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Three Studies in Conflict

Elizabeth Wilke
Three Studies in Conflict

Elizabeth Wilke

This document was submitted as a dissertation in March 2015 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Krishna Kumar (Chair), Howard Shatz, and Daniel Egel.
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Preface
State instability, fragility and conflict pose a global security threat. We expect to see an increase in the use of conflict prevention, cessation, and recovery interventions in coming years as a result. Practitioners still lack answers to questions of critical importance from designing effective interventions relating to the appropriate modes of intervention before and during conflict; effective disarmament and reintegration strategies for combatants; and necessary procedures for consolidating post-conflict peace.

This dissertation uses a variety of social science research methods to answer three research questions related to these issues. How well do current models of faction behavior predict faction participation, behavior and overall levels of violence in a specific conflict? What effects do aid-funded or informal reintegration programs have on returning soldiers? And, how can useful degrees of trust and cooperation be created in a post-conflict environment?

This dissertation should be of particular interest to those engaged in designing and implementing conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery programs.
Acknowledgements

Undertaking this dissertation and bringing it to fruition has been one of the defining activities of my young adulthood. I am grateful to many for their support and humbled by the confidence they continued to place in me when I was filled with doubt. I want, specifically, to thank my father and stepmother for always lending a sensitive ear and a thoughtful perspective; my mother for being my first and best example of a strong, intelligent woman; and my sister for her unconditional belief that I can achieve great things. I am grateful to my Chair, Krishna Kumar. This dissertation was made possible through his continued engagement, practical counsel, and unfailing enthusiasm for this project. Also, I thank my Committee members, Howard Shatz and Daniel Egel, whose critical reviews and excellent comments have shaped this dissertation and made it immeasurably better than otherwise might have been.

This dissertation was supported in part by funding from the Ann and James Rothenberg Dissertation Award.
Summary
The growth of U.S. and foreign interventions in civil conflict over the last two decades has been considerable. As intervenors continue to become involved in unconventional conflicts, policymakers’ understanding of the complexities of civil war increase. War has serious social, economic, and political consequences. Collier (1996), for instance, identifies the incidence of intrastate conflict as one of the key development “traps” of poor countries. Despite its large impacts, the study of conflict at the micro-level – that is, explaining conflict from the perspective of individuals - has only recently emerged as a serious topic in the social science literature. In a recent review of the status of the literature on Civil War, Blattman and Miguel (2010) call for:

- Greater testing of theory with actual real-world examples;
- Critical evaluation of policy interventions;
- Greater use of approaches that combine qualitative and quantitative information; and
- Greater focus on long-term impacts and post-conflict recovery.

This dissertation addresses some of these outstanding gaps in three different chapters. The first, using data from Sierra Leone, brings micro-level quantitative evidence from an individual-level survey to test theories of civilian violence, finding support for a few predictions and calling others into question. The second, using data from Uganda, evaluates the social and economic impact of a set of conflict recovery assistance programs. It finds that the program has large negative and significant effects on social support outcomes and negative but not significant effects on economic indicators. The third, based on a review of studies from across a diverse set of literatures, identifies critical elements for rebuilding social capital in the long term for policy planners in the recovery environment. Findings suggest that some interventions are not appropriate for all context, and that there are large potential benefits to be gained by thoughtfully sequencing interventions and taking advantage of interaction effects between interventions. A concluding discussion brings the findings together to present lessons for policymakers on how to avoid conflict onset, reduce conflict duration, manage reintegration efforts, and plan for longer-term reconciliation and recovery.
Introduction

Sierra Leone: Applying Theory in Context
The first analysis provides a review of major lines of current theory that seek to explain the use of violence against civilians in the age of “new” civil wars. Three major lines of theory are identified. The first argues that civilian violence occurs because factions are unable to maintain control and discipline within their ranks, since the types of selective incentives the faction provides encourage recruitment of low-commitment individuals. The second also argues that civilian violence is the result of low discipline and control within factions, but argues that the causal mechanism stems from the classical principal-agent problem where central and unit commanders have asymmetric preferences and costs of information. The third major strain argues that civilian violence is the result of either (1) weak groups’ inability to provide selective incentives to civilians in order to compel cooperation, or (2) weak groups’ inability to overcome the problem of accurately identifying enemy collaborators or supporters among the civilian population.

So far, these theories have been built using a comparative approach across cases. The exceptions occur where two factions in a conflict are analyzed; the Revolutionary United Front and the Community Defense Forces in Sierra Leone were analyzed together to build some of these theories. The analysis uses a within-case comparative approach in which the Sierra Leone conflict is treated as a case and the major factions that participated in the war are analyzed within this context. The analysis assesses the extent to which any of these theories can successfully predict levels and changes in violence against civilians within a specific context. Overall, none of the theories predict civilian violence with accuracy. This is especially true when the Sierra Leone Army – the formal, national defense force -- is analyzed as a faction.

Uganda: Evaluating the Impact of Programs
The second paper takes advantage of a natural experiment to evaluate the short-term social and economic impacts of aid organizations’ unofficial reintegration assistance programs for combatant youth in northern Uganda. Multiple aid organizations in northern Uganda have established programs to receive youth returned from fighting, provide care, goods, and recovery programs, and reunite youth with their families. These centers justify their activities by arguing that the received youth would have a harder time reconnecting to their families and reintegrating into the community if their services were not available.

To test this argument, I exploit the time lag between the demand for reception centers and the number of reception centers, using reception center data and a survey of former combatant youth. Uniquely, several of the outcomes of interest are indices of social and psychological support received by combatants from their communities after being reunited. The results call into question the assumption that returning youth would otherwise be worse off without reception services. Instead, they suggest that reception centers reduce the amount of social and psychological support received by the community in the short- to medium-term.
I propose a number of mechanisms through which this effect might occur and ultimately speculate that it is likely a resentment mechanism employed by the community at large to punish youth for taking assistance when the community itself lacks basic necessities. During the time period this study focuses on, the majority of the northern Ugandan population was interned in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, due to the violence. These camps were undersupplied with basic needs, and youth who went to reception centers often were given food, medical care, durable goods, and perhaps some education or training. Further study will have to more directly test this hypothesis.

The transitional justice literature frequently cites the dissatisfaction of civilians with reintegration assistance programs and packages given to combatants who inflicted the violence. The solution is to make sure that reintegration assistance for combatants is part of a larger suite of economic recovery and stimulus packages. The policy implication is obvious; aid organizations must seriously consider the likely social consequences of the programs they offer, especially if they favor one group over others, in this case, combatants over non-combatants. This could be achieved in several ways, for example, through greater donor or organizational coordination to make sure that, in total, aid in war-affected areas is distributed across combatants and non-combatants. Or, aid organizations individually could provide aid to war-affected families or communities, rather than focusing on the combatant as an individual. Regardless of the method, this paper calls into question the effectiveness of targeting reintegration assistance to individuals rather than families or communities.

**Long Term Social Capital: Assessing the State of Knowledge**

The final paper takes a long term view, providing a detailed review of post-conflict social reconciliation and the necessary conditions for building cooperative, trusting relationships – i.e., social capital. Without oversimplifying a complex phenomenon, civil war results from the inability of political and social institutions to adjudicate grievances and disputes in a manner that is acceptable to groups with the power to wage war. Cooperative relationships that generate and sustain social capital are critical facilitators of economic activity and exchange. As well, institutions arrangements that result from peace agreements must also promote sustained cooperative interaction in order to abate the social exclusion and grievance-motivated violence that started the conflict. Ergo, rebuilding cooperation and social trust under new political institutions that are designed to more effectively deal with demands is critical for long term stability.

The contribution of the third analysis is its amalgamation of literature across multiple disciplines, using a game theoretic framework wherein cooperation leads to trust and incorporates signaling, information costs, repeated interactions, and asymmetric costs and benefits. This analysis primarily promotes the idea of post-conflict recovery as a fundamentally micro-level social process in which new institutions that support cooperative behavior are established and reinforced until they become self-reinforcing. States may need to rely on a number of tools, and reconciliation must be part of the national dialogue for a long time after the cessation of hostilities.

In sum, the combination of these three analyses represents a new body of work on the micro-dynamics of conflict that builds our understanding of the complete lifecycle of civil violence by probing key unanswered questions about the applicability of theory to reality, the efficacy of aid
programs in conflict environments, and key requirements for long term reconstruction, using multiple methods to find answers in data-scarce contexts. These are all important contributions that help fill large gaps in the current knowledge.
Participation, Organization, and Violence: Findings from Sierra Leone
Elizabeth Wilke

The war in Sierra Leone involving the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Civilian Defense Forces (CDF), and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) lasted eleven years from 1991-2002 and killed an estimated 50,000 civilians. Though much of the focus in both popular media and in academic literature has been on the RUF’s violence against civilians and use of diamonds as a source of revenue, all factions participated to varying extents in these activities. From an analysis of survey data on ex-combatants from all factions, we can see that the RUF, CDF and SLA were indeed different in many ways, but also held some unexpected similarities. Can theoretical models of faction behavior help us explain the organizational and behavioral differences and similarities among these three groups?

This analysis assesses the ability of existing theories of faction behavior to analyze conflict dynamics in the 1991-2002 Sierra Leone civil war using a within-case comparative approach that combines historical and qualitative war accounts with quantitative data on ex-combatants from the major fighting groups and war-time violence to compare and contrast differences in organization and operations across factions in detail. No faction fits neatly within any existing typology or groups, and existing theories do not predict the activities of the militia and the military. The results also show that the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) acted in many ways like an insurgent faction rather than a professional military. The analysis concludes that the ability of existing theories to explain within-conflict dynamics is incomplete, and that future models should seek to explain the behavior of militaries and militias, not just rebels.

1. Introduction

There has probably been more general interest in the Sierra Leone War than any other African civil conflict in recent history.¹ The war became a prototype for African conflict, where violent insurgencies wage war in crony states for the purpose of looting its resources and with little regard for traditional norms of war conduct. The RUF’s practice of mutilation and amputation played a large role in helping construct a narrative in the international media that featured senseless violence against civilians.² The Sierra Leone war became a prototype for the “new” civil wars that, unlike “old” civil wars in the Cold War period – where freedom fighters and rebellions fought against colonial and imperial rule (e.g., Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Mao Tse-tung, and the USSR rebellions) –

¹ The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) captured international headlines as a brutal insurgency waging irrational war against powerless civilians who are fighting over control over lucrative diamond mining areas. Media attention around the use of diamonds to fund the war sparked a critical debate about the international trade in ‘blood diamonds’ and gave momentum to the Kimberley process establishing processes for tracing diamond origins to reduce the use of diamonds to fund conflicts. Stories of the war’s atrocities have found their way into best-selling memoirs (A Long Way Home by Ismael Beah, a former RUF child soldier), Oscar-winning films (Blood Diamond (2006)), and chart-topping music (Diamonds from Sierra Leone by Kanye West (2005)). Few African conflicts have had such a profound impact on the Western imagination.

² An example of a news story about the use of amputation can be found at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/26/world/a-brutal-war-s-machetes-maim-sierra-leone.html
small groups of insurgents motivated by greed and “lootable” resources waged “senseless” war against civilians in order to raid resources under state control.³

The popular conception is that “new” civil wars are motivated by greed and are characterized by senseless and indiscriminate violence against civilians. In contrast, “old” civil wars were grievance-based and marked by rebel groups’ cultivation of civilian support and protection of civilians from violence. However, this conception of new wars in contrast with principles of logic and rationality. To believe that individuals and groups are, on average, strategic and rational and also believe that violence in war is senseless or irrational creates dissonance. When the level and distribution of civilian loyalty and collaboration is paramount to a successful campaign, why do we see indiscriminate violence against civilians?⁴ There is a need to uncover the logic of violence and reconcile our observation of what appears to be widespread and indiscriminate violence against civilians with principles of rationality. To this end, a recent and growing literature has emerged in the field of conflict studies with the aim of answering the fundamental question: why do rebel groups commit violence against civilians? And, what determines the level and nature of violence that will be committed against civilians?

In a seminal review of the recent literature, Blattman and Miguel (2010) note that:

“Existing theory is provocative but incomplete… and making little progress in key areas, like why armed groups form and cohere, or how more than two armed sides compete… Analysis of war will benefit from more attention to causal identification and stronger links to theory. We argue that micro-level analysis and case studies are also crucial to decipher war’s causes, conduct, and consequences” (3).

This analysis addresses Blattman and Miguel’s (2010) identified gaps between theory and case-study evidence. The analysis combines a survey of ex-combatants from the three major fighting groups in the conflict with publicly available data on war-time violence and ecological factors such as resources and governance to compare and contrast differences in organization and operations across factions in detail. This analysis is then linked to existing theories of participation and faction organization. The analysis therefore hopes to bridge some of the gap between theory and case-level evidence.

This chapter also includes analysis of the state military’s actions and operations as a party to the conflict. Despite the fact that state militaries are often the first line of response to rising insurgencies, I was unable to find any analyses of conflict that deal primarily with the behaviors, tactics, and strategies of state militaries in any conflict. Analyses of faction strategies and behavior to

³ Kalyvas Kalyvas, S. (2001). "“New” and "Old" Civil Wars." World Politics 54: 99-118. notes that the dichotomy between “old” and “new” civil wars, or “greed” versus “grievance”, is largely spurious, and analyses that reinforce these characterizations of factions are usually based on one-sided analysis drawn from sources that are likely to have anti-faction sentiments, or an oversimplification of complex interactions are governed by a rational logic not immediately apparent. Other studies also find evidence of rationality in brutality using different methods (Azam, J.-P. and A. Hoeffler (2002). "Violence against civilians in civil wars: looting or terror?" Journal of Peace Research 39(4): 461-485.).

date have focused almost exclusively on analyses of non-state factions, ignoring the critical contributions of state military forces in the origination, escalation, and duration of civil conflict. The role of the state military apparatus is especially relevant in Sierra Leone, making it a good first case for including state militaries in an analysis of within-conflict faction tactics and dynamics. Previous micro-studies analyzing faction differences in Sierra Leone have excluded the military as a faction, but SLA actions and operations are essential in determining the course of the conflict and must be incorporated to achieve a fuller understanding of other groups’ actions.

This paper is organized into eight sections. Section 2 provides a brief review of literature on the topic. Section 3 briefly recounts the events of the Sierra Leone war. Section 4 details the data and methodological approach used for this analysis. Sections 5 through 9 compare theory against observed reality in the Sierra Leone case. Section 10 provides a discussion. Section 11 concludes.

2. Recent Theories of Faction Behavior

The literature attempting to explain and predict faction behavior, measured primarily via observed tactics and violence against civilians, is rooted in economic concepts of industrial organization. The major causal story through most current theories is that faction organization is determined by a number of external factors - such as access to resources, geography, and actions of the state or other groups- and that generally self-interested individuals within the organization make rational decisions about what tactics to employ to maximize personal utility.

Many models focus on the collective action problem, wherein individuals who can benefit from the efforts of a group without putting forth effort themselves have an incentive to “free-ride” on the efforts of the group (e.g., Wood 2003; Weinstein 2007; Lidow 2011). In the case where group participation is highly risky, such as being a member of a faction, Popkin (1979) originally proposes the use of selective benefits that are available only to group members to encourage participation. Weinstein (2007) builds a model that identifies the type of selective benefits available to participants as the key factor in determining the person-type who joins a faction. Resource-rich groups can offer immediate payoffs to participation and as a result tend to attract low-commitment individuals; resource-poor groups offer future benefits relative to current ones and tend to attract high-commitment individuals. The group’s structure and ability to control indiscipline is heavily determined by its human make-up. Resource-rich groups cannot enforce discipline and violence against civilians becomes indiscriminate; resource-poor groups go to great lengths to ensure discipline and minimize indiscriminate violence. Weinstein (2007) uses the RUF as a case to support the model’s predictions. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) go further to interpret Weinstein’s findings to mean that where resources can be looted, grievance-based rebellion must always devolve into greed-based rebellion.

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5 The collective action problem is first identified by Olson, M. (1975). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Of particular interest for Weinstein’s theory is free riding - wherein individuals have incentives to shirk effort because they cannot be excluded from benefiting once the group has achieved its goals. To promote effort, there must be some sort of excludable goods available to combatants in order to make them exert effort.
In addressing the influences that external parties have on conflict dynamics, Lidow (2011) proposes that when leaders need to offer selective incentives to participants in exchange for discipline and loyalty, patrons can exert pressure on groups to conform to the patron’s desired objectives, which may or may not be in conflict with the faction’s. Patrons can support low-quality leaders and promote abuse and weakness if their goals are in conflict with the faction’s; they can support high-quality leaders if they desire the faction’s success. Using Liberia as a case, Lidow shows that the control of resources by patrons significantly determined the quality of discipline and control commanders were able to exert.

Talking specifically about the need to mobilize civilians in wartime, Wood (2010) argues that insurgent groups have incentives to target civilians when they cannot provide sufficient benefits to entice loyalty, i.e., when they are weak. Stronger rebels can mix selective violence with selective benefits to entice compliance. Wood’s (2010) model predicts that “weaker insurgents sharply escalate violence in the face of indiscriminate regime counterinsurgency tactics” than stronger insurgents.

Wood (2010) equates resources and the ability to provide incentives with strength; “all else equal, weak insurgent groups are less capable of providing potential supporters with sufficient material incentives to compel voluntary collaboration” (603). When this occurs, rebels employ low-cost strategies for inducing desired behavior among the population; violence is less costly than providing services. For Wood, capacity is equivalent to manpower, which may not be an accurate proxy for capacity in context.

The principal-agent problem, wherein principals cannot costlessly monitor the efforts of agents and agents have rational incentives to shirk or defect, is a relatively new organizing principle for models explaining faction structure and behavior. Gates (2002) and Johnston (2008) both develop principal-agent models where distance reduces leaders’ ability to monitor the behavior and efforts of local commanders, weakening control between central command and local units. As a result, local unit commanders have incentives to shirk or defect from the orders of central command in order to pursue individual objectives, which can result in increased violence against civilians.

In an attempt to highlight the role of organization structure in bounding participants’ preferences and actions, Johnston (2008) borrows from business and industrial organization concepts to argue that geography and technology intersect to determine central commands’ monitoring costs of local units due to information asymmetries and asymmetrical payoffs between commanders and leaders. If monitoring costs are high, factions form decentralized structures where local commanders have greater autonomy in proportion with their distance from central command, and tend to use this autonomy in order to shirk commands in favor of pursuing greater personal gain locally. Where monitoring is easier, organizations form vertically integrated structures and central command can enforce compliance with directives.

Johnston uses military effectiveness as an outcome instead of violence, measured as military victory relative to resources and expenditure. He hypothesizes that decentralized groups will be less
effective than centralized groups because of their diminished capacity to manage principal-agent problems. He cites the material deficiencies of the CDF relative to the RUF in Sierra Leone compared to their relative effectiveness as a faction. RUF, in contrast, had more resources available but was stretched too thin geographically because of its need to control diamond mining areas in the South and East, a difficult task without good roads or communication technology and untrained troops.

A third strain of theory focuses on relatively faction strength and the need to compel civilian support as determinants of violence. What Kalyvas (2006) calls “rational variance in barbarism” is due to the “basic strategic problem of irregular warfare,” or the difficulty of identifying the enemy, (70). Kalyvas’ develops a theories of selective and indiscriminate violence as joint processes requiring choices about control and cooperation by factions and civilians where selective and indiscriminate violence are both means of population control to compel collaboration and deter defection or denunciation. He argues that areas where factions exert high and low levels of control will see low use of indiscriminate violence, whereas contested areas will see high levels of violence because the need to solve the identification problem and to compel civilian support is more acute in contested areas. Factions use selective or indiscriminate violence depending on the faction’s strength and resources.

Kalyvas (2006) argues that weak rebel groups are more likely to employ indiscriminate violence, particularly in the face of large amounts of indiscriminate violence by the counterinsurgency faction – usually the state. Selective violence is used to compel collaboration with rebel groups by punishing civilian defectors or denouncers. He also notes the large and prevalent identification problem of pinpointing and targeting defectors or denouncers, civilian or otherwise. Selective violence requires a concerted effort and expenditure of resources to confirm allegations or information about the target, otherwise the relationship between action and punishment cannot be maintained with credibility and incentives against defection deteriorate. Because of the resource requirement to employ selective violence, weak groups will not be able to effectively carry out intelligence to discern between defectors and non-defectors in the population and so can resort to indiscriminate violence.6

Bueno de Mesquita (2013) concurs with Kalyvas (2006), suggesting that “by demonstrating lack of rebel capacity and diminishing mobilization, successful counterinsurgencies may increase irregular violence” over conventional tactics (323). Bueno de Mesquita adds that this is due to the decreased public mobilization that accompanies a demonstrated or signaled reduction in capacity. That is, groups must indicate to civilians whether or not that can credibly offer incentives and services. When groups are made to appear weak through increased violence by another faction, civilians

---

6 One critique of Kalyvas’ (2006) theoretical development is that his cases consist primarily of what would be termed “old” civil wars wherein rebel groups fight against a relatively well-developed state and use civilians as a key resource to support their struggle – Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Greece during WWII, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Though Kalyvas (2001) argues that the distinction across old and new wars is spurious, this point would be better supported if he demonstrated that so-called “new” wars also fit his model and predictions.
withdraw support, and factions respond by mounting indiscriminate violence to reduce the selective incentives required to satisfy civilians’ participation constraint. Both agree that as counterinsurgency violence goes up, weak insurgents escalate, strong insurgents de-escalate. As outside risk goes up, required incentives to encourage participation decline. When groups can provide protection, they achieve more mobilization. When groups cannot provide protection, they resort to even more violence to further increase the risk to outsiders and encourage participation.

Figure 1 summarizes three main categories of models that predict rebel behavior and violence identified in Section 2. The outcome of interest for most theories is violence against civilians, particularly indiscriminate violence against civilians. Generally, each model proposes an external or ecological factor that either determines group incentives as a whole, or group structure which bounds and shapes the incentives of utility-maximizing participants. In the collective action and principal-agent problem-based theories, the individual is the unit of analysis. The causal mechanisms affect outcomes via their influence on group structure and the group’s ability to control members’ activities. In the identification and population control-based theories, the group is the unit of analysis, and the group makes strategic decisions about tactics in order to mobilize civilian cooperation and support, and discourage defection or denunciation by civilians.

Figure 1: Summary of theories of rebel organization and behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed causal mechanism</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geography and distance (principal-agent problem)</td>
<td>Organizational structure influences incentives and pay-offs to action</td>
<td>Intensity and types of violence against civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of selective incentives (collective action problem)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative strength (identification and civilian mobilization problems)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each theory yields testable assumptions and predictions, many of which are tested in the authors’ exposition of the theory using case-comparative methods; some use Sierra Leone as a case (Weinstein 2007; Johnston 2008). A summary of these predictions is given in Table 1.
### Table 1: Basic Assumptions and Predictions of Theoretical Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Mechanism</th>
<th>Assumptions/ Necessary conditions</th>
<th>Predictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Geography and distance (principal-agent models) | • Leaders and commanders have asymmetric information and objectives  
• Self-interested actors                  | • When monitoring and oversight costs are high, groups will decentralize  
• Vertically integrated groups will be more militarily effective than disperse groups; violence will be more indiscriminate than centralized groups |
| Types of selective incentives (collective action models) | • Differences in incentive type attracts different person-types  
• Self-interested actors                  | • Groups providing immediate payoffs attract low-commitment individuals and vice versa  
• Resource-poor groups screen recruits  
• Groups with low-commitment members will be unable to enforce discipline and control; violence will be relatively more indiscriminate |
| Relative faction strength (civilian mobilization and identification models) | • Rebel dependence on civilian compliance  
• Costly information for verification  
• Weak groups cannot provide services/incentives | • Weak groups will not provide services or engage in selective violence; strong groups will provide services  
• When facing high levels of violence from counterinsurgency efforts, weak groups will escalate indiscriminate violence; strong groups will de-escalate violence |

### 3. History of the Sierra Leone War (1991-2002)

Three major factions were involved throughout the Sierra Leone war – the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Civilian Defense Forces (CDF), and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). The RUF captured international attention for its involvement in diamond mining and use of amputation as a war tactic. The RUF is often used as an exemplar of the “greed-motivated” group – a faction that started a war in order to gain access to valuable resources, diamonds. In contrast, the CDF originated as loosely affiliated defense militias to protect their local communities from RUF brutality, and maintained a reputation for protection over extraction from civilians. In the few analyses where it is included, the SLA’s characteristics are revealed as similar to many armies in weak states- unprofessional, ineffective, and nepotistic.

The Sierra Leone war has historical roots dating back to independence. In the 1960s and 1970s, there were two major political parties, the All People’s Congress (APC) and the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). Throughout most of the 1960s, the SLPP was the ruling party, with strongholds in the Southern and Eastern districts. In the 1970s, an APC government came to power and declared a one-party state. A series of student protests in the mid- to late-1970s was forcefully suppressed and students fled to Liberia. Some, including Foday Sankoh, the future RUF leader, went to Libya for military training.
The proximate causes of the war are attributed to economic downturn and declining state revenues due to international commodity price shocks in the late 1980s which led to economic hardship for a primarily agriculture-based population as well as a general decline in state revenues for dispensing patronage. In March 1991, the RUF, with a contingent of fighters from the NPFL, crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia into the Southern and Eastern regions. The SLA was unable to mount an effective counterstrike to the RUF/NPFL due partly to the poor quality of the Sla manpower and structure, and also the fact that the SLA was unwelcome in many parts of the Southern and Eastern districts which were hostile to the APC government. The RUF/NPFL quickly gained control of cross-border trade between Sierra Leone and Liberia, as well as large swaths of territory including some diamond mining areas.

In April 1992, several junior officers of the SLA, citing gross mismanagement of the rebellion, carried out a successful coup against the government and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). The NPRC implemented a massive recruiting scheme at the end of 1992 into 1993 and the SLA swelled from around 3,300 to around 10,000 (TRC 3A, Ch. 2, Para 307). In order to achieve such rapid growth, the SLA substantially lowered recruitment standards, indicating that the new recruits were of low-quality, drawn primarily from the population of young, unattached and unemployed men in Freetown.

The relationship between the RUF and NPFL deteriorated into 1992. The NPFL was resistant to pursuing the war into harsh bush territory, instead preferring to take advantage of available diamond resources and trade rents (TRC 3A, 2003; Richards 1996). Charles Taylor ceased sending arms and ammunition to the RUF/NPFL and recalled the NPFL troops in 1993. Thus, the SLA was able to push the RUF to the Eastern border by the end of 1993. Severely weakened, the RUF changed tactics away from controlling territory to penetrating as far as possible into government-held territory to carry out raids and ambushes. The RUF succeeded in establishing a number of jungle camps and strongholds throughout the country, with their strongest presence in the South, near Kenema. This was an effective strategy for gaining territory, and "by late January 1995... there was not a single District in the Provinces in which the RUF was not present" (TRC 3A, Ch. 2, Para. 489).

The NPRC held democratic elections in 1996 and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected president. The Kabbah government contracted a South African security firm, Executive Outcomes (EO) in 1996 to

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7 The NPFL had been crossing the Leonean border for some time leading up to the outbreak of conflict. A small group of SLA soldiers were deployed to the vicinity to strengthen the state's security presence, which had the immediate effect of stemming the influx of NPFL soldiers over the border. Yet, even at an early stage, SLA and RUF/NPFL began to trade by barter - the NPFL would bring looted items to the SLA, which the SLA would then take to town centers to sell. This was a first step in what evolved into a confusing chameleonic feature of this war - the frequent obscuring of force identification, faction membership and loyalty, and factional alliances. In a sense, from the beginning, the differences between fighting forces was at best a little blurry and at worst indistinguishable.

8 One study speculates that the rise in RUF violence during 1995 prior to the election was the RUF’s tactic for avoiding a democratic election that would have certainly excluded the RUF from power in any new government (Gershoni, Y. (1997). "War without end and an end to a war: the prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 40(03): 55-76.).
prosecute the war against the RUF. The local kamajor\(^9\) militias – locally organized protective militias – were amalgamated in 1996 as the Civilian Defense Forces (CDF). The CDF and EO were supposed to coordinate with the SLA in the war effort, although the SLA became increasingly sidelined by the Kabbah government. The EO/CDF operations contributed to the weakening of the RUF to such an extent that the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed in November of 1996. Under fiscal pressures, the Kabbah government dismissed EO by January 1997, allowing the RUF to regroup and undoing the progress made in Abidjan. This is likely in response to the SLA’s ineffectiveness and reputation for being in some cases as brutal as the RUF in its tactics.

In May 1997, a contingent of junior soldiers from the SLA staged a coup and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), as the new government. It invited the RUF to co-lead the new government. The coup drew international attention, and the Economic Union of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) deployed a contingent of troops to oust the AFRC/RUF and restore the Kabbah government. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces forced the AFRC/RUF out of Freetown who fled to the Northern districts away from SLPP strongholds in the South and East. ECOMOG failed to pursue the AFRC/RUF much farther than Freetown. Together, the AFRC/RUF launched a massive attack to overtake Freetown again in January 1999, which they did despite the efforts of ECOMOG and the CDF.

International organizations intervened to promote peace talks and the Lomé Peace Accord was signed in July 1999. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed to Sierra Leone towards the end of 1999 to support the disarmament process. In late April 2000, the RUF took over 550 peacekeepers hostage across the country as a result of an incident at a disarmament center. In response, the government and CDF then moved to capture RUF leaders remaining in Freetown as part of the 1999 agreement. An almost-full battalion of RUF marched toward Freetown as a result of the strike against the leadership. Pro-government forces countered the RUF in outside of Freetown in a series of battles through the remainder of 2000 and early into 2001, at which point the RUF was exhausted of alternatives. The RUF signed a new peace treaty and the demobilization of combatants began in May 2001. The war officially ended on January 18, 2002.

4. Methodological Approach and Data

4.1 Method

The methodological approach used in this analysis is a within-case comparative method using a combination of Sierra Leone-specific empirical research and general theory to (1) provide a descriptive and exploratory analysis of the participation and organizational dynamics of the Sierra Leone war and (2) test predictions in the literature against the reality in Sierra Leone. The overall objective is to use both qualitative and quantitative evidence to test and further develop general models of participation and organization by situating them firmly within the context of a real conflict.

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\(^9\) Kamajors are local mystic warrior societies, comprised almost exclusively of males. One key rite of passage for a Mende youth is to attain membership into these societies.
Blattman and Miguel (2010) note the need to bring case studies to bear on theoretical predictions. This is main justification for using this approach. Moreover, Sierra Leone is a particularly useful case for bridging theory with case-specific data and context due to the availability of relatively good micro-level data and existing historical analysis. Kalyvas (2006) argues that some of the problem with adjudicating between alternatives is the frequent lack of good quality data in conflict settings. Using Sierra Leone helps overcome this hurdle because there is a detailed micro-level survey of combatants as well as rich qualitative information and analysis that can be compared and contrasted to disentangle competing theories to a greater extent than would be otherwise possible with more disaggregated data.

The Sierra Leone case offers a good opportunity to advance the literature primarily because it includes three faction-types that are prevalent across conflicts. The Sierra Leone war was heavily influenced by the active participation of an archetypal rebel group (RUF), a protective militia (CDF), and a state military (SLA). This fact offers an opportunity to assess the applicability of theories of rebel behavior to other actors that are highly relevant to conflict dynamics. A major weakness of the current literature is that most current models are primarily posited from the vantage point of the rebel faction, usually “the one that started it.” Though the models focused on relative strengths incorporate the decisions of other political actors, these decisions are treated as exogenous and not strategically dynamic. Some models focus on the military as an organization; Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010) model strategic decisions about military size and their effects on conflict onset and duration. However, few focus on military organization and violence in the way that rebel organization is considered, despite the fact that state militaries can be faction-like in their behavior during conflict, as was the case in Sierra Leone. I was unable to find any model that focused on predicting behavior of protective militias, despite their recognized importance and relative prevalence in conflict, as was also the case in Sierra Leone.

4.2 Data

This analysis uses several available datasets containing information on combatant characteristics and experience, ecological factors, and war events throughout the course of the war.

Combatant characteristics. Wherever data on combatants are presented in this analysis, the data are from Macartan Humphreys’s and Jeremy Weinstein’s survey of ex-combatants undertaken July-August 2003 (Weinstein and Humphreys 2003). The data include demographic, social, geographic, and economic variables, as well as combatants’ conflict experiences. The key weaknesses of this dataset are that the data may not be representative of the population of combatants, and that responses may be affected by social desirability or recall bias. Humphreys and Weinstein (2003) discuss these issues and go to great lengths to minimize potential sources of bias.10 Table 7 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for the sample.

10 The main threat to representativeness is the manner of interviewee selection. The authors worked with local leaders to gather ex-combatants into town centers for random selection by enumeration staff. Ex-combatants who might have been reluctant to publicly display their combatant status might have stayed home when selection occurred. If their characteristics are different from the general combatant population, this results in an unrepresentative dataset.
War violence. Data on war violence comes from the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) database of human rights violations. As part of its mandate, the TRC undertook an exhaustive and comprehensive data collection effort to capture and record victims’ stories of human rights abuses during all phases of the war. The data may suffer from issues of recall bias and a skew towards those that survived the war. Despite these shortcomings, the TRC database represents the most significant and thorough effort to document violence during the Sierra Leone war.

Sections 5 through 9 detail the facts of the Sierra Leone case along the theoretical aspects identified in Figure 1, beginning with outcomes and working backwards to mechanisms. The objective of Sections 6 through 8 is to elaborate, to the fullest extent possible, the realities of the Sierra Leone case and the characteristics of each of the three factions in order to compare and contrast them against predictions by the models discussed.

5. Violence and Tactics

According to the TRC human rights violations data, over 60 percent of the violence was attributed to the RUF. Violence by the RUF occurred in three distinct waves. The first occurred in the earliest days of the war in 1991 when the RUF was partnered with the NPFL. The second occurred in the time leading up to the early 1996 elections. The last was in 1998 as the RUF/AFRC fled from Freetown and then attempted to re-take the city in early 1999. During this time, "the AFRC and RUF factions, both separately and in tandem with one another, visited a sustained and unprecedented level of human rights abuse on the populace of the North and North-East in [1998]" (TRC 3A, Ch. 3, Para. 866-867).

The period leading to the 1996 elections saw a major spike in violence against civilians, particularly amputations, and is one of the three main spikes in violence during the war. There was a significant rise in the number of RUF attacks on civilian settlements during 1995-1996 prior to the 1996 elections. The emergence of amputation as a widespread form of violence occurred during this period as well. Throughout the war, the RUF was known for its widespread use of indiscriminate violence against civilians (TRC 3A, Weinstein 2007; Richards 1996).

Two of the three waves of violence perpetrated by the RUF occurred when the RUF was partnered with other organizations, the NPFL in 1991 and the AFRC in 1998-1999. These two periods saw between 50 percent and 100 percent more violence than the one during 1995 when the RUF was acting alone. Although the level of violence perpetrated solely by the RUF in 1995-1996 dwarfs that of other factions, it is still far less than violence during the other two episodes, suggesting that the RUF’s partners contributed in large part to the violence in the first and third period. This fact fits

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11 In the period before 1993, this would have been the RUF/NPFL.
12 The emergence of amputation as a widespread form of violence occurred during this period as well.
13 Some speculate that this was due to diminishing supplied of ammunition, since the RUF now operated without external support from the NPFL.
14 In hindsight, the RUF’s partnerships with the NPFL and AFRC may have been a double-edged sword for the RUF. The invasion was likely impossible without the NPFL’s material support, yet its focus on controlling resources instead of prosecuting the war diluted the revolutionary and ideological rhetoric the RUF was attempting to espouse. This is perhaps most
contextually within Weinstein’s argument that groups that depend more on their communities will engage in less indiscriminate violence.

Figure 2: Faction Violence

![Figure 2: Faction Violence](image.png)

Source: TRC Violence Dataset

Neither the CDF nor SLA committed violence on the same scale as the RUF during these periods of high activity. However, during low periods, particularly 1993 and 1997, the CDF and SLA are blamed for a significant amount of violence; combined, the CDF and SLA together contributed to more violence than the RUF in some years.

From Figure 2 we see that the CDF’s use of violence against civilians increased through 1996 and 1997. SLA violence declined after 1996, but CDF violence against civilians increased a more than proportionate amount. Despite this rise, both the CDF and SLA appear able to manage violence against civilians much better than the RUF.

The SLA were known to fight both for the state and for the RUF, earning them the name ‘sobel’ – soldiers by day, rebels by night. This reveals the lack of professionalization of state forces but also the lack of accountability of countryside operations by Freetown. Throughout the war, the SLA had a poor reputation. The SLA was ill-trained, corrupt, and responsible for previous abuses against true for the NPFL, whose actions made it difficult for the RUF to advance the war over mining and trade control. By the time the AFRC invited the RUF to join them in 1997, the bulk of the RUF may have been comprised of individuals more eager for personal gain than political change.
SLPP supporters in the South and East. After election in 1996, the Kabbah government increasingly relied on the CDF and EO to prosecute the war against the RUF, sidelining the SLA. This contributed to the grievances listed by the AFRC as a cause of the 1997 coup.\(^{15}\)

As a caveat, the practice of RUF and SLA soldiers to use each other’s uniforms and fight for alternating sides probably makes recall difficult for those who shared their stories with the TRC. Indeed, the amount of violations designated as having been perpetrated by “army” or “rebel” in the TRC dataset rivals the number of attributions to the SLA or CDF in some years. This would also have the effect of creating uncertainty in the minds of civilians and fighters alike, who could not be certain that SLA uniforms could be equated with SLA fighters or vice versa. This would have effectively raised the costs of identification for factions and prompted more indiscriminate violence according to Kalyvas (2006).

From the evidence on violence we should be able to generate the following predictions according to each theory:

- **H1:** RUF was relatively resource-rich with no patrons with incentives to protect civilians (Weinstein 2007; Lidow 2011).
- **H2:** CDF and SLA were either
  - a. Relatively resource poor (Weinstein 2007), or
  - b. Resource-rich but with patrons with preferences to protect civilians (Lidow 2011).
- **H3:** Periods of high RUF violence follow periods of heightened offensive maneuvers from military or other counterinsurgency forces (Bueno de Mesquita 2013; Kalyvas 2006).
- **H4:** RUF was a ‘weak’ group; CDF and SLA were ‘strong’ groups (Wood 2010; Kalyvas 2006).
- **H5:** RUF was decentralized with poor communications between central command and local units (Johnston 2008; Gates 2002).
- **H6:** RUF had costly identification; CDF and SLA had relatively inexpensive identification (Kalyvas 2006).

H1 bears out; the RUF was supported primarily by Charles Taylor in the early years of the war and then later by diamond revenues. The CDF do not appear to have been resource poor – they were financed through local chiefs who actively recruited fighters and provided supplies. The RUF was not the only beneficiary of diamond revenues. The TRC notes that all factions and actors in the war were engaged in diamond mining efforts (Abdullah 2004; TRC 2004). However, as the CDF’s resources were funneled through local chiefs and international third parties, there seems to have been some interest in preserving civilian safety. Whether this is true for the SLA is unclear. The South and East were hostile to the APC, and the government had a long history of neglecting these areas. The SLA were even unwelcome in many of these areas (TRC 3A), so it is hard to know whether there were strong incentives on the part of SLA commanders to keep civilian violence in check as state resources flowed to local units.

\(^{15}\) This was exacerbated by already existing enmity between the SLA and the CDF. As the SLA were accused of collaborating and cooperating with the RUF, the CDF felt free to increase their attacks on the SLA. This was added to by the long-standing enmity of Southern-based kamajor CDF groups to the government in general.
H3 appears to bear out from the chronology of the conflict, excepting the first wave of violence. Though not a result of tactical counterinsurgency efforts, the 1995 violence was supposedly a response to the upcoming democratic elections in 1996 that would have very likely excluded the RUF from taking power (Gershoni 1997). The last wave in 1999 came on the heels of ECOMOG’s expulsion of the RUF and AFRC from Freetown.

It is hard to classify the RUF as a ‘weak’ group without clear theoretical guidance on what constitutes weakness. By any definition, it is hard to classify the RUF as ‘weak.’ The RUF had resources, external support, and the core commanders had all received military training from Libya. If weakness is defined as an inability to maintain control and discipline despite endowments, then the RUF appears weak. However, weakness is used by Kalyvas (2006) and Johnston (2008) to predict violence and control, so to avoid a tautology we must infer that weakness is defined through resources, which the RUF had in abundance. Without knowing what constitutes a weak group, we can neither accept nor reject H4.

The RUF likely did have high communications costs between central command and local units. Terrain in the south and east is rugged jungle territory and roads and communications infrastructure are of poor quality, partly due to the APC’s neglect of the region in previous years. In fact, the SLA’s only presence in the region at the start of the war was a town 60 km away from the border, due to the poor infrastructure to support a military post at the border (TRC 3A). In this light, there is no evidence to reject H5. However, the SLA also likely faced these hurdles in communication and monitoring of local units’ activities, but we fail to see similar amounts of violence; yet we do see similar levels of military ineffectiveness – the SLA failed in 1993, 1997 and 1999 to defeat the RUF when it seemed well-placed to make a decisive victory.

Lastly, because the CDF were locally recruited and organized, they should have had privileged knowledge of the local civilian population that would have lowered their identification costs relative to the SLA and RUF. The RUF and SLA likely did not benefit from this intimate knowledge of the civilian population. The SLA’s unwelcome in the war-affected areas and the RUF’s guerilla-style tactics removed both factions from sustained interaction with the civilian population and would have made it more difficult to identify collaborators from defectors or denouncers.

H1 and H2 appear confirmed based on what we know about the factions and their sources of revenue and structure. The RUF was resource-rich and those resources were not contingent on the RUF’s protecting civilians. The CDF and RUF are unlikely to have been resource-poor, but in both cases the groups had incentives to protect civilians – the CDF because their resource came directly from local chiefs, and the SLA because of the government’s need to maintain legitimacy. The evidence weakly supports H3. The middle and last surges in violence came at the time of strong counterinsurgency efforts by the SLA in 1993 and ECOMOG in 1999. However, the first surge in violence occurred at a time when the CDF was not organized and the SLA was mounting an ineffective response. Further, the heightened violence in 1995 is attributed to the coming elections that would have shut out the RUF from the political process; though this would have threatened the viability of the RUF, it was not a counterinsurgency movement. H6 seems reasonable is we consider
the CDF. The CDF were locally recruited and therefore more likely to have personal information on civilians, which would have reduced identification costs. However, the RUF had some local recruits and the SLA had virtually none. We should therefore see more violence by the SLA than the RUF, but we see the opposite instead.

Sections 6 through 9 look at the theoretical causal mechanisms used to explain the outcomes in violence and assess how well the describe each of the three factions.

6. Structure, Control, and Discipline

6.1 Structure

Weinstein (2007) predicts that resource-rich groups will develop hierarchical command structures and will display greater verticality in command than resource-poor groups. Principal-agent or distance models predict that vertically integrated groups will have greater military effectiveness, and by implication, less indiscriminate violence against civilians. Figure 3 details changes in rank between the time volunteers entered and the time they left - the greater the use of promotion, the more hierarchical the organization.

Figure 3: Use of Promotion by Faction

The figure shows that, among voluntary participants, promotion was rarely used among the CDF and used to a much greater extent in the other groups; the RUF compares similarly to the SLA. Only 14 percent of CDF voluntary participants reported leaving as a higher rank than entering; 43.5
percent of RUF voluntaries reported this. ¹⁶ This suggests that there was relatively little room for advancement in the CDF, with much greater opportunity for advancement in the RUF and SLA. The similarities between the RUF and SLA here may also indicate that the RUF had a top-down command structure similar to a more traditional military, like the SLA.

Table 2 details combatants’ reports of how resources were kept, shared, or funneled out of the group. The relatively high proportion of participants reporting that loot was either sent outside of the group, shared with commanders, or given entirely to commanders in the SLA and RUF provides additional evidence of a hierarchical top-down structure. Twenty-one percent of RUF respondents claimed that all loot went to the commander, probably reflecting the primarily involuntary nature of participation for many in the lower ranks. That 30 percent of SLA respondents said valuable loot was kept individually especially concerning because of the SLA’s role as a formal arm of the state. The SLA is supposed to protect civilians, yet only 2 percent of SLA participants said that it was forbidden to loot from civilians. The RUF has a better record than the SLA on this score.

Table 2: “What happened to valuable loot in the group?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SLA</th>
<th>RUF</th>
<th>CDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sent Outside the Group</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided Up Among Members</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kept Individually</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share with Commander</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbidden</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Saw</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All for Commander</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to People</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations using Humphreys and Weinstein (2003)
Note: Table includes responses from both voluntary or abducted participants

6.2 Control and Discipline
Many of the current theories focus on faction control as the route through which the causal mechanism affects violence and group tactics. Control refers to the ability of group leadership to ensure that subordinates maintain discipline and follow orders. Control can mean control either of the population or of commanders over fighters (see Weinstein 2007; Johnston 2008; Kalyvas 2006).

¹⁶ About one in four abductees reported receiving a promotion, indicating that there was some room even for abductees to integrate themselves into the ranks. Unlike voluntary participants, the frequency of abductee promotion does not vary systematically across factions; approximately one-quarter of abductees across factions reported being promoted.
In general, the violence by the RUF against civilians was the most indiscriminate. That does not necessarily mean that the RUF did not try to exert control over troops. Respondents were the most likely to report that soldiers were punished publicly for indiscipline or crimes against civilians, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: “Were soldiers ever punished for crimes/indiscipline?”

![Figure 4: “Were soldiers ever punished for crimes/indiscipline?”](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairwise Differences</th>
<th>RUF – SLA</th>
<th>CDF – RUF</th>
<th>CDF – SLA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>0.224 (</strong>* )**</td>
<td>-0.045 (** )</td>
<td>-0.18 (*** )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations using Humphreys and Weinstein (2003)
Note: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

The RUF and CDF respondents both claimed that soldiers were regularly punished for indiscipline or crimes against civilians. The high prevalence of punishment meted out by RUF units for crimes or indiscipline is comparable to the CDF and suggests that the RUF had some desire to control the level of violence and discipline within their ranks. The RUF manifesto also has injunctions against harming civilians. The fact that the overwhelming majority of RUF respondents answered affirmatively that punishment for crimes was given, but yet the RUF was responsible for so much violence may indicate that punishment was not meted out with great enough frequency or regularity to deter violence and indiscipline.17 In contrast, less than two-thirds of respondents said that SLA soldiers were ever punished for indiscipline or crimes, compared to 86 percent and 90 percent for the other two factions. The SLA was a top-down organization, but the violence data shows that the SLA was able to enforce discipline against harming or committing crimes against civilians to a large extent, despite the relative absence of physical punishment relative to the RUF and CDF. We cannot know why the SLA was able to control violence but the RUF was not from the currently available data.

17 It could also be an indicator that the violence by the RUF was in many cases purposeful and targeted, if widespread.
Geography theories would predict that as monitoring goes up, punishment goes down since agents know that their behavior is more easily detected. Distance theory would explain a situation in which SLA monitoring was effective enough to reduce the amount of violence being perpetrated such that punishment was less necessary. However, the level of punishment for CDF forces is as high as that of the RUF, and Johnston (2008) argues that the CDF fit the description of a cohesive group with low monitoring costs. The theory cannot simultaneously explain both outcomes for the SLA and CDF.

Table 3 shows that civilians were approximately three times more likely to complain to local leaders about CDF behavior than for other factions, suggesting that leaders could exert at least some control over CDF units. One-quarter of CDF participants noted that civilians frequently complained to local leaders, three times as much as the RUF, suggesting that the CDF were accountable to local leaders.

**Table 3: “Who did angry civilians complain to?”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SLA</th>
<th>RUF</th>
<th>CDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local leader</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another soldier</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit commander</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They stayed quiet</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This never happened</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncategorized responses</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations using Humphreys and Weinstein (2003)

Weinstein (2007) predicts that resource-wealthy groups will be unable or unwilling to enforce discipline locally, but that military strategy will be controlled through a top-down hierarchical structure. Resource-poor groups will have a flatter, more egalitarian structure and the group will enforce discipline, partly by establishing shared norms and value among members. In line with Weinstein (2007), the RUF and SLA were factions wherein individuals had opportunities for advancement that had the potential to bring personal gains from looting if one could work up the chain of leadership, with less accountability to local authorities. The CDF, on the other hand, emerges as a group with more equitable systems to distribute loot, and some bans on looting outright. The CDF appears as a more equitable, and possibly flat, organization with a stronger system of accountability to local authorities, which perhaps acted as a tempering force on inclinations to harass civilians. The CDF were dependent on local authorities for access to resources, whereas the RUF and SLA were not.
The selective incentives theory could explain differences in faction structure between the RUF and CDF. However, it does not predict the RUF’s efforts to enforce discipline. The theories of both Weinstein (2007) and Lidow (2011) predict the CDF’s high use of punishment, but do not predict the SLA’s relative lack of punishment.

8. Services and Selective Incentives
Table 4 details various services that factions provided to civilians. The CDF emerges as the most prevalent provider of protection to locals, with 97 percent of participants indicating the CDF protected civilians often. Though this is about 24 percent greater than the RUF and 12 percent more than the SLA. The CDF was far less likely than the SLA or RUF to provide other service such as education and healthcare. The RUF and CDF are the most like service providers, while the CDF appears to specialize in protective service. Though we cannot say whether the provision of service was done in cooperation with local communities or whether services provided by the SLA and RUF were more ad-hoc in nature is unclear, but these activities make the RUF and SLA look like activist groups, whereas the coerced provision of food is more in line with an opportunistic strategy.

No theory discussed above satisfactorily predicts the RUF’s provision of services to civilians. Geography theory does not treat the topic of services to civilians. Weinstein’s (2007) selective incentives theory does not directly address issues of service provision to civilians either, but it could logically yield a prediction wherein resource-poor groups, in this case the CDF, offer services to civilians to encourage civilian support and mobilization to supplement a lack of alternative resources. In contrast, resources-rich groups, the RUF, whose revenue sources are disconnected from civilian support have weak incentives to provide services to civilians. Lidow’s (2011) model suggests that if resources are tied to patrons who prefer service provision for civilians, then it could occur that a resource-rich group provides services. While this may be true for the SLA, it is not the case for the RUF.

Civilian mobilization theory could explain this occurrence if the RUF is a strong group instead of a weak one. Strong groups have incentives to display strength because strength is closely followed by collaboration according to Kalyvas (2006) and Bueno de Mesquita (2013). Providing services is a way to signal strength of an organization. However, we see in the analysis of violence that the RUF does not act as if it were a strong organization, it acts as if it were a weak one.
Table 4: Services Provided to Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>SLA (N=543)</th>
<th>RUF (N=359)</th>
<th>CDF (N=523)</th>
<th>Chi-2 result</th>
<th>Two-tailed t-test statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SLA-RUF</td>
<td>CDF-RUF</td>
<td>CDF-SLA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>112.32 (***)</td>
<td>-1.42 (.) 10.92 (<em><strong>) 5.27 (</strong></em>),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.11 (<em>) -10.30 (</em><strong>), -8.20 (</strong>*),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.90 (***), 1.34 (.), 1.34 (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>91.77 (***),</td>
<td>1.61 (.), 9.56 (<em><strong>), 3.09 (</strong></em>),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.11 (<em>) -10.30 (</em><strong>), -8.20 (</strong>*),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.90 (***), 1.34 (.), 1.34 (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>122.25 (***),</td>
<td>-2.11 (<em>) -10.30 (</em><strong>), -8.20 (</strong>*),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.11 (<em>) -10.30 (</em><strong>), -8.20 (</strong>*),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.90 (***), 1.34 (.), 1.34 (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>25.35 (***),</td>
<td>-1.02 (.) 4.90 (***), 1.34 (.),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.90 (***), 1.34 (.), 1.34 (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations using Humphreys and Weinstein (2003)
Note: Tests for pair-wise differences use two-tailed t-test.
Note: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (.) indicates p-value > 0.1.
9. Human and Non-Human Resources

9.1 Recruitment

The analysis of recruitment is primarily focused on testing predictions of Weinstein’s (2007) theory, as groups’ ability to recruit high-commitment individuals is the causal mechanism of the model. The three factions engaged in a number of different recruitment tactics.

The majority of RUF voluntary participants joined in the first half of the war, from 1991-1996. Ethnographic evidence reports that the initial cadre of RUF fighters were political ideologues with college education (Richards 1996). The majority of the RUF forces in the early days of the way were primarily those who had fled government persecution from the Southern and Eastern districts in the 1970s and 1980s into Liberia (TRC 2004). The RUF also picked up a number of volunteers and had some support from local kamajor militias. The TRC notes that a number of kamajor members and locals in the Southern and Eastern districts joined the RUF early on and that the RUF found a significant amount of initial support from communities in these SLPP strongholds. Though the RUF is remembered as having recruited primarily through abduction, it had a number of voluntary joiners, 12.53 percent in the sample.\textsuperscript{18}

SLA volunteers were primarily recruited in Freetown as it was the base of the APC government and the central location of SLA operations. The SLA were primarily young APC supporters living in Freetown at the time of enlistment. Almost all SLA volunteers joined in 1992 during the NPRC’s recruitment push (see Figure 5). At the start of the war, the practice of granting soldiers their posts based on political connections rather than merit was common, and the SLA had been marginalized for years prior due to its heavy contingent of SLPP supporters. To bolster the SLA's capacity to engage the RUF/NPFL, the NPRC implemented a massive recruiting scheme, removed requirements for entry, and swelled the ranks of the SLA. Some figures say that the SLA grew threefold from around 3,300 to around 10,000 (TRC 3A, Ch. 2, Para 307). The NPRC's massive recruitment of soldiers in 1992 improved the numbers but watered down the quality of the average recruit.

The CDF were locally organized as a response to the increasing brutality of the RUF and SLA to some extent which explains the differential recruitment patterns for CDF members in Figure 5. CDF members were locally recruited and organized as a protective force without anti-systemic or revolutionary political goals (Weinstein 2007). They were, at least at the beginning, closely tied to local leaders. The TRC notes that, to become a CDF fighter, you had to know someone in the group, and you had to be a member of the Mende ethnic group (TRC, 3A).

\textsuperscript{18} Given issues with self-identification, social desirability, and survivor biases in responses of combatants in the sample, this estimate is probably a lower bound on the true proportion of volunteers to the RUF total.
Figure 5: Time-distribution of volunteerism

Source: Author’s calculations using Humphreys and Weinstein (2003)

Figure 6 shows participants’ social ties to factions prior to their joining – family, friends, or acquaintances in the community. All three groups’ volunteers had high levels of social connection to their factions, indicating that screening may be also important investor groups as well as non-investor groups. Why might social ties still be important for non-investor groups? This may be explained by the fact that social proximity to a group may provide the potential recruit with information on the group’s resources and location, or best ways to approach the group for recruitment.\(^\text{19}\) In an information-scarce environment, it may be necessary for any recruit to have at least one social connection in order to gather information about the potential benefits and costs, and how to enter the recruitment process in the first place.

It is worth noting that CDF volunteers had significantly more social connections than RUF or SLA volunteers, about 0.6 more than SLA volunteers and 1.0 more than RUF volunteers. From a policy perspective, it is difficult to know how this difference is meaningful for formulating interventions targeted at people more likely to join one group over another, especially given the practical problems attendant with data collection in such an environment. As well, the data do not allow us to know how many social ties participants had to other factions in addition to the one they ultimately joined, so it is hard to know what role social ties play in individuals’ decisions to join one faction over another.

\(^{19}\) This mechanism of exchange would be similar to Granovetter’s weak ties. See Granovetter, M. S. (1973). "The strength of weak ties." American Journal of Sociology: 1360-1380.
Figure 6: Participants’ Ties to Factions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Ties</th>
<th>SLA</th>
<th>RUF</th>
<th>CDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.387 (*)</td>
<td>0.981 (***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>-0.387 (*)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.981 (***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.593 (***)</td>
<td>0.981 (***)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculation using Humphreys and Weinstein (2003)

Note: Tests for pair-wise means differences use two-tailed t-test.

Note: There are no pairwise or overall statistically significant means differences among abductees.

Note: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (.) indicates no statistical significance.

All factions engaged in some sort of demonstration of loyalty, detailed in Table 5 below. For the CDF it was primarily an initiation ceremony that was based on the kamajor groups’ traditional ceremonies. Ethnographic evidence suggests that these ceremonies were costly, which makes them a plausible signal of commitment to the group. There are no statistics or data on the actual cost of such a ceremony, though qualitative accounts report that by the end of the war, local mystics would perform the ceremony for anyone who could pay the fee, perhaps cheapening whatever signaling measure the initiation ceremony held (Hoffman 2011).

Almost two-thirds of RUF volunteers had to go through training also. This is greater even than the level of SLA training. As well, there is no significant difference between the CDF and RUF volunteers in terms of length of time to receive a weapon. Four-fifths of SLA members received weapons immediately upon joining – normal for a military organization. There is no statistically significant difference between the CDF and RUF in receiving a weapon immediately. More than three-fourths of all faction volunteers were required to do something to show loyalty.

Almost all CDF participants had at least one social tie to the group prior to entering; 77.9 percent had two or more. The majority of non-CDF volunteers also knew at least one person in the group before joining, mostly just one other. Of voluntary recruits, only 28 percent of RUF combatants had
no social ties to the group, and a majority, over 70 percent, had one or more social connections. The SLA also had relatively high proportions of people with social ties to the group among voluntary combatants. Over half of voluntary SLA recruits had two or more social ties to the SLA. Eighty-four percent of SLA volunteers knew at least one person before joining. The pair-wise differences across factions are statistically significant for volunteers. The average RUF volunteer had almost 0.4 fewer social ties than an SLA volunteer. The average CDF volunteer had almost one more social tie to their faction than an RUF volunteer. Means differences between faction pairs for abductees are not significant.

Table 5: Volunteer Screening Modes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SLA (N=43)</th>
<th>RUF (N=46)</th>
<th>CDF (N=519)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiation Ceremony</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harm Civilian</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive weapon immediately</td>
<td>82.1%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations using Humphreys and Weinstein (2003)

Factions used a variety of promises to recruit volunteers. Table 6 shows the relative use of specific types of recruitment promises made to participants. The most meaningful comparison in this chart is between the CDF and the other three factions. A chi-square test on the difference between CDF and non-CDF promises reveals that the differences are significant at the 1 percent level. The RUF and SLA were much more likely to use both ideology and promises of personal gain in recruitment that the CDF. CDF were much more likely to use promises of personal, family, and community protection in recruitment. The RUF and SLA were much more likely to use appeals to personal gain and political ideology to recruit persons. Overall, the numbers of promises made to volunteers were comparable across factions, with the CDF offering statistically fewer promises on average than the RUF or SLA. Though the CDF was still less likely to offer any form of personal gain, there are distinct variations among the non-CDF factions. The SLA was much more likely to offer money or jobs as an incentive than the RUF, but the RUF was almost twice as likely to promise food. The RUF and CDF lead in promises for improvements to Sierra Leone. Overall, the RUF and SLA mirror each other in general types of recruitment promises.

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20 Ideological promises have an obscure meaning from the dataset, referring generally to “improvements” in Sierra Leone.
Table 6: Recruitment Promises Made to Voluntary Combatants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SLA (N=43)</th>
<th>RUF (N=46)</th>
<th>CDF (N=520)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Chi-2 p-value</th>
<th>RUF – SLA</th>
<th>CDF – RUF</th>
<th>CDF – SLA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>16.10%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>0.00 (***)</td>
<td>-0.09 (.)</td>
<td>-0.371 (***)</td>
<td>-0.461 (***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>49.60%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>0.00 (***)</td>
<td>-0.40 (.)</td>
<td>-0.278 (***)</td>
<td>0.238 (***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideals</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>29.30%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>0.054 (*)</td>
<td>0.176 (*)</td>
<td>-0.049 (.)</td>
<td>0.128 (*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>0.639 (.)</td>
<td>0.042 (.)</td>
<td>-0.019 (.)</td>
<td>0.023 (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Total Promises</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>0.005 (***)</td>
<td>0.171 (.)</td>
<td>-0.464 (***)</td>
<td>-0.293 (*)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculation using Humphreys and Weinstein (2003)

Note: Tests for pair-wise means differences use two-tailed t-test.
Note: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (.) indicates no statistical significance.

Weinstein (2007) argues that socially dependent groups will make induction costly for recruits, either by making them pay, study for long periods, or go for extended periods without a weapon. This raises the cost of joining and leaving immediately or being cut from the group for bad behavior. Anecdotally, the initiation ceremony for the CDF was a non-trivial cost and also involved a week-long period of instruction and meditation, which might have acted as a way to increase the cost of joining. Overall, it appears that the CDF engaged in some, but not all, of Weinstein’s proposed screening and induction methods, and that the RUF engaged in a number of recruitment methods that are not predicted by the model. The RUF and SLA appear to have similar recruitment strategies, although screening strategies appear to be much more mixed.

One might have expected the CDF to provide intangible benefits to its volunteers as substitutes for direct remuneration, but we do not see this necessarily. This could be either because the total value of CDF compensation in the form of food was on par or better than the total value of SLA or RUF compensation. This would be possible if CDF food disbursements were more regular or of greater quantity or quality than those of the RUF or SLA. It is alternatively possible that the value of personal safety gained by CDF fighters is valuable enough to compensate for low remuneration. CDF volunteers appear to benefit a great deal more than SLA or RUF volunteers from a sense of safety and security. In a highly uncertain war environment, reductions in personal or family risk could become highly desirable. It is possible, even, that RUF and SLA volunteers required greater compensation in other forms to compensate them for taking on a greater amount of risk.

9.2 Non-human Resources

It is quite difficult to know the level and type of resources that each faction had available. I do not make any attempt in this analysis to specify the relative resources of each group; there is too little data to stand firmly on even a relative estimation. However, because of this it is impossible to

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21 This is consistent with the types of recruitment promises made to volunteers. CDF volunteers were much more likely to receive promises of personal, family, or community safety than SLA or CDF volunteers.
validate whether the CDF was actually more resource-poor than the other groups. What seems clear, however, is not the amount of resources, but rather their source.

In the early days of the war, the RUF obtained resources primarily through the patronage of Charles Taylor and the NPFL. Taylor supplied the RUF with cross-border bases on Liberia, supplies and manpower in the form of NPFL troops. As well, the RUF/NPFL controlled and taxed trade along the southeastern border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. They quickly took control of diamond-mining areas as a source of revenue. Taylor’s support for the RUF waned, the NPFL withdrew from Sierra Leone, and material support stopped by the end of 1993.

Analyses of finances of the factions are virtually non-existent and it is practically impossible to generate credible estimates of the amount, types, sources or uses of faction funds. We can discern some general sources and characteristics of funding. To our knowledge, no analysis exists of the finances of any faction besides the recognition that diamonds were a significant source of revenue for all factions. Accounts of the war frequently note that the RUF used diamond mining as an easy way to generate revenues to purchase supplies and ammunition. It does not appear as though the RUF was flush with diamond revenues throughout the entirety of the war, and extent to which the RUF benefitted from diamond revenues even in the early stages of the war is debatable. The TRC notes that “[a]lthough it is true that the RUF partly financed its war effort through diamond trafficking, diamonds did not yield significant revenues for the movement before 1997” (TRC 2004, Vol. 2, Ch. 1, para. 39). This seems to suggest that the RUF’s political goals, and not only diamond revenues, were a central cause of the war in the beginning, even if the importance of those ideals faded as the war progressed.

The RUF was not the only beneficiary of diamond revenues. The TRC notes that all factions and actors in the war were engaged in diamond mining efforts (TRC 2004). Abraham (in Abdullah 2004) also observes that all parties to the conflict traded-off mining and wartime activities, not only the RUF; this includes the SLA, since state revenues were largely dependent on the sale of primary commodities such as rutile, gold and diamonds and the collapse of the state hindered the APC’s ability to collect and funnel revenues to the SLA. Keen notes “[d]iamonds are easily smuggled, providing both income for militia leaders as well as funding for arms. Because large-scale diamond smuggling was possible only so long as the country remained in chaos, diamond profits represented an important incentive for all armed groups to continue fighting” (2005, 50).

The resources available to the other groups are even harder to discern. Before they were assimilated as the CDF in 1996, local kamajor groups were primarily locally funded or supported in the early stages of the war. Accounts suggest that local leaders gave them supplies and ammunition (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007) to support their operations. As the Kabbah administration leaned more on the CDF from 1996 onwards, state and international resources were increasingly funneled to the CDF and local resources became less important for CDF operations. To justify the 1997 coup, the AFRC junta claimed that 35 billion leones per month were going to the CDF forces whereas only 203 million were going to the SLA (Gberie 2005, 151). There are no records to substantiate this claim. Gberie (2005) argues that the AFRC’s number is inflated and that the CDF
did not receive much support from the state at any point. Yet, this seems inconsistent with the Kabbah administration’s formalization of the forces and the use of international resources to prosecute the war against the RUF, especially since CDF were increasingly removed from their home areas and sent to front lines across the country. As well, the PRIO database of external assistance shows that several external actors provided training, ammunition and other materiel support to the CDF and SLA (Hogbladh, Pettersson et al. 2011).

For the SLA, state military expenditure more than doubled between 1990 and 1992 from $15 million USD to just over $30 million USD. This level of expenditure was maintained at least through 1996 before climbing slightly towards the end of the war (see Figure 6). After 1996, possibly before, this would have been split between the CDF and SLA; the proportion going to each, or whether there were other sources that the PRIO database does not account for, is unknown.

Figure 6: Sierra Leone Military Expenditure, 1988-2002

The key difference between RUF and CDF resources appears to be the channels of control over resources. The CDF’s resources appear to have been primarily funneled through local or international governance structures (i.e., the CDF did not have sole power to exercise control over potential resources). The RUF, in contrast, was not immediately accountable as an organization to any stakeholder but itself. That is, the RUF could exercise much greater autonomy in the generation and distribution of its resources. If the relative resources of each group are not clear, constraints on access to those resources is more so. In the CDF’s case, the group was dependent first on local chiefs to provide support and help recruit volunteers, then on the state and aid from the international community. Whether or not these resources were great or small would seem to matter less than whether or not they come from stakeholders who have preferences about how civilians are
treated. Conversely, the RUF was accountable to no stakeholder that could restrict the flow of resources to the group if the RUF did not manage to curb violence. As a state body, the SLA should have had similar constraints as the CDF. However, the SLA was an arm of a government that was historically unresponsive to the needs of Southern and Eastern communities, and we cannot really know with certainty to what extent the APC government truly wished to avoid civilian violence over other goals. In this sense, Lidow’s (2011) explanation is more consistent with the CDF’s ability to curb violence.

10. Discussion
The sections above reveal a significant amount of diversity, and also a significant amount of commonality, among factions in Sierra Leone. The RUF and SLA bear similarities in behavior, tactics to recruit volunteers, organizational structure and command, and the socioeconomic characteristics of their volunteers. The RUF and SLA also engaged in relatively high levels of education and training for their volunteers, and volunteers for both factions appear more likely to have joined for the prospect of material gain than did volunteers for the CDF. The CDF also had some notable similarities with the RUF and SLA. Both the RUF and CDF meted out discipline to their soldiers for crimes or indiscipline, although the RUF did not appear successful in its attempts to curb indiscipline – or the violence was purposeful. The CDF and SLA were both able to successfully manage violence against civilians better than the RUF.

Geography theory could attribute this to a loosening of traditional lines of control between local leaders and local CDF units. Alternatively, Johnston (2008) argues that the removal of EO in 1997 removed the heavy monitoring of the CDF that EO was performing and increased the information asymmetries between leaders and unit commanders. Selective incentives theories might could explain this rise in violence by the injection of resources from international actors; increased resources from non-local actors may have made the CDF more relatively resource-rich. However, Lidow (2011)’s theory of patronage suggests that international governments such as the U.K. would have strong incentives to leverage resource support against civilian violence. Relative strength theory would propose that the increased geographic mobilization of CDF forces to areas outside of their homes would have raised information and verification costs of overcoming the identification problem, and as a result resorted to greater violence because they were less able to distinguish collaborators from defectors among the population.

The SLA defies the predictions of geography theories. The SLA, previously primarily stationed in Freetown, was deployed to areas with rough terrain and little communication ability. This would have increased the effective distance of SLA units from central commanders. We should therefore observe greater violence against civilians by the SLA, but we observe relatively little. If we use Johnston’s original metric of military effectiveness as the measure of interest, as a vertically integrated organization that was part of an established bureaucratic system with resources to support formal communication and monitoring, the SLA should have been the most effective faction in the conflict. However, Section 3 shows us that there were numerous instances where the SLA was inept
and ineffective. The sobel phenomenon suggests the moonlighting predicted by Johnston (2008) for factions that have high information and objective asymmetries, not for low-distance groups.

If the RUF is a weak group, the specific patterns of RUF violence align with theory focused on civilian mobilization. Kalyvas (2006) hypothesizes when faced with a strong counterinsurgency threat, weak groups will escalate indiscriminate violence against civilians in order to create a situation in which it is riskier to be neutral than to collaborate; protection becomes a selective incentive. The three phases of RUF violence coincide with distinct times of threat for the organization. In the first phase, the RUF was almost annihilated by a newly reinforced SLA that pursued the group all the way to the Liberian border (TRC 2004). The second wave came before elections that threatened to exclude the RUF entirely from political power in any new regime (Gershoni 1997). The last co-occurred with the RUF’s expulsion from Freetown by ECOMOG and the increasing involvement of international forces. If the RUF was a strong group, these three waves of violence make less sense form the theoretical perspective. But we should be wary of concluding that the RUF was a weak organization because we can construct a story where the outcomes align with the theory.

With respect to Weinstein’s theory and recruitment of person-types, on balance the factions cannot be easily placed along a spectrum with pecuniary benefits on one side and non-pecuniary benefits on the other. It is clear that the RUF offered the greatest diversity of non-monetary remuneration, followed by the SLA and then the CDF. What is not certain is the total value of any of these forms of compensation. We cannot know which volunteers- RUF, CDF, or SLA – were paid most for their labor, although it seems at face value that SLA fighters had the highest likelihood of receiving the most marketable goods – food and money. The RUF’s use of drugs, diamonds and slaves as compensation is consistent with historical narratives. The SLA’s relatively high use of these forms of compensation makes the SLA appear RUF-like. The CDF is the clear outlier of the three, providing primarily food as recompense.

As well the relative distributions of non-pecuniary benefits amongst the factions adds confusion to the picture. SLA and RUF members were far more likely to receive educational benefits, which is at odds with a picture of opportunistic participants focused primarily on material gains to participation. The protection offered by the CDF may be compensatory for the lack of material gains, and possibly suggests that the value of personal and family safety to the group of people who became CDF participants was very high. One possible explanation for the observed heterogeneity between RUF/SLA and CDF is the differential participation in agriculture. Table 8 in the Appendix shows that CDF volunteers were more likely to have been involved in agriculture than SLA or RUF volunteers prior to joining. As an immobile asset, dependence on land may limit the ability of farmers to leave their communities without risking losing access to the land, and thus a substantial source of wealth. The data cannot prove this either way, but this explanation is consistent with CDF volunteers’ background, the recruitment promises, and eventual compensation they received.

A major drawback of the civilian mobilization theories is that though they rely on relative strength and resources as a link in the causal chain towards violence, there is little discussion in the theoretical literature of how to distinguish a relatively strong group from a relatively weak group, or a group
with relatively greater resources from one with relatively fewer. There are as yet no established
dimensions against which to assess strength and weakness or theoretical foundations for choosing
some criteria over others.

11. Conclusion
In conclusion, this analysis has identified three major threads of theoretical literature and compared
their theoretical predictions to real world events in an archetypal civil conflict. Bringing together the
available qualitative and quantitative evidence on the Sierra Leone war reveals both significant
differences and similarities between the CDF, RUF and SLA factions in terms. Linking this evidence
to theory shows that existing models developed to describe faction characteristics across conflicts
are not yet suitable for application within conflicts, as each strand of theory yields predictions that
do not bear out upon a close analysis within context.

Add a paragraph: Theory helps highlight characteristics to consider, but does not give a complete
categorization and is not predictive. This flaw suggests need for greater understanding of context
and the ways in which the variables presented in the model interact within a given context. In this
case, the SLA’s high cost of identification, which would promote violence, could have been
attenuated by external pressure to preserve civilian welfare. The inability of current theory to predict
faction behavior in the Sierra Leone case could also imply that factions within conflicts, operating in
similar environments, are more likely to share similarities than previously thought. Attempts to treat
factions in the same conflict as unique may lead us to wrong conclusions.

The analysis presented here also suggest a need to incorporate state militaries into theories that
predict or explain faction behavior. Across the dimensions discussed here the SLA bears
resemblance to both factions at different times. The fact that the SLA and RUF are the most like
pair of the possible three is problematic for modes of thinking that assume the military’s motivations
are to protect the state or its civilians. At numerous points in this analysis do we see that the SLA
does not act in accordance with norms associated with professional military organizations. One-
quarter of volunteers said they would beat or kill volunteers for refusing food. The ‘sobel’
phenomenon suggests that at least some contingent within the SLA had no regard for established
norms of war or professionalization. By most accounts, the SLA was, at best, ineffective or, at worst,
complicit with the RUF in committing violence towards civilians and prolonging the war. The SLA’s
role in the development of the war is critical, yet it is frequently omitted from analyses of the war, or
given passing attention. This gap is demonstrated here by the inability of all three types of theories
of civil war dynamics to predict the SLA’s behavior with consistency. The comparisons across
groups underscore the importance of creating theory that specifically incorporates military groups as
significant actor groups in conflict analyses.
## Appendix: Combatant Summary Statistics

### Table 7: Humphreys and Weinstein (2003) Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Abductees</th>
<th>Voluntary Recruits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Joining ***</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Agricultural Parents ***</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother's Education Level **</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Education Level **</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan before 1991</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male ***</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation before war</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student ***</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer ***</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unoccupied ***</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location before War</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region **</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Area</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region **</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 district has alluvial deposits ***</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 district has kimberlite deposits ***</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Context</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 district Herfindahl Index **</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily Identifies with Tribe</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily Identifies with Religion</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily Identifies with “Other”</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported APC Before War</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported SLPP Before War ***</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*), (**), and (***) above represent significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, of a means comparison test between abductees and voluntary recruits.

Note: Unoccupied means that the respondent reported having no employment and did not report being a student.

Note: The district-level Herfindahl index comes from Reed et al (2013), who show that districts with higher Herfindahl indices – that is, lower levels of political competition – experience worse development outcomes, but higher reported levels of satisfaction with their political leaders.
Table 8: Volunteer Characteristics by Faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>ANOVA or Chi² result</th>
<th>Pair-wise Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>CDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Joining</td>
<td>23.5 (7.05)</td>
<td>24.11 (9.42)</td>
<td>27.73 (10.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Highest Education Level</td>
<td>0.84 (1.73)</td>
<td>0.61 (1.20)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Highest Education Level</td>
<td>1.83 (2.28)</td>
<td>1.43 (2.32)</td>
<td>0.85 (1.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan prior to 1991</td>
<td>0.093 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.043 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.087 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.87 (0.34)</td>
<td>0.98 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Prior</td>
<td>0.49 (0.51)</td>
<td>0.39 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.28 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer Prior</td>
<td>0.047 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern/Eastern Region</td>
<td>0.58 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.80 (0.40)</td>
<td>0.72 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Area</td>
<td>0.20 (0.40)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 District has Alluvial Deposits</td>
<td>0.68 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.83 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 District has Kimberlite Deposits</td>
<td>0.27 (0.45)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.46 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 District Herfindahl Index</td>
<td>0.59 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.59 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.61 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District in 1991 != District of Birth</td>
<td>0.51 (0.51)</td>
<td>0.5 (0.35)</td>
<td>0.39 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations using Humphreys and Weinstein (2003), TRC Violence Dataset, and Reed et al. (2013)

Note: Tests for pair-wise means differences use two-tailed t-test.
Note: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Note: ANOVA test statistic is used to test means differences of non-binary variables; binary variables are tested using Chi²
Reintegrating Former Youth Soldiers: The Effect of Reception Centers in Northern Uganda
Elizabeth Wilke

To aid child soldiers’ return to community life after fighting for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda, local and international aid organizations have established at least a dozen reception centers to process returning youth. Yet, little is known about the effects of these centers on returnees’ outcomes. What impact do reception centers in northern Uganda have on the social and economic outcomes of the youth they serve? This paper estimates the impact of attending a reception center on several indicators of social and economic integration for formerly abducted youth in northern Uganda using both instrumental variable (IV) and propensity score weighting methods. The results imply strong negative effects on social outcomes and mixed effects on economic outcomes. The results imply that reception centers in northern Uganda, on average, do more harm than good in helping youth reintegrate after fighting. Possible explanations that could account for the results are discussed.

1. Introduction
Over 1.5 billion people live in fragile or conflict-affected states (World Bank 2013). The challenges of economic and social development in conflict-affected environments are altogether distinct from those of other low-income environments. Recognizing this, international aid and development organizations have turned their focus in recent years to the challenges of conflict-affected environments. As interest in this area has grown in recent years, researchers have begun investigating pathways of recruitment into rebel groups and factions (Weinstein 2003; Uvin 2007; Boas and Hatloy 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Berman 2009; Berman, Callen et al. 2009); the effects of fighting on human and physical capital accumulation (Shemyakina 2006; Bellows and Miguel 2009; Fiala 2009; Verwimp 2009; Gates, Hegre et al. 2010; Voors, Nillesen et al. 2010; Poirier forthcoming); determinants of successful combatant reintegration into communities after fighting (Body 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Pugel 2007; Hill, Taylor et al. 2008; Denissen 2010; Dyck 2011); and the effectiveness of reintegration assistance programs (Allen and Schomerus 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Pugel 2007; Jennings 2008; Gilligan, Mvukiyehe et al. 2010; GUSCO 2010; McMullin 2011; Samii 2011).

Of particular interest in this expanding field of inquiry relating to the challenges of conflict-affected environments is the growing number of studies investigating the micro-dynamics of conflict at the individual level. One still underdeveloped line of inquiry in this developing field is one that deals with the micro-level reintegration of former combatants. Meaningful reintegration for fighters into a society’s economic, political, and social spheres is widely regarded as an indispensable step in the process of conflict cessation and recovery. The successful reintegration of combatants is thought to promote security and peace-building as well as more general economic and social development goals.
However, ex-combatants’ successful transition to civilian lives and their social and economic reintegration into society after fighting is a key challenge in conflict-affected environments. Successful reintegration is often hindered by a number of challenges. Combatants are more likely to be socially marginalized in both the pre- and post-conflict periods (UN 2000; Tajima 2009; ILO 2010). Returning combatants face a number of obstacles returning to their communities. Ex-combatants as a class “[exhibit] material, human capital, and social capital deficiencies” which reduce their economic competitiveness (Samii 2011, 130). Combatants tend to be comprised mostly of poorly educated young men who, upon return from fighting, face depleted human and physical capital stocks, psychoemotional stress, and social disconnectedness which hinder their successful reintegration (UN 2000; Tajima 2009).

Recognizing these challenges, donors and organizations working in these contexts have tried to provide reintegration assistance including skills training, education, socialization training or counseling, and sometimes community outreach programs in order to help combatants transitioning to civilian life in the hope of preventing social and economic exclusion and hasten the transition from violence to stability. These programs can be part of a formal post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) structure or they can be more informal or ad hoc.

Data from Uppsala University’s Peace Agreement Dataset indicates that only 36 percent of the peace agreements made between 1898-1999 had provisions for DDR; from 2000-2005, that proportion increased to 59 percent (Harbom, Högbadh et al. 2011). Despite the increasing role that reintegration assistance programs play in conflict-recovery situations, we know relatively little about what specific role reintegration assistance plays in fostering reconciliation and social and economic reintegration for former combatants. Blattman and Miguel (2010) correctly note that we are far from having a satisfactory body of micro-empirical evidence on conflict in general; the same holds true for evidence on micro-level reintegration. Given the attention and resources that reintegration programs have received in post-conflict situations, pathways of reintegration and the impacts of reintegration programs on fighters and their wider communities need to be better understood.

Relative stability since 2005 in northern Uganda has provided an opportunity for researchers to investigate returning soldiers at the micro-level through the use of recently developed datasets and more secure access to war-affected populations. In the last several years, researchers have investigated the effects of abduction and war violence on both abducted and non-abducted youth including political participation (Blattman 2009); economic consequences of soldiering (Blattman, Annan et al. 2006; Blattman and Annan 2010); psychoemotional trauma and resilience (Banes, Stover et al. 2006; Bayer, Klasen et al. 2007; Pham, Vinck et al. 2007; Veale and Stavrou 2007; Vinck, Pham et al. 2007; Pham, Vinck et al. 2009); social acceptance (Amoni-P’Olak 2007; Corbin 2008); and broader social attitude changes (Vinck, Pham et al. 2007; Fiala 2009; Bozzoli, Bruck et al. 2010).

Although much progress has been made in this area in recent years, there are still a number of gaps that need to be addressed. For example, though reintegration is recognized as having political, social and economic aspects, most- though not all- micro-level studies of conflict and reintegration only use economic measures as outcomes of interest. The majority of the micro-level studies discussed...
above use economic measures or self-reported acceptance as a proxy for reintegration progress. The economic measures are fairly standard, but capture only one aspect of a much more holistic process. Self-reported measures of acceptance try to approximate social reintegration, but are overly vague and may suffer from recall bias or effort justification. Moreover, only a few studies include self-reported acceptance at all. To address this issue, this study takes advantage of rich behavioral and social data to measure social support using more concrete measures. Findings here suggest that the social impacts of reintegration assistance may be very different from the economic impacts.

Second, DDR programs are accepted as critical for post-conflict recovery and stability. The acceptance of this conventional wisdom is reflected in the growing number of DDR programs that accompany post-conflict peace processes. However, experimental or causal evidence is lacking to support such a view. Only a few studies, noted above, have been able to causally identify the impacts of DDR programs. Much more evidence needs to be brought to the table in determining whether DDR programs are worth their price. This analysis adds another data point to the evidence base. As well, it represents the first empirical assessment of an informal reintegration assistance program instead of a formal program as part of a DDR structure. To date, the only programs that have been evaluated or assessed at the micro-level are programs that are part of a formal DDR framework. Yet, aid organizations and international donors often implement reintegration and recovery assistance programs outside of the purview of a formal DDR structure. Understanding the impacts of these programs is also necessary. As one of the first causal, quantitative assessments of a group of informal reintegration programs, this analysis contributes to knowledge on the role and impact of aid in conflict. The results show that returnees who attend these programs have reduced social support outcomes in the medium-term.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 offers a brief exposition of the conflict in northern Uganda as it relates to this analysis. Section 4 describes the reception centers that have been established to support returning abducted youth and reviews evidence on their effectiveness to date. Sections 5 and 6 introduce the data and detail the empirical approach and methodologies, respectively. Section 7 describes and justifies the variables used in the analysis. Sections 8 and 9 present and discuss results including potential explanations for the findings. Section 10 closes. The study conclusions suggest that reception center attendance does not improve outcomes for returnees.

2. Literature
The literatures associated the impacts of soldiering and reintegration convey a general consensus that reintegration assistance is an important and necessary component of post-conflict recovery. With decades of practical experience in post-conflict recovery and peace-building, the UN notes that:

“[E]xperience has shown that disarmament alone has no long-term benefits if not accompanied by demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society through economically viable alternative lifestyles, as well as overall socio-economic development for the country as a whole” (UN 2000, 1).
Reintegration assistance has both short-term and long-term components. Short term components, such as cash or in-kind assistance are intended as stop-gap measures to help combatants before longer-term programs such as vocational training, education, counseling, and placement assistance can be established and start providing services to enrolled combatants who have been disarmed and demobilized (Colletta, Kostner et al. 1996; Muggah 2008). Observers and scholars studying conflicts in the last two decades have argued that reintegration programs are essential to building lasting peace (see Kingma 1997; Muggah 2005; Spear 2006).

Why is DDR - notably the “R” - viewed as such an important component of post-conflict recovery? Though combatants differ widely on demographics such as age, education, and socioeconomic status, both within and across conflicts, combatants tend, in general, to be younger with less education and higher rates of social marginalization than the societal average. One pervasive narrative about combatants is that they joined the fighting because they were socially and economically marginalized to begin with. Upon their return to society after conflict, their previous human and social capital deficiencies remain, and they are burdened with the additional stigma associated with being a combatant, which puts them at risk for greater marginalization. Without reintegration assistance to make civilian life more attractive to returning combatants, the presumption is that they will be more likely to return to violence, disrupting post-conflict stability (Colletta, Kostner et al. 1996; Muggah 2008; Tajima 2009; Samii 2011).22

Ex-combatants themselves have noted that poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and unemployment as primary reasons they would consider a return to violence (Hill, Taylor et al. 2008). Cramer (2010) also demonstrates a more general negative association between employment and participation in violence. Given the practitioner’s focus on economic reintegration, there is somewhat of a disconnect between the programmatic focus of reintegration assistance efforts – which are primarily concerned with cash assistance and the development of economic opportunity for returned combatants – and the focus in the literature on the psycho-emotional disadvantages that returning combatants face at the micro-level. Poverty is also associated with the onset of conflict and recruitment into fighting groups (Collier, Elliott et al. 2003; Miguel, Satyanath et al. 2004). Economic disadvantage, through a lack of education, marketable skills or experience, is noted by several studies of reintegration and reintegration programs as a primary justification for reintegration assistance programs (Colletta, Kostner et al. 1996; Berdal 2009; ILO 2010; UN 2010). Yet, there is a distinct lack of literature focusing on the economic reintegration processes and prospects for returning combatants at the micro-level. A notable few studies focus on economic

reintegration as a primary outcome. Blattman and Annan (2010) show that abduction into the LRA significantly reduces education, skilled employment, and earnings for young former soldiers in northern Uganda, with negative impacts for future capital development. Gilligan et al. (2010) demonstrate the positive earnings impact of a DDR program in Burundi on ex-combatants earnings and employment. Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) also use economic outcomes as an indicator of reintegration progress. Not all impacts of soldiering may be detrimental, however. Blattman (2009) also illustrates the impact of abduction on political participation and voting on abducted youth in northern Uganda, showing that abduction increases both.

The majority of the micro-level literature to date dealing with reintegration and post-conflict adjustment among combatants relates primarily to psychoemotional and mental health outcomes. A number of studies note a high rate of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), mental trauma, feelings of aggression or hostility, and the internalization of mental distress among former combatants (Derluyn, Broekaert et al. 2004; Bayer, Klasen et al. 2007; Kohrt, Jordans et al. 2008; Pham, Vinck et al. 2009; Betancourt, Borisova et al. 2010; Betancourt, Brennan et al. 2010; Schauer and Elbert 2010). Studies with non-soldier control groups note that soldiering is positively associated with higher levels of mental health issues (Kohrt, Jordans et al. 2008; Pham, Vinck et al. 2009).

Collectively, these studies support a narrative that portrays former combatants as a class in need of reintegration assistance beyond general post-conflict recovery efforts. Not all studies find this, however. Annan et al. (2009) show that formerly abducted LRA soldiers in Uganda demonstrate emotional and psychological resilience. Though other outcomes associated with reintegration success are themselves relatively understudied, there is evidence suggesting relationships between psychoemotional adjustment, mental health outcomes and other reintegration outcomes such as social connectedness and support, family acceptance, and returning to school (Betancourt, Borisova et al. 2013). Post-conflict mental health also influences physical health outcomes, anti-social behavior, and developmental outcomes for younger individuals (Schauer and Elbert 2010).

As a group, returning combatants face challenges associated with stigma and social marginalization. Conceptually, stigmatization is a serious barrier to successful social reintegration, which some argue is mandatory for successful reintegration overall (UN 2000; Corbin 2008; Leff 2008). Practitioners note that combatants returning home often face hostile communities reluctant to accept them (Colletta, Kostner et al. 1996). Moreover, even though communities may accept former combatants as a requirement for peace, some engage in “systematic discrimination” against former combatants via tacit exclusion by non-combatant community members (Boersch-Supan 2008, ii). The negative reintegration effects of stigma have been demonstrated in Uganda (Veale and Stavrou 2007; Corbin 2008), Sierra Leone (Betancourt, Agnew-Blais et al. 2010), and Liberia (Pugel 2006; McMullin 2012). This is especially concerning since, given the general lack of economic opportunity in post-conflict environments, social ties and support are of relatively greater importance for individual well-being.

While reintegration assistance is a recognized imperative of post-conflict recovery, the impact of reintegration programs to date is contested. Studies note instances of successful reintegration
programs that, overall, contributed to post-conflict stability and longer-term reconciliation (Colletta, Kostner et al. 1996; Fuhlrott 2007; Knight 2008). However, poorly implemented reintegration programs can undermine the stability and development goals they are supposed to support. Dzinesa (2008) argues that a successful disarmament and demobilization program in Namibia was undermined by a lack of proper reintegration support. The potential for fragmented or poorly implemented reintegration programs to subvert the consolidation of peace is recognized in a number of practical discussions (Muggah 2004; Muggah 2005; Paes 2005; Peters 2007; Jennings 2008). As a specific example, one of the perceived benefits of DDR programs is that they dismantle the command structures and separate fighters from not only their commanders but also other fighters. Yet, Colletta et al. (1996) note in their case studies of Uganda, Mozambique, and Namibia that fighters maintained informal social networks with former comrades and these networks were useful resources for social support, income generation and general transitions to civilian life. Using Angola and Liberia as cases, McMullin (2011; 2012) even argues that by focusing on ex-combatants, reintegration programs do more harm than good because it perpetuates the idea that ex-combatants are more vulnerable and more deserving of aid, which encourages society to fit individual ex-combatants into a discriminatory template that obscures important individual differences among ex-combatants.

The number of micro-level studies on conflict dynamics has increased in recent years through the novel use of existing datasets and the creation of new datasets in conflict-affected environments. In Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) test several hypotheses and find that DDR program participation is not associated with greater reintegration success such as employment, earnings, or self-reported acceptance by the community. Instead, they find that the primary indicator of acceptance is the violence of the unit in which the soldier fought. A similar survey of ex-combatants in Liberia finds that ex-combatants who have participated in the country’s formal DDR program are more successfully reintegrated than those that have not, along several indicators of reintegration (Pugel 2007). While Pugel does not directly attribute improved outcomes to the DDR program, he notes that participating but not yet reintegrated ex-combatants have the worst outcomes, suggesting that the DDR program likely has an impact. Using a natural experiment in Burundi, Gilligan et al. (2010) demonstrate that the DDR program provided a significant income boost, lowered the incidence of poverty among former combatants, but did not seem to promote political integration. Plus, DDR participants also only modestly claimed that they preferred civilian life to their lives as combatants. In a longitudinal study of former combatants in Mozambique, Boothby et al. (2006) show that some interventions to promote community acceptance, ritual cleansing, and economic opportunity had a positive impact on soldiers’ longer term outcomes. Jordans et al. (2012) find no difference in “socio-economic functioning” between non-combatant youth and combatant youth who participated in a reintegration program in Burundi; they argue that this indicates a positive impact of the program. At this nascent point, the micro-level evidence on the impact of reintegration programs is decidedly mixed. These studies represent a significant contribution to the debate on reintegration in post-conflict environments. The lack of consensus highlights the need for further investigation on the effectiveness of DDR assistance programs.
3. Abduction and Return in Northern Uganda

The conflict in northern Uganda between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government remains Africa’s longest running conflict to date. The LRA is a quasi-religious insurgent movement opposed to the southern-dominated Ugandan government and its perceived marginalization of the Acholi people in the northern region. Throughout the course of the conflict, the LRA used abduction of youth as a recruiting tactic. Estimates of the number of abducted youth range between 52,000 and 75,000 over the course of the conflict; youth have been used in the LRA as fighters, porters, sex slaves, or for other tasks. Estimates of the number of youth under the age of 18 who have been abducted are between 20,000 and 38,000 (Allen and Schomerus 2006; Pham, Vinck et al. 2007).

Available evidence suggests that abductees in northern Uganda face substantial reintegration challenges when they return from the “bush.” Fighting increases youths’ exposure to trauma (Vinck, Pham et al. 2007; Pham, Vinck et al. 2009), and decreases levels of schooling, subsequent earnings, and capital accumulation (Blattman and Annan 2010). Returnees in northern Uganda are also at higher risk of reporting symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than comparable non-abducted youth. In a survey of northern Ugandans, two-thirds of abductees met criteria for PTSD versus 56 percent of all respondents (Vinck, Pham et al. 2007). Eighty-percent of those who had been abducted greater than six months met the criteria for PTSD (Pham, Vinck et al. 2009). However, not all studies in northern Uganda find evidence of psychological distress among returnees; Blattman and Annan (2008), for example, report emotional and psychological resilience among formerly abducted youth.

Returnees in northern Uganda also have poorer economic outcomes. Blattman and Annan (2010) take advantage of the random nature of youth abduction to show that abductees, on average, have significantly less education and capital accumulation than non-abductees. These poorer outcomes are directly attributable to abduction. Table 9 shows that although abductees have more work experience and are employed more days on average than non-abductees, they have less formal

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23 There is some question as to whether the conflict is still ongoing. Conflict-related violence and abductions have declined significantly since 2008. The security situation has improved to such an extent that civilians have been allowed to leave the government’s containment camps and return to their homes. However, the LRA and its leader, Joseph Kony, remain active in the region and involved in other regional conflicts. Many northerners also feel that underlying tensions that drove the conflict still exist. In this paper, I treat the conflict as having ended, since the violence and abductions have largely ceased.

24 This is a very broad generalization of the conflict, which has many relevant actors beyond the two mentioned, including the Sudanese government and rebel groups in South Sudan. For a more thorough and nuanced treatment of the conflict in northern Uganda, see Finnström, S. (2003). Living with bad surroundings: War and existential uncertainty in Acholiland, Northern Uganda, Uppsala University, Frederick, O.-T. (2010). Politics, ethnicity and conflict in post independent Acholiland, Uganda 1962-2006. Historical and Heritage Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, University of Pretoria. Doctoral.

25 The term “Acholi” is generally used to refer to northern Ugandans affected by the conflict, since they were the largest affected group. Other affected groups include the Lango and Teso in northeastern Uganda, also known as Karamoja. The term “Acholi” can be used to define people in different contexts, much as the term “midwesterner” can have different meanings to different people in the United States.

26 The wide variability in the number of people abducted speaks to the lack of information and data available in Uganda during this period.

27 The “bush” is the colloquial term to mean participating in the conflict.
education and have fewer assets than non-abductees. They also receive lower wages and are more likely to be in poor health. These differences are large but not statistically significant. Blattman and Annan (2010) show also that the employment abductees receive is more likely to be low-skilled than that of non-abductees.

### Table 9: Differences between Abductee and Non-Abductee Economic Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Abductees</th>
<th>Non-Abductees</th>
<th>Significance level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>21.61</td>
<td>20.87</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days Employed Last Month</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Experience (years)</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Index</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Health Indicator</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Wages Last Month ('000 USH)</td>
<td>2436.08</td>
<td>2964.57</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey of War Affected Youth, Phase I (SWAYI)

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 of Wald test for means difference between abductees and non-abductees

Anecdotal and qualitative evidence suggests that returning youth face an uphill battle socially as well. Returning abductees are reported to suffer from “stigmatization, mistrust and segregation against returnees” (GUSCO 2010, p.7). Thirty-nine percent of abductees report having troubles returning to the community; 68 percent of those that had been abducted for six months or more reported these problems (Pham, Vinck et al. 2009). Some note that while most receive a warm welcome home, returnees are not accepted by all members of the community and reports of harassment from other community members are common (Allen and Schomerus 2006; Amone-P’Olak 2007; Veale and Stavrou 2007; Corbin 2008). It is also unclear whether a warm welcome home relates to continued social acceptance in the medium or long term.

There have been a few attempts to quantify measures of social reintegration for returnees. A report by a local reintegration assistance organization conducted a non-scientific survey of previous returnees across five locally meaningful indicators of social reintegration- harmony, acceptability, care, no discrimination, and family support.28 Only two, acceptability and harmony, had greater than 50 percent prevalence among returnees that had passed through the center (GUSCO 2010). In a more representative survey of Ugandans in several northern districts, respondents were asked whether they would feel comfortable engaging in several activities with an ex-combatant. The results are displayed in Table 10. Though the data were collected most recently in 2010, several years after

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28 These indicators were designed by local organizers to reflect locally meaningful dimensions of reintegration and do not have direct Western equivalents.
the worst of the fighting subsided, this table shows that there are some scenarios in which less than two-thirds of respondents would feel comfortable with an ex-combatant.

Table 10: Comfort-level in Several Scenarios with Ex-combatants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Would you be comfortable _______ with an ex-combatant?”</th>
<th>% Responding “Yes”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in the Same Community</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living as Close Neighbors</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living as Household Members</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing Meals in Your Home</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with Them</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to the Same Market</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing a Drink (Alcohol) Together</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to the Same Church</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marrying a Family Member</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Children Attended the Same School</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pham, Vinck and Stover (2010)

Note: Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader are districts in northern Uganda where much of the war was fought and were highly impacted by LRA violence.

Note: Variables refer to actions that respondents could engage in with community members. E.g., the first row indicates the percent of respondents who answered yes to the question: “would you be comfortable living in the same community with an ex-combatant?”

Less intimate actions – such as going to church with an ex-combatant - tend to be more tolerable than more intimate ones – such as living in the same household with an ex-combatant. There is not, however, much variability across districts; northern Ugandans appear to feel somewhat uniformly about ex-combatants. Moreover, negative attitudes towards ex-combatants do not appear to have improved over time.

4. Reception Centers in Northern Uganda

In all, the available academic and anecdotal evidence indicates that youth formerly abducted into the LRA face some potentially serious challenges returning to their communities and adjusting to civilian life. Since 1995, local and international aid organizations have established reception centers to assist returnees with the transition from the bush to civilian life. Generally these centers receive youth returning from the bush and provide them with a number of services such as basic medical care, psycho-emotional “counseling,” family location and reunification services are common. Nearly all

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29 The counseling that takes place in these centers is generally performed by untrained center workers and takes place in one-on-one and group discussions with youth while they are in the center. The reader should not interpret the
provide some assortment of durable goods – mattresses, jerry cans, shoes, or bowls and cups, for example.

Between 1995 and 2006, the number of reception centers grew from one to roughly a dozen. Reception centers were established in a very ad hoc, ‘hand-to-mouth’ way, with almost no coordination among centers, by persons on the ground who wanted to help (Allen and Schomerus 2006, p. 43). The Ugandan government maintains that all returning youth pass through a reception center. It is also government policy that the Ugandan army transfer youth it encounters in the bush to a reception center. It is highly unlikely that all or almost all youth pass through reception centers. Numbers from the Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAYI), described in Section 5, suggest this number is closer to 40 percent. However, even at 40 percent the number of youth who have utilized reception centers is considerable. One of the largest reception centers, the Gulu Support the Children Organization (GUSCO), estimates that it has received 8,900 youth. The true number is impossible to know due to poor record keeping.

In a review of reception centers in the region, Allen and Schomerus (2006) note that that the length of time spent in a reception center is variable and depends on number of factors such as center capacity, time to locate the youth’s family, and personal determinations by center staff about the youth’s readiness to return to the community. Most youth stayed 2-6 weeks in a reception center and were given a resettlement package that varied in its contents by the center before resettling with their families whenever possible (Pham, Vinck et al. 2007).

What is the impact of these reception centers on the lives of the youth they serve? There are reasons to expect that reception centers affect economic and social reintegration of youth in a number of beneficial ways. Some centers provided skills training such as tailoring or bricklaying; some provided formal education classes. These programs might help returning youth recoup some of the human capital lost during abduction. Behaviorally, counselors at the center may be able to correct aggressive or antisocial behavior before youth return to society. Psychoemotionally, abducted youth might find solace or support among peers who have had similar experiences. They may make future contacts and economic plans, or get advice from center workers. They may simply benefit from better information on how to access relief or other aid services. Attending a reception center may also be a positive signal to the community that the individual desires to be reintegrated back into the community.

There are also reasons to suspect that reception centers have no impact. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the quality of training received was poor and that provision of training was inconstant (Allen and Schomerus 2006). Once youth have left the reception centers, there was some, albeit very little, follow-up and youth were essentially left to reintegrate themselves afterwards (Allen and Schomerus 2006). Noting the generally poor and uneven quality of services, Allen and Schomerus (2006) suggest that perhaps the best service reception centers actually provided was to act as a
‘liminal space’ where abductees can transition from their lives in the bush to their lives as civilians (p. 41).

It is even possible that reception centers have a negative impact if they reinforce aggressive or antisocial modes of behavior, or allow returnees a chance to practice and reinforce old lines of command leftover from their time in the bush in a more civilian setting, as has been suggested by some (Allen and Schomerus 2006). As well, in the same way that reception centers might act as a positive signaling mechanism, they might also act in a negative way. As an example, reception center attendance might enable others to distinguish LRA soldiers from other youth, prompting exclusionary or hostile behavior from community members. One way this could happen is if attending a reception center acts as an information signal about the types of people that attend them; i.e. if going to a reception center singles you out as a “bad” person. Another example might be if assistance from a reception center acts as a substitute for assistance from one’s community, causing the community to reduce the amount of support given to center attendees.

The activities of the reception centers were all intended to help returning youth transition from their lives in the bush into civilian lives. The overall benefit of these reception centers is not unequivocally established. Furthermore, there are reasons to suspect that centers may not be positively impacting those they serve. Thus, this paper seeks a quantitative answer to the question: what is the impact of reception center attendance on the social and economic outcomes of returning youth in northern Uganda?

5. Data: Survey of War Affected Youth, Phase I (SWAYI)
The data for the analysis that follows comes from the Survey of War Affected Youth, Phase I (SWAYI). SWAYI is a representative survey of war-affected male youth from two of northern Uganda’s most conflict-affected districts – Kitgum, and Pader. The SWAYI data includes information on both former soldiers and non-soldiers. Soldiers include primarily abductees but also some volunteers. It also enables us to distinguish between those that attended a reception center or not. This allows us to construct a comparison and control group from the same data collected at the same time.

Data was gathered by a team led by Christopher Blattman, Jeannie Annan, Kristopher Carlson, and Dyan Mazurana between 2005 and 2006 in eight sub-counties of the two districts. The 741 male youths in the SWAYI survey provided responses to questions relating to their war and abduction experiences, and current well-being and other current outcomes such as employment and earnings information. The dataset also contains information about respondents’ social and economic relationships and support of the respondents by people in their community. The data provide a unique opportunity to assess the effects of center attendance on outcomes that are not strictly economic. The sample includes 462 total abducted youth in this dataset who were found and interviewed in person. Some attended a reception center upon their return from abduction, some did not. I exclude from the sample those who were abducted but who were not found, since

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30 SWAYI contains data on male youth only. Females are included in Phase II of the SWAY effort (SWAYII).
outcomes depend heavily on recall of personal experiences by the abductees. Table 11 reports summary statistics for the sample of abducted combatant youth.31

Table 11 shows a few notable differences between reception center attendees and non-attendees. Attendees are slightly less than a year younger than non-attendees. They are also significantly more likely to be living in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, less likely to be employed or have positive earnings. Yet, they are no more likely to be enrolled in school.32 Notably, attendees have very different abduction experiences – their length of abduction is over three times that of non-attendees; surprisingly they experience, witness, or perpetrate only three more acts of violence on average. Also notable is the lack of significant differences in pre-abduction measures of socioeconomic status, such as mother’s and father’s level of education.

The SWAYI dataset has been used in previous studies to estimate the effects of abduction on education and earnings for abducted youth, showing that both are deleteriously affected by abduction and that capital accumulation also suffers (Blattman and Annan 2010). This dataset has also been used to show the impact of abduction on political participation and voting, showing that abduction increases both (Blattman 2009). These two analyses exploit the randomness of abduction to illustrate the effects of soldiering on economic and political outcomes. The analysis presented in this paper represents the first use of this data to investigate the effects of programs intended to mitigate the harmful effects of soldiering on economic as well as previously unstudied social outcomes.

6. Explanation of Variables
This analysis includes social outcomes as primary outcomes of interest including both economic and non-economic support from people in the community. Estimating social impacts is important for assessing reintegration assistance because reintegration includes social as well as economic processes. And while some of the reception centers in northern Uganda offered skills training and education to some of their wards, economic skills training and education was not their primary mandate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11: Sample Summary Statistics, SWAYI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 For more detailed resources describing the dataset and data collection effort, see Blattman’s website at: http://chrisblattman.com/data/sway/ (accessed December 26, 2012). The dataset is also available for download here.

32 In 1995, the LRA scaled up abduction of youth in the northern districts, prompting the Ugandan government to move large numbers of the population to internal displacement (IDP) camps in 1996, 1998 and 2002. By 2006, an estimated 90% of the population of Kitgum, Pader and Gulu lived in IDP camps. Most abductees returned to these IDP camps with “squalid” conditions, where kinship ties and social cohesion were under “enormous stress” (Allen and Schomerus 2006, p. 5).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dev.</th>
<th>Dev.</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>22.17</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In IDP Camp (0/1)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in Last Month (0/1)</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnings &gt; 0 in Last Month (0/1)</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Land (0/1)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently in School (0/1)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Health [0, 1]</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury from LRA (0/1)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction Length (months)</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>10.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of First Abduction</td>
<td>1998.89</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>1899.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence Experienced (of 26 acts)</td>
<td>10.31</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>13.18 4.13 4 24 2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostility Index Score</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Index Score</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother's Education (years)</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Education (years)</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in a Town (1/0)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SWAYI
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 of Wald test for means difference between attendees and non-attendees
Note: Higher values of the Index of Health are associated with poorer health.
Note: Violence Experienced refers to the sum of 25 possible violent acts. These 25 acts include: eight acts perpetrated, six acts received, six witnessed, and five against family members (not perpetrated by the respondent).

Moreover, in extremely poor areas where economic opportunity is limited, it is plausible that social connectedness and community support become relatively more important to individuals sense of well-being and happiness; to be poor is one thing, to be poor and alone is another. It is thus important to consider the social impacts of abduction and reception on former abductees as much as its economic consequences. The SWAYI dataset provides rich information about individuals’ social behavior, interactions and inclusion, allowing me to include social outcomes which have been previously overlooked in reintegration assessment studies.

Economic outcomes are also included in this analysis. Blattman (2009) finds that abduction, especially long-term abduction, has negative impacts on education and earnings. Do reception centers ameliorate these negative effects? Abducted youth may make contacts, build up social capital with other fighters, or be able to access information about jobs and other opportunities in reception centers. As well, if reception centers act as a signal that a person wants to be reintegrated, they may
have an easier time finding employment than abductees who do not access the centers. Conversely, if reception centers reinforce bad behavior, or act as a signal that attendees are “bad guys”, this may have negative impacts on employment and earnings. Outcome and control variables used in the analysis are described and explained in Section 6.

6.1 Outcome Variables

6.1.1 Social Outcomes

Prosocial$_i$ is the decile of a prosocial behavior index generated by exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using nine question about prosocial or positive behavior from the SWAYI dataset. Response values range from 0-3. Centers may encourage or discourage prosocial behavior or norms, which can subsequently affect social and economic reintegration. Exemplar questions are “are you helpful to others” or “Do you like your peers”? The index is broken down into deciles for easier interpretation.

MaterialSupport\_Strict$_i$ is a dummy indicator for whether someone in the community has either given or loaned money or some kind of physical good, such as a bike or household item to the respondent. Strict material support involves an actual transfer of capital from the community to the returnee. This is intended to be a “hard and fast” indicator for how willing community members are to provide tangible material goods to respondents.

MaterialSupport\_Gen$_i$ is the decile of a material support index generated by EFA using responses to seven questions about kinds of tangible, material support received by the returnees. General material support includes tangible items that are included in MaterialSupport\_Strict$_i$, above, along with five other indicators of material support. Responses to questions range in value from 0-2. These include less tangible support that could represent real tangible benefits, such as providing information about opportunities, or taking someone along with them to do work. In this sense, it is more general that material support.

PsychSupport$_i$ is the decile of a psychoemotional support index generated by EFA using seven questions about non-pecuniary and emotional support given to returnee. Response values of these questions range from 0-2. This measure is intended to capture non-material psychological and emotional support by community members. This includes things like a person telling an abducted person to take heart, or spending time with them when they are upset. While this kind of support might not have immediate economic payoffs, emotional closeness to and support from the community can impact sense of well-being. This is the least demanding form of social inclusion, as it requires no actual transfer of physical resources or capital to the returnee.

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33 The index and decile-of-index outcomes are generated using explanatory factor analysis (EFA). Results posted in the text are based on maximum-likelihood Bartlett factor scores. To test for robustness of results, I also ran the analysis on Bartlett principal factors scores and on an unweighted summation of the responses to the nine behavior questions.

34 While psychoemotional support does not necessarily indicate economic payoffs, there is a 0.2564 correlation between psychoemotional support and material support, suggesting a link between social and economic integration.
6.1.2 Economic Outcomes

$\ln(\text{earnings})_i$ equals the natural log of average daily wages over the four weeks prior to interview. Blattman and Annan (2010) have shown that abduction reduces earnings via lost schooling and capital accumulation. Using log earnings as an outcome of interest will assess the impact of reception center attendance on earnings.

$Wages > 0$ indicates whether an individual’s earnings are non-zero. Thirty-eight percent of youth overall (283/741) and 36 percent of abducted youth (169/462) surveyed reported having no earnings at all, which means a regression against log earnings drops them out of the analysis. Using positive earnings as an indicator includes those who are excluded from a regression on the log of average daily wages.

$\text{Unoccupied}_i$ indicates whether or not an individual is neither working nor attending school. Wages are likely to be lower for those attending school, so only using earnings as an indicator could lead us to invalid conclusions about the impact of reception centers on earnings.

$\text{School}_i$ indicates whether or not an individual returned to school after returning. Blattman and Annan (2010) have shown that abduction reduces schooling accumulation. If reception centers are effective at returning youth to school, this might improve their outcomes. If this is the case, regressions on earnings will not reflect positive impacts of reception centers.

6.2 Control Variables

$\text{Reception}_i$ is the treatment variable, a dummy for whether or not individual $i$ passes through a reception center after leaving the bush.

$(\text{Return > 1yr})_i$ indicates whether or not individual $i$ returned from fighting greater than one year ago at the time of the interview. Because reintegration is a process, returnees who have spent more time back will have had longer to rebuild relationships, make new connections, and carve out places for themselves in their communities. We should expect longer time back to be associated with more positive outcomes.

$\text{ABDlength}_i$ is equal to the total months abducted. Longer abductions cause returnees to have greater amounts of lost schooling and capital accumulation (Blattman and Annan 2010), and longer abductions also provide more opportunities for returnees to have internalized the norms and behaviors of the LRA, which may make it more difficult for them to reintegrate into their communities (Corbin 2008). We therefore expect longer abductions to depress outcomes.

$\text{Violence}_i$ is an unweighted, additive index of 25 possible violent acts witnessed, inflicted on or by the respondent, or inflicted on their families. Cumulative levels of trauma are positively associated with meeting criteria for PTSD and depression, which is negatively associated with ability to reintegrate (Pham, Vinck et al. 2009).

$\text{UPDF}_i$ indicates whether or not individual $i$ encountered the Ugandan army – the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) – after leaving fighting. UPDF are supposed to hand abductees
off to reception centers for processing, so passing through them significantly alters one’s chances of going through a reception center. As well, people passing through UPDF might be more or less likely to receive certain kinds of services, such as health care or information, that abductees who do not pass through UPDF, even conditional on center attendance. The impact of passing through UPDF forces on reintegration outcomes is uncertain.

$Ceremony_l$ indicates whether or not a cleansing ceremony was performed for individual $l$ upon return to the community. Some researchers have noted the importance of cleansing ceremonies for abductees returning to their communities (Allen and Schomerus 2006; Corbin 2008; Pham, Vinck et al. 2009; Blattman and Annan 2010). Personal sources have also noted that cleansing ceremonies are supposed to act as a “reset” button when societal norms have been violated and provide a mechanism by which the norms violators can continue to interact with the community as opposed to permanent exclusion (interview with Rev. Phil Proctor, 2012). It is expected that having a ceremony promotes positive reintegration outcomes.

$IDP_l$ indicates whether or not individual $l$ was in an IDP camp when interviewed. IDP camps disrupt social networks and strain community structures (Allen and Schomerus 2006; Corbin 2008). Living in an IDP camp may adversely affect measures of social support as well as opportunities for employment and education.

$Orphan_l$ indicates individual $l$’s orphan status. Immediate family members are the main supportive unit in northern Ugandan society (Allen and Schomerus 2006; Amone-P’Olak 2007). Not having parents can expose youth to economic risks or social marginalization and should be negatively related to reintegration progress.

$Dry_l$ is a dummy to control for seasonal effects on economic outcomes.

$Aid_l$ measures the percent growth in multilateral aid flows to Uganda since the year of individual $l$’s return until the year of interview (2005). Aid programs can have impacts on education, schooling, and employment, as well as social structures that bind communities. Data are from OECD (Harbom, Högbldadh et al. 2011). Positive aid flows may also be positively correlated with the availability of reception centers. This indicator controls potential upward bias in $Reception_l$. We expect aid flows to promote positive reintegration outcomes.

7. Methodology: Instrumental Variables

This study uses an instrumental variables (IV) approach to estimate the impacts of reception center attendance on abductees’ outcomes. The IV approach uses a time-variant instrument, the number of reception centers available in the year of an individual’s return, to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of reception center attendance. Later I use a propensity score weighting approach which uses weights to balance the observations between the two groups, attendee and non-attendee as a robustness check to the IV results.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, given in Table 12, show a negative impact on wages, and a positive impact on returning to school. No other relationships between outcome variables and reception centers are statistically significant. Without confounding by unobservables, the following OLS regression would yield causal estimates of the impact of reception centers, conditional on observable variables:

\[ Y_i = \alpha_1 \text{Reception}_i + \alpha_2 (\text{Return} > 1\text{yr})_i + \alpha_3 \text{AbDlength}_i + \alpha_4 \text{Violence}_i + \alpha_5 \text{UPDF}_i + \alpha_6 \text{Ceremony}_i + \alpha_7 \text{IDP}_i + \alpha_8 \text{Orphan}_i + \alpha_9 \text{Dry}_i + \alpha_{10} \text{Aid}_i + \varepsilon_i, \]

where

- \( Y_i \) is the outcome of interest for individual \( i \), described in Section 6,
- the right-hand side controls are as described in Section 6, and
- \( \varepsilon_i \) is the usual error term to capture individual unobservable characteristics.

If \( Y_i \) is unconfounded by \( \varepsilon_i \), a simple OLS estimation would yield causal estimates of the impact of reception centers on reintegration outcomes of interest. We should assume that this is not the case, especially given the statistically significant differences along key variables between reception center attendees and non-attendees. Individuals choose to attend reception centers or not, and that choice is related to other factors, such as abduction length, violence, and location, which also affect an individual's social and economic outcomes.\(^{35}\) Reception centers could be attracting “high performing” returnees who have access to centers as well as other forms of support through networks, or “low performing” returnees with the worst experience and lowest probability of good outcomes, regardless of treatment status. If the OLS results are biased - which we believe they are - these results could have been achieved in the case where reception centers are helping “low performing” returnees, in which case the bias is negative, or hurting “high performing” returnees, in

\(^{35}\) Logit regression using robust standard errors. Non-statistically significant items are removed for presentation.
Table 12: OLS Estimates of Reception Center Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prosocial</th>
<th>Material Support_Strict</th>
<th>Material Support_Gen</th>
<th>Psych Support</th>
<th>Ln(earnings)</th>
<th>Wages&gt;0</th>
<th>Unoccupied</th>
<th>School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reception</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>-0.277</td>
<td>-0.348</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(2.70)**</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(2.50)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ret &gt; 1yr</td>
<td>-1.270</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>-0.302</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.37)**</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABD length</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(3.56)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(4.19)**</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td>(1.53)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(2.32)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0.867</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(3.03)**</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremony</td>
<td>0.877</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>1.152</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.35)**</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td>(3.38)**</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(2.48)**</td>
<td>(3.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>-0.222</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.74)*</td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.417</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(1.71)*</td>
<td>(1.97)*</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-0.871</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>-0.544</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.42)**</td>
<td>(1.43)</td>
<td>(2.12)**</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
<td>(2.67)**</td>
<td>(5.82)**</td>
<td>(2.33)**</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>-0.373</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosocial</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(2.11)**</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(1.88)*</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(2.64)**</td>
<td>(3.24)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.083</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>5.716</td>
<td>4.604</td>
<td>7.445</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.79)**</td>
<td>(5.21)**</td>
<td>(5.83)**</td>
<td>(5.10)**</td>
<td>(23.46)**</td>
<td>(4.58)**</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(4.89)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
which case the bias is positive. Because reception center attendance is not randomly assigned, an OLS regression model will yield biased estimates due to the self-selection of individuals into the treatment condition. We therefore need a different identification strategy to compute credible causal estimates of impact.

The IV estimation allows for causal identification of reception centers’ impacts. The IV strategy in this analysis uses the disconnect between reception center availability and reception center demand across time, using the number of reception centers available in a given year to instrument for an individual’s decision to attend a reception center. The IV estimation strategy produces a local average treatment effect (LATE) that describes the treatment effect on those whose decision to be treated is altered by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist 1994).

Prior to 2003, there were a handful of reception centers available in northern Uganda. Several more were established in 2003, following escalations of violence in 2002. The number of reception centers available remained relatively steady after 2003, with one or two established in 2004-2005. The need for reception centers climbed through the late 1990’s through the early 2000s, reached its peak in 2003, then dwindled in later years. As a result, the capacity of reception centers differs from year to year; individuals returning in a year that had many returnees had a diminished ability to access services, regardless of their own proclivity for seeking out those services. As well, as the number of centers has grown, reception centers must compete with one another for returnees, since their aid funding is tied to the number of persons served. As the need for services dropped in 2004 and 2005, the likelihood of going is still high, due in part to the competition among centers for returnees to process.36 This incongruity provides a suitable supply-side instrumental variable for calculating a local average treatment effect of reception centers on economic and social outcomes.

7.1 “Shifting” Condition
For an IV approach to be credible, two conditions must be met – the first is the shifting condition and requires that the number of reception centers available in the year of an individual’s return changes the probability that an individual goes to a reception center. This condition is easy to test. The results of a simple probit regression, displayed in Table 13, show that the number of reception centers available in the year of an abductee’s return is a highly significant and relatively large determinant of whether an individual attends a reception center, using the following estimation:

\[
Reception_i = \beta_1 \text{Available}_i + \beta_2 \text{UPDF}_i + \beta_3 ABDlength_i + \beta_4 Violence_i + \beta_5 ReturnAge_i + \\
\beta_6 Location_i + \gamma_i ,
\]

where:

36 This claim is somewhat contended, but is supported both by conversations with people who have lived in northern Uganda and had contact with the centers during this time period, as well as the evidence that reception centers cannot be systematically linked to abductees by location, as they are supposed to be. The reception centers themselves note that there is little or no contact or coordination among centers, even those co-located in the same town.
• $Available_i$ is the total number of operational reception centers in the year of the abductee’s return,
• $Reception_i$ indicates whether or not individual $i$ received treatment, i.e. attended a reception center,
• $ReturnAge_i$ is the fighter’s age after leaving the LRA,
• $Location_i$ is a vector of six dummies indicating the returnee’s home area, and
• $\gamma_i$ is an individual-specific error term.

The number of reception centers available in the year of return is second only to passing through the Ugandan army’s (UPDF) forces in changing the probability that an individual attends a reception center. Passing through UPDF forces is not itself appropriate as an instrument because it is not plausibly random. UPDF is more likely to encounter soldiers and those who escape during battles than youth serving as cooks, porters, or other functions within the LRA or who escape at other times.

7.2 Exclusion Restriction

The second condition for the IV is the exclusion restriction, which requires that the number of reception centers available in year of return does not affect individual’s outcomes except via its effect on reception center attendance; there must be no confounders. This means first and foremost that there be no correlation between the instrument and the predicted residuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Reception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Available</td>
<td>0.108***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>1.115***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABD length</td>
<td>0.0237***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00564)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0.0446***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at return</td>
<td>-0.0329**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: Pajule</td>
<td>0.708*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.392)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.082***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2$ Statistic</td>
<td>144.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors are used to relax homoskedasticity assumption.
Note: Abbreviated table with only statistically significant results is shown here for presentation.
One of the easiest tests that will discredit an instrument is to regress the IV on the outcome and test whether there is a correlation between the error term and the IV. Table 14 provides the correlation coefficients between the fitted residuals and the instrument and shows that the instrument, \( Reception_i \), passes this test.\(^{37}\) A lack of correlation is necessary but insufficient to satisfy the exclusion restriction. There are a number of plausible ways that center availability can affect outcomes beyond the effect of the individual treatment, even if the correlation is zero. The instrument must also be plausibly exogenous to the outcomes. Since the instrument is time-variant, time cannot be associated with an individual’s personal ability or propensity to benefit from center attendance. I.e., the LRA must be abducting the same “type” of person across time.

### Table 14: Zero Correlation between Residuals and Instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome ( (Y_i) )</th>
<th>Correlation between ( v_i ) and ( Reception_i )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prosocial behavior</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/0 material support</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material support index</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychoemotional support</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of average monthly earnings</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/0 indicator for earnings &gt;0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/0 indicator for no occupation</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/0 for return to school</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations using SWAYI

This not would be the case, for instance, if the LRA changed recruiting tactics or adopted different screening measures for abductees at different points. Blattman (2009) shows that abduction has been almost entirely random, determined primarily by age in a given location-year, indicating that LRA screening was constant across time and that LRA abduction was primarily dependent on the needs of the group, unassociated with an individual’s characteristics.

To be valid, reception centers may not affect larger community context or processes which might affect outcomes for returnees. Allen and Schomerus (2006) note that reception centers were established in a very “hand-to-mouth” way, with little contact with the outside community (p. 40). Even simple follow-up with former attendees by center staff was very limited. Only 13 percent of Allen and Schomerus’ sample received any follow-up contact at all from center staff, and the vast majority received only one. Reception centers also do not provide other kinds of community

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\(^{37}\) The estimation for this test is: \( Y_i = \text{Available}_i + v_i \).
organization or development beyond their function as a clearinghouse for abductees. As such, they do not impact economic or social outcomes in the larger community.

Of concern is the possibility that the increase in reception centers may have occurred simultaneously with increases in other forms of aid - schools, health centers, or job training programs for example – that could have an impact on outcomes. Here, the number of reception centers available is not associated with greater changes in the community that may affect outcomes, such as an increase in general aid. As noted, reception centers themselves are not vehicles for distributing or administering other aid. Other aid organizations and funding have been largely absent from northern Uganda during the conflict due to access and security concerns. CNN noted in 2004 that there was not previously any opportunity for aid organizations to function in the northern region because of the poor security conditions; the World Food Program (WFP) was the only UN agency that had consistent access to the most conflict-affected parts of northern Uganda throughout the course of the violence (CNN 2004). For the same reason, IDP camps only began to release people to return to their villages in late 2007 (Russo 2007). Still, this potential confounder can be controlled for by adding as a covariate the percentage of growth in foreign aid flows from an abductee’s year of return to the present.

7.3 Time Variability
The instrument is time variant. In addition to the basic criteria above, there must also be variation in the ability of reception centers to meet the demand for their services. The demand for reception centers, as indicated by the slow rate of returning abductees, has varied over the course of this conflict. The number of abductions was relatively low in the earlier years of the war. The LRA scaled up abduction in 1995. Peak years for returning abductees were 2002 and 2003 (see Table 15). On the other side, the supply of reception centers available to receive returning youth has not been constant over time and also has not mapped cleanly onto the need for reception centers. The number of reception centers available has ranged between zero and twelve over the course of the conflict; the first was established in 1995. In 2002, even though there were an estimated 4,000 returning youth, there were six reception centers operating. In 2001, with one quarter fewer returning youth, there were five centers. In 2003, with 37.5 percent more returning youth than 2002, there were twice as many reception centers. Through 2004 and 2005, the number of reception centers remained nearly constant, while the number of returning youth decreased considerably. The large increase from six

38 Though there are more than this number of organizations that offer services to returning youth, these are usually in addition to other programs and missions and reintegration assistance is not a primary objective of the organization. I restrict the analysis in this paper to reception centers established specifically intended to receive youth and aid their transition to civilian life.
to eleven reception centers in 2003 is due partly to increased awareness of the conflict in Uganda.\textsuperscript{39} Table 15 shows approximate abduction and reception center trends since 2001.\textsuperscript{40}

The supply of reception centers does not scale with the need for reception centers for several reasons. First, center demand and supply are unlikely to align with each other because information about the number of returnees is unreliable, like much information in conflict-affected environments. Poor record keeping on the part of government and reception centers produces wide ranging estimates of the total number of abducted youth without any ability to guess the true number with any precision ex post. This task is even more difficult ex ante, since reception centers do not communicate with one another and have limited involvement with the broader community except to provide reception services, and physical security concerns restrict the movement of persons and information.

**Table 15: Abduction and Reception Center Trends**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Est. Abductions (nearest 500)</td>
<td>&lt;1,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Reception Centers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees/Reception Center (est.)</td>
<td>&lt;200</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pham, Vinck and Stover (2007)

Even if information were reliable and need could be accurately measured, reception centers have a relatively long time horizon that is not shared by the flow of returning youth. Once a need is recognized for a reception center, there is a lag time before a center can be operational. Reception centers take time to plan and organize and have significant start-up costs. Reception centers require time and coordination to secure funding, hire staff, and acquire accommodation and other materials. The time lag between when a need is perceived and a reception center can be set up necessitates that certain abductees go without access. By the time this occurs, the need may be either greater or smaller, and the individuals who need assistance may not be the same. Demand is influenced by lagged intensity of fighting on the part of the LRA, and not with endogenous characteristics of those accessing the centers. The flow of returnees can change rapidly depending on the season, intensity of battle, or troop movements. Because also have relatively fixed sizes and locations once operational, current supply is relatively constant despite short-term fluctuations in the flow of returnees. For example, the largest increase in reception center availability occurred between 2002 and 2003 as a result of the increased international attention to the need for reception centers in


\textsuperscript{40} These numbers are from Pham, Vinck et al (2007)’s estimation based on reception center data. As above, the data are non-random and cannot be assumed to be the true number of abductions.
2002. The number of reception centers remained near 11 after 2003 despite lower levels of returnees through 2005. Prior to 2002, the number of centers grew slightly faster than abductees were returning (see Table 15).

8. Results

8.1 IV Results

Tables 16 and 17 display results from a maximum likelihood two-stage IV regression using robust standard errors on the outcome variables described above. For all regressions I use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to avoid dependence on an assumption of a linear relationship between the parameters and the regressors. Robust standard errors are used throughout this analysis to relax the assumption of homoskedastic residual variance across individuals. Though this makes finding statistical significance less likely, the classic homoskedasticity assumption may not hold given wide variation among individual preferences and situations.

I first use the two-stage estimation to evaluate the impacts of center attendance on prosocial behavior. It is possible that reception center attendance affects the other reintegration outcomes by promoting “good” behavior on the part of returnees that helps them assimilate more readily into their communities and affects other reintegration outcomes. Prosocial behavior is therefore a control of interest for the other outcomes as well as an outcome of interest in its own right. Table 16 describes the results for prosocial behavior. Table 17 presents results for all other outcomes and includes prosocial behavior as a regressor.

The OLS estimates above suggest a null effect of reception centers on outcomes. The IV results indicate that reception center attendance decreases prosocial behavior by 0.69 standard deviations, but is weakly significant. Reception centers have been thought of as “liminal spaces” where returnees are offered counseling and psychological support to help returning youth readjust to civilian life. If this counseling is intended to have behavioral impacts, there do not appear to be any favorable ones. Anecdotaly, the quality of the counseling offered is quite low and provided by untrained individuals; the counseling or other behavioral interventions by therefore be ineffective.41 It is possible that by placing former soldiers together, reception centers reinforce norms of behavior that youth learned during their time with the LRA – adopting familiar command structures and practicing norms of conflict. The reduction in measured prosocial activity could be directly causal - spent at a reception center reduces prosocial activity, perhaps via the mechanism above. Or, or a time confounder, such as ostracism by the community, occurs with reception center attendance that causes a decrease in prosocial activity.

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41 It is worth noting that prosocial behavior above does not include measures of antisocial behavior – such as quarrelling, lying, or stealing – and it is possible that reception centers do reduce this kind of behavior. While there are questions in the SWAY survey relating to antisocial behavior, these items did not exhibit statistical qualities that made them suitable for generating an index or score, and I was unable to select a single item that could plausibly stand in as a proxy for antisocial behavior. As a result, the effects of reception centers on antisocial behavior are not covered in this analysis.
The significance of having a cleansing ceremony seems to indicate that it, in large part, is a more effective community integration mechanism that affects prosocial behavior.\textsuperscript{42} This analysis cannot definitely identify which of these possibilities is correct, or whether it is some combination. As well, the effect of an IDP camp is moderate but strongly significant. There is no literature suggesting an explanation for this finding.

Table 17 presents the IV regression results where prosocial behavior is used as a right-hand-side variable. The regressions displayed in columns (2) and (3) capture the effect of center attendance on physical or material support to returnees by the community. \textit{MaterialSupport\_Strict} (column 2) is the simplest and most straightforward indicator of support – whether an individual received money or physical goods, either as a loan or direct transfer from someone in the community. The results for \textit{MaterialSupport\_Strict} are large both absolutely and relative to other regressors.

\textbf{Table 16: Reception Center Impacts on Prosocial Behavior}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>\textit{Prosocial} \textsubscript{i}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV: Reception Centers</td>
<td>-1.874*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned 1+ year</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.552)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass Through UPDF</td>
<td>0.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.452)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremony</td>
<td>1.143***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction Length</td>
<td>0.000885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00818)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Violence</td>
<td>0.0146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP Camp</td>
<td>0.977***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Growth</td>
<td>-0.803*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.205***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.829)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Stage F-stat</td>
<td>3.090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
\ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

\textsuperscript{42} Despite anecdotes to the contrary, going to a reception center and having a cleansing ceremony are not related to one another (corr = 0.034).
Reception center attendance reduces the likelihood of receiving a loan or transfer by around 58 percent. Given a constant of 0.55, this implies that an attendee’s chances of receiving a loan or transfer from someone in the community are very low, while the chances for an average person are around 1:2. Additionally, the estimate for MaterialSupport_Gen in column (3) denotes that center attendees are almost four centiles below their non-attendee counterparts in terms of material support, equal to about 1.3 standard deviations. PsychSupport (4) also suffers heavily from reception center attendance. Reception center attendance causes a greater than 1.8 decile decrease in psychoemotional support. This is surprising, given that psychoemotional support requires no actual transfer of resources, yet can have positive impacts on returnees’ sense of well-being. It is possible that community members also make assumptions about the mental health of returnees who have gone through a center and received counseling and turn their attention to others—we cannot say using this data.

There is a rather large negative effect of center attendance on earnings and employment; the effect on earnings does not appear significant, but the effect on whether earnings are non-zero is large and highly significant. The coefficient in (8) on returning to school suggests that it is possible that reception centers could be depressing earnings and employment in columns (5) and (6) because attendees return to school and are therefore less likely to be employed. However, while attendees are slightly more likely to be currently in school than non-attendees - 41.3 percent of attendees versus 37.2 percent of non-attendees reported being currently in school – this difference was not found to be statistically significant using a Fischer’s exact test. Therefore, current earnings and employment, shown in columns (5) and (6), should not be greatly affected by the decision to return to school in column (8), except to raise earnings when returnees finally do leave school and go to work. Center attendance does not significantly reduce occupation in general, even if it does reduce earnings. It also, interestingly, increases the likelihood that an individual returns to school after abduction. Notably, education levels, adjusted for age, are not statistically different between attendees and non-attendees, suggesting that even though attendees may return to school, they do not remain in school after their return.

Being returned for a year or more has a significant impact on psychoemotional support that outweighs the negative effects of attending a reception center and has moderate but not significant positive effects on material support. Time spent back may allow returnees to demonstrate “good” behavior and signal to other community members that they are “good” people. It could also be that returnees regenerate old contacts or build new connections. Somewhat surprisingly, time back is only significant for psychoemotional support, although the estimates are positive for the two material support indicators as well in (2) and (3). The effect of being back for a year or more almost outweighs the negative impact of reception center attendance on the psychoemotional support measure; the compensatory effect is considerably small and non-significant for the two measures of material support. Time back also has small and insignificant impacts on the direct
Table 17: IV Impact Estimates, All Other Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV: Reception Center (1/0)</td>
<td>-0.581**</td>
<td>-3.769***</td>
<td>-1.859*</td>
<td>-1.269</td>
<td>-0.528***</td>
<td>0.0964</td>
<td>0.390*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(1.450)</td>
<td>(1.079)</td>
<td>(0.813)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned 1+ years (1/0)</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>1.767***</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>-0.00815</td>
<td>-0.00451</td>
<td>0.0851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.679)</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.0791)</td>
<td>(0.0995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosocial behavior (centile)</td>
<td>0.0139</td>
<td>0.161**</td>
<td>0.292***</td>
<td>0.0550</td>
<td>-0.000145</td>
<td>-0.00197</td>
<td>0.00282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0111)</td>
<td>(0.0700)</td>
<td>(0.0554)</td>
<td>(0.0379)</td>
<td>(0.00992)</td>
<td>(0.00663)</td>
<td>(0.0107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF (1/0)</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>1.291**</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>-0.00810</td>
<td>-0.152*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.572)</td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>(0.0907)</td>
<td>(0.0580)</td>
<td>(0.0892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremony (1/0)</td>
<td>0.0405</td>
<td>0.810**</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>-0.122</td>
<td>0.00102</td>
<td>-0.0597*</td>
<td>0.119**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0629)</td>
<td>(0.374)</td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.0558)</td>
<td>(0.0356)</td>
<td>(0.0568)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (yrs)</td>
<td>0.00196</td>
<td>0.0249**</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>0.01322</td>
<td>0.000544</td>
<td>0.000455</td>
<td>-0.00522***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00175)</td>
<td>(0.0107)</td>
<td>(0.00870)</td>
<td>(0.00649)</td>
<td>(0.00184)</td>
<td>(0.00143)</td>
<td>(0.00171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction length (mos)</td>
<td>0.00675</td>
<td>0.0980**</td>
<td>0.183***</td>
<td>0.00989</td>
<td>0.0170***</td>
<td>0.00438</td>
<td>-0.00792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00735)</td>
<td>(0.0430)</td>
<td>(0.0363)</td>
<td>(0.0256)</td>
<td>(0.00643)</td>
<td>(0.00449)</td>
<td>(0.00666)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence (of 25)</td>
<td>-0.0211</td>
<td>-0.0897</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.00283</td>
<td>0.0492</td>
<td>0.0561</td>
<td>-0.129**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0692)</td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.0605)</td>
<td>(0.0416)</td>
<td>(0.0593)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP camp (1/0)</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>-0.885*</td>
<td>-0.616*</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
<td>0.0203</td>
<td>-0.0712</td>
<td>0.0785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0775)</td>
<td>(0.480)</td>
<td>(0.366)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>(0.0632)</td>
<td>(0.0456)</td>
<td>(0.0690)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry (1/0)</td>
<td>-0.159*</td>
<td>-0.512</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>-0.256</td>
<td>0.0265</td>
<td>0.0332</td>
<td>-0.00389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0936)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.0826)</td>
<td>(0.0591)</td>
<td>(0.0888)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan (1/0)</td>
<td>-0.159*</td>
<td>-0.512</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>-0.256</td>
<td>0.0265</td>
<td>0.0332</td>
<td>-0.00389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0936)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.0826)</td>
<td>(0.0591)</td>
<td>(0.0888)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Growth (year-over-year)</td>
<td>-0.159*</td>
<td>-0.512</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>-0.256</td>
<td>0.0265</td>
<td>0.0332</td>
<td>-0.00389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0936)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.0826)</td>
<td>(0.0591)</td>
<td>(0.0888)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.551***</td>
<td>3.806***</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>7.166***</td>
<td>0.483***</td>
<td>0.0516</td>
<td>0.515***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(1.095)</td>
<td>(0.831)</td>
<td>(0.549)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td>1.379</td>
<td>2.460</td>
<td>8.105</td>
<td>1.963</td>
<td>6.454</td>
<td>2.210</td>
<td>2.706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses.
economic outcomes of employment and earnings, which may be attributable to the general economic environment and lack of wage jobs in general in this area.

Surprisingly, passing through UPDF forces improves social outcomes, despite anecdotal evidence of deep mistrust between northerners and the Ugandan Army. This could possibly be due to a sympathy effect, wherein community members believe that individuals who pass through UPDF forces have been mistreated and are in need of greater help. It could also be that UPDF forces themselves are the direct source of this additional support. This analysis cannot adjudicate between these two possibilities or any other.

As expected, having a cleansing ceremony improves all three measures of social integration – (2), (3), and (4). However, this effect is only significant for the General Material Support measure in (2). The other two effects are intriguing but insignificant in this analysis. Cleansing ceremonies supposedly act as a vehicle by which returnees can reenter their communities, contrite and cleansed of past wrongdoings. The effect of a ceremony on direct economic outcomes – employment and earnings – is small and insignificant. This disconnect between the estimated impact of a cleansing ceremony and its recognized importance in the literature as a reintegration tool might suggest several things. An obvious explanation is that the economy in this region is so depressed that social integration does not necessarily lead to direct employment benefits – if there are no jobs, social connections are not likely to help find one. Another explanation might be that there is not one, but several, forms of exclusion that can occur against returnees in general and abductees specifically. While social reintegration may be possible by allowing fighters to participate in community goings-on, employment and jobs may be off limits to them or reserved for non-fighters, regardless of their having a ceremony. The prevalence of unoccupied individuals for non-abductees in the sample is just over 40 percent, suggesting the former explanation -that there are not enough wage jobs to go around. Some have suggested that a cleansing ceremony is necessary in order to be able to have any contact with the community at all, but is not a guarantee of real integration (interview with Rev. Phil Proctor, 2012).

The signs on education are all in the expected direction, although their magnitudes are small. This is likely to do with the poor economic environment that exists in the region. Being interviewed in the dry season moderately and positively increases earnings and employment, as people move from agriculture into wage labor. Very surprisingly, abduction length and levels of violence are both positively related to social outcomes. However, these effects are near-zero and only significant for Strict Material Support. This result, however, refutes the idea that those who have been away for longer periods or who have experienced or committed more violence necessarily face greater reintegration challenges. Unexpectedly, being in an IDP camp has no significance in any of the regressions except (8). This was unexpected, as some qualitative accounts have noted that IDP camps are responsible for the alteration of social relationships (Allen and Schomerus 2006). Seasonal effects are at work and in the expected direction.

Orphan status operates in the expected direction across all specifications except (8), and is significant for indicators of broad material support and psychological support in columns (3) and (4).
The effects of orphan status in these two regressions are moderate relative to other regressors. The percentage growth in aid funding is conspicuously insignificant across all specifications except (4), and is significant at the 10 percent level here. Surprisingly, here the growth in foreign aid decreases one’s chances of receiving a loan or transfer. As well, the effects of growth in foreign aid are negative for prosocial behavior in Error! Reference source not found. Table 16. Possible explanations for this effect include a crowding out effect, whereby aid growth concomitantly reduces community support. This analysis cannot determine for certain, and this would be worthwhile to investigate further in the future.

8.2 Robustness Check: Alternative Specifications
To ascertain the robustness of the results to the specification of the outcome variables, I constructed and ran regressions on three specifications for the indexed outcomes – prosocial behavior, general material support, and psychoemotional support - a simple unweighted additive index of behaviors, an index generated by EFA, and the decile of the that index. Results vary with the outcome measure used, unsurprisingly, but they are broadly consistent with the results displayed below, with negative impacts on measures of social support. Only the results for the decile measures are displayed below. This measure is the easiest to interpret because its values represent relative, rather than ordinal, outcomes across these dimensions.

8.3 Robustness Check: Propensity Score Weighting
The validity of IV results relies on the mechanism of assignment, or the instrument. A successful IV must satisfy the two criteria discussed in Section 7, which requires the researcher to make assumptions about the assignment process and the exogeneity of the instrument. As a check on the robustness of the results from the IV analysis above, I add a balancing score analysis using the propensity score as a check on the robustness of the IV results. The advantage of the propensity score method is that it can reduce bias without requiring the researcher to make assumptions about the exogeneity of the treatment assignment.

Propensity score analyses are a type of balancing score analysis. Balancing score analyses, first developed by Rubin (1974) and Rosenbaum (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), are essentially weighted regressions wherein a balancing score of some kind is created and then used to weight the regression of interest in order to balance treated and non-treated groups to achieve causal estimates. Propensity scores specifically reflect an individual’s likelihood of receiving treatment, their propensity. In short, individuals who in both treatment and control groups that are more like each other in terms of pre-treatment variables, that is they have similar propensity scores, are weighted more heavily to measure the estimates than unlike individuals. The benefit of using a propensity score-weighted regression is that, unlike IV approaches, it requires no assumptions about how the treatment is determined. Even if reception center attendance is completely non-random, propensity score-weighted regressions will not be affected by this.

Balancing score analyses only produce causal estimates when there is no selection on unobservable traits (Rubin 1974; Rubin 2005). That is, if selection into treatment is determined fully by the observable characteristics, then a propensity score produces causal estimates; if selection into
treatment is determined in part by unobservables, propensity score weighting will not produce causal estimates. We cannot satisfy the “no selection on unobservables” condition in this case. However, even if we are unable to produce causal estimates with this method, the difference between the OLS and propensity score estimates will indicate the direction of bias in the OLS estimates. If the propensity score analysis suggests bias in the same direction as the IV analysis, we can be more confident in the IV estimates.

Classically, propensity scores are constructed using logit regressions of treatment on pre-treatment variables. In this analysis, I use the Toolkit for Weighting and Analysis of Nonequivalent Groups, or twang, designed for the R statistical package by Ridgeway, McCaffrey et al. (2012). Twang “contains a set of functions and procedures to support causal modeling of observational data through the estimation and evaluation of propensity scores and associated weights” (Ridgeway, McCaffrey et al. 2014). Twang uses non-parametric generalized boosting models (GBM) to estimate the propensity score weights. The benefit of this approach is that it “adaptively captures the functional form of the relationship between the covariates and treatment with less bias than traditional regression approaches” (Ridgeway, McCaffrey et al. 2014).

To select variables with which to construct the propensity score weights, Rubin and Thomas (2007) suggest including variables that affect the treatment and outcome, and variables that affect the outcome. They caution against including variables that affect the treatment but do not or only moderately affect the outcome, as this can reduce efficiency and inject bias in the estimates. Because there is no literature that details determinants of reception center attendance, I conducted a series of exploratory regressions and means tests to extract pretreatment variables to use in generating the balancing score. From Section 8.1, one can extract several pretreatment variables that affect the outcomes – UPDF, Orphan, Abduction length, and Total Violence.

The goal of propensity weighting is to achieve balance between the treated and untreated group. If the propensity score fails to achieve statistical indifference between the two groups, the method is invalid. Therefore we must assess balance between the groups on the pre-treatment covariates after weighting to assess the validity of our propensity score for creating like groups. Table 18 shows balance between reception center attendees and non-attendees groups before and after weighting with the twang-generated propensity score.43 We can then use the propensity score to weight individual observations and compare means across treated and untreated groups. Error! Reference source not found. Table 19 shows the weighted and unweighted estimates for reception center effect size.

43 The metric for assessing balance between the two groups is commonly the standardized mean difference (SMD) between the treated and control groups. SMDs with an absolute value greater than 0.25 are considered to be moderate and should be included as covariates in the regression. The maximum SMD on the four pre-treatment covariates in this analysis in twang is 0.14 - indicating fair balance and suggesting an adequate propensity score has been constructed. See Ramchand, R., B. A. Griffin, et al. (2011). "Using a cross-study design to assess the efficacy of motivational enhancement therapy–cognitive behavioral therapy 5 (MET/CBT5) in treating adolescents with cannabis-related disorders." Journal of studies on alcohol and drugs 72(3): 380.
Table 18: Balance among Pretreatment Covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Unweighted Non-Attendee (N=258)</th>
<th>Attendee (N=201)</th>
<th>Weighted Non-Attendee (ESS = 90)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>0.38 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.821 (0.384)</td>
<td>0.791 (0.407)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphan status</td>
<td>0.14 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.116 (0.321)</td>
<td>0.100 (0.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction length</td>
<td>5.02 (0.67)</td>
<td>18.11 (23.01)</td>
<td>14.72 (18.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Violence</td>
<td>10.31 (0.28)</td>
<td>13.18 (4.01)</td>
<td>13.18 (4.13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After weighting, all coefficients except the one for returning to school are pushed downward, consistent with the IV results, indicating that on almost all outcomes measures, reception center attendees may in fact be worse off than non-attendees. The significance for prosocial behavior goes away and material support also suffers. The estimate for general material support grows five-fold. Psychoemotional support falls from near zero to moderately negative.

Table 19: Weighted and Unweighted Estimated Effect Sizes of Center Attendance on Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Unweighted</th>
<th>Weighted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prosocial Behavior</td>
<td>0.49 (0.27) **</td>
<td>0.22 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict Material Support</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.19)</td>
<td>-0.36 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Material Support</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.28)</td>
<td>-0.52 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychoemotional Support</td>
<td>0.067 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.28 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Average Daily Earnings</td>
<td>0.006 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Earnings</td>
<td>-0.40 (0.20) **</td>
<td>-0.67 (0.27) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>0.46 (0.3)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to School</td>
<td>0.27 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.65 (0.27) **</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Daily earnings and occupation are also reduced. Also consistent with the IV results, returning to school is positively impacted by center attendance. Though most of the estimates are not statistically significant, they do show an upward bias before correcting with the propensity score. For these outcomes, the p-values for significance were significantly improved even if not made significant; one case saw a 93 percent reduction in the p-value – Return to School.

The results here are broadly consistent with the IV results. Although the estimated treatment effects between the IV method and propensity score method are different – IV estimates the LATE and propensity score method estimates the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) – both sets of results indicate that the OLS estimates are biased upward and that reception centers depress outcomes. It appears that those more likely to have good outcomes go to reception centers, which ultimately worsens their outcomes. This check against the IV results contributes to their credibility. These results along with the IV results call into question the anecdotal positive impact of reception centers in northern Uganda.

One final note is worth mentioning here. Though the propensity score analysis are large, they are not significant. Since we know that not all of the bias is eliminated from the propensity scores due to probably selection on unobservables, it is possible that true effects exist but the analysis here is unable to eliminate sufficient bias to detect them. Even if this is not the case, the propensity score estimates show that the bias in OLS estimates detected by the IV is correct.

9. Discussion

9.1 Possible Explanations

The difference in magnitude and statistical significance between the IV and propensity score estimates yields some important policy insights that have to do with the policy-relevance of the estimators. Because the propensity score yields the average treatment on the treated (ATT) effect, it measures the average treatment effect across all individuals who receive treatment. The local average treatment effect (LATE) identified by the IV estimator provides treatment effects for individuals whose behavior is changed by the instrument. Simply, for any treatment there are “always joiners,” “never joiners,” and “sometimes joiners.” Always joiners would seek out the treatment even if the instrument did not change. Never joiners would not be treated no matter what the incentive. Sometimes joiners are those who receive treatment as a result of the instrument, in this case reception center availability. Therefore, the IV results only tell us what the impact of treatment is for the sometimes joiners. The strongly negative impacts for the IV tell us that there are likely heterogeneous impacts for the treated group, and that people who would not otherwise go to a reception center would probably be better off not being made to go at all if they have a choice. This is in direct opposition to the UPDF’s stated policy to send youth directly to a reception center when they are found in the bush.

Many of the results presented above about the impact of reception center attendance on the eight outcomes of interest are surprising and perhaps counterintuitive. The results in Section 8 suggest that reception center attendance actually worsens social outcomes, with negative but insignificant
impacts on economic ones. There are a number of possible explanations for the strongly negative impact of reception center attendance. This section discusses potential explanations for the results.

One potential explanation is that staying in a reception center provides a way for formerly abducted youth to practice and reinforce behavior and norms of violence in a civilian setting, which they then carry with them when they leave the centers. Poor social-behavioral skills could account for these negative social results.

However, the significance of the instrumented reception attendance variable after accounting for prosocial behavior suggests that attendance at a reception center is not driving poor outcomes merely by reducing prosocial behaviors. It also suggests that another explanatory variable that occurs alongside reception center attendance exists, given the remaining strength of the instrumented reception attendance variable. If it were only the decrease in prosocial behavior that was causing the negative effects of other outcomes, this would be reflected here by insignificance of the reception center indicator. This result would also tend to support the idea that reductions in prosocial behavior are not necessarily happening in the reception centers themselves, but are being driven by this extra variable. Note also that the overall deleterious effect of center attendance on the outcomes in (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Table 17 is likely larger than the point estimates for reception center effects indicate, because prosocial behavior is positively associated with improvements in these, but reception center attendance depresses prosocial behavior (see Table 18).

Reception centers could reinforce negative habits and hierarchical command structures that do not translate well to civilian life; this may be exacerbated by peer network effects. Though the results above find that reception centers improve prosocial behavior, antisocial or maladaptive behaviors can coexist with prosocial or adaptive behaviors; reception centers may be affecting both Some assistance workers have noted that some former abductees tend to replicate hierarchical command structures in their interactions with other youth, especially other abducted youth. This is especially common when returning abductees spent much time or achieved a high rank within the LRA (Allen and Schomerus 2006). If reception centers allow youth to reinforce this behavior as normal before they return to their communities, they would understandably have a hard time resituating themselves into normal community life.

The negative effects on both strict and general material support could have one of two explanations. There could be a substitution or “crowding out” effect whereby people in the community who would otherwise give aid to returnees who attend centers substitute assistance away from that group simply because they know returnees have received assistance from reception centers, and they prefer to give assistance to others less fortunate. Yet, this explanation is not supported by the corresponding lack of employment and psychoemotional support that center attendees experience. It is also not consistent with the reduction in psychoemotional support that attendees seem to experience; while the results for this kind of support are not significant here, the effect is large.44 If there was simply a substitution of material support away from attendees that was not part of a larger

44 The effect becomes significant when using a factor score index of the outcomes as opposed to an unweighted additive index.
exclusion phenomenon, we would not expect to see negative results for employment, material or psychoemotional support.

In a war, uncertainty reigns and information is limited. It is also plausible that without going to a reception center, one’s combatant status can remain unknown, or at least known without certainty. Going to a reception center can, inadvertently, cause people to identify as combatants, making them easier for the community to identify and subsequently exclude. Identification as a combatant can also make one an easily identified target for anger and insult. Annan, Brier et al. (2009) record that returned youth (who had been to reception centers) reported they were frequently the target of insulting or hurtful remarks. Furthermore, the respondents felt that a normal aggressive response would have led to further alienation and ostracism, as their identities as “combatants” were reinforced by the aggression. The context in northern Uganda is one of deprivation and deep uncertainty. In such situations, societies often seek scapegoats and others on whom they can target their anger, frustration and fear. To the extent that reception centers designate some individuals as combatants there is a supply of center-goers whose combatant status is also completely observable.

Another explanation is that returnees who attend reception centers are being shunned in their communities and therefore receive less integration and care from their communities overall. If it were the case that source of community support were only shifting resources from attendees to non-attendees or other needy parties, then we would not expect to see a co-occurring negative impact of reception centers on psychoemotional social support in column (4), simply because it costs nothing to provide psychoemotional support. Similarly, we would also not expect earnings and employment to suffer, only material support, if a substitution effect were driving the negative estimates for material support. However, we see a negative effect in columns (5) and (6) as well, suggesting that reception center attendees are being excluded economically and socially, in addition to a substitution of material support away from them. Based on the discussion of the results, it seems probable that there is a certain amount of shunning or ostracism that is occurring on the part of the community against center attendees.

Why would reception center attendance encourage shunning? Plausible explanations for this seeming contradiction can be found in the qualitative evidence. One is that receiving services generates jealousy or resentment among non-combatants. A relative deprivation explanation could be employed to explain the seeming lack of social and economic integration achieved by center-goers. This resentment has been identified by several reports (Weinstein and Humphreys 2003; Allen and Schomerus 2006; Banes, Stover et al. 2006; Amone-P’Olak 2007; Veale and Stavrou 2007; Corbin 2008; Annan, Brier et al. 2009).

It could be that capital accumulation is more stunted for attendees than for non-attendees; their abductions are longer on average and they will have missed out on more opportunities to accumulate productive capital. To test this, I did a Wald means test of three productive assets—

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45 The ideal way to test the first explanation would be to do a pre-post measurement of assistance to determine how aid and support shifts between pre- and post-measurements depending on reception center attendance. This cannot be done with the available data, however.
bicycles, cattle/oxen, and mobile phones – looking for significant differences in asset ownership for these assets between center attendees and non-attendees; I found none. These two explanations – reduction in capital and substitution towards schooling - fail to account for the measured negative effect of reception center attendance on earnings and employment, suggesting that one or more confounding variables associated with reception centers are causing these negative impacts.

The question must be raised: if going to a reception center has such detrimental effects, why do people go? Part of the answer may be found in the fact that many attendees do not go willingly, but are transferred there by UPDF in accordance with government policy. Of those that go willingly, it may be that the prospect of receiving goods, a safe place to stay, and access to other services and health care may be too much to pass up. As well, youth may have time inconsistent preferences or high discount factors, and may not weigh the costs and benefits of choosing to attend equally. In addition, the likelihood of receiving services after return from abduction is greater for those who visit centers; it is possible that people go for the future prospect of services as much as the current one. Facing the tradeoff between clearly quantified, tangible assistance and less quantifiable social support, the tradeoffs between the two options may not be easy to make. More investigation in this area is warranted.

Studies note that employment and ‘hard work’ are integral to reestablishing oneself as part of the community; as work – a reintegration outcome itself – increases, so does community integration (Amone-P’Olak 2007). The paradox is, one must be semi-integrated in the first place in order to find and perform productive work that is visible and beneficial to the community. That much is clear from the prevalence of ostracism that is reported. Additionally, IDP camp workers have stressed that activities and other distractions from the otherwise common idleness that is common in camp life helps the process of reintegration (Allen and Schomerus 2006); social inclusion promotes integration. From the literature thus far, it seems apparent that reintegration is a self-reinforcing process. By their going to a reception center, attendees may find it harder to turn a vicious cycle into a virtuous one.

9.2 Study Assessment
This study provides new information on the effects of reintegration assistance programs. This analysis makes use of the best available data and instrument to assess the impact of reception centers in northern Uganda. Reintegration is a complex process; many things impact reintegration success besides reintegration programs themselves, reintegration success itself is hard to measure, and the social, economic, political and psychological processes that relate to reintegration are dynamic. There is a high degree of variation in individual success in reintegration that clearly has much to do with factors that are either not measured or are immeasurable.

This analysis depends on time variation, yet time is also a major component of reintegration. There is unavoidable structural collinearity in the data between the year a person returned and the amount of time since he returned. Adding an indicator for time in the regression reduces the strength of the treatment estimate, even though the results are still generally significant. Even though the IV and propensity score weighting method are in agreement that OLS estimates are upwardly biased, if the
instrument is not convincing, the analysis can only show a negative association between reception
center attendance and outcomes, not a causal link. Omitted variable bias can also derail these results
to the extent that an unknown confounder both correlated with treatment and outcomes is
unobserved.

Other technical issues are related to the unclear interpretation of several of the results. What exactly
does a decile decrease in material support mean for an individual’s daily well-being? The
quantification of well-being and the translation of these results to a more concrete measure of that
well-being for the individual remains an open question.

This analysis tells us about relatively short-term results, on the scale of a few years. Long-term
impacts may vary. The results presented in Section 8 are also strongest for social outcomes. More
generally, results may not generalize to conflicts with different social, demographic and economic
characteristics such as income, employment, cultural norms, and others. Social contexts are different
everywhere, and so might effects be different across contexts.

There may be heterogeneous impacts across reception centers. Centers are run differently with
differing sizes and capacities. While reception centers try to accommodate all youth, during times of
high LRA activity, they get crowded, and stays at the reception center tend to be shorter to make
room for incoming youth. Conversely, when the inflow of abducted youth from the bush slows,
reception centers tend to keep youth for longer periods, partly to provide the youth with greater
care, partly because donor money depends on the number of children at the center (Weinstein and
Humphreys 2003). Time in a reception center is also not a single treatment but rather a bundle of
treatments – counseling, goods provision, social activities, etc. Thus, this analysis cannot claim that
all aspects of reception center attendance are detrimental, though the data do not allow for a more
specific breakdown of types of assistance received and the duration of that assistance. Greater
investigation is necessary to see what aspects of reception center programs, if any, are helpful.

10. Conclusion
The results of this study suggest negative effects of reception center attendance for returning
abductees in northern Uganda. This result diverges from the consensus that reception centers are a
necessary and vital step in the recovery and return process. In light of these results, this consensus
requires some rethinking. The question now arises from these results: what benefit are reception
centers providing, and at what social cost to the returnee? Centers do, without doubt, provide some
benefit to youth. Some of these services are tangible – basic health care, regular nutrition, some
durable goods, help locating family, and possibly skills training. Some of these services are likely to
be much less concrete – a feeling of safety, a buffer space between life in the bush and returning
home, a sense of understanding and compassion. These may be precisely the things that returning
abducted youth need most when they are just out of the bush. However, this analysis shows that
there is a downside as well, particularly in terms of social integration and support from the
community. Ultimately, it is unknown at this point what drives these negative effects. However, their
magnitude relative to other explanatory variables and their significance, coupled with their very real
implications for the social and economic exclusion of returning youth, perhaps in the long-term, necessitates a closer look at this phenomenon.

This analysis offers a micro-level analysis of the effects of reintegration assistance on economic integration as well as understudied measures of social integration. It seeks to contribute to the knowledge of micro-level social dynamics in conflict-affected settings. There are still many questions left unanswered. We do not know by what mechanisms exclusion is propagated, or whether ex-combatants receive social support intensively or extensively, for example. Nor do we know about the longer-term effects of this exclusion along important dimensions such as marriage, work transitions, capital accumulation and access, or intergenerational transmission of exclusion.

The results of this study cast doubt on assertions that reintegration programs are always necessary and beneficial to former fighters. The results of this paper are particularly important for donors and development agencies seeking to implement economic and social development programs in conflict settings. If the source of these negative effects stems from a reception center’s being a signal about combatant status, or otherwise further exacerbates tensions between combatant and non-combatant populations, there is major cause for concern under the first principle of development: do no harm. The jury is still out on whether reintegration programs ultimately help or hurt, and there is much research left to do in this area, particularly on the connection between social support, social capital, and economic outcomes, and the overall well-being of individuals beyond economic outcomes.
Establishing Social Conditions of Trust and Cooperation46
Elizabeth Wilke, Paul K. Davis, and Christopher Chivvis

This chapter addresses certain social aspects of intervention, focusing on how sufficient cooperation among previously warring parties can be achieved so that stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) efforts can be successful. Though much depends on the context of the conflict—the composition of fighting parties, political aims, and economic and social backdrops, as well as international intervention—to facilitate long-term S&R, post-conflict interventions need to establish basic institutional structures that promote cooperation among groups in society, especially those prone to competition and conflict. Trust is a key enabler of cooperation, so the chapter’s question becomes, How can useful degrees of trust and cooperation be created in a post-conflict environment?

1. Introduction
Almost every study of social reconstruction and post-conflict stability calls for understanding conflict as the result of structural processes and institutions that sustain and promote the escalation of conflict (Botes, 2003; Joeng, 2003; Fisher, 2000; Widner, 2004; Donais, 2009; Rubenstein, 2003b). These structures can include corrupt or nepotistic courts that unfairly enforce laws; laws that routinely favor certain groups over others; or economic growth that leaves behind certain groups or denies them access to resources, either de jure or de facto. The successful cessation of conflict in the long run will require the restructuring of institutional structures to ensure fairness and access. Disputes of fairness and equality arise daily in every society, and a successful resolution of intergroup conflict will require that mechanisms for assertively and cooperatively dealing with differences be built into decision- and policymaking processes.

Reestablishing peace and stability after conflict needs to include such social processes as changing attitudes, behaviors, expectations, social networks, and even culture. Post-conflict societies often have relationships characterized by distrust, exclusion of “outgroups,” and unconstructive competitive behavior. People have witnessed, taken part in, or been victims of violence; groups across society have stereotyped and dehumanized others. Social relationships are strained further by a lack of physical security and economic opportunity. To have at least working relationships among stakeholder groups is vital to the success of reconstruction (Kelman, 2008; Bar-Tal and Bennik, 2004; Gaertner, Brewer and Dovidio, 2005; Kaplan, 2009).

The psychological and social processes involved in post-conflict social reconstruction should ideally encourage emotional healing, positive contacts across groups, positive experiences with government, breaking down negative stereotypes, increasing respect and empathy, and positively adjusting...
cultural narratives. All of this is a tall order, and what is actually feasible may be far less. Nonetheless, the extent to which at least some of these occur can have a lasting impact on whether or not peace is sustained (Kelman, 2008; Bar-Tal and Bennik, 2004; Gaertner, Brewer and Dovidio, 2005; Kaplan, 2009). It follows that those conducting S&R operations can benefit from the relevant social science. What follows draws selectively on extensive literatures in social psychology, sociology, cognitive psychology, anthropology, law, economics, criminology, business, political science, and peace research. Fortunately, these literatures reveal reason for optimism: Much can be done—but not easily and certainly not quickly.

The next section identifies key themes from the literature relevant to reconstructing society. The following section then applies them to common post-conflict challenges, addressing both promise and pitfalls. The last sections pull together approximate principles and conclude with a brief recapitulation.

2. Concepts, Literatures, and Themes

2.1 Concepts
It is useful at the outset to identify some important concepts and distinctions involving the terms cooperation, trust, distrust, social capital, social reconciliation, and social reconstruction.

2.1.1 Cooperation
Cooperation is the coordination of efforts or activities to produce a mutually beneficial outcome (Hardin, 1995). Some level of cooperation among parties previously engaged in violent conflict is essential if S&R is to succeed. Cooperation is not a zero-sum game, which makes it different from competitive behavior or violence. In fact, conflict scholars typically think of intergroup relationships as falling along a cooperative-to-competitive spectrum (Table 20). Positive, cooperative group relations are characterized by trust and good feeling; negative or competitive relationships are characterized by distrust and negative social attitudes toward the other group(s).

Table 20: Characteristics of Competitive and Cooperative Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Cooperative Relationships</th>
<th>Competitive Relationships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties' attitudes towards one another</td>
<td>Trusting, friendly, and helpful</td>
<td>Suspicious, hostile, and/or exploitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Open, honest communication</td>
<td>Lack of or misleading communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarities and differences</td>
<td>Maximization of similarities; minimization of differences</td>
<td>Maximization of differences; minimization of similarities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Partnership-oriented; win-win</td>
<td>Dominance-oriented; zero-sum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cooperation, of course, can increase vulnerability: The willingness of groups to cooperate depends on their expectations of the other's likelihood of also cooperating, which is why trust plays such a
powerful role in cooperation. Groups are more likely to be cooperative when there has been a history of cooperation, when structural conditions provide incentives for cooperation, or when positive attitudes exist about the trustworthiness of the other group. Because attitudes affect expectations, interventions to improve attitudes are important. In addition, if relationships are strained or competitive, monitoring and incentives structures may be needed to mitigate risks so that cooperation can continue (Powell, 1996). Outside intervenors can promote cooperation by contributing to environmental and institutional structures that promote cooperation.

**Trust**

Trust can be simply defined as positive expectations about the actions of another party (Deutsch, 2000a), or a belief in, and willingness to act on the basis of, the words and actions of another (Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000; McAllister, 1998). Trust is relevant to S&R because it affects cooperation reducing uncertainty by providing expectations about the behaviors of people or groups (Axelrod, 1984). Trust across groups is key to facilitating conflict resolution, partly because it reduces the need for monitoring and punishment of parties in cooperation (Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000). Most scholars agree that while trust is not a necessary condition for peace (Ward et al., 2006; Axelrod, 1984, Deutsch, 1973), it is necessary if the peacemaking process to take hold (Brune and Bossert, 2009; Gormley-Heenan and MacGinty, 2009). Some important factors involved in enhancing trust and cooperation are depicted in Figure 7 and elaborated below. The concepts appearing in the tree will be discussed in what follows.

**Types of Trust**

Numerous scholars have identified types of trust, with their distinctions and terminology reflecting parent disciplines. By and large, the biggest distinction in usage is between those coming from a rational-choice perspective (e.g., economics, business, or political science) and those coming from an emphasis on social constructions and shared values (e.g., sociology, psychology). Fortunately, good efforts have been made to relate and integrate the two perspectives (Rousseau et al., 1998; Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespi, 2006; Saunders et al., 2010). Saunders et al. (2010) also specifically addresses cross-cultural issues, which is useful to the present chapter.

With some simplification, only two types of trust need be distinguished between here: calculation-based and relational trust. This terminology has the advantage of intuitive labels and allowing for considerable generality. Calculation-based trust is a kind of trust that stems from assessing (whether correctly or not) that trust is justified—for a very concrete set of issues in a very concrete context—because it seems to be in the interest of the other party, or in his or her habit, to behave positively. This might be because it seems that different behavior will be deterred, because the desired behavior is incentivized, because it just “makes sense” (from the perceived perspective of the other), or because it is consistent with observed behavior of the other party. Such trust is intendedly rational and requires neither emotions nor affinity between parties, only that interests are best served by cooperation. As a result, efforts to increase rational trust should be concerned with, e.g., (1) incentive structures, (2) guarantees, and (3) building a history of repeated, positive interactions.
Such trust is usually “thin” in that, if the situation or issue changes, the trust may vanish quickly (i.e., it is not necessarily transferrable).

In contrast, relationship-based trust stems from positive expectations about another’s behavior based on personal experience and ties. Relational ties may be made by group membership, if, for example, the other is part of the same family, group, tribe, community, people, or nation and is assumed, therefore, to be trustworthy (which might or might not be accurate). It may also be that the relationship has been strong enough in the past (e.g., with shared experiences) so as to create mutual empathy and the internalization of positive beliefs and good will. Relationship-based trust may be relatively thick. It need not be (people can drop their trust of even close family members or long-term neighbors, depending on events), but it can be. Emotions, including the sense of relationship itself, play a role. The key point is that relationships enjoying high levels of this “thick” trust typically require less monitoring to ensure compliance than relationships with thinner trust (Lewicki and Weithoff, 2000). It is this “thicker” trust that helps perpetuate longer-term stability.

Developing thicker forms of trust in post-conflict situations requires that group social identities become more inclusive and open (Lewicki and Weithoff, 2000; Dietz, Gillespie, and Chao, 2010).
This means breaking down negative stereotypes that portray individuals from other groups as subhuman, untrustworthy, or incapable of honorable behavior. Wearing away negative attitudes and stereotypes about outgroup members makes it more likely that group members will be able to view each other as human beings with goals, aims, and motivations similar to their own. In addition, creating new and inclusive identities, such as a national identity, that include members of all groups may be a useful tool for creating cooperation and trust.

In most post-conflict situations, building calculation-based trust will be the immediate aim. That, however, opens the door to building relation-based trust, which is the stronger and more enduring, over time. Table 21 compares these types of trust.

### 2.1.2 Trust and Distrust

The literature varies as to whether distrust is equivalent to a low level of trust or something else. The view taken here is that it is something else. Specifically, rather than being the absence of a positive expectation that an agent will behave positively, distrust is used here to mean a positive expectation that an agent will behave negatively. Not only do post-conflict societies lack trust, but they are deeply distrusting. This does not change quickly, even if groups have enough trust to cooperate for specific narrow purposes. Table 21 (adapted from Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie, 2006) distinguishes among four cases defined by low or high trust and low or high distrust. The bottom-right cell (low trust, high distrust) is all too characteristic of many post-conflict societies. It is not merely that the parties in question lack trust; rather, they are seriously worried about each other.

### Table 21: Comparison of Calculation-Based and Relationship-Based Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Trust</th>
<th>Calculation-Based Trust</th>
<th>Relationship-Based Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intendedly rational calculations of others’ self-interest</td>
<td>Identification with others by relationship and association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experiential history of interactions</td>
<td>Some emotional attachment, perhaps including empathy or internalization of others’ aims and goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors’ Focus</td>
<td>Behavior control with incentives and enforcement mechanisms</td>
<td>Identifying common goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information-gathering about motives and actions</td>
<td>Building positive familiarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Encouraging in emotional reciprocity; encouraging sympathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ways to Develop</td>
<td>Education (e.g., about situational and historical facts)</td>
<td>Collaborative projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clear, consistent communication</td>
<td>Building and/or emphasizing commonly held identities, values, and goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Credible commitments</td>
<td>Education about each others’ histories, narratives and travails (empathy-building)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repeated, equal-status interactions with appropriate incentive structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Assessments of self-interest will suffer from limited rationality due to sometimes-incorrect perceptions, difficulties in understanding the other’s self-interest, the effects of cognitive biases, and the effects of decisionmaker personalities (e.g., relative emphasis on risk reduction and opportunity creation).
Based on such considerations, Figure 9 suggests that even an optimistic projection for a post-conflict society might anticipate very high degrees of distrust for years, despite success in finding particular issues and actions on which trust and cooperation can be obtained. We might ponder history after World War II, noting that the nations of Western Europe cooperated rather well after the creation of NATO in 1949. Elements of distrust remained strong for years, however, especially between Germany and its neighbors. Many decades later, today’s western Europeans see themselves collectively as Europeans, and cooperate extensively in most dimensions while retaining national identities. Thus, those involved in the social aspects of S&R should distinguish sharply between short, medium, and long-term goals—with the latter being dependent on developments long after intervenors are gone.

2.1.3 Horizontal and Vertical Trust

An important distinction also exists between “vertical” trust (that between state and society) and “horizontal” trust, i.e., trust across groups within society, such as between ethnic groups. Reciprocal, self-sustaining processes have positive impacts for both types of trust. Horizontally, the provision of services decreases competitive behavior, and the consistent enforcement of rule of law and justice decreases information asymmetry and risk in personal and business interactions, increasing trusting and trustworthy behavior. Vertically, as states become more able to perform vital functions—equably and consistently—they build a history of positive interactions with society that affect perceptions of state legitimacy and encourage acceptance of state authority (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). Wider processes of state-building and improving state capacity to deliver services equitably and uniformly, enforce justice and rule of law, and provide common security are all integral to building both types of trust. This chapter is largely about horizontal trust because of its importance in social reconstruction.
Figure 8: Characteristics of Trust, Distrust, and Combinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of distrust</th>
<th>Low (No fear, skepticism, cynicism, vigilance; low monitoring)</th>
<th>High (Fear, skepticism, cynicism, wariness, vigilance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (Hope, faith, confidence, assurance, initiative)</td>
<td>• High-value congruence</td>
<td>• “Trust but verify”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Interdependence promoted</td>
<td>• Highly segmented and bounded relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Opportunities pursued</td>
<td>• Opportunities pursued but risks continuously monitored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• New initiatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (No hope, faith, confidence, passivity, hesitance)</td>
<td>• Casual acquaintances</td>
<td>• Undesirable eventualities expected and feared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited interdependence</td>
<td>• Harmful motives assumed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bounded, arms-length transactions</td>
<td>• Interdependence limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• At most, formal courtesies</td>
<td>• Paranoia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Preemption: best defense is a good offense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 9: A Possible Optimistic Timeline for Building Trust and Reducing Distrust
2.1.4 Social Capital

The concept of social capital, much discussed in the literature, deserves mention here as a secondary layer of social reconstruction that encompasses both trust and cooperation. Two definitions are worth mentioning:

Social capital includes trust, as well as other social and cultural norms, values, and institutions that promote cooperation and collective action (Fukuyama, 2002).

Social capital includes the shared values and rules for social conduct expressed in personal relationships, trust and a common sense of “civic” responsibility, which make a society more than just a collection of individuals. (World Bank, 2011)

As seen from the definitions above, social capital not cooperation but also encompasses other social functions that are beyond the scope of this chapter but enhance social and political stability (Putnam, 1995). The World Bank provides a useful conceptualization of these functions under five broad component categories, as shown in Table 22.

### Table 22: Five Dimensions of Social Capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groups and networks</td>
<td>Larger networks and cohesive groups provide opportunities for connecting people to ideas and information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust and solidarity</td>
<td>High trust levels and social solidarity decreases the collective action problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action and cooperation</td>
<td>Cooperation and collective action bring people to work together to address community needs or other public issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion and inclusion</td>
<td>Inclusiveness mitigates conflict by promoting equal access to benefits of development and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and communication</td>
<td>Information improves information asymmetries, as well as communicates intention and positive messages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While interventions should focus on cooperative behavior as an outcome, building positive social capital is an important component of post-conflict social reconstruction. Positive social capital enhances both the frequency and quality of cooperative behavior by reducing uncertainty about outcomes and interactions and providing mechanisms to accumulate goodwill between parties that facilitates political and economic cooperation (Putnam, 1993). Rebuilding depleted social capital is vital to reconstruction and is part and parcel of conflict resolution. Social capital also has economic and political payoffs that reinforce the reconstruction process over time (Glaeser, Laibson, and Scerdote, 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1996; Fukuyama, 1995; Brune and Bossert, 2009).

Unfortunately, and despite the fact that academics and practitioners usually assume that higher levels of social capital are beneficial in society, it is not the case under the definitions above. Shared values
and rules, for example, can exist within groups and be detrimental to society at large, e.g., the German Nazi party of the 1930s and 1940s or American Ku Klux Klan members in the 20th century. This type of social capital can have very negative effects. This said, in what follows we have in mind positive social capital across groups, which facilitates the social processes in Table 22, unless specified otherwise.

### 2.1.5 Social Reconciliation

At its heart, social reconciliation in the social psychology literature refers to the process of (re)building functioning, stable intergroup relationships that reinforce nonviolent means of interaction. Social reconciliation as a concept lacks a unified definition. Some definitions focus on healing, reparations, justice, and truth; they do not presuppose much trust in the immediate or medium-term (Kumar, 1999; Gaertner, Brewer, and Dovidio, 2005). Indeed, many definitions of reconciliation see reconciliation as necessary because of the lack of trust (Kumar, 1999; Staub and Bar-Tal, 2003; Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, 2003; Gaertner, Brewer and Dovidio, 2005). That is, social reconciliation processes are essential for rebuilding trusting relationships.

While social reconciliation may be beneficial for society at large, the term reconciliation is loaded and contentious. To many, the term means “forgetting” the past violence that they have witnessed or suffered. Many have deep feelings of hatred or fear toward their enemy groups, which leave them unable or unwilling to engage on any level with the other group. A major and more feasible goal of social reconciliation is to promote tolerance. Doing so is also essential to building even limited trust and cooperation; over time, with luck, it may also lead to healing, empathy, and acceptance.

With this background on major themes, the next four subsections touch briefly on several specific literature groups.

### 2.2 Identities, Stereotypes, and Narratives

The social psychology literature relevant to post-conflict processes deals with issues such as bias, prejudice and stereotypes, identities, social embeddedness, and the behavior of individuals in response to social cues. There are also useful discussions of cultural history, cultural narratives and the formation of social identities (Brubaker, 1996; Barth, 1966), and the sources and dimensions of ethnic conflict (Horowitz, 1985; Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Brubaker, 2009; Brubaker and Laitin, 2005). Topics in psychology include grievance and emotional healing, which provide insights for mechanisms of restorative justice and reconciliation. Psychology also has much to say about cognitive biases and the formation of individual attitudes, which can be juxtaposed with the literature on social attitudes. There are several key concepts from social psychology and sociology that are important for understanding social interactions relating to cooperation and trust.

### 2.1.1 Social Identities and Attitudes

Identities are lenses through which individuals perceive and make sense of the world (Brubaker, 2009). “Constructed” by learned and socialized attitudes, identities frame individuals’ perceptions of social situations. Additionally, they may themselves situationally vary (e.g., depending on who interacts with whom or what cues define a situation). In post-conflict situations, individual identities
are often less context-dependent and linked to group identities. Though people commonly associate ethnicity, gender, and racial identity as being the main identity groups, the structure of identities to the individual is far more complex. Identities may conceivably be anything that serves to distinguish among people—fighter/civilian, socialist/capitalist, elite/poor, Northerner/Southerner. Similarly, certain identities are stronger than others to individuals; family and community identities may be stronger than national or regional identities. A good understanding of the “groups” in conflict will require an intimate knowledge of the make-up of identity groups in play.

2.2.2 Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Bias
Attitudes are formed from socialized and independent learning about the way groups in society interact. Attitudes influence expectations of cooperation and security, as well as adherence to and expectations about others adhering to norms of behavior (Gaertner, Brewer, and Dovidio, 2005). Attitudes are closely related to stereotypes and biases.

Stereotypes are oversimplified, inaccurate, or overstated beliefs about characteristics of an identity group. Groups in conflict tend to hold negative stereotypes of one another (Fisher, 2000). Negative stereotypes help ingroups to dehumanize outgroup members. Conversely, positive outgroup stereotypes lead to favorable treatment of the stereotyped group(s) and the positive interpretation of actions of group members.

2.2.3 Narratives
Narratives define the collective past of identity group members, creating a common origin and experience, which increases social cohesion among group members but can also create grievances or friction between groups with conflictive historical narratives.

2.2.4 Primacy of Group Attitudes
Some scholars have argued that because individual identities tend to be very closely intertwined with group identities, especially in post-conflict situations, attempts to change social attitudes at the individual level may be relatively ineffective. Although programs exist to promote understanding between opposing group members and have had some anecdotal success, the effect of targeting individuals is not thoroughly tested. While strategies to affect group attitudes obviously need to have effects on large portions of the population, one idea would be to attempt to jump-start cooperation in “pockets” that might then “cascade” to the remainder of the group (Laitin, 1995; Kuran, 1998).

The research on urban crime-reduction programs is worth brief mention as well here, since—although not directly related to post-conflict stability—it deals with cultural shifts resulting in violence reduction. Dramatic success has been achieved in reducing violence in a number of cities with programs that engage the small set of violent gang offenders. The best known of the efforts is the Ceasefire approach championed by David Kennedy (Braga et al., 2001a, 2001b). One tack is deterrent in nature, making clear that failure to cease violence will bring authorities down on the entire groups (curfews, tough enforcement of parole conditions, hassling, etc). At the say time, intervenors urge the individuals to recognize that their violence is senseless and wrong with reinforcement from respected or feared individuals (mothers, clergy, leaders). The effort is also
make to weaken identity bonds by demonstrating the myths of close relationships (“brothers” consistently make deals with prosecutors to save themselves; they routinely step in with the girlfriends of those who go to prison; etc). No effort is made to achieve more general reform; the strategy has narrow objectives.

2.3 Contact Theory
Contact theory is a long-established model for attitude change. It is a reaction to the well-known observation that segregation or infrequent contact between groups helps maintain negative stereotypes and mutual ignorance (e.g., Ajdukovic, 2008). The essential idea of contact theory is that increased exposure, under certain conditions, gives each party the opportunity to gather more information about the other and adjust expectations and attitudes accordingly. For interactions geared toward increasing contact and cooperation to be most effective in debunking stereotypes and improving relations, groups must have equal status in the situation, must have common goals identified, and must have the support of authority figures who condone and support cooperation (Allport, 1954). Through this kind of interaction, ingroups and outgroups establish affective, or emotional ties, which causes them to reappraise the negative stereotypes they hold and alter social attitudes toward outgroup members (Pettigrew, 1998). Contact can be direct, through physical interaction with opposing group members, or indirect, through secondary channels, such as media or knowing that one’s friends interact with outgroup members. Both types of contact positively affect outgroup attitudes, reduce prejudice, and enhance intergroup trust in post-conflict situations (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006).

2.3.1 Cautions
Clearly, merely putting people together is by no means sufficient. Indeed, as readers will understand, increased exposure or contact can worsen matters so as to encourage competition rather than cooperation (Deutsch, 1973; Saunders et al., 2010); also, behavior of the “other’s” members may confirm rather than disconfirm negative outgroup stereotypes (Hewstone et al., 2008; McGuire 1998). To put it otherwise, contact theory is nothing at all like a panacea.

2.4 Post-conflict Intervention
This section provides a general overview of the academic literature on specific types of post-conflict social interventions, while subsequent sections delve into greater detail.

Considerable literature exists on what makes post-conflict social intervention programs effective or ineffective. With the primary exception of the quasi-experimental literature investigating intergroup trust and forgiveness, the literatures emphasize theory, best practices, and criticism, with an emphasis on practical applications. Intervention studies look at the role(s) of civil society (Posner, 2004; Pouligny, 2005; Paffenholz, 2009; Duthie, 2009; Pugh, 1998); forms of justice (Cobián and Reátegui, 2009; Avruch and Vejarano, 2001; Lie, Binningsbo, and Gates, 2006; De Grieff, 2009; Park, 2010); media and propaganda (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, 2003; Krabil, 2001; Howard, 2002, 2003); and education (Bekerman, Zembylas, and McGlynn, 2009; Bar-Tal, 2000; Danesh, 2006; Salomon, 2004).
All of these programs promote social reconciliation and build positive social capital—by increasing communication and information, encouraging direct contact, restructuring social values and norms of behavior, providing common goals, and improving civic activism. The roles and impacts of each are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter; they are only briefly overviewed here.

2.4.1 Justice
Transitional justice—post-conflict retributive and restorative justice—is the largest component of the social reconciliation literature and enjoys the most attention in the literature on post-conflict recovery.

The literature on post-conflict justice is divided mainly among overviews of transitional justice (Deutsch, 2000b; Elster, 2004; Lie, Binningsbo, and Gates, 2006); assessments of the value of retributive and restorative justice (Lundy and McGovern, 2008; Wilson, 2001; Park, 2010); and case-studies of specific transitional justice processes that discuss operational or tactical successes and shortcomings (Zorbas, 2004; Mitton, 2009; Megawalu and Loizides, 2010; Gibson, 2002).

However, there is little agreement about proper forms of justice or implementation for promoting stability. There is some statistical evidence that formal justice mechanisms (as distinct from amnesty deals) are positively associated with longer peacetimes (Lie, Binningsbo, and Gates, 2006; Sikkink and Booth Walling, 2007). The relationships are not clear-cut, however, and there may be some optimal combination of transitional justice tools that includes both amnesty and tribunals.

The issue of justice is taken up in greater detail below.

2.4.2 Civil Society
Promoting engagement by building up “civil society” has been suggested as a new and beneficial strategy for post-conflict peacebuilding in situations where states lack capacity to provide services and maintain order (Parver and Wolf, 2006). Several studies have assessed the success or failure of specific programs or organizations related to civil society (e.g., Anckermann et al., 2005; Ager, Strang, and Abebe, 2005). A few empirical studies assess the effectiveness of these programs overall, as do a very few notable ones outside the narrow intergroup trust literature. Most of these studies use survey data to assess community programs affect community cohesion among members of different groups (Widner, 2004; Ajukovic, 2008; Whitt, 2010; Brune and Bossert, 2009) Some empirical work has tested the effect of civil society on trust and general development, with mixed results (Newton, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1997). This is discussed more in a later section.

2.4.3 Others
Overwhelmingly, the post-conflict intervention literatures have been devoted to transitional justice, and—more recently—to the potential for civil society to promote social capital and cohesion. However, there are small and growing bodies of knowledge about communication methods and education programs. The use of strategic media and public communication between groups has been shown to have potentially large effects on intergroup trust and cooperation (Deutsch, 1958; Kerr et al., 1997; Sally, 1995; Balliet, 2010). Indeed, meta-analyses have demonstrated this empirically (Sally, 1995; Balliet 2010). Education, also, has been shown to improve intergroup attitudes toward one
another, and promote intergroup cooperation and trust (Bar-Tal, 2004; McGlynn, Niens, and Hewstone, 2004). These programs are also discussed in greater detail below.

2.5 A Composite Picture
There is still a great deal more to be done in theorizing and examining the process of social reconstruction in a post-conflict environment. However, based on the literature review, we see social reconstruction as involving both reconciliation and the buildup of positive social capital. Cooperation and trust, however, contribute to both reconciliation and social capital.

We next examine some of the main programs or interventions that have been identified in the theoretical and practitioner’s literature as means of rebuilding trust, promoting positive social capital development, and promoting social reconciliation in post-conflict situations. Two subsections examine transitional retributive and restorative justice, respectively. The next subsection looks at the development of civil-society organizations as a means of enhancing state functions, improving civic participation, and encouraging local ownership of development projects. A subsection then deals with the use of media for improving social across-group attitudes, reinforcing cultural narratives, and disseminating information. That is followed by a subsection addressing the use of education to alter cultural tolerance for violence and modes of conflict and restructure cultural relationships to be inclusive and cohesive. Finally, a subsection describes ways in which these various interventions can interact with reinforcing feedbacks.

3. Policy Mechanisms for Social Reconstruction

3.1 Transitional Justice
Scholars and practitioners alike assert the need for justice to serve multiple purposes beyond its mandate in international law. Victims demand recognition and acknowledgement of their suffering, as well as moral condemnation of the perpetrators and retribution against them (Ajdukovic, 2008). Justice processes help establish a basis on which members of the group can interact as human equals, a necessity of trust-building encounters (Hofstede, 1991). Post-conflict justice, sometimes called “transitional” justice, has received much attention and is widely considered a necessary step in post-conflict reconciliation (Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, 2003; Gaertner et al., 2008; Rotberg, 2000).

Appropriate and feasible forms of justice, however, are very context-dependent (Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, 2003). Significantly, transitional justice can involve any or all of several very different types of process. These are sometimes called retributive justice, restorative justice, and reconciliation (Clark, 2008). On one end of the spectrum lies war crime trials, often international, for bringing major perpetrators of violence to justice. On the other end are such mechanisms as truth commissions, apology, and restitution. The relative merits of each are subject to debate. It is certainly the case that the choice of transitional justice mechanisms in any context will require a serious examination of the politically and socially feasible options.

With this background, what follows draws on the literature relating to transitional justice mechanisms. The focus is on formal trials and truth commissions, as they are the common forms of
transitional justice, but also includes other options, such as lustration, restitution, and hybrid courts; it goes beyond the experience of S&R operations.

3.1.1 Retributive Justice: Trials, Hybrid Courts, and Lustration

Prosecution of war criminals and perpetrators of human rights atrocities in the post-conflict setting has the potential to satisfy the societal demand for justice. A number of authors cite the need for retributive justice to stop potential instances of destabilizing vigilante or private justice (Elster, 2004; Bass, 2005). Indeed, failure to have such processes can cause difficulties. In Bosnia, for example, the failure of the Bosnian-Serbs to turn over war criminals wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) has tended to undercut trust between the ethnic groups. However, there is not universal agreement about the value of retributive justice, as actually conducted. Clark (2008), for example, uses empirical data gathered in the former Yugoslavia to argue that, while war-crime tribunals are an important part of the peacebuilding process, the retributive justice they deliver falls seriously short in promoting reconciliation—in significant part because alternative narratives exist and persist about what constitutes justice.

Well-managed retributive justice allows governments to blame individuals (rather than whole identity groups), purge threatening figureheads, and enhance state legitimacy and expectations of rule of law (Dobbins et al., 2007). Formal trials have been relatively scarce in the realm of post-conflict reconstruction; there have been only eight international war crimes tribunals since 1919. Compare this with truth commissions, of which there have been 27 since 1971. The scarcity of war tribunals suggests that there are far fewer situations in which they are appropriate and feasible. Retributive justice is most feasible (whether or not desirable) primarily when one side has had a decisive victory, or when intervenors have the ability and will to crush one or more of the contending parties. The Nuremberg Trials after World War II were an example. A more recent example is the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), created by the United Nations in 1993. And, of course, the Iraqi Special Tribunal (a construct of the Iraqi government, not the United Nations) had Saddam Hussein hanged in 2006.

Another emerging alternative has been the establishment of “hybrid” courts, or courts operating within the country and administered by local judicial authorities. Hybrid courts have a major advantage of being potentially much less costly than war-crimes trials. In addition, they have the potential to support judicial capacity-building and to demonstrate rule of law and fairness at the local level (Dobbins et al., 2007). The Rwandan Gacaca courts, or “grass” courts, were established with the authority to mete out punishment and require those found guilty to make restitution. Based on a traditional system of justice, the courts were conducted quickly with few resources. Further, because they used a traditional system, they enjoyed relatively wide acceptance by Rwandans as legitimate and fair (Zorbas, 2004).

The level of retributive justice delivered in a post-conflict environment varies between the theoretical extremes of complete impunity or punishment for all perpetrators. A notable in-between is lustration, which deprives certain segments of the population access to power or privileges; it is designed to ensure that those previously in power do not regain access to the system (Dobbins et al.,
2007). Notable examples are Democrats after the American Civil War, members of the Nazi party in post-WWII Germany, and members of the Ba’ath party in Iraq. Lustration is administratively easier than individual prosecution since it requires no proof of wrongdoing and the burden of proof for redress lies with the individual, not the government (Dobbins et al., 2007). Yet to ameliorate the effects of its necessarily arbitrary design, an apparatus capable of providing a path for reinstatement of the excluded population is necessary (Dobbins et al., 2007).

In the post-conflict situations most relevant to S&R, negotiations between opposing factions are taking place. In those situations, the primary objective is compromise and cooptation, not retribution. In this case, reconciliation measures such as apology and restitution—such as economic support to victims—may be more immediately implementable. Retribution may come decades later, as it did with Argentina and Chile belatedly facing up to their pasts, but it will seldom be the focus of S&R activities. Some will see a moral dilemma, as when negotiations are attempted between the Afghan government and selected elements of the Taliban, but putting aside retribution is perhaps necessary if complete victory is not in the cards. If negotiations are necessary between groups, then retributive justice mechanisms may be deferred, weakened, or narrowed in scope.

### 3.1.2 Restorative Justice: Truth Commissions

Many scholars believe that restorative justice is the stronger and most generally feasible approach. Truth commissions generally act as complements rather than alternatives to retributive justice where the latter is feasible. At root, truth commissions involve a cooperative effort to establish the facts of history to overcome competing group narratives of the war, narratives that often impede reconciliation and cooperation. Unlike criminal trials, they do not involve prosecution of individuals, but rather constitute an effort to set the record straight. Such programs are normally conceived as having four main objectives: reconciliation, accountability, truth-telling, and restitution for damage (Huyse and Salter, 2008). South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is the most well-known and is generally to be considered the largest success of historical truth commissions, but commissions have been implemented in many other situations with varying degrees of success—e.g., Rwanda, Peru, Liberia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

Truth commissions are officially empowered by the state to act over a set period, usually six months to two years, and investigate human rights abuses occurring over a predetermined period of time (Dobbins et al., 2007). The commissions systematically uncover and publicize the personal narratives of a country’s past war period, generally culminating in a final report of findings. Truth commissions support social reconciliation and provide an avenue for direct participation by a large number of individuals (Dobbins et al., 2007). Truth-telling allows survivors, perpetrators and victims alike to reenact past violence, wherein grudges, bitterness and pain can be conveyed without the risk of inciting new cycles of violence (Huyse and Salter, 2008). Because the core of their mission is on fact-finding and not punishment, truth commissions are in a unique position to investigate collective guilt in a way that criminal trials or tribunals cannot (Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, 2003).

Truth-telling, apology, and acceptance of blame together combat the tendency toward dehumanization of the other group and build a foundation on which each group can begin to see the
other as humans rather than subhuman enemies. This helps establish a basis on which members of
the group can interact as human equals, a necessity of trust-building. Establishing a valid historical
narrative of past atrocities legitimizes the pain of individuals and entire societies and condemns the
use of violence in the future. In the South African case, the truth commission centered its energies
on collecting and publicizing personal testimonies of violence and war, to create an authoritative
memory and to fight against a collective amnesia for the future (Henderson, 2000).

It is clear that thoughtful and strategic planning needs to be brought to bear on the organization of
truth commissions and other restorative justice measures so that they have meaningful impact. A
careful analysis of the cultural setting and other contextual factors will be a must, in addition to
interacting transitional justice with other trust-building initiatives.

### 3.1.3 Other Mechanisms: Apology and Restitution

Truth-commission narratives sometimes also involve apology and announcements of remorse,
although apologies and restitution to victims need not come via truth commissions. Apologies have
powerful social import: Although they cannot undo past wrongs, they can help to undo some of the
damage of past wrongs by delegitimizing them (Tavuchis, 1991). Some authors argue that
reconciliation efforts without any form of apology cannot hope to succeed (Smits, 2003). Public acts
of contrition and apology can help build trust, especially when the act is costly, either socially,
politically, or economically, for the contrite party (Pruitt and Olczak, 1995). Apologies that are
qualified, appear insincere, or are inconsistent with the apologizer’s behavior will irritate conflict and
reduce cooperative drives; unfelt apologies are better left unsaid.

Restitution for victims can also serve this function at the societal level as well as the individual level,
while also promoting a more equal society in general (Huyse and Salter, 2008). Similar to procedural
post-conflict justice, providing accountability and the equitable provision of restitution should also
enhance the credibility of the justice-dispensing body, which increases vertical levels of trust in the
new government.

### 3.1.4 Overall Cautions

All justice mechanisms—whether retributive or restorative—will be judged by the company they
keep. While hybrid courts and national truth-finding commissions—for example, truth and
reconciliation commissions in both South Africa and Sierra Leone—may gain legal authority to
conduct their investigations via legislative or constitutional mandates, they do not necessarily gain
legitimacy or credibility from these same sources. Tribunals and commissions supported or run by
actors that took part in the atrocities, or actors who are seen as partial or weak, will hamper the
impact of the commission’s work. This was the case in Rwanda: Because the church took part in
some of the wartime atrocities, its involvement with the Gacaca “grass” courts was an unwelcome
signal that the impartiality of the courts might be compromised (Parver and Wolf, 2006).

Another operational caveat lies in offering amnesty or economic assistance in exchange for
information, truth-telling, or laying down arms. While amnesty has been relatively successful in
getting perpetrators to come forward for the purposes of truth commissions, it has not worked
universally, and it is unclear whether more-violent perpetrators are more or less likely to step forward. On the one hand, amnesties may be the price of peace; on the other hand, they can deepen resentment among victims and society (Gibson, 2002; Wilson, 2001). Trade-offs between amnesty and trials and prosecutions—or, in the case of truth commissions, incomplete accounts of the past—will have to be made. Amnesty will promote reconstruction by incentivizing fighters to pay down arms and come forward. Yet, amnesty undermines retributive justice goals and may lead to feelings in society that perpetrators got off scot-free.

An important conclusion from the literature is that in all types of post-conflict justice, as in so many other areas, local ownership matters. International and local norms of justice are not the same. A danger of putting justice in the hands of third parties is that outcomes will fail to fulfill culturally defined modes of justice and therefore be poorly accepted. Or, they may appear to be politically partial, fueling distrust and animosity toward the other side (Parver and Wolf, 2006). Linking justice mechanisms to traditional or indigenous forms of justice brings the process close to home for many and imparts a sense of local legitimacy. Moreover, locals are often better equipped than external agents to understand what their community needs to bury memories of past atrocities. However, international third parties need to ensure the safety of both victims and confessed perpetrators. If international actors enjoy perceptions of non-bias and credibility, they can also give their imprimatur process to help legitimize justice efforts.

In this view, international agents are best advised to be supporters of the local process, rather than administrators themselves. Giving room for local social and legal structures to enforce justice contributes to the legitimacy of the justice process and enhances indigenous governance structures, provided that the justice-implementing organizations are nonbiased and perceived to be so. They can help by providing manpower, resources, and facilities and advising on international legal requirements in the context of local justice. To be sure, local justice mechanisms are not always appropriate, or in accordance with international humanitarian standards. International third parties must make sure that humanitarian standards are upheld, and compromises may have to occur for both local justice and international requirements to be satisfied. Attempting to do so can raise dilemmas.

Overall, the forms of justice that occur in the post-conflict period are largely dependent on what is both acceptable by the population and feasible politically. If retributive justice is not an available option, then intervenors may depend on other reconciliation measures. This does not mean, however, that some form of reconciliation is not necessary for societies to move on in the longer term. Though Panama and Uruguay did not institute their own truth commissions until decades after the cessation of the conflicts they were mandated to investigate, the commissions were still needed to “bury the hatchet” on these conflicts. At the end of the day, the purpose of transitional justice is to help societies move on as a whole, rather than continue to hold onto the past conflict as a source of division.
3.2 Efforts to Develop Civil Society

The literature has substantial discussion of the value of civil society in post-conflict reconstruction, as reviewed by Paffenholz and Spurk (2006). The nature and functions of civil society in the literature include protecting citizen’s rights, monitoring government, building community through engagement and socialization, delivering services, and mediating between citizens and the state (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006; Parver and Wolf, 2008; World Bank, 2005). Civil society is often viewed as an alternative to weak, post-conflict states for the provision of public goods. Moreover, civil society can, in theory, build social capital and trust through civic engagement while forcing the government to become more transparent and accountable. To the extent that community organizations understand the needs of their communities, they can also help prioritize programs by providing contextual insights and adding legitimacy to both external and state partners.

Civil society organizations can promulgate social reconciliation in several ways. By providing services equitably they can satisfy needs and, in the process, reduce insecurity and competitiveness. As watchdogs and public-information providers, they can increase knowledge and reduce uncertainty. As organizers, they can stimulate intergroup cooperation and the accumulation of trust—for example, by bringing together adversarial groups and help identify common goals. Thus, they can help bolster nearly all of the dimensions of social-capital identified by the World Bank (2006) and outlined in Table 22. Nor is such discussion purely speculative. Fearon and Humphreys (2009) have shown that the development of civil society in post-conflict communities alters patterns of social cooperation. Several case studies undertaken by the World Bank evaluating community-driven development in conflict areas suggest that, in certain contexts, joint-development programs improve civic participation (especially in youth), restore trust in mixed communities, and promote stability (World Bank, 2006).

Furthermore, besides building positive social capital, the sheer presence of community civil organizations acts as an integrative agent within the community, bringing people together outside of the home (Putnam, 1993, 1995)—perhaps across communities (“bridging” as well as “bonding”). As such, the sheer presence of civil society organizations can create a sense of community inclusiveness that promotes both direct and indirect contact. Although, to date, civil society organizations have been mainly talked about and evaluated in the context of development-assistance programs, the discussion here clearly suggests that they can be useful in promoting stabilization and reconstruction.

3.2.1 Cautions

There are also obvious problems and challenges involved with efforts to develop civil society.

1. **Limited Reach.** Efforts aimed specifically at promoting social harmony and attitudinal change often fail to reach large enough numbers of people to support social change (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006).

2. **Lack of Sustainability.** International investments in civil society tend to be short-sighted and persist only as long as international engagement (World Bank, 2005; Donais, 2009). Thereafter, old patterns reemerge (Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein, 2009).
3. **Identifying Whom to Support.** Identifying the significant and appropriate actors to support can be problematic (Pouligny, 2005; World Bank, 2005), in part because a myriad of organizations may exist. Some may be politically motivated or marginalizing, such as organizations who operate exclusive programs along ethnic, gender, political or other lines; some will arise merely because of the prospect of donor funding; some deal with health, others with political advocacy, and still others with education; even worse, some may seek to undermine the intervention itself by funneling money to insurgents, a problem in today’s Afghanistan (Goodhand and Sedra, 2009).

4. **Capability of Civic Organizations.** The qualitative characteristics of organizations matter, not just their number. Many civil society organizations lack the absorptive capacity to collect and distribute aid in the same way that state bodies can (for the example of Sierra Leone, see Mitton, 2009).

5. **Undermining of Government.** In some cases, investments in civil society can undermine government authority or legitimacy, thereby contributing to long-run state weakness (World Bank, 2005). When the state is weak, civil society has the potential to overpower it (Burde, 2004) and to undercut intervenors’ efforts to strengthen the state.

One lesson might seem to be that civil society organizations should provide services that are complementary rather than supplementary to state services, so as to avoid undermining state legitimacy. Thus, the organizations should be partnered with government rather than sidestepping or subverting it. That is not always possible, however, as discussed in Chapter Seven. Further, in the extreme it presupposes the desirability of a strong state system rather than one that is more decentralized.

Another lesson from the literature is that external actors must be and appear even-handed in their support for civic organizations, especially when it comes to those closely associated with particular groups that were once party to the conflict.

On the difficult issue of how to choose which groups to support, there is no simple formula for guidance. However, it would seem that external support should go to organizations that include, in their core mission, providing locally oriented, socially and economically inclusive programs that promote nonviolence.

### 3.3 Media and Communication

Communication can improve understanding of issues and relationships, enhance positive aspects of identity, and generate norms of cooperation (Kerr et al., 1997). It can frame the course of interpersonal interactions, analyze interests, diffuse mistrust, and provide safe emotional outlets (Howard, 2002, p. 4). It can be a form of contact between groups, which plays a role in breaking down negative stereotypes. A professionalized media can improve cooperation by correcting information asymmetries and mitigating distrust and competitiveness (Kumar, 1999). Recently, the strategic use of media as a stability tool in post-conflict states has moved from strict reporting to delivering a message of peace, choosing information that has the potential to transform conflict, and shifting identities and attitudes (Howard, 2002).
Communication can be either active—via speeches or declarations of intent directed at members of other groups—or passive, via subconscious priming of attitudes. For example, media programs in Rwanda have included ethnically integrated cast members improve groups’ attitudes toward the other (Levy Paluck, 2007). The forms of media are numerous and include traditional newspapers, radio, and television programming with, increasingly, less expensive alternatives, such as dialogue projects and social media.

Strategic development of an independent media can be a tool for social reconstruction in several ways. The media can be used to spread messages of peace, reconciliation, and solidarity that reinforce other trust-building programs. Media can be a form of indirect contact between groups, as well as a medium for subconsciously challenging social attitudes. Media can disseminate message of reconciliation, peace, and apology from one group to another, which aids trust formation. As a mode of indirect contact, exposure, there is evidence to suggest that integrated media encourages social reconciliation (Levy Paluck, 2007). For example, research in Rwanda finds that reconciliation media has potential to affect perceptions and social norms, as well as attitudes about trust, integration, and truth (Levy Paluck, 2007).

3.3.1 Sequencing
In developing professional media in post-conflict environments, sequencing appears to be important. One study (Howard, 2002) suggests that media development needs to start with basic skills training in reporting and objectivity. Focus should then transition to building norms of independence and professionalism, which enhance both quality and credibility. Only later in development should the media be used for disseminating messages seeking to change attitudes. In all of this, long-term commitment is necessary if self-sustaining results are desired (Howard 2002, 2003; Kumar, 1999). Bosnia is a case in point: The Organization for Security and Cooperation was successful in building a free and independent media. However, many media outlets later ran into difficulty financially, and in the struggle to survive were forced into the arms of partisan groups.

3.3.2 Cautions
Despite the potential for good, many issues, problems, and dilemmas exist.

1. Sensationalism Sells. A truly free and independent media in post-conflict states has the potential to negatively impact peace and trust. Excess attention to incidents of intergroup violence and the need for simple, easily packaged ideas that rob situations of their complexity can easily be detrimental (Howard, 2003). To make thing worse, examples of positive cooperation or peaceful negotiations are relatively less exciting and are therefore underrepresented. This overreporting of negative events and underreporting of positive ones can severely affect perceptions of the situation.

It follows that to serve the functions of peace, media will require direction and guidance. Messages of peace must be actively disseminated, and journalists should be trained with an eye to emphasize peace-promoting media over sensationalist or conflict media (Lynch
and McGoldrick, 2005). Accomplishing this is not straightforward, especially when such “direction” can undercut independence and credibility.

2. **Misunderstanding and Misappropriation.** Another problem is that communications can be misinterpreted, and the media can be used as a conduit for identity politicians to exploit. Unclear, vague, or antagonistic communication across groups can increase suspicion and distrust (Howard, 2003). An even worse outcome would be the use of a newly instantiated media network by identity politicians to fuel intergroup competition, spread malicious ethnic myths, and reinforce negative stereotypes. Political entrepreneurs often use sensational media to reinforce negative stereotypes and enforce distrust between groups for their own political gain. Highly uncertain environments, such as those that characterize post-conflict situations, increase the willingness of individuals to accept such messages (Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Weingast, 1998).

It is clear, then, that while the media can have a potentially huge impact, it can be for good or bad. More research on such matters is needed so as to establish best practices for intervenors to work with.

### 3.4 Peace Education

The essential goal of peace education is to increase understanding and mutual respect between groups engaged in protracted conflict by acquiring “beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that are in line with the ideas of coexistence” (Bar-Tal, 2004 p. 261). Through learning about and empathizing with other groups, people engage in a collective process of attitude change and belief restructuring. The intent is to change a group’s narratives by (1) legitimizing the group’s own narrative, (2) examining the group’s own contribution to the conflict, (3) learning empathy for other groups’ suffering, and (4) promoting intergroup engagement in nonviolent activities (Salomon, 2002). Overall, the concept of peace education centers on the process of de-essentialization of one’s own group identity and humanization of the perception of other groups (Bekerman, Zembayas, and McGlynn, 2009).

How does peace education contribute to social reconstruction? Peace education contributes to intergroup trust by (1) establishing an arena for mutually respectful, equal-status contact between group members under the authority of an impartial third party (the teacher or administrator); (2) emphasizing the legitimacy of the cultural heritage of others and molding identity narratives; (3) building empathy for the suffering of the other groups in the conflict; (4) encouraging the acceptance of one’s own role in the conflict. Peace education attempts to draw experiential parallels between the histories of the two groups, thus identifying the similarities between them. This builds a basis for empathy and cross-group identification.

Peace education programs can be centered around either the formal schooling system or the society at large. Recognizing that the school system is a major agent of socialization for youth, desegregated, school-based peace education approaches have been tried in Israel and in universities in Northern Ireland. The societal approach also includes political, social, and cultural institutions and both leaders and elites. The societal approach is tactically much more involved and requires credible
in institutional support, the cooperation of agents from all areas of society, and that new norms are developed conjointly between groups (Bar-Tal, 2004).

The efficacy of school-based peace education in altering youth orientations to problem-solving and conflict is generally positive. While schooling alone has surprisingly little impact on specific issues, it seems to have a large positive impact in influencing the general orientation to problems, such as open-mindedness or predisposition to make judgments (McGuire, 1998). In accordance with this, Salomon (2004) finds that peace education in Israel, despite the ongoing violence, yields positive effects regarding the willingness of Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian youngsters to view a problem from multiple angles and engage in contact with members of other groups, but does not generally affect their specific political views. Yet another study (McGlynn, Niens, and Hewstone, 2004) summarizes several studies on the impact of integrated education in Northern Ireland and elsewhere and concludes that integrated education positively impacts identity, attitudes toward the outgroup, forgiveness, and reconciliation. The authors argue that the Northern Ireland success provides hope for other attempts at co-education to assuage legacies of violent conflict.

The effectiveness of the broader, social approach has not been assessed. The social approach obviously calls for a massive level of coordinated effort and cooperation, and it is by no means clear that politically competitive or adversarial agents in government, civil society, and international parties will be able to effectively coordinate and manage priorities where states are too weak to manage the effort alone.

### 3.4.1 Cautions

A number of cautions also need to be expressed.

1. A unified, committed leadership that can agree on and coordinate the continual dissemination of messages seems to be necessary. Achieving such a unified position among elites of a war-torn country may, however, be seemingly impossible.

2. The state must be prepared to take on the role as the main source of socialization. This may also be difficult to achieve. In the past, families and communities have traditionally been the main socializers of children in many post-conflict environments—e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. Families may be loathe to allow their children to attend a school where they believe their children will be taught to love people with whom they have been in such devastating conflict.

3. Although the literature to date is optimistic about the effects of peace education, most studies have dealt with relatively high-income countries that are either experiencing long-term protracted conflict (Cyprus, Israel) or have had a relatively successful peace for more than a decade (Northern Ireland). Northern Ireland and Israel are unusually wealthy compared with other post-conflict countries. It is uncertain how viable peace education will be in post-conflict states where other more basic needs are lacking.
3.5 Linkages
The reciprocal, self-reinforcing nature of social reconciliation, cooperation, trust, and social capital suggests “cocktail effects” in which the overall benefits to trust-building from several social programs can be significantly more than sum of the programs’ individual values. Also, the benefits to political and economic development can be improved by encouraging a variety of different interventions. For example, Mitton (2009) describes an instance in Sierra Leone in which the National Youth Council lobbied the government to establish a National Youth Commission, as part of the peace agreement. When the government was unresponsive, the council threatened to establish one independently, a move that received massive media attention and elicited a large public response. The Sierra Leonan government acquiesced and established the commission. Here, the ability of civil society to improve government responsiveness was enhanced by media coverage. Another example, given by Krabil (2001), is of the media coverage of the truth commission in South Africa. Media exposure of the truth commission spread the message of justice to a much larger number of people and brought the process of justice and reconciliation closer for many than would have been possible otherwise. Civil society organizations also helped contribute to the effectiveness of the by providing local information and support. Reciprocally, the peace commissions improved perceptions of state legitimacy by providing legitimate local channels of conflict resolution and mediation.

There is, in general, a substantial potential for such synergies in S&R. For example, imagine a situation in which civil-society organizations that deliver health services increase trust and social capital, which in turn strengthens the ability of the local watchdog agency to monitor government responsiveness, whose findings are relayed via the local media, which moves government to act, which increases perceptions of government legitimacy, which increases security and decreases mistrust, which promotes more cooperation. Another example might be a situation in which peace education socializes young people to have more accepting attitudes and brings integrated media programs into the home, where they have an opportunity to affect parents and other adults. Figure 10 illustrates potential linkages among the social interventions discussed in this chapter.
Figure 10: Illustrative Intervention-Program Linkages

Such reinforcing effects are not limited to processes within the social sphere. Social development can have positive effects on economic and political development and vice versa, a theme of the entire volume that will not be repeated here.

4. Integrative Considerations and Discussion

4.1 Context-Specificity: No “One-Size” Recommendations

Any successful cohesion-building program will benefit from an acute awareness of social dynamics, power structures, cultural narratives and identities, and local political economy—evidence again of the importance of local knowledge to successful post-conflict S&R. There is a great deal of variation in post-conflict situations. As examples, the challenges in Rwanda and Cambodia have been very different (e.g., with no groups to reconcile in Cambodia). Even understandings of trust and trustworthiness are culturally rooted and context-specific (Brune and Bossert, 2009). All post-conflict situations are influenced by their own political-economic and socio-cultural histories, which is why local ownership is so important. Donors and external actors, of course, often have difficulty escaping their own cultural frames (Donais, 2009; Pouligny, 2004).
Context specificity, by definition, means that no specific policy recommendations will work for all, or perhaps more than any one, situation.

Therefore, there seems to be a great need for developing frameworks or approaches to developing programs that allow for the satisfaction of social development goals by context-appropriate means, rather than on the identification of specific programmatic forms for use in many situations.

4.2 Sequencing of Trust-and-Cooperation-Relevant Interventions

While there is no clear-cut timeline for implementing social interventions in the post-conflict period, some recommendations for sequencing of programs emerge from the literature. Transitional justice, both retributive and restorative, cannot wait. Transitional justice mechanisms are consistently identified as paramount for post-conflict social reconciliation (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, 2003; Avruch and Vejarano, 2001; Cuevas, Rojas, and Baeza, 2002; Rotberg, 2000; Lundy and McGovern, 2008). Social reconciliation lays the foundation for the reconstruction of healthy social relationships characterized by cooperation. The details of violent experiences tend to fade fast (even if emotional memory remains strong), so getting individuals’ stories into the record as quickly and accurately as possible is important. Retributive justice is logistically harder and takes more time due to the bureaucracy involved in trying prisoners, yet international actors should not hesitate to make clear steps toward implementing formal trials and tribunals. Victims demand retribution, and a delay in providing it will only increase dissatisfaction.

Public and frequent communication between groups in the immediate post-conflict period can also be an aid to developing initial levels of post-conflict cooperation (see earlier discussion of “thin” trust). A well-negotiated peace agreement can be a good jumping off point for reiterating messages of cooperation, tolerance, and unity. Elites can have a very positive role in directing expectations via frequent, respectful communication.

Peace education programs, as previously noted, are clearly long-term prospects requiring unified leadership and infrastructure that may be very difficult to come by, and they divert resources away from more-effective interventions in the short term. Developing a professional media with a mission of promoting nonviolence and stability can be a good way to start moving toward a societal peace education program, by laying the foundation for the future dissemination of peace messages. Furthermore, the media can provide immediate benefits by increasing information in an insecure, information-scarce environment. A professional media that may be used as a tool for projecting information and positive messages can yield large and immediate benefits for S&R, as long as caution is taken to make sure that journalists are not seen as puppets of the intervenors.

Civil society is likely to be lacking in post-conflict situations. There is no clear recommendation for when and how to get involved with promoting civil society organizations. Benefits can be accrued in the short term if there are already some organizations that are capable of providing equal-access, inclusive, and stabilizing services that can partner with external agents. However, external agents should not be tempted to support weak or partisan organizations out of a need to do something; such efforts would be not only wasteful but also counterproductive, as discussed earlier.
Overall, some basic level of security needs to be established in order for social reconstruction to take place. In societies struggling with deep emotional turmoil and severely depleted social capital, the best intervenors can hope for at the beginning is cooperation motivated by “thin” trust. If intervenors cannot guarantee some security, including enforcement mechanisms, cooperation will be unlikely to occur at all, and social construction will be difficult to proceed with.

4.3 Local Ownership and Legitimacy: Relationships Cannot Be Decreed

Local ownership of reconstruction processes has been routinely identified in the reconstruction literature as a necessity for successful peace (Donais, 2009; Goodhand and Sedra, 2009; Duthie, 2009). Local ownership of projects and processes builds endogenous social capital, establishes procedural legitimacy, aligns projects to needs more efficiently, and improves community cooperation and collective action. Additionally, local ownership can help build local capacity to run programs when intervenors leave. Local authority also often enjoys greater legitimacy and confidence with citizens than external actors. Yet, there is still a dichotomy between rhetoric and practice in international intervention in post-conflict states.

The very notion of ownership is contested in some places, and donors have to negotiate with and choose between multiple state and nonstate interlocutors (Goodhand and Sedra, 2009):

This disjuncture between the local and the international does not only occur in relation to trust. . . . There is a danger that externally driven norms, practice, and expectations on trust are universalized, or assumed to have purchase in a wide range of societies. (Gormley-Heenan and MacGinty, 2009, p. 424)

The importation of external norms or institutions has a very short track record of success. When survivors do not have a stake in adjustments, they also lose incentives to perpetuate those changes (Pugh, 1998). In a space where debate on types of interventions, methods, and philosophy are still ongoing, there is overwhelming agreement that social capital cannot be developed externally; rather, processes of trust and social development must happen organically. Hence, it is argued that the best way for international actors to engage is in a supportive and/or consultative role rather than a directorial or leadership one. (World Bank, 2005; Donais, 2009; Pugh, 1998)

4.3.1 Cautions

As noted in the discussions of justice, despite these broad conclusions, intervenors cannot leave everything in the hands of locals. A prime example is that of post-conflict justice. International humanitarian law demands that war crimes be prosecuted, yet local governments have sometimes sought to provide amnesty to leaders in order to guarantee a peace. Conversely, external actors may wish to guarantee that local justice complies with minimum standards of international justice. Some local definitions of justice are not only considered extremely harsh but are in violation of international humanitarian norms—such as those prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment and those providing for equal protection (e.g., for women). External agents must walk a fine line between imposing external justice and making sure their legal and humanitarian obligations are met.
Another less obvious example is that of providing support to civil society organizations. While one goal of promoting the development of civil society is to bring members of different groups together under a common goal, imposing a standard of inclusion can be rejected by a traditionally segregated society. This in turn undermines social capital between the community and the peacekeepers, which makes maintaining order more difficult. Yet, encouraging “local ownership” by allowing civic organizations to deny access to membership or resources—such as providing funding to an organization that administers community health services only to members of certain groups, or that does not take measures to ensure that services are accessible to underprivileged groups—is antithetical to the goals of social reconstruction.

Yet it is important to remember that local ownership does not guarantee success. There is no shortage of cases where reconstruction efforts have failed to produce stability. As an example, the implementation of small government and conservative economic measures did not cause stable economic growth in East Timor but rather mass urbanization, which led to a resurgence of violence. While the idea of local ownership is highly supported in the literature, implementation that retains local autonomy while still achieving reconstruction aims and conforming to external parties’ humanitarian obligations is often more difficult. In the end, trade-offs will have to be made depending on the situation and context of each case.

4.4 Elites Have a Powerful Role

Elites can play an important, even crucial role in post-conflict S&R. Popular leaders are highly visible symbols of the past, present, and future. Leaders act as symbolic representations of the group they represent; they are assumed to speak on behalf of the group and to represent the group’s intentions and attitudes. As such, elites and leaders have symbolic power to encourage (or enforce) acceptance of new norms of cooperation and promote reconciliation. Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is probably one of history’s most remarkable positive examples for having created a modern nation and sense of nationality.

As role models and ideologues for situations torn by conflict, leaders have the potential to dramatically affect the reconciliation process. Elite apologies for past injustices have a profound effect on healing as a collective apology from one group to another (Blatz, Schumann, and Ross, 2009). An apology or expression of empathy by the leaders of one group not only sets an example for others in the group itself, but also encourages trust and reconciliation in members of other groups via the social tendency for reciprocity. Additionally, with the power to speak with authority for the group, leaders have the power to commit group members to certain actions or behaviors, so long as they do not go so far as to alienate the group.

Conversely, situations that are characterized by high levels of insecurity, as post-conflict situations tend to be, are ripe for exploitation by ethno-nationalist politicians who would distort narratives and representations to mobilize groups along identity lines (Brubaker and Laitin, 2005). Identity politicians often create dividing lines that pair ethnic, social, or other identities with political ones, which increases competition and conflict among groups (d’Estree, 2003; Brubaker, 2009). The
significance of the power-structure aspects and related exploitation of nationalism can be seen in a recent article (Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010).

Intervening third parties need to be especially mindful of the role of charismatic leaders who would use the cleavages between groups to mobilize political factions and take steps to mitigate their influence, by promoting social reconciliation and service delivery.

5. Conclusions
Trust and larger social capital-building processes in post-conflict situations are vital to the transition to social stability, but difficult to design and even more difficult to measure. They require long-term commitments and a finessed balance between top-down and bottom-up approaches; they can be undone by insufficient improvement(s) in the economic, political, or security arenas. The actual effectiveness of various types of interventions in the post-conflict setting is largely understudied.

While much analysis has gone into understanding the tactical components of war, there has been much less rigor in approaching the tactical aspects of peace, perhaps partly due to the nontransferrable nature of reconstruction and recovery programs across space and time as well as to the relative nascence of modern, large-scale state-building efforts.

Unfortunately, there is no one-size-fits-all plan for determining what programs are appropriate or how to implement them for the best result. The success of cohesion-building interventions depends on technical implementation, program interactions, and such context-specific factors as the strength of internal and international commitments. Successful peacebuilding will depend on understanding interactions across systems and monitoring-and-feedback systems that allow adjustment of programs to meet evolving needs. Part of local ownership requires including local actors and groups and listening responsively to their counsel about needs and technical implementation.

Social reconciliation and cohesion-building programs can improve social relations in post-conflict situations, but their contribution will depend largely on resources, long-term strategy, process ownership, and the overall network of interactions of political and economic structures within the social system.
Discussion

In this dissertation, I showed that current theories of faction behavior do not adequately predict faction behavior when applied within-case in Sierra Leone, but suggests that some combination of theory may be more useful. The failure of theory to account for behavior by the state military, and the military’s strong resemblance in many cases to the RUF, indicate a strong need to integrate militaries as parties to conflict in future models. The Uganda analysis finds strongly suggestive evidence of a negative social effect of aid-funded reception centers on former abductees’ social outcomes after fighting. This finding indicates a need for aid programs in conflict environments to funnel resources generally to communities without specifically targeting combatants. Finally, the survey and analysis of post-conflict reconciliation interventions indicates appropriate sequencing and interaction effects can be used to consolidate stability in the short- medium- and long-term after conflict. In this chapter, I discuss the policy design implications from the three studies undertaken as part of this dissertation and also theoretical and other directions for future research.

From Sierra Leone, the principal-agent and identification theories suggest a particular pre-conflict prevention policy – infrastructure that facilitates communication and reduces effective distance between urban and rural areas, particularly transport and telecommunications infrastructure. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identify opportunity as a key driver to conflict onset. Kalyvas (2006) notes that rural areas are easier to mobilize civilian support because rural civilians are less influenced by the state apparatus, and rebels are less detectable in rural areas. Johnston (2008) specifically alludes to the problems of monitoring discipline and compliance with central orders. All of these studies relate intimately to effective distance between center and periphery. All are in agreement that, the more remote the battle terrain, the more difficult it is for the state to achieve military effectiveness. Infrastructure-building in conflict-prone areas can reduce the onset, severity, and duration of conflict by reducing the costs of coordinating and monitoring counterinsurgency operations – which reduces the costs of monitoring and coordination between central and local commanders — and subsequently reducing rebels’ probability of success.

Further, stimulating economic activity and job creation in conflict-prone areas is closely linked to opportunity-cost models of conflict participation. Thus, to the extent that infrastructure encourages economic activity and provides direct and indirect employment, the opportunity cost of joining a rebel group should also increase and rebel recruitment should be deterred. This kind of intervention is likely most effective in the pre- and post-conflict periods. Security interests are unlikely to permit sustained construction operations in an ongoing conflict, and the impact of such a program would be depressed by the suspension of normal economic activity.

The behavior of the SLA suggests another pre-conflict prevention intervention – military professionalization. A professionalized militarily should reduce the incidence of onset since stronger militaries reduce the likelihood of rebel victory. It should also reduce the duration of conflict, since professional militaries are likely to be more military effective and chains of command better established and adhered to, which would have the additional benefit of reducing the incidence of
military ‘moonlighting’ for rebel groups as we saw with the SLA. There are two large hurdles in conflict-prone environments to building the capacity of the state military prior to conflict. The first is the state’s incentive to maintain a small and weak military to reduce the probability of a coup. The second is donors’ shyness about providing direct military support. The first hurdle seems larger than the second, but substantial pre-conflict aid to professionalize a military could be well-worth the investment and could also be used to leverage other institutional changes that create balance between the military and other state arms in addition to promoting overall better governance which in and of itself reduces the probability of conflict onset. Furthermore, development professionals need to understand civil-military relations, as they will be affected by development interventions, and, in turn, could affect the longevity of development interventions.

The application of theory within the Sierra Leone case suggests some gains to be had by combining certain aspects of the models to create a more comprehensive picture. For example, the principal-agent and selective incentives models focus on the inability of groups to maintain control and discipline as the cause of indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, a desire to loot does not necessarily have to coincide with a desire to commit violence. Control and discipline are means to curb indiscriminate violence, but control is only necessary when violence would occur without it. Both of these model types presuppose mechanisms that would promote indiscriminate violence without the presence of control. Do faction participants have to have a taste for violence? It is not unreasonable to think that this could be the case. Faction membership may create an opportunity, which those with preferences for violence are able to satisfy those preferences, and control mechanisms are needed to keep those desires in check. However, using Kalyvas’ identification problem we can find an alternate explanation. For Kalyvas, violence is a means of compelling civilian compliance and collaboration. For Kalyvas, indiscriminate violence occurs when groups are too weak to employ selective violence, either because (1) costs of identification are too high, or (2) groups cannot provide protection to civilians against other forces.

The three theories discussed in Sierra Leone propose a number of mechanisms that determine violence by factions. Each theory focuses on a small set of explanatory variables, but there is likely some benefit to combining the models when applying them within contexts, wherein the contributions of one variable can be attenuated by others from other models. Figure 11 below illustrates a potential example of this approach. Levels of violence are determined jointly by the causal variables suggested by the model. For example, where the flow of resources to factions is dependent on protection of civilian welfare, but the cost of identifying civilian detractors is high, we might expect to see moderate levels of indiscriminate violence, as these two factors act in opposite directions.

In the Sierra Leone example, even though the SLA looks much like the RUF in terms of structure and some behavior, the SLA was able to better manage indiscriminate violence against civilians. This could be due to reduced monitoring costs stemming from better communication and military technology relative to the RUF, or because the flow of SLA resources was at least partially tied to civilian welfare to the extent that established norms of war are to be respected by the SLA. Future
analyses could refine and take advantage of the combinatorial approach to predict not only the incidence but relative severity of civilian violence.

**Figure 11: Combinatorial Determinants of Violence?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High levels of indiscriminate violence</th>
<th>Low levels of indiscriminate violence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Flow of resources not dependent on civilian welfare, and</td>
<td>- Flow of resources closely tied to civilian welfare, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cost of monitoring local units by central command is high, and</td>
<td>- Central commanders can easily monitor and punish local commanders, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Costs of identifying civilian collaborators/detractors is high, and</td>
<td>- Costs of identifying civilian collaborators/detractors is low, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Competing groups are relatively effective</td>
<td>- Competing groups are relatively ineffective</td>
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The results from Uganda call into question the usefulness of uncoordinated or informal assistance efforts to aid reintegration of child soldiers and require aid donors to rethink their programming in conflict-affected situations. Recent DDR learning has taught practitioners that targeting aid to former combatants can have unintended negative consequences, and practitioners have therefore moved towards providing assistance and development programs to entire communities that receive ex-combatants. Moreover, depictions of the Acholi culture, the predominant ethnic group in northern Uganda affected by the war, note that work is seen as a key way for young people to become involved in their communities and participate both socially and economically. The absence of work may contribute to the poor social outcomes. If this is true, it suggests that providing employment rather than aid is a more useful way to facilitate reintegration.

The data used in the analysis was collected at a time when approximately 90 percent of the regional population was living in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Qualitative analyses note that the social and economic fabric of the region was severely strained by this situation. The analysis alludes to potential interactions between the extreme poverty and deprivation experienced by community members and aid received by returnees. A useful follow-up to this analysis would evaluate how center attendees are faring now that communities are no longer situated in camps and life is returning to normal. Other useful follow-ups would include greater evaluation of informal DDR and
aid programs in conflict environments, since aid programs are frequently involved in conflict-prone and conflict-affected environments.

The analysis of trust- and cooperation-building suggests an opportunity to strategically sequence interventions to build cooperative behavior at different levels of society. In the near term at the elite level, the presence of a neutral mediator helps to (1) clarify and interpret messages from factions, (2) provides a mechanism through which factions can make credible commitments with diminished probability of defection by their partners, and (3) moderate sustained, repeated, and equal-status interactions to build a history of cooperation within a new institutional context. At the population level, transitional justice mechanisms can (1) establish a common narrative, (2) encourage apology and restitution, and (3) attribute blame to individuals rather than to groups. In the near-term, interventions should lay the foundation for mid-term programs that can build off the successes of immediate gains. A clear example is to actively build norms of professional journalism in the near-term so that in the medium-term the media can be relied upon to clearly report verifiable facts instead of rumors or hearsay. Another useful activity in the near-term to set the stage for longer-term activities is to do due diligence on civil society organizations to identify their capacity and ideology so that high-capacity, neutral organizations can be heavily used to (1) distribute pro-trust propaganda; (2) facilitate equal-status interactions at the local level; (3) moderate public discourse; and (4) promote common identities. Civil society organizations at the local level have the potential to do what third-party intervenors do at the elite level – encourage the establishment of a history of successful cooperation. As the literature shows, this is most effective when civil society is unbiased and capable. Doing due diligence in the early phase seems likely to pay off in the long-term.

The issue of appropriate sequence and the interactions between programs suggests a benefit to having a long-term strategic or master plan to guide post-conflict recovery efforts through the donor period and after. Similar to countries’ 10- or 20-year economic strategic plans, such a plan would specify goals, objectives, and planned activities in the short-term (three to five year), medium-term (five to ten years) and long-term (10-20 years or beyond) that would guide the post-conflict society’s programming for consolidation of peace within the confines of whatever new structures result as part of the new post-conflict institutional arrangements. Notwithstanding the need to review, update or revise at regular intervals according to real-time developments, such a plan could provide (1) clarity about long-term goals and objectives for the society in general; (2) provide continuity, guidance, and clarity about those goals when donors leave or power changes hands; (3) provide guidance to future donors about the appropriate context for their programs, and (4) clearly specify the order, sequence, and appropriateness of trust- and cooperation-building initiatives within the new institutional and economic context.

The analysis also indicates that currently a large emphasis is placed on near-term timelines, evidenced by the large amount of literature on transitional justice and the relative scarcity of evidence on the effectiveness of other interventions with a longer-term focus. This aligns with
intervention timelines, which are commonly between 3-5 years post-conflict, but are not necessarily sufficient to consolidate peace.

This disconnect leads us to seek new ways to align donor funds with more appropriate time horizons. One potential way to overcome this challenge is to establish “recovery funds” whereby donors contribute large sums up front which are managed by professional financial managers and whose gains are applied directly to medium and long-term recovery issues according to a master plan that is identified and developed during the first few post-conflict years when intervenor involvement is most intense. At the end of the fund’s mandate, funds could be returned to donors or cycled into other funds. This would be too risky on a three to five year time horizon, but risk would be significantly diminished over a much longer timeline.

In sum, the overall results point strongly to a need for thoughtful policy in conflict environments that identifies and aligns local and external incentives in a strategic, planned, and coordinated manner. Specific conflict prevention initiatives targeted towards military professionalization and infrastructure building could reduce conflict onset and severity. Reintegration programs need to focus more holistically on communities and families than on individuals. Post-conflict recovery programs need to find ways to align donor timelines and resources with long-term nation-building needs.
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Dissertation

Three Studies in Conflict

Elizabeth Wilke

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