Political Leadership in Afghanistan

Identifying and Assessing Determining Factors

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This document was submitted as a dissertation in January 2016 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Terrence Kelly (Chair), Gery Ryan, and Thomas Szayna.

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Perhaps no question is as central to political discourse as that of political leadership. For if there is an “irreducible fact” of politics, it is that in many political society some shall be the rulers and some the ruled (Dahl and Neubauer, 1968).

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PREFACE

This dissertation is written in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Policy Research and Analysis by Pardee RAND Graduate School. The committee that approved this dissertation on December 14th 2015 consisted of Terrence Kelly (Chairman), Gery Ryan, Thomas Szayna, and Francis Fukuyama (external advisor).

The study is designed to explore the socio-cultural norms, expectations, and values of the Afghan people for good political leadership, and assess variations across different ethnic groups. The effort aims to examine if the socio-cultural norms and values of the Afghan society are to be credited or blamed for the patterns of political leadership that have emerged in the past five decades.

The analysis and policy recommendation provided in this document will be of interest to individuals concerned with political leadership and factors that determine good leadership in the context of Afghanistan. Some of the issues discussed in this study could be defined as time sensitive, meaning more relevant to the time of the study rather than a distance time in the future. But most conclusions and policy recommendations of the study will likely remain relevant for several decades to come.

The views expressed in this study are those of the author, they should not be interpreted as representing the view of the institutions and individuals who provided the technical and financial support, and/or any individual cited herein.

ABSTRACT

Afghanistan is a country where national institutions are weak, if they exist at all. Any socio-political change is initiated and enforced through strong political initiatives exhibited by unique individuals with charismatic leadership capacity. Even after the end of Afghanistan's isolation in 2002, and excessive foreign investment in building institutions, many experts believe that the process has not lived up to expectations, partly because Afghans tend to mobilize around individuals and do not treat institutions seriously. This study takes those beliefs as a starting point and explores the factors that lead to a political leader in Afghanistan being defined as "good," "strong," or "popular"—as well as what needs to be done to improve political leadership for future generations, given cultural consensus on characteristics of good political leadership.

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SUMMARY

Since the fall of the royal system in 1973, Afghanistan has faced repeated failure -- or at least crisis -- of political leadership. Many Afghans believe that this is because other powerful countries use their economic and military power to install leaders of their own choice in Afghanistan. Historical anecdotes support their theory. The British installed Shah Shuja, the Russians installed communist leaders, the Pakistanis endorsed Mujahideen fighters, and recently the U.S. installed Hamid Karzai to shape Afghanistan's political landscape to their advantage. Foreign experts of Afghanistan also ask the very same questions, but answer them based on their own theoretical assumptions. Some experts believe that crisis in political leadership is happening because the country's educational system has failed since the collapse of the royal system. Some other experts believe it is the ethnic conflict and political legitimacy crisis of Pashtun dynasties that is causing political leadership failures. And, there are other experts who think it is the conflict between educated urbanites and the puritan-rural-uneducated villagers of Afghanistan that has produced consistent leadership failures in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is a country where national institutions are weak, if existing at all. Any socio-political change is initiated and enforced through strong political initiatives exhibited by unique individuals with charismatic leadership capacity. Even after the end of Afghanistan's isolation in 2002, and excessive foreign investment in building institutions, many experts believe that the process has not lived up to expectations, partly because Afghans tend to mobilize around individuals and do not treat institutions seriously.

This study takes those beliefs as the starting point and tries to answer questions such as; what is it that makes a political leader “good”, “strong” or “popular” for the people of Afghanistan? Is there any nationwide consensus on the characteristics of good leadership among the Afghans? If yes, what characteristics? If not, what variations exist across different segments of population? And finally, what needs to be done to improve political leadership for future generations, given cultural consensus on characteristics of good political leadership?

The study explores Afghan’s socio-cultural values, norms and attitudes to find a meaningful answer for these questions. It uses systematic analytical methods such as cultural consensus analysis, psychometric analysis, and social network analysis to determine underlying constructs in the minds of Afghans when they think about good political leadership. The study relies on primary data collected from 18 different geographical regions of Afghanistan in two different stages of data collection during 2012 and 2013. A total of 63 individuals were interviewed during the first stage of data collection, and their answers were used to determine key questions for a large scale second stage data collection, which was then administered through interviews of 568 respondents with a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. Through the study, one question has underlain the process of research; what do the Afghans want to see in a political leader before they define him/her as a “good” leader and decide to follow him/her?

The study suggests that some of the theoretical assumptions in the analyses of Western experts are probably correct. There are detectable signs of ethnic conflict at the level of socio-political norms, values and attitudes of Afghans. The study also suggests that majority of Afghan political leaders are not popular among the people of Afghanistan. Only a few political leaders – long deceased – seem to be scored somewhat positively. When Afghans think about

their political leaders and try to judge their measure of “goodness”, their thoughts are mostly driven by the following underlying constructs:

1. Definition of “Goodness” in the context of political leadership: The most important construct was what I define here as the people of Afghanistan’s definition of what makes a political leader good and popular. Key proxy variables that Afghans picked for evaluation and scored, included:
 - a. How just, honest, and truthful a leader is in his/her behavior.
 - b. How decisive a political leader is.
 - c. How much capacity he/she has for “governing” the country (the word used in responses was “management”).
 - d. The level of leader’s passion and love for the country.
 - e. The level of leader’s respect for the law and endorsement of laws.
 - f. Does the leader have a clear political agenda?
 - g. Does he/she believe in God?
 - h. To what extent does the leader discriminate on the basis of ethnic identity?
 - i. How much he/she accepts responsibility.
 - j. Is the leader elected through an election?
2. The second most important construct in the minds of Afghans when thinking about good political leader was defined as Afghans’ measure of Islamic behavior. The proxies that most Afghans were measuring in this regard, included:
 - a. Does the leader have religious education?
 - b. Is the leader highly educated?

- c. Does the leader fight the foreigners?
 - d. Is the leader willing to let the foreigners in the country?
 - e. Is the leader selected through a tribal Jirga?
3. The third most significant construct in Afghans mind was what I define as the measure of adhering to Pashtun values. The key proxy measures that Afghans scored in this regard, were:
- a. The leader putting on a turban.
 - b. The leader putting on Perahan Tunban (traditional shalwar kamis).
 - c. The leader being from Kandahar.
 - d. The leader belonging to a noble family.
 - e. The leader who treats all ethnic groups equally, and
 - f. The leader who is not young.
4. A fourth construct that Afghans emphasized had to do with the measure of trust, dependability and accountability of political leaders. Afghans mostly judged proxy measures such as:
- a. Does the political leader have family outside the country?
 - b. Is the spouse of the political leader a foreigner?
 - c. Does the leader own a business outside the country?
 - d. Does the leader own a property (house) outside the country?

These underlying constructs were determined as mostly influencing Afghans when they thought about a good political leader in the absence of an identity for the leader. That means respondents were judging goodness of political leadership without discussing any specific

political leader. When the questions included identity of a current or past specific political leader, the underlying constructs that determined their judgements changed. In this case the most important construct that influenced their views included:

1. Ethnic identity of political leaders: Respondents measured leader's goodness and popularity under strong influence of their ethnic backgrounds. Tajik identity was determined to be the strongest construct in Afghan's minds, followed by the Pashtun ethnic identity, and then Hazara ethnic identity as the fourth underlying construct. That means respondents on average scored leaders of the same ethnic group similarly.
2. The third most significant construct that influenced Afghans views were the gender of the political leader as well as their attitudes towards women's rights and dislike of Jehadi parties. This was the only major construct that had nothing to do with ethnicity but still reached the same level of importance in Afghans' minds.
3. Other than ethnicity, gender, and pro-women's rights – anti Jehadi constructs, I found eight additional constructs that were not very significant, but important enough to distinguish. These constructs included:
 - a. Belonging to Karzai's family.
 - b. Belonging to the inner circle of Karzai's power structure.
 - c. Belonging to communist parties.
 - d. Belonging to radical Islamist parties.
 - e. Belonging to pro-west technocrat diaspora.
 - f. Belonging to radical Pashtun nationalist groups.
 - g. Belonging to radical Tajik nationalist groups.

h. Being vice presidents in Karzai governments.

Given these findings the study concludes that the most important determinants of being perceived a good political leader for the people of Afghanistan may include the following characteristics:

1. Perception of people about how just, honest, and truthful the leader is.
2. Governing capacity of a leader.
3. Ethnicity background of a leader.
4. Educational background of a leader.
5. Islamic knowledge of a leader.
6. Sense of belonging of a leader to the society.
7. Political ideology of a leader.

The study concludes with policy implication of the findings for future generations of Afghanistan. It acknowledges the fact that policy environment of Afghanistan is unique and challenging. While established institutions are needed to endorse policy reforms and improve political leadership, the leadership is needed before that to establish the necessary institutions. Therefore, policy recommendations are addressed towards a group of young and educated “transitional” leaders of Afghans who can break the chicken and the egg cycle, and serve as the founding fathers of political leadership reform.

Key policy recommendations are focused on the reform of the country’s judiciary system to improve legitimacy of future political leaders. The study reveals that Afghans strongly associate prevalence of justice with the quality of political leadership, and therefore expect any good

leader to prove his or her goodness by prevailing justice in the society. However, it is a daunting task to reform the existing judiciary system of the country without having a very strong political leadership first. Therefore, it is suggested that the focus be directed towards boosting traditional—unofficial—local judiciary system of the country and work with village elders to reduce the demand for official judiciary system which is highly corrupt and politicized.

The study also suggests that in the minds of the Afghan, a good leader also means a good governor or a good ruler who is accessible by the people. They expect a good leader to govern honestly, decisively, and live within close proximity of people so they have access to him/her all the time. The policy recommendation in this regard is oriented towards policy of especial leadership education, recruitment and promotion of leadership positions. This suggests that current system of political appointees should be changed to a system of merit, and promotion should always remain systematic. No provincial governor should be able to get the job unless a candidate has first served in a district governor position for a certain period of time, and no candidate should be given the job of district governorship unless he/she has gone through especial leadership training program first. Systematic promotion will not only help leaders to build their governing capacity, which is a very important expectation of Afghans from their political leaders, but also allow politicians to live in close proximity of people and develop the bonds of trust and dependability.

Another characteristic of good political leadership that was strongly detected by the underlying construct analysis was degree to which a leader is affected by power itself. That means when Afghan leaders are in a position of power they tend to act as if they are above the law. Afghans have become cognizant of this effect of power, and believe a good leader is

someone who can resist these negative effects and remain humble even after he/she is in power. Research shows that Afghans appreciate such characteristics as accepting responsibility, being elected through an election, respecting & enforcing the laws, and believing in God, all of which emphasize the effects of power on a leader's behavior. The study suggests three prime policy reforms; A) ensure that future leaders have social science education to understand how violations of laws and norms can set the example for everyone to follow the suit, B) enforce several measures of power-containing policy so as to strengthen the resilience of future leaders to the negative effects of power, and finally, C) establish methods of checks and balances so as to reduce chances of overruling to protect images of good leadership for the future.

The second strongest underlying construct in Afghans' mind when they think about good political leadership is formed by the degree of "radical Islamic dogmatism". In part it is a product of sustained international support to religious schools during the Cold War, and partly it reflects the nature of the Afghan society. Afghanistan has always been a religious country with very low level of education for the bulk of its modern history. Promoting modern education is probably the best policy to reduce religious radicalism in Afghanistan. The current leaders of Afghanistan need to commit themselves to support sustained modern education for two to three more generations to reduce the effects of religious dogmatism in the country. It is also an important policy priority for the international community to commit funding for public school education program so the choice of education is not limited to the religious schools which are highly radicalized due to the era of Jihad and Cold War. Making education available for the next few generations of Afghans can overcome this challenge. It is equally important to reduce the flow of funding to religious madrasas so that future leaders are not forced by the religious

views of their followers to become more religiously dogmatic. Afghans expect a good leader to fight foreigners which is a mindset borrowed from the era of colonialism. Future generations of Afghanistan need to be educated on how the global political system works, the possible rationale to go to war with another country, and how to develop the country's international relationships so as to maximize the prosperity of the country.

Finally, there has always been a common understanding about Afghanistan that Afghans assess their political leaders on the basis of how successful they are in the provision of security and economic opportunities. My findings suggest that good leadership is not as much defined on the basis of reducing conflict and poverty, as in the context of social and cultural values of the country. Afghans expect their political leaders to be highly knowledgeable and capable of guiding them in their social life. The common word that Afghans use for the term "leader" is "Rahbar" which literally means a guide. Future generations of leaders need to understand these bases of socio-cultural expectations of Afghan population. Better level of education in social sciences will help them in many different dimensions of leadership challenges. For example, future Afghan leaders need to understand the most important factors that determine people's judgment about good political leaders. For instance, it is important that future leaders understand that justice and honesty are important political values for the people of Afghanistan. Data suggest that ethnic divergence happens when respondents evaluate political leaders. Divergences are mostly driven by diversity of norms and values among different segments of Afghan population. Future political leaders need to understand such characteristics of the society and be prepared to overcome the challenge of diversity in cultural norms. At the very least, they need to know where norms and values become critically important to certain ethnic groups of

Afghanistan, and adjust their policy decisions accordingly. Establishment of a political leadership institute and including leadership skills in the educational system can pave the road for future leaders of the country.

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Thank you.

ABBREVIATIONS

FA	Factor Analysis
CA	Correspondence Analysis
CCA	Cultural Consensus Analysis
SNA	Social Network Analysis

CH – 1: INTRODUCTION

Variations exist in norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes of different ethnic groups of Afghanistan when judging the characteristics of a good political leader. This study seeks to explore the socio-cultural norms, expectations, and values of the Afghan people for good political leadership, and assess variations across different ethnic groups. This effort aims to examine if the socio-cultural norms and values of the Afghan society are to be credited or blamed for the patterns of political leadership that have emerged in the past five decades.

The academic objective of this research is to explore the culturally correct answer to the question of what are the most important characteristics for a good political leader in Afghanistan. However, the policy objective of the study is to seek areas of value, norm, or attitude divergence and ways to pave the road for better political leadership in Afghanistan.

To address these goals, this dissertation addresses these four main research questions:

- To what degree do Afghans have a shared understanding of good leadership?
- If Afghans have a shared understanding, what constitutes commonalities?
- How do Afghans differ in their understanding of good leadership?
- How does their understanding vary by ethnicity, gender and social class?

To address these questions, this study uses a two-stage research design. In the first stage, exploratory data were collected in late 2012 with semi-structured interview of 63 interviewees randomly selected from different strata of cultural geography of Afghanistan. In the second

stage, standardized survey data were collected from 568 respondents across 18 different provinces of Afghanistan in early 2013. To assess patterns between similarities and differences in people's beliefs about the characteristics of an effective political leader, various methods were used, including cultural consensus analysis (CCA)¹, factor analysis (FA), correspondence analysis (CA), and social network analysis (SNA).

As part of a secondary objective, this study reviews recent theories of political leadership in academic circles to establish a baseline for comparison with the findings from Afghanistan, and then uses the contrast to formulate policy recommendations for the development of educational system, and future political institutions of Afghanistan. Key policy recommendations are focused on such questions as:

- How can the educational system in Afghanistan promote cultural acceptance and harmony among different ethnic groups in the country?
- How can the educational system pave the road for the emergence of future political leaders who are culturally mindful?
- What policy changes in political institutions can help Afghanistan's future political parties accommodate for the growth of culturally aware political leaders?
- What kind of public awareness can help raise awareness among Afghans of the critical differences in their cultural norms, especially about choices of political leadership and future political development of their country?

¹ See, for example, Romney et al. (1986).

Finally, this research aims to generate policy input that could be relevant to the political development of Afghanistan, and identify areas for additional research to be carried out in the future.

Impact on Policy

Since 1774, when Afghanistan was first established as a state, the country has experienced a total 34 transitions in political leadership, with an average ruling period lasting 7.9 years, but some ruling up to 40 years and others just a few months. However, in the past 50 years, these transitions have become more frequent, with the average ruling period dropping to about 3.6 years per leader; only one leader was able to remain in office for seven years. In several cases, Afghanistan has seen two rulers assuming the position in the same year. Many average citizens of Afghanistan, including highly educated Afghans, said they believe this is happening because foreign countries determine who should rule in Afghanistan. The idea of what determines an effective political leader for the Afghans has never been studied academically, and, therefore, presents the question of why Afghans revolt frequently against their political leaders regardless of their competency.

While this study is not going to focus on the political and economic reasons of political transitions of Afghanistan, it will highlight how various groups of Afghans perceive and judge characteristics of effective political leadership in different ways. These perceptions are important because they will affect collective judgment of Afghans on the success of a political leader, and, thus, the legitimacy of his rule. Exploring these perceptions can help identify where different groups of Afghans disagree, particularly about norms and values.

Historical Background

The modern history of Afghanistan begins with the rule of King Abdul Rahman Khan in 1880. King Abdul Rahmani and two generations of his children tried to build a modern education system for the country to establish a group of political elites so they can guide the future generations of Afghanistan systematically, but the process was disrupted after political failure of King Amanullah in 1929. The first modern high school in Afghanistan—constructed by the United States—was established around 1903, which later become a symbol of friendship between the two countries. A decade later, Germany and France built two additional high schools, which later became iconic symbols of friendship with those two European powers. King Zahir Shah expanded the initiative and provided educational facilities to about 50 percent of the country's population by 1970. These schools produced most of Afghan political leaders through the rest of the century.² As expected, these early century educational investments paid off by the middle of the century when the country moved full speed toward growth, democracy, and modern social life.

It was during this period of cultural, political and economic optimization, that a new wave of power competition within the royal family opened doors toward political failures that came in the second half of the 20th century, and continues to date. A few regional and domestic events constituted the basis of a political rivalry within the family:

- Loss of territory to British India in 1892

² Some examples of political leaders who have graduated from Habibia High School in Kabul, Afghanistan, include King Zahir Khan, President Mohammad Najibullah, President Hamid Karzai, President Sibghatullah Mujadidi, Prime Minister Maiwandwal, Minister Raheen, and Minister Rahim Wardak.

- The political awakening effects of education in all ethnic groups of Afghanistan, which in turn caused the rise of political competition challenging the myth of Pashtun rule
- The belief that Pashtuns should maintain monopoly of political power.

While the loss of territory to British India was a major setback to Pashtun power, Afghans had no choice, as they could not challenge a super power but hoped to one day reclaim the lost land. However, by 1947, when the territory was handed over to a new political entity, Pakistan, Afghan rulers become very concerned about the permanent loss of this territory. Afghanistan's relationship with the new neighbor became unfriendly from the beginning.³ While no Afghan government has officially reclaimed the territory, Pashtun politicians frequently use the issue for domestic political purposes, especially when it serves the interest of Pashtun power projection against other ethnic groups. For example, former President Hamid Karzai constantly used anti-Pakistan policy during his rule, 2002 – 2014, especially when he discovered that a democratic process could deprive Pashtuns from the top power positions. Karzai also used old Pashtun grievances with Pakistan to isolate the chances of being punished by the Pashtun tribes for being a puppet of the Western powers.

In 1929, the overthrow of King Amanullah by the religiously motivated peasants of northern plains of Kabul, and subsequent takeover by a Tajik leader, Habibullah Kalakani, caused Pashtun political elites to become too conservative in their policies toward political awakening and thus empowerment of other ethnic groups. King Nader Shah and his brothers implemented a series of policies, 1929 – 1943 to deprive other ethnic groups of education and other aspects of social

³ “We and Pakistan,” a collection of articles by Akram Andishmand published by local publisher, Maiwan, in Afghanistan.

status to prevent future loss of political power. These conservative policies reversed much of the educational effects of early investments by King Abdul Rahman and his children before 1929. Education typically increases demand for political participation, and Afghanistan was not an exception to the rule. These two opposing events—efforts to consolidate Pashtun rule while increasing demand for broader political participation—could hardly coexist at the same time. It was for this reason that King Zahir Shah reversed the policies of his uncles and tried to open up the political space to everyone in order to stabilize domestic political problems and focus on foreign policy issues, such as the loss of territory to British. The decade of democracy was a very good outcome of the policy measures King Zahir Shah put in effect.

However, he soon faced political pressure from within his own family to reverse some of those policies. For example, his cousin, future President Daoud, who was also his prime minister from 1953 to 1963, used the grievances of territorial loss to Pakistan as a means for increasing his political weight in the elite community of Afghanistan. He pushed for policies that brought relations between the two countries to its knees at one time. Eventually, King Zahir decided to remove Daoud from his post as prime minister, and in 1963 constitution he passed legislation banning members of the royal family from rising to positions of power. This was the turning point when a major crack emerged in the integrity of the royal family, which eventually caused total collapse of the royal system. Daoud joined other political parties that emerged during the decade of democracy and removed the king from power through a military coup in 1973. Since then, political stability has never come back to Afghanistan.

One of the very important outcomes of this period was a reiteration of Pashtun domination, and association of political power with the Pashtun culture and history. While the rulers did it

for specific political objectives (initially foreign policy, and later domestic political consolidation) they never considered the negative effects of that on diverging values, norms and attitudes among the Afghan population over time. Since then, Afghan political elites never consulted political science on the viability of a power monopoly doctrine, or its long term effects on political stability of the country. Afghanistan moved toward the Cold War era (a completely different phenomenon that had nothing to do with Afghanistan's domestic or regional issues) other ethnic groups found the opportunity to expand their political power and claim bigger space in Afghanistan's political space. Moving forward, with the beginning of the war on terrorism and return of democratic system to the country, the issue of power monopoly faced serious contests. It was not easy for the contemporary Pashtun politicians to find a solution to this problem. Thus, they bypassed established processes and paid off politicians to get around democratic rules and save Pashtuns political domination. Karzai and his political advisers ignored constitutionally mandated democratic rules many times to secure power for the Pashtuns. The 2010 election win of parliamentary seats in the Ghazni province by the Hazaras is an example of how Karzai circumvented the democratic process to ensure Pashtuns remain in power.⁴

However, for future generations of Afghans, it is very important to understand that the effects of political decisions in the 20th century have created critical divides between ethnic groups that go beyond the power rivalry of the political elites. The political rhetoric of several decades has now created certain cultural norms and values for the new generations of the Pashtuns and other ethnic groups that can pose challenges for a democratic Afghanistan. The concepts of political

4 See, for example, "Karzai Backs Down from Afghan Leaders," January 22, 2011, USA Today, web page.

leadership, power and state have been linked with Pashtun cultural norms that, for all practical reasons, make it hard for people to elect their new leaders through fair and transparent elections. The 2004, 2009, and 2014 presidential elections, as well as decisions of Bonn Accord, have all been affected by the challenge of whether a person from another ethnic group can become Afghan President if he has the majority vote of the people. If Afghanistan is supposed to come out of its violent and political instability, future generations of Afghanistan need to review and examine carefully how attitudinal divisions have ruined their political life. More specifically, how their norms and values have damaged processes that can affect their country's political leadership, state governance, and democratic transition of power.

This research is a small step toward testing the hypothesis of whether there are significant differences between the Pashtun and non-Pashtun ethnic groups when it comes to their views about the characteristics of good political leadership. While the findings of this research might not present a complete picture of ethnic divide over values and norms in Afghanistan, it does explain how the Pashtun and non-Pashtun ethnic groups define good political leadership differently. The main objective of this study is to detect differences, if they exist, and the distribution of these differences across geography, gender, age, and other social strata. Many experts and observers of Afghanistan agree that the problem of good political leadership is probably central to any political order and future stability of Afghanistan (Wilson, 2011). Afghanistan is facing a political divide along its ethnic lines, and defining characteristic of good political leadership that are demanded by different ethnic groups could be central to future stability of the country. Many researchers in this area agree that “political leadership and

followership account for significant differences across and within individual nation states” (Masciulli et al., 2009).

There is very little agreement among scholars of political science that the causal relationship between good leadership and political popularity is one way stronger than the other ways. However, there is more agreement that society’s norms and cultural beliefs impact the views of political leaders, because political leaders act like entrepreneurs and adopt themselves to the societal norms and demands for political leadership. Both leaders and followers are involved in a circular process of motivation and power exchange that is often difficult to break into a causal sequence (Wildavsky, 2006). Leaders influence their followers as much as followers influence their leaders. However, when it comes to the most important variables that shape the demand side of the political leadership in Afghanistan, social and cultural norms will probably stand alone.

In this research, firsthand empirical evidence from Afghanistan is used to assess how social and cultural norms from different ethnic groups affect the popularity of different political leaders. The study does not intend to answer all questions about the challenges of political leadership in Afghanistan. Because of the limitation of resources and access to larger groups of population, more fundamental questions will have to be answered through future research by the Afghan political scientists.

Finally, it is important to note that the method used in this research could be applied to understating similar questions regarding political leadership and distribution of views and norms

in other countries and cultures. As such, this dissertation also makes small contribution to understanding of how to address these questions in other contexts.

Impact on research

There are two sets of literature that are relevant to this dissertation:

- Latest theories of political leadership in general, which is a very large body of literature, but to a great extent not central to the main thesis of this study.
- Academic research on the political leadership of Afghanistan, which does not exceed a dozen sources, and the best of which is focused on the model of leadership among a Pashtun tribe (Yusoufzai) in the northern valleys of Pakistan (Barth, 1959).

Modern theories of political leadership frequently disapprove the idea of the “big-man” approach to successful leadership. Recent academic literature places greater emphasis on the harmony of cultural norms, values, and beliefs of leaders and followers as the most important determinants of successful leadership. Robert Cialdini (2001) argues if the leadership is about “getting things done through others” then it is logically meaningful to ask the question of what factors make the followers listen to their political leader. Such factors should contain characteristics, behavior patterns, policy choices, or any other processes or mental stimulators that are important for the followers and that allow the leader to stimulate those factors to influence his/her followers. Topics such as psychology of leadership, psychology of politicians, and leader-followership relations aggressively discuss the impact of surroundings in which leaders emerge and succeed. While there is not much agreement on how characteristics of an individual leader can shape the course of history for a country—except for some exceptional

cases such as U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Ministers Stanley Baldwin (Hamby, 2006, 233) and Winston Churchill (Lord, 2003); Lenin (Service, 2000); Deng Xiaoping (Shambaugh, 1995); and even radical leaders such as Mao, Stalin and Hitler (Tucker, 1987)—there is considerable consensus among scholars that social, cultural, and psychological factors of a society influence the views and behaviors of political leaders to a great extent. Some scholars believe that “the operation of psychological processes always depends upon social context” (Israel and Tajfel, 1972). Most scholars agree that the social and cultural norms, as well as psychological conditions of the environment in which leaders emerge, determine the views and future actions of political leaders. The authors of “The New Psychology of Leadership” argue that the social and contextual factors that impact a leader’s capacity to influence others include the culture of the group that is being led, as well as that of the broader society in which the group belongs (Haslam, Reicher and Platow, 2011). Nye believes that in order to “understand, explain and predict patterns of political leadership ... inquirers need to analyze the beliefs, values, characters, ... attitudes [of] followers, as well as their historical situation and cultural-institutional context” (Nye, 2008). Moreover, leadership seems to be a symbolic activity mediated by social and cultural norms. Leaders as the entrepreneurs of social and cultural norms are engaged in providing a vision to create, reshape or enhance these characteristics. What is interesting is that in the process, leaders and followers themselves get reshaped by what they help shape (Rousseau, 1987). Therefore, scholars raise such questions as: Do leaders really shape history, or is it the historical forces that primarily shape them? Why do followers follow leaders? Is it because of leaders’ charismatic characteristics, actions, and thoughts; or it is simply the socioeconomic self-interest of the followers? What part of a leader’s characteristics,

behaviors, and personalities are regarded as the personal property of the leader; and what part of it as a mere reflection of the predominant social, cultural and economic forces? (Masciulli et al., 2009)

On the other hand, “a growing number of political analysts see leadership as ... some kind of process ... that in some way gets people to do something’, or involves ‘some sort of relationship between leaders and followers in which something happens or gets done” (Ciulla, 1998; Burns, 1978). In this perspective, leaders affect their followers’ attitudes, beliefs, demands and needs; and the followers affect the leader’s characteristics, qualities, beliefs and motivations, as they both transform the society together and reflectively get transformed by their own actions (Blondel, 1987; Hay, 2002; Tucker, 1977; Tucker, 1981; Wildavsky, 2006; Rousseau, 1987). It is because of this mutually adaptive relationship between the leaders and followers that some scholars believe political leadership implies followership, where tasks need to be accomplished in a specific institutional and cultural context (Heifetz, 1994; Tucker, 1995; Nye, 1999; Bennis and Thomas, 2002; Nye, 2008). Because of this adoptive nature of the relationship between political leaders and their followers, it is important to assess whether the three decades of war and destruction in Afghanistan were because of the imposition of bad political leaders by foreign countries, or rather an outcome of socio-cultural norms and context of the Afghan society. Most respondents interviewed in this study asserted that Afghanistan did not go in the right direction because of the lack of good political leaders. But the latest theories of political leadership suggest that leaders simply adapt themselves to the existing social and cultural environment of the society to increase their influence. If this is the case, then a search for good leaders is probably not the right answer in Afghanistan, but rather shifting the socio-cultural norms of the society

might be the solution. Afghan political leaders also believe that people have strong cultural norms and standards, which provide wrong incentives to foreign countries to engage with Afghanistan such that good leaders are isolated from power.⁵ The leaders are left with no choice but to adapt to the same social and cultural norms that their followers value if they are to increase their influence.

Political leadership and characteristics of an effective political leader in the context of Afghanistan have never been researched through rigorous academic methods. This study's search among political leadership literature found only two academic papers: Azim M. Nasimi's dissertation, which is basically an ethnographic study of the Afghan political leaders during the royal system in contrast with the communist leaders of post royal system of the country; and Fredrik Barth's "Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans" (1959) is a study related tangentially to the cultural norms and values of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. "Although Barth's monograph stands out as one of the classics of political anthropology (Edwards, 1979), its findings can hardly be generalized to the whole population of Afghanistan because the study discusses one isolated Pashtun tribe (Yusufzai of the Swat valley in Pakistan). Afghanistan is composed of many different ethnic groups, and Yusufzai is only one of several Pashtun tribes, and is predominantly settled outside of Afghanistan.

The Current Concept of Political Leadership

Political leadership is the primary means through which human societies change because it motivates people to put their shoulders to the wheel of progress and work together toward a

⁵ From personal interviews with political leaders in Kabul.

common goal (Haslam, Reicher and Platow, 2011). However, the current challenge is that political leadership has yet to be properly defined in academic literature. As one of the founders in the leadership field, R.J. Stogdell noted: Leadership in various segments of the population (students, military personnel and business) [has] been heavily researched, while others (politicians, labor leaders, and criminal leaders) have been relatively neglected (Blondel, 1987). Although such charismatic leaders as India's Gandhi, the United States' John F. Kennedy, or South Africa's Nelson Mandela are popularly referred to as outstanding examples of strong political leadership, very few researchers have examined the political, policy and public contexts of their achievements (Burns, 1978; Heifetz, 1994; Tucker, 1995). Partly because the main disciplines that concern politicians, such as law, political science and public administration, have largely neglected political leadership in their analytical discourse. This is because: a) these academic disciplines focus more on institutions and regimes, and b) the traditional understanding is that politicians make policy and public servants execute them, leaving little or no room for political leadership (Hartley, 2010a; Behn, 1998).

Kellerman (1984) asserts that leadership is perceived as a form of influence or persuasion. Whether as a function of a group process or an individual personality, it simply increases a leader's influence among followers. However, some experts believe that political leadership is simply control over policies that affect public welfare. What is really lacking is a theory of political leadership that illustrates the relationship between leaders and followers in different settings. "Hence, the wry observation that leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth" (Kellerman, 1986).

Edinger (1990) argues that it is the conditions of international regimes and relations among states that explains key political outcome in both domestic and foreign affairs. In this method of thinking, the actions of a particular individual do not matter at all. This is because nation states are the main variable in the principle analysis of international theories, not individual actors. Factors such as geopolitical, economic, and military conditions are more crucial than political leaders who constantly change during the course of time. At the level of intrastate analysis, individual political leadership still seems to be less important for key political outcomes than other factors, such as a country's historical development, economic constraints, and other long-term conditions. In some analysis, researchers put more emphasis on socioeconomic structures and relations than on the role of an individual character from a dominant ruling class. Other scholars put more emphasis on such factors as the changing nature of political systems, political regimes, and the political ruling class than specific political leaders (Edinger, 1990).

Alternatively, some scholars believe that the concept of political leadership is inherently difficult to define because it depends on such factors as institutional, cultural and historical contexts and situations. (Blondel, 1987; Wildavsky, 2006; Wildavsky, 1989; Klenke, 1996). All leaderships occur in social and cultural contexts, which inspires followers with certain social and cultural characteristics and at the same time permits leaders to utilize certain social and cultural characteristics: inherent qualities and characteristics, socialized customs, cultural skills, social insight, and intelligence of various types, including emotional intelligence and contextual intelligence, but also power-wielding, organizational and communication skills (Greenstein, 2004; Greenstein, 2006; Bose, 2006; Nye, 2008). When it comes to the question of what makes people listen to leaders, Weber distinguishes between the cultural, social and psychological

sources of leaders' powers. Weber (1986) argues that leadership is exercised based on traditional, cultural, or charismatic domination. Weber believes the most usual engine of leadership in societies requires leaders to remain embedded in society so they can influence their followers.

Weber is not alone in his thinking. Other scholars, such as Kellerman, also believe that complex problems of societies that are going through rapid changes require something more than just good policy decision and/or good public administration. International regime, historical development, and economic circumstances do not always explain the events that are direct outcome of good political leadership in the process. It is truer in the context of war and post war societies. Kellerman argues that political leadership is the most important element of successful political developments. Leadership is very critical for any successful governance reform program: weak leadership contributes to government failures, and strong leadership is indispensable for success. Wise leadership typically endures prosperity in the long run; incompetent leaders usually bring about catastrophes (Kellerman, 1986).

So, if leadership is really important, we need to have a critical look at the meaning of this concept. The most fundamental question: What does the term "leadership" mean? (Grint, 2000; Hartley and Benington, 2010). The term, as argued by Masciulli, is of more recent usage. Leadership was coined in the early 19th century and refers to the dignity, or position, of a leader. It refers to the position of a group of people leading or influencing others within a given context. *The Concise Oxford English Dictionary* defines a "leader" as "the person who leads or commands a group, organization, or country."

Although leadership is seen as a universal phenomenon, it oftentimes proves difficult to find equivalent description and comparison terms in different languages. For example, there is no word for leadership in Japanese, and none of the Romance languages has a term for the word “leader” (Edinger, 1990). In other languages, the meanings of equivalent terms differ considerably, but they recently have also adopted the English terms of “leader” and “leadership” (Blondel 1987). With regards to an overall guiding definition of political leadership for research purposes, cultural context matters in giving substantial content to any definition. For example, in a Russian cultural context, a leader with weak character would be rejected as a failure—Gorbachev’s weakness versus Putin’s strength as contrasting images (Wildavsky, 2006; House et al., 2004). As discussed in the chapters ahead, the terms used by different ethnic groups in Afghanistan have different meanings. This research shows that the definition of leadership among citizens of the same country is not necessarily the same. Pashtuns define leadership differently from non-Pashtuns because they have different social and cultural structures. Pashtuns referring to a political leader use the word “Mesher,” which basically means “an elder,” while other ethnic groups refer to a political leader using the Farsi word “Rahbar,” which literally means “someone who can show the way,” or simply “a guide.” In Chapter Four of this dissertation, some empirical findings will be presented to support this.

In general, researchers agree that the following elements should be taken into account when defining political leadership:

- The personality and traits of a leader, including her or his ethical and cultural character;
- The traits and cultural character of the followers with whom the leader interacts

Expected Contribution from This Research

Jean Hartley and her colleague argue that three concepts might be relevant to understanding the essence of political leadership (Hartley and Allison, 2000). Analyzing quality of leadership based on:

- The person
- The position
- The processes.

In some cases, these analytical methods could be combined in practice, but it is helpful to distinguish them conceptually. Studies of political leadership based on the leader and his or her personal characteristics are quite popular and tend to focus more on such characteristics as the skills, abilities, personality, styles of engagement, and the behavior of individual leaders (Yukl, 2006). Popular leadership literature is full of articles about this approach to leadership, but such methods can be problematic if they neglect the environment and the context in which the leader acts (Hartley and Benington, 2010). In recent research, scholars have focused more on the interactions of the leader within context (Bryman, 1992; Grint, 2000; Hartley and Allison, 2000; Porter and McLaughlin, 2006). Edinger's method of analysis suggests that we should first define the phenomenon—in this case, political leadership—and then describe the level of analysis for it, and then proceed with counterfactual tests. The level of analysis concerns the question of how much importance individual leadership deserves in the interpretation of political developments. Does it make a difference in the real world and, if so, how much of a difference (Edinger, 1990)? Other political scientists have reached a certain degree of consensus that the case-study method,

along with qualitative approaches together with systematic use of counterfactual investigations (Kellerman 2004; Kellerman 2008; Gergen, 2000; George and Bennett, 2005; Greenstein, 2004; Ferguson, 1999), combined with quantitative analysis (King 2002; Rejai and Phillips, 1983), is going to be indispensable for arriving at reliable knowledge about political leadership. Of course, experimental research and other causal methods are undeniably more useful for the study of political leadership (Lane, 2003). We also could use typological methods to describe various observable groups of political leaders and their followers, the nature of the relationship that binds the two groups together, their social and cultural traits, functions and societal roles, as well as the extent their character impacts the society at large. Some of the pertinent questions that arise in this regard are:

- How and why do certain individuals gain power in a particular society or state? What are the origins of their power? (Blondel, 1987)?
- What are leaders' and followers' personal characteristics (Greenstein, 2004; Hollander, 1998; Kellerman, 2008)? How do leaders and followers relate (Kellerman, 2004; Kellerman, 2008; Burns, 1978; Burns, 2003)?

Whatever contextual variations presents, political leadership–followership is a social process of adaptation and innovation, meaning innovative adaptation to an environment or context in which a group's way of life and values are challenged. The leader's tasks are to:

- Interpret society's problems;
- Define ends and means to solve problems;
- Inspire followers by personal visions as solutions or, at least, responses to problems;

- Mobilize followers to own those solutions and implement them (Heifetz, 1994; Tucker, 1995).

The leadership–followership dual system means that, to a significant extent, those being led create leaders. Followers matter because leadership is seen as a process, which is caused by following (Mant 1999).

The actual “supply” of political leadership is driven by a pre-existing demand in society, which the political entrepreneurs seek to satisfy. Usually, there is more than one way to satisfy that demand, or to generate a view that the expectation can be met. One of the contributions of this study will be an exploration of the demand for political leadership in Afghanistan, because it has never been studied in the past. Another contribution will be to provide insights into how leaders are judged by their followers, which will allow for a better understanding of the judgmental lenses of different ethnic groups in Afghanistan. And finally, the last contribution will discuss the details of how followers define and prioritize the problems of Afghanistan from their point of views. Variations across ethnic groups will be reviewed to determine areas in which followers present diverging expectations for Afghanistan’s political leaders.

CH – 2: METHODOLOGY

Theoretical Framework and Assumptions

One of the primary objectives of this research is to determine whether there is any shared cultural agreement among Afghans regarding their perceptions of good leadership, and, if there is, to what degree do these notions systematically differ across ethnic groups and social strata. Fortunately, there is a relatively well-established approach for addressing such questions called cultural consensus analysis. This approach uses a mathematical model to determine the degree of shared knowledge within groups of people and estimates the “culturally correct” answer when previously unknown. The analysis initially solves for individual estimates of competency by factoring an agreement (correlation) matrix among informants. The ratio between the first and second eigenvalues determines whether a single-factor solution exists, which would indicate a single, shared cultural belief system (Chavez et al., 1995).

As Russell Bernard (2006) summarizes, the theory behind the model has three main assumptions

1. Informants share a common culture and there is a culturally correct answer to any question asked of them. The culturally correct answer might be incorrect from an outsider’s perspective. Any variation found among informants is the result of individual differences in their knowledge, not the result of being a member of a culture.

2. Informants give their answers to test questions independently of one another, meaning no two respondents were interviewed in one setting.
3. All the questions in a test come from the same cultural domain— i.e., things that can be listed, such as types of animals, hand tools, or weekend activities. This is why a first stage data collection was necessary to determine the cultural domain of political leadership within the Afghan community.

People can be competent in one domain but incompetent in another. Cultural consensus method must be used for people who are knowledgeable about a particular domain (Bernard, 2006). To use the consensus technique, you simply give a sample of informants a test that asks them to make judgments about a list of items in a cultural domain. You can use true-false questions, Likert scale questions, multiple-choice questions, or fill-in-the-blank questions (Bernard 2006).⁶

This dissertation's rationale for the use of the cultural consensus model is based on two central concepts from cognitive anthropology: First, people organize their cultural beliefs and values with what are called mental models, also known as cultural models. Second, agreement and disagreement about these cultural models often have a clear social pattern of variation, as can be shown by analyses of which beliefs and values are shared across groups of society (Kempton, Boster, and Hartley, 1995). Anthropologists use models that are shared within a culture or social group, and thus refer to them as cultural models" (Holland and Quinn, 1987). In

⁶ See, for example, Romney et al. (1986), Caulkins (2001), de Munck et al. (2002), Furlow (2003), Swora (2003), Harvey and Bird (2004), Jaskyte and Dressler (2004), and Miller et al. (2004) for more technical details about the cultural consensus model.

this study, data carry mental models of the individuals interviewed and were widely shared, so it stands to argue that they are Afghans' cultural models.

The second rationale for using this approach is to determine the extent to which cultural models are shared. To establish this, interviews spanned a broad range of social strata, ranging from rural Pashtuns of the Kandahar province, to middle-ground educated citizens in Kabul, to religious scholars (Ulema) of the northern provinces of Afghanistan encompassing different ethnic groups, genders, and age groups. "I use the word 'belief' to refer to what people think the world is like and 'values' to refer to their guiding principles of what is moral, desirable, or just. Either beliefs or values may be incorporated into a cultural model or may stand alone as simple isolates" (Kempton, Boster, and Hartley, 1995). The knowledge of existing Afghan beliefs is crucial even for those who are more concerned with motivations and/or actions, because some of the study's findings are that these beliefs partially determine how ethnic groups of Afghanistan are politically distinct, which type of political leaders are more popular among which ethnic groups, and how certain public policy positions are more important for one ethnic group than another.

Some readers (both scientists and nonscientists) might say these results are obvious and trivial. In response to these reactions, I would say: Every person believes his or her own models of the world are correct because this belief is continually reinforced by interacting with people who share the same cultural models and use them in the same ways—whether in the lab or at home.

This study is somewhat unusual within political science and public policy research realms in that it uses methods developed by psychologists and cultural anthropologists for understanding cognitive concepts in foreign cultures. Even among anthropological studies, it is atypical in combining personal views of respondents with more formal and quantitative methods in analyzing cognitive variation within a culture. The following section provides background on both methods so readers can understand this study's resulting data and interpretations.

Analysis and Data Collection Strategy

Cultural consensus analysis is carried out in two different stages. The purpose of first-stage analysis (level-1 analysis) is to determine the overall items that include in the domain of good political leadership among Afghans. The purpose of second-stage analysis (level-2 analysis) is to study these items across a wider range of respondents from different strata of the society.

Moreover, open-ended questions are used in the semi structured interviews to produce free lists, which are useful tools in determining the cultural domain of good leadership among Afghans. Free listing is a common elicitation technique in the social sciences (Weller and Romney, 1988). Researchers use free listing to identify items in a cultural domain and calculate each item's relative psychological or cultural saliences (i.e., prominence, importance, familiarities or representativeness). Other researchers use free listing to measure cognitive characteristics of informants, including their knowledge of a domain and their categorization patterns.

Level-1 Analysis

In the first-stage analysis, semi structured interviews, free listing methods, and text analysis techniques were employed to analyze answers from respondents. The themes (items) that came up with the highest frequency in the answer set formed questions for the second level of analysis. In the second stage, data is generated through fixed-form survey in which a large number of respondents express their agreement or disagreement with the answers generated from the first level of analysis. These two methods offer different strengths, and are not always used together in the same study. The textual analysis of the semi structured interviews yields rich insights into Afghans' views and values on what constitutes characteristics of good political leadership, which are often different from those of political leadership scholars. The cultural variation analysis of the survey delineates the distribution of these beliefs and values among diverse groups of population within Afghanistan. The synthesis of these two methods synergistically yields more insight into Afghan political leadership thinking than would either method if used independently.

Level-2 Analysis

In the second-stage, the fixed-form survey is employed. The survey did not intend to prove or disapprove that certain characteristics are preferred or disliked by Afghans, which is what one can expect from a typical national poll, but rather documenting the reasoning behind it. National surveys are like photos, giving a broad overview of public opinion. Anthropological research corresponds to exploration on the ground, charting details of the features glimpsed by the national surveys and looking for causal explanations. The sampling strategy of this study differed from that of a survey research as my goals of the study did so. Whereas in a survey research you

need to draw a large sample to establish exact percentage of public opinion, in my sampling strategy it was more important that I have very exhaustive stratification across different segments of Afghan population who have divergent interest and personal attitudes toward political leadership. These groups included all cross-sections and every combination of ethnicity with gender, age, rural/urban settlement, level of income, level of education, and level of participation in public affairs, etc. (more details will be presented in the next chapter).

On top of these variations, samples were distributed across 18 geographic locations (provinces) and extracted responses from 28 different provinces.⁷ These geographic locations were chosen because they bracket the range of variation in social, cultural and political views across Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the sampling strategy and the analytical model did not require probability sampling, the sample selection was randomized as much as security, logistics, and cost constrains permitted. Having diverse views from every social stratum of the society was more critical for the study's research than responses drawn randomly from the whole country. The diverse social background corresponds to diverse cultural interests, which illustrate how individuals construct political leadership beliefs within each cultural segment of the society.

It is also important to acknowledge that the sample selection was biased toward the population with higher education because resources and time were unavailable to conduct each interview in person. About 57 percent of survey questionnaires were distributed to sampled respondents who could read and write. They were asked to fill out the questionnaire and return it

⁷ Although interviews were conducted in 18 provinces, respondents introduced themselves as being from 28 provinces, which I think happened because there is currently a high level of internal labor migration movements inside Afghanistan because of the unbalanced distribution of security and employment opportunities.

back to researcher in Kabul. These constraints introduced a few challenges that were dealt with at a later stage:

4. They reduced the proportion of uneducated respondents in the sample size to about 10 percent, which, while below a desired level, also presented a positive externality because the segment of population who are more interested and knowledgeable about political leadership is most likely the portion of society that is fairly educated. This is also part of the requirement of the analytical model used in this dissertation (cultural consensus analysis). Correlation between level of education and selection of “Don’t Know” in the response set is -0.34 (higher number represented higher level of education), meaning my assumption about positive effects of educational bias holds to some extent.
5. In some cases respondents did not follow the protocol for the interview and filled the questionnaire with similar responses (probably filled it together in a group). During data cleaning 10 observations were dropped because they had similar responses. For the interviews that I did not administer, I ran an analysis of correlation among respondents from the same neighborhoods. If the correlation was more than 0.9, I dropped those responses to make sure the assumptions of the model held (for more details, see analytical model assumption in this chapter’s “Theoretical Framework and Assumptions” section).
6. These constraints also allowed the respondents not to answer any part of the questionnaire that they didn’t like, which in turn introduced higher number of non-response rate. Interviews that were conducted in person generated fewer numbers of non-responses because interviewer has more control over the process. This problem was

more serious because for some sets of analysis (i.e., factor analysis), as I had to drop all responses that had more than a 1-percent non-response.

For a complete chart of sampling distribution, see Appendix I.

Level-1 Data Collection

The main purpose of level-1 data collection was to establish the key areas of inquiries for the level-2 data collection. In this stage, written questions developed in Farsi and Pashtu were generated and used in semi structured interviews. Specific preliminary discussions were used before each question so the respondents were encouraged to present as much detail in their answers as possible. The key for this stage of the study was to exhaust the answer set for every question in the questionnaire. The informants were given leeway to elaborate or bring up new themes and/or topics they considered important. Additional probing questions were created on the spot to pursue topics raised by respondents and paraphrased to verify and correct my understanding of their answers. In semi structured interviews, probing questions are usually the key to understand the meaning of unfamiliar or unexpected answers. In this type of interview, the respondents are considered more informed about the possible sets of answers than in other structured or semi structured interviews, because they are more knowledgeable on the subject than the researcher. So, the researcher needs to give respondents as much time as they need and provide as many additional probing questions as possible to unload most of their information for further analysis. While conducting semi structured interviews, two assistants helped capture the information. In those parts of Afghanistan where people were not sensitive to recording their

voice, a digital audio record of the interview was produced to increase the efficiency of data collection.⁸

The interview generally would follow this pattern:

7. It would start with a broad question, such as, “What constitutes the characteristics of a good human being?” Then, the interviewer tried to record everything the respondents mentioned in their own languages. Their answers were first transcribed and analyzed before they were translated into English to reduce the chances of losing important points in the process of translation. Several probing questions were used to expand the list of characteristics respondents listed under “characteristics of a good human being.” The probing questions normally would continue until the respondent said, “I do not recall anything more.”
8. Then, that response was immediately followed by: “What are the characteristics of a good political leader?” Again, the same protocol rules of probing continued. When the list of characteristics for a good political leader was exhausted, the interviewer would proceed to the third set.
9. The third question included: “Which Afghan political leaders have these characteristics that you have listed for me? Could you please name as many leaders as you think have these characteristics?” Probing questions followed to exhaust the set of names of political leaders from the respondent.

⁸ See Bernard (1994) for more details about this type of interviews.

10. The next question set was asked: “Where are the leaders you have listed coming from?

What societal or social background, do you think, has produced these good leaders? Can you please list for me specific structures and/or institutions that produced these leaders?”

The set of questions was repeated various ways to make sure the respondent understood the main objective of the question. When requesting elaboration from a respondent, additional time was given to ensure the respondent understood the meaning of each word used in the question.

11. The next question set was, “What makes a ‘good political leader’ more legitimate? What do you think increases or decreases the legitimacy of a political leader? Can you please list for me everything you can think of?

12. Then, the final question: “What do you expect ‘good leaders’ to do, once they are in power?” Additional requests for elaborations were made to confirm that respondents understood the main purpose of the question and in an attempt to get into the policies that were considered a priority for them. But it would not make sense if the interviewer had used the word “policy” in the questionnaire. There is no exact translation of this word in local languages; the word has been introduced only recently to the government officials. So, the question was formed to ask what respondents expected leaders to push for once in office (nothing about issues they had already discussed).

Sixty people from ten different social strata of Afghanistan were selected for first-stage interviews. They included 12 Uzbeks, 16 Pashtuns, 16 Hazaras and 16 Tajiks. The sample also included a fair mix of genders, occupations, ages, education levels, income levels and urban-rural backgrounds. On average, the sample included six respondents from a province, distributed

across ten provinces of Afghanistan. A complete summary of respondent demographics for the first-stage of the study is presented in Chapter Three. Most academic works in the context of Afghanistan suggest considerable variation across ethnic and geographic regions of the country. Ethnic variation is a very important aspect of main research question for this study. Therefore, in both stages of the study special attention was paid on balanced stratification of samples along those two lines. For example, in the second stage, the number of Pashtuns who declined to take the survey was more than what was needed for proportional views of the Pashtuns in the study. Additional respondents were oversampled in southern provinces of Afghanistan to make sure the findings are representative of the Pashtuns views.

Level-2 Data Collection

While a semi-structured interview allows the respondent to express his or her understanding of important characteristics in a good political leader, the fixed-form surveys allow a researcher to study how those individual understandings of characteristics are distributed across larger groups of population. When a respondent mentions a particular characteristic, the researcher cannot conclude whether other people share the same views based on the outcome of semi structured interview alone. Conducting a second-stage fixed form survey helps to establish the external validity of findings from the first stage.

To construct the fixed-form survey, views (characteristics listed by the respondents) from the first stage were analyzed. Because statements were recorded in the words of the respondents and transcribed in the same wording, they needed further textual analysis to standardize these answers across all responses. This was needed to ensure their views were understandable when

presented in the second stage, and completely outside of the context of first-stage interviews (respondents of the fixed-form survey were different from those of the semi-structured interviews). A threshold of 5 percent was established, meaning if 5 percent of the respondents mentioned the same characteristics in their responses, then they would be included in the second-stage fixed-form survey. The value of this threshold is a call by the researcher because they differ from one research to another depending on the capability and personality of respondents. If respondents were highly competent in the cultural domain of the question, then the frequency of similarity of themes would go very high, which means a higher threshold is acceptable. On the other hand, if they are not elaborative enough in their answers or not competent in the culture, then lower frequency of themes will appear. In those cases the researcher might decide to accept a lower threshold to generate enough questions for the second stage survey. Since the concept of political leadership was not a topic of everyday discussion in most non-elite communities of Afghanistan, the frequency of common characteristics generated in the first stage were not as high as expected, which is why the threshold was dropped to 5 percent.

Frequently, repeated characteristics extracted from the first stage took the form of statements so respondents of the survey could indicate their level of agreement/disagreement with each statement. The survey was administered on a total of 586 respondents from 18 different provinces of Afghanistan. In most cases, the researcher, with the help from two undergraduate students from Kabul University who volunteered to help in efforts to learn the research method, conducted the survey. Because of the large sample size in the second stage, it took a total of about 11 months to complete both stages of the study across 18 different province of Afghanistan. In some cases where cultural, security, and/or resource constraints prohibited direct

interviews with respondents,⁹ the questionnaires were distributed to the respondents (according to the sampling strategy) through local contacts with instructions to fill out the form and return it to the researcher. The final number of observations in the study's cleaned dataset was therefore reduced to 576 samples. A more-detailed review of the sampling strategy and data cleaning process is discussed in Chapter Three.

How to read the analysis

The data from first stage semi structured interviews were entered into Excel sheets and were categorized by each question to list specific standardized words (in most cases, adjectives) repeated in each respondent's answers to different questions. A collection of all the characteristics from different respondents generated a master list, which was used as the head row defining all the columns. The names or IDs for each respondent were used as the entries in the first column defining each row.¹⁰ Scoring 1 in each cell if the corresponding respondent mentioned the item in his or her responses and 0 otherwise produced a two-mode matrix. The matrix was then used to generate a scree plot¹¹ (Figure 2.1) by adding down different columns, which delivered the frequency of items mentioned by the informants. A visible knee of the scree plot (defined by an arrow in Figure 2.1) was used to decide on the number of most-important characteristics to be further studied in the second-stage fixed-form survey.

9 In the insecure parts of Afghanistan where insurgents have strong influence, local people are quick distinguished from any outsiders, and those who were not from the area could easily be arrested on suspicion of spying.

10 The actual names and IDs of respondents are protected in this study.

11 Scree plot is a term used by STATA software for depiction of frequency (figure 1 shows an example)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

The data from the survey was entered into an Excel sheet and checked for systematic measurement error and consistency in spelling. The data was then turned into a two-mode matrix¹² by scoring each respondent's measure of agreement or disagreement with each question. The cells corresponding to each characteristics of leadership (column head) and each respondent (row head) contained 0 or 1, and the matrices were fed into UCINET for systematic analysis of

12 A two-mode matrix means a matrix in which head rows have different information from head columns.

cultural consensus. While two-dimensional matrices are the direct input for UCINET, for some analysis one-dimensional matrices were also produced.¹³ One-dimensional matrices are used for multi-dimensional scaling and cluster analysis where variation and similarity of different groups of Afghans over each characteristic (hence one dimension) of leadership are calculated and presented in visual graphics.¹⁴ Other aspects of analysis follow standard quantitative and qualitative methods that are commonly used in the world of social science research. Table 2.1 offers an example of how findings from first-stage interviews were used to construct survey questions in the second stage. For example, if one of the participants of the semi structured interviews in response to the question, “What are the most important characteristics of a good political leader” listed the following:

Table 2.1: Example of elicitation data

	The Exact Wording Expressed in Local Language	The Exact Word-by-Word Translation in English	Standardized Form of The Response for the Purpose of Analysis
1	قدرت حل و فصل را داشتند	Must have the resolving power	Has resolving power
2	تمام مردم وطن از آنها پیروی کنند	The whole country is following him	Has followers
3	شایسته رهبری را داشتند	Deserves leadership	Deserves leadership
4	سابق کار در وطن	Has work experience in the country	Has work experience
5	احترام به موضوعات سال می	Respects Islamic issues	Respects Islam
6	خدمتگزار	Servant	Is servant
7	پیروی از اسلام	Following Islam	Is following Islam
8	تجربیل	Education	Is educated
9	سیاسات غلی	Good policies	Has good policies
10	شناخت پیروان مرزی	Understanding of foreign	Knows foreign issues
11	عادل	Just	Is Just
12	نظمی قوی	Enforcing the law	Enforces the law

The standardized form of the response was compared against responses from other participants using the themes (phrases) used in each response as my main point of comparison.

¹³ A one-dimensional matrix means both head rows and head columns have the same information.

¹⁴ See, for example, Bernard (2006) for more technical details about matrices.

Then, the similarities of adjectives were searched to create a master list of different adjectives that were used for the purpose of describing characteristics. In the master list, I searched for the number of times each adjective was repeated. I sorted them based on their frequency of repetition to generate a scree plot to determine the number of adjectives that are significantly more repeated than the rest in the master list.

Scree plots are usually a good tool to determine the threshold above which the highly repeated themes in the master list should be taken. As indicated in the graph by the red arrow, the knee of the graph is a good threshold below which the repetition does not have adequate frequency change, and could be ignored.

Out of the 60 respondents, 39 of them mention the phrase, “Is Educated,” as one of the characteristics of a good political leader. Thus, in the second stage of the study, one of the questions in the fixed-form survey would be:

A good political leader should:

- Be highly educated

Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

In the same way, characteristics that were most frequently repeated were presented in the form of agree-disagreement statements in the second stage. Appendix II presents a complete set of survey questions that were presented to fixed-form survey participants.

A very similar analysis was used for the question “What do you expect the leaders to do once they are in power?” Similar questions, such as “What social structures have produced these

leaders?” were used for cross-checking of the results. The highly repeated responses from the semi structured interviews were presented in the form of paired-comparison. Respondents were asked to compare each pair of structures that were frequently mentioned in the first stage. For example, if three social structures, such as “religious schools,” “famous families,” and/or “tribal communities,” were most frequently mentioned, I constructed the following questions for use in the second stage:

- Following are some pairs of institutions that according to some Afghans have produced Afghan leaders. For each pair of the institution below, please pick the one that you think is more important than the other one (put a tick mark next to the one that you think is more important).

1		Religious Schools	Famous Families		1
2		Religious Schools	Tribal Communities		2
3		Tribal Communities	Famous Families		3

Answers were analyzed for variation of choices across different segments of society, particularly different ethnic groups, to detect similarities that are significant. For the question, “What increases legitimacy of a good leader,” a very similar approach was used to detect variation of sources of legitimacy among different ethnic groups. For example, if the three most frequently mentioned phrases in the first stage were “is elected in the election,” “comes from a Jihadi background,” or “is a Pashtun from Kandahar,” respondents were asked the following question:

- The following are pairs of factors that according to other Afghans increase legitimacy of political leaders. For each pair of factors, please pick the one that you think is more important than the other one (put a tick mark next to the one that you think is more important).

1		Is elected in the election	Comes from Jihadi background		1
2		Is elected in the election	Is a Pashtun from Kandahar		2
3		Is a Pashtun from Kandahar	Comes from Jihadi background		3

Additional questions such as fill-in-the-blank, multiple-choice answers, and free listing were also used to serve as control question.

It is also important to note that data analysis of the second stage included a variety of univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis (i.e., correspondence analysis, cultural consensus analysis, factor analysis, etc.) the results of which will be presented in different chapters as they relate to the main argument of each chapter.

Figure 2.2a: Divergence of views between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns over legitimacy of political leadership.

The charts in Figure 2.2a (above) & 2.2b (below) present significant differences across different segments of the society, particularly Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns over sources of legitimacy of political leaders.

Figure 2.2b: Divergence of views between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns over legitimacy of political leadership.

Factor Analysis

Chapter Three of this research uses a statistical method called factor analysis, which is one of the mathematical methods developed for multivariate analysis of data. Although, factor analysis is widely used by psychologist and social scientists, it is useful to say a few word about its most fundamental principles and the rationale for using it in this research.

Factor analysis consists of a number of statistical techniques that aim to simplify a complex set of data. In the social sciences, factor analysis is usually applied to correlations between variables (Kline, 1994). As Royce (1963) has demonstrated, while there may have been different definitions of a factor, there is a common underlying trend to them all. Essentially, a factor is a dimension or construct that is a condensed statement of the relationships between a set of variables. More precisely, Royce (1963) states that a factor is a construct operationally defined by its factor loadings. Factor loadings are the correlations of a variable with the factor, which

are represented by an arrow and a number between 0 and 1 (see Figure 2.3). The arrow shows the dimension of correlation or the amount of variance in a variable (item) explained by an underlying construct (factor).

While factors can be used to simplify correlation matrices, an important question still remains: what can be done with factors and how can they be useful in this research? To answer this question, I need to say a few words about the form of factor analysis that this research primarily uses, called explanatory factor analysis. The goal in explanatory factor analysis is to explore the data to discover the main constructs or dimensions. It was for this purpose that factor analysis was originally developed by Spearman (1904) in the area of human abilities. Spearman attempted to answer the question of why human abilities are always positively correlated. In this study, I am asking a very similar question perception of Afghans on political leadership: What are the underlying constructs, or factors, that determine good political leadership for the people of Afghanistan?

In order to understand the terminologies used in this method and present some relevant examples from this study, look at the following factor analysis path diagram (Figure 2.3). In it, every arrow shows the direction and size of correlation between a variable (popularly called an “item” in psychology and social sciences) with the main underlying constructs (factors). If we observe that several variables correlate with each other, it is believed that there is an underlying construct (factor) that causes these partial correlations between variables; exactly how Spearman asked the question of why human abilities are correlated positively.

There is also a portion of variance that is not accounted for by the respective factors, which in this case are retained in an error term defined as “*e*”. In this case, if we are able to determine the size of each arrow, then we can technically say that *var1*, *var2*, and *var3* correlate with each other because there is an underlying construct (*factor1*) that exists there. Then, the researcher has to use his or her knowledge and secondary source data and make sense of how these three variables could relate to each other. By systematic reasoning, he or she can define the factor that is behind the three variables. The same analogy goes with *factor2* and *factor3*. In addition, modern statistical methods allow one to extract factors under two different conditions: A) when factors correlate with each other, in which case you show correlations of factors with two-sided arrows (see Figure 2.3); and B) when factors are forced to remain uncorrelated with each other, which by consequence will change the size and scope of covariance between each variables and its respective factor and error term.

Figure 2.3: A diagram of relationship between proxy measures (items) and underlying constructs (factors)

When a respondent was asked what defines a good political leader, I was looking for the main variables that

their answers might define. When I discovered enough of them, in the second-stage fixed-form survey, I asked other Afghans to express their degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement that said a good political leader will have or do X (where X is one of the main variables). The data generated in this manner allowed me to look for correlation between all of those variables (items) and explore the existence of underlying constructs (factors) in good political leadership. For example, in one set of analysis, I found that such characteristics as just, human rights, honesty, etc., were highly correlated and load on the same factor. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that there is an underlying construct in Afghans' cognitive thinking about political leadership that defines a just leader as a good leader. The same set of analysis was used for questions that had to do with what good leaders should do. Finally, this method was used with a different set of data that was presented to Afghans a bit differently: Instead of asking to evaluate the characteristics of a good leader, I gave respondents a set of political leaders' names and ask them to express their agreement or disagreement with the assertion that they were good political leaders. The logical reasoning behind this change of question was to see if the underlying factors change when the identity and personality of actual leaders were evaluated, as was the case in the findings from the first stage.

The following chapters present how the method was applied to the data. Please refer to "An Easy Guide to Factor Analysis" by Paul Kline's (1994) for mathematical details of systematic factor analysis.

CH – 3: DEMOGRAPHICS

In this section, the study provides background information on the informants from the semi structured interviews and survey respondents in the second stage. For both informant groups, the study provides summary statistics to offer a detailed picture of the sample size and its distribution across different strata. For fixed-form survey respondents, additional statistics and reasoning behind the sampling strategy are presented. Demographic information in the survey is detailed to analyze variations of views across as many social strata as possible. The main logic behind stratification was to detect variations across most critical layers of social structures, but as seen in the chapters ahead, the most important strata that exhibited significant variations were ethnicity, gender, and geography.

Table 3.1 provides a complete list of informants and their background information for the semi structured interviews.

Table 3.1: Descriptions of 60 respondents

ID	Education	Occupation	Province	Rural/Urban	Ethnicity	Below 25	Sex	Influential
INF-1	BA	Sr. Civil Servant	Kabul	U	Hazara		M	Y
INF-2	Some Schooling	Shopkeeper	Kabul	U	Hazara		M	
INF-3	BA	Female School Principal	Kabul	U	Hazara		F	Y
INF-4	Grade 12	Unemployed	Kabul	U	Hazara		F	
INF-5	Grade 12	Shopkeeper	Kabul	U	Uzbek		M	
INF-6	Uneducated	Soldier	Kabul	U	Uzbek		M	
INF-7	BA	Director of Youth Union	Kabul	U	Hazara	Y	M	Y
INF-8	Student	Student	Kabul	U	Hazara	Y	M	
INF-9	BA	Human Rights Activist	Kabul	U	Hazara	Y	F	Y
INF-10	Grade 12	Teacher	Kabul	U	Hazara	Y	F	Y
INF-11	Student	Student	Kabul	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-12	Grade 12	Carpet Seller	Kabul	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-13	Grade 12	Street Representative	Parwan	R	Tajik		M	Y
INF-14	Grade 12	Farmer	Parwan	R	Tajik		M	
INF-15	Uneducated	Housewife	Parwan	R	Tajik		F	

INF-16	Diploma	Teacher	Parwan	R	Tajik	Y	M	Y
INF-17	Student	Student	Parwan	R	Tajik	Y	M	
INF-18	Masters	Midwife	Parwan	R	Tajik	Y	F	Y
INF-19	Diploma	Teacher	Parwan	R	Tajik	Y	F	Y
INF-20	Religious School	Mosque Leader	Baghlan	U	Tajik		M	Y
INF-21	BA	Civil Society Work	Baghlan	U	Tajik		M	Y
INF-22	Diploma	Teacher	Baghlan	U	Tajik		F	Y
INF-23	Some Schooling	Housewife	Baghlan	U	Tajik		F	
INF-24	Grade 12	Vocational School Manager	Baghlan	R	Tajik		F	Y
INF-25	BA	Institute Manager	Baghlan	U	Tajik	Y	M	Y
INF-26	Grade 12	Jr. Civil Servant	Baghlan	U	Tajik	Y	M	Y
INF-27	Diploma	Teacher	Baghlan	U	Tajik	Y	F	Y
INF-28	Grade 12	Housewife	Baghlan	U	Tajik	Y	F	
INF-29	Grade 12	Housewife	Baghlan	U	Uzbek	Y	F	
INF-30	Grade 12	Unemployed	Baghlan	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-31	Uneducated	Shopkeeper	Balkh	U	Uzbek		M	
INF-32	Uneducated	Driver	Balkh	U	Uzbek		M	
INF-33	Diploma	Transport Director	Balkh	U	Uzbek	Y	M	Y
INF-34	Uneducated	Daily Wage Worker	Balkh	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-35	Student	Student	Faryab	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-36	BA	Jr. Civil Servant	Bkhshn.	U	Uzbek	Y	M	Y
INF-37	Grade 12	Head Master	Ghazni	R	Hazara		M	Y
INF-38	Grade 12	Teacher	Ghazni	R	Hazara		M	Y
INF-39	Grade 12	Teacher	Ghazni	R	Hazara		F	Y
INF-40	Some Schooling	Housewife	Ghazni	R	Hazara		F	
INF-41	Grade 12	Religious Cleric	Ghazni	R	Hazara	Y	M	Y
INF-42	Some Schooling	Shopkeeper	Ghazni	R	Hazara	Y	M	
INF-43	Grade 12	Head Master	Ghazni	R	Hazara	Y	F	Y
INF-44	Some Schooling	Student	Ghazni	R	Hazara	Y	F	
INF-45	BA	Retired Military Officer	Laghman	U	Pashtun		M	Y
INF-46	Some Schooling	Daily Wage Worker	Laghman	U	Pashtun		M	
INF-47	Grade 12	Teacher	Laghman	U	Pashtun		F	Y
INF-48	Some Schooling	Teacher	Laghman	U	Pashtun		F	Y
INF-49	Religious School	Farmer	Laghman	R	Pashtun		M	
INF-50	Uneducated	Housewife	Laghman	R	Pashtun		F	
INF-51	Uneducated	Farmer	Laghman	U	Pashtun	Y	M	
INF-52	Grade 12	Student	Laghman	U	Pashtun	Y	M	
INF-53	Grade 12	Teacher	Laghman	U	Pashtun	Y	F	Y
INF-54	Student	Student	Laghman	R	Pashtun	Y	M	
INF-55	Grade 12	Housewife	Laghman	R	Pashtun	Y	F	
INF-56	Some Schooling	Farmer	Kunar	R	Pashtun		M	
INF-57	Uneducated	Housewife	Kunar	R	Pashtun		F	
INF-58	Some Schooling	Student	Kunar	U	Pashtun	Y	F	
INF-59	BA	Jr. Civil Servant	Kunar	R	Pashtun	Y	M	Y
INF-60	Grade 12	Student	Kunar	R	Pashtun	Y	F	

Complete table of demographics for all 576 participants of the fixed-form survey is presented in Appendix–I. Table 3.2 presents the sample stratification for the survey:

Table 3.2: Distribution of second stage samples within social strata

Key Strata	Categories	Pashtuns	Tajiks	Hazaras	Uzbeks	Others	Total	Ratio
Men	1	185	121	48	22	14	390	.69
Women	2	39	80	46	10	3	178	.31
Rural	2	90	72	67	17	7	253	.45
Urban	1	134	129	27	15	10	315	.55
High income	3	24	24	10	0	3	61	.11
Middle income	2	90	76	28	17	5	216	.38
Low income	1	110	101	56	15	9	291	.51
Old generation	5	15	14	2	3	1	35	.06
Older mid-generation	4	15	25	6	6	0	52	.09
Younger mid- generation	3	32	44	14	4	5	99	.17
Older new-generation	2	76	70	42	16	7	211	.37
Younger new-generation	1	86	48	30	3	4	171	.30
High education	4	7	12	7	1	3	30	.05
Mid education	3	99	100	37	21	6	263	.46
Low education	2	98	77	30	9	8	222	.39
Uneducated	1	20	12	20	1	0	53	.09
Participant	1	35	25	16	6	3	85	.15
Attentive	2	89	77	26	10	5	207	.36
None participant	3	100	99	52	16	9	276	.49
<i>Ethnic Composition</i>		.39	.35	.17	.06	.03		

Stratification Strategy

For structured interviews, stratification was simply developed on the basis of current literature about major cultural and political fault lines in Afghanistan. The most important ones included ethnicity, geography, and gender, as well as rural-urban divides, as emphasized by Afghanistan observers such as Thomas Barfield (2010). Given that more than 60 percent of the Afghan population is younger than 25, I also decided to divide my key informants into two groups (25 and older, and younger than 25) to see if there were any differences in the opinion of the younger generation.

In the second-stage fixed-form survey, I stratified my sampling frame based on the findings from the semi structure interview data. I also added the suggested important stratification by the existing political leadership literature as well as political and cultural history of Afghanistan. For

the purpose of this study, a provincial district was considered rural if it did not have a functioning municipality, otherwise it was considered an urban area. Villages were always considered rural, but the actual dividing line between urban and rural is subject to dispute because of the lack of administrative boundaries.

An average monthly income higher than 50,000 Afghani (roughly equal to \$1,000) is considered as high income, 50,000 to 10,000 Afghani as an average Afghan income, and amounts under 10,000 as low-income groups.

Any respondent with a reported age of 21 and younger was considered as younger new-generation, 22 to 31 as older new-generation, 32 to 41 as younger mid-generation, 42 to 51 as older mid-generation, and any person older than 51 was old generation. The age of 21 was picked as the baseline because it was assumed that he or she was about 7 years old in 2001 when Afghanistan moved to a new era. Most of these people might not remember much of the political and economic issues of the Taliban period. From that point on every period of 10-year were examined to see if generational variation of views exists across different segments of Afghan population.

Respondents with a master's or a doctorate degree are grouped as high level of education, with a bachelor of arts or bachelor of science as moderate level of education, with a diploma or high school certificate as low level of education and any one with some years of schooling and/or no schooling at all are grouped as uneducated respondents.

If a respondent worked for the government, and/or any other political institution, he or she would be grouped as "participant" in the public affairs of the country. If the respondent was not

a government or political worker but was observing the political development of the country closely, then he or she would be considered as “attentive” of the public affairs, otherwise as “none participant.” This stratification was suggested by the political leadership literature and was expected to have significant effects on variation of views and attitudes toward types of political leadership characteristics.¹⁵

Sampling Strategy

One of the key conditions for the cultural consensus model to produce robust results is to make sure respondents share cultural knowledge, or in another word, their cultural competency is above average of 0.5. That means if a simple question, such as, “What are the most common Afghan foods?” was asked from a group of respondents, correlation between their answers would be at least 0.5. (Romney, 1986). If average cultural competency among the respondents is between 0.7 and 0.8, the model produces robust results at 95 percent confidence interval with as few as 4 samples per strata. If increased to 27 samples, 99.9 percent confidence interval is maintained (Romney, 1986). For the study to reliably distinguish cultural competence among informants, it is best to have about 40 questions in the questionnaire (Bernard, 2006). In this study, more than 40 questions were included for each sets of analysis to ensure the results were reliable. The model produces robust results even with as few as 4 sample points because the bulk of variation comes from the number of questions and not the number of samples, which is

¹⁵ Robert Putnam’s the Comparative Study of Political Elites.

another unique property of cultural consensus model (this would also make the mode uniquely cost effectiveness method of study).¹⁶

My sampling strategy began with the requirement of maintaining at least 4 sample points per strata to allow comparisons across every cell (see Table 3.2). Although finding the adequate number of samples for some sells proved out of budget for this study, I still worked toward maintaining a minimum number of $19 \times 5 \times 4 = 380$ samples to conduct this study, which means 19 social strata by 5 ethnic groups by 4 samples (see Table 3.2 for more details). Given the number of questions in the questionnaire, as well as sensitivity of the subject to an average person in Afghanistan, a relatively higher rate of nonresponse was expected. Therefore, I boosted my sample size by about 25 percent. About 470 questionnaires were printed and distributed to convenient randomly selected respondents from within each selected strata to take the survey.

As I expected the rate of nonresponse was high but not across all regions of Afghanistan. The highest rate of nonresponse was experienced in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Given the level of influence from insurgents in these regions, and the long period of war in these regions, people were very suspicious of my research questions. In some cases, they thought it was a study for the United States or Afghan intelligence institutions rather than an academic research. Some respondents did not want to take the chance and comment on a politically provocative question because it could affect their security. My survey protocol required voluntary participation, and many respondents decided not to take it.

16 A complete review of sample options is presented by Romney (1986), which could be used as the basis of sample calculation.

As a consequence, the number of responses from the Pashtun population dropped to a level that was unacceptable for the main thesis of this dissertation. Pashtuns are one of the main ethnic groups of Afghanistan, so it was important to ensure their participation was proportional to their population in Afghanistan. However, the proportional statistics of ethnic groups are not very credible in Afghanistan. There are commonly accepted ratios that are frequently used by government and international organizations, but accuracy of those figures is not rigorously verified. I needed at least 37 percent to 40 percent Pashtun participants, 30 percent to 35 percent Tajik, 11 percent to 15 percent Hazara, 6 percent to 9 percent Uzbek, and about 2 percent to 3 percent other ethnic groups to abide by the commonly accepted ratios of ethnic groups in Afghanistan.¹⁷ A very high rate of nonresponse from the Pashtun population of Afghanistan could have damaged external validity of this research, especially because the role of Pashtuns in Afghanistan's political leadership, as well as shaping the politics of Afghanistan, has been significant—much more considerable than other ethnic groups in the past two centuries. It was also important because social structure of Pashtun communities (being a tribal society) was considerably different from those of the non-Pashtun population of Afghanistan. The characteristics of political leadership were expected to be different for Pashtuns in comparison with other Afghans based on these ratios.

Therefore, I had a choice to make: drop the observations from other ethnic groups proportionally to that of the Pashtuns; or oversample the Pashtun population to balance it out. After consultation with dissertation advisers, we decided to oversample both the southern and

17 Average of ethnic ratios accepted by the Central Statistics Office of Afghanistan, World Bank, United Nations, and United States Agency for International Development, were taken for this purpose.

eastern regions of Afghanistan for an additional 110 samples to ensure proportional participation of Pashtun population. In Table 4, the column, “After over sampling,” shows distribution of samples after 110 additional samples were added.

Finally, for the samples to be proportional to geographical distribution of population, I also created a statistical map of Afghanistan’s population across five different regions of the country. I used the latest population data from Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Office (CSO) to conduct these calculations, and used the common perception of regional classification as they are grouped by different Afghan and international organizations.

Table 3.3 shows the distribution of samples in proportion to the geographical distribution of population:

Table 3.3: Distribution of samples

	Provinces	Population Distribution			Sample Distribution		
		Both	Male	Female	Original Sampling	After Oversampling	Responses Received
Central	1 Kabul	3,691.40	1,906.70	1,784.70	100	100	65
	2 Kapisa	406.2	205	201.2			6
	3 Parwan	610.3	308.7	301.6	10	10	12
	4 Panjsher	141.4	72.3	69.1			1
	5 Bamyan	411.7	208.7	203	10	10	16
	6 Daykundi	424.1	217.8	206.3	10	10	10
		5,685,100.00	2,919,200.00	2,765,900.00	130	130	110
East	1 Logar	360.9	183.6	177.3	10	20	15
	2 Nangarhar	1,383.90	708.3	675.6	50	50	9
	3 Laghman	410.3	210.2	200.1		10	11
	4 Paktia	507.8	259.6	248.2	10	20	11
	5 Khost	528.9	270.8	258.1	10	10	12
	6 Kunar	414.7	212.2	202.5			2
	7 Nooristan	136.3	69.5	66.8			-
		3,742,800.00	1,914,200.00	1,828,600.00	80	110	60
North	1 Baghlan	833.3	427.1	406.2	10	10	11
	2 Badakhshan	874.8	445.7	429.1	20	20	37
	3 Takhar	901.9	460	441.9			1
	4 Kunduz	917.9	467.1	450.8			1
	5 Samangan	356.3	182.4	173.9	10	10	6
	6 Balkh	1,194.00	610.8	583.2	100	100	134
	7 Sar-e-Pul	514.1	263.2	250.9			1
	8 Jawzjan	494.2	251.5	242.7	10	10	6
		6,086,500.00	3,107,800.00	2,978,700.00	150	150	197
West	1 Badghis	456.4	233.3	223.1			-
	2 Herat	1,710.10	866.3	843.8			-
	3 Farah	466.3	239.2	227.1			1
	4 Ghor	635.7	324.7	311			2
	5 Nimroz	151.1	77.3	73.8			-
	6 Faryab	915.8	467.4	448.4	10	10	21
		4,335,400.00	2,208,200.00	2,127,200.00	10	10	24
South	1 Ghazni	1,130.10	577.5	552.6	20	30	46
	2 Urozgan	322.6	166.1	156.5	10	10	3
	3 Wardak	549.2	280.3	268.9	10	20	15
	4 Zabul	279.8	143.5	136.3			-
	5 Kandahar	1,103.40	565.9	537.5	50	100	100
	6 Helmand	850.2	436.5	413.7	10	20	13
	7 Paktika	400.5	205.5	195			-
		4,635,800.00	2,375,300.00	2,260,500.00	100	180	177

Given this, I distributed 470 samples across five different regions proportional to the size of population in each region (column named “Original Sampling” shows in detail). After oversampling the southern and eastern provinces for 110 additional samples, the total number of samples reached 580.

Within each region, provinces for study were chosen based on my financial, security and logistical constraints. I wanted to make sure that the study covered every region in which patterns of political leadership might be distributed differently. The Herat province in western Afghanistan was one of the key provinces that I was unable to sample for this study. I could not find the local assistance in Herat for distributing questionnaires and returning the completed ones. Logistically, Herat province is far from Kabul, and I could not afford the time and resources to travel to the province. However, given the social structure of Herat, it was not very problematic to assume that the patterns of political leadership choices there would be similar to those of Balkh or Kandahar.

Furthermore, I intentionally allowed respondents to register the province they belonged to according to their own choice. That means, instead of me registering them as respondents from the province in which they were sampled, I allowed them to define their provinces where they think they belong. This rationale behind this decision was based on the dislocation of populations in Afghanistan, which has been a major problem since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the return of refugees post-2001. Even in the past 12 years, a large number of Afghans have moved from one province to another in search of employment and security. I wanted to make sure that the temporary dislocation of populations for security or economic reasons did not distort the geographical distribution of views representing a person's actual province instead of their interim environment. So, the last column ("Responses Received") in Table 3.3 shows the actual geographic distribution of samples after the survey was administered and the answers were recorded.

I lost some pages of two completed questionnaires during the transportation of files to Kabul, so both observations were dropped from the study. I also detected higher rate of correlation between answers of ten female respondents from one province, which indicated coordination of work while responding to the questionnaire. Nine of these observations were dropped to comply with the assumptions of the model. Therefore, the final number of samples (in the far right column of Table 3.3) is 12, which is fewer than that of the actual survey questionnaires distributed to provinces.

Table 3.4 shows proportional computation and distribution of samples and population across all regions of Afghanistan:

Table 3.4: Proportional distribution of samples vs. geographic distribution of population

Central	Proportion of region's population according to CSO	23%
	Proportion of sample originally assigned to this region	28%
	Proportion of samples in the dataset	19%
	Proportion of samples after over sampling	22%
	Relative rate of over or under sampling in this region	1% Under
East	Proportion of region's population according to CSO	15%
	Proportion of sample originally assigned to this region	17%
	Proportion of samples in the dataset	11%
	Proportion of samples after over sampling	19%
	Relative rate of over or under sampling in this region	4% Over
North	Proportion of region's population according to CSO	25%
	Proportion of sample originally assigned to this region	32%
	Proportion of samples in the dataset	35%
	Proportion of samples after over sampling	26%
	Relative rate of over or under sampling in this region	1% Over
West	Proportion of region's population according to CSO	18%
	Proportion of sample originally assigned to this region	2%
	Proportion of samples in the dataset	4%
	Proportion of samples after over sampling	2%
	Relative rate of over or under sampling in this region	16% Under
South	Proportion of region's population according to CSO	19%
	Proportion of sample originally assigned to this region	21%
	Proportion of samples in the dataset	31%
	Proportion of samples after over sampling	31%
	Relative rate of over or under sampling in this region	12% Over

It is important to note that the highlighted figures representing actual proportion of response of each region do not correspond to the original samples sizes and/or to the proportion of regional population weight, mainly because in many cases respondents identified themselves from another province. For example, 100 samples were allocated to Kabul City, but only 65 of them identified themselves as being from Kabul (see Table 3.3).

Coding of strata and distribution of samples under each code are depicted in Tables 3.5 and 3.6:

Table 3.5: Level of measurement codes at each stratum

Strata	1	2	3	4	5
Age	21 and younger	22-31	32-41	42-51	Older than 51
Education	Uneducated & Some Schooling	12G & Diploma	B.A. & B.S.	M.A. & Ph.D.	
Regions	Central	East	North	West	South
R/U	Urban	Rural			
Gender	Men	Women			
Ethnicity	Pashtuns	Tajiks	Hazaras	Uzbeks	Other
Income	Below 10K	10K - 50K	Above 50K		
Elites	None Participants	Attentive	Participants		
Internet Users	Yes	No	No Response		

Table 3.6: Distribution of samples across strata and codes

Categories	Age	Education	Regions	R/U	Gender	Ethnicity	Income	Elite	Internet
1	30%	9%	19%	55%	69%	39%	51%	49%	60%
2	37%	39%	11%	45%	31%	35%	38%	36%	32%
3	17%	46%	35%			17%	11%	15%	8%
4	9%	5%	4%			6%			
5	6%		31%			3%			

CH – 4: DEFINITION OF LEADERSHIP

Generally, leadership is defined as the art of motivating people to act toward achieving a common goal. However, different societies and cultures define the phenomenon in various ways. Language, as a symbol of a culture, allows us to examine how different cultures refer to the concept of leadership through their own cultural lenses. This research shows that the cognitive definition of leadership is influenced by the word available in the local language for the concept of such a term. For example, as part of literature review discussed earlier in the study, Japanese does not have a word for leadership (Edinger, 1990). In Arabic, for instance, the word for leadership is “*zaeem*,” which basically means “representative” or “someone who is responsible for something.” In Pakistan, they use the word “*qaeed*,” which means “someone who is seated.” In Pashtu, the word “*mesher*,” which means “elder” or “someone who is older than others” is used. In Farsi (the language used in Iran, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan), the word used for leader is “*rahbar*,” which is basically two words—“*raah*,” meaning the “way” or “the path,” and “*bar*,” meaning “someone who takes you, walks you through the path.” It could also mean “someone who guides you or finds the right direction for you.” Some other countries near Afghanistan use the word, “*raeece*,” meaning “the elder,” when referring to their heads of states. In some religious contexts, the word “*mawla*” is used, which means “respectable,” “the head,” or “the owner.” In some contexts, other words are used, such as “*sahib*” or “*mowlana*,” which both mean “the owner.” In most radical Islamic contexts, the word “*khalifa*” (or “caliph” in English)

is used, which simply means “someone who has replaced the prophet.” The word “*khilafat*,” or caliphate, basically refers to the concept of *khalifa* or “the replacement.”

Given all of the variety of words and constructs used in different languages in referring to the concept of leadership, I decided to test this in the context of Afghanistan to see if there are significant differences between ethnic groups when it comes to the choice of words. I was curious because Pashtu and Farsi speakers use similar words in daily conversations. So, I wanted to see if different ethnic groups have different cognitive definition for the concept of political leadership given the cultural differences that they might have.

I asked several open ended questions, free listing questions, and fill-in-the-bank type of questions to explore the domain of words/concepts used by Afghans while referring to a political leader (see Appendix III). I was particularly interested to see if there is any relationship between the literal meaning of the words chosen by different ethnic groups and the overall consensus over who is a leader. I was also interested to see if different groups of population have different consensus over the definition of leadership and/or a leader.

In response to questions like “What does the word ‘leader’ mean to you if you say it in one phrase; or what comes to your mind when you hear the word leader?” a total of 568 respondents responded, and the text of their answers was analyzed for most frequently words used. The result of the analysis is depicted in Figure 4.1, together with the list of words in Farsi for better understanding:

Figure 4.1: Frequency of words used for definition of leadership.

This is a national level representation of what words are used when describing definition of leadership. However, when I separated responses of Pashtuns and looked at their definitions in comparison with the rest of the ethnic groups (mostly Farsi speaking), I noticed that for Pashtuns the word “elder” is frequently repeated definition, while for other ethnic groups it is the world

“guide”. Table 4.1 shows complete detail of choices between Pashtuns and other ethnic groups, when responding to the question in Figure 4.1:

Table 4.1: Frequency of words sued for definition of leadership by Pashtuns vs. None Pashtuns.

Definition by Other Ethnic Groups			Definition by Pashtuns		
Farsi	English	Frq	Farsi	English	Frq
رهبر	Guide	63	بزرگ	Elder	85
پیشرو	The point person	39	رهبر	Guide	67
رهبر	Leader (the word means guide)	35	ادارکننده	The one who is steering	9
بزرگ	Elder	31	پیشرو	The point person	9
ادارکننده	The one who is steering	25	رهبر	Leader (the word means guide)	7
هلي ټکننده	The person who guides	16	ننګس	President (means sitting on the top)	6
نښاندونکي	Representative	12	لګو	Example	3
سر	The head	9	اول	First	3
سړو	The person who leads	6	امرملده	The person who gives orders	3
نښاندونکي	Representative (in charge)	6	ليډر	Leader (Direct use of the English word)	3
مدير	Manager	5	مدير	Manager	3
امرملده	The person who gives orders	5	مليکاد	Teacher	2
ننګس	President (means sitting on the top)	3	سړو	The person who leads	2
لګو	Example	3	نښاندونکي	Representative	2
محافظ	Protector	2	حامی	Supporter	1
خادم	Servant	2	سر	The head	1
زورمند	The powerful	2	مسئول	Responsible	1
پيغمبر	Prophet	2	مشاور	Advisor	1
امام	Imam (Islamic Grand Leader)	1	ناجي	Rescuer	1
خدمتگار	Servant	1	نگهبان	Guardian	1
کيل	Representative (in political system)	1	هلي ټکننده	The person who guides	1

This is probably because the word that Pashtu language has for leadership is “*misher*,” which basically means “elder.” Meanwhile, in Farsi, the word used for leadership is “*rahbari*,” which appears as the third choice in Table 4.1. *Rahbari* is a synonym of “*rahnoma*,” which is a highly repeated word by non-Pashtuns in the interview.

In response to a question that a good political leader should not be young (Figure 4.2), Pashtuns and Uzbeks relatively agreed more than other ethnic groups.

Figure 4.2: Pashtuns and none Pashtuns divergence of views.

In order to understand how a leader is defined in the context of social and political life, I ask respondents a series of fill-in-the-blank type of question to expand the domain of leadership

definition beyond words, particularly in the context of demand and expectations from leaders.

The text of answers to each statement was analyzed for repetition of words and themes, and presented in Appendix III. In the response statements where synonyms were used, they were normalized and the numbers were added. This analysis allowed me to look at broader domain of leadership in the context of Afghanistan beyond the limits of language. Some frequency tables are presented through charts in Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5:

Figure 4.3: Frequency of words in response to what a leader must have before you call him a good leader.

Figure 4.4: Frequency of words in response to what a leaders should be bfore one calls him a good leader.

Figure 4.5: Frequency of words used in response to the question of what makes a leader popular.

The charts reveal that the most important attribute of a good political leader for the people of Afghanistan is being educated, staying in close contact with people, having good morals, being honest, being just and having Islamic identity. These are probably the most important characteristics that Afghans want to see in someone before they consider him or her as a good political leader. Most of the elders, tribal chiefs, and religious clerics become popular when they present signs of being educated, having good moral (purity), being honest and just before people refer to them as the community elder. Elders, tribal chiefs, and religious clerics need to live

among the people so residents can have access to them at all times so they can be considered as leaders.

Furthermore, it is important to look for what is not included in the answer set of respondents. For example, such phrases as protecting people, providing security, defending the country, being democratic, promoting civil rights, etc., do not show up in their responses, which may have some policy implication for future leaders and political scientists who want to practice and/or study the concept of political leadership in Afghanistan.

When asking respondents about the level of education they expect from a political leader (Figure 4.6), the answers were heavily skewed toward higher education, except for the choice of highly educated respondents, who did not emphasize on education as important characteristics of a good political leader.

Figure 4.6: Desired level of education for a good political leader vs. the level of education of respondents.

While this might have been due to the fact that my respondents were mostly educated Afghans, but additional analyses (presented in chapters 5) indicate that people of Afghanistan expect their political leaders to be knowledgeable, able to guide followers, and, ultimately, able to know things that are beyond the understanding of average people. These expectations set the bar high for the future political leaders of Afghanistan.

During the 1970s and 1980s, school teachers were among the groups systematically targeted and sometimes killed by anti-government forces. Furthermore, the other group of leaders that was constantly attacked by the government was religious clerics. These groups were essentially individuals who were expected by residents to know more than the rest of the community and, therefore, to lead communities.

Although the type of education that the majority of Afghan villagers believed in during 1970s and 1980s was religious based, the years of war and immigration to the neighboring countries changed Afghans' perspectives toward modern education. Today, demand for education among Afghans is not comparable to the country's past history. However, the same demand seems to exist when it comes to characteristics of good political leadership. This very simple finding of the study will have major implication not only on public policy priorities of Afghanistan, but also on new generations of political leaders who want to prepare themselves for future challenges of the country. It might be very hard for the next generation of leaders to lead Afghanistan unless they exhibit very strong evidence of knowledge and wisdom.

This is probably one of the reasons why radical Islamic parties are heavily investing in Islamic institutions of higher education in Afghanistan. Otherwise, they will not be able to maintain their grasp on power as the playing field shifts down the road.

CH – 5: CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERS

In this chapter, I will analyze the data respondents provided in reply to question number 16th of the questionnaire (see Appendix II). The question required respondents to indicate their agreement or disagreement with 49 different statements.¹⁸ For example, “a good political leader should have a professional cabinet” was presented to respondents, and they had to pick a number between 1 and 5 (with 1 meaning total disagreement and 5 as total agreement) to indicate their feelings on the statement. A total of 49 similar statements were extracted from the data of semi structured interviews (in the first stage) and presented to each respondent under this question. Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of scores the 49 statements received from respondents.

18 In the first stage, 60 different respondents were asked to list most important characteristics of a good political leader. Their answers generated a total of 49 characteristics that were repeated frequently (at least 5 percent of the 60 responded mentioned it in their answers). Their answers were normalized and corrected for the use of synonyms. Most of normalizations were made in local languages before they were translated into English. The final master list of characteristics, which contained about 49 important items, was turned into typical statements that were then presented to respondents of the second-stage, fixed-form survey to indicate their agreement or disagreement.

Table 5.1: Summary statistics of scores to 49 statements

Description of Items	Obs	Max	Min	Mean	Median	Mode	NR	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis
Have professional cabinet	532	5	0	4.682	5	5	36	0.836	-3.246	11.702
Have good morals	529	5	0	4.686	5	5	39	0.826	-3.050	9.932
Be a woman	519	5	0	2.532	3	3	49	1.757	0.006	-1.282
Be a man	494	5	0	4.209	5	5	74	1.210	-1.710	2.693
Not have double passport	512	5	0	3.961	5	5	56	1.672	-1.352	0.339
Not have family outside country	512	5	0	3.674	5	5	56	1.693	-0.943	-0.481
Not be married to foreigners	520	5	0	3.773	5	5	48	1.750	-1.079	-0.365
Not have business outside the country	521	5	0	3.843	5	5	47	1.634	-1.149	-0.053
Not have a home outside the country	519	5	0	3.844	5	5	49	1.636	-1.163	-0.027
Have high income from legitimate sources	515	5	0	3.769	5	5	53	1.583	-1.088	0.013
Pray five times in the mosque	527	5	0	3.934	5	5	41	1.522	-1.232	0.339
Have religious education	517	5	0	3.683	5	5	51	1.644	-0.942	-0.434
Put on a turban	507	5	0	2.341	2	0	61	1.863	0.197	-1.403
Put on Perahan Tunban	510	5	0	2.720	3	5	58	1.880	-0.085	-1.430
Put on suit with tie	513	5	0	2.949	3	5	55	1.741	-0.292	-1.176
Speak both Pashtu and Dari	519	5	0	4.405	5	5	49	1.274	-2.304	4.378
Be from Kandahar	514	5	0	1.558	1	0	54	1.779	0.920	-0.562
Be from a noble family	511	5	0	2.174	1	0	57	1.949	0.354	-1.434
See all ethnic groups with one eye	518	5	0	2.656	3	5	50	1.837	-0.038	-1.404
Be from south	534	5	0	4.822	5	5	34	0.707	-5.018	27.548
Be decisive	534	5	0	4.787	5	5	34	0.642	-3.745	16.126
Have clear political agenda	533	5	0	4.803	5	5	35	0.655	-4.322	21.626
Be a good manager	535	5	0	4.826	5	5	33	0.622	-4.775	27.118
Be accepting responsibility	534	5	0	4.848	5	5	34	0.546	-4.739	26.956
Be honest	535	5	0	4.865	5	5	33	0.513	-5.136	32.436
Be just	535	5	1	4.871	5	5	33	0.578	-5.142	27.513
Not lie to people	537	5	0	4.719	5	5	31	0.836	-3.549	13.299
Be highly educated	534	5	0	4.710	5	5	34	0.682	-2.765	8.821
Love the country	536	5	0	4.841	5	5	32	0.623	-4.816	25.175
Fight the foreigners	527	5	0	3.524	4	5	41	1.676	-0.728	-0.803
Not let foreigners in the country	523	5	0	2.430	2	5	45	1.994	0.122	-1.566
Acknowledges Durand Line	529	5	0	3.208	4	5	39	2.049	-0.536	-1.432
Respect/enforce the law	535	5	0	4.839	5	5	33	0.676	-5.411	32.050
Believe in God	537	5	0	4.791	5	5	31	0.756	-4.203	18.374
Be brave	534	5	0	4.801	5	5	34	0.658	-4.439	23.163
Be impartial	530	5	0	4.455	5	5	38	1.242	-2.401	4.861
Have good relations with neighboring countries	534	5	0	4.515	5	5	34	1.006	-2.400	5.783
Be internationally famous	531	5	0	4.245	5	5	37	1.159	-1.698	2.595
Respect human rights	528	5	0	4.648	5	5	40	0.818	-2.738	7.894
Respect women's rights	531	5	0	4.565	5	5	37	0.934	-2.462	6.001
Allow women to work	529	5	0	4.185	5	5	39	1.317	-1.703	2.090
Be good speaker	525	5	0	4.383	5	5	43	1.070	-2.010	4.112
Be good looking	518	5	0	3.081	3	5	50	1.640	-0.352	-1.066
Be elected through election	533	5	0	4.698	5	5	35	0.834	-3.283	11.475
Not discriminate based on ethnicity	532	5	0	4.694	5	5	36	0.956	-3.369	10.610
Not discriminate based on religion	530	5	0	4.662	5	5	38	1.024	-3.339	10.521
Not be young	507	5	0	2.085	2	0	61	1.704	0.312	-1.093
Have same deeds as words	519	5	0	4.663	5	5	49	0.877	-3.276	11.431
Be selected through Jirga	508	5	0	3.094	4	5	60	1.996	-0.448	-1.451

In addition, the bar chart in Figure 5.1 presents sorted distribution of scores for the 49 statements:

Figure 5.1: Distribution of scores (1 – 5) to different characteristics of a good political leader.

Given a very high level of agreements among respondents on a number of characteristics, and presence of nonresponse to some items, it is technically not appropriate to conduct systematic structural analysis of the data, unless we take care of these two issues first. Structural analysis, such as exploratory factor analysis and correspondence analysis, will allow us to detect presence of major latent variables that might have determined views of respondents while scoring these items. In order to prepare the data for further structural analysis, I had to drop all observations that missed scores for more than three items, and impute the rest of the data. After dropping 89 observations, demographical statistics of the remaining 479 respondents changed to the following:

Table 5.2: Demography of 479 respondents by social stratification

Strata	Age	Education	Regions	R/U	Gender	Ethnicity	Income	Elite	Internet
1	0.28	0.8	0.19	0.57	0.71	0.43	0.49	0.48	0.61
2	0.38	0.38	0.11	0.43	0.29	0.34	0.39	0.38	0.33
3	0.19	0.48	0.33			0.14	0.12	0.15	0.7
4	0.9	0.6	0.5			0.6			
5	0.6		0.33			0.3			

Note: Please see table below for definition of head row numbers

Table 5.3: Level of measurement codes at each stratum

Strata	1	2	3	4	5
Age	21 & younger	22-31	32-41	42-51	Older than 51
Education	Uneducated & Some Schooling	12G & Diploma	B.A. & B.S.	M.A. & Ph.D.	
Regions	Central	East	North	West	South
R/U	Urban	Rural			
Gender	Men	Women			
Ethnicity	Pashtuns	Tajiks	Hazaras	Uzbeks	Other
Income	Below 10K	10K - 50K	Above 50K		
Elites	None Participants	Attentive	Participants		
Internet Users	Yes	No	No Response		

In addition, to make sure that the data were satisfactory for conducting factor analysis, I had to check for Cronbach Alpha and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) coefficients (KMO is a measure

of sample adequacy commonly used for test of reliability of items). KMO was 0.838, but it could be higher if items were not adversely scored:

- A good leader should be a woman.
- A good leader should put on suit and tie.
- A good leader should recognize the Durand Line.

Still, running factor analysis (rotated varimax) without dropping these items produced seven factors with an eigenvalue of above 1, five of which had an eigenvalue of 2 or higher. However, when factors were rotated using the promax method, the number of factors produced with eigenvalue higher than one increased to 21, 15 of which had a value of 2 or higher. The scree plot of the Eigen values (Figure 5.2) shows that only two factors have very significant importance and the other three are somewhat important.

Figure 5.2: Scree plot of Eigen values for main factors

Table 5.4 presents five factors extracted under each method of rotation. In each column covariance of items with the factors are printed. If an item has a covariance of more than 0.4 with one of the factors, is highlighted in red to distinguish it as an item that belongs to that factor. Chapter Two offers further details on how to read factor analysis.

Table 5.4: Items loading on different factors

Items	Uncorrelated Factors					Correlated Factors				
	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5
Have professional cabinet	0.15	-0.16	-0.03	0.27	0.06	0.08	-0.07	-0.15	0.28	0.03
Have good morals	0.15	0.09	0.30	0.06	-0.02	0.09	0.32	0.04	0.00	-0.06
Be a women	-0.19	-0.09	-0.04	-0.08	0.46	-0.30	-0.04	-0.05	-0.08	0.51
Be a man	0.00	0.07	0.15	0.22	-0.18	-0.02	0.16	0.01	0.22	-0.20
Not have double passport	0.08	-0.02	0.00	0.48	0.06	0.00	-0.05	-0.03	0.49	0.04
Not have family outside country	-0.03	0.04	0.06	0.66	0.08	-0.16	0.00	0.00	0.69	0.07
Not be married to foreigners	0.07	0.15	0.16	0.55	0.01	-0.02	0.11	0.11	0.54	-0.02
Not have business outside the country	0.14	0.11	0.07	0.69	-0.03	0.06	0.00	0.09	0.70	-0.06
Not have a home outside the country	0.05	-0.02	0.13	0.72	-0.01	-0.10	0.08	-0.07	0.74	-0.05
Have high income from legitimate sources	0.16	0.02	0.09	0.21	0.26	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.18	0.25
Pray five times in the mosque	0.09	0.32	0.65	0.21	-0.02	-0.05	0.69	0.20	0.10	-0.05
Have religious education	0.00	0.33	0.61	0.13	-0.15	-0.10	0.67	0.19	0.04	-0.18
Put on a turban	-0.03	0.62	0.31	0.10	-0.20	0.06	0.31	0.56	0.05	-0.19
Put on Perahan Tunban	-0.09	0.56	0.26	0.11	-0.20	-0.01	0.27	0.50	0.08	-0.18
Put on suit with tie	0.04	-0.04	0.06	0.13	0.39	-0.08	0.04	-0.01	0.10	0.40
Speak both Pashtu and Dari	0.20	0.02	0.35	0.12	-0.07	0.11	0.36	-0.04	0.06	-0.12
Be from Kandahar	-0.13	0.75	0.08	-0.02	-0.04	0.04	0.06	0.78	-0.04	0.03
Be from a noble family	-0.11	0.63	0.07	0.04	-0.13	0.04	0.05	0.64	0.02	-0.09
See all ethnic groups with one eye	-0.03	0.53	0.11	0.00	0.14	0.05	0.08	0.57	-0.04	0.19
Be from south	0.33	-0.15	0.23	0.00	-0.04	0.26	0.24	-0.18	-0.06	-0.10
Be decisive	0.67	-0.09	-0.03	0.10	0.13	0.69	-0.12	0.02	0.04	0.08
Have clear political agenda	0.56	-0.05	-0.06	0.01	0.09	0.61	-0.14	0.05	-0.04	0.05
Be a good manager	0.64	-0.03	0.04	0.02	0.09	0.68	-0.03	0.06	-0.06	0.04
Be accepting responsibility	0.66	-0.11	-0.06	0.06	0.06	0.71	-0.14	-0.01	0.00	0.01
Be honest	0.66	-0.02	0.20	-0.01	0.02	0.67	0.15	0.03	-0.11	-0.04
Be just	0.67	-0.06	0.06	0.07	-0.04	0.71	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.11
Not lie to people	0.48	-0.03	0.21	0.08	0.10	0.43	0.17	-0.01	0.00	0.06
Be highly educated	0.25	-0.07	0.44	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.46	-0.14	0.00	0.09
Love the country	0.64	-0.02	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.68	-0.01	0.06	-0.04	0.01
Fight the foreigners	0.02	0.30	0.52	0.04	0.01	-0.07	0.56	0.20	-0.05	-0.01
Not let foreigners in the country	-0.04	0.33	0.40	-0.05	0.03	-0.09	0.44	0.26	-0.12	0.03
Acknowledges Durand Line	-0.03	0.01	0.09	-0.16	0.21	-0.07	0.11	0.02	-0.19	0.23
Respect/enforce the law	0.66	-0.08	0.03	-0.03	0.10	0.70	-0.04	0.02	-0.11	0.05
Believe in God	0.50	0.07	0.39	0.10	-0.02	0.45	0.37	0.05	0.00	-0.09
Be brave	0.37	-0.02	0.26	0.10	0.08	0.30	0.24	-0.02	0.02	0.04
Be impartial	0.19	-0.03	0.38	0.25	0.21	0.00	0.38	-0.08	0.18	0.17
Have good relations with neighboring countries	0.21	-0.24	0.34	0.05	0.24	0.01	0.36	-0.28	-0.03	0.19
Be internationally famous	0.25	0.06	0.31	0.11	0.36	0.11	0.29	0.07	0.02	0.35
Respect human rights	0.34	-0.04	0.08	0.08	0.46	0.24	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.46
Respect women's rights	0.27	-0.11	-0.03	0.02	0.54	0.17	-0.09	0.00	-0.03	0.56
Allow women to work	0.11	-0.19	-0.14	-0.04	0.62	0.00	-0.19	-0.07	-0.06	0.66
Be good speaker	0.29	-0.14	0.15	0.21	0.38	0.14	0.11	-0.10	0.15	0.36
Be good looking	0.02	0.32	0.01	0.09	0.12	0.07	-0.03	0.36	0.07	0.15
Be elected through election	0.47	-0.14	0.05	0.10	0.11	0.44	-0.01	-0.09	0.05	0.06
Not discriminate based on ethnicity	0.41	-0.10	-0.09	0.17	0.00	0.44	-0.15	-0.04	0.15	-0.04
Not discriminate based on religion	0.26	-0.14	0.04	0.16	0.20	0.17	0.00	-0.11	0.13	0.17
Not be young	-0.07	0.42	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.00	-0.03	0.46	0.09	0.15
Have same deeds as words	0.23	-0.12	0.29	0.02	0.10	0.11	0.30	-0.15	-0.04	0.06
Be selected through Jirga	0.01	0.33	0.39	-0.01	0.07	-0.04	0.42	0.27	-0.09	0.07
eigenvalue	6.6	4.6	2.0	1.7	1.1	6.6	4.6	2.0	1.7	1.1
% of Variance Explained	27%	16%	15%	13%	11%	31%	23%	20%	17%	16%

Except for five items, the rest load similarly under both rotation methods, which could mean that these factors are more important than the others. Furthermore, those items that were relatively uniform in distribution (smaller Kurtosis values) loaded on one of the five factors, which is one of the reasons why factor analysis was chosen for this dataset. All other items over which Afghans had significant agreement (higher values of Kurtosis) are self-explanatory and most likely correlated.

Factor 1: Measure of Goodness

I define this factor as the “Measure of Goodness” when it comes to judgments of good political leadership by the Afghans. The items (characteristics) that mostly load on this factor are:

Table 5.5: Loading of characteristics (items) on factor 1

Items	Uncorrelated	Correlated
Be decisive	0.67	0.69
Have clear political agenda	0.56	0.61
Be a good manager	0.64	0.68
Be accepting responsibility	0.66	0.71
Be honest	0.66	0.67
Be just	0.67	0.71
Not lie to people	0.48	0.43
Love the country	0.64	0.68
Respect/enforce the law	0.66	0.70
Believe in God	0.50	0.45
Be elected through election	0.47	0.44
Not discriminate based on ethnicity	0.41	0.44

Bivariate analysis of each item that loaded on the above factor does not show variation across different ethnicity groups, gender, age, income levels, education levels, and other social stratum, which means all Afghans commonly accept these characteristics as signs of good political leadership. See Appendix IV for a complete univariate and bivariate analysis of items loaded on

this factor. If you are a political leader in Afghanistan and your words or behavior shows any sign of decisiveness, honesty, loving the country or believing in God, people can easily get attracted to you even if they don't like you for some other reasons. These characteristics impact the spirit of every Afghan pretty easily. Those who have experience leading people can tell if they agree with this conclusion or not. But in order to validate this further, I will use these characteristics as the baseline and review the text data from survey question 17. Under question 17 in the questionnaire (see Appendix II), survey respondents were asked to express their thoughts about strength and weakness of most famous Afghan political leaders and then rate each one using a scale of one to ten. It is important to note that popularity of leaders is a constantly changing variable and the results might not be representative of the views of Afghans today.¹⁹ But it shows how the most important characteristics of good political leadership have constantly been used when judging goodness of different political leaders. Obviously, this data answers more questions, such as:

- Which leader is associated more with characteristics of good political leadership, and thus in better position to politically grow in the future?
- Which leaders are associated with characteristics that are favorable to one ethnic group, but not necessarily to the other ones?
- How do Afghans rate leaders and grouped them cognitively while comparing their characteristics? In other words, how respondents score leaders similarly?

¹⁹ The data was collected in late 2012 and early 2013.

In order to answer these questions more accurately, we need to define additional factors and check their association with ethnicity, gender, etc., before analyzing data for actual political leaders. But we will refer back to findings of this chapter when we discuss characteristics associated with each political leader.

Factor 2: Islamic Factor

I define this underlying construct as the “Islamic” factor that determines good political leadership in Afghans’ minds. Given that Afghans are highly religious people, it is not a surprise that this factor shows at the second most important underlying construct in their definition of good political leadership. It is important to note that the item “being highly educated” does not load on this factor when you force factors not to correlate. That means the item “being highly educated” does not really belong to this factor, but when you allow correlation of factors it comes close, which is probably because education is an important issue for religious people as well.

Table 5.6: Loading of Characteristics on Factor 2

Items	Uncorrelated	Correlated
Pray five times in the mosque	0.65	0.69
Have religious education	0.61	0.67
Be highly educated	0.44	0.46
Fight the foreigners	0.52	0.56
Not let foreigners in the country	0.40	0.44
Be selected through Jirga	0.39	0.42

In order to test that this factor is not miss-specified, I have conducted thorough bivariate analysis of these items with key social strata to check for significant associations. A complete

set of analysis is printed on Appendix V for the reader's judgment. My conclusion based on review of bivariate analysis is that this factor has more of a religious nature than anything else. Afghanistan is a very religious country; therefore, it is hard to see major differences across geography or gender. However, the level of education indicates that highly educated people are less in favor of these items. We also notice that respondents within the range of 22 to 31 years old are relatively less in favor of this factor. I believe these respondents are the ones who grew up during the relatively prosperous, low violence and economically thriving days of 2001 to 2005. They are more influenced by the developments of early good days than those who came before them, or even after them. But again, I will leave further judgment about this factor to the reader, as there is room for speculation.

What we can clearly notice is that these items do not have any significant Pashtun/non-Pashtun association, which is the main point of interest for the thesis of this dissertation. We also notice that Hazaras, Uzbeks and other minorities have responded less favorably than Pashtuns and Tajiks, which is another reason why I think this is a religious factor rather than ethnic. Hazaras are believed for being less fanatic when it comes to religious extremism. Other researches in Afghanistan show that Pashtuns and Tajiks are more radicalized on the basis of religion than other ethnic groups of the country.²⁰

An interesting observation in this research is how Afghans reacted to the item "a good leader should fight the foreigners." Respondents scored this item favorably, but did not do the same thing with the item "a good leader should not let foreigners into the country." Data were

20 AIR Consulting study of youth radicalization sponsored by KOCHA.

collected while the panic of 2014 was not yet that serious in Afghanistan. So, it might have been the economic benefits of having foreigners in the country over-ride their anti-foreign attitude.

Factor 3: Pashtun Factor

I define this construct as the “Pashtun” factor of good political leadership. We need to review the loadings of this factor before we move on and look at association of these items with key social strata to crosscheck and see if this construct is truly a Pashtun underlying factor in political leadership.

Table 5.7: Loading of Characteristics on Factor 3

Items	Uncorrelated	Correlated
Put on a turban	0.62	0.56
Put on Perahan Tunban	0.56	0.50
Be from Kandahar	0.75	0.78
Be from a noble family	0.63	0.64
See all ethnic groups with one eye	0.53	0.57
Not be young	0.42	0.46

Univariate and bivariate analysis presented in Appendix VI shows that there are significant differences between associations of Pashtuns with these characteristics than non-Pashtuns. For example, Pashtuns scored the item “a good leader should put on a Turban” much more favorably than non-Pashtuns (Figure 5.3). Refer to a detailed bivariate analysis of all items in Appendix VI for more details.

Figure 5.3: Divergence of views between Pashtuns and None Pashtuns over characteristics of good political leadership.

During data collection, most of the respondents interviewed from other ethnic groups reacted very surprisingly in respect to items similar to this one. They thought it has nothing to do with the concept of leadership, and were wondering why such a question even be raised if one is studying characteristics of political

leadership in Afghanistan. This was clear miss-observation of other ethnic groups because it is clearly not an important cultural issue for them. However, it frequently happen that Pashtuns political leaders put a turban on important national and/or cultural even to cultivate on this unique cultural norm of their followers. There is also a Pashtun concept of “Shamla” that associates part of the turban (the piece that stands on top of the head) to the honor of the person who has it.

Many Pashtun leaders put on a turban when they really want the attention of their Pashtun constituents. Even President Karzai dresses specifically to present national unity, meaning each piece of an outfit represents a different ethnic group of Afghanistan. When he visited his home province of Kandahar and/or any other tribal gathering in another province, he will wear a turban to obey the cultural norm. President Asharaf Ghani almost never put on a Turban during much of

his public life and public appearance until he began his electoral campaign and his term in the office. The picture below shows the presidential ceremony to sworn him in to the office. The way he appeared in this ceremony shocked many educated Afghans because they thought he was a highly educated Afghan and would follow his regular standards of dressing. A very similar argument holds about Perahan Tunban, which due to space limitation I will not discuss in details. Many Pashtun leaders, including president Karzai, thought that wearing Perahan Tunban in official settings is a good sign of having their own identity, while many non-Pashtuns were surprised when they saw their new leaders in this outfit.

Source: AFP Shah Marai

Factor 4: Trust & Dependability

I define this underlying construct as “Trust & Dependability” factor, which I think has affected Afghans attitude toward political leadership due to the return of many educated Afghans from exile. Returned Afghans controlled more resources and seized more power than those who stayed behind and suffered all the difficulties of war. Today Afghans think that if they rely on them for leadership, they might leave the country and go back to their secondary homeland when tough days come again. The data suggests that the low-income respondents were not very

concerned about these characteristics. I suspect it is because they do not consider these relatively high salaried returnees as their direct competitors.

Table 5.8: Loadings of Characteristics on Factor 4

Items	Uncorrelated	Correlated
Not have double passport	0.48	0.49
Not have family outside country	0.66	0.69
Not be married to foreigners	0.55	0.54
Not have business outside the country	0.69	0.70
Not have a home outside the country	0.72	0.74

It is also important to note is that these items do not present any association with other social strata, such as ethnicity, which makes it a relatively national reaction to the concept of political leadership than a sub-group concern. Refer to Appendix VII for a complete review of bivariate analysis of these items.

Factor 5: Non-Pashtun Standard

I will define this construct as the “Non-Pashtun Standard” of political leadership. Bivariate analysis of these items suggests that ethnicity makes this factor more like a non-Pashtun norm rather than something like gender, or education. Pashtun respondents mostly scored these items more unfavorably than any other ethnic groups. It is also important to notice that some items load on this factor under one set of condition but not the other (allowing factors to be correlated or uncorrelated).

Table 5.9: Loadings of Characteristics on Factor 5

Items	Uncorrelated	Correlated
Be a woman	0.46	0.51
Put on suit with tie	0.39	0.40
Respect human rights	0.46	0.46
Respect women's rights	0.54	0.56
Allow women to work	0.62	0.66
Be good speaker	0.38	0.36

But there is also a gender association to this factor, which is detectable because women have shown bias toward each of the items relating to the social status of women. However, there are items that are relatively non-Pashtun in nature. For example, association of “a good leader should put on suit and tie” has clear ethnicity associations (Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4: Divergence of views between Pashtuns and None Pashtuns over characteristics of good political leadership.

In this graph, the only ethnic group that has responded more negatively is the Pashtuns. For a more detailed bivariate analysis of these items, refer to Appendix VIII. Bivariate analysis of other items also shows a division of interest between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns.

The items in Table 5.9 did not load on any of the above five factors, but it is important to include their univariate and bivariate analyses presented in Appendix IX:

Table 5.10: Characteristics (items) that did not load on any of the key factors

Items
Have professional cabinet
Have good morals
Be a man
Have high income from legitimate sources
Speak both Pashtu and Dari
Be from South
Acknowledges Durand Line
Be brave
Be impartial
Have good relations with neighboring countries
Be internationally famous
Be good looking
Not discriminate based on religion
Have same deeds as words

Of these items, the ones that exhibited signs of ethnic association were:

- A good political leader should have a professional cabinet.
- A good political leader should acknowledge the Durand Line.
- A good political leader should have high income from legitimate sources.
- A good political leader should be impartial.
- A good political leader should have good relations with neighboring countries.

The item over, which few ethnic groups had any significant bias was “a good political leader should be good looking”.

Important Findings from the First Stage

Ethnic division was observable in the data from the first stage, even though, it was based on responses from as few as 63 people. In the first stage, respondents from all ethnic groups had some degree of consensus when discussing characteristics of good political leadership, but their responses presented significant levels of ethnic division when they were asked which leaders actually possessed those characteristics.²¹ Two charts from data analysis of first-stage are represented in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. Responses are coded and turned into two-dimensional matrices of respondents by characteristics so they could be mapped with social network analysis software, such as UCINET.

²¹ This is part of the reason why two-stage research design is more effective than one stage.

■ = Important characteristics, ▽ = Female respondent, ○ = Male respondent

Pink = Uzbeks, Red = Pashtuns, Green = Tajiks, Yellow = Hazaras.

Figure 5.5: Consensus of respondents over characteristics of good political leadership plotted by UCINET.

The size of blue cubes is proportional to the frequency of that characteristic being mentioned by more respondents. Also if a blue cube is located in the center of the chart, it means there are more consensuses over that item, and if not, it will appear on the corners of the chart.

The distance between these shapes are optimized based on the similarity of views among respondents, and the fact that all respondents mention the same type of characteristics.

Therefore, if there is a great level of consensus among a group of respondents, the blue cubes come in the middle and all respondents surround it in a way that no pattern of color or shape skewness is detectable. However, if there is no consensus among respondent then the graph will exhibit all sort of skewness and patterns of shapes and colors. For example, when the same group of respondent was asked, “Which Afghan leaders have these characteristics that you just mentioned?” responses suddenly presented a very detectable pattern of shapes and colors (Figure 5.6).

Notice that Pashtun respondents gather on the right top corner of the chart, Hazaras on the left of side of the chart, and Tajiks and Uzbeks around lower middle part of the map. This map clearly shows the presence of personalities shift consistency of people toward ethnic bias. We also notice that except for two political leaders (Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and former Afghan Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali) who positioned around the upper-middle part of the map, all other leaders appear close to their own ethnic constituencies. These two leaders attract followers from all ethnic groups because they are highly educated and most of their followers are drawn to them based on their interest in education (when I changed the colors to represent level of education, I noticed that respondents around Ghani and Jalali were mostly educated). On the other hand, it is also very important to note that the number of respondents who mentioned the name of these two leaders was very small, which means they were not as popular as other leaders at the time of data collection. As mentioned previously, the popularity of leaders is a function of time and other events. The data for this study were collected in late 2012, and the relative popularity of leaders presented in this graph also belongs to that time.

■ = Important characteristics, ▽ = Female respondent, ○ = Male respondent

Pink = Uzbeks, Red = Pashtuns, Green = Tajiks, Yellow = Hazaras.

Figure 5.6: Lack of consensus over characteristics of good political leadership plotted by UCINET.

So, even the low responses from the first-stage analysis detect the sharp divisions between the Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns when it comes to characteristics of good political leadership. The difference becomes particularly significant when the issue is brought up in the context of personalities. A depersonalized context seems to be producing less diverging choices between different ethnic groups than a personalized context.

Figure 5.7: No significant divergence of views between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns over some characteristics of good political leadership.

Also, it turns out that there are specific areas, where Pashtun and non-Pashtun values diverge even in the context of impersonalized political leadership. For Pashtuns, political leadership has certain characteristics

that are not important for non-Pashtuns, such as putting a turban. By the same token, political leadership possesses some other characteristics that are important for non-Pashtuns, but not for Pashtuns, such as putting a suit and tie. The disagreement over characteristics of political leadership goes beyond power politics and ethnic rivalry, and seems to be embedded in socio-cultural values of each group. Some of these values are deeply embedded in each group, posing challenges to making democratic developments in Afghanistan.

Judging Characteristics of Known Political Leaders

As mentioned previously, initial analysis in the first stage suggested that Afghans did not have diversion of norms and values when they commented on characteristics of good political leadership. However, their views become divergent along ethnic lines when the names of actual political leaders were mentioned in the interviews. In this section, I aim to cross-check this

finding from the first stage. Also, I analyze the data for those questions in which respondents were asked to judge the characteristics of the actual political leaders of Afghanistan.

In the first stage, I asked every respondent to give me a list of officials whom they thought had all the characteristics of a good political leader. I summed up the names that each respondent listed, and then created a master list of famous political leaders. I deleted all the names that only one respondent (of the 60) mentioned, and took the rest and put in the questionnaire of my fixed-form survey. In the second stage, I asked respondents to answer the following three questions (to see a complete list of 63 leaders, refer to Appendix II):

1. What do you think are the most important strengths of these 63 political leaders?
2. What do you think are the most important weaknesses of these 63 political leaders?
3. Given all the strengths and weaknesses that you mentioned, could you please rate these leaders in a scale of 1 to 10?

The answers to the first two questions, unexpectedly, generated a very large body of text that required labor-intensive textual analysis. However, resource limitations for this dissertation project prevented a detailed textual analysis of all the answers provided by the respondents. A summary of the findings from the first two questions is presented in a word cloud chart (Figure 5.9). The answer to the third question is used for another set of multivariate analysis, which will be discussed in Chapter Six.

The original text (all in local languages)—produced in response to the first two questions (strengths and weakness of 63 political leaders)—was used as the primary source of data for generating the word cloud chart. This method of mapping, or data visualization, is helpful

because the size of the text is proportional to the frequency of that word repeated in answers from respondents. In the word cloud chart in Figure 5.9, several of the most frequently mentioned words have been outlined and translated to cross-check them with the key characteristics that were discussed earlier in the dissertation:

Figure 5.8: Key words used in evaluation of actual political leaders (depicted in word cloud).

Even though these single words do not pass the whole message that the data has recorded, but it still provides a good picture of what respondents intended to say.²² Here is why; when I asked respondents another question of what would make a political leader popular among people, the answers are analyzed by frequency analysis—the words in Table 5.11 are the same as those depicted in the word cloud in Figure 5.8.

Table 5.11: Translation and frequency of words used repeatedly in the word cloud analysis

Farsi	English	Frequency
در بین مردم بودن	Being with people	270
وطن را آباد کردن	Building the country	201
از افغانستان بودن	Being from Afghansitan	155
تحصیل کرده باشد	Being educated	151
صانع باشد	Being honest	97
عادل بودن	Being just	95
قانون احترام کردن	Respecting the law	67
تعصب قومی نداشته باشد	Not having ethnic biase	56
عمل داشتن	Being practical	49
مسلم باشد	Being Muslim	49
اخلاق خوب داشتن	Having good morals	41
فساد را از بین ببرد	Fighting corruption	35
مدیریت داشته باشد	Being a manager	30
توجه به ملت داشته باشد	Being concern about the nation	30
اقتصاد جامعه را بسازد	Building the economy	28

Also, I noticed that there were some differences in the choice of words when they judged strengths and weaknesses of actual political leaders, versus defining characteristics of good political leadership.

The question about characteristics of good political leadership was intentionally asked before respondents were exposed to the list of political leaders' names (see Appendix II). This was

²² Complete analysis of all data required much more time and resources than what I achieve within the timeline of writing this dissertation.

done in an effort to cross-check if the choice of words would differ when respondents react to the list of names instead of open-ended questions about abstract characteristics. But as seen in the word cloud in Figure 5.9, the choices of words in both cases come very close.

CH – 6: EXPECTATIONS FROM LEADERS

During the first stage when exploring the most important characteristics of good political leadership among Afghans, I noticed that a number of respondents listed policy actions and other behavioral expectations as characteristics of a good political leader. For example, they said “a good leader would promote women’s rights”, or “a good leader will let women work”, or “a good leader would fight the foreigners”, etc. I noticed that for Afghans also like all other people around the world good leadership is not only defined by the characteristics of the leader, but also by what do actually do when they are in the office.

Therefore, I decided to add another question about policy expectations to see if the underlying constructs that influence judgments of Afghans under policy expectation are different or the same as those under characteristics of leaders. This chapter review analysis of data about a number of policy decisions that were explored in the first stage and evaluated in the second stage fixed form survey. Under the question of what would you expect a good political leader do when s/he is in power, respondents of semi structured interviews listed a total of 41 policy decisions that were turned into fixed form survey question in the second stage. Respondents were asked to rate each policy statement with one of the three choices:

- Very important (Coded as 3)
- Somewhat important (Coded 2)
- Not important (Coded 1)

A summary of statistics of responses is presented below:

Table 6.1: Summary statistics of policy priorities

Items	NR	Mean	Median	Mode	Min	Max	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis
Promote rule of law	45	2.95	3	3	1	3	0.22	-4.77	23.50
Bring peace and stability	42	2.98	3	3	1	3	0.16	-8.16	73.87
Creates jobs for people	55	2.91	3	3	1	3	0.29	-3.16	9.05
Promotes education	40	2.97	3	3	2	3	0.17	-5.69	30.53
Deliver justice	39	2.97	3	3	2	3	0.17	-5.50	28.37
Punishes war criminals	51	2.78	3	3	1	3	0.43	-1.57	1.10
Brings international aid to the country	58	2.68	3	3	1	3	0.53	-1.41	1.04
Enforces Islamic law in the country	50	2.79	3	3	1	3	0.53	-2.53	5.21
Stops ethnic discrimination among people	43	2.88	3	3	1	3	0.38	-3.41	11.64
Removes foreigners from the country	43	2.29	2	3	1	3	0.79	-0.57	-1.17
Improves Afghan economy	39	2.95	3	3	2	3	0.21	-4.28	16.38
Listens to people	46	2.82	3	3	1	3	0.40	-1.94	2.57
Respects elders	47	2.60	3	3	1	3	0.61	-1.26	0.52
Respects the views of MPs	60	2.60	3	3	1	3	0.55	-0.99	-0.05
Defends the country	45	2.97	3	3	2	3	0.17	-5.47	28.00
Have good relations with neighboring countries	47	2.84	3	3	2	3	0.37	-1.83	1.35
Is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan	52	2.86	3	3	1	3	0.35	-2.39	4.64
Ends corruption in the society	44	2.95	3	3	2	3	0.22	-4.07	14.61
Eradicates narcotics in the country	47	2.88	3	3	1	3	0.37	-3.05	9.19
Fights and removes mafia economy	55	2.88	3	3	1	3	0.34	-2.80	7.26
Hires professional and honest team	44	2.86	3	3	1	3	0.40	-2.97	8.53
Stays honest with people	47	2.93	3	3	1	3	0.26	-3.73	13.44
Does exactly what he say he will do	45	2.92	3	3	1	3	0.30	-3.86	15.49
Rebuilds the country	49	2.97	3	3	2	3	0.18	-5.10	24.11
Is useful to your personal needs	60	2.07	2	3	1	3	0.84	-0.13	-1.56
Treats you better than other	62	1.71	1	1	1	3	0.83	0.58	-1.29
Makes peace with insurgents	60	2.38	3	3	1	3	0.78	-0.77	-0.94
Does not recognize the Durand line	60	2.33	3	3	1	3	0.84	-0.68	-1.24
Recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups	58	2.74	3	3	1	3	0.54	-2.01	3.06
Conducts national consensus to determine how many are we	57	2.64	3	3	1	3	0.59	-1.44	1.02
Distributes resources according to the size of population	56	2.67	3	3	1	3	0.56	-1.47	1.20
Allows governors of provinces and districts to be elected	55	2.60	3	3	1	3	0.64	-1.37	0.64
Allows mayors of city cities to be elected	56	2.63	3	3	1	3	0.61	-1.45	0.97
Promotes Sharia law in the country	56	2.67	3	3	1	3	0.65	-1.74	1.58
Makes military service mandatory	55	2.24	2	3	1	3	0.81	-0.47	-1.31
Hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet	55	2.74	3	3	1	3	0.50	-1.74	2.17
Promotes women's rights in the country	62	2.64	3	3	1	3	0.58	-1.39	0.90
Promotes democracy in the country	58	2.52	3	3	1	3	0.66	-1.05	-0.08
Promotes close relation with Western countries	58	2.25	2	3	1	3	0.78	-0.47	-1.20
Promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors	70	2.68	3	3	1	3	0.53	-1.43	1.12
Promotes close relations with Islamic countries	75	2.77	3	3	1	3	0.49	-2.09	3.63

Figure 6.1 presents sorted distribution of scores for the 41 policy expectation ratings.

In the Figure 6.1, 1 means Not Important, 2=Somewhat Important, and 3=Very Important.

A total of 33 observations were dropped because respondents did not respond to more than one policy priority. Another 41 observations were dropped because responses did not present any variations (respondents scored all policy priorities in a similar way). The demographics of 494 respondents were distributed as follows:

Table 6.2: Demographics of 494 Respondents by Social Stratification

	Age	Education	Regions	R/U	Gender	Ethnicity	Income	Elite	Internet
1	0.29	0.08	0.19	0.55	0.70	0.40	0.49	0.47	0.61
2	0.38	0.38	0.10	0.45	0.30	0.35	0.39	0.38	0.32
3	0.17	0.48	0.34			0.16	0.12	0.15	0.07
4	0.09	0.06	0.05			0.06			
5	0.06		0.32			0.03			

Table 6.3: Level of measurement codes at each stratum

Strata	1	2	3	4	5
Age	21 & younger	22-31	32-41	42-51	Older than 51
Education	Uneducated & Some Schooling	12G & Diploma	B.A. & B.S.	M.A. & Ph.D.	
Regions	Central	East	North	West	South
R/U	Urban	Rural			
Gender	Men	Women			
Ethnicity	Pashtuns	Tajiks	Hazaras	Uzbeks	Other
Income	Below 10K	10K - 50K	Above 50K		
Elites	None Participants	Attentive	Participants		
Internet Users	Yes	No	No Response		

Cronbach Alpha coefficient of 0.81 suggests that the reliability of the samples was good. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) coefficient was initially 0.73, but after dropping item No. 4, “a good leader promotes education” presented in Table 6.1, the KMO coefficient became 0.75. This number meets the minimum requirement for conducting factor analysis. The scree plot of the factors was:

Figure 6.2: Scree plot of Eigen values for main factors

At least three important factors are visible on the Scree plot in Figure 6.2 (remember we had two important factors in Chapter Five). The loading of factors show that at least five factors have an eigenvalue of greater than 1, exactly the same number in Chapter Five. I decided to extract five factors and compare them with the factors extracted for characteristics of political leadership in Chapter Five. This allowed cross-checking to see if the underlying constructs for good political leadership were still the same while analyzing two different sets of data.

Table 6.4 shows factor loadings under both correlated and uncorrelated conditions. Items that have loaded on any of the five factors with a covariance of at least 0.4 are highlighted for easy tracking.

Table 6.4: Table of Loadings for Five Extracted Factors

Items	Uncorrelated Factors					Correlated Factors				
	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5
Promote rule of law	-0.01	0.10	0.26	0.11	-0.15	0.04	-0.06	0.27	0.09	-0.15
Bring peace and stability	0.07	0.12	0.40	-0.10	0.21	0.06	-0.05	0.41	-0.14	0.20
Creates jobs for people	0.08	0.22	0.41	0.05	0.06	0.15	-0.04	0.41	-0.01	0.05
Deliver justice	0.11	0.04	0.26	0.01	-0.14	-0.03	0.08	0.28	-0.01	-0.15
Punishes war criminals	0.26	0.20	0.24	0.00	0.16	0.15	0.18	0.21	-0.06	0.15
Brings international aid to the country	0.14	0.39	0.09	-0.10	0.02	0.42	0.07	0.01	-0.19	0.00
Enforces Islamic law in the country	0.74	-0.10	0.14	-0.01	0.07	-0.23	0.76	0.13	-0.02	0.07
Stops ethnic discrimination among people	0.22	-0.02	0.40	0.06	-0.17	-0.15	0.17	0.43	0.05	-0.17
Removes foreigners from the country	0.52	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.23	-0.06	0.51	-0.02	0.02	0.23
Improves Afghan economy	0.12	0.12	0.36	0.12	-0.25	0.03	0.07	0.37	0.08	-0.25
Listens to people	0.36	0.38	0.23	0.10	0.06	0.34	0.27	0.16	0.00	0.05
Respects elders	0.58	0.25	0.19	0.08	0.08	0.18	0.52	0.12	-0.01	0.08
Respects the views of MPs	0.32	0.49	0.11	0.16	0.02	0.48	0.24	0.01	0.04	0.02
Defends the country	0.11	0.01	0.50	0.15	-0.14	-0.13	0.03	0.55	0.14	-0.13
Have good relations with neighboring countries	0.41	0.29	-0.01	0.05	-0.24	0.27	0.42	-0.09	-0.03	-0.24
Is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan	0.16	0.31	0.12	0.05	-0.16	0.30	0.11	0.06	-0.03	-0.17
Ends corruption in the society	0.06	0.03	0.40	0.07	-0.13	-0.07	0.00	0.43	0.05	-0.13
Eradicates narcotics in the country	0.19	0.18	0.48	-0.01	0.11	0.09	0.07	0.48	-0.06	0.10
Fights and removes mafia economy	-0.02	0.31	0.33	0.07	0.02	0.28	-0.14	0.31	0.00	0.02
Hires professional and honest team	0.04	0.21	0.18	0.08	0.00	0.19	-0.03	0.16	0.03	0.00
Stays honest with people	0.16	0.22	0.33	-0.04	-0.08	0.16	0.08	0.31	-0.10	-0.10
Does exactly what he say he will do	0.22	0.01	0.56	-0.03	-0.01	-0.13	0.13	0.60	-0.05	-0.02
Rebuilds the country	0.08	0.08	0.26	0.12	0.15	0.02	0.00	0.26	0.10	0.16
Is useful to your personal needs	0.12	0.00	0.05	0.12	0.57	-0.02	0.05	0.04	0.13	0.58
Treats you better than other	0.24	0.05	-0.15	0.12	0.59	0.06	0.20	-0.18	0.11	0.60
Makes peace with insurgents	0.36	0.07	-0.06	0.00	0.09	0.05	0.37	-0.10	-0.03	0.09
Does not recognize the Durand line	0.34	0.06	-0.01	-0.03	0.26	0.04	0.32	-0.04	-0.06	0.25
Recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups	0.14	0.24	0.22	0.04	-0.12	0.20	0.08	0.19	-0.03	-0.13
Conducts national consensus to determine population	-0.09	0.45	0.02	0.38	-0.05	0.49	-0.17	-0.06	0.29	-0.02
Distributes resources according to the size of population	0.04	0.31	0.17	0.33	-0.04	0.28	-0.04	0.13	0.26	-0.01
Allows governors of provinces and districts to be elected	0.09	0.09	0.01	0.74	0.09	0.03	0.05	-0.01	0.74	0.16
Allows mayors of city cities to be elected	0.04	0.09	0.03	0.75	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.75	0.10
Promotes Sharia law in the country	0.70	-0.09	0.10	0.07	0.13	-0.21	0.71	0.09	0.06	0.14
Makes military service mandatory	0.25	0.14	0.07	0.16	0.26	0.11	0.20	0.04	0.13	0.27
Hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.00	0.22	0.25	0.08	0.07	-0.06	0.21
Promotes women's rights in the country	-0.06	0.53	0.09	0.14	0.06	0.58	-0.17	0.00	0.03	0.06
Promotes democracy in the country	-0.14	0.57	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.64	-0.26	0.02	-0.05	0.08
Promotes close relation with Western countries	-0.10	0.57	-0.02	0.13	-0.02	0.65	-0.19	-0.13	0.01	-0.02
Promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors	0.23	0.40	-0.10	0.22	-0.29	0.42	0.23	-0.21	0.12	-0.28
Promotes close relations with Islamic countries	0.62	0.05	-0.02	0.05	-0.16	-0.01	0.66	-0.07	0.01	-0.16
eigenvalue	5.1	2.4	1.8	1.2	1.1	5.1	2.4	1.8	1.2	1.1
% of Variance Explained	23%	19%	17%	12%	10%	27%	26%	24%	13%	11%

The very first observation is that items load on all five factors almost identically under both methods of rotations. Except for a few items, the rest load on the same factors whether they rotate in accordance with the varimax method or remain oblique. The only difference that appears is the change in eigenvalue of factors, and, therefore, the factors' positions change when we choose a different method of rotation. In the following sections, I will explore the five factors under both methods of rotation to present a complete picture. But it is important to note that in

the context of political leadership, it might make more sense to allow factors to correlate because most characteristics of political leaders can have definitional overlap.

Factor 1: Measure of Goodness

I am going to define this underlying construct as “Measure of Goodness” for priority policies of a good political leader. Some of the policy priorities that have loaded on this factor are time sensitive and driven by the public priorities of the time when the data were collected in the field, but other ones could be relevant for future priorities as much as for today. Obviously “measure of goodness” of policy priorities should be time sensitive because priorities change over time and so the measure of goodness construct in the public’s mind.

The key difference in this set of analysis that one can observe is that the method of rotation changes eigenvalue of Factor 1, which was not the case in characteristics of good political leadership. This is probably because policy priorities are not as clearly defined in Afghans’ minds as characteristics of political leaders.

Table 6.5: Policy priority loading on factor 1

Items	Uncorrelated F-2	Correlated F-1
Brings international aid to the country	0.39	0.42
Respects the views of MPs	0.49	0.48
Conducts national census to determine how many are we	0.45	0.49
Promotes women's rights in the country	0.53	0.58
Promotes democracy in the country	0.57	0.64
Promotes close relation with Western countries	0.57	0.65
Promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors	0.40	0.42

The item that narrowly slips from loading on this factor (under uncorrelated conation) is “a good political leader brings international aid to the country.” The other item that barely makes it is “a good leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.” All other items load on the factor under both correlated and uncorrelated conditions. Review bivariate analysis of these items on the basis of both geography and ethnicity in the Appendix X.

Factor 2: Islamic Factor

I define the underlying construct, once again, as the “Islamic” factor of good political leadership decisions. This is the same factor that we captured in the analysis of characteristics of good political leadership. Again, this not a surprise because we know Afghanistan has always been a religious society. However, the effects of Jihadi slogans and promotions during the Cold War, and the subsequent period of Taliban rule have influenced the attitudes, norms, and values of the new generation to a great extent. The items that mostly load on this factor are:

Table 6.6: Policy priority loadings on factor 2

Items	Uncorrelated F-1	Correlated F-2
Enforces Islamic law in the country	0.74	0.76
Removes foreigners from the country	0.52	0.51
Respects elders	0.58	0.52
Have good relations with neighboring countries	0.41	0.42
Promotes Sharia law in the country	0.70	0.71
Promotes close relations with Islamic countries	0.62	0.66

Refer to Appendix XI for detailed review of bivariate analysis of these items across different social stratification of respondents. The most important stratum associated with items of this factor is education. Respondents with higher level of education scored these policy priorities

very unfavorably, while the uneducated respondents scored them generously. This is going to be one of the most important justifications for the policy recommendations that I will provide in the last chapter of dissertation. At every level of this study, I find strong evidence for sustained and continuous education in Afghanistan if the country is supposed to place itself on a path toward prosperity. Neither of stratifications such as ethnicity, geography, gender, and age account for variation of items loaded on this factor. It is important to notice that younger generation (especially those younger than 21) is more radicalized on religious views than other age groups (see bivariate analysis under Appendix XI).

Factor 3: Justice and Honesty

I define this underlying construct as the “Justice and Honesty” factor of good political leadership. It is important to note that this factor did not exist under characteristics of leadership, probably because the concept of honesty is more relevant to the actual behavior of a leader rather than his or her personal characteristics. Afghans are very concerned about the dishonest, unjust, and unfair actions of their political leaders and, therefore, this underlying construct becomes an important factor in their definitions of good political leadership decisions. The items that load on this factor are:

Table 6.7: Policy Priority Loadings on Factor 3

Items	Uncorrelated F-1	Correlated F-2
Bring peace and stability	0.40	0.41
Creates jobs for people	0.41	0.41
Stops ethnic discrimination among people	0.40	0.43
Defends the country	0.50	0.55
Ends corruption in the society	0.40	0.43
Eradicates narcotics in the country	0.48	0.48
Does exactly what he says he will do	0.56	0.60

Bivariate analysis of these items shows that there is a complete national consensus over priorities of these policies, and there is no significant association between these items and key social strata. See Appendix XII for the details of crosstab analysis.

Factor 4: Decentralization of Power

Factor 4 is a construct related to the concept of “decentralization of power.” This has been a matter of public debate since 2002, but the degree of centralization of power appropriate for Afghanistan remains a controversial issue as Pashtuns consider it equivalent to the independence of other ethnic groups, and non-Pashtuns, particularly Tajiks and Uzbeks, have been demanding it since 2001. It turns out that at the time of data collection, decentralization of power might have been a policy issues that Afghans were thinking about, but as the scree plot in Figure 6.2 suggested, fourth and fifth factors are not very significant constructs in Afghan’s minds.

Factor 5: The Culture of Denying Personal Expectations

This factor relates to a somewhat deeper cultural construct that is common in Afghanistan. I would define it as the culture of denying personal expectations that one has for a person in power. Afghans usually expect favor from their friends if they are in a position of power, but they pretend it is not the case in public. When I first heard this from a few villagers in rural Afghanistan as their measure of good political leadership, I suspected that most respondents would deny it in the second stage. The data suggest that my suspicion was correct. While

Afghans expect people in power to be helpful to their personal needs, residents never acknowledge such an idea in public. The items that load on each of Factors 4 and 5 are:

Table 6.8: Policy priority loadings on factors 4 and 5

Items	Uncorrelated		Correlated	
	F-4	F-5	F-4	F-5
Is useful to your personal needs	0.12	0.57	0.13	0.58
Treats you better than other	0.12	0.59	0.11	0.60
Allows governors of provinces and districts to be elected	0.74	0.09	0.74	0.16
Allows mayors of city cities to be elected	0.75	0.02	0.75	0.10

See Appendix XIII for association of these items with key social strata.

The following items did not load on any of the five factors:

Table 6.9: Other Policy Priorities

Items
Promote rule of law
Deliver justice
Punishes war criminals
Improves Afghan economy
Listens to people
Is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan
Fights and removes mafia economy
Hires professional and honest team
Stays honest with people
Rebuilds the country
Makes peace with insurgents
Does not recognize the Durand line
Recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups
Distributes resources according to the size of population
Makes military service mandatory
Hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet

It is important to note that one item (“a good political leader promotes education”) was dropped to increase reliability of the items. A total of 17 items did not load on any of the major factors. Coincidentally, most of these policy priorities correlate with priority objectives of

international assistance to the government of Afghanistan. Some of them uniquely relate to segments of Afghan population. For example, “a good leader does not recognize the Durand Line,” is a very unique border conflict issue with Pakistan that has its own special importance to the Pashtuns of Afghanistan.

On the other hand, several of these policy expectations (Table 6.9, highlighted in red) such as “a good leader delivers justice” should have loaded on the honesty factor. The reason it is not loaded is probably because there are some aspects of justice delivery that Afghans usually expect from other sources of authority, such as religious clergies who dominate the judiciary system of the country.

It might be useful to review both univariate and bivariate analyses of these items to see if any of them have significant associations with key social strata. Appendix XIV presents univariate and bivariate analyses of these items. Although these policies priorities do not load on any of the key factors, their univariate analysis shows considerable ethnic variations. For example, items such as “a good political leader makes peace with insurgents” (Figure 6.3) and “a good political leader does not recognize the Durand Line” are more associated with Pashtun interest, than non-Pashtuns of Afghanistan.

Some other items, such as “a good political leader recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups” (Figure 6.4) or “a good leader hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet”, exhibit slightly more non-Pashtun interest than Pashtuns.

Figure 6.3: Relative importance of making peace with the insurgents for the Pashtuns population vs other ethnic groups of Afghanistan.

Figure 6.4: Tiny difference in views of Pashtuns and none Pashtuns over recognition of ethnic identity of all ethnic groups equally.

CH – 7: IDENTITY OF POLITICAL LEADERS

In the past two chapters, the discussion has focused on the characteristics of good leaders, as well as policy expectations from good leaders. However, in both cases, the study did not reveal the name and/or other identity of an actual political leader to the respondents. However, as discussed in Chapter Five, I learned in the first stage that Afghans' views drastically differ when questions about the characteristics of political leadership include the names of actual political leaders. In this chapter, I will look into why Afghans' views change when characteristics of leadership are evaluated in the presence of actual name and/or identities of specific political leaders. I will look specifically for the presence of similar latent variables that were extracted in Chapters Five and Six. If different factors are found, then I will explore possible influences from those factors on Afghans' attitudes toward leadership in the context of political leaders' names.

In this chapter, I will attempt to answer three questions driven by the findings from the first stage:

- Are there other factors that influence Afghans' attitudes toward political leadership when evaluated in the presence of actual leader's names?
- If so, what are they, and what causes diversion of views when political leader's identity (name) is judged?
- Do Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns evaluate political leaders similarly?

During first-stage analysis, we discovered that Afghans' views exhibit more harmony on characteristic of good political leadership when they talk about the subject of leadership in the abstract, rather than when connected to politician's names. This was a key observation because it suggests that there is consensus among Afghans when it comes to characteristics of good political leadership. Because ethnic divisions appear when political identity of actual leaders is discussed, this means that there is another set of underlying factors that are different from what we analyzed in previous chapters. In this chapter we will review try to identity these factors and compare them with those extracted in previous chapters.

Political leadership literature considers a leader's traits and environment in determining important factors that relate a leader to a group of people or make him or her more popular than others. In contrast, a new psychology of leadership suggests that effective leadership is never about the individual leader, but rather about how leaders and followers come to see each other as part of a common team or group (Haslam, Reicher, and Platow, 2011). It is all about social identity and how a group of individuals (both leaders and followers) identify each other as representative or members of the same team. Haslam, Reicher and Platwo argue that effective leadership is defined by how leaders effectively craft a sense of "us" and convincingly construct the perception of "doing it for us." In this case, "us" is defined by a continuous and constantly evolving set of interactions in which both leaders and followers participate. Leaders define themselves differently from the rest of the identities used by previous leaders, and they strive to open space for successful political leadership by successfully convincing a group of people that they belong to this newly defined social identity more than other existing identities.

In the past three decades, several groups of political leaders have come to the forefront and quickly moved off the stage through rapid waves of wars and political transitions in Afghanistan. After the collapse of royal system in early 1970s, a group of relatively progressive thinkers came to power, which was quickly challenged by different groups of radical Islamists during the 1980s. All leaders of relatively secular and Islamic parties were challenged by a group of extremely radical Islamists, the Taliban, in the mid-1990s. Since the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, almost all of the previous political groups returned to the political system and participated in a political process that continues to this date.

The three presidential elections of 2004, 2009, and 2014 presented many opportunities, but also challenges. One of the challenges entails a labeling game that is a common method of political rivalry in the Afghan political community. Labeling and blame games have confused the new generation of Afghanistan to think properly about social identities presented by different groups of Afghan political leaders. A very quick review of the Afghan social media suggests that in most cases the general public is skeptical about their political leaders. The new generation is particularly less willing to participate in the political process because it fails to recognize a group identity that motivates them to join. Several polls in 2013 and 2014 suggested that more than 50 percent of Afghan voters were not sure for whom they should vote, or whether they were going to vote at all, while a considerable number of them were not interested to vote in the first place (Shawe et al, 2013).

This chapter of analysis will present the search for any social or political identities that Afghans have in the back of their minds. Are those identities ethnic based, which is a common perception in the political community of Afghanistan, or is the basis something else? I will use

the rating pattern of respondents to look for systematic correlation and determine whether there are any other factors that influence respondents about political leaders. If such latent variable exists, are they significantly distinguishable? And, if there are signification factors, how should we define those factors, given the cultural, social and political context of Afghanistan?

As mentioned previously, about 60 individuals from different backgrounds were interview in the first stage, and they were asked the following two questions:

1. What characteristics do you want to see in a leader before you say, “I would like to follow this leader?”
2. Which Afghan political leaders, do you think have those characteristics?

The answers to these questions produced a total of 63 leaders’ names who were mentioned more than three times by all the respondents. I took these 63 political leaders and formed the following three questions for the second-stage, fixed-form survey:

- From your point of view, what are the strengths of Mr./Ms. [fill in the blank with name]?
(A specific name from the list of 63 political leaders was mentioned in each question.)
- From your point of view, what are the weaknesses of Mr./Ms. [fill in the blank with name]?
- Considering all of the strengths and weaknesses you mentioned for leader [fill in the blank with name], how would you rate him/her in a scale of 0 to 10? (10 being the most ideal leader of your choice, and 0 the least ideal.)

Respondents were allowed to come back and change their ratings for a given leader if he or she decided to do so after rating other leaders until he or she was satisfied with the ratings to all

63 leaders. A bar chart of scale distribution from 0 to 10, including nonresponses, for each ethnic group, as well as at the national level, is depicted in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: Distribution of scores (1 – 10) to actual political leaders of Afghanistan.

The challenge in collecting data for this question was the reluctance of respondents to share their views about actual political leaders. Some nonresponses were expected because, after all, Afghanistan is a society at war and it is not convenient for most Afghan residents to take risks and comment on powerful politicians.

Figure 7.2: Summary statistics of missing values in the dataset

The study protocol required respondents to share their views voluntarily and only if they felt safe to do so. Therefore, it was not possible to increase the response rate more than a certain rate. Out of the 568 respondents only 59 of them scored all leaders voluntarily. The chart in Figure 7.2 provides summary statistics of the missing values for this question.

As it was the case in first stage of analysis, responses exhibited significant divisions along ethnic lines when characteristics of good political leadership were evaluated in the context of actual political leaders' names.

Respondents were given names and were asked to determine the most important characteristic of leaders. Appendix VX shows the details of strong ethnic bias when respondents evaluated characteristics of actual political leaders.

Scores of 63 leaders had missing data, and out of 568 respondents only 59 of them scored all leaders without any missing data. In total, 20,813 missing points existed in the data, which constitutes about 55.8 percent of all the data. Systematic analysis of missing points is presented in Appendix – XV, which shows presence of two patterns. The pattern of nonresponses seemed to be systematic, and Little's MCAR test turned to be significant with $Chi-Square = 11208.264$, $DF = 10707$, $Sig. = 0.000$. Therefore, I had to impute data using multiple imputation method of

SPSS to prepare it for factor analysis. Appendix XVI provides complete statistical details of factor extraction.

Figure 7.3: Distribution of mean values and its proximity to normal distribution.

Cronbach Alpha coefficient was equal to 0.84, but histogram chart of mean values suggested skewed scores toward lower numbers, which means low popularity of most political leaders in Afghanistan. In a perfect world,

distribution of mean values should be close to a normal distribution, but in certain contexts skewed mean distributions are not a major problem for extracting factors.

Usually it is important to rotate factors under both conditions of correlated and uncorrelated factors, but in this case I only rotated them by restricting correlation of factors because it will not only make interpretation of results easier, but also reduces the chances of one item loading on different factors at the same time (reduces association of leaders to several underlying constructs at the same time).

The scree plot of eigenvalues in Figure 7.4 shows that there are at least 13 factors with an eigenvalue of greater than one. However, three of these factors are the most important ones because they appear before the first knee in the graph. It is interesting to observe that there is more than one observable knee in this scree plot. This leaves the decision to the research to

decide which knee should be accepted as the cutoff point and thus define only those factors that have an eigenvalue of greater than that point.

Figure 7.4: Scree plot of Eigen values for main factors.

The summary of factor loadings is presented in the table below:

Table 7.1: Loading of Items (Political Leader) on Factors:

Political Leaders	Factors with eigenvalue > 1												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Ustad Atta	0.80	0.19	0.16	0.15	0.25	0.06	0.07	-0.03	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.15	0.02
Dr Abdullah	0.73	0.22	0.13	0.12	0.15	0.07	0.15	-0.03	-0.01	0.10	0.14	-0.15	-0.01
Younus Qanooni	0.67	0.28	0.28	0.21	0.10	-0.06	0.11	0.02	0.04	0.19	0.12	-0.05	0.05
Ahmad Shah Masood	0.66	0.29	0.14	0.01	-0.01	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.09	-0.04	0.05
Ismael Khan	0.66	0.14	0.07	0.24	0.16	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.32	0.04	0.18	0.06	-0.18
Amrullah Saleh	0.65	0.21	0.12	0.07	-0.02	0.07	0.04	-0.07	0.11	-0.02	0.07	0.35	0.08
Ustad Rabani	0.62	0.15	0.04	0.07	-0.07	0.22	0.29	0.31	0.12	0.13	0.15	-0.08	-0.08
Syed Mustafa Kazimi	0.61	0.20	0.27	0.24	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.04	-0.16	0.07	0.22	0.08
Besmellah Khan	0.58	0.13	0.22	0.08	0.15	0.13	0.04	0.12	0.14	0.21	0.16	0.03	0.19
Shekh Asif Mohseni	0.56	0.12	0.13	0.06	0.17	0.05	-0.05	0.15	-0.08	0.21	0.16	0.18	0.24
Baktash Seyawash	0.54	0.25	0.36	0.18	0.11	0.17	0.06	-0.12	0.16	0.10	-0.03	0.14	0.14
Ahmad Zia Masood	0.53	0.17	0.28	0.15	0.08	0.17	-0.08	0.11	0.11	-0.01	0.44	-0.02	-0.25
Habibullah Khan	0.52	0.22	-0.01	0.16	0.24	0.03	0.19	0.18	0.01	-0.10	-0.14	0.21	0.10

Ramazan Bashar Dost	0.49	0.14	0.42	0.14	0.00	0.15	0.11	0.14	0.05	0.13	-0.12	0.12	-0.06
Lateef Pedram	0.48	0.12	0.36	0.27	-0.02	0.16	0.22	-0.04	0.06	0.10	-0.18	0.14	-0.09
Banoo Ghazanfar	0.44	0.26	0.40	0.13	0.13	-0.02	0.06	0.04	-0.01	0.24	0.02	0.29	-0.01
Ustad Sayaf	0.43	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.08	0.28	0.13	0.37	0.14	0.03	0.04	-0.11	0.04
Mirwais Nika	0.21	0.78	0.19	-0.04	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.19	0.18	-0.05	0.01	0.07	0.13
Ahmad Shah Baba	0.34	0.74	0.13	0.05	0.15	0.11	0.05	0.09	0.11	0.09	-0.05	0.08	0.11
Zahir Khan	0.26	0.66	0.08	0.14	0.21	0.09	0.13	0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.14	-0.04	-0.12
Amanullah Khan	0.33	0.62	0.24	-0.03	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.14	0.16	0.02	-0.01
Dr Najib	0.38	0.49	0.25	0.14	0.04	-0.10	0.17	-0.10	0.06	0.19	-0.12	0.20	-0.07
Abdul Rahman Khan	0.12	0.48	-0.07	-0.03	0.35	0.22	0.12	0.17	0.05	-0.12	0.05	0.09	-0.21
Daoud Khan	0.30	0.48	0.04	0.09	0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.10	0.16	0.11	0.04	0.09	0.09
Hamid Karzai	0.21	0.47	0.09	0.19	0.36	0.05	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.35	0.12	-0.04	-0.02
Dr Spanta	0.11	0.26	0.10	0.23	-0.04	0.20	0.23	0.06	0.26	0.17	0.11	0.06	0.19
Shukria Barakzai	0.21	0.14	0.67	0.02	0.00	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.15	0.27	0.02	0.01
Malaly Joya	0.28	0.07	0.65	0.00	0.25	-0.01	0.09	-0.05	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.17	0.01
Fawzia Koofee	0.33	0.24	0.62	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.08	0.09	-0.11	0.00	0.19	0.29
Habiba Sarabee	0.34	0.30	0.54	0.16	0.13	0.21	0.00	0.08	0.05	0.18	0.15	-0.10	0.20
Dr Seema Samar	0.14	0.09	0.48	0.32	0.11	0.01	0.13	0.02	0.23	0.07	0.05	0.02	-0.05
Haji Qadeer	0.34	0.17	0.39	0.16	0.20	0.28	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.09
Sayed Ahmad Gelani	0.14	0.18	0.33	0.00	0.19	0.11	0.08	0.19	0.11	0.07	0.28	0.17	0.29
Abdul Ali Mazari	0.16	-0.03	0.10	0.78	0.01	0.22	0.18	0.16	-0.01	0.03	0.10	0.07	-0.02
Mohqeq	0.34	0.04	0.13	0.67	0.17	0.11	0.21	0.17	0.09	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	0.10
Karim Khalili	0.26	0.21	0.06	0.60	0.09	0.09	0.21	0.20	0.07	0.20	0.25	0.11	0.11
Gen. Dostum	0.47	0.16	0.15	0.48	0.16	-0.07	0.37	0.13	-0.07	0.06	-0.10	0.16	-0.01
Sultan Ali Kishtmand	0.25	0.05	0.27	0.47	0.06	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.01	0.14	0.20	0.35	0.04
Mahmood Karzai	0.09	0.14	0.21	0.04	0.77	0.31	0.09	0.18	-0.01	0.09	0.03	0.09	0.03
Gul Agha Sherzai	0.28	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.59	0.15	0.04	0.16	0.27	-0.05	0.00	0.05	0.01
Ahmad Wali Karzai	-0.03	0.17	0.14	0.02	0.53	0.25	0.10	0.04	0.10	0.08	0.22	-0.05	0.10
Farooq Wardak	0.28	0.34	0.24	0.06	0.50	0.29	0.00	0.11	0.07	0.20	0.08	-0.03	-0.05
Qayoom Karzai	0.20	0.12	-0.05	0.11	0.45	0.11	0.28	0.29	0.17	0.09	-0.04	0.23	0.05
Gen. Rahim Wardak	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.19	0.34	0.30	0.00	0.17	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.12	-0.05
Omar Daoudzai	0.11	0.12	0.21	0.16	0.25	0.75	0.05	0.14	-0.04	-0.07	0.06	0.06	0.11
Karim Khuram	0.11	-0.04	0.02	0.05	0.26	0.66	0.03	0.06	0.25	0.14	0.14	0.04	0.02
Omar Zakhilwal	0.08	0.16	0.13	0.17	0.29	0.61	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.27	-0.04	-0.13	-0.09
Haneef Atmar	0.19	0.26	0.22	0.21	0.24	0.38	0.16	0.07	0.21	0.30	0.07	0.12	-0.15
Hafeezullah Amin	0.11	0.14	0.07	0.21	0.07	0.09	0.80	0.23	0.12	0.08	-0.03	0.05	0.11
Tarakee	0.15	0.13	0.10	0.19	0.11	0.12	0.75	0.06	0.01	0.12	0.10	0.05	-0.13
Babrak Karmal	0.20	0.09	0.29	0.31	0.13	-0.03	0.63	0.06	0.11	-0.11	0.18	0.10	0.13
Hekmatyar	0.06	0.13	0.00	0.15	0.18	0.10	0.08	0.76	0.14	0.05	0.14	0.09	-0.10
Mullah Omar	0.01	0.10	0.07	0.22	0.20	0.13	0.18	0.63	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.11
Sebghatullah Mujadadi	0.30	0.24	0.22	0.27	0.08	0.20	0.15	0.30	0.05	0.23	0.20	-0.20	-0.03
Ali Ahmad Jalali	0.19	0.18	0.14	-0.05	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.11	0.69	0.01	0.08	0.02	-0.06
Ashraf Ghani	0.13	0.40	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.13	0.02	0.13	0.57	0.27	0.01	-0.04	0.13
Anwarul Haq Ahadi	0.31	0.27	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.21	0.13	0.08	0.17	0.65	0.07	0.02	0.09
Ismael Yoon	0.18	0.01	0.36	0.02	0.07	0.34	0.04	0.26	-0.01	0.44	-0.03	0.21	-0.04
Marshal Fahim	0.34	0.06	0.17	0.25	0.15	0.12	0.18	0.18	0.07	0.07	0.67	0.11	0.04
Zalmay Khalilzad	0.10	0.29	0.20	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.23	-0.03	0.28	-0.05	0.33	0.14	0.12
Tahir Badakhshi	0.26	0.11	0.26	0.17	0.12	0.03	0.16	0.12	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.71	0.06
Ahmad Behzad	0.56	0.02	0.25	0.22	0.06	0.05	0.06	-0.07	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.11	0.56
Semeen Barakzai	0.20	0.16	0.48	0.24	0.16	0.28	0.06	-0.09	0.19	-0.03	0.18	-0.06	0.01

eigenvalue	8.89	4.85	4.48	3.38	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.1
% of Variance Explained	14.1%	7.7%	7.1%	5.4%	5.1%	4.7%	4.4%	3.5%	2.8%	2.8%	2.6%	2.5%	1.8%

Factor 1: Tajik Factor

The most significant underlying construct that defines views of the Afghans about the identity of actual political leaders is the “Tajik” factor. Most of the leaders that load on this factor with a covariance of above 0.4 are Tajik political leaders (see the cells highlighted in red in Table 7.1). A few leaders, such as Shekh Asif Mohseni, Sayed Mustafa Kazaimi, Ramazan Bashar Dost, Gen. Dostum, Banoo Ghazanfar, Ahmad Behzad, and Ustad Sayaf, who are not necessarily Tajiks by ethnic background also load on this factor, but most of them have been allies of the Tajik political parties at some point. Thus, they are perceived to be highly associated with Tajik political leadership dimension of the Afghan society. This data suggest that Tajik underlying constructs of political leadership in Afghanistan are prominent in Afghans’ minds. However, it is important to note that current events usually affect the popularity of political leaders, and political environment of Afghanistan is very fluid. Leaders are known to change their affiliations and support based on the events that happen on daily basis.²³ Therefore, this might not be the case if similar analysis is conducted few years down the road. Appendix XVII presents bivariate analysis of all political leaders (items) loaded on this factor with key social strata such as ethnicity. As predicted before, the results show very significant ethnicity bias of all respondents (most Tajiks have scored these leaders favorably and Pashtuns unfavorably).

23 This data was collected from early 2012 to mid-2013. The popularity of certain leaders was a product of events that were happening at that moment in time. Some of the relationships and affiliation that data captured might not make a lot of sense today.

Factor 2: Pashtun Factor

The second underlying construct that has formed respondents' views about the identity of actual political leaders is the "Pashtun" factor of political leadership. With an eigenvalue of smaller than the Tajik factor, it seems to be the second most-important factor that influences Afghans' cognitive thinking about the identity of actual political leaders. The two leaders who negatively load on this factor are Abdul Ali Mazari and Karim Khuram, which is an important observation. Usually it is a helpful method to look at items that negatively load on a factor because it helps the researcher to define the opposite side of the defined factor. While it is understandable why Abdul Ali Mazari is negatively loaded on this factor (most Pashtuns do not consider him as a member of political leadership community of Afghanistan), it is very strange to see Karim Khuram, a Pashtun who is considered to be a radical Pashtun nationalist, is also loaded negatively. It seems like most respondents did not score him similar to popular Pashtun leaders, which means he is as much foreign to the community of Pashtun political leaders as Abdul Ali Mazari. It is also important to note which Tajik leaders come close to the Pashtun factor, even though, no one of them load with a covariance of greater than 0.4. The ones that come close are Ahmad Shah Masud and Yunous Qanooni. Adversely, the Pashtun leaders who come close to Tajik factor included, Ahmad Shah Baba, Amanullah Khan, Daoud Khan and Dr Najib. This is because some Pashtun and Tajik leaders have been able to create a political leadership identity for themselves that is popular beyond their own ethnic groups. See Appendix XVIII for detailed bivariate analysis of these leaders with strata such as ethnicity.

Factor 3: Gender, Rights, and Anti-Jihadi

The third underlying construct that has influenced Afghans' views about the identity of political leaders is a mixture of gender, rights, and "Anti-Jihadi" factor. Although, the leaders who have loaded on this factor are mostly women members of Parliament who are quite vocal about crimes of Mujahedin and advocate for human rights and punishment of former Mujahedin leaders. I think the most common political behavior that makes these leaders look similar is their constant challenge of Jihadi power brokers. The items that mostly define this factor are such leaders as Dr. Seema Samar, Ramazan Bashar Dost, and Malali Joya who load on this factor with a covariance of greater than 0.4. Many other leaders who come close but do not fully load on this factor have similar identities except for Sayed Ahmad Gailani, who happens to be a Jihadi leader, but the most progressive and least criminal one of all Mujahideen leaders. He has been a famous liberal Mujahedin leader since the early days of war in Afghanistan. The others are either vocal or actively challenging the current Mujahideen leaders. Cross tabulation of ethnicity with these leaders and the summary statistics of all leaders loading on this factor are presented in Appendix XIX.

Factor 4: Hazara Factor

The fourth underlying construct is Hazara factor of political leadership identity. This contains the names of Afghanistan's Hazara leaders, with the exception of Gen. Dustum, who is an Uzbek leader but who still loads on both Tajik and Hazara factors with equal covariance. Dostum has remained a close ally of the Tajiks and Hazaras for a long time, but the recent election changed that pattern for the first time (as mentioned previously, the data were collected before the 2014

electoral grouping was formed).²⁴ Therefore, these data and results do not reflect Dostum's recent shift of popularity. Recently, Dostum and some Hazara leaders advocated for the unification of all ethnic groups with Turkic origin. The move was supported by the Turkish government, but furiously rejected by the Iranians and other regional players who have similar regional ambitions. It was particularly a problem for Hazaras as they consider Iran their traditional supporters of Shia minorities of Afghanistan. The reason Dostum also comes close to Tajiks is because Uzbek and Tajik leaders have been contesting Pashtun leadership since the beginning of war in Afghanistan and are geographically mixed over the same parts of the country. They also follow the Sunni sect of Islam, which is different from the Shia sect that Hazaras are following. Although Hazaras and Uzbeks have closer ethnic ties, they do not get along with the question of Islamic orientations in the forefront of politics.

The best evidence of ethnic cleavages in political leadership is the fact that Sultan Ali Kistmand, a former communist Hazara leader and ideologically the opposite of such leaders as Abdul Ali Mazari, Mahqeq or Khalili is also loading on this factor. The only underlying construct that connects all of them together is belonging to the same Hazara ethnic group. The Hazara factor is the third strongest underlying construct in political leadership identity of Afghanistan, and provides more evidence that political leadership in Afghanistan is not only divided along Pashtun and non-Pashtun cleavages, but also within non-Pashtuns population of the country. These additional cleavages were observable during early stage analysis, but not as clearly as here. The reason for that, I think, is the presence of actual personalities whose

24 Political developments of Afghanistan post-election 2014 again show that Dostum is moving closer to his traditional allies than following his new course of support with Pashtuns.

identities are clearly associated with ethnicity. My first-stage analysis detected ethnic divisions when respondents talked about characteristics of good political leadership, but only after names of the leaders were mentioned. Appendix XX provides more details about bivariate analysis of items loading on this factor.

Factor 5: Karzai Factor

I define an underlying construct of political leadership as the “Karzai” factor, because the leaders who mostly load on this factor are close family members of Karzai or some of his close allies/subordinates. Even those who come close to loading on it are of very similar in nature. For example, Gen. Rahim Wardak, Omar Zakhilwal, Omar Daoudzai, Karim Khuram are all perceived to be the key members of President Karzai’s patrimonial system of governance. The best evidence that can help us re-confirm the definition of this factor is the negative loading of Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta who was part of Karzai’s inner circle but not considered one of his old friends, a family member, or tribal ally. Although Karzai is widely blamed for reinforcing the tribal system of politics in Afghanistan, the system has long been part of the country’s political culture. See Appendix XXI for univariate and bivariate analysis of all items that significantly loaded on this factor.

Factor 6: Inner Circle

I define this underlying construct that defines Afghans’ views about the identity of political leadership as the “Inner Circle” factor. Afghans elites refer to this group of leaders as the “Bats of the Presidential Palace.” They created a public perception that controlling the flow of

information around the president is by itself a very important political leadership role that many young Afghans were aspired to. The jobs around the president became very attractive, especially after they learned that these people get paid lucrative sums by foreign intelligence institutions to keep the views of the president positive toward their country's interest. During Karzai's time in office, many believe that a group of close aides controlled most of his decision-making and secret politics. They mostly became famous after Karzai began his rivalry with the Americans. Additional bivariate analysis of these items is presented in Appendix XXII.

Factor 7: Communist Factor

I define the seventh underlying construct of political leadership identity in Afghanistan as the "communist" factor. This group of leaders is probably the most distinguished group because no matter how many times you run factor analysis under different conditions, they would still stick together and load on the very same factor. It is relatively easy to define it because only former communist leaders load on this factor. The leaders who significantly load on this factor are the three famous communist party leaders. However, Dr. Najib, who was also one of the prominent communist leaders, does not load on this factor and does not come close. Based on univariate analysis of scores among all 63 leaders, it turns out that Najib is the most popular political leader for the people of Afghanistan (see Appendix XXX for more details). He became the most popular political leader of Afghanistan because of such events as:

13. His predictions about what might happen if the Mujahedin assumed power became reality, yet it was difficult for people to believe that he could predict the event with such level of accuracy. Most of Najib's speeches are kept on smartphones, and new

generations of Afghans use his speeches in their political debates on social media as a very strong evidence of what good leadership should look like.

14. He was brutally killed by the Taliban. Later, the incident was publicized as if the Pakistani military generals who accompanied the Taliban to Kabul in 1996 killed him. My data suggest that, on average, Afghans scored dead leaders more generously than living leaders.
15. The recent announcement that Afghanistan's ancient golden treasury was protected by Najib during the civil war immediately increased Afghans' respect for him. If it were not for the communist background of his political career, he would have been chosen as the national hero of Afghanistan by now.

A complete set of univariate and bivariate analysis of these items are presented in Appendix XXIII.

Factor 8: Radical Islamic

I define this underlying construct as the “radical Islamic” factor of political leadership identity in Afghanistan. The only two leaders who load on this factor are Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Hizb-e-Islami leader Gulbudin Hekmatyar. During first stage of analysis, no one mentioned the name of Haqani, otherwise, I suspect he would have also been loading on this factor. The other leaders who came close to this factor were professor Rabani, Ustad Sayaf, and Sebghatullah Mujadidi, who are all key political Islamic leaders of Afghanistan. The leaders who negatively load on this factor come mostly from different political backgrounds, but their

commonality seems to be anti-Islamic radicalism. More bivariate analysis is presented in Appendix XXIV.

Factor 9: Western Technocrats

The ninth underlying construct that has influenced public perception about the identity of political leadership is the “Western Technocrats” factor. I think the most important identity associated with this group is that they are all considered politicians who are loyal to the Western countries. The other leaders who come somewhat close to this group, but do not load significantly, are Dr. Spanta, and Dr. Zalmai Khalilzad, which makes sense. One member of this group, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, also loads on the Pashtun factor, which explains part of the reason why he was able to mobilize Pashtuns to vote for him in the 2014 election (the data for this study was collected about two years before the electoral season). See additional bivariate analysis in Appendix XXV.

Factor 10: Pashtun Nationalists

The next underlying construct seems to be radical “Pashtun Nationalists” factor of political leadership in Afghanistan. The two political leaders who significantly load on this factor are popular for being radical Pashtun nationalists who categorically reject the right of other ethnic groups to run for presidency. They are also famous for promoting Pashtu language as a national language in order to define Afghanistan as a Pashtun state with pure Pashtun criteria that would make it significantly different from other countries such as Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan. It is also believed that radical Pashtun nationalism is promoted as a counter

measure to contain Islamic radicalism among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and thus navigate Afghanistan in a different direction. Some political leaders who come close, but do not load significantly include President Ashraf Ghani and Mr. Haneef Atmar. Appendix XXVI has univariate and cross tabulation of these items.

Factor 11: VP Factor

Only two political leaders significantly load on this factor, Ahmad Zia Masud and Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim, who were both Karzai's vice presidents. They are both famous for being willing to move away from their political constituencies to remain relevant to the food chain. The other individual who comes close to this factor is Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, who also is famous for being a major power player during Karzai's government. Therefore, I suspect this construct is about the "second person" factor of political leadership identity in Afghanistan. However, due to the fact that the last few factors have very small eigenvalue and very few leaders load on it, it is hard to define them with confidence. The readers might define this factor differently based on their reading of the Afghan political environment. Additional bivariate analysis is presented in Appendix XXVII.

Factor 12: Tajik Nationalist

Only one political leader load on this factor and the eigenvalue is so low that it is a bit hard to define it with confidence. The only leader who loads on this factor is Mr. Tahir Badakhshi who was famous for being an anti-Pashtun power monopoly figure. He was killed by the communist regime while he was in prison, and considered by many radical Tajik Nationalists as a symbolic

leader for those who want to challenge the monopoly of the Pashtuns over control of political power. However, it is hard to define this factor as the “radical Tajik nationalism” dimension, because many other political leaders who have similar popularities negatively load on this factor. The most interesting example is Latif Pedram. Alternatively, Sultan Ali Kishmand from Hazara factor comes very close, while his background is quite different from those of Mr. Badakhshi. The only commonality between these two leaders is that they were brother in laws, but not politically aliened (Badakhshi was executed by the same political party that counted Kishmand as a member). See Appendix XXVIII to review univariate and bivariate analysis of these two items.

Other Political Leaders:

There are several political leaders who did not load on any of the 13 factors significantly. Given history of their political behavior it seems like one of the key characteristics that prevent these leaders from loading on any of the 13 factors is because they are mostly cross-factor personalities. Their behavior gives people a perception that they are associated with more than two groups of political leaders at the same time. For a better understanding of the association of these leaders, the bivariate analysis on all of them is attached as Appendix XXIX.

It is also important to have a look at another control question in the questionnaire. In the second-stage fixed-form survey, I asked, “Who is the most famous leader of Afghanistan at the moment?” I wanted to compare this with the findings from Chapter Six in which respondents were pushed to think about leaders’ positive and negative points before rating them. I suspected that asking a simple question about popularity of leaders might lead to a different set of answers

than examining the issue of good political leadership even if the names of the leaders were mentioned.

The chart in Figure 7.5 depicts frequency of names mentioned in response to my control question in the second stage.

Figure 7.5: Frequency of response to question of who is the most famous leader of Afghanistan.

For this simple question, Karzai is mentioned most frequently, while under systematic research that was conducted in Chapter Six, Najibullah was rated as the best political leader. It only confirms that my chosen method for this study was useful and produced better results. The simple question, “Who is the most popular leader,” which is common question in public polling

of Afghanistan, detects the seasonal fame of politicians based on the political conditions of that particular time. This is what I had expected from the beginning, and thus designed a control question to check if it would be the case. This is an interesting example of how simple survey research designs produce different result from cognitive anthropology researches. The fact that I asked them to think and list positive and negative aspects of leaders' personalities, pushed respondents to think about their own norms and values and then bring each leader close to that to decide how to rate them. Therefore, their answer contained more information than what a simple survey can pick from quick-access memory. I suspect their answer to my question of who is the most popular leader was based on their quick and shallow perception of what is commonly thought about that leader in society. Cognitive anthropology is used to examine how communities of people come to share cultural understanding of the world. It looks at how people reason, define things, construct culturally shared models of the world, and act on the basis of those models. It explores how cultural knowledge comes to have a patterned distribution throughout society. I use methods developed for the study of cultures because I thought variation of values and norms among different segments of Afghan population are diverse and had not yet been empirically researched to discover what underlying construct really determines Afghans' thinking about political leadership. Most works about the conflict and political culture of the country fail to provide empirics about the exact norms and values that feed into the conflict and/or form the political culture of Afghans.

I think the data set of rating and evaluating Afghan political leaders have more in-depth information regarding the underlying constructs of political leadership than a data set that would only ask Afghans for a list of popular or successful leaders. The findings from this chapter

provide a better map of norms and values that influences the views of Afghan when they think about their political leaders. The model captures the obvious attitudes on the surface, as well as the underlying constructs that help average Afghan citizen determine a good political leader.

The cognitive constructs that defines Afghans' valuation of political leaders comprises about five to seven hidden factors when the identity of the leader is not disclosed. It comprises about 12 to 13 factors when the identity of the leader is known. It is also detected that these two sets of underlying constructs are not only different among them, but they also vary from the immediate thinking of Afghans when they react on the basis of day-to-day politics.

The next chapter offers a summary of main findings from Chapters Five, Six, and Seven.

CH – 8: MAIN FINDINGS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS

To summarize the findings of this analysis, I would like to begin by defining leadership and then proceed to the analysis of characteristics of good leadership, policy expectations of the followers, and a quick review of main findings from the evaluation of actual political leaders. After this, I will discuss those findings that have important policy implications. In doing this, I will propose policies that could address some of the troubling implications of this research, though each would require further analysis to determine best approaches and how to implement it; they are ideas for future Afghan policies to resolve issues brought to light by this analysis, not the subject of this research.

Definition of Leadership

It turns out that linguistic definition of leaders is not the same for all ethnic groups of Afghanistan. Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns have different cognitive perception of leadership because they use different words in the languages when they refer to leadership. Pashtun's cognitive thinking defines leadership more in the context of "eldership" because the word they use for leadership in Pashtu is Mesher چشر which basically means "elder." However, non-Pashtuns define a leader as a person who can guide them to a destination because the word they use in Farsi is Raahnomaa, راه‌نما, which basically means the "guide."

Analysis of Chapter Five, Characteristics of Leaders, suggests that there are detectable differences between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns over definition of leadership, and that includes

both cognitive and cultural perception of what a leader is all about. Their cognitive definition of leadership impacts their views about characteristics of leadership when they think about an actual political leader. It is probably more important for a Pashtun citizen of Afghanistan to see his/her political leader as one of their elders, while this might not necessarily be the case for the other ethnic groups such as Hazaras and Tajiks.

Further definitional analysis suggests that all ethnic groups expect a good political leader to be highly educated, people oriented, a firm decision maker, honest and Muslim in his public views. The analyses of Chapter Six (Expectations of Leaders) and Chapter Seven (Identity of Political Leaders) suggest that the people of Afghanistan expect their leaders to be highly educated, stay in close proximity with people, have good morals, be honest and just, and have an Islamic identity. These are different characteristics from what outsiders, especially Westerners, think Afghans should want to see in their political leaders. The definition of justice is probably not the same for Afghans and Westerners. For Afghans, I believe justice is defined more in the context of resource distribution than following certain rules and regulations defined by the state or law. According to one political leader interviewed for this research, “the number one task they [people of Afghanistan] expect their leader to be good at is resolving resource conflict that they face in their daily life.” They come to your house and expect you as a leader to be able to solve their conflict in a just way.²⁵ It is likely because of this expectation of the Afghan people that the Taliban established a mobile court policy in every stage of political life, even when they did not possess territorial control over a specific geography. They probably knew this would increase their image of political leadership in the eyes of average Afghan villagers. There is a

25 Interview conducted by the author in Kabul.

need for further research to explore Afghans' expectations from their political leaders when it comes to the delivery of justice. From the findings of this research we can only infer that "being just" is one of the most important characteristics of good political leadership according to Afghans' definition.

Many Western supporters of Afghanistan assume that protecting citizens, providing security, defending the country, being democratically elected, promoting civil rights, creating employment, etc., are probably the most important expectations of political leaders for average citizens in Afghanistan. However, this research suggests that people may not place much value on these characteristics of political leadership, if any at all. Therefore, it is important to note that the concept of political leadership in Afghanistan is defined differently from those in the West, and it will have major policy implication when it comes to supporting Afghanistan in the coming years to overcome its political instability and establishment of a legitimate political system.

Characteristics of Leaders

This analysis indicates that the strongest underlying construct²⁶ in Afghans' mind when thinking about good political leadership correlates strongly with such characteristics as being decisive, having a clear political agenda, being a good manager, accepting responsibility, being honest, being just, not lying to the people, loving the country, believing in God, enforcing the law, not discriminating on the basis of ethnicity, and being elected democratically. These are probably the most important characteristics that an average Afghan wants to see in a political leader before he or she decides to label him as a good political leader and decide to follow him,

26 Underlying construct is another term for the mathematical term known as factor.

based on this analysis. Many interviewed respondents categorically agreed that just and honest behavior in the eyes of citizens is the key characteristic that boosts the popularity of an average political leader. The success of Dr. Ramazan Bashar Dost in the 2009 election cannot be attributed to any other characteristics other than he is widely perceived to be honest, just, fair, and truthful in his words and behaviors.

The other dimension of the first underlying construct is about the capacity to get things done. Afghans do not favor a leader who is weak and cannot get anything done. Characteristics such as being decisive, being a good manager, and enforcing the law mostly point toward governing capability of a good political leader that Afghans really want to see in practice. In a pairwise analysis of the most important characteristics of good leadership, respondents rated the governing capability of a leader higher than being elected democratically, and even higher than being educated. The successes of many active governors, such as Ismail Khan in Herat province, Ustad Atta in Balkh, and Gul Agha Sherzai in Nangarhar, turned them into popular political leaders for a short period of time simply because Afghans appreciate the capability of good governance by their political leaders. If these governors had exhibited more of the characteristics that Afghans scored highly, they would have become important figures on the country's national political stage, as in the case for Atta, to some extent.

There is also a third dimension of the main underlying construct behind good political leadership, according to this analysis, which is humility and not misusing the power of leadership. Afghans emphasize such characteristics as being democratically elected, accepting responsibility, and believing in God because the third dimension of this construct appears to be the degree of humility in leaders. The concept of humility also emerges repeatedly when

reviewing the positive characteristics of current political leaders. If a political leader happens to be strong, decisive, and yet humble and just, it would be hard to prevent his or her success in the political leadership domain of Afghanistan. There are not many political leaders who are considered humble by average Afghans. At some point, Karzai—probably during earlier stages of his leadership (2001 to 2004)—was perceived to be a humble leader because he was not misusing his power as much as he did later in office. Other political leaders who were described by respondents as humble included the late Afghan leader Ahmad Shah Masood and Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

The second underlying construct of good political leadership, Islamic dogmatism, correlates with such characteristics as praying five times in the mosque, having religious education, being highly educated, being selected through a Jirga, not letting foreigners into the country, and fighting the foreigners. It turns out this factor of leadership also has three dimensions, which includes education, religious dogmatism, and resisting foreign invasion. Given the lower eigenvalue of this factor, these characteristics are certainly not as important as those that belonged to the first factor, but still considerable importance in Afghans' minds when they think about good political leadership. The widespread emphasis on education is a relatively new phenomenon, although religious education has been an important indicator of good leadership for ages. Afghanistan's educational system is relatively new. Before 1890, there was no sign of modern education in Afghanistan. Except for some special education programs that were specifically arranged for members of royal families, Afghans had to attend religious madrasas to learn the basics of reading and writing. The introduction of modern education was not an easy process in the early 1900s. The religious leaders of the country were quick to declare modern

education as not Islamic and thus forbidden to a Muslim child. Even in the 1960s, Afghan families used to pay bribes to government officials not to enlist their children in newly established schools. The collapse of the royal system and four decades of war and immigration opened Afghans' eyes toward the importance and effectiveness of modern education. Therefore, we observed a strong emphasis on higher education for good political leaders while still maintaining the importance of religious education. This attitude change is probably why more than 5 million children were sent to school in 2001. Importantly, many average villagers of Afghanistan harshly rejected a similar attempt by the Russians in 1980.

The second dimension is the clear impact of Islamic characteristics on the country, in particular the past four decades of jihad and struggle against the Russians under the auspices of religion. While Afghans are religious by many standards, they were not as religious 30 years ago as they are today. The past three decades of war brought huge amounts of funds from outside countries, including the United States, to finance religious education, build religious schools and madrasas to sustain a force for the proxy war against the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, the effects of this earlier investment in religious education are felt in the Afghan society today. The emphasis on both types of education is probably because the United States and the rest of the world switched funding from religious schools to modern public schools in 2001. If the outside commitment continues for another decade or so, we might observe a switch in public emphasis from religious education and religious dogmatism to modern education, thus prompting more harmony in future generations of Afghanistan.

The third underlying construct of good political leadership in Afghans' minds highly correlated with such characteristics as putting on a turban, putting on Perahan Turban, being

from Kandahar, being from a noble family, not being young, and seeing all ethnic groups with one eye (which basically means treating all groups equally). Except for the last characteristic, which is about justice and we have already covered that, the remaining ones only have one dimension: That a leader has to be a Pashtun from Kandahar, and adhere to cultural norms and values of Pashtuns. Univariate and multivariate analyses of these characteristics show that putting on a turban and Perahan Turban (local Afghan Shalwar Kamis) are not necessarily serious expectations by Pashtuns.

The last underlying construct of good political leadership in respondents' minds is highly correlated with such characteristics as not having two passports (meaning double citizenship), not having family outside the country, not marrying a foreign woman, not having a business outside the country, and not having a home outside the country. This construct has only one clear dimension, which I would define as trustfulness and dependability of leaders. Afghans are basically concerned about the loyalty of their political leaders to their followers. Existence of this construct in Afghans' minds suggests that there is considerable trust crisis between the people of Afghanistan and their political leaders. While this construct might have emerged because of the shortfalls of previous Afghan political leaders, one aspect clearly mentioned in this study is to have a secondary "home" outside the country, whether it is in the form of a house, a business, citizenship, or a wife. In the past 15 years, many past political leaders with secondary citizenship made irresponsible decisions and then escaped the country to avoid the consequences. The former minister of commerce and the governor of the Afghanistan Bank are examples of such personalities.

However, political leaders also escape the country when they are out of power and some of their decisions, especially reform decisions, appear to be controversial and/or against the norms and cultural values of Afghans. Reformist leaders have faced major security consequences in the past, and, therefore, other leaders have chosen to leave the country when they leave office.

Analyses were conducted with policy expectations as proxy measures of good political leadership (instead of characteristics) to detect underlying constructs in Afghan minds when they think about good political leadership. It turned out that similar constructs influence Afghans' thinking even when proxy variables were changed for measuring the underlying constructs. But when proxy measures were changed to the actual political leaders' names, the analyses produced completely different set of underlying constructs. The most dominant underlying construct in this case was ethnicity as first, and second and third factors, respectively, correlated with Tajik, Pashtun, and Hazara leaders. The third factor correlated with all female leaders, which formed the third most-important construct in Afghans' minds when they evaluated current political leaders of Afghanistan. Below is a list of additional detectable factors, according to the size of their eigenvalue:

1. Karzai family factor
2. Inner Circle factor
3. Communists factor
4. Islamist factor
5. Pro-West technocrats factor
6. Pashtun superiority factor
7. Vice president factor

8. Tajik superiority factor

The underlying constructs influenced respondent's views to score leaders not only on the basis of ethnicity and gender, but also political ideology that those leaders promoted. For example, some leaders who loaded on the Tajik factor were not necessarily Tajiks by ethnicity, but they were strong allies of Tajik leaders and their political objectives. One leader who loaded on gender factor was not necessarily a woman, but he was a very strong ally of those female leaders on political ideology grounds.

Therefore, we can conclude that most underlying constructs under the second factor of good political leadership were about ethnic identity, gender identity, and political ideology. These constructs actually have nothing to do with good political leadership but rather explain their political identity in the context of Afghanistan's domestic politics. This is probably why the study of political leadership through analyzing the portfolio of actual political leaders and/or using political leaders as proxy measures does not produce accurate results. This is the best proof that the study of political leadership through psychometric analysis is the best way to go about this phenomenon. It allows researchers to identify and distinguish deep underlying constructs that people have in the back of their minds when they think about their ideal leaders. They might not even know it themselves as vividly as this methodology reveals it.

One conclusion that I could make from such a drastic shift of underlying construct when respondents reacted to the names of current political leaders is that the Afghan leaders have successfully managed to introduce themselves as leaders of ethnicity, gender and political ideology rather than leaders of justice, decisiveness, knowledge and other key Afghan values.

These are the constructs that usually come into play when people talk about leadership that really want to see in their life. Therefore, it is very important to think about what could be done to produce the ideal Afghan political leaders who might be the actual inspirational leaders for future generations.

Policy Implications

It is well known that Afghanistan is a country where conditions for policy reform are harsh and complicated. The country's only functioning economy is based on narcotics, its political system is badly damaged by widespread insurgency and its critical intuitions for good governance are broken or nonexistent. Most of the Afghan leaders, as revealed by this research, are perceived to be unpopular, incapable, and highly divisive along the lines of ethnicity, gender and political ideologies. Under such conditions, it is hard to determine what needs to be prioritized in order to begin the process of policy reform to develop good political leaders for the future. Strong and functioning institutions are necessary to train future leaders, but on the other hand, good leaders are needed in establishing these institutions. It is very much like the dilemma of the chicken and the egg—one cannot exist unless the other one precedes it first. That is, Afghanistan needs good leaders with the characteristics of leadership discussed above to create the strong institutions that will make it a viable country able to produce strong leaders. However, without institutions that can function and produce good leaders, Afghanistan lacks the leadership it needs to accomplish this.

Given this situation in the country, the only way a policy reform process can begin is to have a group of well-trained, highly capable, and critically committed individuals to join hands and

serve as the founding fathers of new institutions that can facilitate emergence of future political leaders of Afghanistan. These institutions can only begin to exist if someone establishes them at some point. In the absence of functioning institutions, policy reforms can never start, let alone succeed in the long run, unless a strong leader makes it happen. A group of young, highly educated, and seriously committed Afghans who have learned the necessary skills (e.g., the Fulbright Alumni of Afghanistan) can begin the process of building institutions today so Afghanistan has its people's ideal good political leaders tomorrow. The majority of the policy recommendations from this research will have to be implemented by such a group of strong individuals, which will call the "founding leaders" of Afghanistan.

As soon as the first institutions necessary for the process of developing future good leaders come into existence, the cycle of chicken and egg can be broken and the process of policy reform will find its path. Once these institutions produce the next generation of good leaders and before these founding leaders retire, the process of improving good political leadership in Afghanistan can find its way into the future.

With that in mind, let me present a few policy recommendations that I think are highly endorsed by the empirical findings of this research:

Policy Recommendation I: Fix the judiciary to deliver justice

It is hard to separate the importance of justice, honesty, and truthfulness from the image of good political leadership in the minds of the Afghan population. A group of highly educated and committed Afghans whom we might call "transitional leaders" or "founding leaders" of the country can work on the reform process of Afghanistan's judicial system. Restoration of justice

by the political system of the country will increase the political legitimacy of future leaders of the country. No leader can establish justice unless he can create a functioning judiciary machine. The research suggests that future leaders of the country cannot be viewed as good political leaders unless they are perceived to be delivering justice. In the absence of a functioning and effective judiciary system, no leader can win the title of good political leader even if he happens to be a just leader. An individual cannot meet the judiciary demand of 30 million people, no matter his or her commitment and power. Therefore, it is the top task of today's transitional leaders to build strong institutions for delivery of justice so future leaders can use them and deliver justice in the country.²⁷

It is not going to be easy; one of the sectors in which the international community never succeeded in the past 15 years, was the reform of the Afghan judiciary system. The current system is highly corrupt and influenced by the religious political figures. Given the Islamic identity of the Afghan state, it would be hard for any reformist to bring radical changes in the current system.

One approach for establishing a working justice system is to de-monopolize it. The de-monopolization of the judiciary power can make a very strong crack in the corruption network of the system. If the unofficial and traditional institutions of justice in local villages of the country can be strengthen, most of the conflicts that Afghans have to bring to the courts can be solved at the village level. Traditionally, highly respected and honest elders within communities establish and run these institutions. They still exist because people frequently refer to them to resolve

²⁷ Further research is necessary to define Afghans' expectations when it comes to good judiciary system.

their issues. The only problem they have is that they are not trained lawyers and judges by any academic measures. If a group of strong leaders begin to support these institutions and the international community invests in their efforts, the process could become a success in the medium to long term. Success of unofficial judiciary system can not only reduce the power of the government's corrupt judiciary machine, but will also reduce the relevance of Taliban's mobile judiciary policy which has gained considerable amount of political legitimacy for the Taliban insurgency groups. If the unofficial judiciary structures gain power in the long run, the existing government system can lose its relevance in the society at which point it is much easier to abolish it and build a new judiciary system that works in harmony with the community owned judiciary mechanism.

This policy cannot succeed unless the transitional Afghan leaders work side by side with their international community and the civil society activists of Afghanistan to make it a success. Again, this is only way the problem of injustice can be fixed in Afghanistan. There has to be other ways to fix the country's malfunctioning judiciary system, which I think needs further research. However, the suggestion I presented here is one that could be effective.

Policy Recommendation II: Ensure candidates for high office are well qualified

Research suggests that political leaders' capacity for governing and decision-making, and proximity with people are scored highly by the Afghans. These characteristics are obtained in schools as effectively as in practice. Policies that encourage future political leaders to develop their governing and public relation skills can be very helpful for their success in becoming good political leaders of Afghanistan. One way this can happen is if Afghanistan provides more

opportunities for systematic learning of governance and public relation knowledge and skills in specialized higher education programs. Potential leaders of tomorrow would be able to learn about the challenges of leadership before they resume a critical role in society. Systematic progression in public leadership positions could also allow future leaders of Afghanistan to learn the critical skills of governance, public engagement, and decision-making in a gradual manner before they rise to the higher levels of leadership and damage their leadership image.

The government can endorse a policy that makes leadership education a prerequisite for most junior leadership positions such as district governor office, parliamentarian candidates, judiciary clerks, and mid-level ministerial positions. Such policy could be important because what Afghans expect from their political leaders can hardly be learned in a typical school. It will be easier for the Afghan leaders to learn critical expectations of the people through practical and systematic engagement in early stages of life before they are challenged in higher levels of leadership down the road. Early learning of leadership and governance skills can develop the necessary capabilities in early jobs before potential leaders face higher expectations and challenges in higher leadership positions. Such requirements by the country's civil service regulations could prevent leaders' loss of popularity and increase their chances for becoming more successful political leaders for the country. The government of Afghanistan along with the current leaders of the country can make this policy happen. All future leaders of the country, including other senior government officials would be affected by it.

Policy Recommendation III: Foster future leaders of good character

Another characteristic of good political leadership that was strongly detected by the underlying construct analysis was degree to which a leader is affected by power itself. That means when Afghan leaders are in a position of power they begin to act as if they are above the law. For the sake of simplicity I will call this characteristic “humility” of political leaders. Research shows that Afghans appreciate such characteristics as accepting responsibility, being elected, enforcing the laws, and believing in God, all which emphasize the effects of power on a leader’s behavior. It is well known that humility is a function of knowledge, education, and systematic power containment policies. Requiring future leaders to be educated in such disciplines as politics, economics, philosophy, and history will make it easier for them to understand the consequences of violating the law while in power. These future leaders will be more capable of living up to the expectations of the Afghan people, if they know what can happen when they do not abide by the rules. Increasing a leader’s understanding of power, how it impacts other human beings, and how it corrupts individuals can help that official overcome the natural temptations of misusing power. Explicit recognition of how violating democratic norms sets the wrong example for other politicians, and how they in turn will be tempted to follow that course and use violence to obtain power, may help future leaders overcome the negative effects of power.

Requiring educational credentials of future political leaders in Afghanistan may increase the probability of developing humble leaders more than any other measures. This policy can happen only if the current transitional leaders set the right examples, and work with legal system of the country to make higher education a requirement for any political leadership position. They can

also work on several power containment policies, such as increasing checks and balances, promoting freedom of media, and policy review institutions so senior political leader's decision go through a number of filters before it backfires on them and ruins their leadership popularity. These policies will affect all senior public leaders of the country and requires strong commitment of the current leaders to begin the cycle.

Policy Recommendation IV: Reduce the propensity towards radical Islamic dogmatism

The second strongest underlying construct in Afghans' mind, when they think about good political leadership, is formed by the "radical Islamic dogmatism" that has dominated Afghan society for the last several decades. While part of it is due to sustained international support to religious schools during the Cold War, another portion of it belongs to the Afghan society. Arguably, this mindset has led to continuing violence and the destruction of opportunities for Afghanistan to become more prosperous and peaceful. Reversing this popular perception (that radical Islamic dogmatism is a positive leadership characteristic) may be critical to Afghanistan's future.

Afghanistan has always been a religious country with very low level of education for the bulk of its modern history. Promoting modern education may be the best policy to reduce religious dogmatism in Afghanistan. If this is true, the current leaders of Afghanistan need to commit themselves to support sustained modern education for two to three decades to reduce the effects of religious dogmatism in the country. It is also an important policy priority for the international community to commit funding for public school education so it is available for the next few generations of Afghans.

Furthermore, the current curriculum of Afghan schools is seriously skewed toward violence and religious extremism. The content of language and math books of schools are contaminated with extremely harmful ideas that will only make future generations of Afghanistan more violent, more isolated, more radical, and less knowledgeable. Appendix XXXI shows several pages of a school math book with translation of contents in English. If the future generations of the country are educated with similar type of educational material, Afghanistan will never get a chance to move out of the vicious circle of violence and religious extremism. A radically religious Afghanistan will only serve the objectives of proxy wars, such as the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union, while a knowledgeable Afghanistan will always know how to serve the interest of its own people and its future prosperity. It is very important to know how religious education serves Afghanistan's national interest, and thus what kind of religious curriculums need to be promoted for the religious schools of the country. There is a very famous Afghan proverb, "The crop you plant is what you yield," which explains the importance of good education better than 100 books. It is, therefore, an extremely important policy priority for the political leaders of Afghanistan to insure that future school curriculums are more knowledge-oriented than violence-and religious-based.

Transitional leaders of the country need to work with the ministries of education, religious affairs, and higher education to reform Afghanistan's educational system and make this policy work. This is the most important policy reform Afghanistan needs because it effects all of it future generations, and it also cures additional causes of poor leadership that this research has identified. For example, ethnic conflict is a major challenge to political stability and economic security for the future generations of Afghanistan. While part of the problem is going to be

tackled by the first policy recommendation of this document, the other part can only be fixed through sustained public education that promotes cross-cultural values of different ethnic groups of Afghanistan. Future generations of Afghanistan can have less ethnic bias if they learn more about the beauties of cultural diversity of Afghanistan. Early education will influence personal values and norms. Therefore, it is very important for these differences to be reconciled at an earlier stage of life so future generations of Afghans have a firm understanding of how different ethnic groups are part of Afghanistan's cultural mosaic. In the presence of solid cross-cultural education, and a judiciary system that treats all citizens of the country equally, it would be easier for future generations of Afghanistan to produce more national leaders than ethnic.

The research also shows that Afghans expect their political leaders to be against foreigners and fight them in order to be perceived as good political leaders. Fighting foreigners has turned into a patriotic behavior since the invasion of Afghanistan by the British, and then the Russians, and then the Americans during the past two centuries. Many Afghans today do not have clear understanding of the international regime and rules of engagement among nations. Such lack of understanding reduces their capability to form their views about other countries in light of their national interest rather than traditional rhetoric that they have heard from their ancestors.

Future generations of Afghanistan need to be educated more on the realities of the international system and its political and economic regime to counter this biased perception of what constitutes a good leader. They need to know how the relationship of a country is determined in the global space.

They also need to know world history, a subject that has never been taught in Afghan schools since the onset of modern education. It is important that future public education curriculums teach Afghan children how the concept of fighting foreigners emerged in the past, and when it serves the vital interests of Afghanistan to go to war with other nations. They need to know that the idea of fighting foreigners was most relevant during the era of colonialism, which does not exist in the international system any more. They need to learn that the interest of the country should determine what to do with every other nations of the world, at every stages of time, not the blanket label of “foreign” all the time. Future generations need to be aware of how previous generations were sent to bloody wars under the auspices of fighting the foreigners, but the eventual results of those wars were destruction, poverty, poor relationships with more countries, and the return of more foreigners to the country. Transitional leaders of the country will have to be the primary agents of change to reform Afghanistan’s educational system and make it more attune toward critical needs of good political leadership for tomorrow. The new generation of leaders need to protect future generations of Afghanistan from those educational material, which bring only war, destruction and blood. As mentioned before, this is the most important policy reform the country needs and it will affect every individual in the future. While several ministerial organizations will have to work on it, the most important stakeholder for this policy is a committed and well-trained group of transitional leaders who can begin the process of change.

Policy Recommendation V: Provide specialized training for future political leaders

There are very few aspects of political leadership about which Afghans are as clear as their desire that their leaders should be highly educated and professionally trained. A common “understanding” about Afghanistan has always been that Afghans rate their political leaders on

the basis of how successful they are in providing security and economic opportunities. This research suggest that Afghans view good leadership as not defined on the basis of reducing conflict and poverty, but rather in the context of the social and cultural values of the country. Afghans define good political leaders more on the basis of qualities such as education, ethnicity, religious identity, proximity with people, and ruling capability, rather than achieving political and economic prosperity. Training of future leaders should recognize this distinction.

Empirical evidence suggests that Afghans expect their political leaders to be well educated. The majority of Afghan leaders completed some form of high school education in the country before they moved to other countries to obtain higher educational degrees. For example, King Zahir Shah, Presidents Najibullah, and Karzai are a very few examples of leaders who went to Habibia High School, the first high school that was built in Afghanistan with the assistance of the United States. Schools were always at the forefront in producing new leaders of Afghanistan. After several years of United States disengagement with Afghanistan, in 2002, the largest project of U.S. government assistance to Afghanistan was the return to school for 4 million children. It is therefore, not a surprise that one of the main characteristics of a good political leader is defined to be highly educated person. Afghans expect their leaders to be more educated so they can lead people toward a better tomorrow.

Moreover, the country does not have any specialized school for political leadership, yet needs good political leaders to make a better future. Political leadership is not a distinct academic discipline in most academic institutions, yet in some countries specialized institutions exist which help improve political leadership in the society. The institute for political leadership in Harvard University is one example of such educational institutions in the United States. Many

regional neighbors of Afghanistan have such instruction under their military programs, but not available to civilians. It might be helpful for Afghanistan to establish a political leadership school where future generations of leaders can learn better skills for serving in public domains. Learning more specific topics about the essence of good political leadership for Afghanistan could be another item in the curriculum, which is subject to further research and analysis. Countries with diverse cultural values but plagued by conflict need such institutions to build a generation of leaders who are trained specifically to stay above existing challenges in an effort to solve them. For example, future Afghan leaders need to understand the most important factors that determine people's judgment about good political leaders in order for them to be one of those perceived as such. Or, for instance, it is important that future leaders understand that justice and honesty are important political values for the people of Afghanistan. Data suggest that ethnic divergence happens when respondents evaluate political leaders. Divergences are mostly driven by diversity of norms and values among different segments of Afghan population. Future political leaders need to be alerted toward such characteristics of the society. They need to prepare to overcome the challenge of diversity in cultural norms. At the very least, they need to know where norms and values become critically important to certain ethnic groups of Afghanistan, and adjust their policy decisions accordingly. Establishment of a political leadership institute and amendment of the country's education programs to include leadership skills can pave the road for future leaders of the country. Further research might be necessary to determine the exact scope and size of such educational amendments.

While improving country's educational system is an important policy recommendation to facilitate growth of better political leadership in the long run, we need additional measures to

ensure current leaders are equipped with better educational attributes. To achieve this goal, a group of transitional leaders who have already obtained higher degrees of education can commit themselves to establishing a mid-career political leadership school in Afghanistan to specifically enroll the current and near future leaders of the country. The international community can support such an initiative to reduce the financial burden of making it happen, and the government can help it by demanding current generation of political leaders to take classes in such an institution as part of their job requirements. Further research could be employed to determine the scope and the content of special leadership training program.

Policy Recommendation VI: Teach Afghan children about the country and their cultures

Afghanistan's current school curriculum does not teach children about ethnic and identity divergence of Afghanistan. This is probably part of the reason why the research shows strong ethnic divergence among respondents to the study. Most Afghans inherit cultural values from their own family and neighborhood, and that makes them very alien to the cultural norms and concepts of other ethnic groups of Afghanistan, who do not necessarily live in their neighborhood. Such educational gaps makes leaders of Afghanistan vulnerable when they face political maneuvering in the form of cultural norms and values. It is hard to lead in modern societies if you do not hook up with followers' cultural norms and values, especially if you are in a country where these cultural factors are at the heart of political disagreements. Cross-cultural educational activities can help future generations of political leaders to become more immune against the politics of ethnic diversity. While the other policy recommendations of this study may take time to amend school curriculums, the country needs a widespread public awareness campaign to help Afghans understand the challenge of diversity in the short run.

Afghanistan traditionally has been a country where teachers and religious officials have had major roles in public leadership tasks, especially in local public awareness campaigns. Given this characteristic of the society, it is important to establish incentives and mechanisms to attract highly intelligent citizens in an effort to start a national campaign about the value of diversity among different ethnic groups. The media and other social forums can be the other groups of stakeholders for such a mass awareness campaign. The process should help people learn about their own divergence of norms and values, and the need for cooperation with their leaders to move them toward some sort of convergence. Public awareness is probably the most important instrument to inform people that diversity is normal and they should not judge good political leaders on the basis of their ethnic and cultural affiliations. This policy also will affect most of the population of the country and can be initiated and lead by a group of strong leaders in coordination with the international community. Afghan leaders need to be challenged to institute such programs.

Policy Recommendation VII: Provide safeguards for political leaders

Recent technological advances have connected the world in ways previously unimaginable. A modern human being moves around the world and connects to different societies very easily. Advances in information technology and the Internet make it harder for people to consider themselves as members of one society and ignore others. This phenomenon has affected citizens of the modern world as well as those of the least developed countries, though to different extents. Educational and employment curiosity is particularly a force behind every modern citizen's decision to travel to different parts of the world and possibly become member of larger global community.

On the other hand, the high cost of being a decision-maker in a divided and at-war society makes it risky for political elites not to shield their children from the reactions of the society, especially when their reform policies fail and people retaliate. President Daoud was murdered with several members of his family, including his young children, because members of the society did not agree with some of his policy decisions. Similar incidences have happened to many mid-level political leaders when the state collapsed or the country's political regime changed.

It is also a reality that the gap in knowledge, social norms, and values between Afghan political leaders and their followers makes their policy positions very alien to the average followers. This has been particularly deadly for most reformists who tried to bring socio-economic changes for the country. King Amanullah and Najibullah are outstanding examples. The history of Afghanistan shows that Afghans do not forgive their leaders when they enforce any policy that is targeted toward social and cultural changes. While most educated leaders know that these changes are necessary for the country to catch up with the rest of the world, average Afghans are very sensitive toward change and highly suspicious of any foreign ideas.

On the other hand, lack of professional education and solidarity among the political elites of Afghanistan make them very tough enemies of each other. For example, they cannot agree on a code of conduct that determines how far to punish the losing side of political maneuverings. When opposition groups try to pave the road for their return to power, the group in power never calculates how much to resist them so that when they do return to power they do not take a bloody revenge. By the same token, those who assume power never have a measure of how to treat the outgoing group of political elites to prevent the creation of an insurgency group and

maintain an acceptable standard of living in the society. Lack of such agreements among Afghan political elites makes political confrontation dangerous, and thus the leaders nervous about life outside the power circle.

Therefore, a lack of personal security and safety for political elites makes it an optimal choice for them to seek a secondary citizenship in a different country where they can save the life of their loved ones in case their policy agenda fails and they face public revenge. This has been a popular method of securing life in the past five decades of war and conflict. Kings who ruled Afghanistan before the period of political instability have also used similar methods. Over time, every one learned how to immunize themselves against future failures before they moved toward political leadership positions.

Today, due to abundance of political leaders with double citizenship, the Afghan people have developed a measure for the sense of belonging to the country, which basically means do not have a secondary passport if you want to be perceived as a good political leader for the country. Residents are convinced that if a political leader has a way out of the country, it is not possible to hold them responsible for their decisions— they make bad decisions but do not want to live with the consequences of them. The last 14 years of Karzai's government provided lots of justification for the average Afghans to take this issue seriously. They even pushed for incorporating such measures into the constitution of the country. However, because of some pressure from Western countries, this law bound only the President. This research catches some of the symptoms of this phenomenon as it was carried out at a time when many presidential candidates had double citizenships. Members of all ethnic groups and genders scored highly

such characteristics as a good leader should not have home, business, or even wife located in a different country.

The best way future leaders can cope with such a challenge is putting strong policy measures in place toward safeguarding the lives of political leaders and their immediate family members. Development of a code of conduct among future political leaders can definitely help, but it has to be introduced to them in the early stages of their educational lives so they really honor them. An overhaul of the processes in which one person decides on key reform decisions is needed to ensure no individual is penalized for such actions, especially when controversial laws are at stake. The new methods of decision-making should be communicated to all Afghans so they are aware that no one person is responsible for reforms. Special education programs for future leaders should emphasize that Afghan officials need to stay away from making unilateral decisions in order to make history or put other people behind. The country might not be able to institute such methods of decision-making and distribution of power until Afghanistan gets out of the gravitational field of war and conflict, but it should have a plan to do so. It is also important for future Afghan leaders to spend more energy on systematic reforms through educational and economic growth rather than pushing for quick fixes. Even if there are some areas that require quick fixes, future leaders should calculate the cost of an uprising and state collapse in comparison with the benefits of quick-fix policy decisions.

After all, people understand there are no quick solutions for Afghanistan to get out of its current state of political and economic instability. Only sustained education and economic progress can restore Afghanistan on a path toward success and prosperity.

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APPENDICES

ANNEX – I:

Demography of Respondents in the 1st Stage Data Collection:

ID No	Education	Occupation	Province	Rural/Urban	Ethnicity	Below 25	Gender	Influential
INF-1	BA	Sr. Civil Servant	Kabul	U	Hazara		M	Y
INF-2	Some Schooling	Shopkeeper	Kabul	U	Hazara		M	
INF-3	BA	Female School Principle	Kabul	U	Hazara		F	Y
INF-4	Grade 12	Unemployed	Kabul	U	Hazara		F	
INF-5	Grade 12	Shopkeeper	Kabul	U	Uzbek		M	
INF-6	Uneducated	Soldier	Kabul	U	Uzbek		M	
INF-7	BA	Director of Youth Union	Kabul	U	Hazara	Y	M	Y
INF-8	Student	Student	Kabul	U	Hazara	Y	M	
INF-9	BA	Human Rights Activist	Kabul	U	Hazara	Y	F	Y
INF-10	Grade 12	Teacher	Kabul	U	Hazara	Y	F	Y
INF-11	Student	Student	Kabul	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-12	Grade 12	Carpet Seller	Kabul	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-13	Grade 12	Street Representative	Parwan	R	Tajik		M	Y
INF-14	Grade 12	Farmer	Parwan	R	Tajik		M	
INF-15	Uneducated	House Wife	Parwan	R	Tajik		F	
INF-16	Diploma	Teacher	Parwan	R	Tajik	Y	M	Y
INF-17	Student	Student	Parwan	R	Tajik	Y	M	
INF-18	Masters	Midwife	Parwan	R	Tajik	Y	F	Y
INF-19	Diploma	Teacher	Parwan	R	Tajik	Y	F	Y
INF-20	Religious School	Mosque Leader	Baghlan	U	Tajik		M	Y
INF-21	BA	Civil Society Work	Baghlan	U	Tajik		M	Y
INF-22	Diploma	Teacher	Baghlan	U	Tajik		F	Y
INF-23	Some Schooling	House Wife	Baghlan	U	Tajik		F	
INF-24	Grade 12	Vocational School Manager	Baghlan	R	Tajik		F	Y
INF-25	BA	Institute Manager	Baghlan	U	Tajik	Y	M	Y
INF-26	Grade 12	Jr. Civil Servant	Baghlan	U	Tajik	Y	M	Y
INF-27	Diploma	Teacher	Baghlan	U	Tajik	Y	F	Y
INF-28	Grade 12	House Wife	Baghlan	U	Tajik	Y	F	
INF-29	Grade 12	House Wife	Baghlan	U	Uzbek	Y	F	
INF-30	Grade 12	Unemployed	Baghlan	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-31	Uneducated	Shopkeeper	Balkh	U	Uzbek		M	
INF-32	Uneducated	Driver	Balkh	U	Uzbek		M	
INF-33	Diploma	Transport Director	Balkh	U	Uzbek	Y	M	Y
INF-34	Uneducated	Dailywage Worker	Balkh	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-35	Student	Student	Faryab	U	Uzbek	Y	M	
INF-36	BA	Jr. Civil Servant	Badakhshan	U	Uzbek	Y	M	Y
INF-37	Grade 12	Head Master	Ghazni	R	Hazara		M	Y
INF-38	Grade 12	Teacher	Ghazni	R	Hazara		M	Y
INF-39	Grade 12	Teacher	Ghazni	R	Hazara		F	Y
INF-40	Some Schooling	House Wife	Ghazni	R	Hazara		F	
INF-41	Grade 12	Religious Cleric	Ghazni	R	Hazara	Y	M	Y
INF-42	Some Schooling	Shopkeeper	Ghazni	R	Hazara	Y	M	
INF-43	Grade 12	Head Master	Ghazni	R	Hazara	Y	F	Y
INF-44	Some Schooling	Student	Ghazni	R	Hazara	Y	F	
INF-45	BA	Retired Military Officer	Laghman	U	Pashtun		M	Y

INF-46	Some Schooling	Dailywage Worker	Laghman	U	Pashtun	M	
INF-47	Grade 12	Teacher	Laghman	U	Pashtun	F	Y
INF-48	Some Schooling	Teacher	Laghman	U	Pashtun	F	Y
INF-49	Religious School	Farmer	Laghman	R	Pashtun	M	
INF-50	Uneducated	House Wife	Laghman	R	Pashtun	F	
INF-51	Uneducated	Farmer	Laghman	U	Pashtun	Y	M
INF-52	Grade 12	Student	Laghman	U	Pashtun	Y	M
INF-53	Grade 12	Teacher	Laghman	U	Pashtun	Y	F
INF-54	Student	Student	Laghman	R	Pashtun	Y	M
INF-55	Grade 12	House Wife	Laghman	R	Pashtun	Y	F
INF-56	Some Schooling	Farmer	Kunar	R	Pashtun		M
INF-57	Uneducated	House Wife	Kunar	R	Pashtun		F
INF-58	Some Schooling	Student	Kunar	U	Pashtun	Y	F
INF-59	BA	Jr. Civil Servant	Kunar	R	Pashtun	Y	M
INF-60	Grade 12	Student	Kunar	R	Pashtun	Y	F

Demography of Respondents in the 2nd Stage Data Collection:

No	ID Code	Age	Age Bins	Education	Edu. Bins	Province	Reg.	R/U Bins	Gender	Gen. Bin	Ethnic	Ethnic Bin	Language	Income	Inco. Bins	Occupation	E/NE Bins
1	SM-3	28	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Journalist	2
2	MK-4	43	4	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	F	3	Journalist	2
3	HH-2	28	2	BA	3	kabul	1	1	male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	F	3	Private Sector	2
4	OS-1	34	3	Masters	4	kabul	1	1	male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Head of AIAS	2
5	NE-01	34	3	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Shopkeeper	1
6	ZD-8	41	3	BA	3	kabul	1	1	male	1	Tajik	2	farsi	F	3	Civil Society	2
7	ND-7	33	3	PhD	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Researcher	2
8	MS-6	53	5	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	NGO	2
9	SG-9	51	4	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	NGO	2
10	NE-02	24	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	1
11	AQ-12	38	3	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Arab	5	Farsi	F	3	Civil Servant	3
12	NS-5	32	3	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Civil Society	2
13	AA-13	28	2	BA	3	kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	F	3	CSO Official	3
14	NE-04	65	5	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Solder	3
15	NE-06	53	5	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	NGO	2
16	NE-03	41	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
17	NE-07	35	3	BA	3	Baghlan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Private Sector	1
18	NE-05	21	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Shopkeeper	1
19	TA-19	27	2	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Civil Servant	3
20	DM-15	36	3	PhD	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Head of AISS	2
21	NA-27	36	3	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	F	3	Deputy OAA	3
22	AB-26	30	2	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Balooch	5	Farsi	E	3	Civil Society	2
23	NN-28	31	2	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	F	3	Spokperson IEC	3
24	YT-24	36	3	PhD	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Arab	5	Farsi	F	3	Head of Wach News	2
25	AA-22	37	3	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	F	3	Deputy TAF	2
26	HK-16	37	3	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	F	3	Head of CAPS	2
27	NA-31	43	4	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Head of OSA	2
28	NN-10	38	3	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	F	3	Human Rights Commission	3
29	AS-20	40	3	BA	3	Panj Sher	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Private Sector	2
30	FD-32	52	5	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	F	3	Musician	2
31	NE-08	21	1	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	2
32	NE-09	40	3	Masters	4	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	E	3	Professor	2
33	NE-10	35	3	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Teacher	2

34	NE-11	25	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Civil Servant	3
35	NE-12	26	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Teacher	2
36	NE-13	40	3	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Journalist	2
37	NE-23	25	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Teacher	1
38	NE-22	20	1	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Journalist	2
39	NE-21	30	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Civil Servant	3
40	NE-20	39	3	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Teacher	2
41	NE-19	45	4	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Civil Servant	3
42	NE-18	23	2	Diploma	2	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Civil Servant	3
43	NE-17	40	3	BA	3	Ghazni	5	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Private Sector	2
44	NE-16	28	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Journalist	2
45	NE-15	55	5	Diploma	2	Ghazni	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Civil Servant	3
46	NE-14	23	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	2
47	NE-24	45	4	BA	3	Ghazni	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Head of School	1
48	NE-25	23	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
49	NE-26	42	4	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
50	NE-27	44	4	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Teacher	2
51	NE-28	44	4	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Teacher	1
52	NE-32	44	4	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Representative	3
53	NE-29	23	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Journalist	2
54	NE-30	32	3	Diploma	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Representative	3
55	NE-31	58	5	Diploma	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Shopkeeper	2
56	HK-17	51	4	Masters	4	Farah	4	1	male	1	Pashtun	1	farsi	F	3	General	3
57	WM-33	55	5	BA	3	Baghlan	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Manager	2
58	ED-34	55	5	BA	3	Helmand	5	2	male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	F	3	Former Governor	3
59	RK-35	33	3	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
60	RK-36	35	3	Masters	4	Ghazni	5	2	male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	F	3	Civil Servant	3
61	RK-37	40	3	Masters	4	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Student	2
62	RK-38	31	2	BA	3	Uruzgan	5	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
63	NE-33	64	5	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
64	NE-34	34	3	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Manager	2
65	NE-35	18	1	High School	2	Helmand	5	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	nr	3	Private Sector	1
66	NE-36	27	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Journalist	2
67	NE-37	39	3	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	2
68	NE-67	32	3	Masters	4	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
69	NE-68	26	2	High School	2	Parwan	1	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Translator	1
70	NE-66	20	1	High School	2	Wardak	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Student	2
71	NE-65	27	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	F	3	Student	2
72	NE-64	21	1	Diploma	2	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
73	NE-63	18	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	nr	1	Unemployed	2
74	NE-62	30	2	Some Schooling	1	Wardak	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Police	3
75	NE-61	30	2	BA	3	Paktya	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Police	3
76	NE-60	36	3	Some Schooling	1	Paktya	2	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	2
77	NE-59	40	3	Diploma	2	Paktya	2	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	2
78	NE-58	25	2	High School	2	Paktya	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	nr	2	Civil Servant	3
79	NE-57	34	3	BA	3	Paktya	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	B	1	Police	3
80	NE-56	31	2	Masters	4	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Manager	2
81	NE-55	28	2	High School	2	Paktya	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Teacher	2
82	NE-54	55	5	Diploma	2	Paktya	2	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
83	NE-53	24	2	High School	2	Paktya	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	nr	2	Sportsman	2
84	NE-52	42	4	Diploma	2	Paktya	2	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Civil Society	2
85	NE-51	41	3	High School	2	Paktya	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Daily Wage Worker	1
86	NE-50	27	2	High School	2	Paktya	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	nr	2	Teacher	1
87	NE-49	48	4	BA	3	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Commander	3
88	NE-48	40	3	Diploma	2	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Civil Servant	3
89	NE-47	16	1	Some Schooling	1	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
90	NE-46	21	1	BA	3	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	2
91	NE-45	20	1	BA	3	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Journalist	2

92	NE-44	19	1	Some Schooling	1	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	2
93	NE-43	34	3	Diploma	2	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Commander	3
94	NE-42	22	2	Diploma	2	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
95	NE-41	29	2	BA	3	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Teacher	2
96	NE-40	30	2	Diploma	2	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Civil Servant	3
97	NE-39	15	1	Some Schooling	1	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	2
98	NE-38	39	3	Diploma	2	Khost	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Teacher	2
99	NE-69	22	2	Diploma	2	Parwan	1	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Commander	3
100	NE-70	19	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Unemployed	1
101	NE-71	20	1	Some Schooling	1	Kabul	1	1	male	1	Tajik	2	farsi	nr	1	Student	1
102	NE-72	20	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	farsi	B	1	Student	1
103	NE-73	21	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	farsi	B	1	Engineer	1
104	NE-74	21	1	BA	3	Parwan	1	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	farsi	C	2	Student	2
105	NE-75	21	1	BA	3	Kapisa	1	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	farsi	A	1	Student	2
106	NE-76	20	1	BA	3	Kunduz	3	2	male	1	Tajik	2	farsi	A	1	Student	2
107	NE-77	20	1	BA	3	Parwan	1	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	2
108	NE-78	21	1	BA	3	Parwan	1	2	male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	1
109	NE-79	27	2	BA	3	Parwan	1	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Civil Society	2
110	NE-80	36	3	Ba	3	Parwan	1	2	male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Professor	2
111	NE-81	29	2	BA	3	Kapisa	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	2
112	NE-82	22	2	BA	3	Parwan	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Student	2
113	NE-83	22	2	Diploma	2	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	nr	1	Student	1
114	NE-84	31	2	BA	3	Parwan	1	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Sportsman	1
115	NE-85	48	4	Some Schooling	1	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Driver	1
116	NE-86	75	5	High School	2	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Manager	1
117	NE-87	36	3	BA	3	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	C	2	Doctor	1
118	NE-88	23	2	Diploma	2	Logar	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Teacher	1
119	NE-89	48	4	High School	2	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Head of School	1
120	NE-90	63	5	Some Schooling	1	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Tribal Elder	2
121	NE-91	25	2	Some Schooling	1	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Police	3
122	NE-92	55	5	BA	3	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Engineer	1
123	NE-93	26	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Police	3
124	NE-94	20	1	High School	2	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Teacher	2
125	NE-95	62	5	BA	3	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Head of School	1
126	NE-96	35	3	Diploma	2	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Teacher	1
127	NE-97	70	5	Diploma	2	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Malek	1
128	NE-98	22	2	BA	3	Wardak	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Private Sector	1
129	NE-99	22	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Student	2
130	NE-100	27	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
131	NE-101	24	2	BA	3	Laghman	2	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Civil Society	2
132	NE-102	20	1	High School	2	Laghman	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Unemployed	1
133	NE-103	35	3	High School	2	Laghman	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Farmer	1
134	NE-104	23	2	Diploma	2	Laghman	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Shopkeeper	1
135	NE-105	35	3	High School	2	Laghman	2	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Sportsman	2
136	NE-106	25	2	High School	2	Laghman	2	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Daily Wage Worker	1
137	NE-107	54	5	BA	3	Laghman	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	D	2	Commander	3
138	NE-108	18	1	BA	3	Laghman	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
139	NE-109	23	2	High School	2	Laghman	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Solder	3
140	NE-110	27	2	High School	2	Nengarhar	2	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Shopkeeper	2
141	NE-111	44	4	High School	2	Nengarhar	2	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Shopkeeper	1
142	NE-112	32	3	High School	2	Nengarhar	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Private Sector	1
143	NE-113	30	2	High School	2	Nengarhar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Private Sector	1
144	NE-114	24	2	High School	2	Nengarhar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	C	2	Sportsman	2
145	NE-115	24	2	BA	3	Nengarhar	2	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	B	1	Journalist	2
146	NE-116	38	3	High School	2	Nengarhar	2	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	nr	1
147	NE-117	22	2	High School	2	Nengarhar	2	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Sportsman	2
148	NE-118	20	1	High School	2	Nengarhar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	B	1	nr	1
149	NE-119	15	1	BA	3	Bamyan	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Student	1

150	NE-120	18	1	Some Schooling	1	Bamyan	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	nr	1
151	NE-121	16	1	Some Schooling	1	Bamyan	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	farsi	B	1	Student	2
152	NE-122	15	1	Some Schooling	1	Bamyan	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	farsi	A	1	Student	1
153	NE-123	16	1	Some Schooling	1	Bamyan	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	farsi	B	1	Teacher	2
154	NE-124	21	1	High School	2	Bamyan	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	nr	1
155	NE-125	26	2	High School	2	Kapisa	1	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	farsi	C	2	Commander	3
156	NE-126	28	2	High School	2	Parwan	1	2	male	1	Hazara	3	farsi	A	1	Police	3
157	NE-127	21	1	Uneducated	1	Bamyan	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Driver	1
158	NE-128	16	1	Some Schooling	1	Bamyan	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	nr	1	Student	1
159	NE-129	16	1	Diploma	2	Bamyan	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Student	1
160	NE-130	27	2	High School	2	Bamyan	1	1	male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Police	3
161	NE-131	37	3	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	House wife	1
162	NE-132	22	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Student	1
163	NE-133	23	2	BA	3	Sarpul	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Civil Servant	3
164	NE-134	40	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Private Sector	1
165	NE-135	37	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
166	NE-136	45	4	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Private Sector	1
167	NE-137	26	2	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	Teacher	1
168	NE-138	23	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	2
169	NE-139	32	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	C	2	House wife	1
170	NE-140	25	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	C	2	Private Sector	1
171	NE-141	30	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Engineer	1
172	NE-142	35	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Private Sector	1
173	NE-143	38	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
174	NE-144	28	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	D	2	NGO	2
175	NE-145	26	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	Civil Servant	3
176	NE-146	26	2	BA	3	Samangan	3	2	Male	1	Sadat	5	Farsi	B	1	Doctor	1
177	NE-147	23	2	BA	3	Baghlan	3	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	B	1	Manager	1
178	NE-148	38	3	BA	3	Baghlan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Engineer	2
179	NE-149	25	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Unemployed	1
180	NE-150	26	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Unemployed	1
181	NE-151	25	2	BA	3	Jawzjan	3	2	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	A	1	Teacher	1
182	NE-152	19	1	High School	2	Jawzjan	3	1	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	Translator	1
183	NE-153	25	2	Diploma	2	Wardak	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Journalist	2
184	NE-154	25	2	BA	3	Wardak	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	nr	1
185	NE-155	18	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Unemployed	2
186	NE-156	30	2	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
187	NE-157	20	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
188	NE-158	20	1	Diploma	2	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Unemployed	2
189	NE-159	34	3	Some Schooling	1	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Civil Servant	3
190	NE-160	18	1	High School	2	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
191	NE-161	17	1	High School	2	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Student	2
192	NE-162	17	1	Some Schooling	1	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
193	NE-163	16	1	Some Schooling	1	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
194	NE-164	18	1	High School	2	Uruzgan	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Student	1
195	NE-165	21	1	Some Schooling	1	Daikundi	1	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Unemployed	1
196	NE-166	38	3	Some Schooling	1	Daikundi	1	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	House wife	1
197	NE-167	24	2	High School	2	Daikundi	1	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	nr	1	Unemployed	2
198	NE-168	15	1	Some Schooling	1	Wardak	5	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
199	NE-169	30	2	Diploma	2	Wardak	5	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Religious Teacher	2
200	NE-170	22	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
201	NE-171	23	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	farsi	B	1	Student	2
202	NE-172	23	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	farsi	A	1	Student	2
203	NE-173	22	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	farsi	B	1	Student	1
204	NE-174	23	2	BA	3	Wardak	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	farsi	B	1	Student	1
205	NE-175	16	1	High School	2	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	farsi	A	1	Student	1
206	NE-176	17	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	farsi	A	1	Student	2
207	NE-177	21	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Student	1

208	NE-178	21	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Turk	5	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
209	NE-179	18	1	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Qizilbash	5	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
210	NE-180	15	1	Some Schooling	1	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
211	Ne-181	20	1	Diploma	2	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
212	NE-182	30	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
213	NE-183	49	4	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Civil Society	2
214	NE-184	21	1	Diploma	2	Wardak	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Student	2
215	NE-185	15	1	Some Schooling	1	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
216	NE-186	23	2	BA	3	Bamyan	1	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Journalist	2
217	NE-187	23	2	BA	3	Bamyan	1	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Student	2
218	NE-188	29	2	Masters	4	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Civil Servant	3
219	NE-189	25	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	E	3	Civil Servant	3
220	NE-190	32	3	BA	3	Daikundi	1	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	E	3	Civil Servant	3
221	NE-191	24	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Student	2
222	NE-192	18	1	High School	2	Wardak	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
223	NE-193	29	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	E	3	Manager	1
224	NE-194	32	3	Masters	4	Daikundi	1	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	E	3	Teacher	1
225	NE-195	49	4	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Manager	1
226	NE-196	31	2	BA	3	Daikundi	1	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
227	NE-197	30	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
228	NE-198	22	2	BA	3	Wardak	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
229	NE-199	23	2	BA	3	Daikundi	1	2	Male	1	Sadat	5	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
230	NE-200	38	3	Uneducated	1	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	House wife	1
231	NE-201	34	3	Uneducated	1	Daikundi	1	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
232	NE-202	31	2	High School	2	Wardak	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Teacher	1
233	NE-203	34	3	Some Schooling	1	Bamyan	1	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Unemployed	1
234	NE-204	40	3	Uneducated	1	Bamyan	1	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Unemployed	1
235	NE-205	18	1	Uneducated	1	Wardak	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	nr	1
236	NE-206	30	2	Uneducated	1	Bamyan	1	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
237	NE-207	20	1	Uneducated	1	Parwan	1	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Unemployed	1
238	NE-208	42	4	Uneducated	1	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
239	NE-209	41	3	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Civil Servant	3
240	NE-210	45	4	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	House wife	1
241	NE-211	46	4	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
242	NE-212	30	2	Uneducated	1	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	House wife	1
243	NE-213	40	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	2
244	NE-214	38	3	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
245	NE-215	25	2	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	House wife	1
246	NE-216	44	4	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Civil Servant	3
247	NE-217	36	3	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	House wife	1
248	NE-218	20	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	House wife	1
249	NE-219	18	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
250	NE-220	32	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	nr	2	Teacher	2
251	NE-221	21	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	farsi	C	2	Student	2
252	NE-222	19	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	farsi	B	1	Student	2
253	NE-223	25	2	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	F	3	Student	2
254	NE-224	28	2	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	Student	1
255	NE-225	24	2	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	House wife	1
256	NE-226	35	3	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	farsi	A	1	House wife	1
257	NE-227	24	2	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
258	NE-228	20	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
259	NE-229	23	2	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	2
260	NE-230	25	2	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Shopkeeper	1
261	NE-231	25	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
262	NE-232	20	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Manager	2
263	NE-233	37	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	House wife	1
264	NE-234	45	4	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	D	2	Engineer	1
265	NE-235	27	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	D	2	Engineer	2

266	NE-236	25	2	High School	2	Baghlan	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Private Sector	2
267	NE-237	26	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Journalist	2
268	NE-238	21	1	BA	3	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
269	NE-239	50	4	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	C	2	House wife	1
270	NE-240	40	3	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
271	NE-241	25	2	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
272	NE-242	40	3	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
273	NE-243	45	4	Masters	4	Baghlan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Engineer	1
274	NE-244	46	4	Some Schooling	1	Kapisa	1	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Student	2
276	NE-246	26	2	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Unemployed	1
277	NE-247	43	4	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	2
278	NE-248	29	2	Uneducated	1	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	C	2	House wife	1
279	NE-249	57	5	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Head of School	2
280	NE-250	18	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Private Sector	2
281	NE-251	22	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Student	2
282	NE-252	25	2	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	nr	2	Teacher	1
283	NE-253	29	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Private Sector	2
284	NE-254	19	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	B	1	Unemployed	2
285	NE-255	20	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	nr	1	Student	1
286	NE-256	19	1	Some Schooling	1	Kapisa	1	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	E	3	Student	2
287	NE-257	18	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	nr	1	Student	1
288	NE-258	40	3	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Teacher	1
289	NE-259	30	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
290	NE-260	45	4	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
291	NE-261	43	4	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Teacher	1
292	NE-262	30	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
293	NE-263	25	2	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
294	NE-264	32	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
295	NE-265	48	4	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
296	NE-266	23	2	Diploma	2	Laghman	2	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	1
299	NE-269	47	4	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Teacher	2
306	NE-276	78	5	High School	2	Baghlan	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
307	Ne-277	25	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
308	NE-278	18	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
309	NE-279	60	5	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Private Sector	1
310	NE-280	60	5	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Teacher	1
311	NE-281	20	1	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	2
312	NE-282	29	2	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Farmer	2
313	NE-283	28	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Shopkeeper	1
314	NE-284	25	2	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	E	3	Student	1
315	NE-285	21	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	D	2	Student	1
316	NE-386	20	1	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	1
317	NE-287	32	3	BA	3	Samangan	3	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	D	2	Student	2
318	NE-288	20	1	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	nr	2
319	NE-289	20	1	BA	3	Jawzjan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	1
320	NE-290	20	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	2
321	NE-291	20	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	1
322	NE-292	23	2	Diploma	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
323	NE-293	26	2	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
324	NE-294	36	3	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
325	NE-295	26	2	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	E	3	Private Sector	2
326	NE-296	38	3	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Doctor	1
327	NE-297	30	2	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Civil Servant	3
328	NE-298	30	2	Diploma	2	Baghlan	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Private Sector	2
329	NE-299	25	2	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	nr	1
330	NE-300	26	2	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	nr	2
331	NE-301	32	3	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Civil Servant	3
332	NE-302	25	2	Diploma	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Civil Servant	3

333	NE-303	22	2	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
334	NE-304	23	2	Diploma	2	Badakhshan	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
335	NE-305	50	4	Diploma	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	nr	1
336	NE-306	45	4	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Unemployed	1
337	NE-307	36	3	Diploma	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
338	NE-308	20	1	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
339	NE-309	25	2	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
340	NE-310	45	4	Diploma	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
341	NE-311	29	2	Diploma	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
342	NE-312	20	1	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Student	2
343	NE-313	45	4	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
344	NE-314	27	2	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Doctor	1
345	NE-315	19	1	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
346	NE-316	50	4	Diploma	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	nr	2	Teacher	1
347	NE-317	25	2	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Student	2
348	NE-318	27	2	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	E	3	Civil Servant	3
349	NE-319	37	3	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Daily Wage Worker	1
350	NE-320	25	2	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	2
351	NE-321	22	2	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	E	3	Student	1
352	NE-322	32	3	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Engineer	1
353	NE-323	32	3	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Engineer	2
354	NE-324	31	2	BA	3	Kapisa	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	nr	3	Engineer	2
355	NE-325	40	3	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Civil Servant	3
356	NE-326	45	4	Diploma	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	2
357	NE-327	34	3	BA	3	Kabul	1	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Engineer	1
358	NE-328	24	2	BA	3	balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	nr	1
359	NE-329	70	5	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Unemployed	1
360	NE-330	25	2	High School	2	Takhar	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Private Sector	2
361	NE-331	23	2	BA	3	Jawzjan	3	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	D	2	Student	1
362	NE-332	22	2	BA	3	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Turkmani	B	1	Student	2
363	NE-333	24	2	BA	3	Baghlan	3	2	Male	1	Arab	5	Farsi	B	1	Engineer	2
364	NE-334	23	2	BA	3	Baghlan	3	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	A	1	nr	1
365	NE-335	19	1	BA	3	Baghlan	3	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	Student	2
366	NE-336	23	2	BA	3	Samangan	3	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	Student	2
367	NE-337	25	2	Diploma	2	balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
368	NE-338	53	5	Masters	4	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	E	3	Civil Servant	3
369	NE-339	21	1	BA	3	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Student	2
370	NE-340	24	2	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
371	NE-341	28	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Journalist	2
372	NE-342	26	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Teacher	2
373	NE-343	23	2	BA	3	Faryab	4	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	C	2	Student	1
374	NE-344	23	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Teacher	1
375	NE-345	28	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	E	3	Teacher	1
376	NE-346	50	4	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	E	3	House wife	1
377	NE-347	20	1	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	E	3	Teacher	1
378	NE-348	63	5	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	NGO	2
379	NE-349	37	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	D	2	Engineer	2
380	NE-350	20	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Private Sector	2
381	NE-351	22	2	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Private Sector	2
382	NE-352	53	5	BA	3	Kabul	1	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Civil Servant	3
383	NE-353	21	1	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	2
384	NE-354	41	3	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Arab	5	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
385	NE-355	21	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	House wife	1
386	NE-356	21	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
387	NE-357	20	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
388	NE-358	19	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	House wife	1
389	NE-359	18	1	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
390	NE-360	20	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	A	1	Student	2

391	NE-361	23	2	BA	3	Jawzjan	3	1	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	D	2	Civil Society	2
392	NE-262	22	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Student	1
393	NE-363	19	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
394	NE-364	41	3	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Arab	5	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
395	NE-365	38	3	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Shopkeeper	1
396	NE-366	29	2	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Shopkeeper	1
397	NE-367	18	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Student	2
398	NE-368	19	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Private Sector	1
399	NE-369	18	1	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
400	NE-370	19	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Teacher	1
401	NE-371	42	4	High School	2	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
402	NE-372	18	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Pashtun	2	Pashtu	B	1	Student	1
403	NE-373	21	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	nr	2
404	NE-374	24	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	A	1	Student	2
405	NE-375	20	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	nr	1	Student	2
406	NE-376	22	2	BA	3	Jawzjan	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	2
407	NE-377	53	5	High School	2	Kunar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	E	3	Teacher	1
408	NE-378	19	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	2
409	NE-379	57	5	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Student	1
410	NE-380	18	1	High School	2	Balkh	3	2	Female	2	Arab	5	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
411	NE-381	21	1	Some Schooling	1	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Student	2
412	NE-382	27	2	Diploma	2	Kunar	2	2	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
413	NE-383	28	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	nr	1
414	NE-384	22	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Banker	2
415	NE-385	22	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Civil Servant	3
416	NE-386	23	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Civil Society	2
417	NE-387	22	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
418	NE-388	58	5	BA	3	Samangan	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Private Sector	2
419	NE-389	20	1	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	nr	1	Student	1
420	NE-390	46	4	Some Schooling	1	Samangan	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Civil Servant	3
421	NE-391	52	5	BA	3	Samangan	3	1	Male	1	Tatar	5	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
422	NE-392	41	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
423	NE-393	52	5	High School	2	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Shopkeeper	2
424	NE-394	24	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Teacher	2
425	NE-395	20	1	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Teacher	1
426	NE-396	22	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Private Sector	1
427	NE-397	24	2	BA	3	Badakhshan	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Civil Servant	3
428	NE-398	20	1	Diploma	2	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Unemployed	1
429	NE-399	31	2	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	1
430	NE-400	45	4	BA	3	Wardak	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	F	3	Civil Servant	3
431	NE-401	37	3	Masters	4	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
432	NE-402	27	2	Diploma	2	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	Civil Servant	3
433	NE-403	32	3	BA	3	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	C	2	Civil Servant	3
434	NE-404	32	3	BA	3	Faryab	4	1	Male	1	Aymaq	5	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
435	NE-405	52	5	Diploma	2	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	C	2	Civil Servant	3
436	NE-406	50	4	Masters	4	Faryab	4	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	D	2	Engineer	1
437	NE-407	55	5	Some Schooling	1	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	Cook	1
438	NE-408	33	3	High School	2	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Farsi	B	1	Civil Servant	3
439	NE-409	28	2	BA	3	Faryab	4	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	D	2	Engineer	1
440	NE-410	18	1	BA	3	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	D	2	Student	1
441	NE-411	25	2	BA	3	Faryab	4	1	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	D	2	NGO	2
442	NE-412	44	4	BA	3	Faryab	4	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
443	NE-413	42	4	BA	3	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	C	2	Civil Servant	3
444	NE-414	50	4	Diploma	2	Faryab	4	1	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	C	2	NGO	2
445	NE-415	58	5	BA	3	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	A	1	Civil Servant	3
446	NE-416	49	4	Diploma	2	Faryab	4	2	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	A	1	Teacher	1
447	NE-417	24	2	BA	3	Faryab	4	2	Male	1	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	C	2	NGO	2
448	NE-418	34	3	Diploma	2	Faryab	4	2	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	Teacher	1

449	NE-419	45	4	Diploma	2	Faryab	4	2	Female	2	Uzbek	4	Uzbek	B	1	NGO	2
450	NE-420	38	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
451	FH-40	31	2	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Researcher	2
452	AN-41	30	2	Masters	4	Kabul	1	1	Female	2	Tajik	2	Farsi	F	3	Leadership Expert	2
453	NE-421	33	3	BA	3	Balkh	3	2	Male	1	Tajik	2	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	2
454	NE-422	40	3	High School	2	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Shopkeeper	2
455	NE-423	38	3	Some Schooling	1	kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Tailor	1
456	NE-424	28	2	Some Schooling	1	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Driver	1
457	NE-425	42	4	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Shopkeeper	2
458	NE-426	18	1	High School	2	Laghman	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	1
459	NE-427	32	3	BA	3	Wardak	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	F	3	Engineer	1
460	NE-428	27	2	BA	3	Ghor	4	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	E	3	Civil Servant	3
461	NE-429	20	1	BA	3	Uruzgan	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	NGO	2
462	NE-430	29	2	BA	3	Ghor	4	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Engineer	2
463	NE-431	57	5	uneducated	1	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	House wife	1
464	NE-432	29	2	High School	2	Parwan	1	2	Male	1	sadat	5	Farsi	D	2	Engineer	1
465	NE-433	24	2	Diploma	2	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Student	1
466	NE-434	25	2	BA	3	Daikundi	1	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Draftsman	1
467	NE-435	25	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Civil Servant	3
468	NE-436	42	4	Masters	4	Daikundi	1	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Designer	1
469	NE-437	32	3	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Teacher	2
470	NE-438	24	2	BA	3	Kabul	1	1	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Student	1
471	NE-439	45	4	High School	2	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	1
472	NE-440	46	4	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	C	2	Teacher	2
473	NE-441	29	2	High School	2	Bamyan	1	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	E	3	Engineer	2
474	NE-442	50	4	High School	2	Ghazni	5	2	Female	2	Hazara	3	Farsi	D	2	Teacher	1
475	NE-443	21	1	BA	3	Helmand	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
476	NE-444	21	1	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	A	1	Student	1
477	NE-445	22	2	BA	3	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	nr	1	Student	1
478	NE-446	21	1	High School	2	Ghazni	5	2	Male	1	Hazara	3	Farsi	B	1	Unemployed	1
479	NE-447	19	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	nr	1
480	NE-448	32	3	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Civil Servant	3
481	NE-449	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	nr	1
482	NE-450	19	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	nr	1
483	NE-451	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	nr	1
484	NE-452	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Teacher	1
485	NE-453	22	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	1
486	NE-454	21	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	nr	2
487	NE-455	18	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	nr	1
488	NE-456	28	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	NGO	2
489	NE-457	18	1	Some Schooling	1	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	1
490	NE-458	29	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Civil Servant	3
491	NE-459	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	2
492	NE-460	34	3	High School	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	2
493	NE-461	21	1	BA	3	Helmand	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	1
494	NE-462	20	1	BA	3	Helmand	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	2
495	NE-463	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
496	NE-464	20	1	BA	3	Helmand	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	2
497	NE-465	22	2	BA	3	Helmand	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Shopkeeper	2
498	NE-466	22	2	BA	3	Helmand	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	nr	1
499	NE-467	25	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Private Sector	2
500	NE-468	18	1	BA	3	Helmand	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	E	3	nr	1
501	NE-469	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	1
502	NE-470	30	2	BA	3	Helmand	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	E	3	Student	1
503	NE-471	20	1	BA	3	Helmand	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	2
504	NE-472	25	2	BA	3	Helmand	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
505	NE-473	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	2
506	NE-474	19	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Student	1

507	NE-475	18	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Student	1
508	NE-476	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	2
509	NE-477	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	1
510	NE-478	20	1	BA	3	Helmand	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	nr	1
511	NE-479	22	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	2
512	NE-480	21	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	2
513	NE-481	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	1
514	NE-482	18	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	2
515	NE-483	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	1
516	NE-484	23	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Teacher	2
517	NE-485	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	2
518	NE-486	24	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Balooch	5	Pashtu	C	2	Journalist	2
519	NE-487	18	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Journalist	2
520	NE-488	19	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Journalist	2
521	NE-489	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	nr	2
522	NE-490	18	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	2
523	NE-491	18	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	2
524	NE-492	24	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	2
525	NE-493	18	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	E	3	Journalist	2
526	NE-494	25	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Journalist	2
527	NE-495	21	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	1
528	NE-496	23	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Private Sector	2
529	NE-497	35	3	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	IT	1
530	NE-498	19	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
531	NE-499	21	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Teacher	1
532	NE-500	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	2
533	NE-501	16	1	BA	3	Logar	2	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
534	NE-502	21	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	nr	1
535	NE-503	19	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	E	3	nr	2
536	NE-504	18	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	nr	1	Student	1
537	NE-505	24	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	E	3	Student	2
538	NE-506	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
539	NE-507	40	3	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	1
540	NE-508	23	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Shopkeeper	2
541	NE-509	34	3	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Civil Servant	3
542	NE-510	58	5	BA	3	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	nr	2
543	NE-511	23	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Journalist	2
544	NE-512	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	1
545	NE-513	20	1	Diploma	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Teacher	1
546	NE-514	18	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	2
547	NE-515	18	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Student	1
548	NE-516	18	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	2
549	NE-517	23	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
550	NE-518	19	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	2
551	NE-519	30	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	E	3	Student	2
552	NE-520	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Student	2
553	NE-521	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Civil Servant	3
554	NE-522	20	1	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	Student	1
555	NE-523	19	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	1
556	NE-524	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Private Sector	1
557	NE-525	19	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	nr	1	Student	2
558	NE-526	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	1
559	NE-527	23	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Civil Servant	3
560	NE-528	19	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	nr	2
561	NE-529	35	3	Diploma	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Farmer	1
562	NE-530	23	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Sadat	5	Pashtu	B	1	Student	2
563	NE-531	22	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	nr	1
564	NE-532	21	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	2

565	NE-533	29	2	Diploma	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Doctor	1
566	NE-534	31	2	Diploma	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Teacher	1
567	NE-535	25	2	BA	3	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Student	2
568	NE-536	23	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	nr	2
569	NE-537	29	2	Diploma	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	D	2	nr	1
570	NE-538	25	2	Diploma	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	1
571	NE-539	26	2	Diploma	2	Kandahar	5	1	Female	2	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	C	2	Teacher	1
572	NE-540	59	5	BA	3	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Private Sector	2
573	NE-541	22	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	A	1	Student	1
574	NE-542	25	2	High School	2	Kandahar	5	2	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	nr	3	Private Sector	2
575	NE-543	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	Student	2
576	NE-544	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Pashtun	1	Pashtu	B	1	nr	1
577	NE-545	20	1	High School	2	Kandahar	5	1	Male	1	Balooch	5	Pashtu	B	1	Shopkeeper	1

Sample Stratification:

No	Strata	Pashtuns	Tajiks	Hazaras	Uzbeks	Others	Totals	Ratio
1	Men	185	121	48	22	14	390	69%
2	Women	39	80	46	10	3	178	31%
3	Rural	90	72	67	17	7	253	45%
4	Urban	134	129	27	15	10	315	55%
5	High income	24	24	10	0	3	61	11%
6	Middle income	90	76	28	17	5	216	38%
7	Low income	110	101	56	15	9	291	51%
8	Old generation	15	14	2	3	1	35	6%
9	Mid-high generation	15	25	6	6	0	52	9%
10	Mid-low generation	32	44	14	4	5	99	17%
11	New-older generation	76	70	42	16	7	211	37%
12	New-younger generation	86	48	30	3	4	171	30%
13	High education	7	12	7	1	3	30	5%
14	Mid education	99	100	37	21	6	263	46%
15	Low education	98	77	30	9	8	222	39%
16	Uneducated	20	12	20	1	0	53	9%
17	Participant	35	25	16	6	3	85	15%
18	Attentive	89	77	26	10	5	207	36%
19	None participant	100	99	52	16	9	276	49%
Total Ethnic Groups		224	201	94	32	17	568	

Geographic Distribution of Samples:

		Provinces		Population Distribution			Sample Distribution		
				Both	Male	Female	Original Sampling	After Over Sampling	Responses Received
1	Central	1	Kabul	3,691.40	1,906.70	1,784.70	100	100	65
		2	Kapisa	406.2	205	201.2			6
		3	Parwan	610.3	308.7	301.6	10	10	12
		4	Panjsher	141.4	72.3	69.1			1
		5	Bamyan	411.7	208.7	203	10	10	16
		6	Daykundi	424.1	217.8	206.3	10	10	10
				5,685,100	2,919,200	2,765,900	130	130	110
2	East	1	Logar	360.9	183.6	177.3	10	20	15
		2	Nangarhar	1,383.90	708.3	675.6	50	50	9
		3	Laghman	410.3	210.2	200.1		10	11
		4	Paktia	507.8	259.6	248.2	10	20	11
		5	Khost	528.9	270.8	258.1	10	10	12
		6	Kunar	414.7	212.2	202.5			2
		7	Nooristan	136.3	69.5	66.8			-
				3,742,800	1,914,200	1,828,600	80	110	60
3	North	1	Baghlan	833.3	427.1	406.2	10	10	11
		2	Badakhshan	874.8	445.7	429.1	20	20	37
		3	Takhar	901.9	460	441.9			1
		4	Kunduz	917.9	467.1	450.8			1
		5	Samangan	356.3	182.4	173.9	10	10	6
		6	Balkh	1,194.00	610.8	583.2	100	100	134
		7	Sar-e-Pul	514.1	263.2	250.9			1
		8	Jawzjan	494.2	251.5	242.7	10	10	6
				6,086,500	3,107,800	2,978,700	150	150	197
4	West	1	Badghis	456.4	233.3	223.1			-
		2	Herat	1,710.10	866.3	843.8			-
		3	Farah	466.3	239.2	227.1			1
		4	Chor	635.7	324.7	311			2
		5	Nimroz	151.1	77.3	73.8			-
		6	Faryab	915.8	467.4	448.4	10	10	21
				4,335,400	2,208,200	2,127,200	10	10	24
5	South	1	Ghazni	1,130.10	577.5	552.6	20	30	46
		2	Urozgan	322.6	166.1	156.5	10	10	3
		3	Wardak	549.2	280.3	268.9	10	20	15
		4	Zabul	279.8	143.5	136.3			-
		5	Kandahar	1,103.40	565.9	537.5	50	100	100
		6	Helmand	850.2	436.5	413.7	10	20	13
		7	Paktika	400.5	205.5	195			-
				4,635,800	2,375,300	2,260,500	100	180	177

Central	Popl. Weight	23%
	Pro. Sample Distributed	28%
	Pro. Actual Responses	19%
	Pro. After Over Sampling	22%
	Over/Under Response	1% Under
East	Popl. Weight	15%
	Pro. Sample Distributed	17%
	Pro. Actual Responses	11%
	Pro. After Over Sampling	19%
North	Over/Under Response	4% Over
	Popl. Weight	25%
	Pro. Sample Distributed	32%
	Pro. Actual Responses	35%
	Pro. After Over Sampling	26%
West	Over/Under Response	1% Over
	Popl. Weight	18%
	Pro. Sample Distributed	2%
	Pro. Actual Responses	4%
	Pro. After Over Sampling	2%
South	Over/Under Response	16% Under
	Popl. Weight	19%
	Pro. Sample Distributed	21%
	Pro. Actual Responses	31%
	Pro. After Over Sampling	31%
	Over/Under Response	12% Over

Actual Sample Distribution after Data Collection:

Ethnic Groups	Actual Responses	Proportion
Pashtun	224	39%
Tajik	201	35%
Hazara	94	17%
Uzbek	32	6%
Other	17	3%
	568	100%

Adjusted Sampling Plan based on Ethnicity weights		Proportion
Pushtun	154	40%
Tajik	138	36%
Hazara	46	12%
Uzbek	35	9%
Other	12	3%
	384	100%

Province	# of Samples
Balkh	134
Kandahar	100
Ghazni	46
Kabul	65
Badakhshan	37
Faryab	21
Bamyan	16
Logar	15
Wardak	15
Khost	12
Parwan	12
Helmand	13
Laghman	11
Paktia	11
Baghlan	11
Daikundi	10
Nangarhar	9
Jawzjan	6
Kapisa	6
Samangan	6
Ghor	2
Kunar	2
Uruzgan	3
Kunduz	1
Sar-e-Pul	1
Takhar	1
Farah	1
Panjsher	1
Total	568

Province	1st Dist. Questionnaires	2nd Dist. Questionnaires	Total Questionnaires
Balkh	100		100
Kandahar	50	50	100
Ghazni	20	10	30
Kabul	100		100
Badakhshan	20		20
Faryab	10		10
Bamyan	10		10
Logar	10	10	20
Wardak	10	10	20
Khost	10		10
Parwan	10		10
Helmand	10	10	20
Laghman		10	10
Paktia	10	10	20
Baghlan	10		10
Daikundi	10		10
Nangarhar	50		50
Jawzjan	10		10
Kapisa			
Samangan	10		10
Ghor			
Kunar			
Uruzgan	10		10
Kunduz			
Sar-e-Pul			
Takhar			
Farah			
Panjsher			
Total	470	110	580

Dropped & Lost	2%
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Actual Distribution of Samples Geographically

		No	Provinces	Total		
				Original Sampling	After Over Sampling	Responses Received
<div>Popl. Weight23%</div> <div>Adj Popl. Weight27%</div> <div>Pro. Sample Distributed28%</div> <div>Pro. Actual Responses19%</div> <div>Pro. After Over Sampling22%</div> <div>Over/Under Response1% Under</div>	Central	1	Kabul	100	100	65
		2	Kapisa			6
		3	Parwan	10	10	12
		4	Panjsher			1
		5	Bamyan	10	10	16
		6	Daykundi	10	10	10
		Total		130	130	110
<div>Popl. Weight15%</div> <div>Adj Popl. Weight13%</div> <div>Pro. Sample Distributed17%</div> <div>Pro. Actual Responses11%</div> <div>Pro. After Over Sampling19%</div> <div>Over/Under Response4% Over</div>	East	1	Logar	10	20	15
		2	Nangarhar	50	50	9
		3	Laghman		10	11
		4	Paktia	10	20	11
		5	Khost	10	10	12
		6	Kunar			2
		7	Nooristan			-
Total		80	110	60		
<div>Popl. Weight25%</div> <div>Adj Popl. Weight29%</div> <div>Pro. Sample Distributed32%</div> <div>Pro. Actual Responses35%</div> <div>Pro. After Over Sampling26%</div> <div>Over/Under Response1% Over</div>	North	1	Baghlan	10	10	11
		2	Badakhshan	20	20	37
		3	Takhar			1
		4	Kunduz			1
		5	Samangan	10	10	6
		6	Balkh	100	100	134
		7	Sar-e-Pul			1
		8	Jawzjan	10	10	6
Total		150	150	197		
<div>Popl. Weight18%</div> <div>Adj Popl. Weight15%</div> <div>Pro. Sample Distributed2%</div> <div>Pro. Actual Responses4%</div> <div>Pro. After Over Sampling2%</div> <div>Over/Under Response16% Under</div>	West	1	Badghis			-
		2	Herat			-
		3	Farah			1
		4	Chor			2
		5	Nimroz			-
		6	Faryab	10	10	21
Total		10	10	24		
<div>Popl. Weight19%</div> <div>Adj Popl. Weight17%</div> <div>Pro. Sample Distributed21%</div> <div>Pro. Actual Responses31%</div> <div>Pro. After Over Sampling31%</div> <div>Over/Under Response12% Over</div>	South	1	Ghazni	20	30	46
		2	Urozgan	10	10	3
		3	Wardak	10	20	15
		4	Zabul			-
		5	Kandahar	50	100	100
		6	Helmand	10	20	13
		7	Paktika			-
Total		100	180	177		

No	ID No	Ethnicity	Province
1	SM-3	T	Kabul
2	MK-4	P	Kabul
3	HH-2	P	kabul
4	OS-1	T	kabul
5	NE-01	T	Kabul
6	ZD-8	T	kabul
7	ND-7	T	Kabul
8	MS-6	T	Kabul
9	SG-9	T	Kabul
10	NE-02	P	Kabul
11	AQ-12	A	Kabul
12	NS-5	T	Kabul
13	AA-13	P	kabul
14	NE-04	P	Balkh
15	NE-06	T	Balkh
16	NE-03	T	Balkh
17	NE-07	T	Baghlan
18	NE-05	T	Balkh
19	TA-19	T	Kabul
20	DM-15	T	Kabul
21	NA-27	P	Kabul
22	AB-26	B	Kabul
23	NN-28	P	Kabul
24	YT-24	A	Kabul
25	AA-22	P	Kabul
26	HK-16	P	Kabul
27	NA-31	T	Kabul
28	NN-10	P	Kabul
29	AS-20	T	Panj Sher
30	FD-32	P	Kabul
31	NE-08	T	Kabul
32	NE-09	P	Ghazni
33	NE-10	P	Ghazni
34	NE-11	P	Ghazni
35	NE-12	P	Ghazni
36	NE-13	P	Ghazni
37	NE-23	P	Ghazni
38	NE-22	P	Ghazni
39	NE-21	P	Ghazni
40	NE-20	P	Ghazni
41	NE-19	P	Ghazni
42	NE-18	P	Ghazni
43	NE-17	T	Ghazni
44	NE-16	P	Ghazni
45	Ne-15	P	Ghazni
46	NE-14	P	Ghazni
47	NE-24	P	Ghazni
48	NE-25	P	Kandahar
49	NE-26	T	Kandahar
50	NE-27	P	Kandahar

51	NE-28	P	Kandahar
52	NE-32	P	Kandahar
53	NE-29	P	Kandahar
54	NE-30	P	Kandahar
55	NE-31	P	Kandahar
56	HK-17	P	Farah
57	WM-33	T	Baghlan
58	ED-34	P	Helmand
59	RK-35	H	Kabul
60	RK-36	H	Ghazni
61	RK-37	H	Ghazni
62	RK-38	H	Uruzgan
63	NE-33	H	Kandahar
64	NE-34	T	Kandahar
65	NE-35	P	Helmand
66	NE-36	P	Kandahar
67	NE-37	P	Kandahar
68	NE-67	H	Ghazni
69	NE-68	H	Parwan
70	NE-66	H	Wardak
71	NE-65	H	Kabul
72	NE-64	H	Kabul
73	NE-63	H	Kabul
74	NE-62	P	Wardak
75	NE-61	P	Paktya
76	NE-60	T	Paktya
77	NE-59	T	Paktya
78	NE-58	P	Paktya
79	NE-57	P	Paktya
80	NE-56	H	Ghazni
81	NE-55	P	Paktya
82	NE-54	T	Paktya
83	NE-53	P	Paktya
84	NE-52	T	Paktya
85	NE-51	P	Paktya
86	NE-50	P	Paktya
87	NE-49	P	Khost
88	NE-48	P	Khost
89	NE-47	P	Khost
90	NE-46	P	Khost
91	NE-45	P	Khost
92	NE-44	P	Khost
93	NE-43	P	Khost
94	NE-42	P	Khost
95	NE-41	P	Khost
96	NE-40	P	Khost
97	NE-39	P	Khost
98	RK-38	P	Khost
99	NE-69	H	Parwan
100	NE-70	P	Kabul
101	NE-71	T	Kabul

102	NE-72	T	Kabul
103	NE-73	P	Kabul
104	NE-74	T	Parwan
105	NE-75	P	Kapisa
106	NE-76	T	Kunduz
107	NE-77	T	Parwan
108	NE-78	T	Parwan
109	NE-79	T	Parwan
110	NE-80	T	Parwan
111	NE-81	T	Kapisa
112	NE-82	T	Parwan
113	NE-83	P	Logar
114	NE-84	T	Parwan
115	NE-85	P	Logar
116	NE-86	P	Logar
117	NE-87	P	Logar
118	NE-88	P	Logar
119	NE-89	P	Logar
120	NE-90	P	Logar
121	NE-91	P	Logar
122	NE-92	P	Logar
123	NE-93	P	Kabul
124	NE-94	P	Logar
125	NE-95	P	Logar
126	NE-96	P	Logar
127	NE-97	P	Logar
128	NE-98	H	Wardak
129	NE-99	H	Ghazni
130	NE-100	H	Ghazni
131	NE-101	H	Laghman
132	NE-102	P	Laghman
133	NE-103	P	Laghman
134	NE-104	P	Laghman
135	NE-105	H	Laghman
136	NE-106	T	Laghman
137	NE-107	P	Laghman
138	NE-108	P	Laghman
139	NE-109	P	Laghman
140	NE-110	T	Nengarhar
141	NE-111	T	Nengarhar
142	NE-112	P	Nengarhar
143	NE-113	P	Nengarhar
144	NE-114	P	Nengarhar
145	NE-115	P	Nengarhar
146	NE-116	T	Nengarhar
147	NE-117	T	Nengarhar
148	NE-118	P	Nengarhar
149	NE-119	H	Bamyan
150	NE-120	H	Bamyan
151	NE-121	H	Bamyan
152	NE-122	H	Bamyan

153	NE-123	H	Bamyan
154	NE-124	H	Bamyan
155	NE-125	T	Kapisa
156	NE-126	H	Parwan
157	NE-127	H	Bamyan
158	NE-128	H	Bamyan
159	NE-129	H	Bamyan
160	NE-130	H	Bamyan
161	NE-131	T	Balkh
162	NE-132	T	Balkh
163	NE-133	T	Sarpul
164	NE-134	T	Balkh
165	NE-135	T	Balkh
166	NE-136	T	Balkh
167	NE-137	U	Balkh
168	NE-138	T	Balkh
169	NE-139	U	Balkh
170	NE-140	U	Balkh
171	NE-141	T	Balkh
172	NE-142	T	Balkh
173	NE-143	T	Balkh
174	NE-144	U	Balkh
175	NE-145	U	Balkh
176	NE-146	S	Samangan
177	NE-147	P	Baghlan
178	NE-148	T	Baghlan
179	NE-149	T	Balkh
180	NE-150	T	Balkh
181	NE-151	U	Jawzjan
182	NE-152	U	Jawzjan
183	NE-153	H	Wardak
184	NE-154	H	Wardak
185	NE-155	T	Kabul
186	NE-156	T	Kabul
187	NE-157	T	Kabul
188	NE-158	T	Kabul
189	NE-159	T	Kabul
190	NE-160	H	Ghazni
191	NE-161	H	Ghazni
192	NE-162	H	Ghazni
193	NE-163	P	Kabul
194	NE-164	H	Uruzgan
195	NE-165	H	Daikundi
196	NE-166	H	Daikundi
197	NE-167	H	Daikundi
198	NE-168	P	Wardak
199	NE-169	P	Wardak
200	NE-170	H	Ghazni
201	NE-171	H	Ghazni
202	NE-172	H	Ghazni
203	NE-173	H	Ghazni

204	NE-174	H	Wardak
205	NE-175	H	Ghazni
206	NE-176	H	Kabul
207	NE-177	H	Kabul
208	NE-178	Tu	Kabul
209	NE-179	Q	Kabul
210	NE-180	H	Kabul
211	NE-181	H	Ghazni
212	NE-182	T	Kabul
213	NE-183	P	Kabul
214	NE-184	H	Wardak
215	NE-185	P	Kabul
216	NE-186	H	Bamyan
217	NE-187	H	Bamyan
218	NE-188	H	Ghazni
219	NE-189	H	Ghazni
220	NE-190	H	Daikundi
221	NE-191	H	Ghazni
222	NE-192	H	Wardak
223	NE-193	H	Ghazni
224	NE-194	H	Daikundi
225	NE-195	H	Kabul
226	NE-196	H	Daikundi
227	NE-197	H	Kabul
228	NE-198	H	Wardak
229	NE-199	S	Daikundi
230	NE-200	H	Ghazni
231	NE-201	H	Daikundi
232	NE-202	H	Wardak
233	NE-203	H	Bamyan
234	NE-204	H	Bamyan
235	NE-205	H	Wardak
236	NE-206	H	Bamyan
237	NE-207	H	Parwan
238	NE-208	H	Ghazni
239	NE-209	T	Balkh
240	NE-210	T	Balkh
241	NE-211	T	Balkh
242	NE-212	H	Balkh
243	NE-213	T	Balkh
244	NE-214	P	Balkh
245	NE-215	P	Balkh
246	NE-216	P	Balkh
247	NE-217	P	Balkh
248	NE-218	P	Balkh
249	NE-219	T	Balkh
250	NE-220	T	Balkh
251	NE-221	T	Balkh
252	NE-222	T	Balkh
253	NE-223	P	Balkh
254	NE-224	U	Balkh

255	NE-225	P	Balkh
256	NE-226	T	Balkh
257	NE-227	P	Balkh
258	NE-228	T	Balkh
259	NE-229	T	Balkh
260	NE-230	H	Balkh
261	NE-231	T	Balkh
262	NE-232	T	Balkh
263	NE-233	T	Balkh
264	NE-234	U	Balkh
265	NE-235	P	Balkh
266	NE-236	T	Baghlan
267	NE-237	T	Balkh
268	NE-238	T	Logar
269	NE-239	P	Balkh
270	NE-240	T	Balkh
271	NE-241	T	Balkh
272	NE-242	T	Balkh
273	NE-243	T	Baghlan
274	NE-244	T	Kapisa
276	NE-246	T	Balkh
277	NE-247	T	Balkh
278	NE-248	P	Balkh
279	NE-249	T	Balkh
280	NE-250	T	Balkh
281	NE-251	T	Balkh
282	NE-252	P	Balkh
283	NE-253	P	Balkh
284	NE-254	P	Balkh
285	NE-255	P	Balkh
286	NE-256	P	Kapisa
287	NE-257	T	Balkh
288	NE-258	P	Balkh
289	NE-259	T	Balkh
290	NE-260	T	Balkh
291	NE-261	T	Balkh
292	NE-262	T	Balkh
293	NE-263	T	Balkh
294	NE-264	T	Balkh
295	NE-265	T	Balkh
296	NE-266	P	Laghman
299	NE-269	T	Balkh
306	NE-276	T	Baghlan
307	NE-277	T	Balkh
308	NE-278	T	Balkh
309	NE-279	T	Balkh
310	NE-280	P	Balkh
311	NE-281	T	Balkh
312	NE-282	H	Balkh
313	NE-283	T	Balkh
314	NE-284	H	Balkh

315	NE-285	P	Balkh
316	NE-286	T	Badakhshan
317	NE-287	U	Samangan
318	NE-288	T	Badakhshan
319	NE-289	T	Jawzjan
320	NE-290	T	Balkh
321	NE-291	T	Balkh
322	NE-292	T	Badakhshan
323	NE-293	T	Badakhshan
324	NE-294	T	Badakhshan
325	NE-295	T	Badakhshan
326	NE-296	T	Badakhshan
327	NE-297	T	Badakhshan
328	NE-298	T	Baghlan
329	NE-299	T	Badakhshan
330	NE-300	T	Badakhshan
331	NE-301	T	Badakhshan
332	NE-302	T	Badakhshan
333	NE-303	T	Badakhshan
334	NE-304	T	Badakhshan
335	NE-305	T	Badakhshan
336	NE-306	T	Badakhshan
337	NE-307	T	Badakhshan
338	NE-308	T	Badakhshan
339	NE-309	T	Badakhshan
340	NE-310	T	Badakhshan
341	NE-311	T	Badakhshan
342	NE-312	T	Badakhshan
343	NE-313	T	Badakhshan
344	NE-314	T	Badakhshan
345	NE-315	T	Badakhshan
346	NE-316	T	Badakhshan
347	NE-317	T	Badakhshan
348	NE-318	T	Badakhshan
349	NE-319	T	Badakhshan
350	NE-320	T	Badakhshan
351	NE-321	T	Badakhshan
352	NE-322	T	Badakhshan
353	NE-323	T	Badakhshan
354	NE-324	T	Kapisa
355	NE-325	T	Badakhshan
356	NE-326	T	Badakhshan
357	NE-327	T	Kabul
358	NE-328	T	balkh
359	NE-329	T	Balkh
360	NE-330	T	Takhar
361	NE-331	U	Jawzjan
362	NE-332	U	Faryab
363	NE-333	A	Baghlan
364	NE-334	U	Baghlan
365	NE-335	U	Baghlan

366	NE-336	U	Samangan
367	NE-337	T	balkh
368	NE-338	T	Balkh
369	NE-339	P	Faryab
370	NE-340	T	Balkh
371	NE-341	T	Balkh
372	NE-342	T	Balkh
373	NE-343	U	Faryab
374	NE-344	T	Balkh
375	NE-345	T	Balkh
376	NE-346	T	Balkh
377	NE-347	T	Balkh
378	NE-348	T	Balkh
379	NE-349	P	Balkh
380	NE-350	T	Balkh
381	NE-351	T	Balkh
382	NE-352	T	Kabul
383	NE-353	T	Balkh
384	NE-354	A	Balkh
385	NE-355	T	Balkh
386	NE-356	T	Balkh
387	NE-357	T	Balkh
388	NE-358	T	Balkh
389	NE-359	T	Balkh
390	NE-360	P	Balkh
391	NE-361	U	Jawzjan
392	NE-362	T	Balkh
393	NE-363	T	Balkh
394	NE-364	A	Balkh
395	NE-365	T	Balkh
396	NE-366	T	Balkh
397	NE-367	T	Balkh
398	NE-368	T	Balkh
399	NE-369	T	Balkh
400	NE-370	T	Balkh
401	NE-371	T	Badakhshan
402	NE-372	P	Balkh
403	NE-373	T	Balkh
404	NE-374	T	Balkh
405	NE-375	T	Balkh
406	NE-376	T	Jawzjan
407	NE-377	P	Kunar
408	NE-378	T	Balkh
409	NE-379	T	Balkh
410	NE-380	A	Balkh
411	NE-381	T	Balkh
412	NE-382	P	kunar
413	NE-383	T	Kabul
414	NE-384	P	Kabul
415	NE-385	T	Kabul
416	NE-386	T	Kabul

417	NE-387	T	Kabul
418	NE-388	T	Samangan
419	NE-389	P	Balkh
420	NE-390	T	Samangan
421	NE-391	Ta	Samangan
422	NE-392	T	balkh
423	NE-393	T	balkh
424	NE-394	P	balkh
425	NE-395	T	balkh
426	NE-396	T	balkh
427	NE-397	T	Badakhshan
428	NE-398	T	balkh
429	NE-399	T	balkh
430	NE-400	P	Wardak
431	NE-401	T	Balkh
432	NE-402	U	Faryab
433	NE-403	U	Faryab
434	NE-404	Ay	Faryab
435	NE-405	U	Faryab
436	NE-406	U	Faryab
437	NE-407	U	Faryab
438	NE-408	P	Faryab
439	NE-409	U	Faryab
440	NE-410	U	Faryab
441	NE-411	U	Faryab
442	NE-412	T	Faryab
443	NE-413	U	Faryab
444	NE-414	U	Faryab
445	NE-415	U	Faryab
446	NE-416	U	Faryab
447	NE-417	U	Faryab
448	NE-418	U	Faryab
449	NE-419	U	Faryab
450	NE-420	T	Balkh
451	FH-40	T	Kabul
452	AN-41	T	Kabul
453	NE-421	T	balkh
454	NE-422	P	Kabul
455	NE-423	P	kabul
456	NE-424	P	Kabul
457	NE-425	P	Kabul
458	NE-426	P	Laghman
459	NE-427	H	Wardak
460	NE-428	H	Ghor
461	NE-429	H	Uruzgan
462	NE-430	H	Ghor
463	NE-431	H	Ghazni
464	NE-432	S	Parwan
465	NE-433	H	Kabul
466	NE-434	H	Daikundi
467	NE-435	H	Ghazni

468	NE-436	H	Daikundi
469	NE-437	H	Ghazni
470	NE-438	H	Kabul
471	NE-439	H	Ghazni
472	NE-440	H	Ghazni
473	NE-441	H	Bamyan
474	NE-442	H	Ghazni
475	NE-443	H	Helmand
476	NE-444	H	Ghazni
477	NE-445	H	Ghazni
478	NE-446	H	Ghazni
479	NE-447	P	Kandahar
480	NE-448	P	Kandahar
481	NE-449	P	Kandahar
482	NE-450	P	Kandahar
483	NE-451	P	Kandahar
484	NE-452	P	Kandahar
485	NE-453	P	Kandahar
486	NE-454	P	Kandahar
487	NE-455	P	Kandahar
488	NE-456	P	Kandahar
489	NE-457	P	Kandahar
490	NE-458	P	Kandahar
491	NE-459	P	Kandahar
492	NE-460	P	Kandahar
493	NE-461	P	Helmand
494	NE-462	P	Helmand
495	NE-463	P	Kandahar
496	NE-464	P	Helmand
497	NE-465	P	Helmand
498	NE-466	P	Helmand
499	NE-467	P	Kandahar
500	NE-468	P	Helmand
501	NE-469	P	Kandahar
502	NE-470	P	Helmand
503	NE-471	P	Helmand
504	NE-472	P	Helmand
505	NE-473	P	Kandahar
506	NE-474	P	Kandahar
507	NE-475	P	Kandahar
508	NE-476	P	Kandahar
509	NE-477	P	Kandahar
510	NE-478	P	Helmand
511	NE-479	P	Kandahar
512	NE-480	P	Kandahar
513	NE-481	P	Kandahar
514	NE-482	P	Kandahar
515	NE-483	P	Kandahar
516	NE-484	P	Kandahar
517	NE-485	P	Kandahar
518	NE-486	B	Kandahar

519	NE-487	P	Kandahar
520	NE-488	P	Kandahar
521	NE-489	P	Kandahar
522	NE-490	P	Kandahar
523	NE-491	P	Kandahar
524	NE-492	P	Kandahar
525	NE-493	P	Kandahar
526	NE-494	P	Kandahar
527	NE-495	P	Kandahar
528	NE-496	P	Kandahar
529	NE-497	P	Kandahar
530	NE-498	P	Kandahar
531	NE-499	P	Kandahar
532	NE-500	P	Kandahar
533	NE-501	P	Logar
534	NE-502	P	Kandahar
535	NE-503	P	Kandahar
536	NE-504	P	Kandahar
537	NE-505	P	Kandahar
538	NE-506	P	Kandahar
539	NE-507	P	Kandahar
540	NE-508	P	Kandahar
541	NE-509	P	Kandahar
542	NE-510	P	Kandahar
543	NE-511	P	Kandahar
544	NE-512	P	Kandahar
545	NE-513	P	Kandahar
546	NE-514	P	Kandahar
547	NE-515	P	Kandahar
548	NE-516	P	Kandahar
549	NE-517	P	Kandahar
550	NE-518	P	Kandahar
551	NE-519	P	Kandahar
552	NE-520	P	Kandahar
553	NE-521	P	Kandahar
554	NE-522	P	Kandahar
555	NE-523	P	Kandahar
556	NE-524	P	Kandahar
557	NE-525	P	Kandahar
558	NE-526	P	Kandahar
559	NE-527	P	Kandahar
560	NE-528	P	Kandahar
561	NE-529	P	Kandahar
562	NE-530	S	Kandahar
563	NE-531	P	Kandahar
564	NE-532	P	Kandahar
565	NE-533	P	Kandahar
566	NE-534	P	Kandahar
567	NE-535	P	Kandahar
568	NE-536	P	Kandahar
569	NE-537	P	Kandahar

570	NE-538	P	Kandahar
571	NE-539	P	Kandahar
572	NE-540	P	Kandahar
573	NE-541	P	Kandahar
574	NE-542	P	Kandahar
575	NE-543	P	Kandahar
576	NE-544	P	Kandahar
577	NE-545	B	Kandahar

Political Leadership Study Questionnaire

Thank you for accepting to take this survey on characteristics of good political leadership among the Afghan population. We are conducting interviews to learn about cultural consensus over characteristics of good political leadership among Afghans. We are interested in talking to different types of people such as you. We selected you because your views on this subject are valuable to us.

We will use the information you provide for the purposes of academic research only. We will not disclose your identity or information that would identify you to anyone outside of the project without your permission, except as required by law. We will destroy all information that identifies you at the end of the study.

The answers from this survey will be used only for academic purposes and are not intended to serve any political parties. You are totally free if you decide not to respond to some of the questions if you do not feel comfortable with. If you do not understand a question, please ask me to repeat it or elaborate it further. Once again thank you for your time. We will begin with the question of what is:

1. Your age_____.
2. Your level of education_____.
3. Province_____. (Do not ask if the respondent is a resident of the area)
4. District/city_____. (Do not ask if the respondent is a resident of the area)
5. Village/Guzar_____. (Do not ask if the respondent is a resident of the area)
6. Gender_____. (Do not ask. Just fill it in)
7. Ethnic group_____.
8. Primary language spoken in the family _____.
9. Your average monthly family income is:
 - a. Below 5,000 Afghani
 - b. 5,001 to 10,000 Afghani
 - c. 10,001 to 20,000 Afghani
 - d. 20,001 to 50,000 Afghani
 - e. 50,001 to 100,000 Afghani
 - f. Above 100,001
10. Your occupation_____.

11. What do you want to be in the future _____?

12. Are you an internet user ____? If so, what is the main purpose for using internet _____?

Now I would like to ask you some questions about political leaders. We have talked to many different people about this and find that people have many different beliefs about current leaders and what leaders should or shouldn't be like. We would like to hear your thoughts on this.

13. What the word leader means to you if you say it in one phrase _____?

14. Can you please complete the sentences by adding the word or phrase that makes most sense to you?

- a. For you, a good political leader must have _____.
- b. For you, a good political leader should be _____.
- c. For you, a good political leader has to be from _____.
- d. For me personally, a political leader is my ideal leader if _____.
- e. For me, the most important difference between an ideal political leader and an average politician is _____.
- f. I will not vote for a leader if he/she _____.

15. Can you please choose the best answer from the following options?

a. A good political leader has to be educated at least up to:

- 1. 12th Grade
- 2. Religious school (Madrasa) level
- 3. Under graduate level
- 4. Master Degree level
- 5. Doctoral Degree level
- 6. Other degree _____
- 7. Educational degree is not needed

- b. Following are some pairs of institutions that have reportedly produced Afghan leaders. Please pick for each pair the institution that you think has been more important than the other one: put a tick mark in the box next to the one that is picked as the more important. (e.g., What is more important? That people come from famous families or tribal communities? Or What is more important? That people are from a particular political party or that they fought in the war?)

1		Famous families	Tribal communities		1
2		Religious Madrassas	Famous families		2
3		Famous families	Good universities		3
4		Political Parties	Famous families		4
5		Famous families	Certain provinces		5
6		The war	Famous families		6
7		Tribal communities	Religious Madrassas		7
8		Good universities	Tribal Communities		8
9		Tribal communities	Political parties		9
10		Certain provinces	Tribal communities		10
11		Tribal communities	The war		11
12		Foreign countries	Tribal communities		12
13		Religious Madrassas	Good universities		13
14		Political parties	Religious Madrassas		14
15		Religious Madrassas	Certain provinces		15
16		The war	Religious Madrassas		16
17		Religious Madrassas	Foreign countries		17
18		Good universities	Political Parties		18
19		Certain provinces	Good universities		19
20		Good universities	The war		20

21		Foreign countries	Good universities		21
22		Political Parties	Certain provinces		22
23		The war	Political Parties		23
24		Political parties	Foreign countries		24
25		Foreign countries	Certain provinces		25
26		The war	Foreign countries		26
27		Certain provinces	The war		27

28. Other _____.

- c. Please choose the most important factor that increases a leader's political legitimacy from the following list of pairs:

1		Is elected through an election	Comes from a Jehadi background		1
2		Is a Pashtun from Kandahar	Is elected through an election		2
3		Is elected through an election	Comes from a popular family		3
4		Is highly educated	Is elected through an election		4
5		Is elected through an election	Is backed by intel. community		5
6		Does not have two passports	Is elected through an election		6
7		Is elected through an election	Is successful in governance		7
8		Comes from a Jehadi Background	Is a Pashtun from Kandahar		8
9		Comes from a popular family	Comes from a Jehadi Background		9
10		Comes from a Jehadi Background	Is highly educated		10
11		Is backed by intel. community	Comes from a Jehadi Background		11
12		Comes from a Jehadi Background	Does not have two passports		12
13		Is successful in governance	Comes from a Jehadi Background		13
14		Is a Pashtun from Kandahar	Comes from a popular family		14

15		Is highly educated	Is a Pashtun from Kandahar		15
16		Is a Pashtun from Kandahar	Is backed by intel. community		16
17		Does not have two passports	Is a Pashtun from Kandahar		17
18		Is a Pashtun from Kandahar	Is successful in governance		18
19		Comes from a popular family	Is highly educated		19
20		Is backed by intel. community	Comes from a popular family		20
21		Comes from a popular family	Does not have two passports		21
22		Is successful in governance	Comes from a popular family		22
23		Is highly educated	Is backed by intel. community		23
24		Does not have two passports	Is highly educated		24
25		Is highly educated	Is successful in governance		25
26		Is backed by intel. community	Does not have two Passports		26
27		Is successful in governance	Is backed by intel. community		27
28		Does not have two passports	Is successful in governance		28

29. Other_____.

16. Can you please score your agreement or disagreement between 1 and 5 (1 totally disagree and 5 totally agree) on the following statements?

a. A good political leader should:

1. Have a professional cabinet.

Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

2. Have good morals.

Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

3. Be a woman

Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

4. Be a man

- Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
5. Not have double passport
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
6. Not have his family and children outside the country
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
7. Not be married to a foreign wife
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
8. Not have a business outside the country
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
9. Not have a house in another country
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
10. Have high income from a legitimate source.
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
11. Pray five times per day in the mosque
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
12. Have religious education.
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
13. Put on a turban.
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
14. Put on Perahan Tunban
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
15. Put on a suit with tie.
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
16. Speak both Pashtu and Dari.
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
17. Be from Kandahar.
Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
18. Be from a noble family.

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
19. See all ethnic groups with one eye.

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 20. Be from South.

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 21. Be decisive

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 22. Has a clear political agenda.

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 23. Be a good manager

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 24. Be accepting responsibility

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 25. Be honest

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 26. Be just

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 27. Not lie to the people.

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 28. Be highly educated

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 29. Love the country

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 30. Fight the foreigners

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 31. Not let foreigners in the country

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
--	-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------
 32. Acknowledge the Durand line

	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
33. Respect and enforce the law
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
34. Believe in God
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
35. Be brave
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
36. Be impartial
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
37. Have good relations with neighboring countries.
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
38. Be internationally famous
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
39. Respect human rights
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
40. Respect women's rights
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
41. Allow women to work in the government and businesses
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
42. Be good speaker
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
43. Be good looking
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
44. Be elected through election.
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
45. Not ethnically discriminate
	Strongly Disagree	0	1	2	3	4	5	Strongly Agree
46. Not religiously discriminate

Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

47. Not be young

Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

48. Have the same deeds as his words.

Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

49. Is selected through Jerga.

Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

50. Any other characteristics that were not mentioned above

_____?

Strongly Disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

17. Now I want to ask you about your impressions of different leaders. We know that leaders have many different characteristics like the ones we just talked about. For each leader we would like you to name the most positive characteristics that come to mind and the most negative characteristics that come to mind? Also can you rate your opinion about the level of their leadership popularity between 0 to 5, where 0 means completely unpopular and 5 means extremely popular?

		A	B	C	
#	Leader	Positive	Negative	Rate	NR
1	Mirwais Nika				
2	Ahmad Shah Baba				
3	Abdurahman Khan				
4	Habibullah Kalakani				
5	Amanullah Khan				
6	Zahir Khan				
7	Dawood Khan				
8	Tarakee				
9	Hafeezullah Amin				

10	Babrak Karmal				
11	Dr Najib				
12	Sebghatullah Mujadadi				
13	Ustad Rabani				
14	Hamid Karzai				
15	Qayoom Karzai				
16	Ahmad Shah Masood				
17	Hekmatyar				
18	Mullah Omar				
19	Abdul Ali Mazari				
20	Karim Khalil				
21	Marshal Fahim				
22	Ahmad Zia Masood				
23	Amrullah Saleh				
24	Ustad Atta				
25	Ismael Khan				
26	Gul Agha Sherzai				
27	Mohqeq				
28	General Dostum				
29	Ustad Sayaf				
30	Yonus Qanooni				
31	Shek Asif Mohseni				
32	Sayed Ahmad Gelani				
33	Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai				

34	Ali Ahmad Jalali				
35	Zalmai Khalilzad				
36	Anwarul Haq Ahadi				
37	Ismael Yoon				
38	Tahir Badakhshi				
39	Sultan Ali Kishmand				
40	Haneef Atmar				
41	Farooq Wardak				
42	Ramazan Bashar Dost				
43	Dr Seema Samar				
44	Shukria Barakzai				
45	Fawzia Koofee				
46	Shemeen Barakzai				
47	Habiba Sarabee				
48	Banoo Ghazanfar				
49	Malalay Joya				
50	Dr Abdullah				
51	Dr Spanta				
52	Besmellah Khan				
53	General Rahim Wardak				
54	Syed Mustafa Kazimi				
55	Lateef Pedram				
56	Baktash Seyawash				
57	Ahmad Behzad				

58	Haji Qadeer				
59	Omar Zakhilwal				
60	Karim Khuram				
61	Omar Dawoodzai				
62	Mahmood Karzai				
63	Ahmad Wali Karzai				

18. So far we have been talking just about characteristics of leaders. Now I'm going to ask you some questions about what you think might be the most important thing a good leader should do when they are in office. You consider a political leader a good political leader if he or she:

1. Promotes rule of law.

Not very important Somewhat important Very important

2. Brings peace and stability.

Not very important Somewhat important Very important

3. Creates jobs for people.

Not very important Somewhat important Very important

4. Promotes education.

Not very important Somewhat important Very important

5. Delivers justice.

Not very important Somewhat important Very important

6. Punishes war criminals.

Not very important Somewhat important Very important

7. Brings international aid to the country.

Not very important Somewhat important Very important

8. Enforces Islamic laws in the country.

Not very important Somewhat important Very important

9. Stops ethnic discrimination among people.

	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
10. Removes foreigners from the country.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
11. Improves Afghan economy.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
12. Listens to people	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
13. Respects elders	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
14. Respects the views of MPs	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
15. Defends the country.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
16. Have good relations with the neighboring countries.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
17. Is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
18. Ends corruption in the society.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
19. Eradicates narcotics in the country.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
20. Fights and removes mafia economy.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
21. Hires professional and honest team.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
22. Stays honest with people.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
23. Does exactly what he says he will do.			

	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
24. Rebuilds the country.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
25. Is useful to your personal needs.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
26. Treats you better than others.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
27. Makes peace with insurgents.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
28. Does not recognize the Durand Line.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
29. Recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
30. Conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
31. Distributes resources according to the size of population.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
32. Allows governors of the provinces and districts to be elected.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
33. Allows mayors of the cities to be elected.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
34. Promotes Sharia law in the country.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
35. Makes military service mandatory.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
36. Hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
37. Promotes women's rights in the country.			

	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
38. Promotes democracy in the country.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
39. Promotes close relations with Western countries.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
40. Promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
41. Promotes close relations with Islamic countries.	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important
42. Any other actions that were not mentioned above_____?	Not very important	Somewhat important	Very important

19. For you, who is the most popular Afghan political leader_____?

Finally, we have one more question for you.

Some leaders are seen as popular and other leaders are not.

20. To you, what makes a political leader popular politician? Could you please list the most important things that make a political leader popular?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.

Thank you very much for taking the survey. Your views are highly valuable for the study.

21. Would you like to be contacted for any follow up questions? Yes No

22. If so, how can we reach/find you in the future_____?

Really appreciate it,

Thank you,

ANNEX – III: Text Analysis of Definitional and Change-Frame Questions.

Question – 13: What the word “leader” means to you if you say in one phrase?

Farsi			Definition by Other Ethnic Groups			Definition by Pashtuns		
Farsi	English	Frequency	Farsi	English	Frq	Farsi	English	Frq
ره‌ن‌ما	Guide	130	ره‌ن‌ما	Guide	63	بزرگ	Elder	85
بزرگ	Elder	116	پي‌ش‌وا	The point person	39	ره‌ن‌ما	Guide	67
پي‌ش‌وا	The point person	48	ره‌بر	Leader (the word means guide)	35	ادا‌ک‌ن‌ده	The one who is steering	9
ره‌بر	Leader (the word means guide)	42	بزرگ	Elder	31	پي‌ش‌وا	The point person	9
ادا‌ک‌ن‌ده	The one who is steering	34	ادا‌ک‌ن‌ده	The one who is steering	25	ره‌بر	Leader (the word means guide)	7
ه‌ط‌ي‌ک‌ن‌ده	The person who guides	17	ه‌ط‌ي‌ک‌ن‌ده	The person who guides	16	رئ‌ي‌س	President (means sitting on the top)	6
ن‌ما‌ي‌ن‌ده	Representative	14	ن‌ما‌ي‌ن‌ده	Representative	12	ال‌گو	Example	3
سر	The head	10	سر	The head	9	اول	First	3
رئ‌ي‌س	President (means sitting on the top)	9	س‌وق	The person who leads	6	فر‌ما‌ن‌ده	The person who gives orders	3
س‌وق‌ده‌ن‌ده	The person who leads	8	ز‌ع‌ي‌م	Representative (in charge)	6	ل‌ي‌در	Leader (Direct use of the English word)	3
فر‌ما‌ن‌ده	The person who gives orders	8	م‌دي‌ر	Manager	5	م‌دي‌ر	Manager	3
م‌دي‌ر	Manager	8	فر‌ما‌ن‌ده	The person who gives orders	5	اس‌ت‌اد	Teacher	2
ز‌ع‌ي‌م	Representative, in charge	6	رئ‌ي‌س	President (means sitting on the top)	3	س‌وق	The person who leads	2
ال‌گو	Example	6	ال‌گو	Example	3	ن‌ما‌ي‌ن‌ده	Representative	2
اول	First	3	ح‌اف‌ظ	Protector	2	ح‌ام‌ي	Supporter	1
ل‌ي‌در	Leader (Direct use of the English word)	3	خ‌ادم	Servant	2	سر	The head	1
اس‌ت‌اد	Teacher	2	ز‌ور‌م‌ن‌د	The powerful	2	م‌س‌ئ‌ول	Responsible	1
ح‌اف‌ظ	Protector	2	پي‌ا‌م‌ب‌ر	Prophet	2	م‌ش‌اور	Advisor	1
خ‌ادم	Servant	2	ا‌م‌ام	Imam (Islamic Grand Leader)	1	ن‌ا‌ج‌ي	Rescuer	1
ز‌ور‌م‌ن‌د	The powerful	2	خ‌د‌م‌ت‌گ‌ار	Servant	1	ن‌گ‌ه‌ب‌ان	Guardian	1
پي‌ا‌م‌ب‌ر	Prophet	2	و‌ک‌ي‌ل	Representative (in political system)	1	ه‌ط‌ي‌ک‌ن‌ده	The person who guides	1
ح‌ام‌ي	Supporter	1						
ا‌م‌ام	Imam (Islamic Grand Leader)	1						
خ‌د‌م‌ت‌گ‌ار	Servant	1						
و‌ک‌ي‌ل	Representative (in political system)	1						
م‌س‌ئ‌ول	Responsible	1						
م‌ش‌اور	Advisor	1						
ن‌ا‌ج‌ي	Rescuer	1						
ن‌گ‌ه‌ب‌ان	Guardian	1						

Frequency

What the word leader means to you?

Question – 14: Can you please complete the sentences by adding the word or phrase that makes most sense to you?

a. For you, a good political leader must have_____.

Farsi	English	Frequency
حصتي التعالی	Higher Education	82
خالق خوب	Good morals	68
محبوبیت	Popularity	52
دانشیاسی	Political knowledge	50
سالامیت	Islamic belief	40
آگاهی و انایی	Wisdom	39
صلقت	Honesty	33
عدالت	Justice	29
مفکوره	Ideas	16
دیدگاه	Vision	15
شخصیت	Personality	13
تقوا	Virtue	13
ایمان	Faith	12
وطنپرستی	Love for country	12
تجربه	Experience	11
مدیریت	Management	9
احساس	Emotions	8
توانایی	Capabilities	8
تعهد	Commitment	8
اداره	Steering	7
رهبری	Leadership	7
ظرفیت	Capacity	6
تصمیم	Decision	5
استعداد	Talent	4
اعتماد	Trust	4
الان	Plan	4
حاکمیت	Dominance	4
روابط	Relations	4
شجاعت	Courage	4
قدرت	Power	4
ایستادیت	Citizenship	3
عمل	Deeds	3

For you, a good political leader must have _____.

b. For you, a good political leader should be _____.

Farsi	English	Frequency
محبوب	Popular	55
تحصیلاته	Educated	49
صادق	Honest	47
عادل	Just	43
وطن دوست	Patriotic	39
آگاه و پرمهیده	Wise	35
مسلمان	Muslim	28
با خالق	Of good morals	24
سیاست مدار	Politician	21
دل سوز	Caring	18
افغان ستان	From Afghanistan	17
بتجربه	Experienced	16
قاطع	Decisive	10
بشخصیت	Good personality	10
ببلاقوا	Virtuous	8
مدیر	Manager	8
مهربان	Kind	6
اجتماعی	Social	5
حوصله	Patient	5
وفادار	Loyal	3
سخاوتمند	Generous	2
متعهد	Committed	2

For you, a good political leader should be _____.

- c. For you, a good political leader has to be from _____. (The answer to this question was not as clear as the other questions, however, terms such as “country” and “people” were the highly frequent words used for the answers)

Words	Frequency
مردم	84
خوب	45
خالق	25
جامعه	21
افغان ستان	17
خبر	17
سياست	17
کار	17
کشور	16
وطن	16
نیت	12
آگاه	11
آگاهی	9
تحصيل	9
دلش	9
سیاسی	9
طبقه	9
افغان	8
حیالات	8
خدمت	8
رهبر	7
نيکو	7
ابتي	6
قوم	6
زيک	6
بطن	5
پاک	5
تخصیبات	5
دفاع	5
دوست	5
رشوت	5
شخصيت	5
عدالت	5
فساد	5
فکر	5
قومی	5
قوی	5
مدیریت	5
مسلمان	5
لجیت	5
صاحب	4

Frequencies

Statistics

	A good political leader should be decisive.	A good political leader should have a clear political agenda.	A good political leader should be a good manager.	A good political leader should be accepting responsibility.	A good political leader should be honest.	A good political leader should be just.	A good political leader should not lie to the people.	A good political leader should love the country.	A good political leader should respect and enforce the law.	A good political leader should believe in God.	A good political leader should be elected through election.	A good political leader should not ethnically discriminate.
N Valid	534	533	535	534	535	535	537	536	535	537	533	532
Missing	34	35	33	34	33	33	31	32	33	31	35	36
Mean	4.79	4.80	4.83	4.85	4.87	4.87	4.72	4.84	4.84	4.79	4.70	4.69
Median	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Mode	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Std. Deviation	.642	.655	.622	.546	.513	.578	.836	.623	.676	.756	.834	.956
Skewness	-3.745	-4.322	-4.775	-4.739	-5.136	-5.142	-3.549	-4.816	-5.411	-4.203	-3.283	-3.369
Std. Error of Skewness	.106	.106	.106	.106	.106	.106	.105	.106	.106	.105	.106	.106
Kurtosis	16.126	21.626	27.118	26.956	32.436	27.513	13.299	25.175	32.050	18.374	11.475	10.610
Std. Error of Kurtosis	.211	.211	.211	.211	.211	.211	.210	.211	.211	.210	.211	.211
Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

Frequency Table

A good political leader should be decisive.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1	.2	.2	.2
	1	3	.5	.6	.7
	2	6	1.1	1.1	1.9
	3	19	3.3	3.6	5.4
	4	41	7.2	7.7	13.1
	5	464	81.7	86.9	100.0
	Total	534	94.0	100.0	
Missing	System	34	6.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should have a clear political agenda.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	2	.4	.4	.4
	1	5	.9	.9	1.3
	2	1	.2	.2	1.5
	3	19	3.3	3.6	5.1
	4	34	6.0	6.4	11.4
	5	472	83.1	88.6	100.0
	Total	533	93.8	100.0	
Missing	System	35	6.2		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be a good manager.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	3	.5	.6	.6
	1	2	.4	.4	.9
	2	2	.4	.4	1.3
	3	17	3.0	3.2	4.5
	4	30	5.3	5.6	10.1
	5	481	84.7	89.9	100.0
	Total	535	94.2	100.0	
Missing	System	33	5.8		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be accepting responsibility.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1	.2	.2	.2
	1	2	.4	.4	.6
	2	4	.7	.7	1.3
	3	11	1.9	2.1	3.4
	4	34	6.0	6.4	9.7
	5	482	84.9	90.3	100.0
	Total	534	94.0	100.0	
Missing	System	34	6.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be honest.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1	.2	.2	.2
	1	2	.4	.4	.6
	2	2	.4	.4	.9
	3	11	1.9	2.1	3.0
	4	31	5.5	5.8	8.8
	5	488	85.9	91.2	100.0
	Total	535	94.2	100.0	
Missing	System	33	5.8		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be just.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	6	1.1	1.1	1.1
	2	5	.9	.9	2.1
	3	8	1.4	1.5	3.6
	4	14	2.5	2.6	6.2
	5	502	88.4	93.8	100.0
	Total	535	94.2	100.0	
Missing	System	33	5.8		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should not lie to the people.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	5	.9	.9	.9
	1	5	.9	.9	1.9
	2	11	1.9	2.0	3.9
	3	20	3.5	3.7	7.6
	4	33	5.8	6.1	13.8
	5	463	81.5	86.2	100.0
	Total	537	94.5	100.0	
Missing	System	31	5.5		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should love the country.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1	.2	.2	.2
	1	6	1.1	1.1	1.3
	2	4	.7	.7	2.1
	3	10	1.8	1.9	3.9
	4	24	4.2	4.5	8.4
	5	491	86.4	91.6	100.0
	Total	536	94.4	100.0	
Missing	System	32	5.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should respect and enforce the law.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	6	1.1	1.1	1.1
	1	1	.2	.2	1.3
	2	4	.7	.7	2.1
	3	8	1.4	1.5	3.6
	4	24	4.2	4.5	8.0
	5	492	86.6	92.0	100.0
	Total	535	94.2	100.0	
Missing	System	33	5.8		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should believe in God.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	3	.5	.6	.6
	1	8	1.4	1.5	2.0
	2	5	.9	.9	3.0
	3	16	2.8	3.0	6.0
	4	18	3.2	3.4	9.3
	5	487	85.7	90.7	100.0
	Total	537	94.5	100.0	
Missing	System	31	5.5		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be elected through election.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	4	.7	.8	.8
	1	5	.9	.9	1.7
	2	11	1.9	2.1	3.8
	3	26	4.6	4.9	8.6
	4	36	6.3	6.8	15.4
	5	451	79.4	84.6	100.0
	Total	533	93.8	100.0	
Missing	System	35	6.2		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should not ethnically discriminate.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	5	.9	.9	.9
	1	15	2.6	2.8	3.8
	2	13	2.3	2.4	6.2
	3	7	1.2	1.3	7.5
	4	25	4.4	4.7	12.2
	5	467	82.2	87.8	100.0
	Total	532	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	36	6.3		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader should have a clear political agenda.

A good political leader should be a good manager.

A good political leader should be accepting responsibility.

A good political leader should be honest.

A good political leader should be just.

A good political leader should not lie to the people.

A good political leader should love the country.

A good political leader should respect and enforce the law.

A good political leader should believe in God.

A good political leader should be elected through election.

A good political leader should not ethnically discriminate.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader should be decisive.	534	94.0%	34	6.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should have a clear political agenda.	533	93.8%	35	6.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be a good manager.	535	94.2%	33	5.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be accepting responsibility.	534	94.0%	34	6.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be honest.	535	94.2%	33	5.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be just.	535	94.2%	33	5.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should not lie to the people.	537	94.5%	31	5.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should love the country.	536	94.4%	32	5.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should respect and enforce the law.	535	94.2%	33	5.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should believe in God.	537	94.5%	31	5.5%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader should be elected through election.	533	93.8%	35	6.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should not ethnically discriminate.	532	93.7%	36	6.3%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader should be decisive.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be decisive.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	1	1	5	72	79
		Expected Count	.1	.4	.9	2.8	6.1	68.6	79.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	0	0	16	16
		Expected Count	.0	.1	.2	.6	1.2	13.9	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	2	4	15	25	170	217
		Expected Count	.4	1.2	2.4	7.7	16.7	188.6	217.0
	Tajik	Count	0	1	1	2	11	175	190
		Expected Count	.4	1.1	2.1	6.8	14.6	165.1	190.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	1	0	31	32
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.4	1.1	2.5	27.8	32.0
	Total	Count	1	3	6	19	41	464	534
		Expected Count	1.0	3.0	6.0	19.0	41.0	464.0	534.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	29.000 ^a	20	.088
Likelihood Ratio	34.494	20	.023
N of Valid Cases	534		

a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader should have a clear political agenda.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should have a clear political agenda.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	1	4	75	80
		Expected Count	.3	.8	.2	2.9	5.1	70.8	80.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	0	0	16	16
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.0	.6	1.0	14.2	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	3	0	15	22	178	219
		Expected Count	.8	2.1	.4	7.8	14.0	193.9	219.0
	Tajik	Count	0	2	1	3	5	177	188
		Expected Count	.7	1.8	.4	6.7	12.0	166.5	188.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	0	0	0	3	26	30
		Expected Count	.1	.3	.1	1.1	1.9	26.6	30.0
	Total	Count	2	5	1	19	34	472	533
		Expected Count	2.0	5.0	1.0	19.0	34.0	472.0	533.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	36.134 ^a	20	.015
Likelihood Ratio	36.752	20	.013
N of Valid Cases	533		

a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be a good manager.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be a good manager.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	0	4	76	80
		Expected Count	.4	.3	.3	2.5	4.5	71.9	80.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	1	0	15	16
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.1	.5	.9	14.4	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	2	1	2	13	17	184	219
		Expected Count	1.2	.8	.8	7.0	12.3	196.9	219.0
	Tajik	Count	1	0	0	3	8	177	189
		Expected Count	1.1	.7	.7	6.0	10.6	169.9	189.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	0	1	29	31
		Expected Count	.2	.1	.1	1.0	1.7	27.9	31.0
	Total	Count	3	2	2	17	30	481	535
		Expected Count	3.0	2.0	2.0	17.0	30.0	481.0	535.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	27.845 ^a	20	.113
Likelihood Ratio	29.541	20	.078
N of Valid Cases	535		

a. 21 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be accepting responsibility.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be accepting responsibility.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	0	7	74	81
		Expected Count	.2	.3	.6	1.7	5.2	73.1	81.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	0	0	16	16
		Expected Count	.0	.1	.1	.3	1.0	14.4	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	2	4	6	19	185	217
		Expected Count	.4	.8	1.6	4.5	13.8	195.9	217.0
	Tajik	Count	0	0	0	5	6	178	189
		Expected Count	.4	.7	1.4	3.9	12.0	170.6	189.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	0	2	29	31
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.2	.6	2.0	28.0	31.0
	Total	Count	1	2	4	11	34	482	534
		Expected Count	1.0	2.0	4.0	11.0	34.0	482.0	534.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21.489 ^a	20	.369
Likelihood Ratio	27.867	20	.113
N of Valid Cases	534		

a. 22 cells (73.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be honest.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be honest.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	1	3	5	71	80
		Expected Count	.1	.3	.3	1.6	4.6	73.0	80.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	1	0	15	16
		Expected Count	.0	.1	.1	.3	.9	14.6	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	2	1	6	19	189	218
		Expected Count	.4	.8	.8	4.5	12.6	198.8	218.0
	Tajik	Count	0	0	0	1	5	183	189
		Expected Count	.4	.7	.7	3.9	11.0	172.4	189.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	0	2	30	32
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.1	.7	1.9	29.2	32.0
	Total	Count	1	2	2	11	31	488	535
		Expected Count	1.0	2.0	2.0	11.0	31.0	488.0	535.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21.373 ^a	20	.375
Likelihood Ratio	24.779	20	.210
N of Valid Cases	535		

a. 23 cells (76.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be just.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be just.					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	2	1	5	72	80
		Expected Count	.9	.7	1.2	2.1	75.1	80.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	1	15	16
		Expected Count	.2	.1	.2	.4	15.0	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	6	3	6	4	199	218
		Expected Count	2.4	2.0	3.3	5.7	204.6	218.0
	Tajik	Count	0	0	1	3	186	190
		Expected Count	2.1	1.8	2.8	5.0	178.3	190.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	1	30	31
		Expected Count	.3	.3	.5	.8	29.1	31.0
	Total	Count	6	5	8	14	502	535
		Expected Count	6.0	5.0	8.0	14.0	502.0	535.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.540 ^a	16	.078
Likelihood Ratio	27.537	16	.036
N of Valid Cases	535		

a. 19 cells (76.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Ethnic * A good political leader should not lie to the people.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should not lie to the people.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	1	1	2	5	5	66	80
		Expected Count	.7	.7	1.6	3.0	4.9	69.0	80.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	0	3	13	16
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.3	.6	1.0	13.8	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	4	3	6	11	18	178	220
		Expected Count	2.0	2.0	4.5	8.2	13.5	189.7	220.0
	Tajik	Count	0	1	2	4	7	176	190
		Expected Count	1.8	1.8	3.9	7.1	11.7	163.8	190.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	0	0	30	31
		Expected Count	.3	.3	.6	1.2	1.9	26.7	31.0
	Total	Count	5	5	11	20	33	463	537
		Expected Count	5.0	5.0	11.0	20.0	33.0	463.0	537.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.507 ^a	20	.221
Likelihood Ratio	29.435	20	.080
N of Valid Cases	537		

a. 21 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Ethnic * A good political leader should love the country.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should love the country.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	1	3	76	80
		Expected Count	.1	.9	.6	1.5	3.6	73.3	80.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	2	0	14	16
		Expected Count	.0	.2	.1	.3	.7	14.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	5	4	6	13	189	218
		Expected Count	.4	2.4	1.6	4.1	9.8	199.7	218.0
	Tajik	Count	0	1	0	1	8	181	191
		Expected Count	.4	2.1	1.4	3.6	8.6	175.0	191.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	0	0	31	31
		Expected Count	.1	.3	.2	.6	1.4	28.4	31.0
	Total	Count	1	6	4	10	24	491	536
		Expected Count	1.0	6.0	4.0	10.0	24.0	491.0	536.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	29.667 ^a	20	.075
Likelihood Ratio	30.050	20	.069
N of Valid Cases	536		

a. 23 cells (76.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader should respect and enforce the law.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should respect and enforce the law.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	0	5	73	78
		Expected Count	.9	.1	.6	1.2	3.5	71.7	78.0
	Other	Count	1	0	0	0	0	15	16
		Expected Count	.2	.0	.1	.2	.7	14.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	4	1	4	7	14	189	219
		Expected Count	2.5	.4	1.6	3.3	9.8	201.4	219.0
	Tajik	Count	1	0	0	1	5	184	191
		Expected Count	2.1	.4	1.4	2.9	8.6	175.6	191.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	0	0	31	31
		Expected Count	.3	.1	.2	.5	1.4	28.5	31.0
	Total	Count	6	1	4	8	24	492	535
		Expected Count	6.0	1.0	4.0	8.0	24.0	492.0	535.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	28.501 ^a	20	.098
Likelihood Ratio	32.793	20	.036
N of Valid Cases	535		

a. 23 cells (76.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader should believe in God.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should believe in God.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	2	1	4	1	69	79
		Expected Count	.4	1.2	.7	2.4	2.6	71.6	79.0
	Other	Count	0	1	0	2	0	13	16
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.1	.5	.5	14.5	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	4	1	5	8	201	220
		Expected Count	1.2	3.3	2.0	6.6	7.4	199.5	220.0
	Tajik	Count	0	1	2	3	6	179	191
		Expected Count	1.1	2.8	1.8	5.7	6.4	173.2	191.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	2	3	25	31
		Expected Count	.2	.5	.3	.9	1.0	28.1	31.0
	Total	Count	3	8	5	16	18	487	537
		Expected Count	3.0	8.0	5.0	16.0	18.0	487.0	537.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	29.324 ^a	20	.082
Likelihood Ratio	24.537	20	.220
N of Valid Cases	537		

a. 21 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be elected through election.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be elected through election.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	6	2	71	79
		Expected Count	.6	.7	1.6	3.9	5.3	66.8	79.0
	Other	Count	1	0	0	0	2	13	16
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.3	.8	1.1	13.5	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	3	3	8	14	21	168	217
		Expected Count	1.6	2.0	4.5	10.6	14.7	183.6	217.0
	Tajik	Count	0	2	2	5	7	173	189
		Expected Count	1.4	1.8	3.9	9.2	12.8	159.9	189.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	1	4	26	32
		Expected Count	.2	.3	.7	1.6	2.2	27.1	32.0
	Total	Count	4	5	11	26	36	451	533
		Expected Count	4.0	5.0	11.0	26.0	36.0	451.0	533.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.073 ^a	20	.020
Likelihood Ratio	37.167	20	.011
N of Valid Cases	533		

a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

Ethnic * A good political leader should not ethnically discriminate.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should not ethnically discriminate.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	3	1	0	4	68	78
		Expected Count	.7	2.2	1.9	1.0	3.7	68.5	78.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	1	1	14	16
		Expected Count	.2	.5	.4	.2	.8	14.0	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	2	7	10	4	15	180	218
		Expected Count	2.0	6.1	5.3	2.9	10.2	191.4	218.0
	Tajik	Count	1	5	1	2	4	176	189
		Expected Count	1.8	5.3	4.6	2.5	8.9	165.9	189.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	0	1	29	31
		Expected Count	.3	.9	.8	.4	1.5	27.2	31.0
	Total	Count	5	15	13	7	25	467	532
		Expected Count	5.0	15.0	13.0	7.0	25.0	467.0	532.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.053 ^a	20	.240
Likelihood Ratio	26.505	20	.150
N of Valid Cases	532		

a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Frequencies

Statistics							
		A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.	A good political leader should have religious education.	A good political leader should be highly educated.	A good political leader should fight the foreigners.	A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.	A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.
N	Valid	527	517	534	527	523	508
	Missing	41	51	34	41	45	60
Mean		3.93	3.68	4.71	3.52	2.43	3.09
Median		5.00	5.00	5.00	4.00	2.00	4.00
Mode		5	5	5	5	5	5
Std. Deviation		1.522	1.644	.682	1.676	1.994	1.996
Skewness		-1.232	-.942	-2.765	-.728	.122	-.448
Std. Error of Skewness		.106	.107	.106	.106	.107	.108
Kurtosis		.339	-.434	8.821	-.803	-1.566	-1.451
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.212	.214	.211	.212	.213	.216
Minimum		0	0	0	0	0	0
Maximum		5	5	5	5	5	5

Frequency Table

A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	26	4.6	4.9	4.9
	1	29	5.1	5.5	10.4
	2	38	6.7	7.2	17.6
	3	80	14.1	15.2	32.8
	4	42	7.4	8.0	40.8
	5	312	54.9	59.2	100.0

Total	527	92.8	100.0
Missing System	41	7.2	
Total	568	100.0	

A good political leader should have religious education.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0	34	6.0	6.6	6.6
1	42	7.4	8.1	14.7
2	47	8.3	9.1	23.8
3	72	12.7	13.9	37.7
4	58	10.2	11.2	48.9
5	264	46.5	51.1	100.0
Total	517	91.0	100.0	
Missing System	51	9.0		
Total	568	100.0		

A good political leader should be highly educated.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0	1	.2	.2	.2
1	1	.2	.2	.4
2	7	1.2	1.3	1.7
3	32	5.6	6.0	7.7
4	61	10.7	11.4	19.1
5	432	76.1	80.9	100.0
Total	534	94.0	100.0	
Missing System	34	6.0		
Total	568	100.0		

A good political leader should fight the foreigners.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0	36	6.3	6.8	6.8
1	50	8.8	9.5	16.3
2	59	10.4	11.2	27.5
3	87	15.3	16.5	44.0
4	47	8.3	8.9	52.9
5	248	43.7	47.1	100.0
Total	527	92.8	100.0	
Missing System	41	7.2		
Total	568	100.0		

A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	134	23.6	25.6	25.6
	1	90	15.8	17.2	42.8
	2	46	8.1	8.8	51.6
	3	75	13.2	14.3	66.0
	4	26	4.6	5.0	70.9
	5	152	26.8	29.1	100.0
	Total	523	92.1	100.0	
Missing	System	45	7.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	90	15.8	17.7	17.7
	1	67	11.8	13.2	30.9
	2	32	5.6	6.3	37.2
	3	50	8.8	9.8	47.0
	4	54	9.5	10.6	57.7
	5	215	37.9	42.3	100.0
	Total	508	89.4	100.0	
Missing	System	60	10.6		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader should have religious education.

A good political leader should be highly educated.

A good political leader should fight the foreigners.

A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.

A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.	527	92.8%	41	7.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should have religious education.	517	91.0%	51	9.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be highly educated.	534	94.0%	34	6.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should fight the foreigners.	527	92.8%	41	7.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.	523	92.1%	45	7.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.	508	89.4%	60	10.6%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	12	8	5	22	4	23	74
		Expected Count	3.7	4.1	5.3	11.2	5.9	43.8	74.0
	Other	Count	3	0	1	4	0	8	16
		Expected Count	.8	.9	1.2	2.4	1.3	9.5	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	6	6	16	21	19	151	219
		Expected Count	10.8	12.1	15.8	33.2	17.5	129.7	219.0
	Tajik	Count	4	13	16	26	15	113	187
		Expected Count	9.2	10.3	13.5	28.4	14.9	110.7	187.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	2	0	7	4	17	31
		Expected Count	1.5	1.7	2.2	4.7	2.5	18.4	31.0
	Total	Count	26	29	38	80	42	312	527
		Expected Count	26.0	29.0	38.0	80.0	42.0	312.0	527.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	75.695 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	71.223	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	527		

a. 12 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .79.

Ethnic * A good political leader should have religious education.

Crosstab										
			A good political leader should have religious education.						Total	
			0	1	2	3	4	5		
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	12	11	6	13	8	22	72	
		Expected Count	4.7	5.8	6.5	10.0	8.1	36.8	72.0	
	Other	Count	6	0	0	3	1	6	16	
		Expected Count	1.1	1.3	1.5	2.2	1.8	8.2	16.0	
	Pashtun	Count	5	11	21	22	28	129	216	
		Expected Count	14.2	17.5	19.6	30.1	24.2	110.3	216.0	
	Tajik	Count	9	16	17	27	20	95	184	
		Expected Count	12.1	14.9	16.7	25.6	20.6	94.0	184.0	
	Uzbek	Count	2	4	3	7	1	12	29	
		Expected Count	1.9	2.4	2.6	4.0	3.3	14.8	29.0	
Total		Count	34	42	47	72	58	264	517	
		Expected Count	34.0	42.0	47.0	72.0	58.0	264.0	517.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	70.632 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	60.360	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	517		

a. 11 cells (36.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.05.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be highly educated.

Crosstab										
			A good political leader should be highly educated.						Total	
			0	1	2	3	4	5		
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	7	11	62	80	
		Expected Count	.1	.1	1.0	4.8	9.1	64.7	80.0	
	Other	Count	0	0	0	0	4	12	16	
		Expected Count	.0	.0	.2	1.0	1.8	12.9	16.0	
	Pashtun	Count	1	1	3	14	25	173	217	
		Expected Count	.4	.4	2.8	13.0	24.8	175.6	217.0	
	Tajik	Count	0	0	2	10	20	158	190	
		Expected Count	.4	.4	2.5	11.4	21.7	153.7	190.0	
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	2	1	1	27	31	
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.4	1.9	3.5	25.1	31.0	
Total		Count	1	1	7	32	61	432	534	
		Expected Count	1.0	1.0	7.0	32.0	61.0	432.0	534.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18.557 ^a	20	.551
Likelihood Ratio	18.406	20	.561
N of Valid Cases	534		

a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader should fight the foreigners.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should fight the foreigners.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	6	15	8	17	8	26	80
		Expected Count	5.5	7.6	9.0	13.2	7.1	37.6	80.0
	Other	Count	4	1	3	3	0	5	16
		Expected Count	1.1	1.5	1.8	2.6	1.4	7.5	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	13	13	27	30	25	106	214
		Expected Count	14.6	20.3	24.0	35.3	19.1	100.7	214.0
	Tajik	Count	12	19	19	32	13	92	187
		Expected Count	12.8	17.7	20.9	30.9	16.7	88.0	187.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	2	2	5	1	19	30
		Expected Count	2.0	2.8	3.4	5.0	2.7	14.1	30.0
Total	Count	36	50	59	87	47	248	527	
	Expected Count	36.0	50.0	59.0	87.0	47.0	248.0	527.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	34.769 ^a	20	.021
Likelihood Ratio	32.499	20	.038
N of Valid Cases	527		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.09.

Ethnic * A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	24	23	7	8	3	14	79
		Expected Count	20.2	13.6	6.9	11.3	3.9	23.0	79.0
	Other	Count	9	1	1	1	1	2	15
		Expected Count	3.8	2.6	1.3	2.2	.7	4.4	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	46	30	18	34	16	70	214
		Expected Count	54.8	36.8	18.8	30.7	10.6	62.2	214.0
	Tajik	Count	47	29	19	28	5	58	186
		Expected Count	47.7	32.0	16.4	26.7	9.2	54.1	186.0
	Uzbek	Count	8	7	1	4	1	8	29
		Expected Count	7.4	5.0	2.6	4.2	1.4	8.4	29.0
Total	Count	134	90	46	75	26	152	523	
	Expected Count	134.0	90.0	46.0	75.0	26.0	152.0	523.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	33.586 ^a	20	.029
Likelihood Ratio	32.320	20	.040
N of Valid Cases	523		

a. 11 cells (36.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .75.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	16	16	7	7	5	27	78
		Expected Count	13.8	10.3	4.9	7.7	8.3	33.0	78.0
	Other	Count	5	2	1	0	3	4	15
		Expected Count	2.7	2.0	.9	1.5	1.6	6.3	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	27	22	9	22	33	96	209
		Expected Count	37.0	27.6	13.2	20.6	22.2	88.5	209.0
	Tajik	Count	37	22	11	18	11	79	178
		Expected Count	31.5	23.5	11.2	17.5	18.9	75.3	178.0
	Uzbek	Count	5	5	4	3	2	9	28
		Expected Count	5.0	3.7	1.8	2.8	3.0	11.9	28.0
Total	Count	90	67	32	50	54	215	508	
	Expected Count	90.0	67.0	32.0	50.0	54.0	215.0	508.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	32.527 ^a	20	.038
Likelihood Ratio	32.830	20	.035
N of Valid Cases	508		

a. 11 cells (36.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .94.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
AgeBin * A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.	527	92.8%	41	7.2%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should have religious education.	517	91.0%	51	9.0%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should be highly educated.	534	94.0%	34	6.0%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should fight the foreigners.	527	92.8%	41	7.2%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.	523	92.1%	45	7.9%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.	508	89.4%	60	10.6%	568	100.0%

AgeBin * A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	4	7	9	13	8	111	152
		Expected Count	7.5	8.4	11.0	23.1	12.1	90.0	152.0
	22 to 31	Count	12	11	10	39	17	108	197
		Expected Count	9.7	10.8	14.2	29.9	15.7	116.6	197.0
	32 to 41	Count	7	4	12	18	8	47	96
		Expected Count	4.7	5.3	6.9	14.6	7.7	56.8	96.0
	42 to 51	Count	1	3	5	7	6	27	49
		Expected Count	2.4	2.7	3.5	7.4	3.9	29.0	49.0
	Above 51	Count	2	4	2	3	3	19	33
		Expected Count	1.6	1.8	2.4	5.0	2.6	19.5	33.0
	Total	Count	26	29	38	80	42	312	527
		Expected Count	26.0	29.0	38.0	80.0	42.0	312.0	527.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	32.252 ^a	20	.041
Likelihood Ratio	31.912	20	.044
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.971	1	.015
N of Valid Cases	527		

a. 9 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.63.

AgeBin * A good political leader should have religious education.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should have religious education.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	5	9	13	11	16	94	148
		Expected Count	9.7	12.0	13.5	20.6	16.6	75.6	148.0
	22 to 31	Count	15	15	8	33	25	96	192
		Expected Count	12.6	15.6	17.5	26.7	21.5	98.0	192.0
	32 to 41	Count	8	11	13	18	9	37	96
		Expected Count	6.3	7.8	8.7	13.4	10.8	49.0	96.0
	42 to 51	Count	3	3	11	7	4	21	49
		Expected Count	3.2	4.0	4.5	6.8	5.5	25.0	49.0
	Above 51	Count	3	4	2	3	4	16	32
		Expected Count	2.1	2.6	2.9	4.5	3.6	16.3	32.0
	Total	Count	34	42	47	72	58	264	517
		Expected Count	34.0	42.0	47.0	72.0	58.0	264.0	517.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	41.310 ^a	20	.003
Likelihood Ratio	40.536	20	.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.523	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	517		

a. 8 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.10.

AgeBin * A good political leader should be highly educated.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be highly educated.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	1	0	2	5	14	131	153
		Expected Count	.3	.3	2.0	9.2	17.5	123.8	153.0
	22 to 31	Count	0	0	3	15	20	162	200
		Expected Count	.4	.4	2.6	12.0	22.8	161.8	200.0
	32 to 41	Count	0	0	1	8	14	74	97
		Expected Count	.2	.2	1.3	5.8	11.1	78.5	97.0
	42 to 51	Count	0	0	1	3	8	38	50
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.7	3.0	5.7	40.4	50.0
	Above 51	Count	0	1	0	1	5	27	34
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.4	2.0	3.9	27.5	34.0
	Total	Count	1	1	7	32	61	432	534
		Expected Count	1.0	1.0	7.0	32.0	61.0	432.0	534.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	25.828 ^a	20	.172
Likelihood Ratio	17.298	20	.634
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.536	1	.215
N of Valid Cases	534		

a. 18 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

AgeBin * A good political leader should fight the foreigners.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should fight the foreigners.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	3	13	17	25	13	79	150
		Expected Count	10.2	14.2	16.8	24.8	13.4	70.6	150.0
	22 to 31	Count	17	15	19	35	19	93	198
		Expected Count	13.5	18.8	22.2	32.7	17.7	93.2	198.0
	32 to 41	Count	12	12	11	16	10	36	97
		Expected Count	6.6	9.2	10.9	16.0	8.7	45.6	97.0
	42 to 51	Count	3	4	10	8	2	23	50
		Expected Count	3.4	4.7	5.6	8.3	4.5	23.5	50.0
	Above 51	Count	1	6	2	3	3	17	32
		Expected Count	2.2	3.0	3.6	5.3	2.9	15.1	32.0
	Total	Count	36	50	59	87	47	248	527
		Expected Count	36.0	50.0	59.0	87.0	47.0	248.0	527.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	26.568 ^a	20	.148
Likelihood Ratio	27.288	20	.127
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.346	1	.067
N of Valid Cases	527		

a. 7 cells (23.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.19.

AgeBin * A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	17	24	14	24	12	59	150
		Expected Count	38.4	25.8	13.2	21.5	7.5	43.6	150.0
	22 to 31	Count	58	35	17	32	9	47	198
		Expected Count	50.7	34.1	17.4	28.4	9.8	57.5	198.0
	32 to 41	Count	31	17	10	14	2	22	96
		Expected Count	24.6	16.5	8.4	13.8	4.8	27.9	96.0
	42 to 51	Count	20	9	3	3	1	13	49
		Expected Count	12.6	8.4	4.3	7.0	2.4	14.2	49.0
	Above 51	Count	8	5	2	2	2	11	30
		Expected Count	7.7	5.2	2.6	4.3	1.5	8.7	30.0
Total		Count	134	90	46	75	26	152	523
		Expected Count	134.0	90.0	46.0	75.0	26.0	152.0	523.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	39.287 ^a	20	.006
Likelihood Ratio	42.465	20	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.446	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	523		

a. 6 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.49.

AgeBin * A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	10	13	7	16	18	79	143
		Expected Count	25.3	18.9	9.0	14.1	15.2	60.5	143.0
	22 to 31	Count	39	31	13	20	16	78	197
		Expected Count	34.9	26.0	12.4	19.4	20.9	83.4	197.0
	32 to 41	Count	24	13	6	9	12	27	91
		Expected Count	16.1	12.0	5.7	9.0	9.7	38.5	91.0
	42 to 51	Count	12	4	3	2	6	19	46
		Expected Count	8.1	6.1	2.9	4.5	4.9	19.5	46.0
	Above 51	Count	5	6	3	3	2	12	31
		Expected Count	5.5	4.1	2.0	3.1	3.3	13.1	31.0
	Total	Count	90	67	32	50	54	215	508
		Expected Count	90.0	67.0	32.0	50.0	54.0	215.0	508.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.234 ^a	20	.019
Likelihood Ratio	37.761	20	.009
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.499	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	508		

a. 7 cells (23.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.95.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
EliteBin * A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.	527	92.8%	41	7.2%	568	100.0%
EliteBin * A good political leader should have religious education.	517	91.0%	51	9.0%	568	100.0%
EliteBin * A good political leader should be highly educated.	534	94.0%	34	6.0%	568	100.0%
EliteBin * A good political leader should fight the foreigners.	527	92.8%	41	7.2%	568	100.0%
EliteBin * A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.	523	92.1%	45	7.9%	568	100.0%
EliteBin * A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.	508	89.4%	60	10.6%	568	100.0%

EliteBin * A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
EliteBin	None Participants	Count	8	11	13	37	19	165	253
		Expected Count	12.5	13.9	18.2	38.4	20.2	149.8	253.0
	Attentives	Count	10	12	15	32	17	108	194
		Expected Count	9.6	10.7	14.0	29.4	15.5	114.9	194.0
	Participants	Count	8	6	10	11	6	39	80
		Expected Count	3.9	4.4	5.8	12.1	6.4	47.4	80.0
Total	Count	26	29	38	80	42	312	527	
	Expected Count	26.0	29.0	38.0	80.0	42.0	312.0	527.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.886 ^a	10	.103
Likelihood Ratio	14.794	10	.140
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.795	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	527		

a. 2 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.95.

EliteBin * A good political leader should have religious education.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should have religious education.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
EliteBin	None Participants	Count	16	18	17	32	22	141	246
		Expected Count	16.2	20.0	22.4	34.3	27.6	125.6	246.0
	Attentives	Count	12	13	17	30	28	93	193
		Expected Count	12.7	15.7	17.5	26.9	21.7	98.6	193.0
	Participants	Count	6	11	13	10	8	30	78
		Expected Count	5.1	6.3	7.1	10.9	8.8	39.8	78.0
Total	Count	34	42	47	72	58	264	517	
	Expected Count	34.0	42.0	47.0	72.0	58.0	264.0	517.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18.766 ^a	10	.043
Likelihood Ratio	17.386	10	.066
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.381	1	.007
N of Valid Cases	517		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.13.

EliteBin * A good political leader should be highly educated.

Crosstab										
			A good political leader should be highly educated.						Total	
			0	1	2	3	4	5		
EliteBin	None	Participants	Count	1	1	3	13	16	226	260
		Expected Count	.5	.5	3.4	15.6	29.7	210.3	260.0	
	Attentives	Count	0	0	3	14	33	144	194	
		Expected Count	.4	.4	2.5	11.6	22.2	156.9	194.0	
	Participants	Count	0	0	1	5	12	62	80	
		Expected Count	.1	.1	1.0	4.8	9.1	64.7	80.0	
Total	Count		1	1	7	32	61	432	534	
	Expected Count		1.0	1.0	7.0	32.0	61.0	432.0	534.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18.027 ^a	10	.055
Likelihood Ratio	19.302	10	.037
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.289	1	.130
N of Valid Cases	534		

a. 10 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

EliteBin * A good political leader should fight the foreigners.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should fight the foreigners.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
EliteBin	None Participants	Count	12	17	25	44	26	133	257
		Expected Count	17.6	24.4	28.8	42.4	22.9	120.9	257.0
	Attentives	Count	15	22	23	33	17	82	192
		Expected Count	13.1	18.2	21.5	31.7	17.1	90.4	192.0
	Participants	Count	9	11	11	10	4	33	78
		Expected Count	5.3	7.4	8.7	12.9	7.0	36.7	78.0
Total	Count	36	50	59	87	47	248	527	
	Expected Count	36.0	50.0	59.0	87.0	47.0	248.0	527.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.295 ^a	10	.122
Likelihood Ratio	15.295	10	.122
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.291	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	527		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.33.

EliteBin * A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
EliteBin	None Participants	Count	50	33	23	41	15	91	253
		Expected Count	64.8	43.5	22.3	36.3	12.6	73.5	253.0
	Attentives	Count	51	41	16	30	10	46	194
		Expected Count	49.7	33.4	17.1	27.8	9.6	56.4	194.0
	Participants	Count	33	16	7	4	1	15	76
		Expected Count	19.5	13.1	6.7	10.9	3.8	22.1	76.0
Total	Count	134	90	46	75	26	152	523	
	Expected Count	134.0	90.0	46.0	75.0	26.0	152.0	523.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	33.879 ^a	10	.000
Likelihood Ratio	34.944	10	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	25.700	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	523		

a. 1 cells (5.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.78.

EliteBin * A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
EliteBin	None Participants	Count	33	27	12	24	29	117	242
		Expected Count	42.9	31.9	15.2	23.8	25.7	102.4	242.0
	Attentives	Count	33	29	15	20	19	72	188
		Expected Count	33.3	24.8	11.8	18.5	20.0	79.6	188.0
	Participants	Count	24	11	5	6	6	26	78
		Expected Count	13.8	10.3	4.9	7.7	8.3	33.0	78.0
Total	Count	90	67	32	50	54	215	508	
	Expected Count	90.0	67.0	32.0	50.0	54.0	215.0	508.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18.703 ^a	10	.044
Likelihood Ratio	17.657	10	.061
Linear-by-Linear Association	14.339	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	508		

a. 1 cells (5.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.91.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
AgeBin * A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.	527	92.8%	41	7.2%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should have religious education.	517	91.0%	51	9.0%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should be highly educated.	534	94.0%	34	6.0%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should fight the foreigners.	527	92.8%	41	7.2%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.	523	92.1%	45	7.9%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.	508	89.4%	60	10.6%	568	100.0%

AgeBin * A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should pray five times in the mosque.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	4	7	9	13	8	111	152
		Expected Count	7.5	8.4	11.0	23.1	12.1	90.0	152.0
	22 to 31	Count	12	11	10	39	17	108	197
		Expected Count	9.7	10.8	14.2	29.9	15.7	116.6	197.0
	32 to 41	Count	7	4	12	18	8	47	96
		Expected Count	4.7	5.3	6.9	14.6	7.7	56.8	96.0
	42 to 51	Count	1	3	5	7	6	27	49
		Expected Count	2.4	2.7	3.5	7.4	3.9	29.0	49.0
	Above 51	Count	2	4	2	3	3	19	33
		Expected Count	1.6	1.8	2.4	5.0	2.6	19.5	33.0
	Total	Count	26	29	38	80	42	312	527
		Expected Count	26.0	29.0	38.0	80.0	42.0	312.0	527.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	32.252 ^a	20	.041
Likelihood Ratio	31.912	20	.044
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.971	1	.015
N of Valid Cases	527		

a. 9 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.63.

AgeBin * A good political leader should have religious education.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should have religious education.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	5	9	13	11	16	94	148
		Expected Count	9.7	12.0	13.5	20.6	16.6	75.6	148.0
	22 to 31	Count	15	15	8	33	25	96	192
		Expected Count	12.6	15.6	17.5	26.7	21.5	98.0	192.0
	32 to 41	Count	8	11	13	18	9	37	96
		Expected Count	6.3	7.8	8.7	13.4	10.8	49.0	96.0
	42 to 51	Count	3	3	11	7	4	21	49
		Expected Count	3.2	4.0	4.5	6.8	5.5	25.0	49.0
	Above 51	Count	3	4	2	3	4	16	32
		Expected Count	2.1	2.6	2.9	4.5	3.6	16.3	32.0
	Total	Count	34	42	47	72	58	264	517
		Expected Count	34.0	42.0	47.0	72.0	58.0	264.0	517.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	41.310 ^a	20	.003
Likelihood Ratio	40.536	20	.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.523	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	517		

a. 8 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.10.

AgeBin * A good political leader should be highly educated.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be highly educated.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	1	0	2	5	14	131	153
		Expected Count	.3	.3	2.0	9.2	17.5	123.8	153.0
	22 to 31	Count	0	0	3	15	20	162	200
		Expected Count	.4	.4	2.6	12.0	22.8	161.8	200.0
	32 to 41	Count	0	0	1	8	14	74	97
		Expected Count	.2	.2	1.3	5.8	11.1	78.5	97.0
	42 to 51	Count	0	0	1	3	8	38	50
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.7	3.0	5.7	40.4	50.0
	Above 51	Count	0	1	0	1	5	27	34
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.4	2.0	3.9	27.5	34.0
	Total	Count	1	1	7	32	61	432	534
		Expected Count	1.0	1.0	7.0	32.0	61.0	432.0	534.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	25.828 ^a	20	.172
Likelihood Ratio	17.298	20	.634
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.536	1	.215
N of Valid Cases	534		

a. 18 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

AgeBin * A good political leader should fight the foreigners.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should fight the foreigners.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	3	13	17	25	13	79	150
		Expected Count	10.2	14.2	16.8	24.8	13.4	70.6	150.0
	22 to 31	Count	17	15	19	35	19	93	198
		Expected Count	13.5	18.8	22.2	32.7	17.7	93.2	198.0
	32 to 41	Count	12	12	11	16	10	36	97
		Expected Count	6.6	9.2	10.9	16.0	8.7	45.6	97.0
	42 to 51	Count	3	4	10	8	2	23	50
		Expected Count	3.4	4.7	5.6	8.3	4.5	23.5	50.0
	Above 51	Count	1	6	2	3	3	17	32
		Expected Count	2.2	3.0	3.6	5.3	2.9	15.1	32.0
	Total	Count	36	50	59	87	47	248	527
		Expected Count	36.0	50.0	59.0	87.0	47.0	248.0	527.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	26.568 ^a	20	.148
Likelihood Ratio	27.288	20	.127
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.346	1	.067
N of Valid Cases	527		

a. 7 cells (23.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.19.

AgeBin * A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not let foreigners in the country.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	17	24	14	24	12	59	150
		Expected Count	38.4	25.8	13.2	21.5	7.5	43.6	150.0
	22 to 31	Count	58	35	17	32	9	47	198
		Expected Count	50.7	34.1	17.4	28.4	9.8	57.5	198.0
	32 to 41	Count	31	17	10	14	2	22	96
		Expected Count	24.6	16.5	8.4	13.8	4.8	27.9	96.0
	42 to 51	Count	20	9	3	3	1	13	49
		Expected Count	12.6	8.4	4.3	7.0	2.4	14.2	49.0
	Above 51	Count	8	5	2	2	2	11	30
		Expected Count	7.7	5.2	2.6	4.3	1.5	8.7	30.0
	Total	Count	134	90	46	75	26	152	523
		Expected Count	134.0	90.0	46.0	75.0	26.0	152.0	523.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	39.287 ^a	20	.006
Likelihood Ratio	42.465	20	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.446	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	523		

a. 6 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.49.

AgeBin * A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be selected through Jirga.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	10	13	7	16	18	79	143
		Expected Count	25.3	18.9	9.0	14.1	15.2	60.5	143.0
	22 to 31	Count	39	31	13	20	16	78	197
		Expected Count	34.9	26.0	12.4	19.4	20.9	83.4	197.0
	32 to 41	Count	24	13	6	9	12	27	91
		Expected Count	16.1	12.0	5.7	9.0	9.7	38.5	91.0
	42 to 51	Count	12	4	3	2	6	19	46
		Expected Count	8.1	6.1	2.9	4.5	4.9	19.5	46.0
	Above 51	Count	5	6	3	3	2	12	31
		Expected Count	5.5	4.1	2.0	3.1	3.3	13.1	31.0
	Total	Count	90	67	32	50	54	215	508
		Expected Count	90.0	67.0	32.0	50.0	54.0	215.0	508.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.234 ^a	20	.019
Likelihood Ratio	37.761	20	.009
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.499	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	508		

a. 7 cells (23.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.95.

Frequencies

Statistics							
		A good political leader should put on a turban.	A good political leader should put on Perahan Tunban.	A good political leader should be from Kandahar.	A good political leader should be from a noble family.	A good political leader should see all ethnic groups with one eye.	A good political leader should not be young.
N	Valid	507	510	514	511	518	507
	Missing	61	58	54	57	50	61
Mean		2.34	2.72	1.56	2.17	2.66	2.08
Median		2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00
Mode		0	5	0	0	5	0
Std. Deviation		1.863	1.880	1.779	1.949	1.837	1.704
Skewness		.197	-.085	.920	.354	-.038	.312
Std. Error of Skewness		.108	.108	.108	.108	.107	.108
Kurtosis		-1.403	-1.430	-.562	-1.434	-1.404	-1.093
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.217	.216	.215	.216	.214	.217
Minimum		0	0	0	0	0	0
Maximum		5	5	5	5	5	5

Frequency Table

A good political leader should put on a turban.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	114	20.1	22.5	22.5
	1	97	17.1	19.1	41.6
	2	67	11.8	13.2	54.8
	3	73	12.9	14.4	69.2
	4	43	7.6	8.5	77.7
	5	113	19.9	22.3	100.0

Total		507	89.3	100.0	
Missing	System	61	10.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should put on Perahan Tunban.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	92	16.2	18.0	18.0
	1	67	11.8	13.1	31.2
	2	81	14.3	15.9	47.1
	3	79	13.9	15.5	62.5
	4	34	6.0	6.7	69.2
	5	157	27.6	30.8	100.0
	Total	510	89.8	100.0	
Missing	System	58	10.2		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be from Kandahar.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	202	35.6	39.3	39.3
	1	128	22.5	24.9	64.2
	2	46	8.1	8.9	73.2
	3	45	7.9	8.8	81.9
	4	19	3.3	3.7	85.6
	5	74	13.0	14.4	100.0
	Total	514	90.5	100.0	
Missing	System	54	9.5		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be from a noble family.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	141	24.8	27.6	27.6
	1	115	20.2	22.5	50.1
	2	40	7.0	7.8	57.9
	3	67	11.8	13.1	71.0
	4	25	4.4	4.9	75.9
	5	123	21.7	24.1	100.0
	Total	511	90.0	100.0	
Missing	System	57	10.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should see all ethnic groups with one eye.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	87	15.3	16.8	16.8
	1	87	15.3	16.8	33.6
	2	68	12.0	13.1	46.7
	3	92	16.2	17.8	64.5
	4	43	7.6	8.3	72.8
	5	141	24.8	27.2	100.0
	Total	518	91.2	100.0	
Missing	System	50	8.8		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should not be young.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	127	22.4	25.0	25.0
	1	93	16.4	18.3	43.4
	2	67	11.8	13.2	56.6
	3	121	21.3	23.9	80.5
	4	28	4.9	5.5	86.0
	5	71	12.5	14.0	100.0
	Total	507	89.3	100.0	
Missing	System	61	10.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader should put on Perahan Tunban.

A good political leader should be from Kandahar.

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

A good political leader should be from a noble family.

A good political leader should see all ethnic groups with one eye.

A good political leader should not be young.

0
1
2
3
4
5

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader should put on a turban.	507	89.3%	61	10.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should put on Perahan Tunban.	510	89.8%	58	10.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be from Kandahar.	514	90.5%	54	9.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be from a noble family.	511	90.0%	57	10.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should see all ethnic groups with one eye.	518	91.2%	50	8.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should not be young.	507	89.3%	61	10.7%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader should put on a turban.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should put on a turban.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	20	17	8	9	3	14	71
		Expected Count	16.0	13.6	9.4	10.2	6.0	15.8	71.0
	Other	Count	10	2	1	2	1	0	16
		Expected Count	3.6	3.1	2.1	2.3	1.4	3.6	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	25	21	21	37	32	79	215
		Expected Count	48.3	41.1	28.4	31.0	18.2	47.9	215.0
	Tajik	Count	52	49	30	22	6	18	177
		Expected Count	39.8	33.9	23.4	25.5	15.0	39.4	177.0
	Uzbek	Count	7	8	7	3	1	2	28
		Expected Count	6.3	5.4	3.7	4.0	2.4	6.2	28.0
Total	Count	114	97	67	73	43	113	507	
	Expected Count	114.0	97.0	67.0	73.0	43.0	113.0	507.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	112.985 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	116.530	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	507		

a. 9 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.36.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.472	.000
	Cramer's V	.236	.000
N of Valid Cases		507

Ethnic * A good political leader should put on Perahan Tunban.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should put on Perahan Tunban.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	18	16	8	8	5	19	74

		Expected Count	13.3	9.7	11.8	11.5	4.9	22.8	74.0
	Other	Count	7	3	2	1	0	3	16
		Expected Count	2.9	2.1	2.5	2.5	1.1	4.9	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	18	14	23	32	18	109	214
		Expected Count	38.6	28.1	34.0	33.1	14.3	65.9	214.0
	Tajik	Count	43	31	42	31	9	23	179
		Expected Count	32.3	23.5	28.4	27.7	11.9	55.1	179.0
	Uzbek	Count	6	3	6	7	2	3	27
		Expected Count	4.9	3.5	4.3	4.2	1.8	8.3	27.0
	Total	Count	92	67	81	79	34	157	510
	Expected Count	92.0	67.0	81.0	79.0	34.0	157.0	510.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	107.056 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	110.992	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	510		

a. 12 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.07.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.458	.000
	Cramer's V	.229	.000
N of Valid Cases		510

Ethnic * A good political leader should be from Kandahar.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be from Kandahar.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	29	24	9	4	1	4	71
		Expected Count	27.9	17.7	6.4	6.2	2.6	10.2	71.0
	Other	Count	10	3	2	1	0	0	16
		Expected Count	6.3	4.0	1.4	1.4	.6	2.3	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	53	44	15	34	15	56	217
		Expected Count	85.3	54.0	19.4	19.0	8.0	31.2	217.0
	Tajik	Count	94	47	20	5	3	12	181
		Expected Count	71.1	45.1	16.2	15.8	6.7	26.1	181.0
	Uzbek	Count	16	10	0	1	0	2	29
		Expected Count	11.4	7.2	2.6	2.5	1.1	4.2	29.0
Total	Count	202	128	46	45	19	74	514	
	Expected Count	202.0	128.0	46.0	45.0	19.0	74.0	514.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	101.316 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	108.287	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	514		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .59.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.444	.000
	Cramer's V	.222	.000
N of Valid Cases		514

Ethnic * A good political leader should be from a noble family.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be from a noble family.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	26	25	1	9	3	7	71
		Expected Count	19.6	16.0	5.6	9.3	3.5	17.1	71.0
	Other	Count	11	2	1	1	0	1	16
		Expected Count	4.4	3.6	1.3	2.1	.8	3.9	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	23	32	12	32	19	97	215
		Expected Count	59.3	48.4	16.8	28.2	10.5	51.8	215.0
	Tajik	Count	67	48	25	22	3	15	180
		Expected Count	49.7	40.5	14.1	23.6	8.8	43.3	180.0
Uzbek	Count	14	8	1	3	0	3	29	
	Expected Count	8.0	6.5	2.3	3.8	1.4	7.0	29.0	
Total	Count	141	115	40	67	25	123	511	
	Expected Count	141.0	115.0	40.0	67.0	25.0	123.0	511.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	154.842 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	161.577	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	511		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .78.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.550	.000
	Cramer's V	.275	.000
N of Valid Cases		511

Ethnic * A good political leader should see all ethnic groups with one eye.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should see all ethnic groups with one eye.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	19	14	9	14	8	15	79
		Expected Count	13.3	13.3	10.4	14.0	6.6	21.5	79.0
	Other	Count	9	2	2	1	0	2	16
		Expected Count	2.7	2.7	2.1	2.8	1.3	4.4	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	26	31	25	47	21	66	216
		Expected Count	36.3	36.3	28.4	38.4	17.9	58.8	216.0
	Tajik	Count	32	35	23	27	11	51	179
		Expected Count	30.1	30.1	23.5	31.8	14.9	48.7	179.0
Uzbek	Count	1	5	9	3	3	7	28	
	Expected Count	4.7	4.7	3.7	5.0	2.3	7.6	28.0	
Total	Count	87	87	68	92	43	141	518	
	Expected Count	87.0	87.0	68.0	92.0	43.0	141.0	518.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	45.670 ^a	20	.001
Likelihood Ratio	41.516	20	.003
N of Valid Cases	518		

a. 11 cells (36.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.33.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.297	.001
	Cramer's V	.148	.001
N of Valid Cases		518

Ethnic * A good political leader should not be young.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not be young.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	24	22	9	13	0	9	77
		Expected Count	19.3	14.1	10.2	18.4	4.3	10.8	77.0
	Other	Count	7	1	1	2	1	4	16
		Expected Count	4.0	2.9	2.1	3.8	.9	2.2	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	46	37	21	55	21	32	212
		Expected Count	53.1	38.9	28.0	50.6	11.7	29.7	212.0
	Tajik	Count	46	29	32	44	5	18	174
		Expected Count	43.6	31.9	23.0	41.5	9.6	24.4	174.0
	Uzbek	Count	4	4	4	7	1	8	28
		Expected Count	7.0	5.1	3.7	6.7	1.5	3.9	28.0
Total	Count	127	93	67	121	28	71	507	
	Expected Count	127.0	93.0	67.0	121.0	28.0	71.0	507.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	42.867 ^a	20	.002
Likelihood Ratio	45.023	20	.001
N of Valid Cases	507		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .88.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.291	.002
	Cramer's V	.145	.002
N of Valid Cases		507

Frequencies

Statistics						
		A good political leader should not have double passport.	A good political leader should not have his/her family & children outside the country.	A good political leader should not be married to a foreign wife.	A good political leader should not have a business outside the country.	A good political leader should not have a house in another country.
N	Valid	512	512	520	521	519
	Missing	56	56	48	47	49
Mean		3.96	3.67	3.77	3.84	3.84
Median		5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Mode		5	5	5	5	5
Std. Deviation		1.672	1.693	1.750	1.634	1.636
Skewness		-1.352	-.943	-1.079	-1.149	-1.163
Std. Error of Skewness		.108	.108	.107	.107	.107
Kurtosis		.339	-.481	-.365	-.053	-.027
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.215	.215	.214	.214	.214
Minimum		0	0	0	0	0
Maximum		5	5	5	5	5

Frequency Table

A good political leader should not have double passport.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	40	7.0	7.8	7.8
	1	34	6.0	6.6	14.5
	2	25	4.4	4.9	19.3
	3	46	8.1	9.0	28.3
	4	29	5.1	5.7	34.0
	5	338	59.5	66.0	100.0
	Total	512	90.1	100.0	
Missing	System	56	9.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should not have his/her family & children outside the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	40	7.0	7.8	7.8
	1	40	7.0	7.8	15.6
	2	42	7.4	8.2	23.8
	3	77	13.6	15.0	38.9
	4	39	6.9	7.6	46.5
	5	274	48.2	53.5	100.0
	Total	512	90.1	100.0	
Missing	System	56	9.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should not be married to a foreign wife.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	45	7.9	8.7	8.7
	1	43	7.6	8.3	16.9
	2	38	6.7	7.3	24.2
	3	45	7.9	8.7	32.9
	4	37	6.5	7.1	40.0
	5	312	54.9	60.0	100.0
	Total	520	91.5	100.0	
Missing	System	48	8.5		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should not have a business outside the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	34	6.0	6.5	6.5
	1	37	6.5	7.1	13.6
	2	41	7.2	7.9	21.5
	3	57	10.0	10.9	32.4
	4	48	8.5	9.2	41.7
	5	304	53.5	58.3	100.0
	Total	521	91.7	100.0	
Missing	System	47	8.3		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should not have a house in another country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	34	6.0	6.6	6.6
	1	39	6.9	7.5	14.1
	2	37	6.5	7.1	21.2
	3	55	9.7	10.6	31.8
	4	53	9.3	10.2	42.0
	5	301	53.0	58.0	100.0
	Total	519	91.4	100.0	
Missing	System	49	8.6		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader should not have his/her family & children outside the country.

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

A good political leader should not be married to a foreign wife.

A good political leader should not have a business outside the country.

A good political leader should not have a house in another country.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader should not have double passport.	512	90.1%	56	9.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should not have his/her family & children outside the country.	512	90.1%	56	9.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should not be married to a foreign wife.	520	91.5%	48	8.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should not have a business outside the country.	521	91.7%	47	8.3%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should not have a house in another country.	519	91.4%	49	8.6%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader should not have double passport.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not have double passport.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	4	5	5	5	7	46	72
		Expected Count	5.6	4.8	3.5	6.5	4.1	47.5	72.0
	Other	Count	2	0	1	2	0	10	15
		Expected Count	1.2	1.0	.7	1.3	.8	9.9	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	22	15	11	24	15	125	212
		Expected Count	16.6	14.1	10.4	19.0	12.0	140.0	212.0
	Tajik	Count	11	11	7	12	7	135	183
		Expected Count	14.3	12.2	8.9	16.4	10.4	120.8	183.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	3	1	3	0	22	30
		Expected Count	2.3	2.0	1.5	2.7	1.7	19.8	30.0
Total	Count	40	34	25	46	29	338	512	
	Expected Count	40.0	34.0	25.0	46.0	29.0	338.0	512.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	20.598 ^a	20	.421
Likelihood Ratio	23.823	20	.250
N of Valid Cases	512		

a. 13 cells (43.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .73.

Ethnic * A good political leader should not have his/her family & children outside the country.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not have his/her family & children outside the country.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	8	11	4	9	5	35	72
		Expected Count	5.6	5.6	5.9	10.8	5.5	38.5	72.0
	Other	Count	5	1	1	1	3	5	16
		Expected Count	1.3	1.3	1.3	2.4	1.2	8.6	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	18	11	23	28	15	116	211
		Expected Count	16.5	16.5	17.3	31.7	16.1	112.9	211.0
	Tajik	Count	7	12	13	32	12	108	184
		Expected Count	14.4	14.4	15.1	27.7	14.0	98.5	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	5	1	7	4	10	29
		Expected Count	2.3	2.3	2.4	4.4	2.2	15.5	29.0
Total	Count	40	40	42	77	39	274	512	
	Expected Count	40.0	40.0	42.0	77.0	39.0	274.0	512.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	43.639 ^a	20	.002
Likelihood Ratio	37.453	20	.010
N of Valid Cases	512		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.22.

Ethnic * A good political leader should not be married to a foreign wife.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not be married to a foreign wife.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	7	12	9	13	3	28	72
		Expected Count	6.2	6.0	5.3	6.2	5.1	43.2	72.0
	Other	Count	6	2	0	0	1	7	16
		Expected Count	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.1	9.6	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	17	15	9	18	14	142	215
		Expected Count	18.6	17.8	15.7	18.6	15.3	129.0	215.0
	Tajik	Count	13	10	18	13	15	119	188
		Expected Count	16.3	15.5	13.7	16.3	13.4	112.8	188.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	4	2	1	4	16	29
		Expected Count	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.5	2.1	17.4	29.0
Total	Count	45	43	38	45	37	312	520	
	Expected Count	45.0	43.0	38.0	45.0	37.0	312.0	520.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	55.530 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	48.836	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	520		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.14.

Ethnic * A good political leader should not have a business outside the country.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not have a business outside the country.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	5	5	8	10	13	32	73
		Expected Count	4.8	5.2	5.7	8.0	6.7	42.6	73.0
	Other	Count	3	1	0	1	2	9	16
		Expected Count	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.8	1.5	9.3	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	13	15	13	22	17	136	216
		Expected Count	14.1	15.3	17.0	23.6	19.9	126.0	216.0
	Tajik	Count	11	13	17	20	13	112	186
		Expected Count	12.1	13.2	14.6	20.3	17.1	108.5	186.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	3	3	4	3	15	30
		Expected Count	2.0	2.1	2.4	3.3	2.8	17.5	30.0
Total	Count	34	37	41	57	48	304	521	
	Expected Count	34.0	37.0	41.0	57.0	48.0	304.0	521.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	20.388 ^a	20	.434
Likelihood Ratio	19.413	20	.495
N of Valid Cases	521		

a. 11 cells (36.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.04.

Ethnic * A good political leader should not have a house in another country.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should not have a house in another country.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	5	7	6	11	4	40	73
		Expected Count	4.8	5.5	5.2	7.7	7.5	42.3	73.0
	Other	Count	4	0	0	2	1	9	16
		Expected Count	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.7	1.6	9.3	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	14	18	15	18	25	127	217
		Expected Count	14.2	16.3	15.5	23.0	22.2	125.9	217.0
	Tajik	Count	10	12	15	20	19	110	186
		Expected Count	12.2	14.0	13.3	19.7	19.0	107.9	186.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	2	1	4	4	15	27
		Expected Count	1.8	2.0	1.9	2.9	2.8	15.7	27.0
Total		Count	34	39	37	55	53	301	519
		Expected Count	34.0	39.0	37.0	55.0	53.0	301.0	519.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	19.041 ^a	20	.519
Likelihood Ratio	18.186	20	.575
N of Valid Cases	519		

a. 11 cells (36.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.05.

Frequencies

Statistics							
		A good political leader should be a woman.	A good political leader should put on a suit with tie.	A good political leader should respect human rights.	A good political leader should respect women's rights.	A good political leader should allow women to work in the government and business.	A good political leader should be good speaker.
N	Valid	519	513	528	531	529	525
	Missing	49	55	40	37	39	43
Mean		2.53	2.95	4.65	4.56	4.19	4.38
Median		3.00	3.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Mode		3	5	5	5	5	5
Std. Deviation		1.757	1.741	.818	.934	1.317	1.070
Skewness		.006	-.292	-2.738	-2.462	-1.703	-2.010
Std. Error of Skewness		.107	.108	.106	.106	.106	.107
Kurtosis		-1.282	-1.176	7.894	6.001	2.090	4.112
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.214	.215	.212	.212	.212	.213
Minimum		0	0	0	0	0	0
Maximum		5	5	5	5	5	5

Frequency Table

A good political leader should be a woman.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	90	15.8	17.3	17.3
	1	89	15.7	17.1	34.5
	2	62	10.9	11.9	46.4
	3	120	21.1	23.1	69.6
	4	49	8.6	9.4	79.0
	5	109	19.2	21.0	100.0
	Total	519	91.4	100.0	
Missing	System	49	8.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should put on a suit with tie.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	65	11.4	12.7	12.7
	1	58	10.2	11.3	24.0
	2	74	13.0	14.4	38.4
	3	109	19.2	21.2	59.6
	4	55	9.7	10.7	70.4
	5	152	26.8	29.6	100.0
	Total	513	90.3	100.0	
Missing	System	55	9.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should respect human rights.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1	.2	.2	.2
	1	8	1.4	1.5	1.7
	2	8	1.4	1.5	3.2
	3	34	6.0	6.4	9.7
	4	57	10.0	10.8	20.5
	5	420	73.9	79.5	100.0
	Total	528	93.0	100.0	
Missing	System	40	7.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should respect women's rights.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	3	.5	.6	.6
	1	8	1.4	1.5	2.1
	2	18	3.2	3.4	5.5
	3	34	6.0	6.4	11.9
	4	62	10.9	11.7	23.5
	5	406	71.5	76.5	100.0
	Total	531	93.5	100.0	
Missing	System	37	6.5		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should allow women to work in the government and business.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	17	3.0	3.2	3.2
	1	19	3.3	3.6	6.8
	2	26	4.6	4.9	11.7
	3	56	9.9	10.6	22.3
	4	80	14.1	15.1	37.4
	5	331	58.3	62.6	100.0
	Total	529	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	39	6.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be good speaker.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	9	1.6	1.7	1.7
	1	5	.9	1.0	2.7
	2	18	3.2	3.4	6.1
	3	64	11.3	12.2	18.3
	4	77	13.6	14.7	33.0
	5	352	62.0	67.0	100.0
	Total	525	92.4	100.0	
Missing	System	43	7.6		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader should put on a suit with tie.

A good political leader should respect human rights.

A good political leader should respect women's rights.

A good political leader should allow women to work in the government and business.

A good political leader should be good speaker.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Gender * A good political leader should be a woman.	519	91.4%	49	8.6%	568	100.0%
Gender * A good political leader should put on a suit with tie.	513	90.3%	55	9.7%	568	100.0%
Gender * A good political leader should respect human rights.	528	93.0%	40	7.0%	568	100.0%
Gender * A good political leader should respect women's rights.	531	93.5%	37	6.5%	568	100.0%
Gender * A good political leader should allow women to work in the government and business.	529	93.1%	39	6.9%	568	100.0%
Gender * A good political leader should be good speaker.	525	92.4%	43	7.6%	568	100.0%

Gender * A good political leader should be a woman.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be a woman.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Gender	Female	Count	11	12	12	32	24	64	155
		Expected Count	26.9	26.6	18.5	35.8	14.6	32.6	155.0
	Male	Count	79	77	50	88	25	45	364
		Expected Count	63.1	62.4	43.5	84.2	34.4	76.4	364.0
Total		Count	90	89	62	120	49	109	519
		Expected Count	90.0	89.0	62.0	120.0	49.0	109.0	519.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	80.495 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	79.864	5	.000
N of Valid Cases	519		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.63.

Gender * A good political leader should put on a suit with tie.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should put on a suit with tie.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Gender	Female	Count	11	9	20	24	18	69	151
		Expected Count	19.1	17.1	21.8	32.1	16.2	44.7	151.0
	Male	Count	54	49	54	85	37	83	362
		Expected Count	45.9	40.9	52.2	76.9	38.8	107.3	362.0
Total		Count	65	58	74	109	55	152	513
		Expected Count	65.0	58.0	74.0	109.0	55.0	152.0	513.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	32.328 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	32.335	5	.000
N of Valid Cases	513		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.19.

Gender * A good political leader should respect human rights.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should respect human rights.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Gender	Female	Count	0	0	1	5	8	141	155
		Expected Count	.3	2.3	2.3	10.0	16.7	123.3	155.0
	Male	Count	1	8	7	29	49	279	373
		Expected Count	.7	5.7	5.7	24.0	40.3	296.7	373.0
Total		Count	1	8	8	34	57	420	528
		Expected Count	1.0	8.0	8.0	34.0	57.0	420.0	528.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18.405 ^a	5	.002
Likelihood Ratio	22.497	5	.000
N of Valid Cases	528		

a. 4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .29.

Gender * A good political leader should respect women's rights.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should respect women's rights.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Gender	Female	Count	0	0	2	3	8	144	157
		Expected Count	.9	2.4	5.3	10.1	18.3	120.0	157.0
	Male	Count	3	8	16	31	54	262	374
		Expected Count	2.1	5.6	12.7	23.9	43.7	286.0	374.0
Total		Count	3	8	18	34	62	406	531
		Expected Count	3.0	8.0	18.0	34.0	62.0	406.0	531.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	29.643 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	36.218	5	.000
N of Valid Cases	531		

a. 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .89.

Gender * A good political leader should allow women to work in the government and business.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should allow women to work in the government and business.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Gender	Female	Count	1	1	2	2	14	137	157
		Expected Count	5.0	5.6	7.7	16.6	23.7	98.2	157.0
	Male	Count	16	18	24	54	66	194	372
		Expected Count	12.0	13.4	18.3	39.4	56.3	232.8	372.0
Total		Count	17	19	26	56	80	331	529
		Expected Count	17.0	19.0	26.0	56.0	80.0	331.0	529.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	61.787 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	73.393	5	.000
N of Valid Cases	529		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.05.

Gender * A good political leader should be good speaker.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be good speaker.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Gender	Female	Count	2	0	3	9	14	129	157
		Expected Count	2.7	1.5	5.4	19.1	23.0	105.3	157.0
	Male	Count	7	5	15	55	63	223	368
		Expected Count	6.3	3.5	12.6	44.9	54.0	246.7	368.0
Total		Count	9	5	18	64	77	352	525
		Expected Count	9.0	5.0	18.0	64.0	77.0	352.0	525.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.237 ^a	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	27.239	5	.000
N of Valid Cases	525		

a. 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.50.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader should be a woman.	519	91.4%	49	8.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should put on a suit with tie.	513	90.3%	55	9.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should respect human rights.	528	93.0%	40	7.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should respect women's rights.	531	93.5%	37	6.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should allow women to work in the government and business.	529	93.1%	39	6.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be good speaker.	525	92.4%	43	7.6%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader should be a woman.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be a woman.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	5	4	13	26	7	22	77
		Expected Count	13.4	13.2	9.2	17.8	7.3	16.2	77.0
	Other	Count	3	1	2	5	2	2	15
		Expected Count	2.6	2.6	1.8	3.5	1.4	3.2	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	50	48	20	43	16	37	214
		Expected Count	37.1	36.7	25.6	49.5	20.2	44.9	214.0
	Tajik	Count	30	31	24	41	17	41	184
		Expected Count	31.9	31.6	22.0	42.5	17.4	38.6	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	5	3	5	7	7	29
		Expected Count	5.0	5.0	3.5	6.7	2.7	6.1	29.0
	Total	Count	90	89	62	120	49	109	519
		Expected Count	90.0	89.0	62.0	120.0	49.0	109.0	519.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	43.385 ^a	20	.002
Likelihood Ratio	44.960	20	.001
N of Valid Cases	519		

a. 9 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.42.

Ethnic * A good political leader should put on a suit with tie.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should put on a suit with tie.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	8	8	5	21	4	25	71
		Expected Count	9.0	8.0	10.2	15.1	7.6	21.0	71.0
	Other	Count	3	2	2	3	1	5	16
		Expected Count	2.0	1.8	2.3	3.4	1.7	4.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	39	29	37	48	18	45	216
		Expected Count	27.4	24.4	31.2	45.9	23.2	64.0	216.0
	Tajik	Count	14	18	24	32	24	69	181
		Expected Count	22.9	20.5	26.1	38.5	19.4	53.6	181.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	1	6	5	8	8	29
		Expected Count	3.7	3.3	4.2	6.2	3.1	8.6	29.0
Total	Count	65	58	74	109	55	152	513	
	Expected Count	65.0	58.0	74.0	109.0	55.0	152.0	513.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	45.041 ^a	20	.001
Likelihood Ratio	44.969	20	.001
N of Valid Cases	513		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.72.

Ethnic * A good political leader should respect human rights.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should respect human rights.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	7	7	63	77
		Expected Count	.1	1.2	1.2	5.0	8.3	61.3	77.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	0	3	13	16
		Expected Count	.0	.2	.2	1.0	1.7	12.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	0	4	4	20	29	162	219
		Expected Count	.4	3.3	3.3	14.1	23.6	174.2	219.0
	Tajik	Count	1	2	4	6	16	157	186
		Expected Count	.4	2.8	2.8	12.0	20.1	148.0	186.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	1	2	25	30
		Expected Count	.1	.5	.5	1.9	3.2	23.9	30.0
Total	Count	1	8	8	34	57	420	528	
	Expected Count	1.0	8.0	8.0	34.0	57.0	420.0	528.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.329 ^a	20	.228
Likelihood Ratio	26.710	20	.144
N of Valid Cases	528		

a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader should respect women's rights.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should respect women's rights.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	6	7	65	78
		Expected Count	.4	1.2	2.6	5.0	9.1	59.6	78.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	1	3	12	16
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.5	1.0	1.9	12.2	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	2	6	12	21	35	141	217
		Expected Count	1.2	3.3	7.4	13.9	25.3	165.9	217.0
	Tajik	Count	1	2	6	6	14	160	189
		Expected Count	1.1	2.8	6.4	12.1	22.1	144.5	189.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	0	3	28	31
		Expected Count	.2	.5	1.1	2.0	3.6	23.7	31.0
Total		Count	3	8	18	34	62	406	531
		Expected Count	3.0	8.0	18.0	34.0	62.0	406.0	531.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	36.291 ^a	20	.014
Likelihood Ratio	44.402	20	.001
N of Valid Cases	531		

a. 18 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Ethnic * A good political leader should allow women to work in the government and business.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should allow women to work in the government and business.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	1	0	1	5	6	66	79
		Expected Count	2.5	2.8	3.9	8.4	11.9	49.4	79.0
	Other	Count	0	1	0	2	3	10	16
		Expected Count	.5	.6	.8	1.7	2.4	10.0	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	13	12	17	31	49	94	216
		Expected Count	6.9	7.8	10.6	22.9	32.7	135.2	216.0
	Tajik	Count	3	5	7	17	21	135	188
		Expected Count	6.0	6.8	9.2	19.9	28.4	117.6	188.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	1	1	1	26	30
		Expected Count	1.0	1.1	1.5	3.2	4.5	18.8	30.0
Total	Count	17	19	26	56	80	331	529	
	Expected Count	17.0	19.0	26.0	56.0	80.0	331.0	529.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	68.238 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	75.031	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	529		

a. 13 cells (43.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .51.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be good speaker.

Crosstab									
			A good political leader should be good speaker.					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	14	13	50	77
		Expected Count	1.3	.7	2.6	9.4	11.3	51.6	77.0
	Other	Count	1	0	0	2	3	10	16
		Expected Count	.3	.2	.5	2.0	2.3	10.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	6	2	16	32	35	124	215
		Expected Count	3.7	2.0	7.4	26.2	31.5	144.2	215.0
	Tajik	Count	2	2	2	13	23	146	188
		Expected Count	3.2	1.8	6.4	22.9	27.6	126.0	188.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	3	3	22	29
		Expected Count	.5	.3	1.0	3.5	4.3	19.4	29.0
Total		Count	9	5	18	64	77	352	525
		Expected Count	9.0	5.0	18.0	64.0	77.0	352.0	525.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	42.093 ^a	20	.003
Likelihood Ratio	46.292	20	.001
N of Valid Cases	525		

a. 17 cells (56.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Frequencies

		Statistics													
		A good political leader should have a professional cabinet.	A good political leader should have good morals.	A good political leader should be a man.	A good political leader should have high income from a legitimate source.	A good political leader should speak both Dari and Pashtu languages.	A good political leader should be from the South.	A good political leader should acknowledge the Durand Line.	A good political leader should be brave.	A good political leader should be impartial.	A good political leader should have good relations with neighboring countries.	A good political leader should be internationally famous.	A good political leader should be good looking.	A good political leader should not religiously discriminate.	A good political leader should have the same deeds as his words.
N	Valid	532	529	494	515	519	534	529	534	530	534	531	518	530	519
	Missing	36	39	74	53	49	34	39	34	38	34	37	50	38	49
	Mean	4.68	4.69	4.21	3.77	4.40	4.82	3.21	4.80	4.45	4.51	4.24	3.08	4.66	4.66
	Median	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	3.00	5.00	5.00
	Mode	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	Std. Deviation	.836	.826	1.210	1.583	1.274	.707	2.049	.658	1.242	1.006	1.159	1.640	1.024	.877
	Skewness	-3.246	-3.050	-1.710	-1.088	-2.304	-5.018	-.536	-4.439	-2.401	-2.400	-1.698	-.352	-3.339	-3.276
	Std. Error of Skewness	.106	.106	.110	.108	.107	.106	.106	.106	.106	.106	.106	.107	.106	.107
	Kurtosis	11.702	9.932	2.693	.013	4.378	27.548	-1.432	23.163	4.861	5.783	2.595	-1.066	10.521	11.431
	Std. Error of Kurtosis	.211	.212	.219	.215	.214	.211	.212	.211	.212	.211	.212	.214	.212	.214
	Minimum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Maximum	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

Frequency Table

A good political leader should have a professional cabinet.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	5	.9	.9	.9
	1	4	.7	.8	1.7
	2	7	1.2	1.3	3.0
	3	33	5.8	6.2	9.2
	4	41	7.2	7.7	16.9
	5	442	77.8	83.1	100.0
Total		532	93.7	100.0	
Missing	System	36	6.3		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should have good morals.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	3	.5	.6	.6
	1	5	.9	.9	1.5
	2	9	1.6	1.7	3.2
	3	36	6.3	6.8	10.0
	4	32	5.6	6.0	16.1
	5	444	78.2	83.9	100.0
Total		529	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	39	6.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be a man.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	14	2.5	2.8	2.8
	1	9	1.6	1.8	4.7
	2	13	2.3	2.6	7.3
	3	87	15.3	17.6	24.9
	4	72	12.7	14.6	39.5
	5	299	52.6	60.5	100.0
Total		494	87.0	100.0	
Missing	System	74	13.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should have high income from a legitimate source.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	34	6.0	6.6	6.6
	1	31	5.5	6.0	12.6
	2	34	6.0	6.6	19.2
	3	89	15.7	17.3	36.5
	4	60	10.6	11.7	48.2
	5	267	47.0	51.8	100.0
Total		515	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	53	9.3		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should speak both Dari and Pashtu languages.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	19	3.3	3.7	3.7
	1	17	3.0	3.3	6.9
	2	11	1.9	2.1	9.1
	3	33	5.8	6.4	15.4
	4	47	8.3	9.1	24.5
	5	392	69.0	75.5	100.0
	Total	519	91.4	100.0	
Missing	System	49	8.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be from the South.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	6	1.1	1.1	1.1
	1	2	.4	.4	1.5
	2	3	.5	.6	2.1
	3	13	2.3	2.4	4.5
	4	22	3.9	4.1	8.6
	5	488	85.9	91.4	100.0
	Total	534	94.0	100.0	
Missing	System	34	6.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should acknowledge the Durand Line.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	97	17.1	18.3	18.3
	1	65	11.4	12.3	30.6
	2	26	4.6	4.9	35.5
	3	46	8.1	8.7	44.2
	4	33	5.8	6.2	50.5
	5	262	46.1	49.5	100.0
	Total	529	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	39	6.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be brave.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	3	.5	.6	.6
	1	3	.5	.6	1.1
	2	3	.5	.6	1.7
	3	16	2.8	3.0	4.7
	4	38	6.7	7.1	11.8
	5	471	82.9	88.2	100.0
	Total	534	94.0	100.0	
Missing	System	34	6.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be impartial.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	18	3.2	3.4	3.4
	1	14	2.5	2.6	6.0
	2	14	2.5	2.6	8.7
	3	36	6.3	6.8	15.5
	4	29	5.1	5.5	20.9
	5	419	73.8	79.1	100.0
	Total	530	93.3	100.0	
Missing	System	38	6.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should have good relations with neighboring countries.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	7	1.2	1.3	1.3
	1	5	.9	.9	2.2
	2	21	3.7	3.9	6.2
	3	40	7.0	7.5	13.7
	4	61	10.7	11.4	25.1
	5	400	70.4	74.9	100.0
	Total	534	94.0	100.0	
Missing	System	34	6.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be internationally famous.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	10	1.8	1.9	1.9
	1	11	1.9	2.1	4.0
	2	22	3.9	4.1	8.1
	3	75	13.2	14.1	22.2
	4	91	16.0	17.1	39.4
	5	322	56.7	60.6	100.0
Total		531	93.5	100.0	
Missing	System	37	6.5		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should be good looking.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	41	7.2	7.9	7.9
	1	71	12.5	13.7	21.6
	2	66	11.6	12.7	34.4
	3	118	20.8	22.8	57.1
	4	71	12.5	13.7	70.8
	5	151	26.6	29.2	100.0
Total		518	91.2	100.0	
Missing	System	50	8.8		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should not religiously discriminate.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	11	1.9	2.1	2.1
	1	11	1.9	2.1	4.2
	2	10	1.8	1.9	6.0
	3	12	2.1	2.3	8.3
	4	26	4.6	4.9	13.2
	5	460	81.0	86.8	100.0
	Total	530	93.3	100.0	
Missing	System	38	6.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader should have teh same deeds as his words.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	5	.9	1.0	1.0
	1	8	1.4	1.5	2.5
	2	8	1.4	1.5	4.0
	3	19	3.3	3.7	7.7
	4	56	9.9	10.8	18.5
	5	423	74.5	81.5	100.0
	Total	519	91.4	100.0	
Missing	System	49	8.6		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader should have a professional cabinet.

A good political leader should have good morals.

A good political leader should be a man.

A good political leader should have high income from a legitimate source.

A good political leader should speak both Dari and Pashtu languages.

A good political leader should be from the South.

A good political leader should acknowledge the Durand Line.

A good political leader should be brave.

A good political leader should be impartial.

A good political leader should have good relations with neighboring countries.

A good political leader should be internationally famous.

A good political leader should be good looking.

A good political leader should not religiously discriminate.

A good political leader should have teh same deeds as his words.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader should have a professional cabinet.	532	93.7%	36	6.3%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should have good morals.	529	93.1%	39	6.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be a man.	494	87.0%	74	13.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should have high income from a legitimate source.	515	90.7%	53	9.3%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should speak both Dari and Pashtu languages.	519	91.4%	49	8.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be from the South.	534	94.0%	34	6.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should acknowledge the Durand Line.	529	93.1%	39	6.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be brave.	534	94.0%	34	6.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be impartial.	530	93.3%	38	6.7%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader should have good relations with neighboring countries.	534	94.0%	34	6.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be internationally famous.	531	93.5%	37	6.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should be good looking.	518	91.2%	50	8.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should not religiously discriminate.	530	93.3%	38	6.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader should have teh same deeds as his words.	519	91.4%	49	8.6%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader should have a professional cabinet.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should have a professional cabinet.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	1	2	7	8	65	83
		Expected Count	.8	.6	1.1	5.1	6.4	69.0	83.0
	Other	Count	0	0	1	0	3	11	15
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.2	.9	1.2	12.5	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	2	2	3	23	19	167	216
		Expected Count	2.0	1.6	2.8	13.4	16.6	179.5	216.0

	Tajik	Count	3	1	0	2	10	173	189
		Expected Count	1.8	1.4	2.5	11.7	14.6	157.0	189.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	1	1	26	29
		Expected Count	.3	.2	.4	1.8	2.2	24.1	29.0
Total		Count	5	4	7	33	41	442	532
		Expected Count	5.0	4.0	7.0	33.0	41.0	442.0	532.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	36.048 ^a	20	.015
Likelihood Ratio	41.194	20	.004
N of Valid Cases	532		

a. 19 cells (63.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .11.

Ethnic * A good political leader should have good morals.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should have good morals.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	1	3	14	8	51	79
		Expected Count	.4	.7	1.3	5.4	4.8	66.3	79.0
	Other	Count	0	1	0	1	2	12	16
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.3	1.1	1.0	13.4	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	0	1	2	14	12	191	220
		Expected Count	1.2	2.1	3.7	15.0	13.3	184.7	220.0
	Tajik	Count	1	2	3	6	8	164	184
		Expected Count	1.0	1.7	3.1	12.5	11.1	154.4	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	1	2	26	30
		Expected Count	.2	.3	.5	2.0	1.8	25.2	30.0
	Total	Count	3	5	9	36	32	444	529
		Expected Count	3.0	5.0	9.0	36.0	32.0	444.0	529.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	42.873 ^a	20	.002
Likelihood Ratio	35.841	20	.016
N of Valid Cases	529		

a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be a man.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be a man.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	4	1	5	18	12	31	71
		Expected Count	2.0	1.3	1.9	12.5	10.3	43.0	71.0
	Other	Count	1	1	0	3	3	6	14
		Expected Count	.4	.3	.4	2.5	2.0	8.5	14.0
	Pashtun	Count	6	2	3	30	31	135	207
		Expected Count	5.9	3.8	5.4	36.5	30.2	125.3	207.0
	Tajik	Count	3	5	4	28	22	112	174
		Expected Count	4.9	3.2	4.6	30.6	25.4	105.3	174.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	8	4	15	28
		Expected Count	.8	.5	.7	4.9	4.1	16.9	28.0
	Total	Count	14	9	13	87	72	299	494
		Expected Count	14.0	9.0	13.0	87.0	72.0	299.0	494.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	28.414 ^a	20	.100
Likelihood Ratio	26.974	20	.136
N of Valid Cases	494		

a. 17 cells (56.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .26.

Ethnic * A good political leader should have high income from a legitimate source.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should have high income from a legitimate source.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	5	7	8	17	7	29	73
		Expected Count	4.8	4.4	4.8	12.6	8.5	37.8	73.0
	Other	Count	2	0	0	3	2	8	15
		Expected Count	1.0	.9	1.0	2.6	1.7	7.8	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	21	20	12	43	24	94	214
		Expected Count	14.1	12.9	14.1	37.0	24.9	110.9	214.0
	Tajik	Count	3	4	12	22	24	119	184
		Expected Count	12.1	11.1	12.1	31.8	21.4	95.4	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	3	0	2	4	3	17	29
		Expected Count	1.9	1.7	1.9	5.0	3.4	15.0	29.0
	Total	Count	34	31	34	89	60	267	515
		Expected Count	34.0	31.0	34.0	89.0	60.0	267.0	515.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	45.184 ^a	20	.001
Likelihood Ratio	51.481	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	515		

a. 12 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .90.

Ethnic * A good political leader should speak both Dari and Pashtu languages.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should speak both Dari and Pashtu languages.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	6	2	2	7	6	50	73
		Expected Count	2.7	2.4	1.5	4.6	6.6	55.1	73.0
	Other	Count	2	0	0	2	1	11	16
		Expected Count	.6	.5	.3	1.0	1.4	12.1	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	2	7	7	12	24	163	215
		Expected Count	7.9	7.0	4.6	13.7	19.5	162.4	215.0
	Tajik	Count	7	6	1	11	15	146	186
		Expected Count	6.8	6.1	3.9	11.8	16.8	140.5	186.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	2	1	1	1	22	29
		Expected Count	1.1	.9	.6	1.8	2.6	21.9	29.0
	Total	Count	19	17	11	33	47	392	519
		Expected Count	19.0	17.0	11.0	33.0	47.0	392.0	519.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.790 ^a	20	.210
Likelihood Ratio	25.366	20	.188
N of Valid Cases	519		

a. 16 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .34.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be from the South.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be from the South.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	1	3	76	80
		Expected Count	.9	.3	.4	1.9	3.3	73.1	80.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	0	0	16	16
		Expected Count	.2	.1	.1	.4	.7	14.6	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	3	2	2	8	14	189	218
		Expected Count	2.4	.8	1.2	5.3	9.0	199.2	218.0
	Tajik	Count	3	0	1	3	5	177	189
		Expected Count	2.1	.7	1.1	4.6	7.8	172.7	189.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	1	0	30	31
		Expected Count	.3	.1	.2	.8	1.3	28.3	31.0
	Total	Count	6	2	3	13	22	488	534
		Expected Count	6.0	2.0	3.0	13.0	22.0	488.0	534.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.611 ^a	20	.740
Likelihood Ratio	20.355	20	.436
N of Valid Cases	534		

a. 22 cells (73.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Ethnic * A good political leader should acknowledge the Durand Line.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should acknowledge the Durand Line.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	10	9	6	8	5	41	79
		Expected Count	14.5	9.7	3.9	6.9	4.9	39.1	79.0
	Other	Count	5	2	3	0	1	4	15
		Expected Count	2.8	1.8	.7	1.3	.9	7.4	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	57	30	7	15	14	95	218
		Expected Count	40.0	26.8	10.7	19.0	13.6	108.0	218.0
	Tajik	Count	24	22	9	20	11	102	188
		Expected Count	34.5	23.1	9.2	16.3	11.7	93.1	188.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	2	1	3	2	20	29
		Expected Count	5.3	3.6	1.4	2.5	1.8	14.4	29.0
	Total	Count	97	65	26	46	33	262	529
		Expected Count	97.0	65.0	26.0	46.0	33.0	262.0	529.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	37.474 ^a	20	.010
Likelihood Ratio	37.114	20	.011
N of Valid Cases	529		

a. 11 cells (36.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .74.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be brave.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be brave.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	0	0	3	5	70	78
		Expected Count	.4	.4	.4	2.3	5.6	68.8	78.0
	Other	Count	1	0	0	1	1	13	16
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.1	.5	1.1	14.1	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	3	2	10	20	182	218
		Expected Count	1.2	1.2	1.2	6.5	15.5	192.3	218.0
	Tajik	Count	0	0	1	1	11	178	191
		Expected Count	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.7	13.6	168.5	191.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	0	0	1	1	28	31
		Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.9	2.2	27.3	31.0
	Total	Count	3	3	3	16	38	471	534
		Expected Count	3.0	3.0	3.0	16.0	38.0	471.0	534.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	30.464 ^a	20	.063
Likelihood Ratio	27.087	20	.133
N of Valid Cases	534		

a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be impartial.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be impartial.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	2	5	6	4	59	78
		Expected Count	2.6	2.1	2.1	5.3	4.3	61.7	78.0
	Other	Count	1	2	0	2	1	10	16
		Expected Count	.5	.4	.4	1.1	.9	12.6	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	10	6	5	16	11	171	219
		Expected Count	7.4	5.8	5.8	14.9	12.0	173.1	219.0
	Tajik	Count	4	4	4	11	7	157	187
		Expected Count	6.4	4.9	4.9	12.7	10.2	147.8	187.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	0	0	1	6	22	30
		Expected Count	1.0	.8	.8	2.0	1.6	23.7	30.0
	Total	Count	18	14	14	36	29	419	530
		Expected Count	18.0	14.0	14.0	36.0	29.0	419.0	530.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	30.657 ^a	20	.060
Likelihood Ratio	24.053	20	.240
N of Valid Cases	530		

a. 16 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .42.

Ethnic * A good political leader should have good relations with neighboring countries.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should have good relations with neighboring countries.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	1	2	1	5	10	60	79
		Expected Count	1.0	.7	3.1	5.9	9.0	59.2	79.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	0	2	14	16
		Expected Count	.2	.1	.6	1.2	1.8	12.0	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	6	3	18	28	35	130	220
		Expected Count	2.9	2.1	8.7	16.5	25.1	164.8	220.0
	Tajik	Count	0	0	1	6	13	169	189
		Expected Count	2.5	1.8	7.4	14.2	21.6	141.6	189.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	1	1	27	30
		Expected Count	.4	.3	1.2	2.2	3.4	22.5	30.0
	Total	Count	7	5	21	40	61	400	534
		Expected Count	7.0	5.0	21.0	40.0	61.0	400.0	534.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	66.822 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	74.863	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	534		

a. 17 cells (56.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be internationally famous.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be internationally famous.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	1	2	3	16	11	45	78
		Expected Count	1.5	1.6	3.2	11.0	13.4	47.3	78.0
	Other	Count	1	0	0	2	4	9	16
		Expected Count	.3	.3	.7	2.3	2.7	9.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	6	3	13	37	43	117	219
		Expected Count	4.1	4.5	9.1	30.9	37.5	132.8	219.0
	Tajik	Count	2	6	6	17	32	125	188
		Expected Count	3.5	3.9	7.8	26.6	32.2	114.0	188.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	3	1	26	30
		Expected Count	.6	.6	1.2	4.2	5.1	18.2	30.0
	Total	Count	10	11	22	75	91	322	531
		Expected Count	10.0	11.0	22.0	75.0	91.0	322.0	531.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	29.452 ^a	20	.079
Likelihood Ratio	33.475	20	.030
N of Valid Cases	531		

a. 16 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

Ethnic * A good political leader should be good looking.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should be good looking.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	12	17	5	20	9	14	77
		Expected Count	6.1	10.6	9.8	17.5	10.6	22.4	77.0
	Other	Count	3	1	1	5	1	5	16
		Expected Count	1.3	2.2	2.0	3.6	2.2	4.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	9	17	27	52	39	71	215
		Expected Count	17.0	29.5	27.4	49.0	29.5	62.7	215.0
	Tajik	Count	16	34	25	33	19	54	181
		Expected Count	14.3	24.8	23.1	41.2	24.8	52.8	181.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	2	8	8	3	7	29
		Expected Count	2.3	4.0	3.7	6.6	4.0	8.5	29.0
	Total	Count	41	71	66	118	71	151	518
		Expected Count	41.0	71.0	66.0	118.0	71.0	151.0	518.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	48.240 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	47.557	20	.000
N of Valid Cases	518		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.27.

Ethnic * A good political leader should not religiously discriminate.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should not religiously discriminate.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	2	0	1	3	70	78
		Expected Count	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.8	3.8	67.7	78.0
	Other	Count	1	0	2	1	1	11	16
		Expected Count	.3	.3	.3	.4	.8	13.9	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	8	5	6	7	13	178	217
		Expected Count	4.5	4.5	4.1	4.9	10.6	188.3	217.0
	Tajik	Count	0	4	2	2	9	170	187
		Expected Count	3.9	3.9	3.5	4.2	9.2	162.3	187.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	1	0	31	32
		Expected Count	.7	.7	.6	.7	1.6	27.8	32.0
	Total	Count	11	11	10	12	26	460	530
		Expected Count	11.0	11.0	10.0	12.0	26.0	460.0	530.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	30.955 ^a	20	.056
Likelihood Ratio	33.646	20	.029
N of Valid Cases	530		

a. 23 cells (76.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

Ethnic * A good political leader should have the same deeds as his words.

Crosstab

			A good political leader should have the same deeds as his words.						Total
			0	1	2	3	4	5	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	1	1	0	10	63	77
		Expected Count	.7	1.2	1.2	2.8	8.3	62.8	77.0
	Other	Count	0	2	0	1	1	12	16
		Expected Count	.2	.2	.2	.6	1.7	13.0	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	2	2	6	17	22	163	212
		Expected Count	2.0	3.3	3.3	7.8	22.9	172.8	212.0
	Tajik	Count	1	3	1	1	18	159	183
		Expected Count	1.8	2.8	2.8	6.7	19.7	149.2	183.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	0	5	26	31
		Expected Count	.3	.5	.5	1.1	3.3	25.3	31.0
	Total	Count	5	8	8	19	56	423	519
		Expected Count	5.0	8.0	8.0	19.0	56.0	423.0	519.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	43.668 ^a	20	.002
Likelihood Ratio	40.880	20	.004
N of Valid Cases	519		

a. 20 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Frequencies:

Statistics							
	A good political leader brings international aid to the country.						
	A good political leader respects the views of MPs.						
	A good political leader conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.						
	A good political leader promotes women's rights in the country.						
	A good political leader promotes democracy in the country.						
	A good political leader promotes close relations with Western countries.						
	A good political leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.						
N Valid	510	508	511	506	510	510	498
Missing	58	60	57	62	58	58	70

Frequency Table:

A good political leader brings international aid to the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	16	2.8	3.1	3.1
	Somewhat Important	130	22.9	25.5	28.6
	Very Important	364	64.1	71.4	100.0
	Total	510	89.8	100.0	
Missing	nr	58	10.2		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader respects the views of MPs.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	16	2.8	3.1	3.1
	Somewhat Important	169	29.8	33.3	36.4
	Very Important	323	56.9	63.6	100.0
	Total	508	89.4	100.0	
Missing	nr	60	10.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	31	5.5	6.1	6.1
	Somewhat Important	121	21.3	23.7	29.7
	Very Important	359	63.2	70.3	100.0
	Total	511	90.0	100.0	
Missing	nr	57	10.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader promotes women's rights in the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	28	4.9	5.5	5.5
	Somewhat Important	127	22.4	25.1	30.6
	Very Important	351	61.8	69.4	100.0
	Total	506	89.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	62	10.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader promotes democracy in the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	47	8.3	9.2	9.2
	Somewhat Important	150	26.4	29.4	38.6
	Very Important	313	55.1	61.4	100.0
	Total	510	89.8	100.0	
Missing	nr	58	10.2		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader promotes close relations with Western countries.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	106	18.7	20.8	20.8
	Somewhat Important	170	29.9	33.3	54.1
	Very Important	234	41.2	45.9	100.0
	Total	510	89.8	100.0	
Missing	nr	58	10.2		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	16	2.8	3.2	3.2
	Somewhat Important	125	22.0	25.1	28.3
	Very Important	357	62.9	71.7	100.0
	Total	498	87.7	100.0	
Missing	nr	70	12.3		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader respects the views of MPs.

A good political leader conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.

A good political leader promotes women's rights in the country.

A good political leader promotes democracy in the country.

A good political leader promotes close relations with Western countries.

A good political leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader brings international aid to the country.	510	89.8%	58	10.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader respects the views of MPs.	508	89.4%	60	10.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.	511	90.0%	57	10.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader promotes women's rights in the country.	506	89.1%	62	10.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader promotes democracy in the country.	510	89.8%	58	10.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader promotes close relations with Western countries.	510	89.8%	58	10.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.	498	87.7%	70	12.3%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader brings international aid to the country.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader brings international aid to the country.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	4	33	40	77
		Expected Count	2.4	19.6	55.0	77.0
	Other	Count	0	7	9	16
		Expected Count	.5	4.1	11.4	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	8	45	156	209
		Expected Count	6.6	53.3	149.2	209.0
	Tajik	Count	2	39	137	178
		Expected Count	5.6	45.4	127.0	178.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	6	22	30
		Expected Count	.9	7.6	21.4	30.0
Total		Count	16	130	364	510
		Expected Count	16.0	130.0	364.0	510.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.782 ^a	8	.002
Likelihood Ratio	24.211	8	.002
N of Valid Cases	510		

a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .50.

Ethnic * A good political leader respects the views of MPs.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader respects the views of MPs.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	30	46	76
		Expected Count	2.4	25.3	48.3	76.0
	Other	Count	0	7	9	16
		Expected Count	.5	5.3	10.2	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	10	75	120	205
		Expected Count	6.5	68.2	130.3	205.0
	Tajik	Count	6	46	129	181
		Expected Count	5.7	60.2	115.1	181.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	11	19	30
		Expected Count	.9	10.0	19.1	30.0
Total	Count	16	169	323	508	
	Expected Count	16.0	169.0	323.0	508.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14.100 ^a	8	.079
Likelihood Ratio	17.804	8	.023
N of Valid Cases	508		

a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .50.

Ethnic * A good political leader conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	1	14	62	77
		Expected Count	4.7	18.2	54.1	77.0
	Other	Count	2	0	13	15
		Expected Count	.9	3.6	10.5	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	15	70	123	208
		Expected Count	12.6	49.3	146.1	208.0
	Tajik	Count	11	32	136	179
		Expected Count	10.9	42.4	125.8	179.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	5	25	32
		Expected Count	1.9	7.6	22.5	32.0
Total	Count		31	121	359	511
	Expected Count		31.0	121.0	359.0	511.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	27.847 ^a	8	.001
Likelihood Ratio	31.923	8	.000
N of Valid Cases	511		

a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .91.

Ethnic * A good political leader promotes women's rights in the country.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader promotes women's rights in the country.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	4	19	55	78
		Expected Count	4.3	19.6	54.1	78.0
	Other	Count	0	6	10	16
		Expected Count	.9	4.0	11.1	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	21	67	117	205
		Expected Count	11.3	51.5	142.2	205.0
	Tajik	Count	3	30	142	175
		Expected Count	9.7	43.9	121.4	175.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	5	27	32
		Expected Count	1.8	8.0	22.2	32.0
	Total	Count	28	127	351	506
		Expected Count	28.0	127.0	351.0	506.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.893 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	38.844	8	.000
N of Valid Cases	506		

a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .89.

Ethnic * A good political leader promotes democracy in the country.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader promotes democracy in the country.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	22	53	77
		Expected Count	7.1	22.6	47.3	77.0
	Other	Count	0	7	9	16
		Expected Count	1.5	4.7	9.8	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	25	66	116	207
		Expected Count	19.1	60.9	127.0	207.0
	Tajik	Count	19	47	112	178
		Expected Count	16.4	52.4	109.2	178.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	8	23	32
		Expected Count	2.9	9.4	19.6	32.0
Total	Count	47	150	313	510	
	Expected Count	47.0	150.0	313.0	510.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13.369 ^a	8	.100
Likelihood Ratio	16.418	8	.037
N of Valid Cases	510		

a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.47.

Ethnic * A good political leader promotes close relations with Western countries.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader promotes close relations with Western countries.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	13	28	37	78
		Expected Count	16.2	26.0	35.8	78.0
	Other	Count	2	5	9	16
		Expected Count	3.3	5.3	7.3	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	36	70	99	205
		Expected Count	42.6	68.3	94.1	205.0
	Tajik	Count	46	61	72	179
		Expected Count	37.2	59.7	82.1	179.0
	Uzbek	Count	9	6	17	32
		Expected Count	6.7	10.7	14.7	32.0
Total	Count		106	170	234	510
	Expected Count		106.0	170.0	234.0	510.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.676 ^a	8	.289
Likelihood Ratio	10.029	8	.263
N of Valid Cases	510		

a. 1 cells (6.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.33.

Ethnic * A good political leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	3	22	51	76
		Expected Count	2.4	19.1	54.5	76.0
	Other	Count	0	6	10	16
		Expected Count	.5	4.0	11.5	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	5	54	143	202
		Expected Count	6.5	50.7	144.8	202.0
	Tajik	Count	8	39	129	176
		Expected Count	5.7	44.2	126.2	176.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	4	24	28
		Expected Count	.9	7.0	20.1	28.0
	Total	Count	16	125	357	498
		Expected Count	16.0	125.0	357.0	498.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.676 ^a	8	.466
Likelihood Ratio	9.077	8	.336
N of Valid Cases	498		

a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .51.

Crosstabs

	Case Processing Summary					
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Province * A good political leader brings international aid to the country.	510	89.8%	58	10.2%	568	100.0%
Province * A good political leader respects the views of MPs.	508	89.4%	60	10.6%	568	100.0%
Province * A good political leader conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.	511	90.0%	57	10.0%	568	100.0%
Province * A good political leader promotes women's rights in the country.	506	89.1%	62	10.9%	568	100.0%
Province * A good political leader promotes democracy in the country.	510	89.8%	58	10.2%	568	100.0%
Province * A good political leader promotes close relations with Western countries.	510	89.8%	58	10.2%	568	100.0%
Province * A good political leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.	498	87.7%	70	12.3%	568	100.0%

Province * A good political leader brings international aid to the country.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader brings international aid to the country.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Province	Badakhshan	Count	0	7	23	30
		Expected Count	.9	7.6	21.4	30.0
	Baghlan	Count	0	1	8	9
		Expected Count	.3	2.3	6.4	9.0
	Balkh	Count	4	22	93	119
		Expected Count	3.7	30.3	84.9	119.0
	Bamyan	Count	0	5	6	11
		Expected Count	.3	2.8	7.9	11.0
	Daikundi	Count	1	4	2	7
		Expected Count	.2	1.8	5.0	7.0
	Farah	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Faryab	Count	2	4	14	20
		Expected Count	.6	5.1	14.3	20.0
	Ghazni	Count	1	13	27	41
		Expected Count	1.3	10.5	29.3	41.0
	Ghor	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Helmand	Count	4	2	6	12
		Expected Count	.4	3.1	8.6	12.0
	Jawzjan	Count	0	1	5	6
		Expected Count	.2	1.5	4.3	6.0
	Kabul	Count	0	27	33	60
		Expected Count	1.9	15.3	42.8	60.0
	Kandahar	Count	3	29	63	95
		Expected Count	3.0	24.2	67.8	95.0
	Kapisa	Count	0	1	5	6
		Expected Count	.2	1.5	4.3	6.0
	Khost	Count	0	0	12	12
		Expected Count	.4	3.1	8.6	12.0

	Kunar	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Kunduz	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Laghman	Count	0	2	8	10
		Expected Count	.3	2.5	7.1	10.0
	Logar	Count	0	2	12	14
		Expected Count	.4	3.6	10.0	14.0
	Nangarhar	Count	0	0	8	8
		Expected Count	.3	2.0	5.7	8.0
	Paktya	Count	0	1	10	11
		Expected Count	.3	2.8	7.9	11.0
	Panj Sher	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Parwan	Count	0	0	9	9
		Expected Count	.3	2.3	6.4	9.0
	Samangan	Count	0	3	3	6
		Expected Count	.2	1.5	4.3	6.0
	Sarpul	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Takhar	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Uruzgan	Count	0	1	1	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Wardak	Count	1	5	8	14
		Expected Count	.4	3.6	10.0	14.0
Total		Count	16	130	364	510
		Expected Count	16.0	130.0	364.0	510.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	94.229 ^a	54	.001
Likelihood Ratio	82.300	54	.008
N of Valid Cases	510		

a. 62 cells (73.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Province * A good political leader respects the views of MPs.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader respects the views of MPs.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Province	Badakhshan	Count	0	12	20	32
		Expected Count	1.0	10.6	20.3	32.0
	Baghlan	Count	0	2	7	9
		Expected Count	.3	3.0	5.7	9.0
	Balkh	Count	0	25	96	121
		Expected Count	3.8	40.3	76.9	121.0
	Bamyan	Count	0	6	6	12
		Expected Count	.4	4.0	7.6	12.0
	Daikundi	Count	0	3	3	6
		Expected Count	.2	2.0	3.8	6.0
	Farah	Count	0	1	0	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.6	1.0
	Faryab	Count	0	9	12	21
		Expected Count	.7	7.0	13.4	21.0
	Ghazni	Count	4	14	23	41
		Expected Count	1.3	13.6	26.1	41.0
	Ghor	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.1	.7	1.3	2.0
	Helmand	Count	0	3	9	12
		Expected Count	.4	4.0	7.6	12.0
	Jawzjan	Count	0	1	5	6
		Expected Count	.2	2.0	3.8	6.0
	Kabul	Count	4	29	24	57
		Expected Count	1.8	19.0	36.2	57.0
	Kandahar	Count	1	38	52	91
		Expected Count	2.9	30.3	57.9	91.0
	Kapisa	Count	0	2	4	6
		Expected Count	.2	2.0	3.8	6.0
	Khost	Count	1	4	7	12
		Expected Count	.4	4.0	7.6	12.0
	Kunar	Count	0	0	2	2

	Expected Count		.1	.7	1.3	2.0
	Kunduz	Count	0	0	1	1
	Expected Count		.0	.3	.6	1.0
	Laghman	Count	0	2	8	10
	Expected Count		.3	3.3	6.4	10.0
	Logar	Count	1	2	11	14
	Expected Count		.4	4.7	8.9	14.0
	Nangarhar	Count	2	3	4	9
	Expected Count		.3	3.0	5.7	9.0
	Paktya	Count	0	5	6	11
	Expected Count		.3	3.7	7.0	11.0
	Panj Sher	Count	1	0	0	1
	Expected Count		.0	.3	.6	1.0
	Parwan	Count	2	1	7	10
	Expected Count		.3	3.3	6.4	10.0
	Samangan	Count	0	2	3	5
	Expected Count		.2	1.7	3.2	5.0
	Sarpul	Count	0	1	0	1
	Expected Count		.0	.3	.6	1.0
	Takhar	Count	0	0	1	1
	Expected Count		.0	.3	.6	1.0
	Uruzgan	Count	0	1	1	2
	Expected Count		.1	.7	1.3	2.0
	Wardak	Count	0	3	9	12
	Expected Count		.4	4.0	7.6	12.0
	Total	Count	16	169	323	508
	Expected Count		16.0	169.0	323.0	508.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	111.751 ^a	54	.000
Likelihood Ratio	86.020	54	.004
N of Valid Cases	508		

a. 62 cells (73.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Province * A good political leader conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader conducts national censuses to determine how many we are.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Province	Badakhshan	Count	1	12	18	31
		Expected Count	1.9	7.3	21.8	31.0
	Baghlan	Count	1	1	8	10
		Expected Count	.6	2.4	7.0	10.0
	Balkh	Count	8	14	101	123
		Expected Count	7.5	29.1	86.4	123.0
	Bamyan	Count	0	1	11	12
		Expected Count	.7	2.8	8.4	12.0
	Daikundi	Count	1	1	5	7
		Expected Count	.4	1.7	4.9	7.0
	Farah	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.7	1.0
	Faryab	Count	0	3	18	21
		Expected Count	1.3	5.0	14.8	21.0
	Ghazni	Count	3	7	30	40
		Expected Count	2.4	9.5	28.1	40.0
	Ghor	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Helmand	Count	0	3	6	9
		Expected Count	.5	2.1	6.3	9.0
	Jawzjan	Count	1	0	5	6
		Expected Count	.4	1.4	4.2	6.0
	Kabul	Count	2	12	46	60
		Expected Count	3.6	14.2	42.2	60.0
	Kandahar	Count	8	45	37	90
		Expected Count	5.5	21.3	63.2	90.0
	Kapisa	Count	0	2	3	5
		Expected Count	.3	1.2	3.5	5.0
	Khost	Count	1	1	10	12
		Expected Count	.7	2.8	8.4	12.0

	Kunar	Count	1	0	1	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Kunduz	Count	0	1	0	1
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.7	1.0
	Laghman	Count	0	2	8	10
		Expected Count	.6	2.4	7.0	10.0
	Logar	Count	0	4	11	15
		Expected Count	.9	3.6	10.5	15.0
	Nangarhar	Count	0	4	5	9
		Expected Count	.5	2.1	6.3	9.0
	Paktya	Count	1	1	9	11
		Expected Count	.7	2.6	7.7	11.0
	Panj Sher	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.7	1.0
	Parwan	Count	3	2	5	10
		Expected Count	.6	2.4	7.0	10.0
	Samangan	Count	0	2	4	6
		Expected Count	.4	1.4	4.2	6.0
	Sarpul	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.7	1.0
	Takhar	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.1	.2	.7	1.0
	Uruzgan	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Wardak	Count	0	3	10	13
		Expected Count	.8	3.1	9.1	13.0
Total		Count	31	121	359	511
		Expected Count	31.0	121.0	359.0	511.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	99.680 ^a	54	.000
Likelihood Ratio	98.252	54	.000
N of Valid Cases	511		

a. 61 cells (72.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Province * A good political leader promotes women's rights in the country.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader promotes women's rights in the country.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Province	Badakhshan	Count	0	5	22	27
		Expected Count	1.5	6.8	18.7	27.0
	Baghlan	Count	0	4	6	10
		Expected Count	.6	2.5	6.9	10.0
	Balkh	Count	3	16	104	123
		Expected Count	6.8	30.9	85.3	123.0
	Bamyan	Count	0	4	8	12
		Expected Count	.7	3.0	8.3	12.0
	Daikundi	Count	0	2	5	7
		Expected Count	.4	1.8	4.9	7.0
	Farah	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.1	.3	.7	1.0
	Faryab	Count	0	2	19	21
		Expected Count	1.2	5.3	14.6	21.0
	Ghazni	Count	3	11	27	41
		Expected Count	2.3	10.3	28.4	41.0
	Ghor	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Helmand	Count	0	3	7	10
		Expected Count	.6	2.5	6.9	10.0
	Jawzjan	Count	0	1	5	6
		Expected Count	.3	1.5	4.2	6.0
	Kabul	Count	5	12	43	60
		Expected Count	3.3	15.1	41.6	60.0
	Kandahar	Count	12	34	43	89
		Expected Count	4.9	22.3	61.7	89.0
	Kapisa	Count	0	3	2	5
		Expected Count	.3	1.3	3.5	5.0
	Khost	Count	3	4	5	12
		Expected Count	.7	3.0	8.3	12.0

	Kunar	Count	0	1	1	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Kunduz	Count	0	1	0	1
		Expected Count	.1	.3	.7	1.0
	Laghman	Count	0	4	6	10
		Expected Count	.6	2.5	6.9	10.0
	Logar	Count	1	2	12	15
		Expected Count	.8	3.8	10.4	15.0
	Nangarhar	Count	0	3	6	9
		Expected Count	.5	2.3	6.2	9.0
	Paktya	Count	0	4	6	10
		Expected Count	.6	2.5	6.9	10.0
	Panj Sher	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.1	.3	.7	1.0
	Parwan	Count	0	4	6	10
		Expected Count	.6	2.5	6.9	10.0
	Samangan	Count	0	3	3	6
		Expected Count	.3	1.5	4.2	6.0
	Sarpul	Count	1	0	0	1
		Expected Count	.1	.3	.7	1.0
	Uruzgan	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Wardak	Count	0	4	9	13
		Expected Count	.7	3.3	9.0	13.0
Total		Count	28	127	351	506
		Expected Count	28.0	127.0	351.0	506.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	94.766 ^a	52	.000
Likelihood Ratio	87.885	52	.001
N of Valid Cases	506		

a. 58 cells (71.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Province * A good political leader promotes democracy in the country.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader promotes democracy in the country.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Province	Badakhshan	Count	9	7	14	30
		Expected Count	2.8	8.8	18.4	30.0
	Baghlan	Count	0	4	5	9
		Expected Count	.8	2.6	5.5	9.0
	Balkh	Count	9	20	95	124
		Expected Count	11.4	36.5	76.1	124.0
	Bamyan	Count	0	4	8	12
		Expected Count	1.1	3.5	7.4	12.0
	Daikundi	Count	0	2	5	7
		Expected Count	.6	2.1	4.3	7.0
	Farah	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.1	.3	.6	1.0
	Faryab	Count	1	5	15	21
		Expected Count	1.9	6.2	12.9	21.0
	Ghazni	Count	1	14	26	41
		Expected Count	3.8	12.1	25.2	41.0
	Ghor	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.2	.6	1.2	2.0
	Helmand	Count	1	4	5	10
		Expected Count	.9	2.9	6.1	10.0
	Jawzjan	Count	0	1	5	6
		Expected Count	.6	1.8	3.7	6.0
	Kabul	Count	5	19	35	59
		Expected Count	5.4	17.4	36.2	59.0
	Kandahar	Count	13	40	38	91
		Expected Count	8.4	26.8	55.8	91.0
	Kapisa	Count	0	3	2	5
		Expected Count	.5	1.5	3.1	5.0
	Khost	Count	2	5	5	12
		Expected Count	1.1	3.5	7.4	12.0
	Kunar	Count	0	0	2	2

	Expected Count		.2	.6	1.2	2.0
	Kunduz	Count	0	1	0	1
	Expected Count		.1	.3	.6	1.0
	Laghman	Count	1	3	6	10
	Expected Count		.9	2.9	6.1	10.0
	Logar	Count	2	3	10	15
	Expected Count		1.4	4.4	9.2	15.0
	Nangarhar	Count	0	3	6	9
	Expected Count		.8	2.6	5.5	9.0
	Paktya	Count	0	1	9	10
	Expected Count		.9	2.9	6.1	10.0
	Panj Sher	Count	0	1	0	1
	Expected Count		.1	.3	.6	1.0
	Parwan	Count	2	2	6	10
	Expected Count		.9	2.9	6.1	10.0
	Samangan	Count	0	2	4	6
	Expected Count		.6	1.8	3.7	6.0
	Sarpul	Count	0	1	0	1
	Expected Count		.1	.3	.6	1.0
	Takhar	Count	1	0	0	1
	Expected Count		.1	.3	.6	1.0
	Uruzgan	Count	0	0	2	2
	Expected Count		.2	.6	1.2	2.0
	Wardak	Count	0	5	7	12
	Expected Count		1.1	3.5	7.4	12.0
	Total	Count	47	150	313	510
	Expected Count		47.0	150.0	313.0	510.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	87.232 ^a	54	.003
Likelihood Ratio	87.542	54	.003
N of Valid Cases	510		

a. 59 cells (70.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Province * A good political leader promotes close relations with Western countries.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader promotes close relations with Western countries.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Province	Badakhshan	Count	9	17	5	31
		Expected Count	6.4	10.3	14.2	31.0
	Baghlan	Count	4	4	2	10
		Expected Count	2.1	3.3	4.6	10.0
	Balkh	Count	31	22	71	124
		Expected Count	25.8	41.3	56.9	124.0
	Bamyan	Count	2	6	4	12
		Expected Count	2.5	4.0	5.5	12.0
	Daikundi	Count	2	3	2	7
		Expected Count	1.5	2.3	3.2	7.0
	Farah	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.2	.3	.5	1.0
	Faryab	Count	6	5	10	21
		Expected Count	4.4	7.0	9.6	21.0
	Ghazni	Count	6	15	20	41
		Expected Count	8.5	13.7	18.8	41.0
	Ghor	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.4	.7	.9	2.0
	Helmand	Count	4	2	4	10
		Expected Count	2.1	3.3	4.6	10.0
	Jawzjan	Count	0	2	4	6
		Expected Count	1.2	2.0	2.8	6.0
	Kabul	Count	12	23	24	59
		Expected Count	12.3	19.7	27.1	59.0
	Kandahar	Count	14	41	33	88
		Expected Count	18.3	29.3	40.4	88.0
	Kapisa	Count	0	3	2	5
		Expected Count	1.0	1.7	2.3	5.0
	Khost	Count	0	3	9	12
		Expected Count	2.5	4.0	5.5	12.0

	Kunar	Count	0	1	1	2
		Expected Count	.4	.7	.9	2.0
	Kunduz	Count	0	1	0	1
		Expected Count	.2	.3	.5	1.0
	Laghman	Count	4	3	3	10
		Expected Count	2.1	3.3	4.6	10.0
	Logar	Count	1	3	11	15
		Expected Count	3.1	5.0	6.9	15.0
	Nangarhar	Count	3	4	2	9
		Expected Count	1.9	3.0	4.1	9.0
	Paktya	Count	0	3	7	10
		Expected Count	2.1	3.3	4.6	10.0
	Panj Sher	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.2	.3	.5	1.0
	Parwan	Count	3	1	6	10
		Expected Count	2.1	3.3	4.6	10.0
	Samangan	Count	2	3	1	6
		Expected Count	1.2	2.0	2.8	6.0
	Sarpul	Count	1	0	0	1
		Expected Count	.2	.3	.5	1.0
	Takhar	Count	1	0	0	1
		Expected Count	.2	.3	.5	1.0
	Uruzgan	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.4	.7	.9	2.0
	Wardak	Count	1	5	7	13
		Expected Count	2.7	4.3	6.0	13.0
Total		Count	106	170	234	510
		Expected Count	106.0	170.0	234.0	510.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	87.739 ^a	54	.003
Likelihood Ratio	98.660	54	.000
N of Valid Cases	510		

a. 62 cells (73.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

Province * A good political leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader promotes close relations with Afghanistan neighbors.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Province	Badakhshan	Count	1	6	23	30
		Expected Count	1.0	7.5	21.5	30.0
	Baghlan	Count	1	0	8	9
		Expected Count	.3	2.3	6.5	9.0
	Balkh	Count	6	16	100	122
		Expected Count	3.9	30.6	87.5	122.0
	Bamyan	Count	1	6	5	12
		Expected Count	.4	3.0	8.6	12.0
	Daikundi	Count	0	2	5	7
		Expected Count	.2	1.8	5.0	7.0
	Farah	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Faryab	Count	0	4	14	18
		Expected Count	.6	4.5	12.9	18.0
	Ghazni	Count	2	13	24	39
		Expected Count	1.3	9.8	28.0	39.0
	Ghor	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Helmand	Count	0	4	6	10
		Expected Count	.3	2.5	7.2	10.0
	Jawzjan	Count	0	0	6	6
		Expected Count	.2	1.5	4.3	6.0
	Kabul	Count	2	19	38	59
		Expected Count	1.9	14.8	42.3	59.0
	Kandahar	Count	1	29	55	85
		Expected Count	2.7	21.3	60.9	85.0
	Kapisa	Count	0	2	3	5
		Expected Count	.2	1.3	3.6	5.0
	Khost	Count	0	3	9	12
		Expected Count	.4	3.0	8.6	12.0

	Kunar	Count	0	0	2	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Kunduz	Count	0	1	0	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Laghman	Count	0	3	7	10
		Expected Count	.3	2.5	7.2	10.0
	Logar	Count	1	1	13	15
		Expected Count	.5	3.8	10.8	15.0
	Nangarhar	Count	1	7	1	9
		Expected Count	.3	2.3	6.5	9.0
	Paktya	Count	0	0	9	9
		Expected Count	.3	2.3	6.5	9.0
	Panj Sher	Count	0	1	0	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Parwan	Count	0	1	10	11
		Expected Count	.4	2.8	7.9	11.0
	Samangan	Count	0	2	4	6
		Expected Count	.2	1.5	4.3	6.0
	Sarpul	Count	0	1	0	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Takhar	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.0	.3	.7	1.0
	Uruzgan	Count	0	1	1	2
		Expected Count	.1	.5	1.4	2.0
	Wardak	Count	0	3	10	13
		Expected Count	.4	3.3	9.3	13.0
Total		Count	16	125	357	498
		Expected Count	16.0	125.0	357.0	498.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	72.360 ^a	54	.048
Likelihood Ratio	81.381	54	.009
N of Valid Cases	498		

a. 62 cells (73.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Frequencies

Statistics						
		A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.				
		A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.				
		A good political leader respects elders				
		A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.				
		A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.				
		A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.				
N	Valid	518	525	521	521	493
	Missing	50	43	47	47	75

Frequency Table

A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	31	5.5	6.0	6.0
	Somewhat Important	45	7.9	8.7	14.7
	Very Important	442	77.8	85.3	100.0
	Total	518	91.2	100.0	
Missing	nr	50	8.8		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	108	19.0	20.6	20.6
	Somewhat Important	155	27.3	29.5	50.1
	Very Important	262	46.1	49.9	100.0
	Total	525	92.4	100.0	
Missing	nr	43	7.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader respects elders					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	33	5.8	6.3	6.3
	Somewhat Important	141	24.8	27.1	33.4
	Very Important	347	61.1	66.6	100.0
	Total	521	91.7	100.0	
Missing	nr	47	8.3		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Somewhat Important	85	15.0	16.3	16.3
	Very Important	436	76.8	83.7	100.0
	Total	521	91.7	100.0	
Missing	nr	47	8.3		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	51	9.0	10.0	10.0
	Somewhat Important	68	12.0	13.3	23.2
	Very Important	393	69.2	76.8	100.0
	Total	512	90.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	56	9.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	16	2.8	3.2	3.2
	Somewhat Important	80	14.1	16.2	19.5
	Very Important	397	69.9	80.5	100.0
	Total	493	86.8	100.0	
Missing	nr	75	13.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.

A good political leader respects elders

- Not Important
- Somewhat Important
- Very Important

A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.

A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.

A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.

Not Important
Somewhat Important
Very Important

Crosstabs

	Case Processing Summary					
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.	518	91.2%	50	8.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.	525	92.4%	43	7.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader respects elders	521	91.7%	47	8.3%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.	521	91.7%	47	8.3%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.	512	90.1%	56	9.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.	493	86.8%	75	13.2%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	8	13	54	75
		Expected Count	4.5	6.5	64.0	75.0
	Other	Count	3	2	11	16
		Expected Count	1.0	1.4	13.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	7	19	187	213
		Expected Count	12.7	18.5	181.7	213.0
	Tajik	Count	11	9	163	183
		Expected Count	11.0	15.9	156.2	183.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	2	27	31
		Expected Count	1.9	2.7	26.5	31.0
Total	Count		31	45	442	518
	Expected Count		31.0	45.0	442.0	518.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	22.153 ^a	8	.005
Likelihood Ratio	19.755	8	.011
N of Valid Cases	518		

a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .96.

Ethnic * A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	34	26	19	79
		Expected Count	16.3	23.3	39.4	79.0
	Other	Count	7	4	5	16
		Expected Count	3.3	4.7	8.0	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	23	62	127	212
		Expected Count	43.6	62.6	105.8	212.0
	Tajik	Count	38	56	93	187
		Expected Count	38.5	55.2	93.3	187.0
	Uzbek	Count	6	7	18	31
		Expected Count	6.4	9.2	15.5	31.0
	Total	Count	108	155	262	525
		Expected Count	108.0	155.0	262.0	525.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	50.633 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	49.431	8	.000
N of Valid Cases	525		

a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.29.

Ethnic * A good political leader respects elders

Crosstab						
			A good political leader respects elders			
				Somewhat Important	Very Important	
			Not Important			Total
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	15	29	35	79
		Expected Count	5.0	21.4	52.6	79.0
	Other	Count	3	5	8	16
		Expected Count	1.0	4.3	10.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	7	49	156	212
		Expected Count	13.4	57.4	141.2	212.0
	Tajik	Count	7	49	128	184
		Expected Count	11.7	49.8	122.5	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	9	20	30
		Expected Count	1.9	8.1	20.0	30.0
Total	Count	33	141	347	521	
	Expected Count	33.0	141.0	347.0	521.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	41.730 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	34.997	8	.000
N of Valid Cases	521		

a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.01.

Ethnic * A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.

			Crosstab		
			A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.		Total
			Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	16	62	78
		Expected Count	12.7	65.3	78.0
	Other	Count	1	15	16
		Expected Count	2.6	13.4	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	38	173	211
		Expected Count	34.4	176.6	211.0
	Tajik	Count	26	158	184
		Expected Count	30.0	154.0	184.0
Uzbek	Count	4	28	32	
	Expected Count	5.2	26.8	32.0	
Total	Count	85	436	521	
	Expected Count	85.0	436.0	521.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.622 ^a	4	.460
Likelihood Ratio	3.899	4	.420
N of Valid Cases	521		

a. 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.61.

Ethnic * A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	11	25	39	75
		Expected Count	7.5	10.0	57.6	75.0
	Other	Count	3	2	11	16
		Expected Count	1.6	2.1	12.3	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	15	25	169	209
		Expected Count	20.8	27.8	160.4	209.0
	Tajik	Count	19	14	147	180
		Expected Count	17.9	23.9	138.2	180.0
	Uzbek	Count	3	2	27	32
		Expected Count	3.2	4.3	24.6	32.0
Total	Count	51	68	393	512	
	Expected Count	51.0	68.0	393.0	512.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	40.281 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	34.991	8	.000
N of Valid Cases	512		

a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.59.

Ethnic * A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	7	16	49	72
		Expected Count	2.3	11.7	58.0	72.0
	Other	Count	0	3	11	14
		Expected Count	.5	2.3	11.3	14.0
	Pashtun	Count	5	26	173	204
		Expected Count	6.6	33.1	164.3	204.0
	Tajik	Count	3	30	142	175
		Expected Count	5.7	28.4	140.9	175.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	5	22	28
		Expected Count	.9	4.5	22.5	28.0
Total	Count	16	80	397	493	
	Expected Count	16.0	80.0	397.0	493.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	16.802 ^a	8	.032
Likelihood Ratio	14.287	8	.075
N of Valid Cases	493		

a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .45.

Crosstabs

	Case Processing Summary					
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Education * A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.	518	91.2%	50	8.8%	568	100.0%
Education * A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.	525	92.4%	43	7.6%	568	100.0%
Education * A good political leader respects elders	521	91.7%	47	8.3%	568	100.0%
Education * A good political leader will have good relations with the neihboring countries.	521	91.7%	47	8.3%	568	100.0%
Education * A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.	512	90.1%	56	9.9%	568	100.0%
Education * A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.	493	86.8%	75	13.2%	568	100.0%

Education * A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Education	BA	Count	14	21	211	246
		Expected Count	14.7	21.4	209.9	246.0
	Diploma	Count	1	3	63	67
		Expected Count	4.0	5.8	57.2	67.0
	High School	Count	2	11	122	135
		Expected Count	8.1	11.7	115.2	135.0
	Masters	Count	12	8	3	23
		Expected Count	1.4	2.0	19.6	23.0
	PhD	Count	2	0	1	3
		Expected Count	.2	.3	2.6	3.0
	Religious School	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.9	1.0
	Some Schooling	Count	0	1	32	33
		Expected Count	2.0	2.9	28.2	33.0
	Uneducated	Count	0	1	9	10
		Expected Count	.6	.9	8.5	10.0
Total		Count	31	45	442	518
		Expected Count	31.0	45.0	442.0	518.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	147.597 ^a	14	.000
Likelihood Ratio	90.840	14	.000
N of Valid Cases	518		

a. 13 cells (54.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Education * A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	Total
Education	BA	Count	53	83	115	251
		Expected Count	51.6	74.1	125.3	251.0
	Diploma	Count	7	19	40	66
		Expected Count	13.6	19.5	32.9	66.0
	High School	Count	23	33	81	137
		Expected Count	28.2	40.4	68.4	137.0
	Masters	Count	15	7	3	25
		Expected Count	5.1	7.4	12.5	25.0
	PhD	Count	2	1	0	3
		Expected Count	.6	.9	1.5	3.0
	Religious School	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.2	.3	.5	1.0
	Some Schooling	Count	6	7	19	32
		Expected Count	6.6	9.4	16.0	32.0
	Uneducated	Count	2	5	3	10
		Expected Count	2.1	3.0	5.0	10.0
Total		Count	108	155	262	525
		Expected Count	108.0	155.0	262.0	525.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	46.516 ^a	14	.000
Likelihood Ratio	44.470	14	.000
N of Valid Cases	525		

a. 9 cells (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

Education * A good political leader respects elders

Crosstab						
			A good political leader respects elders			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Education	BA	Count	14	76	156	246
		Expected Count	15.6	66.6	163.8	246.0
	Diploma	Count	1	16	49	66
		Expected Count	4.2	17.9	44.0	66.0
	High School	Count	5	26	107	138
		Expected Count	8.7	37.3	91.9	138.0
	Masters	Count	10	13	2	25
		Expected Count	1.6	6.8	16.7	25.0
	PhD	Count	1	1	1	3
		Expected Count	.2	.8	2.0	3.0
	Religious School	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.1	.3	.7	1.0
	Some Schooling	Count	1	6	25	32
		Expected Count	2.0	8.7	21.3	32.0
	Uneducated	Count	1	3	6	10
		Expected Count	.6	2.7	6.7	10.0
Total	Count	33	141	347	521	
	Expected Count	33.0	141.0	347.0	521.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	82.739 ^a	14	.000
Likelihood Ratio	65.159	14	.000
N of Valid Cases	521		

a. 11 cells (45.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Education * A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.

Crosstab					
			A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.		Total
			Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Education	BA	Count	36	214	250
		Expected Count	40.8	209.2	250.0
	Diploma	Count	7	58	65
		Expected Count	10.6	54.4	65.0
	High School	Count	26	109	135
		Expected Count	22.0	113.0	135.0
	Masters	Count	8	17	25
		Expected Count	4.1	20.9	25.0
	PhD	Count	0	3	3
		Expected Count	.5	2.5	3.0
	Religious School	Count	1	0	1
		Expected Count	.2	.8	1.0
	Some Schooling	Count	2	30	32
		Expected Count	5.2	26.8	32.0
	Uneducated	Count	5	5	10
		Expected Count	1.6	8.4	10.0
Total		Count	85	436	521
		Expected Count	85.0	436.0	521.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23.897 ^a	7	.001
Likelihood Ratio	20.583	7	.004
N of Valid Cases	521		

a. 6 cells (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .16.

Education * A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.

Crosstab					
			A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.		
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important
Education	BA	Count	19	41	184
		Expected Count	24.3	32.4	187.3
	Diploma	Count	5	4	56
		Expected Count	6.5	8.6	49.9
	High School	Count	7	15	116
		Expected Count	13.7	18.3	105.9
	Masters	Count	18	3	1
		Expected Count	2.2	2.9	16.9
	PhD	Count	2	1	0
		Expected Count	.3	.4	2.3
	Religious School	Count	0	0	1
		Expected Count	.1	.1	.8
	Some Schooling	Count	0	1	29
		Expected Count	3.0	4.0	23.0
	Uneducated	Count	0	3	6
		Expected Count	.9	1.2	6.9
	Total		Count	51	68
			Expected Count	51.0	68.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	164.639 ^a	14	.000
Likelihood Ratio	107.954	14	.000
N of Valid Cases	512		

a. 12 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .10.

Education * A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Education	BA	Count	7	42	186	235
		Expected Count	7.6	38.1	189.2	235.0
	Diploma	Count	1	6	55	62
		Expected Count	2.0	10.1	49.9	62.0
	High School	Count	5	21	105	131
		Expected Count	4.3	21.3	105.5	131.0
	Masters	Count	2	9	11	22
		Expected Count	.7	3.6	17.7	22.0
	PhD	Count	1	1	1	3
		Expected Count	.1	.5	2.4	3.0
	Religious School	Count	0	0	1	1
		Expected Count	.0	.2	.8	1.0
	Some Schooling	Count	0	0	31	31
		Expected Count	1.0	5.0	25.0	31.0
	Uneducated	Count	0	1	7	8
		Expected Count	.3	1.3	6.4	8.0
Total		Count	16	80	397	493
		Expected Count	16.0	80.0	397.0	493.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	34.275 ^a	14	.002
Likelihood Ratio	32.777	14	.003
N of Valid Cases	493		

a. 13 cells (54.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Crosstabs

	Case Processing Summary					
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
AgeBin * A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.	518	91.2%	50	8.8%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.	525	92.4%	43	7.6%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader respects elders	521	91.7%	47	8.3%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader will have good relations with the neihboring countries.	521	91.7%	47	8.3%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.	512	90.1%	56	9.9%	568	100.0%
AgeBin * A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.	493	86.8%	75	13.2%	568	100.0%

AgeBin * A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader enforces Islamic laws in the country.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	6	15	130	151
		Expected Count	9.0	13.1	128.8	151.0
	22 to 31	Count	8	14	170	192
		Expected Count	11.5	16.7	163.8	192.0
	32 to 41	Count	12	10	70	92
		Expected Count	5.5	8.0	78.5	92.0
	42 to 51	Count	4	3	42	49
		Expected Count	2.9	4.3	41.8	49.0
	Above 51	Count	1	3	30	34
		Expected Count	2.0	3.0	29.0	34.0
	Total	Count	31	45	442	518
		Expected Count	31.0	45.0	442.0	518.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13.430 ^a	8	.098
Likelihood Ratio	11.879	8	.157
N of Valid Cases	518		

a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.03.

AgeBin * A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader removes foreigners from the country.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	25	43	84	152
		Expected Count	31.3	44.9	75.9	152.0
	22 to 31	Count	37	62	99	198
		Expected Count	40.7	58.5	98.8	198.0
	32 to 41	Count	27	26	40	93
		Expected Count	19.1	27.5	46.4	93.0
	42 to 51	Count	13	15	21	49
		Expected Count	10.1	14.5	24.5	49.0
	Above 51	Count	6	9	18	33
		Expected Count	6.8	9.7	16.5	33.0
	Total	Count	108	155	262	525
		Expected Count	108.0	155.0	262.0	525.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.610 ^a	8	.376
Likelihood Ratio	8.310	8	.404
N of Valid Cases	525		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.79.

AgeBin * A good political leader respects elders

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader respects elders			
				Somewhat		
			Not Important	Important	Very Important	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	5	34	112	151
		Expected Count	9.6	40.9	100.6	151.0
	22 to 31	Count	13	57	127	197
		Expected Count	12.5	53.3	131.2	197.0
	32 to 41	Count	9	30	55	94
		Expected Count	6.0	25.4	62.6	94.0
	42 to 51	Count	5	12	31	48
		Expected Count	3.0	13.0	32.0	48.0
	Above 51	Count	1	8	22	31
		Expected Count	2.0	8.4	20.6	31.0
Total	Count	33	141	347	521	
	Expected Count	33.0	141.0	347.0	521.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.290 ^a	8	.245
Likelihood Ratio	10.453	8	.235
N of Valid Cases	521		

a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.96.

AgeBin * A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.

Crosstab					
			A good political leader will have good relations with the neighboring countries.		Total
			Somewhat Important	Very Important	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	32	116	148
		Expected Count	24.1	123.9	148.0
	22 to 31	Count	25	173	198
		Expected Count	32.3	165.7	198.0
	32 to 41	Count	17	76	93
		Expected Count	15.2	77.8	93.0
	42 to 51	Count	10	39	49
		Expected Count	8.0	41.0	49.0
	Above 51	Count	1	32	33
		Expected Count	5.4	27.6	33.0
Total		Count	85	436	521
		Expected Count	85.0	436.0	521.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.156 ^a	4	.038
Likelihood Ratio	11.817	4	.019
N of Valid Cases	521		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.38.

AgeBin * A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader promotes Sharia law in the country.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	6	19	120	145
		Expected Count	14.4	19.3	111.3	145.0
	22 to 31	Count	19	21	155	195
		Expected Count	19.4	25.9	149.7	195.0
	32 to 41	Count	15	19	57	91
		Expected Count	9.1	12.1	69.8	91.0
	42 to 51	Count	8	5	34	47
		Expected Count	4.7	6.2	36.1	47.0
	Above 51	Count	3	4	27	34
		Expected Count	3.4	4.5	26.1	34.0
	Total	Count	51	68	393	512
		Expected Count	51.0	68.0	393.0	512.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	19.803 ^a	8	.011
Likelihood Ratio	19.787	8	.011
N of Valid Cases	512		

a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.39.

AgeBin * A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader promotes close relations with Islamic countries.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
AgeBin	Below 21	Count	6	14	115	135
		Expected Count	4.4	21.9	108.7	135.0
	22 to 31	Count	4	32	155	191
		Expected Count	6.2	31.0	153.8	191.0
	32 to 41	Count	5	18	64	87
		Expected Count	2.8	14.1	70.1	87.0
	42 to 51	Count	0	11	37	48
		Expected Count	1.6	7.8	38.7	48.0
	Above 51	Count	1	5	26	32
		Expected Count	1.0	5.2	25.8	32.0
	Total	Count	16	80	397	493
		Expected Count	16.0	80.0	397.0	493.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.869 ^a	8	.209
Likelihood Ratio	12.357	8	.136
N of Valid Cases	493		

a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.04.

Frequencies

Statistics							
	A good political leader brings peace and stability.						
	A good political leader creates jobs for people.						
	A good political leader stops ethnic discrimination among people.						
	A good political leader defends the country.						
	A good political leader ends corruption in the society.						
	A good political leader eradicates narcotics in the country.						
	A good political leader does exactly what he says he will do.						
N Valid	526	513	525	523	524	521	523
Missing	42	55	43	45	44	47	45

Frequency Table

A good political leader brings peace and stability.				
		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	1	.2	.2
	Somewhat Important	9	1.6	1.9
	Very Important	516	90.8	100.0
	Total	526	92.6	
Missing	nr	42	7.4	
Total		568	100.0	

A good political leader creates jobs for people.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	1	.2	.2	.2
	Somewhat Important	43	7.6	8.4	8.6
	Very Important	469	82.6	91.4	100.0
	Total	513	90.3	100.0	
Missing	nr	55	9.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader stops ethnic discrimination among people.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	10	1.8	1.9	1.9
	Somewhat Important	41	7.2	7.8	9.7
	Very Important	474	83.5	90.3	100.0
	Total	525	92.4	100.0	
Missing	nr	43	7.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader defends the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Somewhat Important	16	2.8	3.1	3.1
	Very Important	507	89.3	96.9	100.0
	Total	523	92.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	45	7.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader ends corruption in the society.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Somewhat Important	27	4.8	5.2	5.2
	Very Important	497	87.5	94.8	100.0
	Total	524	92.3	100.0	
Missing	nr	44	7.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader eradicates narcotics in the country.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	7	1.2	1.3	1.3
	Somewhat Important	51	9.0	9.8	11.1
	Very Important	463	81.5	88.9	100.0
	Total	521	91.7	100.0	
Missing	nr	47	8.3		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader does exactly what he says he will do.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	4	.7	.8	.8
	Somewhat Important	35	6.2	6.7	7.5
	Very Important	484	85.2	92.5	100.0
	Total	523	92.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	45	7.9		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader creates jobs for people.

A good political leader stops ethnic discrimination among people.

A good political leader defends the country.

Somewhat Important
Very Important

A good political leader ends corruption in the society.

A good political leader eradicates narcotics in the country.

A good political leader does exactly what he says he will do.

Not Important
Somewhat Important
Very Important

Crosstabs

	Case Processing Summary					
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader brings peace and stability.	526	92.6%	42	7.4%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader creates jobs for people.	513	90.3%	55	9.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader stops ethnic discrimination among people.	525	92.4%	43	7.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader defends the country.	523	92.1%	45	7.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader ends corruption in the society.	524	92.3%	44	7.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader eradicates narcotics in the country.	521	91.7%	47	8.3%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader does exactly what he says he will do.	523	92.1%	45	7.9%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader brings peace and stability.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader brings peace and stability.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	1	79	80
		Expected Count	.2	1.4	78.5	80.0
	Other	Count	0	2	14	16
		Expected Count	.0	.3	15.7	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	0	2	213	215
		Expected Count	.4	3.7	210.9	215.0
	Tajik	Count	0	4	180	184
		Expected Count	.3	3.1	180.5	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	0	30	31
		Expected Count	.1	.5	30.4	31.0
Total	Count	1	9	516	526	
	Expected Count	1.0	9.0	516.0	526.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	28.693 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	12.688	8	.123
N of Valid Cases	526		

a. 10 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader creates jobs for people.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader creates jobs for people.			
				Somewhat Important	Very Important	
			Not Important			Total
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	1	7	70	78
		Expected Count	.2	6.5	71.3	78.0
	Other	Count	0	3	13	16
		Expected Count	.0	1.3	14.6	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	0	22	183	205
		Expected Count	.4	17.2	187.4	205.0
	Tajik	Count	0	10	174	184
		Expected Count	.4	15.4	168.2	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	29	30
		Expected Count	.1	2.5	27.4	30.0
Total	Count	1	43	469	513	
	Expected Count	1.0	43.0	469.0	513.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.429 ^a	8	.133
Likelihood Ratio	10.519	8	.230
N of Valid Cases	513		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader stops ethnic discrimination among people.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader stops ethnic discrimination among people.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	1	7	72	80
		Expected Count	1.5	6.2	72.2	80.0
	Other	Count	1	1	14	16
		Expected Count	.3	1.2	14.4	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	5	17	191	213
		Expected Count	4.1	16.6	192.3	213.0
	Tajik	Count	2	15	168	185
		Expected Count	3.5	14.4	167.0	185.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	1	29	31
		Expected Count	.6	2.4	28.0	31.0
	Total	Count	10	41	474	525
		Expected Count	10.0	41.0	474.0	525.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.997 ^a	8	.857
Likelihood Ratio	3.720	8	.881
N of Valid Cases	525		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

Ethnic * A good political leader defends the country.

			Crosstab		
			A good political leader defends the country.		Total
			Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	78	80
		Expected Count	2.4	77.6	80.0
	Other	Count	1	15	16
		Expected Count	.5	15.5	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	10	200	210
		Expected Count	6.4	203.6	210.0
	Tajik	Count	3	182	185
		Expected Count	5.7	179.3	185.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	32	32
		Expected Count	1.0	31.0	32.0
Total	Count		16	507	523
	Expected Count		16.0	507.0	523.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.986 ^a	4	.289
Likelihood Ratio	5.815	4	.213
N of Valid Cases	523		

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .49.

Ethnic * A good political leader ends corruption in the society.

			Crosstab		
			A good political leader ends corruption in the society.		Total
			Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	3	76	79
		Expected Count	4.1	74.9	79.0
	Other	Count	1	15	16
		Expected Count	.8	15.2	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	16	197	213
		Expected Count	11.0	202.0	213.0
	Tajik	Count	6	178	184
		Expected Count	9.5	174.5	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	31	32
		Expected Count	1.6	30.4	32.0
Total	Count		27	497	524
	Expected Count		27.0	497.0	524.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.378 ^a	4	.357
Likelihood Ratio	4.353	4	.360
N of Valid Cases	524		

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .82.

Ethnic * A good political leader eradicates narcotics in the country.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader eradicates narcotics in the country.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	7	69	78
		Expected Count	1.0	7.6	69.3	78.0
	Other	Count	0	2	14	16
		Expected Count	.2	1.6	14.2	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	25	186	212
		Expected Count	2.8	20.8	188.4	212.0
	Tajik	Count	4	14	165	183
		Expected Count	2.5	17.9	162.6	183.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	3	29	32
		Expected Count	.4	3.1	28.4	32.0
Total	Count	7	51	463	521	
	Expected Count	7.0	51.0	463.0	521.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.659 ^a	8	.685
Likelihood Ratio	6.377	8	.605
N of Valid Cases	521		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

Ethnic * A good political leader does exactly what he says he will do.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader does exactly what he says he will do.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	7	72	79
		Expected Count	.6	5.3	73.1	79.0
	Other	Count	0	2	14	16
		Expected Count	.1	1.1	14.8	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	3	20	190	213
		Expected Count	1.6	14.3	197.1	213.0
	Tajik	Count	1	5	177	183
		Expected Count	1.4	12.2	169.4	183.0
Uzbek	Count	0	1	31	32	
	Expected Count	.2	2.1	29.6	32.0	
Total	Count	4	35	484	523	
	Expected Count	4.0	35.0	484.0	523.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11.541 ^a	8	.173
Likelihood Ratio	13.212	8	.105
N of Valid Cases	523		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

Frequencies

Statistics				
	A good political leader is useful to your personal needs.			
	A good political leader treats you better than others.			
	A good political leader allows governors of the provinces and districts to be elected.			
	A good political leader allows mayors of the cities to be elected.			
N Valid	508	506	513	512
Missing	60	62	55	56

Frequency Table

A good political leader is useful to your personal needs.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	161	28.3	31.7	31.7
	Somewhat Important	152	26.8	29.9	61.6
	Very Important	195	34.3	38.4	100.0
	Total	508	89.4	100.0	
Missing	nr	60	10.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader treats you better than others.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	266	46.8	52.6	52.6
	Somewhat Important	120	21.1	23.7	76.3
	Very Important	120	21.1	23.7	100.0
	Total	506	89.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	62	10.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader allows governors of the provinces and districts to be elected.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	44	7.7	8.6	8.6
	Somewhat Important	116	20.4	22.6	31.2
	Very Important	353	62.1	68.8	100.0
	Total	513	90.3	100.0	
Missing	nr	55	9.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader allows mayors of the cities to be elected.					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	36	6.3	7.0	7.0
	Somewhat Important	116	20.4	22.7	29.7
	Very Important	360	63.4	70.3	100.0
	Total	512	90.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	56	9.9		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader treats you better than others.

A good political leader allows governors of the provinces and districts to be elected.

A good political leader allows mayors of the cities to be elected.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader is useful to your personal needs.	508	89.4%	60	10.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader treats you better than others.	506	89.1%	62	10.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader allows governors of the provinces and districts to be elected.	513	90.3%	55	9.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader allows mayors of the cities to be elected.	512	90.1%	56	9.9%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader is useful to your personal needs.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader is useful to your personal needs.			
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	30	25	22	77
		Expected Count	24.4	23.0	29.6	77.0
	Other	Count	6	1	9	16
		Expected Count	5.1	4.8	6.1	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	46	76	89	211
		Expected Count	66.9	63.1	81.0	211.0
	Tajik	Count	68	42	64	174
		Expected Count	55.1	52.1	66.8	174.0
	Uzbek	Count	11	8	11	30
		Expected Count	9.5	9.0	11.5	30.0
Total	Count	161	152	195	508	
	Expected Count	161.0	152.0	195.0	508.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23.229 ^a	8	.003
Likelihood Ratio	25.141	8	.001
N of Valid Cases	508		

a. 1 cells (6.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.79.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.214	.003
	Cramer's V	.151	.003
N of Valid Cases		508

Ethnic * A good political leader treats you better than others.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader treats you better than others.			
				Somewhat Important	Very Important	
			Not Important			Total
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	57	14	6	77
		Expected Count	40.5	18.3	18.3	77.0
	Other	Count	9	3	3	15
		Expected Count	7.9	3.6	3.6	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	69	69	71	209
		Expected Count	109.9	49.6	49.6	209.0
	Tajik	Count	109	32	34	175
		Expected Count	92.0	41.5	41.5	175.0
	Uzbek	Count	22	2	6	30
		Expected Count	15.8	7.1	7.1	30.0
Total	Count	266	120	120	506	
	Expected Count	266.0	120.0	120.0	506.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	61.382 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	65.352	8	.000
N of Valid Cases	506		

a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.56.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.348	.000
	Cramer's V	.246	.000
N of Valid Cases		506

Ethnic * A good political leader allows governors of the provinces and districts to be elected.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader allows governors of the provinces and districts to be elected.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	6	14	58	78
		Expected Count	6.7	17.6	53.7	78.0
	Other	Count	3	5	8	16
		Expected Count	1.4	3.6	11.0	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	23	46	139	208
		Expected Count	17.8	47.0	143.1	208.0
	Tajik	Count	10	45	124	179
		Expected Count	15.4	40.5	123.2	179.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	6	24	32
		Expected Count	2.7	7.2	22.0	32.0
Total	Count		44	116	353	513
	Expected Count		44.0	116.0	353.0	513.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.054 ^a	8	.338
Likelihood Ratio	8.795	8	.360
N of Valid Cases	513		

a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.37.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.133	.338
	Cramer's V	.094	.338
N of Valid Cases		513

Ethnic * A good political leader allows mayors of the cities to be elected.

Crosstab						
			A good political leader allows mayors of the cities to be elected.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	8	16	53	77
		Expected Count	5.4	17.4	54.1	77.0
	Other	Count	0	4	12	16
		Expected Count	1.1	3.6	11.3	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	16	50	144	210
		Expected Count	14.8	47.6	147.7	210.0
	Tajik	Count	7	43	128	178
		Expected Count	12.5	40.3	125.2	178.0
	Uzbek	Count	5	3	23	31
		Expected Count	2.2	7.0	21.8	31.0
Total		Count	36	116	360	512
		Expected Count	36.0	116.0	360.0	512.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11.603 ^a	8	.170
Likelihood Ratio	12.676	8	.123
N of Valid Cases	512		

a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.13.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.151	.170
	Cramer's V	.106	.170
N of Valid Cases		512

Frequencies

N Valid																	
Missing	45	40	39	51	39	46	52	55	44	47	49	60	60	58	56	55	55
	A good political leader promotes rule of law.	A good political leader promotes education.	A good political leader delivers justice.	A good political leader punishes war criminals.	A good political leader improves Afghan economy.	A good political leader listens to people.	A good political leader is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan.	A good political leader fights and removes mafia economy.	A good political leader hires professional and honest team.	A good political leader stays honest with people.	A good political leader rebuilds the country.	A good political leader makes peace with insurgents.	A good political leader does not recognize the Durand Line.	A good political leader recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups.	A good political leader distributes resources according to the size of population.	A good political leader makes military service mandatory.	A good political leader hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet.

Frequency Table

A good political leader promotes rule of law.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	1	.2	.2	.2
	Somewhat Important	23	4.0	4.4	4.6
	Very Important	499	87.9	95.4	100.0
	Total	523	92.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	45	7.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader promotes education.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Somewhat Important	15	2.6	2.8	2.8
	Very Important	513	90.3	97.2	100.0
	Total	528	93.0	100.0	
Missing	nr	40	7.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader delivers justice.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Somewhat Important	16	2.8	3.0	3.0
	Very Important	513	90.3	97.0	100.0
	Total	529	93.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	39	6.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader punishes war criminals.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	3	.5	.6	.6
	Somewhat Important	108	19.0	20.9	21.5
	Very Important	406	71.5	78.5	100.0
	Total	517	91.0	100.0	
Missing	nr	51	9.0		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader improves Afghan economy.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Somewhat Important	25	4.4	4.7	4.7
	Very Important	504	88.7	95.3	100.0
	Total	529	93.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	39	6.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader listens to people.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	3	.5	.6	.6
	Somewhat Important	88	15.5	16.9	17.4
	Very Important	431	75.9	82.6	100.0
	Total	522	91.9	100.0	
Missing	nr	46	8.1		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	2	.4	.4	.4
	Somewhat Important	66	11.6	12.8	13.2
	Very Important	448	78.9	86.8	100.0
	Total	516	90.8	100.0	
Missing	nr	52	9.2		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader fights and removes mafia economy.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	3	.5	.6	.6
	Somewhat Important	55	9.7	10.7	11.3
	Very Important	455	80.1	88.7	100.0
	Total	513	90.3	100.0	
Missing	nr	55	9.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader hires professional and honest team.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	11	1.9	2.1	2.1
	Somewhat Important	52	9.2	9.9	12.0
	Very Important	461	81.2	88.0	100.0
	Total	524	92.3	100.0	
Missing	nr	44	7.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader stays honest with people.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	1	.2	.2	.2
	Somewhat Important	34	6.0	6.5	6.7
	Very Important	486	85.6	93.3	100.0
	Total	521	91.7	100.0	
Missing	nr	47	8.3		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader rebuilds the country.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Somewhat Important	18	3.2	3.5	3.5
	Very Important	501	88.2	96.5	100.0
	Total	519	91.4	100.0	
Missing	nr	49	8.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader makes peace with insurgents.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	94	16.5	18.5	18.5
	Somewhat Important	129	22.7	25.4	43.9
	Very Important	285	50.2	56.1	100.0
	Total	508	89.4	100.0	
Missing	nr	60	10.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader does not recognize the Durand Line.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	122	21.5	24.0	24.0
	Somewhat Important	98	17.3	19.3	43.3
	Very Important	288	50.7	56.7	100.0
	Total	508	89.4	100.0	
Missing	nr	60	10.6		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	26	4.6	5.1	5.1
	Somewhat Important	80	14.1	15.7	20.8
	Very Important	404	71.1	79.2	100.0
	Total	510	89.8	100.0	
Missing	nr	58	10.2		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader distributes resources according to the size of population.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	24	4.2	4.7	4.7
	Somewhat Important	123	21.7	24.0	28.7
	Very Important	365	64.3	71.3	100.0
	Total	512	90.1	100.0	
Missing	nr	56	9.9		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader makes military service mandatory.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	119	21.0	23.2	23.2
	Somewhat Important	151	26.6	29.4	52.6
	Very Important	243	42.8	47.4	100.0
	Total	513	90.3	100.0	
Missing	nr	55	9.7		
Total		568	100.0		

A good political leader hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Important	14	2.5	2.7	2.7
	Somewhat Important	106	18.7	20.7	23.4
	Very Important	393	69.2	76.6	100.0
	Total	513	90.3	100.0	
Missing	nr	55	9.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

A good political leader promotes rule of law.

A good political leader promotes education.

A good political leader delivers justice.

A good political leader punishes war criminals.

A good political leader improves Afghan economy.

A good political leader listens to people.

A good political leader is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan.

A good political leader fights and removes mafia economy.

A good political leader hires professional and honest team.

A good political leader stays honest with people.

A good political leader rebuilds the country.

A good political leader makes peace with insurgents.

A good political leader does not recognize the Durand Line.

A good political leader recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups.

A good political leader distributes resources according to the size of population.

A good political leader makes military service mandatory.

A good political leader hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet.

Crosstabs:

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnic * A good political leader promotes rule of law.	523	92.1%	45	7.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader promotes education.	528	93.0%	40	7.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader delivers justice.	529	93.1%	39	6.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader punishes war criminals.	517	91.0%	51	9.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader improves Afghan economy.	529	93.1%	39	6.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader listens to people.	522	91.9%	46	8.1%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan.	516	90.8%	52	9.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader fights and removes mafia economy.	513	90.3%	55	9.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader hires professional and honest team.	524	92.3%	44	7.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader stays honest with people.	521	91.7%	47	8.3%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader rebuilds the country.	519	91.4%	49	8.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader makes peace with insurgents.	508	89.4%	60	10.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader does not recognize the Durand Line.	508	89.4%	60	10.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups.	510	89.8%	58	10.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader distributes resources according to the size of population.	512	90.1%	56	9.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader makes military service mandatory.	513	90.3%	55	9.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnic * A good political leader hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet.	513	90.3%	55	9.7%	568	100.0%

Ethnic * A good political leader promotes rule of law.

Crosstab

			A good political leader promotes rule of law.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	5	73	78
		Expected Count	.1	3.4	74.4	78.0
	Other	Count	0	0	15	15
		Expected Count	.0	.7	14.3	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	12	202	215
		Expected Count	.4	9.5	205.1	215.0
	Tajik	Count	0	5	180	185
		Expected Count	.4	8.1	176.5	185.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	29	30
		Expected Count	.1	1.3	28.6	30.0
	Total	Count	1	23	499	523
		Expected Count	1.0	23.0	499.0	523.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.964 ^a	8	.761
Likelihood Ratio	6.026	8	.644
N of Valid Cases	523		

a. 8 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader promotes education.

Crosstab

			A good political leader promotes education.		Total
			Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	3	76	79
		Expected Count	2.2	76.8	79.0
	Other	Count	0	16	16
		Expected Count	.5	15.5	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	5	212	217
		Expected Count	6.2	210.8	217.0
	Tajik	Count	6	179	185
		Expected Count	5.3	179.7	185.0
Uzbek	Count	1	30	31	
	Expected Count	.9	30.1	31.0	
Total	Count	15	513	528	
	Expected Count	15.0	513.0	528.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.081 ^a	4	.897
Likelihood Ratio	1.521	4	.823
N of Valid Cases	528		

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .45.

Ethnic * A good political leader delivers justice.

Crosstab

			A good political leader delivers justice.		Total
			Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	2	76	78
		Expected Count	2.4	75.6	78.0
	Other	Count	0	16	16
		Expected Count	.5	15.5	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	8	209	217
		Expected Count	6.6	210.4	217.0
	Tajik	Count	5	182	187
		Expected Count	5.7	181.3	187.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	30	31
		Expected Count	.9	30.1	31.0
Total	Count	16	513	529	
	Expected Count	16.0	513.0	529.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.962 ^a	4	.915
Likelihood Ratio	1.432	4	.839
N of Valid Cases	529		

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .48.

Ethnic * A good political leader punishes war criminals.

Crosstab

			A good political leader punishes war criminals.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	17	58	75
		Expected Count	.4	15.7	58.9	75.0
	Other	Count	0	5	10	15
		Expected Count	.1	3.1	11.8	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	35	178	214
		Expected Count	1.2	44.7	168.1	214.0
	Tajik	Count	1	44	137	182
		Expected Count	1.1	38.0	142.9	182.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	7	23	31
		Expected Count	.2	6.5	24.3	31.0
	Total	Count	3	108	406	517
		Expected Count	3.0	108.0	406.0	517.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.817 ^a	8	.278
Likelihood Ratio	8.352	8	.400
N of Valid Cases	517		

a. 6 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Ethnic * A good political leader improves Afghan economy.

Crosstab

			A good political leader improves Afghan economy.		Total
			Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	5	74	79
		Expected Count	3.7	75.3	79.0
	Other	Count	0	16	16
		Expected Count	.8	15.2	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	13	202	215
		Expected Count	10.2	204.8	215.0
	Tajik	Count	6	181	187
		Expected Count	8.8	178.2	187.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	31	32
		Expected Count	1.5	30.5	32.0
Total	Count	25	504	529	
	Expected Count	25.0	504.0	529.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.216 ^a	4	.522
Likelihood Ratio	4.005	4	.405
N of Valid Cases	529		

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .76.

Ethnic * A good political leader listens to people.

			Crosstab			
			A good political leader listens to people.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	20	59	79
		Expected Count	.5	13.3	65.2	79.0
	Other	Count	0	5	11	16
		Expected Count	.1	2.7	13.2	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	2	34	176	212
		Expected Count	1.2	35.7	175.0	212.0
	Tajik	Count	1	25	157	183
		Expected Count	1.1	30.9	151.1	183.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	4	28	32
		Expected Count	.2	5.4	26.4	32.0
Total	Count	3	88	431	522	
	Expected Count	3.0	88.0	431.0	522.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.402 ^a	8	.310
Likelihood Ratio	9.351	8	.314
N of Valid Cases	522		

a. 6 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Ethnic * A good political leader is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan.

Crosstab

			A good political leader is able to increase international attention on Afghanistan.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	11	68	79
		Expected Count	.3	10.1	68.6	79.0
	Other	Count	0	2	14	16
		Expected Count	.1	2.0	13.9	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	22	188	211
		Expected Count	.8	27.0	183.2	211.0
	Tajik	Count	1	28	150	179
		Expected Count	.7	22.9	155.4	179.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	3	28	31
		Expected Count	.1	4.0	26.9	31.0
	Total	Count	2	66	448	516
		Expected Count	2.0	66.0	448.0	516.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.404 ^a	8	.907
Likelihood Ratio	3.880	8	.868
N of Valid Cases	516		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Ethnic * A good political leader fights and removes mafia economy.

Crosstab

			A good political leader fights and removes mafia economy.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	7	73	80
		Expected Count	.5	8.6	71.0	80.0
	Other	Count	0	0	16	16
		Expected Count	.1	1.7	14.2	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	3	35	168	206
		Expected Count	1.2	22.1	182.7	206.0
	Tajik	Count	0	11	170	181
		Expected Count	1.1	19.4	160.5	181.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	28	30
		Expected Count	.2	3.2	26.6	30.0
	Total	Count	3	55	455	513
		Expected Count	3.0	55.0	455.0	513.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	20.233 ^a	8	.009
Likelihood Ratio	22.586	8	.004
N of Valid Cases	513		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Ethnic * A good political leader hires professional and honest team.

Crosstab

			A good political leader hires professional and honest team.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	3	8	68	79
		Expected Count	1.7	7.8	69.5	79.0
	Other	Count	0	3	13	16
		Expected Count	.3	1.6	14.1	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	3	23	188	214
		Expected Count	4.5	21.2	188.3	214.0
	Tajik	Count	5	17	162	184
		Expected Count	3.9	18.3	161.9	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	30	31
		Expected Count	.7	3.1	27.3	31.0
	Total	Count	11	52	461	524
		Expected Count	11.0	52.0	461.0	524.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.185 ^a	8	.627
Likelihood Ratio	7.230	8	.512
N of Valid Cases	524		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .34.

Ethnic * A good political leader stays honest with people.

Crosstab

			A good political leader stays honest with people.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	0	7	72	79
		Expected Count	.2	5.2	73.7	79.0
	Other	Count	0	2	14	16
		Expected Count	.0	1.0	14.9	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	1	13	198	212
		Expected Count	.4	13.8	197.8	212.0
	Tajik	Count	0	11	173	184
		Expected Count	.4	12.0	171.6	184.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	29	30
		Expected Count	.1	2.0	28.0	30.0
	Total	Count	1	34	486	521
		Expected Count	1.0	34.0	486.0	521.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.740 ^a	8	.880
Likelihood Ratio	3.935	8	.863
N of Valid Cases	521		

a. 7 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Ethnic * A good political leader rebuilds the country.

Crosstab

			A good political leader rebuilds the country.		Total
			Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	4	75	79
		Expected Count	2.7	76.3	79.0
	Other	Count	3	13	16
		Expected Count	.6	15.4	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	8	201	209
		Expected Count	7.2	201.8	209.0
	Tajik	Count	3	181	184
		Expected Count	6.4	177.6	184.0
Uzbek	Count	0	31	31	
	Expected Count	1.1	29.9	31.0	
Total	Count	18	501	519	
	Expected Count	18.0	501.0	519.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14.812 ^a	4	.005
Likelihood Ratio	10.737	4	.030
N of Valid Cases	519		

a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .55.

Ethnic * A good political leader makes peace with insurgents.

Crosstab

			A good political leader makes peace with insurgents.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	26	23	28	77
		Expected Count	14.2	19.6	43.2	77.0
	Other	Count	6	4	6	16
		Expected Count	3.0	4.1	9.0	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	14	55	137	206
		Expected Count	38.1	52.3	115.6	206.0
	Tajik	Count	44	38	97	179
		Expected Count	33.1	45.5	100.4	179.0
	Uzbek	Count	4	9	17	30
		Expected Count	5.6	7.6	16.8	30.0
	Total	Count	94	129	285	508
		Expected Count	94.0	129.0	285.0	508.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	44.726 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	47.423	8	.000
N of Valid Cases	508		

a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.96.

Ethnic * A good political leader does not recognize the Durand Line.

Crosstab

			A good political leader does not recognize the Durand Line.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	26	17	32	75
		Expected Count	18.0	14.5	42.5	75.0
	Other	Count	6	5	5	16
		Expected Count	3.8	3.1	9.1	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	32	27	148	207
		Expected Count	49.7	39.9	117.4	207.0
	Tajik	Count	47	41	92	180
		Expected Count	43.2	34.7	102.0	180.0
	Uzbek	Count	11	8	11	30
		Expected Count	7.2	5.8	17.0	30.0
	Total	Count	122	98	288	508
		Expected Count	122.0	98.0	288.0	508.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	36.735 ^a	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	37.260	8	.000
N of Valid Cases	508		

a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.09.

Ethnic * A good political leader recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups.

Crosstab

			A good political leader recognizes the identity of all ethnic groups.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	1	13	63	77
		Expected Count	3.9	12.1	61.0	77.0
	Other	Count	0	2	13	15
		Expected Count	.8	2.4	11.9	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	14	45	149	208
		Expected Count	10.6	32.6	164.8	208.0
	Tajik	Count	9	17	154	180
		Expected Count	9.2	28.2	142.6	180.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	3	25	30
		Expected Count	1.5	4.7	23.8	30.0
	Total	Count	26	80	404	510
		Expected Count	26.0	80.0	404.0	510.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	16.742 ^a	8	.033
Likelihood Ratio	18.694	8	.017
N of Valid Cases	510		

a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .76.

Ethnic * A good political leader distributes resources according to the size of population.

Crosstab

			A good political leader distributes resources according to the size of population.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	8	11	59	78
		Expected Count	3.7	18.7	55.6	78.0
	Other	Count	1	3	11	15
		Expected Count	.7	3.6	10.7	15.0
	Pashtun	Count	6	62	139	207
		Expected Count	9.7	49.7	147.6	207.0
	Tajik	Count	8	42	131	181
		Expected Count	8.5	43.5	129.0	181.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	5	25	31
		Expected Count	1.5	7.4	22.1	31.0
	Total	Count	24	123	365	512
		Expected Count	24.0	123.0	365.0	512.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.172 ^a	8	.056
Likelihood Ratio	14.523	8	.069
N of Valid Cases	512		

a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .70.

Ethnic * A good political leader makes military service mandatory.

Crosstab

			A good political leader makes military service mandatory.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	31	24	23	78
		Expected Count	18.1	23.0	36.9	78.0
	Other	Count	4	6	6	16
		Expected Count	3.7	4.7	7.6	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	42	62	102	206
		Expected Count	47.8	60.6	97.6	206.0
	Tajik	Count	32	55	94	181
		Expected Count	42.0	53.3	85.7	181.0
	Uzbek	Count	10	4	18	32
		Expected Count	7.4	9.4	15.2	32.0
	Total	Count	119	151	243	513
		Expected Count	119.0	151.0	243.0	513.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23.928 ^a	8	.002
Likelihood Ratio	24.079	8	.002
N of Valid Cases	513		

a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.71.

Ethnic * A good political leader hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet.

Crosstab

			A good political leader hires young educated Afghans in his cabinet.			Total
			Not Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important	
Ethnic	Hazara	Count	1	19	55	75
		Expected Count	2.0	15.5	57.5	75.0
	Other	Count	0	6	10	16
		Expected Count	.4	3.3	12.3	16.0
	Pashtun	Count	9	36	163	208
		Expected Count	5.7	43.0	159.3	208.0
	Tajik	Count	4	37	141	182
		Expected Count	5.0	37.6	139.4	182.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	8	24	32
		Expected Count	.9	6.6	24.5	32.0
	Total	Count	14	106	393	513
		Expected Count	14.0	106.0	393.0	513.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.034 ^a	8	.339
Likelihood Ratio	9.779	8	.281
N of Valid Cases	513		

a. 5 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .44.

Univariate Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Missing		No. of Extremes ^a	
				Count	Percent	Low	High
Mirwais	293	5.348	2.7062	275	48.4	39	41
AhmadShah	351	5.627	2.7140	217	38.2	19	0
AbdulRahman	281	3.477	2.7348	287	50.5	0	0
Habibullah	255	3.576	3.3709	313	55.1	0	0
Amanullah	347	5.896	2.7624	221	38.9	11	0
ZahirKhan	331	4.157	2.9013	237	41.7	0	29
DawoodKhan	339	5.540	2.7821	229	40.3	0	0
Tarakee	278	2.032	2.1885	290	51.1	0	9
HafeezullahAmin	263	1.681	2.1197	305	53.7	0	31
BarakKarma	263	2.179	2.5775	305	53.7	0	8
DrNajib	371	5.809	2.9635	197	34.7	0	0
Sebghatulah	279	3.115	2.5092	289	50.9	0	0
Rabani	296	3.598	3.0091	272	47.9	0	0
HamidKarzai	369	4.593	2.6432	199	35.0	26	54
QayoomKarzai	175	2.309	2.3235	393	69.2	0	3
AShMasood	332	5.148	3.3451	236	41.5	0	0
Hekmatyar	269	2.134	2.1693	299	52.6	0	1
MullahOmar	289	2.156	2.3629	279	49.1	0	2
AliMazari	240	2.654	2.5860	328	57.7	0	0
KrimKhalili	245	2.551	2.2694	323	56.9	0	2
Marshal	252	2.329	2.1917	316	55.6	0	2
ZiaMasood	221	3.050	2.8304	347	61.1	0	16
Saleh	248	4.536	3.0987	320	56.3	0	0
UstadAtta	291	5.048	3.6033	277	48.8	0	0
IsmaelKhan	252	3.290	2.9859	316	55.6	0	0
Sherzai	259	3.216	2.5744	309	54.4	0	0
Mohqeq	244	2.869	2.6292	324	57.0	0	0
GenDostum	277	3.372	3.0708	291	51.2	0	0
UstadSayaf	259	3.151	2.9116	309	54.4	0	0
Qanooni	257	4.272	2.9428	311	54.8	0	0
Mohseni	232	3.957	3.0731	336	59.2	0	0
Ghailan	168	3.054	2.4889	400	70.4	0	0
AshrafGhani	274	3.942	2.5884	294	51.8	0	11
Jalali	193	3.751	2.4791	375	66.0	0	9
KhalilZad	223	2.964	2.5991	345	60.7	0	0
Ahadi	192	2.542	2.1215	376	66.2	0	3
Yoon	151	1.894	1.8873	417	73.4	0	0

Badakhshi	132	2.644	2.8044	436	76.8	0	5
Kishtmand	165	3.333	2.7923	403	71.0	0	0
Atmar	218	3.275	2.5648	350	61.6	0	0
FarooqWardak	243	3.576	2.7085	325	57.2	0	0
BasharDost	314	5.019	2.8329	254	44.7	0	0
SimaSamar	209	3.775	2.6858	359	63.2	0	12
ShukriaBarakzai	250	4.036	2.8543	318	56.0	0	19
FawziaKoofi	212	4.462	3.3121	356	62.7	0	0
SimeenBarakzai	148	2.851	2.7215	420	73.9	0	0
HabibaSarabi	179	3.687	2.9476	389	68.5	0	0
BanuGhazanfar	173	3.595	3.0036	395	69.5	0	0
MalalyJoya	217	3.696	2.9705	351	61.8	0	0
DrAbdullah	260	3.958	3.0279	308	54.2	0	0
DrSpanta	192	2.984	2.5674	376	66.2	0	0
BesmellahKHan	189	3.280	2.5684	379	66.7	0	0
GenRahimWardak	213	3.141	2.5787	355	62.5	0	0
MustafaKazimi	201	4.269	3.2646	367	64.6	0	0
LateefPedram	181	3.083	2.8439	387	68.1	0	0
BaktashSeyawash	232	4.422	3.5005	336	59.2	0	0
AhmadBehzad	162	3.37	2.817	406	71.5	0	0
HajiQadeer	155	2.323	2.3381	413	72.7	0	2
Zakhilwal	180	2.483	2.2335	388	68.3	0	5
Khuram	166	1.958	2.0222	402	70.8	0	1
Dawoodzai	141	2.11	2.290	427	75.2	0	3
MahmudKarzai	186	2.231	2.1041	382	67.3	0	0
WaliKarzai	194	2.835	2.3110	374	65.8	0	0

a. Number of cases outside the range (Q1 - 1.5*IQR, Q3 + 1.5*IQR).

Little’s MCAR test: Chi-Square=11208.264, DF=10707, Sig. = 0.000

Missing Values

Variable Summary^{a,b}

	Missing		Valid N	Mean	Std. Deviation
	N	Percent			
Tahir Badakhshi	436	76.8%	132	2.644	2.8044
Omar Dawoodzai	427	75.2%	141	2.11	2.290
Semeen Barakzai	420	73.9%	148	2.851	2.7215
Ismael Yoon	417	73.4%	151	1.894	1.8873
Haji Qadeer	413	72.7%	155	2.323	2.3381
Ahmad Behzad	406	71.5%	162	3.37	2.817
Sultan Ali Kishtmand	403	71.0%	165	3.333	2.7923
Karim Khuram	402	70.8%	166	1.958	2.0222
Sayed Ahmad Gelani	400	70.4%	168	3.054	2.4889
Banoo Ghazanfar	395	69.5%	173	3.595	3.0036
Qayoom Karzai	393	69.2%	175	2.309	2.3235
Habiba Sarabee	389	68.5%	179	3.687	2.9476
Omar Zakhilwal	388	68.3%	180	2.483	2.2335
Lateef Pedram	387	68.1%	181	3.083	2.8439
Mahmood Karzai	382	67.3%	186	2.231	2.1041
Besmellah Khan	379	66.7%	189	3.280	2.5684
Dr Spanta	376	66.2%	192	2.984	2.5674
Anwarul Haq Ahadi	376	66.2%	192	2.542	2.1215
Ali Ahmad Jalali	375	66.0%	193	3.751	2.4791
Ahmad Wali Karzai	374	65.8%	194	2.835	2.3110
Syed Mustafa Kazimi	367	64.6%	201	4.269	3.2646
Dr Seema Samar	359	63.2%	209	3.775	2.6858
Fawzia Koofee	356	62.7%	212	4.462	3.3121
Gen. Rahim Wardak	355	62.5%	213	3.141	2.5787
Malaly Joya	351	61.8%	217	3.696	2.9705
Haneef Atmar	350	61.6%	218	3.275	2.5648
Ahmad Zia Masood	347	61.1%	221	3.050	2.8304
Zalmay Khalilzad	345	60.7%	223	2.964	2.5991
Baktash Seyawash	336	59.2%	232	4.422	3.5005
Shekh Asif Mohseni	336	59.2%	232	3.957	3.0731
Abdul Ali Mazari	328	57.7%	240	2.654	2.5860
Farooq Wardak	325	57.2%	243	3.576	2.7085
Mohqeq	324	57.0%	244	2.869	2.6292
Karim Khalili	323	56.9%	245	2.551	2.2694

Amrullah Saleh	320	56.3%	248	4.536	3.0987
Shukria Barakzai	318	56.0%	250	4.036	2.8543
Ismael Khan	316	55.6%	252	3.290	2.9859
Marshal Fahim	316	55.6%	252	2.329	2.1917
Habibullah Khan	313	55.1%	255	3.576	3.3709
Younus Qanooni	311	54.8%	257	4.272	2.9428
Ustad Sayaf	309	54.4%	259	3.151	2.9116
Gul Agha Sherzai	309	54.4%	259	3.216	2.5744
Dr Abdullah	308	54.2%	260	3.958	3.0279
Babrak Karmal	305	53.7%	263	2.179	2.5775
Hafeezullah Amin	305	53.7%	263	1.681	2.1197
Hekmatyar	299	52.6%	269	2.134	2.1693
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai	294	51.8%	274	3.942	2.5884
Gen. Dostum	291	51.2%	277	3.372	3.0708
Tarakee	290	51.1%	278	2.032	2.1885
Sebghatullah Mujadadi	289	50.9%	279	3.115	2.5092
Abdul Rahman Khan	287	50.5%	281	3.477	2.7348
Mullah Omar	279	49.1%	289	2.156	2.3629
Ustad Atta	277	48.8%	291	5.048	3.6033
Mirwais Nia	275	48.4%	293	5.348	2.7062
Ustad Rabani	272	47.9%	296	3.598	3.0091
Ramazan Bashar Dost	254	44.7%	314	5.019	2.8329
Zahir Khan	237	41.7%	331	4.157	2.9013
Ahmad Shah Masood	236	41.5%	332	5.148	3.3451
Dawood Khan	229	40.3%	339	5.540	2.7821
Amanullah Khan	221	38.9%	347	5.896	2.7624
Ahmad Shah Baba	217	38.2%	351	5.627	2.7140
Hamid Karzai	199	35.0%	369	4.593	2.6432
Dr Najib	197	34.7%	371	5.809	2.9635

a. Maximum number of variables shown: 63

b. Minimum percentage of missing values for variable to be included: 0.0%

The 10 most frequently occurring patterns are shown in the chart.

Frequency analysis of items after multiple imputations

[illegible]

ANNEX – VXi: Factor Analysis Using Data about Actual Afghan Leaders.

Rotated Factor Loadings:

	Rotated Factor Matrix ^{a,b}														
	Factor														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Ustad Atta	0.80	0.19	0.16	0.15	0.25	0.06	0.07	-0.03	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.15	0.02	0.03	-0.05
Dr Abdullah	0.73	0.22	0.13	0.12	0.15	0.07	0.15	-0.03	-0.01	0.10	0.14	-0.15	-0.01	0.03	-0.24
Younus Qanooni	0.67	0.28	0.28	0.21	0.10	-0.06	0.11	0.02	0.04	0.19	0.12	-0.05	0.05	0.07	-0.05
Ahmad Shah Masood	0.66	0.29	0.14	0.01	-0.01	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.09	-0.04	0.05	-0.02	0.07
Ismael Khan	0.66	0.14	0.07	0.24	0.16	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.32	0.04	0.18	0.06	-0.18	0.10	0.14
Amrullah Saleh	0.65	0.21	0.12	0.07	-0.02	0.07	0.04	-0.07	0.11	-0.02	0.07	0.35	0.08	0.09	0.00
Ustad Rabani	0.62	0.15	0.04	0.07	-0.07	0.22	0.29	0.31	0.12	0.13	0.15	-0.08	-0.08	-0.12	0.17
Syed Mustafa Kazimi	0.61	0.20	0.27	0.24	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.04	-0.16	0.07	0.22	0.08	0.03	0.16
Besmellah Khan	0.58	0.13	0.22	0.08	0.15	0.13	0.04	0.12	0.14	0.21	0.16	0.03	0.19	0.02	-0.03
Shekh Asif Mohseni	0.56	0.12	0.13	0.06	0.17	0.05	-0.05	0.15	-0.08	0.21	0.16	0.18	0.24	0.33	0.09
Baktash Seyawash	0.54	0.25	0.36	0.18	0.11	0.17	0.06	-0.12	0.16	0.10	-0.03	0.14	0.14	-0.06	-0.04
Ahmad Zia Masood	0.53	0.17	0.28	0.15	0.08	0.17	-0.08	0.11	0.11	-0.01	0.44	-0.02	-0.25	-0.08	-0.01
Habibullah Khan	0.52	0.22	-0.01	0.16	0.24	0.03	0.19	0.18	0.01	-0.10	-0.14	0.21	0.10	0.18	0.24
Ramazan Bashar Dost	0.49	0.14	0.42	0.14	0.00	0.15	0.11	0.14	0.05	0.13	-0.12	0.12	-0.06	-0.07	0.17
Lateef Pedram	0.48	0.12	0.36	0.27	-0.02	0.16	0.22	-0.04	0.06	0.10	-0.18	0.14	-0.09	0.11	-0.04
Banoo Ghazanfar	0.44	0.26	0.40	0.13	0.13	-0.02	0.06	0.04	-0.01	0.24	0.02	0.29	-0.01	-0.15	0.20
Ustad Sayaf	0.43	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.08	0.28	0.13	0.37	0.14	0.03	0.04	-0.11	0.04	0.42	0.04
Mirwais Nia	0.21	0.78	0.19	-0.04	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.19	0.18	-0.05	0.01	0.07	0.13	-0.06	-0.01
Ahmad Shah Baba	0.34	0.74	0.13	0.05	0.15	0.11	0.05	0.09	0.11	0.09	-0.05	0.08	0.11	-0.05	0.03
Zahir Khan	0.26	0.66	0.08	0.14	0.21	0.09	0.13	0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.14	-0.04	-0.12	-0.06	0.16
Amanullah Khan	0.33	0.62	0.24	-0.03	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.10	0.14	0.16	0.02	-0.01	0.19	-0.07
Dr Najib	0.38	0.49	0.25	0.14	0.04	-0.10	0.17	-0.10	0.06	0.19	-0.12	0.20	-0.07	0.12	-0.03
Abdul Rahman Khan	0.12	0.48	-0.07	-0.03	0.35	0.22	0.12	0.17	0.05	-0.12	0.05	0.09	-0.21	0.22	-0.02
Dawood Khan	0.30	0.48	0.04	0.09	0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.10	0.16	0.11	0.04	0.09	0.09	0.42	0.08
Hamid Karzai	0.21	0.47	0.09	0.19	0.36	0.05	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.35	0.12	-0.04	-0.02	0.10	0.06
Dr Spanta	0.11	0.26	0.10	0.23	-0.04	0.20	0.23	0.06	0.26	0.17	0.11	0.06	0.19	-0.03	-0.02
Shukria Barakzai	0.21	0.14	0.67	0.02	0.00	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.15	0.27	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.09
Malaly Joya	0.28	0.07	0.65	0.00	0.25	-0.01	0.09	-0.05	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.17	0.01	0.04	0.04
Fawzia Koofee	0.33	0.24	0.62	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.08	0.09	-0.11	0.00	0.19	0.29	-0.04	0.07
Habiba Sarabee	0.34	0.30	0.54	0.16	0.13	0.21	0.00	0.08	0.05	0.18	0.15	-0.10	0.20	0.09	0.02
Dr Seema Samar	0.14	0.09	0.48	0.32	0.11	0.01	0.13	0.02	0.23	0.07	0.05	0.02	-0.05	0.00	-0.06
Haji Qadeer	0.34	0.17	0.39	0.16	0.20	0.28	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.09	0.15	-0.04
Sayed Ahmad Gelani	0.14	0.18	0.33	0.00	0.19	0.11	0.08	0.19	0.11	0.07	0.28	0.17	0.29	0.10	-0.13
Abdul Ali Mazari	0.16	-0.03	0.10	0.78	0.01	0.22	0.18	0.16	-0.01	0.03	0.10	0.07	-0.02	-0.01	0.07
Mohqeq	0.34	0.04	0.13	0.67	0.17	0.11	0.21	0.17	0.09	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	0.10	0.11	-0.03
Karim Khalili	0.26	0.21	0.06	0.60	0.09	0.09	0.21	0.20	0.07	0.20	0.25	0.11	0.11	-0.13	0.03
Gen. Dostum	0.47	0.16	0.15	0.48	0.16	-0.07	0.37	0.13	-0.07	0.06	-0.10	0.16	-0.01	0.19	0.12
Sultan Ali Kishmand	0.25	0.05	0.27	0.47	0.06	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.01	0.14	0.20	0.35	0.04	0.08	0.10
Mahmood Karzai	0.09	0.14	0.21	0.04	0.77	0.31	0.09	0.18	-0.01	0.09	0.03	0.09	0.03	-0.05	-0.06
Gul Agha Sherzai	0.28	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.59	0.15	0.04	0.16	0.27	-0.05	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.14
Ahmad Wali Karzai	-0.03	0.17	0.14	0.02	0.53	0.25	0.10	0.04	0.10	0.08	0.22	-0.05	0.10	0.12	0.15

Farooq Wardak	0.28	0.34	0.24	0.06	0.50	0.29	0.00	0.11	0.07	0.20	0.08	-0.03	-0.05	0.00	-0.14
Qayoom Karzai	0.20	0.12	-0.05	0.11	0.45	0.11	0.28	0.29	0.17	0.09	-0.04	0.23	0.05	-0.09	0.01
Gen. Rahim Wardak	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.19	0.34	0.30	0.00	0.17	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.12	-0.05	0.03	-0.10
Omar Dawoodzai	0.11	0.12	0.21	0.16	0.25	0.75	0.05	0.14	-0.04	-0.07	0.06	0.06	0.11	-0.01	-0.06
Karim Khuram	0.11	-0.04	0.02	0.05	0.26	0.66	0.03	0.06	0.25	0.14	0.14	0.04	0.02	-0.04	0.11
Omar Zakhilwal	0.08	0.16	0.13	0.17	0.29	0.61	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.27	-0.04	-0.13	-0.09	0.16	0.11
Haneef Atmar	0.19	0.26	0.22	0.21	0.24	0.38	0.16	0.07	0.21	0.30	0.07	0.12	-0.15	0.08	0.17
Hafeezullah Amin	0.11	0.14	0.07	0.21	0.07	0.09	0.80	0.23	0.12	0.08	-0.03	0.05	0.11	-0.18	0.06
Tarakee	0.15	0.13	0.10	0.19	0.11	0.12	0.75	0.06	0.01	0.12	0.10	0.05	-0.13	0.16	0.02
Babrak Karmal	0.20	0.09	0.29	0.31	0.13	-0.03	0.63	0.06	0.11	-0.11	0.18	0.10	0.13	0.11	-0.07
Hekmatyar	0.06	0.13	0.00	0.15	0.18	0.10	0.08	0.76	0.14	0.05	0.14	0.09	-0.10	0.04	-0.06
Mullah Omar	0.01	0.10	0.07	0.22	0.20	0.13	0.18	0.63	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.11	0.06	0.04
Sebghatullah Mujadadi	0.30	0.24	0.22	0.27	0.08	0.20	0.15	0.30	0.05	0.23	0.20	-0.20	-0.03	-0.04	0.18
Ali Ahmad Jalali	0.19	0.18	0.14	-0.05	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.11	0.69	0.01	0.08	0.02	-0.06	0.08	0.03
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai	0.13	0.40	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.13	0.02	0.13	0.57	0.27	0.01	-0.04	0.13	-0.03	0.05
Anwarul Haq Ahadi	0.31	0.27	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.21	0.13	0.08	0.17	0.65	0.07	0.02	0.09	0.04	-0.03
Ismael Yoon	0.18	0.01	0.36	0.02	0.07	0.34	0.04	0.26	-0.01	0.44	-0.03	0.21	-0.04	0.04	-0.07
Marshal Fahim	0.34	0.06	0.17	0.25	0.15	0.12	0.18	0.18	0.07	0.07	0.67	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.09
Zalmay Khalilzad	0.10	0.29	0.20	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.23	-0.03	0.28	-0.05	0.33	0.14	0.12	0.07	-0.03
Tahir Badakhshi	0.26	0.11	0.26	0.17	0.12	0.03	0.16	0.12	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.71	0.06	0.01	-0.03
Ahmad Behzad	0.56	0.02	0.25	0.22	0.06	0.05	0.06	-0.07	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.11	0.56	0.09	0.04
Semeen Barakzai	0.20	0.16	0.48	0.24	0.16	0.28	0.06	-0.09	0.19	-0.03	0.18	-0.06	0.01	0.12	0.55

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

- Imputation Number = 5
- Rotation Converged in 13 iterations.

Total Variance Explained:

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	22.813	36.211	36.211	22.496	35.709	35.709	8.89	14.111	14.111
2	3.791	6.018	42.228	3.476	5.517	41.226	4.848	7.696	21.807
3	3.057	4.853	47.081	2.779	4.411	45.637	4.482	7.114	28.92
4	2.47	3.921	51.002	2.156	3.423	49.06	3.376	5.358	34.279
5	2.02	3.206	54.209	1.717	2.726	51.785	3.207	5.091	39.369
6	1.865	2.96	57.168	1.545	2.452	54.237	2.974	4.72	44.09
7	1.532	2.432	59.601	1.199	1.902	56.14	2.757	4.377	48.466
8	1.473	2.337	61.938	1.151	1.827	57.967	2.199	3.491	51.957
9	1.299	2.062	64	0.973	1.544	59.511	1.755	2.785	54.742
10	1.274	2.022	66.022	0.97	1.539	61.051	1.731	2.748	57.491
11	1.219	1.934	67.956	0.913	1.449	62.5	1.624	2.578	60.069
12	1.191	1.89	69.847	0.883	1.402	63.902	1.591	2.525	62.593
13	1.113	1.766	71.613	0.798	1.266	65.168	1.13	1.794	64.387
14	1.079	1.713	73.325	0.745	1.182	66.35	0.994	1.578	65.965
15	1.009	1.602	74.927	0.665	1.056	67.406	0.908	1.441	67.406
16	0.939	1.49	76.418						
17	0.859	1.364	77.781						
18	0.826	1.312	79.093						
19	0.762	1.209	80.302						
20	0.743	1.18	81.482						
21	0.695	1.103	82.585						
22	0.661	1.049	83.635						
23	0.642	1.02	84.654						
24	0.587	0.932	85.586						
25	0.57	0.904	86.491						
26	0.531	0.843	87.334						
27	0.461	0.732	88.067						
28	0.449	0.712	88.779						
29	0.434	0.688	89.467						
30	0.415	0.659	90.126						
31	0.404	0.641	90.767						
32	0.383	0.607	91.375						
33	0.366	0.581	91.955						
34	0.347	0.551	92.506						
35	0.331	0.525	93.032						
36	0.318	0.505	93.537						
37	0.304	0.483	94.02						
38	0.299	0.475	94.495						
39	0.287	0.455	94.95						
40	0.261	0.415	95.365						
41	0.243	0.386	95.751						
42	0.229	0.364	96.114						
43	0.22	0.349	96.464						

44	0.204	0.324	96.788						
45	0.201	0.319	97.107						
46	0.176	0.279	97.386						
47	0.171	0.271	97.657						
48	0.168	0.267	97.924						
49	0.153	0.242	98.167						
50	0.139	0.221	98.388						
51	0.133	0.212	98.6						
52	0.124	0.196	98.796						
53	0.12	0.19	98.986						
54	0.106	0.168	99.154						
55	0.091	0.145	99.3						
56	0.082	0.13	99.429						
57	0.075	0.119	99.548						
58	0.061	0.096	99.644						
59	0.057	0.091	99.735						
60	0.05	0.079	99.814						
61	0.045	0.072	99.886						
62	0.039	0.062	99.948						
63	0.033	0.052	100						

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
a. Imputation Number = 5

Factor Correlation:

Factor Transformation Matrix^a

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1	0.565	0.371	0.367	0.288	0.27	0.243	0.227	0.183	0.173	0.164	0.142	0.128	0.065	0.081	0.065
2	-0.579	0.03	-0.121	0.014	0.435	0.488	0.101	0.348	0.182	0.115	0.077	-0.16	-0.111	-0.017	0.022
3	-0.056	-0.553	-0.047	0.59	-0.144	-0.038	0.476	0.183	-0.143	-0.083	0.031	0.154	0.04	-0.025	0.064
4	0.038	0.502	-0.608	0.061	-0.056	-0.361	0.373	0.226	0.061	-0.043	-0.125	-0.042	-0.137	0.075	-0.043
5	-0.501	0.313	0.446	-0.018	0.063	-0.254	0.331	-0.239	0.026	-0.082	-0.154	0.362	0.22	-0.063	-0.046
6	0.163	-0.14	-0.184	-0.122	0.571	-0.007	-0.152	0.155	-0.3	-0.319	-0.319	0.431	0.15	0.115	-0.127
7	-0.027	-0.008	-0.019	-0.084	0.076	-0.172	-0.04	0.077	0.249	-0.61	0.698	0.043	0.109	0.063	0.097
8	-0.079	0	0.067	-0.151	-0.173	-0.22	-0.156	0.564	-0.196	0.42	0.307	0.206	0.279	-0.065	-0.335
9	0.093	-0.182	-0.011	-0.351	-0.307	0.204	0.198	0.219	0.508	-0.115	-0.339	0.017	0.422	0.216	0.005
10	0.13	-0.175	0.051	-0.432	-0.04	0.039	0.27	0.056	0.142	0.048	0.069	0.409	-0.608	-0.346	-0.011
11	-0.118	0.147	-0.001	0.33	-0.218	-0.029	-0.517	0.274	0.264	-0.086	-0.219	0.361	-0.125	-0.181	0.402
12	-0.041	0.137	0.375	-0.175	-0.218	0.062	0.085	0.407	-0.47	-0.326	-0.128	-0.235	-0.261	0.263	0.218
13	-0.109	-0.096	-0.076	-0.063	0.009	-0.075	-0.025	-0.148	0.032	0.33	0.157	0.309	-0.176	0.777	0.276
14	-0.031	0.266	-0.282	-0.019	-0.362	0.602	0.058	-0.203	-0.337	-0.101	0.195	0.342	0.171	-0.054	-0.005
15	-0.055	0.043	0.112	0.257	-0.162	0.117	-0.153	-0.013	0.194	-0.215	-0.059	0.071	-0.333	0.293	-0.751

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.^a
a. Imputation Number = 5

Factor Plot in Rotated Factor Space

KMO and Bartlett's Test^a

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		0.86
Approx. Chi-Square		24888.71
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	df	1953
	Sig.	0

a. Imputation Number = 5

Frequencies

		Ustad Atta	Dr Abdullah	Younus Qanooni	Ahmad Shah Masood	Ismael Khan	Amrullah Saleh	Ustad Rabani	Syed Mustafa Kazimi	Besmellah Khan	Shekh Asif Mohseni	Baktash Seyawash	Ahmad Zia Masood	Habibullah Khan	Ramazan Bashar Dost	Lateef Pedram	Banoo Ghazanfar	Ustad Sayaf	Gen. Dostum	Ahmad Behzad
N	Valid	291	260	257	332	252	248	296	201	189	232	232	221	255	314	181	173	259	277	162
	Missing	277	308	311	236	316	320	272	367	379	336	336	347	313	254	387	395	309	291	406
Mean		5.048	3.958	4.272	5.148	3.29	4.536	3.598	4.269	3.28	3.957	4.422	3.05	3.576	5.019	3.083	3.595	3.151	3.372	3.37
Median		5	4	4	5	3	5	3	4	3	4	4	3	3	5	2	3	3	3	3
Mode		10	0	5	5	0	5	0	5	5	5	10	0	0	5	0	.0 ^a	0	0	0
Std. Deviation		3.6033	3.0279	2.9428	3.3451	2.9859	3.0987	3.0091	3.2646	2.5684	3.0731	3.5005	2.8304	3.3709	2.8329	2.8439	3.0036	2.9116	3.0708	2.817
Skewness		0.098	0.46	0.476	0.081	0.673	0.264	0.638	0.442	0.631	0.494	0.425	1.018	0.66	0.3	0.793	0.651	0.772	0.646	0.7
Std. Error of Skewness		0.143	0.151	0.152	0.134	0.153	0.155	0.142	0.172	0.177	0.16	0.16	0.164	0.153	0.138	0.181	0.185	0.151	0.146	0.191
Kurtosis		-1.379	-0.702	-0.621	-1.14	-0.524	-0.922	-0.5	-0.86	-0.091	-0.633	-1.136	0.405	-0.791	-0.532	-0.17	-0.494	-0.208	-0.573	-0.161
Std. Error of Kurtosis		0.285	0.301	0.303	0.267	0.306	0.308	0.282	0.341	0.352	0.318	0.318	0.326	0.304	0.274	0.359	0.367	0.302	0.292	0.379
Minimum		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maximum		10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

Frequency Table

Ustad Atta				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid .0	43	7.6	14.8	14.8
1.0	20	3.5	6.9	21.6
2.0	23	4.0	7.9	29.6
3.0	31	5.5	10.7	40.2
4.0	19	3.3	6.5	46.7
5.0	38	6.7	13.1	59.8
6.0	9	1.6	3.1	62.9
7.0	13	2.3	4.5	67.4
8.0	22	3.9	7.6	74.9

	9.0	7	1.2	2.4	77.3
	10.0	66	11.6	22.7	100.0
	Total	291	51.2	100.0	
Missing	System	277	48.8		
Total		568	100.0		

Dr Abdullah

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	45	7.9	17.3	17.3
	1.0	20	3.5	7.7	25.0
	2.0	26	4.6	10.0	35.0
	3.0	35	6.2	13.5	48.5
	4.0	27	4.8	10.4	58.8
	5.0	42	7.4	16.2	75.0
	6.0	11	1.9	4.2	79.2
	7.0	11	1.9	4.2	83.5
	8.0	16	2.8	6.2	89.6
	9.0	7	1.2	2.7	92.3
	10.0	20	3.5	7.7	100.0
	Total	260	45.8	100.0	
Missing	System	308	54.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Younus Qanooni

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	25	4.4	9.7	9.7
	1.0	26	4.6	10.1	19.8
	2.0	26	4.6	10.1	30.0
	3.0	38	6.7	14.8	44.7
	4.0	28	4.9	10.9	55.6
	5.0	45	7.9	17.5	73.2
	6.0	16	2.8	6.2	79.4

	7.0	6	1.1	2.3	81.7
	8.0	17	3.0	6.6	88.3
	9.0	5	.9	1.9	90.3
	10.0	25	4.4	9.7	100.0
	Total	257	45.2	100.0	
Missing	System	311	54.8		
Total		568	100.0		

Ahmad Shah Masood

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	41	7.2	12.3	12.3
	1.0	14	2.5	4.2	16.6
	2.0	26	4.6	7.8	24.4
	3.0	32	5.6	9.6	34.0
	4.0	22	3.9	6.6	40.7
	5.0	75	13.2	22.6	63.3
	6.0	10	1.8	3.0	66.3
	7.0	16	2.8	4.8	71.1
	8.0	18	3.2	5.4	76.5
	9.0	12	2.1	3.6	80.1
	10.0	66	11.6	19.9	100.0
	Total	332	58.5	100.0	
Missing	System	236	41.5		
Total		568	100.0		

Ismael Khan

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	63	11.1	25.0	25.0
	1.0	27	4.8	10.7	35.7
	2.0	30	5.3	11.9	47.6
	3.0	27	4.8	10.7	58.3
	4.0	21	3.7	8.3	66.7
	5.0	29	5.1	11.5	78.2
	6.0	12	2.1	4.8	82.9
	7.0	15	2.6	6.0	88.9
	8.0	11	1.9	4.4	93.3
	9.0	3	.5	1.2	94.4
	10.0	14	2.5	5.6	100.0
	Total	252	44.4	100.0	
Missing	System	316	55.6		
Total		568	100.0		

Amrullah Saleh					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	30	5.3	12.1	12.1
	1.0	19	3.3	7.7	19.8
	2.0	24	4.2	9.7	29.4
	3.0	29	5.1	11.7	41.1
	4.0	16	2.8	6.5	47.6
	5.0	53	9.3	21.4	69.0
	6.0	12	2.1	4.8	73.8
	7.0	11	1.9	4.4	78.2
	8.0	20	3.5	8.1	86.3
	9.0	7	1.2	2.8	89.1
	10.0	27	4.8	10.9	100.0
	Total	248	43.7	100.0	
Missing	System	320	56.3		
Total		568	100.0		

Ustad Rabani					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	57	10.0	19.3	19.3
	1.0	35	6.2	11.8	31.1
	2.0	32	5.6	10.8	41.9
	3.0	32	5.6	10.8	52.7
	4.0	35	6.2	11.8	64.5
	5.0	43	7.6	14.5	79.1
	6.0	12	2.1	4.1	83.1
	7.0	6	1.1	2.0	85.1
	8.0	16	2.8	5.4	90.5
	9.0	7	1.2	2.4	92.9
	10.0	21	3.7	7.1	100.0
	Total	296	52.1	100.0	
Missing	System	272	47.9		
Total		568	100.0		

Syed Mustafa Kazimi

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	32	5.6	15.9	15.9
	1.0	19	3.3	9.5	25.4
	2.0	14	2.5	7.0	32.3
	3.0	27	4.8	13.4	45.8
	4.0	17	3.0	8.5	54.2
	5.0	39	6.9	19.4	73.6
	6.0	6	1.1	3.0	76.6
	7.0	6	1.1	3.0	79.6
	8.0	9	1.6	4.5	84.1
	9.0	3	.5	1.5	85.6
	10.0	29	5.1	14.4	100.0
	Total	201	35.4	100.0	
Missing	System	367	64.6		
Total		568	100.0		

Besmellah Khan

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	32	5.6	16.9	16.9
	1.0	26	4.6	13.8	30.7
	2.0	20	3.5	10.6	41.3
	3.0	28	4.9	14.8	56.1
	4.0	22	3.9	11.6	67.7
	5.0	33	5.8	17.5	85.2
	6.0	7	1.2	3.7	88.9
	7.0	7	1.2	3.7	92.6
	8.0	5	.9	2.6	95.2
	9.0	4	.7	2.1	97.4
	10.0	5	.9	2.6	100.0
	Total	189	33.3	100.0	
Missing	System	379	66.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Shekh Asif Mohseni					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	38	6.7	16.4	16.4
	1.0	28	4.9	12.1	28.4
	2.0	19	3.3	8.2	36.6
	3.0	22	3.9	9.5	46.1
	4.0	20	3.5	8.6	54.7
	5.0	52	9.2	22.4	77.2
	6.0	12	2.1	5.2	82.3
	7.0	4	.7	1.7	84.1
	8.0	10	1.8	4.3	88.4
	9.0	4	.7	1.7	90.1
	10.0	23	4.0	9.9	100.0
	Total	232	40.8	100.0	
Missing	System	336	59.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Baktash Seyawash					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	36	6.3	15.5	15.5
	1.0	22	3.9	9.5	25.0
	2.0	29	5.1	12.5	37.5
	3.0	21	3.7	9.1	46.6
	4.0	21	3.7	9.1	55.6
	5.0	34	6.0	14.7	70.3
	6.0	5	.9	2.2	72.4
	7.0	7	1.2	3.0	75.4
	8.0	6	1.1	2.6	78.0
	9.0	8	1.4	3.4	81.5
	10.0	43	7.6	18.5	100.0
	Total	232	40.8	100.0	
Missing	System	336	59.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Ahmad Zia Masood

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	47	8.3	21.3	21.3
	1.0	35	6.2	15.8	37.1
	2.0	26	4.6	11.8	48.9
	3.0	33	5.8	14.9	63.8
	4.0	26	4.6	11.8	75.6
	5.0	20	3.5	9.0	84.6
	6.0	7	1.2	3.2	87.8
	7.0	6	1.1	2.7	90.5
	8.0	5	.9	2.3	92.8
	10.0	16	2.8	7.2	100.0
	Total	221	38.9	100.0	
Missing	System	347	61.1		
Total		568	100.0		

Habibullah Khan

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	65	11.4	25.5	25.5
	1.0	31	5.5	12.2	37.6
	2.0	28	4.9	11.0	48.6
	3.0	18	3.2	7.1	55.7
	4.0	15	2.6	5.9	61.6
	5.0	38	6.7	14.9	76.5
	6.0	5	.9	2.0	78.4
	7.0	13	2.3	5.1	83.5
	8.0	8	1.4	3.1	86.7
	9.0	4	.7	1.6	88.2
	10.0	30	5.3	11.8	100.0
	Total	255	44.9	100.0	
Missing	System	313	55.1		
Total		568	100.0		

Ramazan Bashar Dost					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	21	3.7	6.7	6.7
	1.0	12	2.1	3.8	10.5
	2.0	23	4.0	7.3	17.8
	3.0	28	4.9	8.9	26.8
	4.0	47	8.3	15.0	41.7
	5.0	97	17.1	30.9	72.6
	6.0	6	1.1	1.9	74.5
	7.0	10	1.8	3.2	77.7
	8.0	19	3.3	6.1	83.8
	9.0	7	1.2	2.2	86.0
	10.0	44	7.7	14.0	100.0
	Total	314	55.3	100.0	
Missing	System	254	44.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Lateef Pedram					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	44	7.7	24.3	24.3
	1.0	24	4.2	13.3	37.6
	2.0	24	4.2	13.3	50.8
	3.0	17	3.0	9.4	60.2
	4.0	16	2.8	8.8	69.1
	5.0	25	4.4	13.8	82.9
	6.0	5	.9	2.8	85.6
	7.0	12	2.1	6.6	92.3
	8.0	3	.5	1.7	93.9
	9.0	2	.4	1.1	95.0
	10.0	9	1.6	5.0	100.0
	Total	181	31.9	100.0	
Missing	System	387	68.1		
Total		568	100.0		

Banoo Ghazanfar

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	29	5.1	16.8	16.8
	1.0	29	5.1	16.8	33.5
	2.0	16	2.8	9.2	42.8
	3.0	20	3.5	11.6	54.3
	4.0	12	2.1	6.9	61.3
	5.0	29	5.1	16.8	78.0
	6.0	11	1.9	6.4	84.4
	7.0	3	.5	1.7	86.1
	8.0	8	1.4	4.6	90.8
	9.0	3	.5	1.7	92.5
	10.0	13	2.3	7.5	100.0
	Total	173	30.5	100.0	
Missing	System	395	69.5		
Total		568	100.0		

Ustad Sayaf

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	66	11.6	25.5	25.5
	1.0	33	5.8	12.7	38.2
	2.0	24	4.2	9.3	47.5
	3.0	28	4.9	10.8	58.3
	4.0	27	4.8	10.4	68.7
	5.0	37	6.5	14.3	83.0
	6.0	9	1.6	3.5	86.5
	7.0	9	1.6	3.5	90.0
	8.0	8	1.4	3.1	93.1
	9.0	3	.5	1.2	94.2
	10.0	15	2.6	5.8	100.0
	Total	259	45.6	100.0	
Missing	System	309	54.4		
Total		568	100.0		

Gen. Dostum		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	74	13.0	26.7	26.7
	1.0	26	4.6	9.4	36.1
	2.0	22	3.9	7.9	44.0
	3.0	35	6.2	12.6	56.7
	4.0	24	4.2	8.7	65.3
	5.0	40	7.0	14.4	79.8
	6.0	7	1.2	2.5	82.3
	7.0	11	1.9	4.0	86.3
	8.0	16	2.8	5.8	92.1
	9.0	4	.7	1.4	93.5
	10.0	18	3.2	6.5	100.0
	Total	277	48.8	100.0	
Missing	System	291	51.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Ahmad Behzad		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	34	6.0	21.0	21.0
	1	14	2.5	8.6	29.6
	2	22	3.9	13.6	43.2
	3	20	3.5	12.3	55.6
	4	18	3.2	11.1	66.7
	5	27	4.8	16.7	83.3
	6	7	1.2	4.3	87.7
	7	1	.2	.6	88.3
	8	7	1.2	4.3	92.6
	9	4	.7	2.5	95.1
	10	8	1.4	4.9	100.0
	Total	162	28.5	100.0	
Missing	System	406	71.5		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Younus Qanooni

Shekh Asif Mohseni

Ahmad Zia Masood

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Ustad Atta	291	51.2%	277	48.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Dr Abdullah	260	45.8%	308	54.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Younus Qanooni	257	45.2%	311	54.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ahmad Shah Masood	332	58.5%	236	41.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ismael Khan	252	44.4%	316	55.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Amrullah Saleh	248	43.7%	320	56.3%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ustad Rabani	296	52.1%	272	47.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Syed Mustafa Kazimi	201	35.4%	367	64.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Besmellah Khan	189	33.3%	379	66.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Shekh Asif Mohseni	232	40.8%	336	59.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Baktash Seyawash	232	40.8%	336	59.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ahmad Zia Masood	221	38.9%	347	61.1%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Habibullah Khan	255	44.9%	313	55.1%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ramazan Bashar Dost	314	55.3%	254	44.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Lateef Pedram	181	31.9%	387	68.1%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Banoo Ghazanfar	173	30.5%	395	69.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ustad Sayaf	259	45.6%	309	54.4%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Gen. Dostum	277	48.8%	291	51.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ahmad Behzad	162	28.5%	406	71.5%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Ustad Atta

			Crosstab											
			Ustad Atta										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	38	6	11	14	9	12	1	4	1	2	13	111
		Expected Count	16.4	7.6	8.8	11.8	7.2	14.5	3.4	5.0	8.4	2.7	25.2	111.0
	Tajik	Count	1	5	6	9	6	19	4	4	16	5	48	123
		Expected Count	18.2	8.5	9.7	13.1	8.0	16.1	3.8	5.5	9.3	3.0	27.9	123.0
	Hazara	Count	3	8	4	5	3	4	0	3	0	0	1	31
		Expected Count	4.6	2.1	2.5	3.3	2.0	4.0	1.0	1.4	2.3	.7	7.0	31.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	1	1	0	4	1	4	0	3	15
		Expected Count	2.2	1.0	1.2	1.6	1.0	2.0	.5	.7	1.1	.4	3.4	15.0
	Other	Count	1	0	2	2	0	3	0	1	1	0	1	11
		Expected Count	1.6	.8	.9	1.2	.7	1.4	.3	.5	.8	.3	2.5	11.0
	Total	Count	43	20	23	31	19	38	9	13	22	7	66	291
		Expected Count	43.0	20.0	23.0	31.0	19.0	38.0	9.0	13.0	22.0	7.0	66.0	291.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	165.655 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	160.103	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.936	1	.005
N of Valid Cases	291		

a. 37 cells (67.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .26.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.754	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.377	.000
N of Valid Cases		291

Ethnicity * Dr Abdullah

			Crosstab											
			Dr Abdullah										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	34	12	7	20	11	25	1	1	3	1	2	117
		Expected Count	20.3	9.0	11.7	15.8	12.2	18.9	5.0	5.0	7.2	3.2	9.0	117.0
	Tajik	Count	7	4	7	8	9	12	7	8	11	4	16	93
		Expected Count	16.1	7.2	9.3	12.5	9.7	15.0	3.9	3.9	5.7	2.5	7.2	93.0
	Hazara	Count	3	2	12	4	5	4	0	0	0	1	0	31
		Expected Count	5.4	2.4	3.1	4.2	3.2	5.0	1.3	1.3	1.9	.8	2.4	31.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	1	1	0	3	1	1	1	2	11
		Expected Count	1.9	.8	1.1	1.5	1.1	1.8	.5	.5	.7	.3	.8	11.0
	Other	Count	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	8
		Expected Count	1.4	.6	.8	1.1	.8	1.3	.3	.3	.5	.2	.6	8.0
	Total	Count	45	20	26	35	27	42	11	11	16	7	20	260
		Expected Count	45.0	20.0	26.0	35.0	27.0	42.0	11.0	11.0	16.0	7.0	20.0	260.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	126.412 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	121.338	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.468	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	260		

a. 37 cells (67.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.697	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.349	.000
N of Valid Cases		260

Ethnicity * Younus Qanooni

Crosstab														
			Younus Qanooni										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	20	13	12	18	12	19	5	0	4	0	3	106
		Expected Count	10.3	10.7	10.7	15.7	11.5	18.6	6.6	2.5	7.0	2.1	10.3	106.0
	Tajik	Count	3	5	11	5	11	17	9	3	11	4	20	99
		Expected Count	9.6	10.0	10.0	14.6	10.8	17.3	6.2	2.3	6.5	1.9	9.6	99.0
	Hazara	Count	1	7	2	10	5	6	0	0	0	0	1	32
		Expected Count	3.1	3.2	3.2	4.7	3.5	5.6	2.0	.7	2.1	.6	3.1	32.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	3	0	1	2	2	2	0	1	11
		Expected Count	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.6	1.2	1.9	.7	.3	.7	.2	1.1	11.0
	Other	Count	1	1	1	2	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	9
		Expected Count	.9	.9	.9	1.3	1.0	1.6	.6	.2	.6	.2	.9	9.0
	Total	Count	25	26	26	38	28	45	16	6	17	5	25	257
		Expected Count	25.0	26.0	26.0	38.0	28.0	45.0	16.0	6.0	17.0	5.0	25.0	257.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	105.979 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	110.656	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.256	1	.012
N of Valid Cases	257		

a. 36 cells (65.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .18.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.642	.000
	Cramer's V	.321	.000
N of Valid Cases		257

Ethnicity * Ahmad Shah Masood

Crosstab														
			Ahmad Shah Masood											Total
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	25	3	15	16	14	42	2	5	3	2	10	137
		Expected Count	16.9	5.8	10.7	13.2	9.1	30.9	4.1	6.6	7.4	5.0	27.2	137.0
	Tajik	Count	4	3	2	6	5	20	6	10	11	7	50	124
		Expected Count	15.3	5.2	9.7	12.0	8.2	28.0	3.7	6.0	6.7	4.5	24.7	124.0
	Hazara	Count	11	6	8	8	1	9	0	0	0	0	2	45
		Expected Count	5.6	1.9	3.5	4.3	3.0	10.2	1.4	2.2	2.4	1.6	8.9	45.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	1	1	2	1	1	4	2	2	16
		Expected Count	2.0	.7	1.3	1.5	1.1	3.6	.5	.8	.9	.6	3.2	16.0
	Other	Count	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	2	10
		Expected Count	1.2	.4	.8	1.0	.7	2.3	.3	.5	.5	.4	2.0	10.0
	Total	Count	41	14	26	32	22	75	10	16	18	12	66	332
		Expected Count	41.0	14.0	26.0	32.0	22.0	75.0	10.0	16.0	18.0	12.0	66.0	332.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	151.657 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	156.084	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.651	1	.103
N of Valid Cases	332		

a. 34 cells (61.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.676	.000
	Cramer's V	.338	.000
N of Valid Cases		332

Ethnicity * Ismael Khan

			Crosstab											
			Ismael Khan										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	37	11	18	14	9	15	2	2	0	0	0	108
		Expected Count	27.0	11.6	12.9	11.6	9.0	12.4	5.1	6.4	4.7	1.3	6.0	108.0
	Tajik	Count	12	8	6	4	9	12	5	8	7	3	12	86
		Expected Count	21.5	9.2	10.2	9.2	7.2	9.9	4.1	5.1	3.8	1.0	4.8	86.0
	Hazara	Count	12	6	5	7	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	34
		Expected Count	8.5	3.6	4.0	3.6	2.8	3.9	1.6	2.0	1.5	.4	1.9	34.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	1	0	0	4	5	1	0	2	14
		Expected Count	3.5	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.6	.7	.8	.6	.2	.8	14.0
	Other	Count	2	1	1	1	2	0	1	0	2	0	0	10
		Expected Count	2.5	1.1	1.2	1.1	.8	1.2	.5	.6	.4	.1	.6	10.0
	Total	Count	63	27	30	27	21	29	12	15	11	3	14	252
		Expected Count	63.0	27.0	30.0	27.0	21.0	29.0	12.0	15.0	11.0	3.0	14.0	252.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	126.124 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	127.553	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.056	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	252		

a. 38 cells (69.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.707	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.354	.000
N of Valid Cases		252

Ethnicity * Amrullah Saleh

			Crosstab											
			Amrullah Saleh										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	23	8	8	13	7	26	4	1	0	1	8	99
		Expected Count	12.0	7.6	9.6	11.6	6.4	21.2	4.8	4.4	8.0	2.8	10.8	99.0
	Tajik	Count	2	5	8	7	2	21	7	8	15	4	16	95
		Expected Count	11.5	7.3	9.2	11.1	6.1	20.3	4.6	4.2	7.7	2.7	10.3	95.0
	Hazara	Count	4	5	7	7	6	3	0	0	1	0	0	33
		Expected Count	4.0	2.5	3.2	3.9	2.1	7.1	1.6	1.5	2.7	.9	3.6	33.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	2	2	2	3	13
		Expected Count	1.6	1.0	1.3	1.5	.8	2.8	.6	.6	1.0	.4	1.4	13.0
	Other	Count	1	0	1	1	1	2	0	0	2	0	0	8
		Expected Count	1.0	.6	.8	.9	.5	1.7	.4	.4	.6	.2	.9	8.0
	Total	Count	30	19	24	29	16	53	12	11	20	7	27	248
		Expected Count	30.0	19.0	24.0	29.0	16.0	53.0	12.0	11.0	20.0	7.0	27.0	248.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	104.834 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	118.337	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.905	1	.027
N of Valid Cases	248		

a. 38 cells (69.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.650	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.325	.000
N of Valid Cases		248

Ethnicity * Ustad Rabani

			Crosstab										Total	
			Ustad Rabani											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	37	12	13	15	20	19	3	0	1	0	3	123
		Expected Count	23.7	14.5	13.3	13.3	14.5	17.9	5.0	2.5	6.6	2.9	8.7	123.0
	Tajik	Count	8	11	6	11	11	14	5	6	12	6	16	106
		Expected Count	20.4	12.5	11.5	11.5	12.5	15.4	4.3	2.1	5.7	2.5	7.5	106.0
	Hazara	Count	11	10	7	3	3	7	1	0	0	0	0	42
		Expected Count	8.1	5.0	4.5	4.5	5.0	6.1	1.7	.9	2.3	1.0	3.0	42.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	3	0	1	3	2	0	1	1	2	15
		Expected Count	2.9	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.8	2.2	.6	.3	.8	.4	1.1	15.0
	Other	Count	1	0	3	3	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	10
		Expected Count	1.9	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.5	.4	.2	.5	.2	.7	10.0
	Total	Count	57	35	32	32	35	43	12	6	16	7	21	296
		Expected Count	57.0	35.0	32.0	32.0	35.0	43.0	12.0	6.0	16.0	7.0	21.0	296.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	109.227 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	122.273	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.306	1	.038
N of Valid Cases	296		

a. 37 cells (67.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.607	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.304	.000
N of Valid Cases		296

Ethnicity * Syed Mustafa Kazimi

			Crosstab											
			Syed Mustafa Kazimi										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	23	6	6	16	5	14	3	0	2	0	6	81
		Expected Count	12.9	7.7	5.6	10.9	6.9	15.7	2.4	2.4	3.6	1.2	11.7	81.0
	Tajik	Count	6	6	3	5	6	12	2	6	5	1	16	68
		Expected Count	10.8	6.4	4.7	9.1	5.8	13.2	2.0	2.0	3.0	1.0	9.8	68.0
	Hazara	Count	2	5	4	5	4	10	1	0	0	0	0	31
		Expected Count	4.9	2.9	2.2	4.2	2.6	6.0	.9	.9	1.4	.5	4.5	31.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	7	12
		Expected Count	1.9	1.1	.8	1.6	1.0	2.3	.4	.4	.5	.2	1.7	12.0
	Other	Count	1	2	1	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	9
		Expected Count	1.4	.9	.6	1.2	.8	1.7	.3	.3	.4	.1	1.3	9.0
	Total	Count	32	19	14	27	17	39	6	6	9	3	29	201
		Expected Count	32.0	19.0	14.0	27.0	17.0	39.0	6.0	6.0	9.0	3.0	29.0	201.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	107.058 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	102.829	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.711	1	.005
N of Valid Cases	201		

a. 41 cells (74.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.730	.000
	Cramer's V	.365	.000
N of Valid Cases		201

Ethnicity * Besmellah Khan

			Crosstab											
			Besmellah Khan										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	22	12	8	13	12	14	2	0	0	0	2	85
		Expected Count	14.4	11.7	9.0	12.6	9.9	14.8	3.1	3.1	2.2	1.8	2.2	85.0
	Tajik	Count	5	5	8	8	7	15	2	7	3	4	3	67
		Expected Count	11.3	9.2	7.1	9.9	7.8	11.7	2.5	2.5	1.8	1.4	1.8	67.0
	Hazara	Count	3	7	2	5	3	4	0	0	0	0	0	24
		Expected Count	4.1	3.3	2.5	3.6	2.8	4.2	.9	.9	.6	.5	.6	24.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	6
		Expected Count	1.0	.8	.6	.9	.7	1.0	.2	.2	.2	.1	.2	6.0
	Other	Count	2	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	7
		Expected Count	1.2	1.0	.7	1.0	.8	1.2	.3	.3	.2	.1	.2	7.0
	Total	Count	32	26	20	28	22	33	7	7	5	4	5	189
		Expected Count	32.0	26.0	20.0	28.0	22.0	33.0	7.0	7.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	189.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	78.258 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	76.867	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.735	1	.188
N of Valid Cases	189		

a. 43 cells (78.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.643	.000
	Cramer's V	.322	.000
N of Valid Cases		189

Ethnicity * Shekh Asif Mohseni

			Crosstab											
			Shekh Asif Mohseni										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	21	11	11	11	12	17	0	1	2	0	6	92
		Expected Count	15.1	11.1	7.5	8.7	7.9	20.6	4.8	1.6	4.0	1.6	9.1	92.0
	Tajik	Count	5	10	4	4	3	17	12	1	7	3	15	81
		Expected Count	13.3	9.8	6.6	7.7	7.0	18.2	4.2	1.4	3.5	1.4	8.0	81.0
	Hazara	Count	12	5	2	4	5	14	0	0	0	0	1	43
		Expected Count	7.0	5.2	3.5	4.1	3.7	9.6	2.2	.7	1.9	.7	4.3	43.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	5
		Expected Count	.8	.6	.4	.5	.4	1.1	.3	.1	.2	.1	.5	5.0
	Other	Count	0	1	0	3	0	4	0	1	0	1	1	11
		Expected Count	1.8	1.3	.9	1.0	.9	2.5	.6	.2	.5	.2	1.1	11.0
	Total	Count	38	28	19	22	20	52	12	4	10	4	23	232
		Expected Count	38.0	28.0	19.0	22.0	20.0	52.0	12.0	4.0	10.0	4.0	23.0	232.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	105.887 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	105.620	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.087	1	.149
N of Valid Cases	232		

a. 38 cells (69.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.676	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.338	.000
N of Valid Cases		232

Ethnicity * Baktash Seyawash

			Crosstab										Total	
			Baktash Seyawash											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	25	10	11	13	5	13	1	0	0	1	9	88
		Expected Count	13.7	8.3	11.0	8.0	8.0	12.9	1.9	2.7	2.3	3.0	16.3	88.0
	Tajik	Count	8	8	12	3	8	12	2	3	5	4	28	93
		Expected Count	14.4	8.8	11.6	8.4	8.4	13.6	2.0	2.8	2.4	3.2	17.2	93.0
	Hazara	Count	2	3	3	5	6	6	1	1	0	1	3	31
		Expected Count	4.8	2.9	3.9	2.8	2.8	4.5	.7	.9	.8	1.1	5.7	31.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	2	3	11
		Expected Count	1.7	1.0	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.6	.2	.3	.3	.4	2.0	11.0
	Other	Count	1	0	3	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	9
		Expected Count	1.4	.9	1.1	.8	.8	1.3	.2	.3	.2	.3	1.7	9.0
	Total	Count	36	22	29	21	21	34	5	7	6	8	43	232
		Expected Count	36.0	22.0	29.0	21.0	21.0	34.0	5.0	7.0	6.0	8.0	43.0	232.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	87.034 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	88.095	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.720	1	.003
N of Valid Cases	232		

a. 40 cells (72.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.612	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.306	.000
N of Valid Cases		232

Ethnicity * Ahmad Zia Masood

			Crosstab										Total	
			Ahmad Zia Masood											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	10.0		
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	31	9	11	16	14	11	1	0	0	1	94	
		Expected Count	20.0	14.9	11.1	14.0	11.1	8.5	3.0	2.6	2.1	6.8	94.0	
	Tajik	Count	11	11	5	12	7	7	5	5	3	12	78	
		Expected Count	16.6	12.4	9.2	11.6	9.2	7.1	2.5	2.1	1.8	5.6	78.0	
	Hazara	Count	4	10	8	3	2	0	0	0	0	1	28	
		Expected Count	6.0	4.4	3.3	4.2	3.3	2.5	.9	.8	.6	2.0	28.0	
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	2	11	
		Expected Count	2.3	1.7	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.0	.3	.3	.2	.8	11.0	
	Other	Count	1	3	1	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	10	
		Expected Count	2.1	1.6	1.2	1.5	1.2	.9	.3	.3	.2	.7	10.0	
	Total	Count	47	35	26	33	26	20	7	6	5	16	221	
		Expected Count	47.0	35.0	26.0	33.0	26.0	20.0	7.0	6.0	5.0	16.0	221.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	90.301 ^a	36	.000
Likelihood Ratio	91.778	36	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.849	1	.050
N of Valid Cases	221		

a. 35 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.639	.000
	Cramer's V	.320	.000
N of Valid Cases		221

Ethnicity * Habibullah Khan

			Crosstab											
			Habibullah Khan										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	38	11	14	8	9	18	1	2	0	0	5	106
		Expected Count	27.0	12.9	11.6	7.5	6.2	15.8	2.1	5.4	3.3	1.7	12.5	106.0
	Tajik	Count	7	11	6	5	4	16	4	8	7	3	21	92
		Expected Count	23.5	11.2	10.1	6.5	5.4	13.7	1.8	4.7	2.9	1.4	10.8	92.0
	Hazara	Count	17	4	6	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	34
		Expected Count	8.7	4.1	3.7	2.4	2.0	5.1	.7	1.7	1.1	.5	4.0	34.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	1	0	3	0	2	1	1	2	12
		Expected Count	3.1	1.5	1.3	.8	.7	1.8	.2	.6	.4	.2	1.4	12.0
	Other	Count	3	3	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	11
		Expected Count	2.8	1.3	1.2	.8	.6	1.6	.2	.6	.3	.2	1.3	11.0
	Total	Count	65	31	28	18	15	38	5	13	8	4	30	255
		Expected Count	65.0	31.0	28.0	18.0	15.0	38.0	5.0	13.0	8.0	4.0	30.0	255.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	100.614 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	116.791	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.952	1	.329
N of Valid Cases	255		

a. 38 cells (69.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.628	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.314	.000
N of Valid Cases		255

Ethnicity * Ramazan Bashar Dost

			Crosstab										Total	
			Ramazan Bashar Dost											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	8	5	9	19	25	59	0	1	2	0	10	138
		Expected Count	9.2	5.3	10.1	12.3	20.7	42.6	2.6	4.4	8.4	3.1	19.3	138.0
	Tajik	Count	9	7	8	4	12	13	6	6	12	3	23	103
		Expected Count	6.9	3.9	7.5	9.2	15.4	31.8	2.0	3.3	6.2	2.3	14.4	103.0
	Hazara	Count	2	0	5	3	9	24	0	1	1	3	1	49
		Expected Count	3.3	1.9	3.6	4.4	7.3	15.1	.9	1.6	3.0	1.1	6.9	49.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	8	15
		Expected Count	1.0	.6	1.1	1.3	2.2	4.6	.3	.5	.9	.3	2.1	15.0
	Other	Count	2	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	9
		Expected Count	.6	.3	.7	.8	1.3	2.8	.2	.3	.5	.2	1.3	9.0
	Total	Count	21	12	23	28	47	97	6	10	19	7	44	314
		Expected Count	21.0	12.0	23.0	28.0	47.0	97.0	6.0	10.0	19.0	7.0	44.0	314.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	133.923 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	144.075	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.969	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	314		

a. 37 cells (67.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.653	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.327	.000
N of Valid Cases		314

Ethnicity * Lateef Pedram

			Crosstab											
			Lateef Pedram										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	32	9	11	6	7	8	0	0	0	1	1	75
		Expected Count	18.2	9.9	9.9	7.0	6.6	10.4	2.1	5.0	1.2	.8	3.7	75.0
	Tajik	Count	9	9	6	5	6	12	3	8	1	1	4	64
		Expected Count	15.6	8.5	8.5	6.0	5.7	8.8	1.8	4.2	1.1	.7	3.2	64.0
	Hazara	Count	2	6	6	3	2	3	0	1	0	0	1	24
		Expected Count	5.8	3.2	3.2	2.3	2.1	3.3	.7	1.6	.4	.3	1.2	24.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	1	2	0	3	10
		Expected Count	2.4	1.3	1.3	.9	.9	1.4	.3	.7	.2	.1	.5	10.0
	Other	Count	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	8
		Expected Count	1.9	1.1	1.1	.8	.7	1.1	.2	.5	.1	.1	.4	8.0
	Total	Count	44	24	24	17	16	25	5	12	3	2	9	181
		Expected Count	44.0	24.0	24.0	17.0	16.0	25.0	5.0	12.0	3.0	2.0	9.0	181.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	100.726 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	88.381	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	21.761	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	181		

a. 42 cells (76.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.746	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.373	.000
N of Valid Cases		181

Ethnicity * Banoo Ghazanfar

			Crosstab											
			Banoo Ghazanfar										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	20	8	7	12	6	13	2	1	2	1	2	74
		Expected Count	12.4	12.4	6.8	8.6	5.1	12.4	4.7	1.3	3.4	1.3	5.6	74.0
	Tajik	Count	6	15	4	3	1	11	4	1	4	1	8	58
		Expected Count	9.7	9.7	5.4	6.7	4.0	9.7	3.7	1.0	2.7	1.0	4.4	58.0
	Hazara	Count	1	6	4	3	4	3	1	1	0	0	0	23
		Expected Count	3.9	3.9	2.1	2.7	1.6	3.9	1.5	.4	1.1	.4	1.7	23.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1	4	0	2	1	3	12
		Expected Count	2.0	2.0	1.1	1.4	.8	2.0	.8	.2	.6	.2	.9	12.0
	Other	Count	2	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	6
		Expected Count	1.0	1.0	.6	.7	.4	1.0	.4	.1	.3	.1	.5	6.0
	Total	Count	29	29	16	20	12	29	11	3	8	3	13	173
		Expected Count	29.0	29.0	16.0	20.0	12.0	29.0	11.0	3.0	8.0	3.0	13.0	173.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	75.030 ^a	40	.001
Likelihood Ratio	74.869	40	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.081	1	.014
N of Valid Cases	173		

a. 43 cells (78.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .10.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.659	.001
Nominal	Cramer's V	.329	.001
N of Valid Cases		173

Ethnicity * Ustad Sayaf

			Crosstab											
			Ustad Sayaf										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	31	9	11	20	13	19	3	2	1	0	1	110
		Expected Count	28.0	14.0	10.2	11.9	11.5	15.7	3.8	3.8	3.4	1.3	6.4	110.0
	Tajik	Count	15	13	5	5	10	13	4	6	5	2	11	89
		Expected Count	22.7	11.3	8.2	9.6	9.3	12.7	3.1	3.1	2.7	1.0	5.2	89.0
	Hazara	Count	17	5	6	3	1	3	0	0	1	0	2	38
		Expected Count	9.7	4.8	3.5	4.1	4.0	5.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	.4	2.2	38.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	6	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	12
		Expected Count	3.1	1.5	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.7	.4	.4	.4	.1	.7	12.0
	Other	Count	3	0	2	0	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	10
		Expected Count	2.5	1.3	.9	1.1	1.0	1.4	.3	.3	.3	.1	.6	10.0
	Total	Count	66	33	24	28	27	37	9	9	8	3	15	259
		Expected Count	66.0	33.0	24.0	28.0	27.0	37.0	9.0	9.0	8.0	3.0	15.0	259.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	89.578 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	91.211	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.366	1	.545
N of Valid Cases	259		

a. 39 cells (70.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.588	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.294	.000
N of Valid Cases		259

Ethnicity * Gen. Dostum

			Crosstab											
			Gen. Dostum										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	51	7	12	13	4	17	2	0	0	0	5	111
		Expected Count	29.7	10.4	8.8	14.0	9.6	16.0	2.8	4.4	6.4	1.6	7.2	111.0
	Tajik	Count	12	14	7	9	8	17	4	9	8	2	7	97
		Expected Count	25.9	9.1	7.7	12.3	8.4	14.0	2.5	3.9	5.6	1.4	6.3	97.0
	Hazara	Count	7	3	1	11	10	5	1	0	3	0	2	43
		Expected Count	11.5	4.0	3.4	5.4	3.7	6.2	1.1	1.7	2.5	.6	2.8	43.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	2	5	2	4	16
		Expected Count	4.3	1.5	1.3	2.0	1.4	2.3	.4	.6	.9	.2	1.0	16.0
	Other	Count	4	0	2	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	10
		Expected Count	2.7	.9	.8	1.3	.9	1.4	.3	.4	.6	.1	.6	10.0
	Total	Count	74	26	22	35	24	40	7	11	16	4	18	277
		Expected Count	74.0	26.0	22.0	35.0	24.0	40.0	7.0	11.0	16.0	4.0	18.0	277.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	138.527 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	136.625	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	18.898	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	277		

a. 36 cells (65.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .14.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.707	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.354	.000
N of Valid Cases		277

Ethnicity * Ahmad Behzad

			Crosstab											
			Ahmad Behzad										Total	
			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	24	5	10	13	5	6	0	0	0	0	1	64
		Expected Count	13.4	5.5	8.7	7.9	7.1	10.7	2.8	.4	2.8	1.6	3.2	64.0
	Tajik	Count	8	5	6	3	4	10	5	1	5	2	4	53
		Expected Count	11.1	4.6	7.2	6.5	5.9	8.8	2.3	.3	2.3	1.3	2.6	53.0
	Hazara	Count	1	1	4	3	7	9	1	0	1	1	1	29
		Expected Count	6.1	2.5	3.9	3.6	3.2	4.8	1.3	.2	1.3	.7	1.4	29.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	8
		Expected Count	1.7	.7	1.1	1.0	.9	1.3	.3	.0	.3	.2	.4	8.0
	Other	Count	1	1	2	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	8
		Expected Count	1.7	.7	1.1	1.0	.9	1.3	.3	.0	.3	.2	.4	8.0
	Total	Count	34	14	22	20	18	27	7	1	7	4	8	162
		Expected Count	34.0	14.0	22.0	20.0	18.0	27.0	7.0	1.0	7.0	4.0	8.0	162.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	72.732 ^a	40	.001
Likelihood Ratio	78.145	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	14.431	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	162		

a. 43 cells (78.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .05.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.670	.001
	Cramer's V	.335	.001
N of Valid Cases		162

Frequencies

		Statistics								
		Mirwais Nia	Ahmad Shah Baba	Zahir Khan	Amanullah Khan	Dr Najib	Abdul Rahman Khan	Dawood Khan	Hamid Karzai	Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai
N	Valid	293	351	331	347	371	281	339	369	274
	Missing	275	217	237	221	197	287	229	199	294
Mean		5.348	5.627	4.157	5.896	5.809	3.477	5.540	4.593	3.942
Median		5.000	5.000	4.000	5.000	5.000	4.000	5.000	5.000	4.000
Mode		5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Std. Deviation		2.7062	2.7140	2.9013	2.7624	2.9635	2.7348	2.7821	2.6432	2.5884
Skewness		.075	.087	.480	.055	.021	.413	.101	.347	.316
Std. Error of Skewness		.142	.130	.134	.131	.127	.145	.132	.127	.147
Kurtosis		-.257	-.405	-.518	-.701	-.871	-.566	-.699	-.160	-.275
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.284	.260	.267	.261	.253	.290	.264	.253	.293
Minimum		.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
Maximum		10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0

Frequency Table

		Mirwais Nia			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	18	3.2	6.1	6.1
	1.0	14	2.5	4.8	10.9
	2.0	7	1.2	2.4	13.3
	3.0	17	3.0	5.8	19.1
	4.0	14	2.5	4.8	23.9
	5.0	140	24.6	47.8	71.7
	6.0	5	.9	1.7	73.4
	7.0	10	1.8	3.4	76.8
	8.0	21	3.7	7.2	84.0
	9.0	6	1.1	2.0	86.0
	10.0	41	7.2	14.0	100.0
	Total	293	51.6	100.0	
Missing	System	275	48.4		
Total		568	100.0		

		Ahmad Shah Baba			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	19	3.3	5.4	5.4
	1.0	6	1.1	1.7	7.1
	2.0	12	2.1	3.4	10.5
	3.0	24	4.2	6.8	17.4
	4.0	19	3.3	5.4	22.8
	5.0	157	27.6	44.7	67.5
	6.0	10	1.8	2.8	70.4
	7.0	10	1.8	2.8	73.2
	8.0	22	3.9	6.3	79.5
	9.0	14	2.5	4.0	83.5
	10.0	58	10.2	16.5	100.0
	Total	351	61.8	100.0	
Missing	System	217	38.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Zahir Khan					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	40	7.0	12.1	12.1
	1.0	27	4.8	8.2	20.2
	2.0	32	5.6	9.7	29.9
	3.0	47	8.3	14.2	44.1
	4.0	47	8.3	14.2	58.3
	5.0	58	10.2	17.5	75.8
	6.0	11	1.9	3.3	79.2
	7.0	16	2.8	4.8	84.0
	8.0	18	3.2	5.4	89.4
	9.0	6	1.1	1.8	91.2
	10.0	29	5.1	8.8	100.0
	Total	331	58.3	100.0	
Missing	System	237	41.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Amanullah Khan					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	11	1.9	3.2	3.2
	1.0	13	2.3	3.7	6.9
	2.0	9	1.6	2.6	9.5
	3.0	17	3.0	4.9	14.4
	4.0	36	6.3	10.4	24.8
	5.0	131	23.1	37.8	62.5
	6.0	6	1.1	1.7	64.3
	7.0	16	2.8	4.6	68.9
	8.0	24	4.2	6.9	75.8
	9.0	15	2.6	4.3	80.1
	10.0	69	12.1	19.9	100.0
	Total	347	61.1	100.0	
Missing	System	221	38.9		
Total		568	100.0		

Dr Najib					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	17	3.0	4.6	4.6
	1.0	18	3.2	4.9	9.4
	2.0	8	1.4	2.2	11.6
	3.0	28	4.9	7.5	19.1
	4.0	32	5.6	8.6	27.8
	5.0	129	22.7	34.8	62.5
	6.0	12	2.1	3.2	65.8
	7.0	6	1.1	1.6	67.4
	8.0	21	3.7	5.7	73.0
	9.0	18	3.2	4.9	77.9
	10.0	82	14.4	22.1	100.0
	Total	371	65.3	100.0	
Missing	System	197	34.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Abdul Rahman Khan					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	57	10.0	20.3	20.3
	1.0	34	6.0	12.1	32.4
	2.0	18	3.2	6.4	38.8
	3.0	30	5.3	10.7	49.5
	4.0	28	4.9	10.0	59.4
	5.0	67	11.8	23.8	83.3
	6.0	6	1.1	2.1	85.4
	7.0	16	2.8	5.7	91.1
	8.0	12	2.1	4.3	95.4
	9.0	4	.7	1.4	96.8
	10.0	9	1.6	3.2	100.0
	Total	281	49.5	100.0	
Missing	System	287	50.5		
Total		568	100.0		

Dawood Khan					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	13	2.3	3.8	3.8
	1.0	16	2.8	4.7	8.6
	2.0	16	2.8	4.7	13.3
	3.0	23	4.0	6.8	20.1
	4.0	37	6.5	10.9	31.0
	5.0	115	20.2	33.9	64.9
	6.0	11	1.9	3.2	68.1
	7.0	11	1.9	3.2	71.4
	8.0	28	4.9	8.3	79.6
	9.0	19	3.3	5.6	85.3
	10.0	50	8.8	14.7	100.0
	Total	339	59.7	100.0	
Missing	System	229	40.3		
Total		568	100.0		

Hamid Karzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	26	4.6	7.0	7.0
	1.0	26	4.6	7.0	14.1
	2.0	25	4.4	6.8	20.9
	3.0	36	6.3	9.8	30.6
	4.0	50	8.8	13.6	44.2
	5.0	124	21.8	33.6	77.8
	6.0	11	1.9	3.0	80.8
	7.0	17	3.0	4.6	85.4
	8.0	12	2.1	3.3	88.6
	9.0	10	1.8	2.7	91.3
	10.0	32	5.6	8.7	100.0
	Total	369	65.0	100.0	
Missing	System	199	35.0		
Total		568	100.0		

Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	32	5.6	11.7	11.7
	1.0	31	5.5	11.3	23.0
	2.0	19	3.3	6.9	29.9
	3.0	31	5.5	11.3	41.2
	4.0	29	5.1	10.6	51.8
	5.0	83	14.6	30.3	82.1
	6.0	11	1.9	4.0	86.1
	7.0	11	1.9	4.0	90.1
	8.0	10	1.8	3.6	93.8
	9.0	6	1.1	2.2	96.0
	10.0	11	1.9	4.0	100.0
	Total	274	48.2	100.0	
Missing	System	294	51.8		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Mirwais Nia	293	51.6%	275	48.4%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ahmad Shah Baba	351	61.8%	217	38.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Zahir Khan	331	58.3%	237	41.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Amanullah Khan	347	61.1%	221	38.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Dr Najib	371	65.3%	197	34.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Abdul Rahman Khan	281	49.5%	287	50.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Dawood Khan	339	59.7%	229	40.3%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Hamid Karzai	369	65.0%	199	35.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai	274	48.2%	294	51.8%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Mirwais Nia

			Crosstab										Total	
			Mirwais Nia											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	3	4	3	3	10	117	1	0	4	3	12	160
		Expected Count	9.8	7.6	3.8	9.3	7.6	76.5	2.7	5.5	11.5	3.3	22.4	160.0
	Tajik	Count	5	3	2	3	3	15	4	6	14	2	21	78
		Expected Count	4.8	3.7	1.9	4.5	3.7	37.3	1.3	2.7	5.6	1.6	10.9	78.0
	Hazara	Count	9	3	2	7	1	6	0	0	0	0	3	31
		Expected Count	1.9	1.5	.7	1.8	1.5	14.8	.5	1.1	2.2	.6	4.3	31.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	4	11
		Expected Count	.7	.5	.3	.6	.5	5.3	.2	.4	.8	.2	1.5	11.0
	Other	Count	1	2	0	4	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	13
		Expected Count	.8	.6	.3	.8	.6	6.2	.2	.4	.9	.3	1.8	13.0
Total	Count	18	14	7	17	14	140	5	10	21	6	41	293	
	Expected Count	18.0	14.0	7.0	17.0	14.0	140.0	5.0	10.0	21.0	6.0	41.0	293.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	210.806 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	187.136	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.694	1	.405
N of Valid Cases	293		

a. 41 cells (74.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .19.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.848	.000
	Cramer's V	.424	.000
N of Valid Cases		293

Ethnicity * Ahmad Shah Baba

Crosstab														
			Ahmad Shah Baba										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	7	3	2	8	6	123	1	0	5	5	15	175
		Expected Count	9.5	3.0	6.0	12.0	9.5	78.3	5.0	5.0	11.0	7.0	28.9	175.0
	Tajik	Count	3	3	2	5	5	20	8	8	14	5	35	108
		Expected Count	5.8	1.8	3.7	7.4	5.8	48.3	3.1	3.1	6.8	4.3	17.8	108.0
	Hazara	Count	7	0	7	7	7	10	0	0	0	1	4	43
		Expected Count	2.3	.7	1.5	2.9	2.3	19.2	1.2	1.2	2.7	1.7	7.1	43.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	3	4	13
		Expected Count	.7	.2	.4	.9	.7	5.8	.4	.4	.8	.5	2.1	13.0
	Other	Count	2	0	0	3	1	3	0	1	2	0	0	12
		Expected Count	.6	.2	.4	.8	.6	5.4	.3	.3	.8	.5	2.0	12.0
Total	Count	19	6	12	24	19	157	10	10	22	14	58	351	
	Expected Count	19.0	6.0	12.0	24.0	19.0	157.0	10.0	10.0	22.0	14.0	58.0	351.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	206.257 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	191.837	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.014	1	.906
N of Valid Cases	351		

a. 37 cells (67.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.767	.000
	Cramer's V	.383	.000
N of Valid Cases		351

Ethnicity * Zahir Khan

Crosstab														
			Zahir Khan										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	14	8	12	30	28	39	3	2	4	1	9	150
		Expected Count	18.1	12.2	14.5	21.3	21.3	26.3	5.0	7.3	8.2	2.7	13.1	150.0
	Tajik	Count	11	9	13	8	13	9	4	11	12	4	15	109
		Expected Count	13.2	8.9	10.5	15.5	15.5	19.1	3.6	5.3	5.9	2.0	9.5	109.0
	Hazara	Count	14	6	5	8	3	6	0	0	1	0	3	46
		Expected Count	5.6	3.8	4.4	6.5	6.5	8.1	1.5	2.2	2.5	.8	4.0	46.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	1	0	0	2	4	2	1	1	2	15
		Expected Count	1.8	1.2	1.5	2.1	2.1	2.6	.5	.7	.8	.3	1.3	15.0
	Other	Count	1	2	1	1	3	2	0	1	0	0	0	11
		Expected Count	1.3	.9	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.9	.4	.5	.6	.2	1.0	11.0
Total	Count	40	27	32	47	47	58	11	16	18	6	29	331	
	Expected Count	40.0	27.0	32.0	47.0	47.0	58.0	11.0	16.0	18.0	6.0	29.0	331.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	116.019 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	108.120	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.082	1	.774
N of Valid Cases	331		

a. 33 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.592	.000
	Cramer's V	.296	.000
N of Valid Cases		331

Ethnicity * Amanullah Khan

Crosstab														
			Amanullah Khan										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	4	4	2	6	22	95	0	1	4	5	16	159
		Expected Count	5.0	6.0	4.1	7.8	16.5	60.0	2.7	7.3	11.0	6.9	31.6	159.0
	Tajik	Count	3	3	5	3	6	20	6	8	16	8	41	119
		Expected Count	3.8	4.5	3.1	5.8	12.3	44.9	2.1	5.5	8.2	5.1	23.7	119.0
	Hazara	Count	4	4	2	6	6	13	0	1	1	0	4	41
		Expected Count	1.3	1.5	1.1	2.0	4.3	15.5	.7	1.9	2.8	1.8	8.2	41.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	5	2	2	5	16
		Expected Count	.5	.6	.4	.8	1.7	6.0	.3	.7	1.1	.7	3.2	16.0
	Other	Count	0	1	0	2	2	2	0	1	1	0	3	12
		Expected Count	.4	.4	.3	.6	1.2	4.5	.2	.6	.8	.5	2.4	12.0
Total	Count	11	13	9	17	36	131	6	16	24	15	69	347	
	Expected Count	11.0	13.0	9.0	17.0	36.0	131.0	6.0	16.0	24.0	15.0	69.0	347.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	166.604 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	158.721	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.028	1	.082
N of Valid Cases	347		

a. 36 cells (65.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.693	.000
	Cramer's V	.346	.000
N of Valid Cases		347

Ethnicity * Dr Najib

Crosstab														
			Dr Najib										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	9	5	1	13	17	86	2	1	4	3	19	160
		Expected Count	7.3	7.8	3.5	12.1	13.8	55.6	5.2	2.6	9.1	7.8	35.4	160.0
	Tajik	Count	4	7	5	5	2	20	6	5	15	10	45	124
		Expected Count	5.7	6.0	2.7	9.4	10.7	43.1	4.0	2.0	7.0	6.0	27.4	124.0
	Hazara	Count	4	3	2	9	12	17	3	0	0	2	4	56
		Expected Count	2.6	2.7	1.2	4.2	4.8	19.5	1.8	.9	3.2	2.7	12.4	56.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	3	13	18
		Expected Count	.8	.9	.4	1.4	1.6	6.3	.6	.3	1.0	.9	4.0	18.0
	Other	Count	0	3	0	1	1	5	1	0	1	0	1	13
		Expected Count	.6	.6	.3	1.0	1.1	4.5	.4	.2	.7	.6	2.9	13.0
Total	Count	17	18	8	28	32	129	12	6	21	18	82	371	
	Expected Count	17.0	18.0	8.0	28.0	32.0	129.0	12.0	6.0	21.0	18.0	82.0	371.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	166.506 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	167.253	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.834	1	.050
N of Valid Cases	371		

a. 35 cells (63.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.670	.000
	Cramer's V	.335	.000
N of Valid Cases		371

Ethnicity * Abdul Rahman Khan

Crosstab														
			Abdul Rahman Khan										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	15	4	10	20	14	48	1	7	2	1	3	125
		Expected Count	25.4	15.1	8.0	13.3	12.5	29.8	2.7	7.1	5.3	1.8	4.0	125.0
	Tajik	Count	11	18	5	7	11	11	3	7	8	3	4	88
		Expected Count	17.9	10.6	5.6	9.4	8.8	21.0	1.9	5.0	3.8	1.3	2.8	88.0
	Hazara	Count	28	4	1	2	2	5	0	0	0	0	1	43
		Expected Count	8.7	5.2	2.8	4.6	4.3	10.3	.9	2.4	1.8	.6	1.4	43.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	6	0	0	1	2	1	2	0	0	1	13
		Expected Count	2.6	1.6	.8	1.4	1.3	3.1	.3	.7	.6	.2	.4	13.0
	Other	Count	3	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	12
		Expected Count	2.4	1.5	.8	1.3	1.2	2.9	.3	.7	.5	.2	.4	12.0
Total	Count	57	34	18	30	28	67	6	16	12	4	9	281	
	Expected Count	57.0	34.0	18.0	30.0	28.0	67.0	6.0	16.0	12.0	4.0	9.0	281.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	145.280 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	136.593	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.152	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	281		

a. 37 cells (67.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.719	.000
	Cramer's V	.360	.000
N of Valid Cases		281

Ethnicity * Dawood Khan

Crosstab														
			Dawood Khan										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	6	3	8	13	19	82	2	1	5	7	11	157
		Expected Count	6.0	7.4	7.4	10.7	17.1	53.3	5.1	5.1	13.0	8.8	23.2	157.0
	Tajik	Count	4	7	6	6	6	15	3	9	13	10	34	113
		Expected Count	4.3	5.3	5.3	7.7	12.3	38.3	3.7	3.7	9.3	6.3	16.7	113.0
	Hazara	Count	3	4	1	4	10	14	2	0	1	0	3	42
		Expected Count	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.8	4.6	14.2	1.4	1.4	3.5	2.4	6.2	42.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	7	1	2	15
		Expected Count	.6	.7	.7	1.0	1.6	5.1	.5	.5	1.2	.8	2.2	15.0
	Other	Count	0	0	1	0	1	4	2	1	2	1	0	12
		Expected Count	.5	.6	.6	.8	1.3	4.1	.4	.4	1.0	.7	1.8	12.0
Total	Count	13	16	16	23	37	115	11	11	28	19	50	339	
	Expected Count	13.0	16.0	16.0	23.0	37.0	115.0	11.0	11.0	28.0	19.0	50.0	339.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	156.508 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	151.560	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.872	1	.090
N of Valid Cases	339		

a. 33 cells (60.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .39.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.679	.000
	Cramer's V	.340	.000
N of Valid Cases		339

Ethnicity * Hamid Karzai

Crosstab														
			Hamid Karzai										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	11	6	6	12	26	80	1	5	2	2	10	161
		Expected Count	11.3	11.3	10.9	15.7	21.8	54.1	4.8	7.4	5.2	4.4	14.0	161.0
	Tajik	Count	10	12	11	11	11	25	8	8	7	8	17	128
		Expected Count	9.0	9.0	8.7	12.5	17.3	43.0	3.8	5.9	4.2	3.5	11.1	128.0
	Hazara	Count	5	5	6	11	9	12	0	1	0	0	3	52
		Expected Count	3.7	3.7	3.5	5.1	7.0	17.5	1.6	2.4	1.7	1.4	4.5	52.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	3	2	1	0	4	0	3	2	0	2	17
		Expected Count	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.7	2.3	5.7	.5	.8	.6	.5	1.5	17.0
	Other	Count	0	0	0	1	4	3	2	0	1	0	0	11
		Expected Count	.8	.8	.7	1.1	1.5	3.7	.3	.5	.4	.3	1.0	11.0
Total	Count	26	26	25	36	50	124	11	17	12	10	32	369	
	Expected Count	26.0	26.0	25.0	36.0	50.0	124.0	11.0	17.0	12.0	10.0	32.0	369.0	

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	109.886 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	109.992	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.169	1	.681
N of Valid Cases	369		

a. 34 cells (61.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.546	.000
	Cramer's V	.273	.000
N of Valid Cases		369

Ethnicity * Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai

Crosstab														
			Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	13	6	7	15	18	67	3	2	3	0	3	137
		Expected Count	16.0	15.5	9.5	15.5	14.5	41.5	5.5	5.5	5.0	3.0	5.5	137.0
	Tajik	Count	12	9	7	10	5	9	3	5	7	4	7	78
		Expected Count	9.1	8.8	5.4	8.8	8.3	23.6	3.1	3.1	2.8	1.7	3.1	78.0
	Hazara	Count	7	12	5	5	1	5	1	0	0	1	1	38
		Expected Count	4.4	4.3	2.6	4.3	4.0	11.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	.8	1.5	38.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	0	3	0	3	2	0	1	0	11
		Expected Count	1.3	1.2	.8	1.2	1.2	3.3	.4	.4	.4	.2	.4	11.0
	Other	Count	0	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	0	0	0	10
		Expected Count	1.2	1.1	.7	1.1	1.1	3.0	.4	.4	.4	.2	.4	10.0
Total	Count	32	31	19	31	29	83	11	11	10	6	11	274	
	Expected Count	32.0	31.0	19.0	31.0	29.0	83.0	11.0	11.0	10.0	6.0	11.0	274.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	131.071 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	126.931	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.906	1	.341
N of Valid Cases	274		

a. 38 cells (69.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.692	.000
	Cramer's V	.346	.000
N of Valid Cases		274

Frequencies

Statistics								
		Ramazan Bashar Dost	Shukria Barakzai	Malaly Joya	Fawzia Koofee	Habiba Sarabee	Dr Seema Samar	Semeen Barakzai
N	Valid	314	250	217	212	179	209	148
	Missing	254	318	351	356	389	359	420
Mean		5.019	4.036	3.696	4.462	3.687	3.775	2.851
Median		5.000	4.000	4.000	4.000	3.000	4.000	2.000
Mode		5.0	5.0	5.0	10.0	.0	5.0	.0 ^a
Std. Deviation		2.8329	2.8543	2.9705	3.3121	2.9476	2.6858	2.7215
Skewness		.300	.494	.668	.410	.570	.546	1.076
Std. Error of Skewness		.138	.154	.165	.167	.182	.168	.199
Kurtosis		-.532	-.411	-.275	-1.010	-.557	-.094	.587
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.274	.307	.329	.333	.361	.335	.396
Minimum		.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
Maximum		10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

Frequency Table

Ramazan Bashar Dost					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	21	3.7	6.7	6.7
	1.0	12	2.1	3.8	10.5
	2.0	23	4.0	7.3	17.8
	3.0	28	4.9	8.9	26.8
	4.0	47	8.3	15.0	41.7
	5.0	97	17.1	30.9	72.6
	6.0	6	1.1	1.9	74.5
	7.0	10	1.8	3.2	77.7
	8.0	19	3.3	6.1	83.8
	9.0	7	1.2	2.2	86.0
	10.0	44	7.7	14.0	100.0
	Total	314	55.3	100.0	
Missing	System	254	44.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Shukria Barakzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	31	5.5	12.4	12.4
	1.0	26	4.6	10.4	22.8
	2.0	22	3.9	8.8	31.6
	3.0	31	5.5	12.4	44.0
	4.0	32	5.6	12.8	56.8
	5.0	54	9.5	21.6	78.4
	6.0	11	1.9	4.4	82.8
	7.0	7	1.2	2.8	85.6
	8.0	10	1.8	4.0	89.6
	9.0	7	1.2	2.8	92.4
	10.0	19	3.3	7.6	100.0
	Total	250	44.0	100.0	
Missing	System	318	56.0		
Total		568	100.0		

Malaly Joya					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	36	6.3	16.6	16.6
	1.0	30	5.3	13.8	30.4
	2.0	17	3.0	7.8	38.2
	3.0	22	3.9	10.1	48.4
	4.0	30	5.3	13.8	62.2
	5.0	46	8.1	21.2	83.4
	6.0	2	.4	.9	84.3
	7.0	5	.9	2.3	86.6
	8.0	6	1.1	2.8	89.4
	9.0	3	.5	1.4	90.8
	10.0	20	3.5	9.2	100.0
	Total	217	38.2	100.0	
Missing	System	351	61.8		
Total		568	100.0		

Fawzia Koofee					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	27	4.8	12.7	12.7
	1.0	20	3.5	9.4	22.2
	2.0	24	4.2	11.3	33.5
	3.0	23	4.0	10.8	44.3
	4.0	23	4.0	10.8	55.2
	5.0	31	5.5	14.6	69.8
	6.0	7	1.2	3.3	73.1
	7.0	7	1.2	3.3	76.4
	8.0	13	2.3	6.1	82.5
	9.0	3	.5	1.4	84.0
	10.0	34	6.0	16.0	100.0
	Total	212	37.3	100.0	
Missing	System	356	62.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Habiba Sarabee					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	30	5.3	16.8	16.8
	1.0	21	3.7	11.7	28.5
	2.0	24	4.2	13.4	41.9
	3.0	19	3.3	10.6	52.5
	4.0	14	2.5	7.8	60.3
	5.0	28	4.9	15.6	76.0
	6.0	15	2.6	8.4	84.4
	7.0	2	.4	1.1	85.5
	8.0	12	2.1	6.7	92.2
	9.0	2	.4	1.1	93.3
	10.0	12	2.1	6.7	100.0
	Total	179	31.5	100.0	
Missing	System	389	68.5		
Total		568	100.0		

Dr Seema Samar					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	27	4.8	12.9	12.9
	1.0	24	4.2	11.5	24.4
	2.0	23	4.0	11.0	35.4
	3.0	16	2.8	7.7	43.1
	4.0	36	6.3	17.2	60.3
	5.0	48	8.5	23.0	83.3
	6.0	9	1.6	4.3	87.6
	7.0	3	.5	1.4	89.0
	8.0	7	1.2	3.3	92.3
	9.0	4	.7	1.9	94.3
	10.0	12	2.1	5.7	100.0
	Total	209	36.8	100.0	
Missing	System	359	63.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Semeen Barakzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	31	5.5	20.9	20.9
	1.0	31	5.5	20.9	41.9
	2.0	19	3.3	12.8	54.7
	3.0	15	2.6	10.1	64.9
	4.0	12	2.1	8.1	73.0
	5.0	25	4.4	16.9	89.9
	7.0	2	.4	1.4	91.2
	8.0	3	.5	2.0	93.2
	9.0	3	.5	2.0	95.3
	10.0	7	1.2	4.7	100.0
	Total	148	26.1	100.0	
Missing	System	420	73.9		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Ramazan Bashar Dost	314	55.3%	254	44.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Shukria Barakzai	250	44.0%	318	56.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Malaly Joya	217	38.2%	351	61.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Fawzia Koofee	212	37.3%	356	62.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Habiba Sarabee	179	31.5%	389	68.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Dr Seema Samar	209	36.8%	359	63.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Semeen Barakzai	148	26.1%	420	73.9%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Ramazan Bashar Dost

Crosstab														
			Ramazan Bashar Dost										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	8	5	9	19	25	59	0	1	2	0	10	138
		Expected Count	9.2	5.3	10.1	12.3	20.7	42.6	2.6	4.4	8.4	3.1	19.3	138.0
	Tajik	Count	9	7	8	4	12	13	6	6	12	3	23	103
		Expected Count	6.9	3.9	7.5	9.2	15.4	31.8	2.0	3.3	6.2	2.3	14.4	103.0
	Hazara	Count	2	0	5	3	9	24	0	1	1	3	1	49
		Expected Count	3.3	1.9	3.6	4.4	7.3	15.1	.9	1.6	3.0	1.1	6.9	49.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	8	15
		Expected Count	1.0	.6	1.1	1.3	2.2	4.6	.3	.5	.9	.3	2.1	15.0
	Other	Count	2	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	9
		Expected Count	.6	.3	.7	.8	1.3	2.8	.2	.3	.5	.2	1.3	9.0
Total	Count	21	12	23	28	47	97	6	10	19	7	44	314	
	Expected Count	21.0	12.0	23.0	28.0	47.0	97.0	6.0	10.0	19.0	7.0	44.0	314.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	133.923 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	144.075	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.969	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	314		

a. 37 cells (67.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.653	.000
	Cramer's V	.327	.000
N of Valid Cases		314

Ethnicity * Shukria Barakzai

Crosstab														
			Shukria Barakzai										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	15	7	11	18	18	31	1	0	0	1	5	107
		Expected Count	13.3	11.1	9.4	13.3	13.7	23.1	4.7	3.0	4.3	3.0	8.1	107.0
	Tajik	Count	10	13	4	5	9	16	7	5	8	2	10	89
		Expected Count	11.0	9.3	7.8	11.0	11.4	19.2	3.9	2.5	3.6	2.5	6.8	89.0
	Hazara	Count	4	5	4	7	4	4	1	0	0	2	1	32
		Expected Count	4.0	3.3	2.8	4.0	4.1	6.9	1.4	.9	1.3	.9	2.4	32.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	2	1	3	13
		Expected Count	1.6	1.4	1.1	1.6	1.7	2.8	.6	.4	.5	.4	1.0	13.0
	Other	Count	2	0	2	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	9
		Expected Count	1.1	.9	.8	1.1	1.2	1.9	.4	.3	.4	.3	.7	9.0
Total	Count	31	26	22	31	32	54	11	7	10	7	19	250	
	Expected Count	31.0	26.0	22.0	31.0	32.0	54.0	11.0	7.0	10.0	7.0	19.0	250.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	80.767 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	87.586	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.583	1	.058
N of Valid Cases	250		

a. 40 cells (72.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.568	.000
	Cramer's V	.284	.000
N of Valid Cases		250

Ethnicity * Malaly Joya

			Crosstab										Total	
			Malaly Joya											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	17	9	10	10	17	32	0	2	0	0	6	103
		Expected Count	17.1	14.2	8.1	10.4	14.2	21.8	.9	2.4	2.8	1.4	9.5	103.0
	Tajik	Count	11	14	3	4	9	12	2	1	3	2	7	68
		Expected Count	11.3	9.4	5.3	6.9	9.4	14.4	.6	1.6	1.9	.9	6.3	68.0
	Hazara	Count	6	6	4	4	3	1	0	0	1	0	1	26
		Expected Count	4.3	3.6	2.0	2.6	3.6	5.5	.2	.6	.7	.4	2.4	26.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	2	1	4	11
		Expected Count	1.8	1.5	.9	1.1	1.5	2.3	.1	.3	.3	.2	1.0	11.0
	Other	Count	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	9
		Expected Count	1.5	1.2	.7	.9	1.2	1.9	.1	.2	.2	.1	.8	9.0
Total	Count	36	30	17	22	30	46	2	5	6	3	20	217	
	Expected Count	36.0	30.0	17.0	22.0	30.0	46.0	2.0	5.0	6.0	3.0	20.0	217.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	75.514 ^a	40	.001
Likelihood Ratio	74.272	40	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.544	1	.060
N of Valid Cases	217		

a. 40 cells (72.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.590	.001
	Cramer's V	.295	.001
N of Valid Cases		217

Ethnicity * Fawzia Koofee

Crosstab														
			Fawzia Koofee										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	14	5	11	15	9	13	1	0	1	1	5	75
		Expected Count	9.6	7.1	8.5	8.1	8.1	11.0	2.5	2.5	4.6	1.1	12.0	75.0
	Tajik	Count	9	9	6	2	7	15	5	4	10	1	22	90
		Expected Count	11.5	8.5	10.2	9.8	9.8	13.2	3.0	3.0	5.5	1.3	14.4	90.0
	Hazara	Count	1	6	4	5	6	0	0	1	0	1	3	27
		Expected Count	3.4	2.5	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.9	.9	.9	1.7	.4	4.3	27.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	2	0	4	13
		Expected Count	1.7	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.9	.4	.4	.8	.2	2.1	13.0
	Other	Count	2	0	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	.9	.7	.8	.8	.8	1.0	.2	.2	.4	.1	1.1	7.0
	Total	Count	27	20	24	23	23	31	7	7	13	3	34	212
		Expected Count	27.0	20.0	24.0	23.0	23.0	31.0	7.0	7.0	13.0	3.0	34.0	212.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	80.424 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	91.563	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.926	1	.087
N of Valid Cases	212		

a. 40 cells (72.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .10.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.616	.000
	Cramer's V	.308	.000
N of Valid Cases		212

Ethnicity * Habiba Sarabee

			Crosstab											
			Habiba Sarabee											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	Total
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	21	6	9	11	5	11	6	1	2	1	3	76
		Expected Count	12.7	8.9	10.2	8.1	5.9	11.9	6.4	.8	5.1	.8	5.1	76.0
	Tajik	Count	6	9	4	3	3	9	5	1	6	0	6	52
		Expected Count	8.7	6.1	7.0	5.5	4.1	8.1	4.4	.6	3.5	.6	3.5	52.0
	Hazara	Count	1	5	8	4	4	7	1	0	2	0	1	33
		Expected Count	5.5	3.9	4.4	3.5	2.6	5.2	2.8	.4	2.2	.4	2.2	33.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	2	9
		Expected Count	1.5	1.1	1.2	1.0	.7	1.4	.8	.1	.6	.1	.6	9.0
	Other	Count	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	9
		Expected Count	1.5	1.1	1.2	1.0	.7	1.4	.8	.1	.6	.1	.6	9.0
Total	Count	30	21	24	19	14	28	15	2	12	2	12	179	
	Expected Count	30.0	21.0	24.0	19.0	14.0	28.0	15.0	2.0	12.0	2.0	12.0	179.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	52.012 ^a	40	.097
Likelihood Ratio	53.089	40	.081
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.311	1	.069
N of Valid Cases	179		

a. 39 cells (70.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .10.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.539	.097
	Cramer's V	.270	.097
N of Valid Cases		179

Ethnicity * Dr Seema Samar

			Crosstab										Total	
			Dr Seema Samar											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	15	5	15	8	15	17	2	0	0	0	2	79
		Expected Count	10.2	9.1	8.7	6.0	13.6	18.1	3.4	1.1	2.6	1.5	4.5	79.0
	Tajik	Count	9	14	7	2	3	14	3	2	3	1	8	66
		Expected Count	8.5	7.6	7.3	5.1	11.4	15.2	2.8	.9	2.2	1.3	3.8	66.0
	Hazara	Count	1	2	1	4	16	15	1	0	1	2	1	44
		Expected Count	5.7	5.1	4.8	3.4	7.6	10.1	1.9	.6	1.5	.8	2.5	44.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	3	0	1	10
		Expected Count	1.3	1.1	1.1	.8	1.7	2.3	.4	.1	.3	.2	.6	10.0
	Other	Count	2	2	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	10
		Expected Count	1.3	1.1	1.1	.8	1.7	2.3	.4	.1	.3	.2	.6	10.0
Total	Count	27	24	23	16	36	48	9	3	7	4	12	209	
	Expected Count	27.0	24.0	23.0	16.0	36.0	48.0	9.0	3.0	7.0	4.0	12.0	209.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	107.991 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	99.755	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.788	1	.003
N of Valid Cases	209		

a. 39 cells (70.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .14.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.719	.000
	Cramer's V	.359	.000
N of Valid Cases		209

Ethnicity * Semeen Barakzai

			Crosstab										Total
			Semeen Barakzai										
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	18	11	12	7	9	10	0	1	0	2	70
		Expected Count	14.7	14.7	9.0	7.1	5.7	11.8	.9	1.4	1.4	3.3	70.0
	Tajik	Count	10	13	3	3	2	7	2	1	2	3	46
		Expected Count	9.6	9.6	5.9	4.7	3.7	7.8	.6	.9	.9	2.2	46.0
	Hazara	Count	1	7	2	4	1	3	0	1	1	0	20
		Expected Count	4.2	4.2	2.6	2.0	1.6	3.4	.3	.4	.4	.9	20.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	5
		Expected Count	1.0	1.0	.6	.5	.4	.8	.1	.1	.1	.2	5.0
	Other	Count	2	0	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	1.5	1.5	.9	.7	.6	1.2	.1	.1	.1	.3	7.0
Total	Count	31	31	19	15	12	25	2	3	3	7	148	
	Expected Count	31.0	31.0	19.0	15.0	12.0	25.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	7.0	148.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	50.279 ^a	36	.057
Likelihood Ratio	49.004	36	.073
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.572	1	.059
N of Valid Cases	148		

a. 40 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .07.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.583	.057
	Cramer's V	.291	.057
N of Valid Cases		148

Frequencies

Statistics						
		Abdul Ali Mazari	Mohqeq	Karim Khalili	Gen. Dostum	Sultan Ali Kishtmand
N	Valid	240	244	245	277	165
	Missing	328	324	323	291	403
Mean		2.654	2.869	2.551	3.372	3.333
Median		2.000	2.500	2.000	3.000	3.000
Mode		.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
Std. Deviation		2.5860	2.6292	2.2694	3.0708	2.7923
Skewness		.824	.816	.729	.646	.607
Std. Error of Skewness		.157	.156	.156	.146	.189
Kurtosis		-.021	.036	.106	-.573	-.380
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.313	.310	.310	.292	.376
Minimum		.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
Maximum		10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0

Frequency Table

Abdul Ali Mazari					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	68	12.0	28.3	28.3
	1.0	44	7.7	18.3	46.7
	2.0	16	2.8	6.7	53.3
	3.0	24	4.2	10.0	63.3
	4.0	24	4.2	10.0	73.3
	5.0	37	6.5	15.4	88.8
	6.0	7	1.2	2.9	91.7
	7.0	6	1.1	2.5	94.2
	8.0	7	1.2	2.9	97.1
	9.0	2	.4	.8	97.9
	10.0	5	.9	2.1	100.0
	Total	240	42.3	100.0	
Missing	System	328	57.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Mohqeq					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	61	10.7	25.0	25.0
	1.0	34	6.0	13.9	38.9
	2.0	27	4.8	11.1	50.0
	3.0	32	5.6	13.1	63.1
	4.0	26	4.6	10.7	73.8
	5.0	32	5.6	13.1	86.9
	6.0	5	.9	2.0	88.9
	7.0	9	1.6	3.7	92.6
	8.0	10	1.8	4.1	96.7
	9.0	1	.2	.4	97.1
	10.0	7	1.2	2.9	100.0
	Total	244	43.0	100.0	
Missing	System	324	57.0		
Total		568	100.0		

Karim Khalili					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	62	10.9	25.3	25.3
	1.0	40	7.0	16.3	41.6
	2.0	24	4.2	9.8	51.4
	3.0	38	6.7	15.5	66.9
	4.0	27	4.8	11.0	78.0
	5.0	36	6.3	14.7	92.7
	6.0	4	.7	1.6	94.3
	7.0	7	1.2	2.9	97.1
	8.0	3	.5	1.2	98.4
	9.0	2	.4	.8	99.2
	10.0	2	.4	.8	100.0
	Total	245	43.1	100.0	
Missing	System	323	56.9		
Total		568	100.0		

Gen. Dostum					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	74	13.0	26.7	26.7
	1.0	26	4.6	9.4	36.1
	2.0	22	3.9	7.9	44.0
	3.0	35	6.2	12.6	56.7
	4.0	24	4.2	8.7	65.3
	5.0	40	7.0	14.4	79.8
	6.0	7	1.2	2.5	82.3
	7.0	11	1.9	4.0	86.3
	8.0	16	2.8	5.8	92.1
	9.0	4	.7	1.4	93.5
	10.0	18	3.2	6.5	100.0
	Total	277	48.8	100.0	
Missing	System	291	51.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Sultan Ali Kishtmand					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	37	6.5	22.4	22.4
	1.0	15	2.6	9.1	31.5
	2.0	18	3.2	10.9	42.4
	3.0	20	3.5	12.1	54.5
	4.0	21	3.7	12.7	67.3
	5.0	26	4.6	15.8	83.0
	6.0	6	1.1	3.6	86.7
	7.0	2	.4	1.2	87.9
	8.0	10	1.8	6.1	93.9
	9.0	5	.9	3.0	97.0
	10.0	5	.9	3.0	100.0
	Total	165	29.0	100.0	
Missing	System	403	71.0		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Abdul Ali Mazari	240	42.3%	328	57.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Mohqeq	244	43.0%	324	57.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Karim Khalili	245	43.1%	323	56.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Gen. Dostum	277	48.8%	291	51.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Sultan Ali Kishtmand	165	29.0%	403	71.0%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Abdul Ali Mazari

Crosstab														
			Abdul Ali Mazari										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	43	18	6	12	6	4	0	0	1	0	1	91
		Expected Count	25.8	16.7	6.1	9.1	9.1	14.0	2.7	2.3	2.7	.8	1.9	91.0
	Tajik	Count	22	20	5	9	6	5	3	4	2	1	0	77
		Expected Count	21.8	14.1	5.1	7.7	7.7	11.9	2.2	1.9	2.2	.6	1.6	77.0
	Hazara	Count	1	3	3	2	6	26	1	1	3	0	3	49
		Expected Count	13.9	9.0	3.3	4.9	4.9	7.6	1.4	1.2	1.4	.4	1.0	49.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	0	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	14
		Expected Count	4.0	2.6	.9	1.4	1.4	2.2	.4	.4	.4	.1	.3	14.0
	Other	Count	2	1	2	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	9
		Expected Count	2.6	1.7	.6	.9	.9	1.4	.3	.2	.3	.1	.2	9.0
Total	Count	68	44	16	24	24	37	7	6	7	2	5	240	
	Expected Count	68.0	44.0	16.0	24.0	24.0	37.0	7.0	6.0	7.0	2.0	5.0	240.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	145.500 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	141.767	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	44.733	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	240		

a. 40 cells (72.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.779	.000
	Cramer's V	.389	.000
N of Valid Cases		240

Ethnicity * Mohqeq

Crosstab														
			Mohqeq										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	41	13	14	12	6	12	0	0	0	1	0	99
		Expected Count	24.8	13.8	11.0	13.0	10.5	13.0	2.0	3.7	4.1	.4	2.8	99.0
	Tajik	Count	15	15	7	10	8	7	3	6	5	0	3	79
		Expected Count	19.8	11.0	8.7	10.4	8.4	10.4	1.6	2.9	3.2	.3	2.3	79.0
	Hazara	Count	4	4	4	8	10	8	0	1	2	0	2	43
		Expected Count	10.8	6.0	4.8	5.6	4.6	5.6	.9	1.6	1.8	.2	1.2	43.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	1	0	2	3	2	2	3	0	2	17
		Expected Count	4.3	2.4	1.9	2.2	1.8	2.2	.3	.6	.7	.1	.5	17.0
	Other	Count	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	6
		Expected Count	1.5	.8	.7	.8	.6	.8	.1	.2	.2	.0	.2	6.0
Total	Count	61	34	27	32	26	32	5	9	10	1	7	244	
	Expected Count	61.0	34.0	27.0	32.0	26.0	32.0	5.0	9.0	10.0	1.0	7.0	244.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	89.120 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	96.793	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	33.839	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	244		

a. 39 cells (70.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.604	.000
	Cramer's V	.302	.000
N of Valid Cases		244

Ethnicity * Karim Khalili

			Crosstab										Total	
			Karim Khalili											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	38	15	13	14	8	15	0	0	0	0	1	104
		Expected Count	26.3	17.0	10.2	16.1	11.5	15.3	1.7	3.0	1.3	.8	.8	104.0
	Tajik	Count	17	15	8	8	4	13	3	6	2	0	1	77
		Expected Count	19.5	12.6	7.5	11.9	8.5	11.3	1.3	2.2	.9	.6	.6	77.0
	Hazara	Count	6	4	2	11	13	5	1	0	0	1	0	43
		Expected Count	10.9	7.0	4.2	6.7	4.7	6.3	.7	1.2	.5	.4	.4	43.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	4	0	2	1	2	0	1	1	1	0	12
		Expected Count	3.0	2.0	1.2	1.9	1.3	1.8	.2	.3	.1	.1	.1	12.0
	Other	Count	1	2	1	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	9
		Expected Count	2.3	1.5	.9	1.4	1.0	1.3	.1	.3	.1	.1	.1	9.0
Total	Count	62	40	24	38	27	36	4	7	3	2	2	245	
	Expected Count	62.0	40.0	24.0	38.0	27.0	36.0	4.0	7.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	245.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	80.445 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	78.100	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.232	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	245		

a. 39 cells (70.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .07.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.573	.000
	Cramer's V	.287	.000
N of Valid Cases		245

Ethnicity * Gen. Dostum

			Crosstab											
			Gen. Dostum											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	Total
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	51	7	12	13	4	17	2	0	0	0	5	111
		Expected Count	29.7	10.4	8.8	14.0	9.6	16.0	2.8	4.4	6.4	1.6	7.2	111.0
	Tajik	Count	12	14	7	9	8	17	4	9	8	2	7	97
		Expected Count	25.9	9.1	7.7	12.3	8.4	14.0	2.5	3.9	5.6	1.4	6.3	97.0
	Hazara	Count	7	3	1	11	10	5	1	0	3	0	2	43
		Expected Count	11.5	4.0	3.4	5.4	3.7	6.2	1.1	1.7	2.5	.6	2.8	43.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	2	5	2	4	16
		Expected Count	4.3	1.5	1.3	2.0	1.4	2.3	.4	.6	.9	.2	1.0	16.0
	Other	Count	4	0	2	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	10
		Expected Count	2.7	.9	.8	1.3	.9	1.4	.3	.4	.6	.1	.6	10.0
Total	Count	74	26	22	35	24	40	7	11	16	4	18	277	
	Expected Count	74.0	26.0	22.0	35.0	24.0	40.0	7.0	11.0	16.0	4.0	18.0	277.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	138.527 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	136.625	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	18.898	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	277		

a. 36 cells (65.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .14.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.707	.000
	Cramer's V	.354	.000
N of Valid Cases		277

Ethnicity * Sultan Ali Kishtmand

Crosstab														
			Sultan Ali Kishtmand										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	25	4	8	10	6	11	2	0	1	0	2	69
		Expected Count	15.5	6.3	7.5	8.4	8.8	10.9	2.5	.8	4.2	2.1	2.1	69.0
	Tajik	Count	9	8	5	7	4	6	3	2	4	1	0	49
		Expected Count	11.0	4.5	5.3	5.9	6.2	7.7	1.8	.6	3.0	1.5	1.5	49.0
	Hazara	Count	2	2	3	3	9	8	0	0	3	2	0	32
		Expected Count	7.2	2.9	3.5	3.9	4.1	5.0	1.2	.4	1.9	1.0	1.0	32.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	3	8
		Expected Count	1.8	.7	.9	1.0	1.0	1.3	.3	.1	.5	.2	.2	8.0
	Other	Count	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	7
		Expected Count	1.6	.6	.8	.8	.9	1.1	.3	.1	.4	.2	.2	7.0
Total	Count	37	15	18	20	21	26	6	2	10	5	5	165	
	Expected Count	37.0	15.0	18.0	20.0	21.0	26.0	6.0	2.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	165.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	99.508 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	80.983	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	17.386	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	165		

a. 42 cells (76.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.777	.000
	Cramer's V	.388	.000
N of Valid Cases		165

Frequencies

Statistics						
		Mahmood Karzai	Gul Agha Sherzai	Ahmad Wali Karzai	Farooq Wardak	Qayoom Karzai
N	Valid	186	259	194	243	175
	Missing	382	309	374	325	393
Mean		2.231	3.216	2.835	3.576	2.309
Median		1.500	3.000	3.000	3.000	2.000
Mode		.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	.0
Std. Deviation		2.1041	2.5744	2.3110	2.7085	2.3235
Skewness		.535	.658	.196	.672	.949
Std. Error of Skewness		.178	.151	.175	.156	.184
Kurtosis		-.941	.146	-.986	-.024	.652
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.355	.302	.347	.311	.365
Minimum		.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
Maximum		8.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0

Frequency Table

Mahmood Karzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	55	9.7	29.6	29.6
	1.0	38	6.7	20.4	50.0
	2.0	16	2.8	8.6	58.6
	3.0	19	3.3	10.2	68.8
	4.0	15	2.6	8.1	76.9
	5.0	35	6.2	18.8	95.7
	6.0	5	.9	2.7	98.4
	7.0	1	.2	.5	98.9
	8.0	2	.4	1.1	100.0
	Total	186	32.7	100.0	
Missing	System	382	67.3		
Total		568	100.0		

Gul Agha Sherzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	50	8.8	19.3	19.3
	1.0	35	6.2	13.5	32.8
	2.0	21	3.7	8.1	40.9
	3.0	34	6.0	13.1	54.1
	4.0	33	5.8	12.7	66.8
	5.0	57	10.0	22.0	88.8
	6.0	7	1.2	2.7	91.5
	7.0	4	.7	1.5	93.1
	8.0	5	.9	1.9	95.0
	9.0	3	.5	1.2	96.1
	10.0	10	1.8	3.9	100.0
	Total	259	45.6	100.0	
Missing	System	309	54.4		
Total		568	100.0		

Ahmad Wali Karzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	50	8.8	25.8	25.8
	1.0	27	4.8	13.9	39.7
	2.0	10	1.8	5.2	44.8
	3.0	22	3.9	11.3	56.2
	4.0	12	2.1	6.2	62.4
	5.0	62	10.9	32.0	94.3
	6.0	4	.7	2.1	96.4
	7.0	3	.5	1.5	97.9
	8.0	3	.5	1.5	99.5
	10.0	1	.2	.5	100.0
	Total	194	34.2	100.0	
Missing	System	374	65.8		
Total		568	100.0		

Farooq Wardak					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	32	5.6	13.2	13.2
	1.0	38	6.7	15.6	28.8
	2.0	22	3.9	9.1	37.9
	3.0	34	6.0	14.0	51.9
	4.0	25	4.4	10.3	62.1
	5.0	52	9.2	21.4	83.5
	6.0	11	1.9	4.5	88.1
	7.0	5	.9	2.1	90.1
	8.0	7	1.2	2.9	93.0
	9.0	2	.4	.8	93.8
	10.0	15	2.6	6.2	100.0
	Total	243	42.8	100.0	
Missing	System	325	57.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Qayoom Karzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	55	9.7	31.4	31.4
	1.0	32	5.6	18.3	49.7
	2.0	11	1.9	6.3	56.0
	3.0	25	4.4	14.3	70.3
	4.0	12	2.1	6.9	77.1
	5.0	32	5.6	18.3	95.4
	6.0	1	.2	.6	96.0
	7.0	2	.4	1.1	97.1
	8.0	1	.2	.6	97.7
	9.0	1	.2	.6	98.3
	10.0	3	.5	1.7	100.0
	Total	175	30.8	100.0	
Missing	System	393	69.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Mahmood Karzai	186	32.7%	382	67.3%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Gul Agha Sherzai	259	45.6%	309	54.4%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ahmad Wali Karzai	194	34.2%	374	65.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Farooq Wardak	243	42.8%	325	57.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Qayoom Karzai	175	30.8%	393	69.2%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Mahmood Karzai

Crosstab												
			Mahmood Karzai								Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0		8.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	22	8	4	14	14	28	0	1	0	91
		Expected Count	26.9	18.6	7.8	9.3	7.3	17.1	2.4	.5	1.0	91.0
	Tajik	Count	20	21	8	4	1	4	3	0	1	62
		Expected Count	18.3	12.7	5.3	6.3	5.0	11.7	1.7	.3	.7	62.0
	Hazara	Count	11	5	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	22
		Expected Count	6.5	4.5	1.9	2.2	1.8	4.1	.6	.1	.2	22.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5
		Expected Count	1.5	1.0	.4	.5	.4	.9	.1	.0	.1	5.0
	Other	Count	1	1	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	6
		Expected Count	1.8	1.2	.5	.6	.5	1.1	.2	.0	.1	6.0
Total		Count	55	38	16	19	15	35	5	1	2	186
		Expected Count	55.0	38.0	16.0	19.0	15.0	35.0	5.0	1.0	2.0	186.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	75.206 ^a	32	.000
Likelihood Ratio	79.036	32	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.239	1	.007
N of Valid Cases	186		

a. 32 cells (71.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures				
		Value	Approx. Sig.	
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.636	.000	
	Cramer's V	.318	.000	
N of Valid Cases		186

Ethnicity * Gul Agha Sherzai

			Crosstab											
			Gul Agha Sherzai											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	Total
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	26	8	9	25	20	42	2	0	1	0	6	139
		Expected Count	26.8	18.8	11.3	18.2	17.7	30.6	3.8	2.1	2.7	1.6	5.4	139.0
	Tajik	Count	13	19	5	5	8	12	4	2	3	1	3	75
		Expected Count	14.5	10.1	6.1	9.8	9.6	16.5	2.0	1.2	1.4	.9	2.9	75.0
	Hazara	Count	9	6	6	3	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	29
		Expected Count	5.6	3.9	2.4	3.8	3.7	6.4	.8	.4	.6	.3	1.1	29.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	1	7
		Expected Count	1.4	.9	.6	.9	.9	1.5	.2	.1	.1	.1	.3	7.0
	Other	Count	2	1	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	9
		Expected Count	1.7	1.2	.7	1.2	1.1	2.0	.2	.1	.2	.1	.3	9.0
Total	Count	50	35	21	34	33	57	7	4	5	3	10	259	
	Expected Count	50.0	35.0	21.0	34.0	33.0	57.0	7.0	4.0	5.0	3.0	10.0	259.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	89.105 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	89.247	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.678	1	.410
N of Valid Cases	259		

a. 40 cells (72.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.587	.000
	Cramer's V	.293	.000
N of Valid Cases		259

Ethnicity * Ahmad Wali Karzai

			Crosstab										Total
			Ahmad Wali Karzai										
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	19	5	5	13	10	53	2	0	1	0	108
		Expected Count	27.8	15.0	5.6	12.2	6.7	34.5	2.2	1.7	1.7	.6	108.0
	Tajik	Count	19	16	1	6	0	5	1	2	2	1	53
		Expected Count	13.7	7.4	2.7	6.0	3.3	16.9	1.1	.8	.8	.3	53.0
	Hazara	Count	10	3	2	2	0	3	0	1	0	0	21
		Expected Count	5.4	2.9	1.1	2.4	1.3	6.7	.4	.3	.3	.1	21.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
		Expected Count	1.3	.7	.3	.6	.3	1.6	.1	.1	.1	.0	5.0
	Other	Count	2	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	1.8	1.0	.4	.8	.4	2.2	.1	.1	.1	.0	7.0
Total	Count	50	27	10	22	12	62	4	3	3	1	194	
	Expected Count	50.0	27.0	10.0	22.0	12.0	62.0	4.0	3.0	3.0	1.0	194.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	92.502 ^a	36	.000
Likelihood Ratio	94.730	36	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.791	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	194		

a. 38 cells (76.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.691	.000
	Cramer's V	.345	.000
N of Valid Cases		194

Ethnicity * Farooq Wardak

			Crosstab										Total	
			Farooq Wardak											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	10	9	9	16	19	43	6	0	0	1	4	117
		Expected Count	15.4	18.3	10.6	16.4	12.0	25.0	5.3	2.4	3.4	1.0	7.2	117.0
	Tajik	Count	12	14	10	10	4	8	3	3	4	1	11	80
		Expected Count	10.5	12.5	7.2	11.2	8.2	17.1	3.6	1.6	2.3	.7	4.9	80.0
	Hazara	Count	8	9	3	4	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	29
		Expected Count	3.8	4.5	2.6	4.1	3.0	6.2	1.3	.6	.8	.2	1.8	29.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	5	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	10
		Expected Count	1.3	1.6	.9	1.4	1.0	2.1	.5	.2	.3	.1	.6	10.0
	Other	Count	2	1	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	.9	1.1	.6	1.0	.7	1.5	.3	.1	.2	.1	.4	7.0
Total	Count	32	38	22	34	25	52	11	5	7	2	15	243	
	Expected Count	32.0	38.0	22.0	34.0	25.0	52.0	11.0	5.0	7.0	2.0	15.0	243.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	101.407 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	107.093	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.618	1	.010
N of Valid Cases	243		

a. 40 cells (72.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.646	.000
	Cramer's V	.323	.000
N of Valid Cases		243

Ethnicity * Qayoom Karzai

Crosstab														
			Qayoom Karzai										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	31	8	4	19	6	23	0	1	0	0	1	93
		Expected Count	29.2	17.0	5.8	13.3	6.4	17.0	.5	1.1	.5	.5	1.6	93.0
	Tajik	Count	15	13	2	1	5	5	1	1	1	0	1	45
		Expected Count	14.1	8.2	2.8	6.4	3.1	8.2	.3	.5	.3	.3	.8	45.0
	Hazara	Count	7	5	3	5	0	3	0	0	0	1	1	25
		Expected Count	7.9	4.6	1.6	3.6	1.7	4.6	.1	.3	.1	.1	.4	25.0
	Uzbek	Count	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
		Expected Count	1.9	1.1	.4	.9	.4	1.1	.0	.1	.0	.0	.1	6.0
	Other	Count	0	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	6
		Expected Count	1.9	1.1	.4	.9	.4	1.1	.0	.1	.0	.0	.1	6.0
Total	Count	55	32	11	25	12	32	1	2	1	1	3	175	
	Expected Count	55.0	32.0	11.0	25.0	12.0	32.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	175.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	60.080 ^a	40	.022
Likelihood Ratio	60.751	40	.019
Linear-by-Linear Association	.789	1	.374
N of Valid Cases	175		

a. 44 cells (80.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.586	.022
	Cramer's V	.293	.022
N of Valid Cases		175

Frequencies

Statistics				
		Omar Dawoodzai	Karim Khuram	Omar Zakhilwal
N	Valid	141	166	180
	Missing	427	402	388
Mean		2.11	1.958	2.483
Median		1.00	1.000	2.000
Mode		0	.0	1.0
Std. Deviation		2.290	2.0222	2.2335
Skewness		1.213	1.002	1.063
Std. Error of Skewness		.204	.188	.181
Kurtosis		1.322	.439	1.315
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.406	.375	.360
Minimum		0	.0	.0
Maximum		10	10.0	10.0

Frequency Table

Omar Dawoodzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	45	7.9	31.9	31.9
	1	31	5.5	22.0	53.9
	2	16	2.8	11.3	65.2
	3	11	1.9	7.8	73.0
	4	11	1.9	7.8	80.9
	5	19	3.3	13.5	94.3
	6	2	.4	1.4	95.7
	7	3	.5	2.1	97.9
	10	3	.5	2.1	100.0
	Total	141	24.8	100.0	
Missing	System	427	75.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Karim Khuram					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	49	8.6	29.5	29.5
	1.0	45	7.9	27.1	56.6
	2.0	19	3.3	11.4	68.1
	3.0	12	2.1	7.2	75.3
	4.0	11	1.9	6.6	81.9
	5.0	24	4.2	14.5	96.4
	6.0	3	.5	1.8	98.2
	7.0	2	.4	1.2	99.4
	10.0	1	.2	.6	100.0
	Total	166	29.2	100.0	
Missing	System	402	70.8		
Total		568	100.0		

Omar Zakhilwal					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	37	6.5	20.6	20.6
	1.0	41	7.2	22.8	43.3
	2.0	26	4.6	14.4	57.8
	3.0	17	3.0	9.4	67.2
	4.0	22	3.9	12.2	79.4
	5.0	28	4.9	15.6	95.0
	6.0	3	.5	1.7	96.7
	8.0	1	.2	.6	97.2
	9.0	1	.2	.6	97.8
	10.0	4	.7	2.2	100.0
	Total	180	31.7	100.0	
Missing	System	388	68.3		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Omar Dawoodzai	141	24.8%	427	75.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Karim Khuram	166	29.2%	402	70.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Omar Zakhilwal	180	31.7%	388	68.3%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Omar Dawoodzai

Crosstab												
			Omar Dawoodzai								Total	
			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		10
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	25	9	8	10	7	12	1	0	1	73
		Expected Count	23.3	16.0	8.3	5.7	5.7	9.8	1.0	1.6	1.6	73.0
	Tajik	Count	13	13	6	1	2	2	1	2	2	42
		Expected Count	13.4	9.2	4.8	3.3	3.3	5.7	.6	.9	.9	42.0
	Hazara	Count	6	4	1	0	0	4	0	1	0	16
		Expected Count	5.1	3.5	1.8	1.2	1.2	2.2	.2	.3	.3	16.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	4
		Expected Count	1.3	.9	.5	.3	.3	.5	.1	.1	.1	4.0
	Other	Count	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	6
		Expected Count	1.9	1.3	.7	.5	.5	.8	.1	.1	.1	6.0
Total		Count	45	31	16	11	11	19	2	3	3	141
		Expected Count	45.0	31.0	16.0	11.0	11.0	19.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	141.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	36.680 ^a	32	.261
Likelihood Ratio	41.995	32	.111
Linear-by-Linear Association	.070	1	.791
N of Valid Cases	141		

a. 35 cells (77.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.510	.261
	Cramer's V	.255	.261
N of Valid Cases		141

Ethnicity * Karim Khuram

Crosstab												
			Karim Khuram								Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	22	11	10	7	8	16	0	0	1	75
		Expected Count	22.1	20.3	8.6	5.4	5.0	10.8	1.4	.9	.5	75.0
	Tajik	Count	15	21	4	3	2	5	3	1	0	54
		Expected Count	15.9	14.6	6.2	3.9	3.6	7.8	1.0	.7	.3	54.0
	Hazara	Count	9	8	3	1	0	3	0	1	0	25
		Expected Count	7.4	6.8	2.9	1.8	1.7	3.6	.5	.3	.2	25.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
		Expected Count	1.5	1.4	.6	.4	.3	.7	.1	.1	.0	5.0
	Other	Count	3	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	2.1	1.9	.8	.5	.5	1.0	.1	.1	.0	7.0
Total		Count	49	45	19	12	11	24	3	2	1	166
		Expected Count	49.0	45.0	19.0	12.0	11.0	24.0	3.0	2.0	1.0	166.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	39.159 ^a	32	.179
Likelihood Ratio	44.263	32	.073
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.211	1	.040
N of Valid Cases	166		

a. 34 cells (75.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.486	.179
	Cramer's V	.243	.179
N of Valid Cases		166

Ethnicity * Omar Zakhilwal

			Crosstab										
			Omar Zakhilwal									Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	17	10	10	15	15	21	2	0	0	1	91
		Expected Count	18.7	20.7	13.1	8.6	11.1	14.2	1.5	.5	.5	2.0	91.0
	Tajik	Count	12	16	9	2	4	5	1	1	0	2	52
		Expected Count	10.7	11.8	7.5	4.9	6.4	8.1	.9	.3	.3	1.2	52.0
	Hazara	Count	7	9	6	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	26
		Expected Count	5.3	5.9	3.8	2.5	3.2	4.0	.4	.1	.1	.6	26.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5
		Expected Count	1.0	1.1	.7	.5	.6	.8	.1	.0	.0	.1	5.0
	Other	Count	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	6
		Expected Count	1.2	1.4	.9	.6	.7	.9	.1	.0	.0	.1	6.0
Total	Count	37	41	26	17	22	28	3	1	1	4	180	
	Expected Count	37.0	41.0	26.0	17.0	22.0	28.0	3.0	1.0	1.0	4.0	180.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	53.605 ^a	36	.030
Likelihood Ratio	57.135	36	.014
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.778	1	.029
N of Valid Cases	180		

a. 37 cells (74.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.546	.030
	Cramer's V	.273	.030
N of Valid Cases		180

Frequencies

Statistics				
		Hafeezullah Amin	Tarakee	Babrak Karmal
N	Valid	263	278	263
	Missing	305	290	305
Mean		1.681	2.032	2.179
Median		1.000	1.000	1.000
Mode		.0	.0	.0
Std. Deviation		2.1197	2.1885	2.5775
Skewness		1.850	1.276	1.364
Std. Error of Skewness		.150	.146	.150
Kurtosis		3.771	1.539	1.257
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.299	.291	.299
Minimum		.0	.0	.0
Maximum		10.0	10.0	10.0

Frequency Table

Hafeezullah Amin					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	93	16.4	35.4	35.4
	1.0	77	13.6	29.3	64.6
	2.0	30	5.3	11.4	76.0
	3.0	17	3.0	6.5	82.5
	4.0	15	2.6	5.7	88.2
	5.0	20	3.5	7.6	95.8
	6.0	2	.4	.8	96.6
	7.0	1	.2	.4	97.0
	8.0	2	.4	.8	97.7
	9.0	1	.2	.4	98.1
	10.0	5	.9	1.9	100.0
Total		263	46.3	100.0	
Missing	System	305	53.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Tarakee					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	86	15.1	30.9	30.9
	1.0	65	11.4	23.4	54.3
	2.0	32	5.6	11.5	65.8
	3.0	32	5.6	11.5	77.3
	4.0	16	2.8	5.8	83.1
	5.0	33	5.8	11.9	95.0
	6.0	4	.7	1.4	96.4
	7.0	1	.2	.4	96.8
	8.0	5	.9	1.8	98.6
	10.0	4	.7	1.4	100.0
	Total	278	48.9	100.0	
Missing	System	290	51.1		
Total		568	100.0		

Babrak Karmal					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	88	15.5	33.5	33.5
	1.0	63	11.1	24.0	57.4
	2.0	28	4.9	10.6	68.1
	3.0	12	2.1	4.6	72.6
	4.0	20	3.5	7.6	80.2
	5.0	27	4.8	10.3	90.5
	6.0	6	1.1	2.3	92.8
	7.0	4	.7	1.5	94.3
	8.0	4	.7	1.5	95.8
	9.0	3	.5	1.1	97.0
	10.0	8	1.4	3.0	100.0
	Total	263	46.3	100.0	
Missing	System	305	53.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Hafeezullah Amin	263	46.3%	305	53.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Tarakee	278	48.9%	290	51.1%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Babrak Karmal	263	46.3%	305	53.7%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Hafeezullah Amin

Crosstab														
			Hafeezullah Amin										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	43	28	13	9	10	14	0	0	0	0	2	119
		Expected Count	42.1	34.8	13.6	7.7	6.8	9.0	.9	.5	.9	.5	2.3	119.0
	Tajik	Count	24	30	10	4	4	4	2	1	2	1	1	83
		Expected Count	29.3	24.3	9.5	5.4	4.7	6.3	.6	.3	.6	.3	1.6	83.0
	Hazara	Count	23	7	3	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	37
		Expected Count	13.1	10.8	4.2	2.4	2.1	2.8	.3	.1	.3	.1	.7	37.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	8	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	13
		Expected Count	4.6	3.8	1.5	.8	.7	1.0	.1	.0	.1	.0	.2	13.0
	Other	Count	3	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
		Expected Count	3.9	3.2	1.3	.7	.6	.8	.1	.0	.1	.0	.2	11.0
Total	Count	93	77	30	17	15	20	2	1	2	1	5	263	
	Expected Count	93.0	77.0	30.0	17.0	15.0	20.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	5.0	263.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	59.027 ^a	40	.027
Likelihood Ratio	63.709	40	.010
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.371	1	.242
N of Valid Cases	263		

a. 42 cells (76.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .04.

Symmetric Measures		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.474	.027
	Cramer's V	.237	.027
N of Valid Cases		263

Ethnicity * Tarakee

			Crosstab										Total
			Tarakee										
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	45	18	17	16	7	24	1	0	2	0	130
		Expected Count	40.2	30.4	15.0	15.0	7.5	15.4	1.9	.5	2.3	1.9	130.0
	Tajik	Count	20	31	4	11	7	6	3	1	3	1	87
		Expected Count	26.9	20.3	10.0	10.0	5.0	10.3	1.3	.3	1.6	1.3	87.0
	Hazara	Count	19	7	5	3	0	1	0	0	0	2	37
		Expected Count	11.4	8.7	4.3	4.3	2.1	4.4	.5	.1	.7	.5	37.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	7	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	13
		Expected Count	4.0	3.0	1.5	1.5	.7	1.5	.2	.0	.2	.2	13.0
	Other	Count	2	2	4	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	11
		Expected Count	3.4	2.6	1.3	1.3	.6	1.3	.2	.0	.2	.2	11.0
Total	Count	86	65	32	32	16	33	4	1	5	4	278	
	Expected Count	86.0	65.0	32.0	32.0	16.0	33.0	4.0	1.0	5.0	4.0	278.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	73.900 ^a	36	.000
Likelihood Ratio	79.041	36	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.238	1	.626
N of Valid Cases	278		

a. 36 cells (72.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .04.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.516	.000
	Cramer's V	.258	.000
N of Valid Cases		278

Ethnicity * Babrak Karmal

Crosstab														
			Babrak Karmal										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	49	17	14	6	12	12	2	0	2	0	1	115
		Expected Count	38.5	27.5	12.2	5.2	8.7	11.8	2.6	1.7	1.7	1.3	3.5	115.0
	Tajik	Count	20	29	7	4	6	11	2	2	2	1	3	87
		Expected Count	29.1	20.8	9.3	4.0	6.6	8.9	2.0	1.3	1.3	1.0	2.6	87.0
	Hazara	Count	16	8	4	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	2	36
		Expected Count	12.0	8.6	3.8	1.6	2.7	3.7	.8	.5	.5	.4	1.1	36.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	6	0	0	0	1	2	2	0	1	2	14
		Expected Count	4.7	3.4	1.5	.6	1.1	1.4	.3	.2	.2	.2	.4	14.0
	Other	Count	3	3	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	11
		Expected Count	3.7	2.6	1.2	.5	.8	1.1	.3	.2	.2	.1	.3	11.0
Total	Count	88	63	28	12	20	27	6	4	4	3	8	263	
	Expected Count	88.0	63.0	28.0	12.0	20.0	27.0	6.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	8.0	263.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	83.236 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	75.641	40	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.931	1	.047
N of Valid Cases	263		

a. 42 cells (76.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.563	.000
	Cramer's V	.281	.000
N of Valid Cases		263

Frequencies

Statistics			
		Hekmatyar	Mullah Omar
N	Valid	269	289
	Missing	299	279
Mean		2.134	2.156
Median		1.000	1.000
Mode		.0	.0
Std. Deviation		2.1693	2.3629
Skewness		.973	.934
Std. Error of Skewness		.149	.143
Kurtosis		.459	-.003
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.296	.286
Minimum		.0	.0
Maximum		10.0	10.0

Frequency Table

Hekmatyar					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	82	14.4	30.5	30.5
	1.0	57	10.0	21.2	51.7
	2.0	29	5.1	10.8	62.5
	3.0	29	5.1	10.8	73.2
	4.0	23	4.0	8.6	81.8
	5.0	34	6.0	12.6	94.4
	6.0	6	1.1	2.2	96.7
	7.0	3	.5	1.1	97.8
	8.0	2	.4	.7	98.5
	9.0	3	.5	1.1	99.6
	10.0	1	.2	.4	100.0
	Total	269	47.4	100.0	
Missing	System	299	52.6		
Total		568	100.0		

Mullah Omar					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	101	17.8	34.9	34.9
	1.0	66	11.6	22.8	57.8
	2.0	12	2.1	4.2	61.9
	3.0	23	4.0	8.0	69.9
	4.0	19	3.3	6.6	76.5
	5.0	48	8.5	16.6	93.1
	6.0	5	.9	1.7	94.8
	7.0	8	1.4	2.8	97.6
	8.0	3	.5	1.0	98.6
	9.0	2	.4	.7	99.3
	10.0	2	.4	.7	100.0
	Total	289	50.9	100.0	
Missing	System	279	49.1		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Hekmatyar	269	47.4%	299	52.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Mullah Omar	289	50.9%	279	49.1%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Hekmatyar

Crosstab														
			Hekmatyar										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	31	10	12	22	13	23	1	1	0	0	0	113
		Expected Count	34.4	23.9	12.2	12.2	9.7	14.3	2.5	1.3	.8	1.3	.4	113.0
	Tajik	Count	23	27	10	4	6	8	4	1	2	2	1	88
		Expected Count	26.8	18.6	9.5	9.5	7.5	11.1	2.0	1.0	.7	1.0	.3	88.0
	Hazara	Count	25	7	5	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	44
		Expected Count	13.4	9.3	4.7	4.7	3.8	5.6	1.0	.5	.3	.5	.2	44.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	10	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	15
		Expected Count	4.6	3.2	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.9	.3	.2	.1	.2	.1	15.0
	Other	Count	2	3	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	9
		Expected Count	2.7	1.9	1.0	1.0	.8	1.1	.2	.1	.1	.1	.0	9.0
Total		Count	82	57	29	29	23	34	6	3	2	3	1	269
		Expected Count	82.0	57.0	29.0	29.0	23.0	34.0	6.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	1.0	269.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	90.564 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	88.351	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.098	1	.014
N of Valid Cases	269		

a. 40 cells (72.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.580	.000
	Cramer's V	.290	.000
N of Valid Cases		269

Ethnicity * Mullah Omar

Crosstab														
			Mullah Omar										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	41	15	7	15	15	33	0	2	0	0	1	129
		Expected Count	45.1	29.5	5.4	10.3	8.5	21.4	2.2	3.6	1.3	.9	.9	129.0
	Tajik	Count	31	36	2	4	3	6	5	4	2	0	1	94
		Expected Count	32.9	21.5	3.9	7.5	6.2	15.6	1.6	2.6	1.0	.7	.7	94.0
	Hazara	Count	24	5	2	3	0	7	0	1	1	1	0	44
		Expected Count	15.4	10.0	1.8	3.5	2.9	7.3	.8	1.2	.5	.3	.3	44.0
	Uzbek	Count	1	9	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	13
		Expected Count	4.5	3.0	.5	1.0	.9	2.2	.2	.4	.1	.1	.1	13.0
	Other	Count	4	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	9
		Expected Count	3.1	2.1	.4	.7	.6	1.5	.2	.2	.1	.1	.1	9.0
Total		Count	101	66	12	23	19	48	5	8	3	2	2	289
		Expected Count	101.0	66.0	12.0	23.0	19.0	48.0	5.0	8.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	289.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	102.888 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	104.307	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.987	1	.084
N of Valid Cases	289		

a. 41 cells (74.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .06.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.597	.000
	Cramer's V	.298	.000
N of Valid Cases		289

Frequencies

Statistics			
		Ali Ahmad Jalali	Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai
N	Valid	193	274
	Missing	375	294
Mean		3.751	3.942
Median		4.000	4.000
Mode		5.0	5.0
Std. Deviation		2.4791	2.5884
Skewness		.485	.316
Std. Error of Skewness		.175	.147
Kurtosis		.033	-.275
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.348	.293
Minimum		.0	.0
Maximum		10.0	10.0

Frequency Table

Ali Ahmad Jalali					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	16	2.8	8.3	8.3
	1.0	32	5.6	16.6	24.9
	2.0	18	3.2	9.3	34.2
	3.0	20	3.5	10.4	44.6
	4.0	21	3.7	10.9	55.4
	5.0	57	10.0	29.5	85.0
	6.0	8	1.4	4.1	89.1
	7.0	7	1.2	3.6	92.7
	8.0	5	.9	2.6	95.3
	10.0	9	1.6	4.7	100.0
	Total	193	34.0	100.0	
Missing	System	375	66.0		
Total		568	100.0		

Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	32	5.6	11.7	11.7
	1.0	31	5.5	11.3	23.0
	2.0	19	3.3	6.9	29.9
	3.0	31	5.5	11.3	41.2
	4.0	29	5.1	10.6	51.8
	5.0	83	14.6	30.3	82.1
	6.0	11	1.9	4.0	86.1
	7.0	11	1.9	4.0	90.1
	8.0	10	1.8	3.6	93.8
	9.0	6	1.1	2.2	96.0
	10.0	11	1.9	4.0	100.0
	Total	274	48.2	100.0	
Missing	System	294	51.8		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Ali Ahmad Jalali	193	34.0%	375	66.0%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai	274	48.2%	294	51.8%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Ali Ahmad Jalali

Crosstab													
			Ali Ahmad Jalali									Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	8	10	6	12	13	38	3	0	1	1	92
		Expected Count	7.6	15.3	8.6	9.5	10.0	27.2	3.8	3.3	2.4	4.3	92.0
	Tajik	Count	7	12	3	5	5	10	5	5	3	5	60
		Expected Count	5.0	9.9	5.6	6.2	6.5	17.7	2.5	2.2	1.6	2.8	60.0
	Hazara	Count	1	6	8	1	3	3	0	1	0	1	24
		Expected Count	2.0	4.0	2.2	2.5	2.6	7.1	1.0	.9	.6	1.1	24.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	3	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	8
		Expected Count	.7	1.3	.7	.8	.9	2.4	.3	.3	.2	.4	8.0
	Other	Count	0	1	0	2	0	4	0	1	1	0	9
		Expected Count	.7	1.5	.8	.9	1.0	2.7	.4	.3	.2	.4	9.0
Total		Count	16	32	18	20	21	57	8	7	5	9	193
		Expected Count	16.0	32.0	18.0	20.0	21.0	57.0	8.0	7.0	5.0	9.0	193.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	74.155 ^a	36	.000
Likelihood Ratio	74.093	36	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.374	1	.541
N of Valid Cases	193		

a. 38 cells (76.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.620	.000
	Cramer's V	.310	.000
N of Valid Cases		193

Ethnicity * Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai

Crosstab														
			Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai											Total
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	13	6	7	15	18	67	3	2	3	0	3	137
		Expected Count	16.0	15.5	9.5	15.5	14.5	41.5	5.5	5.5	5.0	3.0	5.5	137.0
	Tajik	Count	12	9	7	10	5	9	3	5	7	4	7	78
		Expected Count	9.1	8.8	5.4	8.8	8.3	23.6	3.1	3.1	2.8	1.7	3.1	78.0
	Hazara	Count	7	12	5	5	1	5	1	0	0	1	1	38
		Expected Count	4.4	4.3	2.6	4.3	4.0	11.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	.8	1.5	38.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	0	3	0	3	2	0	1	0	11
		Expected Count	1.3	1.2	.8	1.2	1.2	3.3	.4	.4	.4	.2	.4	11.0
	Other	Count	0	2	0	1	2	2	1	2	0	0	0	10
		Expected Count	1.2	1.1	.7	1.1	1.1	3.0	.4	.4	.4	.2	.4	10.0
	Total	Count	32	31	19	31	29	83	11	11	10	6	11	274
		Expected Count	32.0	31.0	19.0	31.0	29.0	83.0	11.0	11.0	10.0	6.0	11.0	274.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	131.071 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	126.931	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.906	1	.341
N of Valid Cases	274		

a. 38 cells (69.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.692	.000
	Cramer's V	.346	.000
N of Valid Cases		274

Frequencies

Statistics			
		Anwarul Haq	
		Ahadi	Ismael Yoon
N	Valid	192	151
	Missing	376	417
Mean		2.542	1.894
Median		2.000	1.000
Mode		1.0	.0
Std. Deviation		2.1215	1.8873
Skewness		.826	.764
Std. Error of Skewness		.175	.197
Kurtosis		.641	-.570
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.349	.392
Minimum		.0	.0
Maximum		10.0	7.0

Frequency Table

Anwarul Haq Ahadi					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	37	6.5	19.3	19.3
	1.0	38	6.7	19.8	39.1
	2.0	29	5.1	15.1	54.2
	3.0	28	4.9	14.6	68.8
	4.0	20	3.5	10.4	79.2
	5.0	28	4.9	14.6	93.8
	6.0	6	1.1	3.1	96.9
	7.0	1	.2	.5	97.4
	8.0	2	.4	1.0	98.4
	9.0	1	.2	.5	99.0
	10.0	2	.4	1.0	100.0
	Total	192	33.8	100.0	
Missing	System	376	66.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Ismael Yoon					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	47	8.3	31.1	31.1
	1.0	34	6.0	22.5	53.6
	2.0	21	3.7	13.9	67.5
	3.0	17	3.0	11.3	78.8
	4.0	6	1.1	4.0	82.8
	5.0	23	4.0	15.2	98.0
	6.0	1	.2	.7	98.7
	7.0	2	.4	1.3	100.0
	Total	151	26.6	100.0	
Missing	System	417	73.4		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Anwarul Haq Ahadi	192	33.8%	376	66.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ismael Yoon	151	26.6%	417	73.4%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Anwarul Haq Ahadi

Crosstab														
			Anwarul Haq Ahadi										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	16	12	12	18	7	18	2	0	0	0	1	86
		Expected Count	16.6	17.0	13.0	12.5	9.0	12.5	2.7	.4	.9	.4	.9	86.0
	Tajik	Count	12	15	7	6	9	3	4	1	2	0	1	60
		Expected Count	11.6	11.9	9.1	8.8	6.3	8.8	1.9	.3	.6	.3	.6	60.0
	Hazara	Count	8	4	9	1	3	4	0	0	0	1	0	30
		Expected Count	5.8	5.9	4.5	4.4	3.1	4.4	.9	.2	.3	.2	.3	30.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	5	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	8
		Expected Count	1.5	1.6	1.2	1.2	.8	1.2	.3	.0	.1	.0	.1	8.0
	Other	Count	1	2	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	8
		Expected Count	1.5	1.6	1.2	1.2	.8	1.2	.3	.0	.1	.0	.1	8.0
Total		Count	37	38	29	28	20	28	6	1	2	1	2	192
		Expected Count	37.0	38.0	29.0	28.0	20.0	28.0	6.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	192.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	51.750 ^a	40	.101
Likelihood Ratio	53.499	40	.075
Linear-by-Linear Association	.874	1	.350
N of Valid Cases	192		

a. 41 cells (74.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .04.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.519	.101
	Cramer's V	.260	.101
N of Valid Cases		192

Ethnicity * Ismael Yoon

			Crosstab									
			Ismael Yoon								Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0		
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	22	10	12	11	4	19	0	0	78	
		Expected Count	24.3	17.6	10.8	8.8	3.1	11.9	.5	1.0	78.0	
	Tajik	Count	15	15	7	1	1	4	1	1	45	
		Expected Count	14.0	10.1	6.3	5.1	1.8	6.9	.3	.6	45.0	
	Hazara	Count	9	5	1	3	0	0	0	1	19	
		Expected Count	5.9	4.3	2.6	2.1	.8	2.9	.1	.3	19.0	
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	
		Expected Count	.9	.7	.4	.3	.1	.5	.0	.0	3.0	
	Other	Count	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	6	
		Expected Count	1.9	1.4	.8	.7	.2	.9	.0	.1	6.0	
Total	Count	47	34	21	17	6	23	1	2	151		
	Expected Count	47.0	34.0	21.0	17.0	6.0	23.0	1.0	2.0	151.0		

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	38.806 ^a	28	.084
Likelihood Ratio	44.604	28	.024
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.787	1	.052
N of Valid Cases	151		

a. 29 cells (72.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.507	.084
	Cramer's V	.253	.084
N of Valid Cases		151

Frequencies

Statistics			
		Ahmad Zia Masood	Marshal Fahim
N	Valid	221	252
	Missing	347	316
Mean		3.050	2.329
Median		3.000	2.000
Mode		.0	.0
Std. Deviation		2.8304	2.1917
Skewness		1.018	.954
Std. Error of Skewness		.164	.153
Kurtosis		.405	.503
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.326	.306
Minimum		.0	.0
Maximum		10.0	10.0

Frequency Table

Ahmad Zia Masood					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	47	8.3	21.3	21.3
	1.0	35	6.2	15.8	37.1
	2.0	26	4.6	11.8	48.9
	3.0	33	5.8	14.9	63.8
	4.0	26	4.6	11.8	75.6
	5.0	20	3.5	9.0	84.6
	6.0	7	1.2	3.2	87.8
	7.0	6	1.1	2.7	90.5
	8.0	5	.9	2.3	92.8
	10.0	16	2.8	7.2	100.0
Total		221	38.9	100.0	
Missing	System	347	61.1		
Total		568	100.0		

Marshal Fahim					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	63	11.1	25.0	25.0
	1.0	50	8.8	19.8	44.8
	2.0	40	7.0	15.9	60.7
	3.0	29	5.1	11.5	72.2
	4.0	24	4.2	9.5	81.7
	5.0	26	4.6	10.3	92.1
	6.0	8	1.4	3.2	95.2
	7.0	4	.7	1.6	96.8
	8.0	6	1.1	2.4	99.2
	10.0	2	.4	.8	100.0
	Total	252	44.4	100.0	
Missing	System	316	55.6		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

	Case Processing Summary					
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Ahmad Zia Masood	221	38.9%	347	61.1%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Marshal Fahim	252	44.4%	316	55.6%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Ahmad Zia Masood

Crosstab													
			Ahmad Zia Masood										Total
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	10.0	
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	31	9	11	16	14	11	1	0	0	1	94
		Expected Count	20.0	14.9	11.1	14.0	11.1	8.5	3.0	2.6	2.1	6.8	94.0
	Tajik	Count	11	11	5	12	7	7	5	5	3	12	78
		Expected Count	16.6	12.4	9.2	11.6	9.2	7.1	2.5	2.1	1.8	5.6	78.0
	Hazara	Count	4	10	8	3	2	0	0	0	0	1	28
		Expected Count	6.0	4.4	3.3	4.2	3.3	2.5	.9	.8	.6	2.0	28.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	2	11
		Expected Count	2.3	1.7	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.0	.3	.3	.2	.8	11.0
	Other	Count	1	3	1	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	10
		Expected Count	2.1	1.6	1.2	1.5	1.2	.9	.3	.3	.2	.7	10.0
	Total	Count	47	35	26	33	26	20	7	6	5	16	221
		Expected Count	47.0	35.0	26.0	33.0	26.0	20.0	7.0	6.0	5.0	16.0	221.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	90.301 ^a	36	.000
Likelihood Ratio	91.778	36	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.849	1	.050
N of Valid Cases	221		

a. 35 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.639	.000
	Cramer's V	.320	.000
N of Valid Cases		221

Ethnicity * Marshal Fahim

Crosstab												
			Marshal Fahim									
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	36	17	14	11	11	14	1	0	0	0
		Expected Count	26.0	20.6	16.5	12.0	9.9	10.7	3.3	1.7	2.5	.8
	Tajik	Count	17	22	12	7	12	8	6	2	6	1
		Expected Count	23.3	18.5	14.8	10.7	8.9	9.6	3.0	1.5	2.2	.7
	Hazara	Count	8	6	9	7	1	1	0	0	0	0
		Expected Count	10.7	8.9	12.0	9.9	3.3	1.7	2.5	.8	0	0

	Expected Count		8.0	6.3	5.1	3.7	3.0	3.3	1.0	.5	.8	.3	32.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	4	2	1	0	2	1	2	0	1	13
		Expected Count	3.3	2.6	2.1	1.5	1.2	1.3	.4	.2	.3	.1	13.0
	Other	Count	2	1	3	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	10
		Expected Count	2.5	2.0	1.6	1.2	1.0	1.0	.3	.2	.2	.1	10.0
	Total	Count	63	50	40	29	24	26	8	4	6	2	252
		Expected Count	63.0	50.0	40.0	29.0	24.0	26.0	8.0	4.0	6.0	2.0	252.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	76.467 ^a	36	.000
Likelihood Ratio	71.400	36	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.552	1	.110
N of Valid Cases	252		

a. 35 cells (70.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .08.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.551	.000
	Cramer's V	.275	.000
N of Valid Cases		252

Frequencies

Statistics			
		Tahir Badakhshi	Ahmad Behzad
N	Valid	132	162
	Missing	436	406
Mean		2.644	3.37
Median		2.000	3.00
Mode		.0	0
Std. Deviation		2.8044	2.817
Skewness		1.104	.700
Std. Error of Skewness		.211	.191
Kurtosis		.350	-.161
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.419	.379
Minimum		.0	0
Maximum		10.0	10

Frequency Table

Tahir Badakhshi					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	37	6.5	28.0	28.0
	1.0	25	4.4	18.9	47.0
	2.0	17	3.0	12.9	59.8
	3.0	13	2.3	9.8	69.7
	4.0	9	1.6	6.8	76.5
	5.0	12	2.1	9.1	85.6
	6.0	2	.4	1.5	87.1
	7.0	5	.9	3.8	90.9
	8.0	5	.9	3.8	94.7
	9.0	2	.4	1.5	96.2
	10.0	5	.9	3.8	100.0
	Total	132	23.2	100.0	
Missing	System	436	76.8		
Total		568	100.0		

Ahmad Behzad					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	34	6.0	21.0	21.0
	1	14	2.5	8.6	29.6
	2	22	3.9	13.6	43.2
	3	20	3.5	12.3	55.6
	4	18	3.2	11.1	66.7
	5	27	4.8	16.7	83.3
	6	7	1.2	4.3	87.7
	7	1	.2	.6	88.3
	8	7	1.2	4.3	92.6
	9	4	.7	2.5	95.1
	10	8	1.4	4.9	100.0
	Total	162	28.5	100.0	
Missing	System	406	71.5		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

	Case Processing Summary					
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Tahir Badakhshi	132	23.2%	436	76.8%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Ahmad Behzad	162	28.5%	406	71.5%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Tahir Badakhshi

Crosstab														
			Tahir Badakhshi										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	23	9	8	7	3	7	0	1	0	0	0	58
		Expected Count	16.3	11.0	7.5	5.7	4.0	5.3	.9	2.2	2.2	.9	2.2	58.0
	Tajik	Count	9	9	5	3	4	5	2	2	4	1	2	46
		Expected Count	12.9	8.7	5.9	4.5	3.1	4.2	.7	1.7	1.7	.7	1.7	46.0
	Hazara	Count	3	5	2	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	15
		Expected Count	4.2	2.8	1.9	1.5	1.0	1.4	.2	.6	.6	.2	.6	15.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	7
		Expected Count	2.0	1.3	.9	.7	.5	.6	.1	.3	.3	.1	.3	7.0
	Other	Count	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	6
		Expected Count	1.7	1.1	.8	.6	.4	.5	.1	.2	.2	.1	.2	6.0
Total	Count	37	25	17	13	9	12	2	5	5	2	5	132	
	Expected Count	37.0	25.0	17.0	13.0	9.0	12.0	2.0	5.0	5.0	2.0	5.0	132.0	

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	71.471 ^a	40	.002
Likelihood Ratio	58.520	40	.029
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.618	1	.006
N of Valid Cases	132		

a. 47 cells (85.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.736	.002
	Cramer's V	.368	.002
N of Valid Cases		132

Ethnicity * Ahmad Behzad

			Crosstab											
			Ahmad Behzad											
			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	24	5	10	13	5	6	0	0	0	0	1	64
		Expected Count	13.4	5.5	8.7	7.9	7.1	10.7	2.8	.4	2.8	1.6	3.2	64.0
	Tajik	Count	8	5	6	3	4	10	5	1	5	2	4	53
		Expected Count	11.1	4.6	7.2	6.5	5.9	8.8	2.3	.3	2.3	1.3	2.6	53.0
	Hazara	Count	1	1	4	3	7	9	1	0	1	1	1	29
		Expected Count	6.1	2.5	3.9	3.6	3.2	4.8	1.3	.2	1.3	.7	1.4	29.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	8
		Expected Count	1.7	.7	1.1	1.0	.9	1.3	.3	.0	.3	.2	.4	8.0
	Other	Count	1	1	2	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	8
		Expected Count	1.7	.7	1.1	1.0	.9	1.3	.3	.0	.3	.2	.4	8.0
Total		Count	34	14	22	20	18	27	7	1	7	4	8	162
		Expected Count	34.0	14.0	22.0	20.0	18.0	27.0	7.0	1.0	7.0	4.0	8.0	162.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	72.732 ^a	40	.001
Likelihood Ratio	78.145	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	14.431	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	162		

a. 43 cells (78.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .05.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.670	.001
	Cramer's V	.335	.001
N of Valid Cases		162

Frequencies

		Statistics						
		Dr Spanta	Haji Qadeer	Sayed Ahmad Gelani	Gen. Rahim Wardak	Haneef Atmar	Sebghatullah Mujadadi	Zalmay Khalilzad
N	Valid	192	155	168	213	218	279	223
	Missing	376	413	400	355	350	289	345
Mean		2.984	2.323	3.054	3.141	3.275	3.115	2.964
Median		2.000	2.000	3.000	3.000	3.000	3.000	2.000
Mode		.0	.0	1.0	.0	.0	1.0	.0
Std. Deviation		2.5674	2.3381	2.4889	2.5787	2.5648	2.5092	2.5991
Skewness		.668	1.157	.832	.791	.663	.670	.787
Std. Error of Skewness		.175	.195	.187	.167	.165	.146	.163
Kurtosis		-.166	1.026	.470	.274	.047	-.145	.008
Std. Error of Kurtosis		.349	.387	.373	.332	.328	.291	.324
Minimum		.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
Maximum		10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0

Frequency Table

		Dr Spanta			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	44	7.7	22.9	22.9
	1.0	22	3.9	11.5	34.4
	2.0	31	5.5	16.1	50.5
	3.0	19	3.3	9.9	60.4
	4.0	15	2.6	7.8	68.2
	5.0	32	5.6	16.7	84.9
	6.0	12	2.1	6.3	91.1
	7.0	7	1.2	3.6	94.8
	8.0	4	.7	2.1	96.9
	9.0	1	.2	.5	97.4
	10.0	5	.9	2.6	100.0
Total		192	33.8	100.0	
Missing	System	376	66.2		
Total		568	100.0		

Haji Qadeer					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	41	7.2	26.5	26.5
	1.0	32	5.6	20.6	47.1
	2.0	24	4.2	15.5	62.6
	3.0	18	3.2	11.6	74.2
	4.0	9	1.6	5.8	80.0
	5.0	16	2.8	10.3	90.3
	6.0	8	1.4	5.2	95.5
	7.0	1	.2	.6	96.1
	8.0	1	.2	.6	96.8
	9.0	3	.5	1.9	98.7
	10.0	2	.4	1.3	100.0
	Total	155	27.3	100.0	
Missing	System	413	72.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Sayed Ahmad Gelani					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	28	4.9	16.7	16.7
	1.0	29	5.1	17.3	33.9
	2.0	20	3.5	11.9	45.8
	3.0	22	3.9	13.1	58.9
	4.0	24	4.2	14.3	73.2
	5.0	25	4.4	14.9	88.1
	6.0	6	1.1	3.6	91.7
	7.0	4	.7	2.4	94.0
	8.0	3	.5	1.8	95.8
	9.0	1	.2	.6	96.4
	10.0	6	1.1	3.6	100.0
	Total	168	29.6	100.0	
Missing	System	400	70.4		
Total		568	100.0		

Gen. Rahim Wardak					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	37	6.5	17.4	17.4
	1.0	35	6.2	16.4	33.8
	2.0	24	4.2	11.3	45.1
	3.0	26	4.6	12.2	57.3
	4.0	29	5.1	13.6	70.9
	5.0	33	5.8	15.5	86.4
	6.0	10	1.8	4.7	91.1
	7.0	4	.7	1.9	93.0
	8.0	5	.9	2.3	95.3
	9.0	1	.2	.5	95.8
	10.0	9	1.6	4.2	100.0
	Total	213	37.5	100.0	
Missing	System	355	62.5		
Total		568	100.0		

Haneef Atmar					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	37	6.5	17.0	17.0
	1.0	29	5.1	13.3	30.3
	2.0	26	4.6	11.9	42.2
	3.0	25	4.4	11.5	53.7
	4.0	36	6.3	16.5	70.2
	5.0	32	5.6	14.7	84.9
	6.0	10	1.8	4.6	89.4
	7.0	7	1.2	3.2	92.7
	8.0	7	1.2	3.2	95.9
	9.0	1	.2	.5	96.3
	10.0	8	1.4	3.7	100.0
	Total	218	38.4	100.0	
Missing	System	350	61.6		
Total		568	100.0		

Sebghatullah Mujadadi					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	45	7.9	16.1	16.1
	1.0	50	8.8	17.9	34.1
	2.0	37	6.5	13.3	47.3
	3.0	33	5.8	11.8	59.1
	4.0	26	4.6	9.3	68.5
	5.0	45	7.9	16.1	84.6
	6.0	15	2.6	5.4	90.0
	7.0	12	2.1	4.3	94.3
	8.0	8	1.4	2.9	97.1
	9.0	1	.2	.4	97.5
	10.0	7	1.2	2.5	100.0
	Total	279	49.1	100.0	
Missing	System	289	50.9		
Total		568	100.0		

Zalmay Khalilzad					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.0	46	8.1	20.6	20.6
	1.0	38	6.7	17.0	37.7
	2.0	28	4.9	12.6	50.2
	3.0	27	4.8	12.1	62.3
	4.0	19	3.3	8.5	70.9
	5.0	30	5.3	13.5	84.3
	6.0	14	2.5	6.3	90.6
	7.0	7	1.2	3.1	93.7
	8.0	6	1.1	2.7	96.4
	9.0	1	.2	.4	96.9
	10.0	7	1.2	3.1	100.0
	Total	223	39.3	100.0	
Missing	System	345	60.7		
Total		568	100.0		

Pie Chart

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Ethnicity * Dr Spanta	192	33.8%	376	66.2%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Haji Qadeer	155	27.3%	413	72.7%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Sayed Ahmad Gelani	168	29.6%	400	70.4%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Gen. Rahim Wardak	213	37.5%	355	62.5%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Haneef Atmar	218	38.4%	350	61.6%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Sebghatullah Mujadadi	279	49.1%	289	50.9%	568	100.0%
Ethnicity * Zalmay Khalilzad	223	39.3%	345	60.7%	568	100.0%

Ethnicity * Dr Spanta

			Crosstab										Total	
			Dr Spanta											
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	27	5	11	11	9	20	4	0	1	0	0	88
		Expected Count	20.2	10.1	14.2	8.7	6.9	14.7	5.5	3.2	1.8	.5	2.3	88.0
	Tajik	Count	13	8	10	3	1	9	6	5	3	1	4	63
		Expected Count	14.4	7.2	10.2	6.2	4.9	10.5	3.9	2.3	1.3	.3	1.6	63.0
	Hazara	Count	3	5	7	4	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	26
		Expected Count	6.0	3.0	4.2	2.6	2.0	4.3	1.6	.9	.5	.1	.7	26.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	8
		Expected Count	1.8	.9	1.3	.8	.6	1.3	.5	.3	.2	.0	.2	8.0
	Other	Count	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	1.6	.8	1.1	.7	.5	1.2	.4	.3	.1	.0	.2	7.0
Total		Count	44	22	31	19	15	32	12	7	4	1	5	192
		Expected Count	44.0	22.0	31.0	19.0	15.0	32.0	12.0	7.0	4.0	1.0	5.0	192.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	62.223 ^a	40	.014
Likelihood Ratio	72.469	40	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	.935	1	.334
N of Valid Cases	192		

a. 42 cells (76.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .04.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.569	.014
	Cramer's V	.285	.014
N of Valid Cases		192

Ethnicity * Haji Qadeer

Crosstab														
			Haji Qadeer										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	28	13	11	8	5	10	1	0	0	0	0	76
		Expected Count	20.1	15.7	11.8	8.8	4.4	7.8	3.9	.5	.5	1.5	1.0	76.0
	Tajik	Count	8	12	5	8	1	5	4	1	1	1	2	48
		Expected Count	12.7	9.9	7.4	5.6	2.8	5.0	2.5	.3	.3	.9	.6	48.0
	Hazara	Count	4	6	4	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	19
		Expected Count	5.0	3.9	2.9	2.2	1.1	2.0	1.0	.1	.1	.4	.2	19.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	5
		Expected Count	1.3	1.0	.8	.6	.3	.5	.3	.0	.0	.1	.1	5.0
	Other	Count	1	0	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	1.9	1.4	1.1	.8	.4	.7	.4	.0	.0	.1	.1	7.0
Total		Count	41	32	24	18	9	16	8	1	1	3	2	155
		Expected Count	41.0	32.0	24.0	18.0	9.0	16.0	8.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	2.0	155.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	75.053 ^a	40	.001
Likelihood Ratio	60.606	40	.019
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.367	1	.037
N of Valid Cases	155		

a. 45 cells (81.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.696	.001
	Cramer's V	.348	.001
N of Valid Cases		155

Ethnicity * Sayed Ahmad Gelani

Crosstab														
			Sayed Ahmad Gelani										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	17	8	8	12	12	17	1	2	1	0	2	80
		Expected Count	13.3	13.8	9.5	10.5	11.4	11.9	2.9	1.9	1.4	.5	2.9	80.0
	Tajik	Count	6	12	7	7	7	6	5	2	2	1	3	58
		Expected Count	9.7	10.0	6.9	7.6	8.3	8.6	2.1	1.4	1.0	.3	2.1	58.0
	Hazara	Count	3	6	4	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	18
		Expected Count	3.0	3.1	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.7	.6	.4	.3	.1	.6	18.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	5
		Expected Count	.8	.9	.6	.7	.7	.7	.2	.1	.1	.0	.2	5.0
	Other	Count	2	0	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	1.2	1.2	.8	.9	1.0	1.0	.3	.2	.1	.0	.3	7.0
Total		Count	28	29	20	22	24	25	6	4	3	1	6	168
		Expected Count	28.0	29.0	20.0	22.0	24.0	25.0	6.0	4.0	3.0	1.0	6.0	168.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	45.789 ^a	40	.244
Likelihood Ratio	47.514	40	.193
Linear-by-Linear Association	.688	1	.407
N of Valid Cases	168		

a. 43 cells (78.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.522	.244
	Cramer's V	.261	.244
N of Valid Cases		168

Ethnicity * Gen. Rahim Wardak

Crosstab														
			Gen. Rahim Wardak										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	18	9	8	19	18	24	3	0	2	0	4	105
		Expected Count	18.2	17.3	11.8	12.8	14.3	16.3	4.9	2.0	2.5	.5	4.4	105.0
	Tajik	Count	13	13	11	4	5	7	5	4	3	1	5	71
		Expected Count	12.3	11.7	8.0	8.7	9.7	11.0	3.3	1.3	1.7	.3	3.0	71.0
	Hazara	Count	4	10	4	2	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	25
		Expected Count	4.3	4.1	2.8	3.1	3.4	3.9	1.2	.5	.6	.1	1.1	25.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
		Expected Count	.9	.8	.6	.6	.7	.8	.2	.1	.1	.0	.2	5.0
	Other	Count	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	1.2	1.2	.8	.9	1.0	1.1	.3	.1	.2	.0	.3	7.0
Total		Count	37	35	24	26	29	33	10	4	5	1	9	213
		Expected Count	37.0	35.0	24.0	26.0	29.0	33.0	10.0	4.0	5.0	1.0	9.0	213.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	63.996 ^a	40	.009
Likelihood Ratio	67.795	40	.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.968	1	.085
N of Valid Cases	213		

a. 43 cells (78.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.548	.009
	Cramer's V	.274	.009
N of Valid Cases		213

Ethnicity * Haneef Atmar

Crosstab														
			Haneef Atmar										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	17	6	10	11	23	25	4	1	2	0	0	99
		Expected Count	16.8	13.2	11.8	11.4	16.3	14.5	4.5	3.2	3.2	.5	3.6	99.0
	Tajik	Count	13	13	9	6	6	6	5	3	3	1	7	72
		Expected Count	12.2	9.6	8.6	8.3	11.9	10.6	3.3	2.3	2.3	.3	2.6	72.0
	Hazara	Count	6	9	5	3	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	29
		Expected Count	4.9	3.9	3.5	3.3	4.8	4.3	1.3	.9	.9	.1	1.1	29.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	1	0	4	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	11
		Expected Count	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.6	.5	.4	.4	.1	.4	11.0
	Other	Count	1	0	2	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	7
		Expected Count	1.2	.9	.8	.8	1.2	1.0	.3	.2	.2	.0	.3	7.0
Total		Count	37	29	26	25	36	32	10	7	7	1	8	218
		Expected Count	37.0	29.0	26.0	25.0	36.0	32.0	10.0	7.0	7.0	1.0	8.0	218.0

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	80.366 ^a	40	.000
Likelihood Ratio	84.024	40	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.000	1	.988
N of Valid Cases	218		

a. 43 cells (78.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.607	.000
	Cramer's V	.304	.000
N of Valid Cases		218

Ethnicity * Sebghatullah Mujadadi

Crosstab														
			Sebghatullah Mujadadi										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	25	19	19	17	13	20	3	2	1	0	2	121
		Expected Count	19.5	21.7	16.0	14.3	11.3	19.5	6.5	5.2	3.5	.4	3.0	121.0
	Tajik	Count	15	20	11	6	7	13	11	8	4	1	2	98
		Expected Count	15.8	17.6	13.0	11.6	9.1	15.8	5.3	4.2	2.8	.4	2.5	98.0
	Hazara	Count	4	7	3	8	4	8	0	0	1	0	1	36
		Expected Count	5.8	6.5	4.8	4.3	3.4	5.8	1.9	1.5	1.0	.1	.9	36.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	2	3	0	1	3	1	1	2	0	2	15
		Expected Count	2.4	2.7	2.0	1.8	1.4	2.4	.8	.6	.4	.1	.4	15.0
	Other	Count	1	2	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	9
		Expected Count	1.5	1.6	1.2	1.1	.8	1.5	.5	.4	.3	.0	.2	9.0
Total		Count	45	50	37	33	26	45	15	12	8	1	7	279
		Expected Count	45.0	50.0	37.0	33.0	26.0	45.0	15.0	12.0	8.0	1.0	7.0	279.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	55.932 ^a	40	.048
Likelihood Ratio	57.437	40	.036
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.300	1	.012
N of Valid Cases	279		

a. 37 cells (67.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.448	.048
	Cramer's V	.224	.048
N of Valid Cases		279

Ethnicity * Zalmay Khalilzad

Crosstab														
			Zalmay Khalilzad										Total	
			.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0		10.0
Ethnicity	Pashtun	Count	23	14	15	16	8	17	3	1	2	1	2	102
		Expected Count	21.0	17.4	12.8	12.3	8.7	13.7	6.4	3.2	2.7	.5	3.2	102.0
	Tajik	Count	11	16	7	5	5	8	10	5	1	0	3	71
		Expected Count	14.6	12.1	8.9	8.6	6.0	9.6	4.5	2.2	1.9	.3	2.2	71.0
	Hazara	Count	9	5	3	4	3	2	1	1	1	0	0	29
		Expected Count	6.0	4.9	3.6	3.5	2.5	3.9	1.8	.9	.8	.1	.9	29.0
	Uzbek	Count	0	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	11
		Expected Count	2.3	1.9	1.4	1.3	.9	1.5	.7	.3	.3	.0	.3	11.0
	Other	Count	3	0	0	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	10
		Expected Count	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.2	.9	1.3	.6	.3	.3	.0	.3	10.0
Total		Count	46	38	28	27	19	30	14	7	6	1	7	223
		Expected Count	46.0	38.0	28.0	27.0	19.0	30.0	14.0	7.0	6.0	1.0	7.0	223.0

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	66.460 ^a	40	.005
Likelihood Ratio	63.523	40	.010
Linear-by-Linear Association	.699	1	.403
N of Valid Cases	223		

a. 41 cells (74.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .04.

Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.546	.005
	Cramer's V	.273	.005
N of Valid Cases		223

ANNEX – XXX: Rating of Actual Afghan Leaders (Popularity Measure):

Average rating of an actual Afghan leader by 568 respondents:

No	Leader's Names	Rating	Status (D=Dead, A=Alive)
11	داکتر نېچېب	6.2	D
5	امان الله خان	5.9	D
2	احمدشاه املېلېا	5.6	D
7	داود خان	5.5	D
1	ميريسن يکېه	5.3	D
16	احمدشاه من عود	5.2	D
24	استاد عطا	5.0	A
42	رمضان شردوست	5.0	A
14	حامد کرزی	4.6	A
23	امران صالح	4.5	A
45	فوزي کوفی	4.4	A
56	کیتاش سيواوش	4.4	A
54	سید حسامی کاظمی	4.3	D
30	تيونس لوی	4.2	A
6	ظاهر شاه	4.2	D
44	شکریه بابا کزی	4.0	A
31	شېخ اصف حسینی	4.0	A
50	داکتر عبداللہ	4.0	A
33	اشرف غني احمدزی	3.9	A
34	نقی احمد الی	3.8	A
43	داکتر یونس ماسمر	3.7	A
49	اللی جهیا	3.7	A
47	بېچېبه سابی	3.7	A
13	استاد پدلی	3.6	D
41	فاروق وردک	3.6	A
4	حبيب الله کولی	3.6	D
48	بلال و غنډر	3.6	A
52	بسم الله خان	3.6	A
3	عبدالرحمن خان	3.5	D
57	احمد بهزاد	3.4	A
39	سلطان نقي کشتياد	3.4	A
28	جنرال وسيتام	3.3	A
25	لمام عیال خان	3.3	A
26	گل انجليرزی	3.2	A
40	حنيفاتمر	3.2	A
29	استاد سياف	3.2	A
53	رحيم وردک	3.1	A
12	صوبغت الله مجددي	3.1	A
35	زلمعل پهلزاد	3.1	A
55	لطيف درام	3.1	A
22	احمد نيزيا من عود	3.1	A
32	سید احمدنگ النی	3.1	A
51	داکتر لیا ایتا	3.0	A
27	محمد جوق	2.9	A
46	سمیر بابا کزی	2.9	A
63	احمد علی کرزی	2.8	A
19	بیچال نقي مزاری	2.6	D
38	طاهربخش	2.6	A
36	لورال حق احمدی	2.5	A
20	کريم چلی	2.5	A
59	عمر زاخيلوال	2.5	A
15	قيويو کرزی	2.3	A
21	ماشال محمديسيهيم	2.3	A
58	ظاهر قير	2.3	A
62	محمد وکرزی	2.2	A
18	ال محمد عمر	2.2	A
10	بېبر ککارمل	2.2	D
17	کسيار	2.1	A
61	عمر داودزی	2.1	A

8	نور محمد تکی	2.0	D
60	کریم خرم	2.0	A
37	سید علی یون	1.9	A
9	حافظ الله امین	1.7	D

The most and least popular Afghan leaders (dead and alive):

Average not Alive			Average Alive		
4.1			3.3		
Top Ten High Rated Leaders			Top Ten Low Rated Leaders		
Leader	Rate	Status	Leader	Rate	Status
Dr. Najib	6.2	D	Zahir Qadeer	2.3	A
King Amanullah	5.9	D	Mahmood Karzai	2.2	A
King Ahmad Shah	5.6	D	Mollah Omar	2.2	A
President Dawood	5.5	D	Babrak Karmal	2.2	D
Mirwais Nika	5.3	D	Hekmatyar	2.1	A
Ahmad Shah Masood	5.2	D	Omar Dawoodzai	2.1	A
Ustad Atta	5.0	A	Noor Mohd. Taraki	2.0	D
Dr. Bashar Dost	5.0	A	Karim Khuram	2.0	A
President Karzai	4.6	A	Esmael Yoon	1.9	A
Amrullah Saleh	4.5	A	Hafeezullah Amin	1.7	D

Appendix – XXXI: Sample of Education Material in Afghanistan's Educational System.

This is the title page of a first grade math book printed during Jihad of Afghanistan and were thought to Afghan children during 80s and 90s. Below are some example pages from this book.

Letter Z (it is a Pashtu letter that sounds like Z in English)

Translation form Pashtu to English:

I keep my body clean. Youth go to Jihad. Good boys do not play in an inappropriate place.

In this math book they printed bullet symbols to help kids learn addition and subtraction.

دین مویو او قبله مویو ده .
هېڅوک نشي کولی چې مسلمانان سره
بېل کړي .

ښوونکی دی ۱۵۰ دقیقو لپاره شاگردانوسره شوره زکړی او د اسلام
د ښمن دی ورته وښيي .

Translation from Pashtu to English:

We have one religion, and pray towards one distention (Mekah)

Nobody can separate Muslims from one another.

Once again, symbols of bullets, hand grenade, and gun are used to teach math.

Translation from Pashtu to English:

Ahmad has sword. He uses his sword for Jihad.

Translation from Pashtu to English:

Jihad is a religious obligation. Jameel (male name in Afghanistan) has gone to Jihad. I will go too.

Translation from Pashtun to English:

Religion

Islam is our religion. I die for my religion. Infidels are the enemies of our religion.

Translation form Pashtu to English:

Mujahid

Muslims of Afghanistan are Mujahids.

Mujahids fight with Infidels. We are all Mujahid. My uncle is going to Jihad.

Translation from Pashtu to English:

Gun

My uncle has a gun.

He uses his gun for Jihad.