role in project selection. In addition, all three cases include mechanisms to avoid elite capture. The central role of civil society also contributes to foreign policy interests in the three cases. Interviewees in all three cases did, however, indicate that the ceiling on the amount of the project grants did limit their project selection. As such, civil society contributes to the allocation of resources based on local needs and commitment with some limitations. This limitation posed by the ceilings on the grant sizes is a common limitation across the three cases. This may be an inherent challenge for CDD/R programming where budget constraints and potentially concerns over resource management may require restrictions on the size of grants to communities. Given that the average size of the loan varies amongst the communities, however, this limitation may stem more from the common issue of insufficient resources to address the myriad of development and reconstruction issues facing conflict-affected communities.
The role of aid workers in all three cases is relatively limited in project selection. This may face some limitations as the project selection does not benefit from international expertise and “lessons learned.” In Haiti, the relatively high level of capacity amongst civil society organizations offsets this limitation.

Table 7.10 below summarizes the findings from each of the three cases on how the roles of the three key actors affect selectivity.

Table 7.10 – Summary of Selectivity for the Three Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NSP - Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane - The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PRODEPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the government</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of civil society</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of aid workers</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
<td>Medium (3.3)</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results and Accountability

The principle of results and accountability involves directing resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives while also designing accountability and transparency into systems and building effective checks and balances to guard against corruption. Overall, the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers contribute significantly to results and accountability in the cases of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR and with some limitations in the case of Tuungane. As was the case for the principles of ownership and selectivity, no variation occurs across the three cases in terms of the role of civil society. Again, the CDD/R program design emphasizes the central role of civil society in project management, including monitoring and reporting on progress. The conflict context does not seem to affect whether civil society can play this role. Mirroring the results for capacity building and partnership and selectivity, the role of the government contributes most to the overall lowest score for Tuungane, and the difference between the role of aid workers explains the variation between the cases of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR.
In the cases of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the government’s role in program management significantly contributes to this principle. Both governments collect information at the outcome level that they make publicly available through websites and other written documents. Both governments have commissioned independent impact evaluations that include outcome variables, which provide a better understanding of the impacts of the CDD/R programs. Thus both the Afghan and Haitian governments significantly contribute to the principle of results and accountability. In the case of Tuungane, the government plays an extremely limited role. The limited role of the government creates mixed results in terms of results and accountability that translate into the role of aid workers neither contributing to nor detracting from this principle as described in the relevant section of the Tuungane case study chapter.

In all three cases, the role of civil society significantly contributes to the principle of results and accountability. The development councils report to the communities on their activities and conduct on-going monitoring of the projects.

In all three cases, aid workers bear at least some responsibility to conduct monitoring and evaluation and collect data. With the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR, these data are provided to the government agencies responsible for overall program management. In the case of Tuungane, the data go to the national directorate of the aid organizations. As the lead actor in program management, Tuungane aid workers also support a rigorous, multi-year evaluation of their activities. Despite these significant efforts to promote results and accountability, the security situations and related strategies employed by the NSP and Tuungane aid workers somewhat limit results and accountability. Security-related delays may limit monitoring and evaluation by decreasing the frequency of visits (“stand out” and “wait it out”) or the level of technical expertise available for these visits (“blend in”). The “rely within” security strategy in Haiti – with high levels of capacity among local aid workers and the relatively low level of violence – does not create such a limitation.
Table 7.11 below summarizes the extent to which the roles of the government, civil society and aid workers contribute to this principle in each of the three cases.

**Table 7.11 - Summary of Results and Accountability for the Three Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of the government</th>
<th>NSP - Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane - The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PRODEPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of civil society</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Role of aid workers    | Medium-High      | Medium-High          | High                   |
|------------------------|------------------|----------------------|

| Overall                | High (4.7)       | Medium-High (3.7)    | High (5)               |

**Flexibility**

Flexibility encompasses the ability to adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency. Overall, the role of the three key actors contributed significantly in the cases of Tuungane and PRODEP/PRODEPUR and with some limitations in the case of the NSP. The greatest variation across the three cases related to the role of the government, with increased role for the government resulting in less flexibility given the common challenges of rigidity amongst bureaucracies.

In the case of the NSP, the central role of the government - a bureaucracy not known for its ability to adapt - faces significant limitations in flexibility. Similarly, in the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the role of the government faces some limitations in contributing to flexibility; however, the changing role of the government does point to flexibility in the overall program, and the reliance on the UCP, which is somewhat separated from the overall government bureaucracy, minimizes this limitation. In the case of Tuungane, aid workers - rather than the government - play the lead program management role. This limited role of the government significantly contributes to adherence to the principle of flexibility.

Although these CDD/R programs may not build in substantial flexibility at the program management level, the program design allows for substantial flexibility at the project level. The central role
played by civil society and their ability to conduct project selection as part of the overall program process (rather than prior to start of the program) significantly contributes to the flexibility of the three CDD/R programs.

The “supporting” role of the aid workers in both the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR significantly contributes to the principle of flexibility. In the case of Tuungane, the rigidity of the processes and procedures employed by the aid workers – who are also the key actor for program management – pose some limitations to the principle of flexibility. Interestingly, the program where aid workers – rather than the government – play the lead in program management, the aid workers received a lower coding for flexibility. This may signal some limitations in flexibility of program management for CDD/R whether this role is played by the government or by aid workers.

Table 7.12 below summarizes the contributions of the roles of these three key actors in contributing to the principle of flexibility.

Table 7.12 – Summary of Flexibility for the Three Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NSP - Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane - The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PRODEPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the government</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of civil society</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of aid workers</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.3)</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
<td>High (4.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessment and Conflict Management

The principle of assessment and conflict management entails conducting careful research, adapting best practices, and designing for local conditions with particular consideration given to understanding and managing the drivers of conflict. Overall, the roles of the three key actors contribute with some limitations in the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR and with significant limitations in the cases of the NSP and Tuungane. No variation existed in terms of the contribution of civil society, and the greatest variation amongst the three cases related to the role of the government. As discussed previously, the
variation in assessment and conflict management stems more the program design and does not appear to be inherent to CDD/R or driven by the conflict context.

In the case of the NSP, the Afghan government did not conduct a thorough pre-program assessment to understand the particular needs and challenges of each area where it operated and did not conduct a conflict assessment. This detracts somewhat from the program assessment and conflict management, but the maintenance of a “negative list” reduces the extent to which the role of the government detracts from this principle somewhat. In the case of Tuungane, given the historical and current lack of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government, the limited role actually contributes to conflict management, although the lack of opportunity for the government to contribute does create some limitations. In the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the government did conduct baseline data collection that provides a good starting point for the program to respond to any potential factors that may exacerbate the conflict, but it did not incorporate this type of conflict assessment into the ongoing monitoring and evaluation. In addition, the various requirements around inclusion of those with political affiliations contribute to conflict management. Taking into consideration these efforts, the role of the Haitian government contributes to assessment and conflict management with some limitations.

In all three cases, civil society actors conduct the project selection. The inclusion requirements and transparent processes help to ensure that projects do not further promote sub-group tensions. The lack of more explicit consideration of how projects could exacerbate “dividers” or could support “connectors,” and the lack of conflict management expertise, however, do somewhat limit the contributions of civil society to adherence to assessment and conflict management.

In none of the three cases did the aid workers conduct an explicit conflict assessment prior to program commencement, which detracts from assessment and conflict management. In the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR, the aid workers contributed to a baseline assessment which contributes to this principle; however, the lack of on-going conflict assessment
significantly limits aid workers' contributions to assessment and conflict management.

Table 7.13 summarizes the contributions of the government, civil society and aid workers to the principle of assessment and conflict management for the three cases.

**Table 7.13 – Summary of Assessment and Conflict Management for the Three Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of the government</th>
<th>NSP – Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane – The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PROEDPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of civil society</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of aid workers</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium (2.7)</td>
<td>Medium (3.3)</td>
<td>Medium-High (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Adherence of the Three Key Actors to the Seven Principles**

Drawing from the findings gleaned from looking at the variation between cases for each of the seven principles of development and reconstruction individually, this section analyzes how adherence across the seven principles. Tables 7.14 and 7.15 below summarize these results.

Across the three cases, the role of the government and aid workers contributed with some limitations and the role of civil society contributed significantly to adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction as depicted in Table 7.14 below.
Table 7.14 - Summary of the Seven Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction for the Three Key Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Aid Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building &amp; Partnerships</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectivity</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results &amp; Accountability</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment &amp; Conflict Management</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium-High(3.6)</td>
<td>High (4.5)</td>
<td>Medium-High(4.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil society significantly contributed to ownership, capacity building and partnership, results and accountability and flexibility. For the other three principles (sustainability, selectivity and assessment and conflict management), civil society contributed with some limitations. The government contributed with some limitations to the principles of selectivity, results and accountability, flexibility, and assessment and conflict management. The government contributed with significant limitations to the other three principles (ownership, capacity building and sustainability).

Aid workers contributed with some limitations to all seven of the principles except flexibility (which it contributed to significantly) and assessment and conflict management (which it did not contribute to or slightly detracted from adherence). The security strategies used by aid workers in the more insecure environments (Nangarhar and the Kivus) cause security-related delays. This appears to create some level of trade-off between the quality of technical assistance, and thus the level of capacity building and partnership and sustainability, and the feasibility of implementing in insecure environments.

These findings show that civil society strongly promotes adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction inherent to CDD/R programming across the three cases. More variation exists in terms of the role of aid workers (with aid workers playing the lead role in program implementation in the case of Tuungane) and substantially more variation exists in the role of the government. Given these
variations in the role of key actors in the CDD/R program designs, comparing the combined role of the three actors for each of the case studies provides greater insights into the feasibility of adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction across the conflict spectrum as depicted in Table 7.15 below.

**Table 7.15 – Summary of the Seven Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction for the Three Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>NSP – Nangarhar</th>
<th>Tuungane – The Kivus</th>
<th>PRODEP/PROEDPUR-Haiti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building &amp; Partnerships</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectivity</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results &amp; Accountability</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment &amp; Conflict Management</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium-High (4.1)</td>
<td>Medium (3.4)</td>
<td>High (4.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each of the principles of sound development and reconstruction, the worst any given case did was to contribute with significant limitations. Tuungane was coded the lowest amongst the three cases for all of the principles, except for flexibility, where it tied with PRODEP/PRODEPUR for the highest coding (high), and assessment and conflict management, where it tied with the NSP for the lowest coding (medium). The low level of government involvement in program management drives the high score for flexibility. The low coding for the NSP with respect to assessment and conflict management results from the lack of explicit conflict assessment activities undertaken by the government and aid workers. This was also the principle where the NSP received its lowest coding (medium).

PRODEP/PRODEPUR receives (or ties for) the highest coding for each of the principles except ownership. The relative weakness of PRODEP/PRODEPUR compared to the NSP in contributing to the principle of ownership derives from the more limited role of the Haitian government in the program management. Although this role has increased as the
Haitian government has improved its legitimacy, effectiveness and reach, the emphasis on contracting out activities and staff positions, and the somewhat detached nature of the UCP does present significant limitations to adherence to the principle of ownership.

Overall, assessment and conflict management received relatively low ratings. This is not inherent to CDD/R programming, but rather an area for potential improvement. In general, most development and reconstruction programs would benefit from more explicit assessment and conflict management to inform the program design phase, but often a lack of resources for analysis (versus programming), a desire to implement activities quickly, and even a sense that actors on the ground inherently understand the conflict context all contribute to insufficient assessment and conflict management in conflict-affected settings. More explicit assessment and conflict management analysis by civil society would strengthen the CDD/R programs.

Overall, the three case studies show that CDD/R can contribute with varying levels of limitations to adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. The case study with a relatively low level of conflict (PRODEP/PRODEPUR in Haiti) contributed significantly to overall adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction. The case study with relatively high levels of violence - the NSP in Nangarhar, Afghanistan - significantly contributed to adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction with some limitations. The case study with a medium level of violence - Tuungane in the Kivus, the DRC - contributed but with significant limitations to the principles of sound development and reconstruction. This indicates that development and reconstruction actors can feasibly implement sound development and reconstruction across a relatively wide spectrum of conflict; however, the conflict context may cause some limitations to adherence to these principles. Figure 7.1 summarizes the overall adherence to each of the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction for the three cases.
Figure 7.1 - Summary of Overall Contribution to Adherence to the Principles of Sound Development and Reconstruction for the Three Cases
8. CONCLUSION

The three case studies demonstrate that development and reconstruction actors can feasibly implement sound development and reconstruction in a variety of conflict contexts spanning the conflict spectrum; however, the conflict context affects the “soundness” of these efforts. This conclusion examines how the conflict context in the three case studies affected the ability of the programs to adhere to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction by examining three key factors – the level and nature of violence, the historical and current capacity of civil society, and the capacity and role of the government. The conclusion also discusses factors not related to the conflict context that created limitations and, lastly, presents recommendations for further research.

The Level and Nature of Violence

The debate over whether development and reconstruction actors can operate in conflict-affected settings is sometimes simplified to the notion that the ability to implement “sound” development and reconstruction is inversely related to the level of violence. In other words, the more violent the conflict, the worse the program will be. Although the conflict context limits adherence to the principles of development and reconstruction, this relationship is more complex.

This relationship primarily plays out at the program level and particularly the role played by aid workers. The lead role played by civil society at the project level as specified by the CDD/R approach means that all three cases employed the “rely within” security strategy, and variations in the contributions made by civil society relate to factors in the conflict context other than the level of nature and level of violence (see below).

Aid workers carried out program management that engaged communities. Aid workers traveling to beneficiary communities had to choose one (or more) of the security strategies. In the case of PRODEP/PRODEPUR in Haiti, the security strategy of “rely within” and
“wait it out” with the relatively low level of violence avoids many of the limitations posed by the insecurity in the cases of the NSP in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, and Tuungane in the Kivus.

In the other two cases, the strategy employed varied. In the case of the NSP, the variation in security strategies related less to the specific security situation and more to the policies and practices of the various FPs. In the case of Tuungane in the Kivus, the same program implementers selected different security strategies based on the specific security situations within this area.

Interestingly, the case where the level and nature of violence most significantly affected the ability of aid workers to implement program management did not occur in the case with the highest level of violence (the NSP), but rather in the case with the middle level of violence (Tuungane). Although initially designed to operate in both North and South Kivu, Tuungane was only implemented in South Kivu. Importantly, this CDD/R program was never even attempted in North Kivu. Rather, those implementing Tuungane decided to employ a “bug out” security strategy and focus program implementation in more secure areas. The existence of other humanitarian, development and reconstruction efforts, including another CDD/R program, carried out in North Kivu suggests that a different security strategy (e.g., “armor up” or “stand out”) might have enabled implementation of Tuungane in North Kivu. It also suggests that the security strategies are not chosen solely on the conflict context, but are based on the policy and strategy considerations of the individual donors and/or their implementing partners.

In Nangarhar, the selection of the security strategy appeared to vary amongst the FPs and did not directly correspond to the perceived security threat. The “stand out” strategy employed by some of the NSP FPs resulted in the greatest interruptions in program implementation, and thus appears to be a sub-optimal security strategy in this context. The relative predictability of the violence in Nangarhar lent it to security strategies that decreased the risk of attack while still allowing program management to occur. The FPs most commonly used “blend in,” although, some also employed “rely within.”
In both of these cases - with medium and relatively high levels of violence - the insecurity affects the ability of aid workers to access participating communities and affects adherence to the principles of capacity building and partnership, selectivity and results and accountability. Although remaining under a certain threshold of violence does seem to avoid limitations posed by insecurity, above that threshold the nature of the insecurity has a greater influence on ability to adhere to the principles than the level of violence. For example, the relatively predictable nature of instability in Nangarhar enabled a security strategy to minimize disruptions in accessing communities. The same adaptation was not possible in the case of the Kivus with lower levels of violence, but less predictability. The effect of the use of these security strategies was seen via the extent to which it affected the frequency or technical capacity of aid worker visits to communities. The “stand out” and “wait it out” strategy employed by Tuungane interrupted program management in locations experiencing heightened insecurity. The “blend in” and “rely within” strategies employed by the NSP led to fewer interruptions in program management, but the limits placed on international aid workers to then implement the program may have lowered the technical capacity of the program management. In both instances, the level and nature of violence and related security strategies reduce the role of international aid workers in program management. This results in differing impacts depending on the local capacity.

**Historical and Current Civil Society Capacity**

The central role of civil society in project management serves as a critical cornerstone to CDD/R programming and varied only at the margins - such as using representatives from CBOs in the PRODEP/PRODEPUR case. Across conflict contexts, the lead role of civil society in project management significantly contributed to adherence to the principles of ownership, results and accountability, and flexibility in all three cases. This indicates that civil society’s contributions to principles of sound development and reconstruction are relatively robust to the conflict context and are significant for several of the principles.
The key role played by civil society resulted in minimal variation in adherence to the seven principles of sound development and reconstruction, with differences between cases for only two principles (capacity building and partnership and sustainability). In these cases, the two cases with relatively strong pre-existing civil society capacity and current local capacity (Nangarhar and Haiti) both fared better than the case without a strong pre-existing civil society infrastructure. This indicates that although communities with lower levels of existing civil society capacity can participate in CDD/R activities, the CDD/R approach may suffer somewhat in these contexts. In addition, a relatively strong civil society may somewhat mitigate the potentially negative effects of restricted international aid worker engagement resulting from the security situation.

**Government Capacity and Role**

The variation in the roles of key actors stemmed to a large degree from the current political differences in the three cases. Specifically, the level of engagement of the government varied based upon the level of legitimacy, effectiveness and reach of the government. The variation in the extent to which the role of the government affects adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction largely drives the overall results.

The installation of a legitimate government at the beginning of the NSP in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, created an opportunity for significant Afghan government involvement. Although initially the CDD/R programming in Haiti did not significantly engage the Haitian government, increased engagement in PRODEP/PRODEPUR accompanied increases in the government’s legitimacy. Its persistent lack of effectiveness, however, means that the aid workers provide substantial support (e.g., the staff of the UCP consists of Haitian World Bank consultants). The Congolese government in the Kivus has not experienced the same evolution and thus plays a relatively limited role in Tuungane. As such, the aid workers play a leading role in program management in the DRC.

Notably, the case study with the highest level of violence also presented a window of opportunity to engage the government. As such, a
conflict context with a higher level of violence, but with greater government involvement, better adhered to the overall principles of sound development and reconstruction than one with a medium level of violence and limited government involvement. This indicates both that government involvement may more significantly affect adherence to principles of sound development and reconstruction than the level of violence.

Extremely minimal government involvement largely explains the greatest limitations faced by Tuungane, and its overall lowest coding for adherence to each of the principles of sound development and reconstruction except flexibility. This inverse relationship between the level of government involvement and adherence to the principle of flexibility indicates a level of trade-offs between the principle of flexibility and the other principles in the shortterm; however, the high level of flexibility fostered by the central role of civil society in project management offsets the potential drawbacks for less flexibility at the program level. In addition, the costs of excluding the government (e.g., in terms of ownership, capacity building and partnership and sustainability) clearly outweigh any short-term benefits and completely undermine long-term success of development and reconstruction efforts. Although the extent and nature of government involvement in the cases of the NSP and PRODEP/PRODEPUR do differ, this variation at the margins does not seem to drive differences in adherence to the principles of sound development and reconstruction between these two cases. Rather, the role of the aid workers largely drives the differences between these two cases for several of the principles (capacity building and partnership, selectivity, and results and accountability).

Factors Not Related to the Conflict Context

Although the level and - more importantly - the nature of the violence, the historical and current capacity of civil society, and the capacity and role of the government do affect adherence to the principles of development and reconstruction, some limitations also stem from program design. This includes both aspects stemming from the CDD/R
approach and those not explained by the approach. As an example of the former, the central role of civil society in project management and thus the more limited role of aid workers with extensive development and reconstruction expertise somewhat limits adherence to the principle of selectivity. Limitations stemming from the CDD/R approach similarly affect the three case studies and thus do not bias the comparison between the case studies. Rather, these limitations identify inherent weaknesses in the CDD/R approach. Limitations not inherent to the CDD/R approach do affect the assessment of the seven principles and can be identified as areas where certain aspects of program design are stronger in one case than another.

The most striking instance of limitations neither driven by the conflict context nor inherent to the CDD/R approach is the relatively weak adherence to the principle of assessment and conflict management across the three cases. The conflict contexts do not preclude extensive assessment and conflict management, however. On the contrary, assessment is particularly critical in conflict-affected settings to ensure that programs not only “do no harm,” but also ideally ameliorate the conflict situation. Development and reconstruction actors should prioritize careful assessment and conflict management throughout the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programs in conflict-affected settings.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

The findings from this research identified several areas for future research, including: (1) expanding to more cases to facilitate closer examination of aspects of the conflict context beyond the level of violence and to increase the generalizability of these findings, (2) standardizing data collection approaches to enable greater comparison among the case studies, and (3) collecting longitudinal impact data to understand effects in the longer term.

First, this research selected the cases based on the level of conflict as a proxy for the the conflict context. Expanding this research to additional cases would allow further variation to more deeply examine the effects of other key aspects of the conflict context.
including the nature of violence, the historical and current capacity of
civil society, and the government capacity. A non-conflict case
study(ies) would also provide a base case to further understand the
effects of conflict on CDD/R.

In addition, the case studies had several common characteristics
that limit the generalizability of their findings. For example, in all
three case studies, development and reconstruction actors had at least
some presence in the area prior to the escalation of violence and prior
to the creation of the programs. As a result, these cases tell us
little about expanding into new and violent areas. Additional research
could analyze cases where aid workers did not have a presence prior to
the conflict to examine feasibility of adhering to principles of sound
development and reconstruction in new environments. Similarly, in all
three cases civilians working for predominantly international NGOs serve
as the aid workers. Further research could examine cases where the aid
workers consist predominantly of local aid organizations. In addition,
cases examining when non-aid workers play this type of traditional role
(e.g., military civil affairs personnel) could provide useful insights.

Second, the case study analysis relies heavily upon the evaluations
conducted by third parties in addition to the fieldwork. The use of
secondary data results in differences in the type and amount of
information available, which creates discrepancies between the analyses
of the three cases. For example, the NSP case study incorporates
results from the first round follow-up of a randomized control trial,
whereas only the baseline results were available at the time of this
writing for the Tuungane case study, and no randomized control trial had
been conducted for the PRODEP/PRODEPUR case study. Differences also
occur in the methodological approach and level of rigor of the data
available for each case study. Future research could address these
limitations by carrying out a long-term, cross-country impact evaluation
of CDD/R programs or replicate existing impact evaluation methodology
being utilized to assess CDD/R programs. This would move the analysis
beyond examining adherence to the principles of sound development and
reconstruction to assessing the overall effectiveness of these efforts.
Third, the approach utilized in this dissertation compares three case studies that are a snapshot in time. This does not enable analysis of either how changes in the conflict context over time affect the soundness of these programs, nor the long-term impacts of the programs. For example, do limitations in the technical soundness and thus sustainability of projects actually undermine other principles of governance in the long-term?

In addition to strengthening the research to examine the hypothesis presented in this dissertation, related research could further inform the broader policy question of the feasibility of sound development and reconstruction in conflict-affected contexts. Many assumptions have been made about the targeting of aid workers, particularly when they operate in the same spaces as military actors. Future research should empirically examine this question to better understand whether aid workers face higher risks of attack than other civilians and whether other factors (e.g., relationships with a party to the conflict) appear to increase this risk. This analysis could also more closely examine the relative pros and cons of the various security strategies both within and across a given conflict context. In particular, it could consider the policies and strategies that inform the selection of the security strategy. This would help to inform development and reconstruction actors to select optimal security strategies for a given context and contribute to the ability to implement sound development and reconstruction in a variety of conflict contexts.
APPENDIX A – NUMBER OF INCIDENTS CARRIED OUT BY TALIBAN/ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN BY PROVINCE, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2007 AND 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONAL COMMAND/ PROVINCE</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>% CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KABUL</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC EAST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARWAN</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>132%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARDAK</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANJSHER</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGAR</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPISA</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>162%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHOST</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKTIA</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHAZNI</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>134%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKTIKA</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NANGARHAR</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAGHMAN</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NURISTAN</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUNAR</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAMYAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>167%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RC EAST TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,028</strong></td>
<td><strong>39%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC SOUTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANDAHAR</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELMAND</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>188%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMROZ</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>139%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URUZGAN</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>165%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZABUL</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAI KUNDI</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RC SOUTH TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,010</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,785</strong></td>
<td><strong>77%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC WEST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADGHIS</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>163%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERAT</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHOR</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARAH</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RC WEST TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>254</strong></td>
<td><strong>393</strong></td>
<td><strong>55%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC NORTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARYAB</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAWZJAN</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>110%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARI PUL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALKH</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMANGAN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUNDUZ</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>291%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAGHLAN</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAKHAR</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADAKSHAN</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RC NORTH TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>254</strong></td>
<td><strong>395</strong></td>
<td><strong>56%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL, ALL REGIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,704</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,601</strong></td>
<td><strong>51%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Campbell and Shapiro, 2009
### APPENDIX B - LIST OF INELIGIBLE PROJECTS FOR THE NSP

- Items funded by other organizations
- Political campaign materials or donations
- Weapons
- Chainsaws
- Chemicals (e.g., pesticides)
- Investments detrimental to the environment
- Land
- Construction, rehabilitation, or maintenance of any government office building
- Salaries of government officials, staff of government subsidized organizations, or CDC members
- Any activity on land that has disputed ownership or is deemed to be dangerous (e.g., presence of mines)
- Any activity using child labor
- Any activity that supports drug crop production or processing of such crops
- Rehabilitation of structures of archaeological and cultural value
- Diesel water pumps for irrigation
- Religious buildings
- Dams over three meters
- Cash donations for the disabled
- Vehicles
- Enterprise development or income-generating activities (unless combined with productive skills training)

Source: MRRD, 2007
## APPENDIX C – LIST OF INELIGIBLE PROJECTS FOR PRODEPUR

- Construction of individual wells
- New “pistes”
- Purchase of land
- Purchase of an animal for fattening
- Construction of churches
- Construction of political parties’ offices
- Construction of latrines
- Purchase of ambulances
- Production of controlled substances (e.g., tobacco or alcohol)
- Mobile dental or medical facilities
- Purchase of motorized vehicles
- Construction of bakeries using wood as the energy source

Source: WB, 2008
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http://www.nspafghanistan.org/default.aspx?sel=1
http://www.nspafghanistan.org/faqs.shtm
http://www.nspafghanistan.org/nsp_donors.shtm
http://www.nspafghanistan.org/about_nsp/nsp_OM.shtm
http://www.nspafghanistan.org/about_nsp/nsp_OM.shtm


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/afghanistan_is_the_new_afghanistan


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