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Police-Community Relations  
in Cincinnati

Year Two Evaluation Report

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Sponsored by the City of Cincinnati



INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT

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## Summary

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### Introduction

In 2002, the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD), the Fraternal Order of Police, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) initiated a collaboration to resolve social conflict, improve community relations, and avoid litigation in Cincinnati. The collaborative agreement requires the participants (referred to collectively as “the parties”) to undertake collective efforts to achieve these goals. Specifically, the agreement requires CPD to implement a variety of changes in pursuit of five primary goals:

- “[Ensure that p]olice officers and community members . . . become proactive partners in community problem solving.”
- “Build relationships of respect, cooperation, and trust within and between police and communities.”
- “Improve education, oversight, monitoring, hiring practices, and accountability of the CPD.”
- “Ensure fair, equitable, and courteous treatment for all.”
- “Create methods to establish the public’s understanding of police policies and procedures and recognition of exceptional service in an effort to foster support for the police” (*In re Cincinnati Policing*, pp. 3–4).

The agreement requires evaluation of efforts to achieve and progress toward these goals. The parties chose RAND to be the evaluator in 2004. RAND will conduct the evaluation for five years, with the results published annually in a publicly available report. The evaluation is conducted using a variety of methods, including the following:

- a survey of citizen satisfaction with CPD
- a survey of CPD officers about their perceptions of community support, working conditions, and other factors related to job satisfaction and performance
- a survey of officers and citizens involved in a sample of citizen complaints against the officers and the department
- an analysis of motor vehicle stops for patterns of racial disparity in various aspects of the stop
- a review of CPD statistical compilations

- analysis of a sample of videotaped interactions between citizens and officers during motor vehicle stops.

## The Context of Policing in Cincinnati

A critical component of the evaluation is to understand the context of policing in Cincinnati. To that end, CPD provides RAND with statistical compilations that detail arrest and citation activity, use of force, calls for service, and crime patterns. These compilations provide insight into how crime, and thus the allocation of law enforcement resources, varies across neighborhoods. The compilations also feed into other analyses conducted as part of the evaluation. The main crime pattern findings from our year-one<sup>1</sup> report continue in this analysis; the patterns of calls for service, reported crime, arrests, and police use of force were geographically clustered in Cincinnati. Neighborhoods with high crime rates were also more likely to have a high volume of calls for service and police use-of-force incidents. Over-the-Rhine and Central Business District (CBD)/Riverfront, and Pendleton were disproportionately affected by crime and police interventions such as stops, arrests, and use of force. Additional law enforcement effort, such as saturation patrols and targeted enforcement, activities that the community could perceive as a “sweep,” necessitates regular dialogue with the community so that these programs are a part of building a police-community partnership rather than creating additional friction.

### Arrests and Citations

As in 2004, five neighborhoods—constituting less than 10 percent of the city’s 53 neighborhoods—accounted for more than one-third of CPD’s arrests and nearly one-third of Cincinnati’s reported crimes in 2005. CBD/Riverfront and Over-the-Rhine accounted for the largest share of arrests and reported crimes. As in the year-one report, citation rates and arrest rates across neighborhoods were strongly negatively correlated ( $r = -0.70$ ) and search rates and arrest rates strongly positively correlated ( $r = 0.87$ ). These findings are consistent with research that indicates that police are less likely to exercise their discretion to enforce traffic and other less serious offenses in high-crime neighborhoods (Klinger, 1997).

The Over-the-Rhine neighborhood saw a 25-percent jump in the number of arrests in 2005 and a 5-percent drop in the number of reported crimes. As a result of increased enforcement in early 2006, Over-the-Rhine is on track for nearly 11,000 arrests in 2006, a 44-percent increase from 2004.

### Use of Force

Citywide, there were, on average, 14 use-of-force incidents per 1,000 arrests. This rate is down from 20 per thousand in the year-one report. There was no relationship between the type of force used and the subject’s race. The increased deployment of electronic control devices (e.g.,

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<sup>1</sup> The term *year one* refers to the first evaluation report of the contract (published in December 2005) and the data used therein. The data used in the year-one report came from calendar year 2003, 2004, or 2005, depending on the task.

TASER® less-lethal weapons<sup>2</sup>) in 2004 has led to officers utilizing them instead of pepper spray, batons, and physical force, nearly eliminating the latter methods. Police used electronic control devices in 73 percent of use-of-force incidents involving nonblack subjects and in 76 percent of those involving black subjects. The race of the officer involved also appears to be unrelated to subject's race.

### **Calls for Service**

The numbers of calls for service and of reported Part 1 crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) in a neighborhood were highly correlated ( $r = 0.96$ ). Each Part 1 crime generated an average of 10.7 calls for service. The number of arrests was also highly correlated with both calls for service ( $r = 0.87$ ) and the number of reported crimes ( $r = 0.81$ ). Thus, as in year one, crime, calls for service, and arrests were geographically clustered in the same areas of Cincinnati.

### **Analysis of Vehicle Stops**

The analysis of vehicle stops involved three stages: assessing race bias at the department level, at the officer level, and in post-stop outcomes. The reliability of the data has greatly improved since the year-one report that assessed 2003 and 2004 traffic stop data. Compliance rates are high and the number of missing data fields has decreased. The improved quality of the data is an assurance that CPD is diligent in documenting interactions with community members and appears to have reduced some of the disparities that we flagged as potential problems in the previous report. For example, the inclusion of data on invalid driver's licenses reduced and nearly removed the disparity in stop duration that we had previously reported. Also, earlier ambiguities in the analysis of racial bias in the decision to stop have been clarified as a result of the larger sample size; they indicate no evidence of a departmentwide practice of targeting black drivers.

### **Department-Level Stop Patterns**

The first stage of the analysis examined stops occurring near the changes to and from daylight saving time (DST) and found no evidence of a racial bias in the decision to stop. Black drivers were more likely to be stopped during daylight when drivers' races were more visible, but this observed elevated risk for black drivers was not statistically significant. Including the 2003 and 2004 data from the year-one report further supported this conclusion. We repeated the analysis including stops occurring throughout the year. This analysis was more sensitive to seasonal changes in the distribution of officers and the racial mix of drivers on the road, but it also concluded that there was no statistical evidence of racial bias in the decision to stop.

On average, black drivers experienced longer stops than did white drivers. In the vehicle stop analysis, this difference disappeared after adjusting for when, where, and why the stop took place as well as other features of the stop such as whether the driver had a valid license.

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<sup>2</sup> TASER® is a registered trademark of TASER International, Inc.

This analysis concludes that race was not a factor in the difference in stop length. However, our analysis of traffic stop videos indicated some disparities in stop length that are explained in more detail in Chapter Four.

### **Individual-Level Stop Patterns**

The second stage of the analysis examined 133 officers to assess whether individual officers were stopping a disproportionate number of black drivers relative to other, similarly situated officers. Five officers stopped black drivers at substantially higher rates than other, similarly situated officers. We estimate that the probability that these officers overstop black drivers exceeds 70 percent. We will be working with CPD's IT management to deliver analytical tools to CPD that will enable it to analyze the data and flag potential problem officers.<sup>3</sup>

### **Post-Stop Patterns**

The third stage of the analysis examined stop outcomes, including stop duration, citation rates, and search rates and outcomes. Black drivers and similarly situated nonblack drivers were equally likely to have stops last less than 10 minutes. Black drivers were slightly less likely than were similarly situated nonblack drivers to receive citations (68 percent versus 71 percent), a change from the analysis of previous years, which had found no differences. Officers searched black and nonblack drivers at nearly the same rate in cases when the officers had discretion (6.1 percent versus 5.2). However, black drivers in 2005 were frequently subjected to weapon searches (a specific type of high-discretion search), significantly more than nonblack drivers and significantly more than black drivers stopped in previous years. For high-discretion searches, such as consent searches, black drivers were more likely to be found with contraband (29 percent versus 27). This is indicative of no racial bias in search decisions.

## **Analysis of Videotaped Police-Motorist Interactions**

Perhaps the most common interaction between police and community members is the traffic stop. Available video and audio data from traffic stops in Cincinnati permit a detailed, objective examination of what typically occurs in traffic stops and how it may depend on the officer's or driver's race. This year, we analyzed a random sample of 325 video records of traffic stops. As with last year, this analysis revealed three key differences as a function of the officers' and drivers' races:

- Black drivers typically experienced more proactive policing than did white drivers. This included more questions about drugs or weapons, more searches, and more license checks on passengers, leading to longer stops.

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<sup>3</sup> Federal regulations regarding the protection of human subjects prevent RAND from conducting research in a way that causes adverse consequences to the subjects of or participants in the research. Thus, we cannot identify the specific officers. We can, however, provide CPD with the tools and methods to enable it to analyze the data and identify specific officers.

- Several of these racial differences in stop characteristics were larger when the officers were white.
- White drivers, on average, communicated more positively than did black drivers. White drivers were more likely to be apologetic, cooperative, and courteous.

### **Stop Characteristics**

One key finding that sets the background for understanding these interactions is that, on average, blacks and whites experienced very different types of traffic stops. White drivers' stops were typically shorter; less likely to involve searches for drugs, weapons, or contraband; and less likely to involve investigation of all of the vehicle's passengers. There are several plausible reasons for these differences other than racial profiling, including different neighborhood enforcement techniques or differences in the infraction types committed by whites and blacks. However, the longer, more-invasive traffic stops that black drivers experience are likely to contribute to a more negative attitude in future interactions with the police, and not simply among blacks whom police have stopped. These differences in traffic stops may be a significant barrier to improved police-community relations.

There is an additional complicating factor in this year's analysis. The general pattern of black drivers facing longer stop durations, higher rates of technical violations, and higher rates of requiring passengers to produce identification is primarily driven by stops conducted by white officers. Although this finding is consistent with racial bias, the video recordings cannot definitively rule out several alternative explanations, so we cannot conclude that racial bias caused it. For example, white officers may be given different assignments or instructions than black officers for reasons that are not directly related to race (e.g., seniority, neighborhood of assignment, shift being worked) that lead them to interact with blacks differently.

Even if racial bias does not explain this pattern, the fact that blacks are more likely to experience longer, more-invasive traffic stops when white officers stop them should be expected to contribute to more-negative attitudes within the black community. Since white officers conduct two out of three of all stops of black motorists, the white officer effects observed in the videotape analyses will affect a large number of blacks.

### **Communication Quality**

We found that black drivers had a more negative communication style in traffic stops than did white drivers, even after controlling for a wide range of stop characteristics. Black drivers were less likely to apologize, less likely to use courteous phrases, and more likely to argue with the officer than were white drivers. This continues the pattern found last year. As noted in last year's report, it appears likely that the broad dissatisfaction among black residents with CPD affects their communication with white and black officers. Differences in cultural standards of expression cannot be ruled out as a contributing factor (e.g., Hecht, Jackson, and Ribeau, 2003).

### **Limits to the Analysis**

There are limitations to our analysis of the audio and video records. Perhaps most important, the analysis uses observational data that allow us to describe what typically occurs in these

interactions, but do not allow us to isolate the causes of what we observe. Thus, for example, the reader should not conclude from our study that the police chose to search black motorists or hold them longer *because* they are black, simply based on the correlations that we observed in this study.

The strength of the current study is that it looks at a random sample of interactions. This sampling method increases the study's ability to describe accurately what typically occurs in motor vehicle stops. Despite the fact that CPD has made substantial improvements in reducing missing data, missing data presents some threat to the sample's representativeness. It is still possible that a different pattern of associations between race and behavior would be found in the data. Fortunately, there was no significant evidence that any of this missing data was associated with the driver's or officer's race.

### **Differences from the First Annual Report**

Though the analytic methods were unchanged from last year's report, there are several noteworthy differences in findings. First, several statistically significant findings in last year's data were not significant this year. This is likely due to the fact that we do not have a sufficient number of cases to reliably detect significant effects. That is, with only approximately 300 observations per year, the effect would have to be very strong to be statistically significant in every year's sample. The fact that the effect of matched race on officers' communication behavior is not found this year should not be taken as evidence that the effect has disappeared or even changed, necessarily. Rather, such changes in significance across years are a necessary limitation of working from a random sample of 300 incidents.

In addition, several of the findings described in this report are based on variables that did not exist for last year's data. One important new variable is whether the officer demanded identification for passengers. Since these variables did not exist in last year's data, it is not possible to determine whether these factors have changed significantly between 2004 and 2005 data.

### **Reconciliation of the Traffic Stop Analysis and the Analysis of Videotaped Interactions**

There are several notable differences in the data and analyses used in Chapter Three (Analysis of Traffic Stops) and Chapter Four (Analysis of Videotaped Police-Motorist Interactions) that are important to understand when synthesizing their separate findings. The traffic stop analysis is designed to assess the extent to which a motorist in a specific situation would receive different treatment if he or she were white versus black. It attempts to answer the causal question at the heart of racial profiling: "Do police treat individual drivers differently specifically because of their races?" The data sources for this analysis are well suited for this purpose because the large sample allows us to match black and white drivers on a wide range of situational factors and assess whether there is an effect of race.

However, police can treat black and white drivers very differently for reasons other than racial profiling, and these differences may still be a significant problem for community relations and racial fairness. If police have different enforcement practices or a greater presence

in those neighborhoods with a large number of black residents, it will likely appear racially biased to those residents even if individuals in those neighborhoods are actually being stopped without regard to their race. Perceptions of racial inequality in treatment drive attitudes and community relations, regardless of whether the true cause of that inequality is racial profiling, neighborhood profiling, enforcement priorities, or other factors. While the analysis of contact cards (Chapter Three) is effective at isolating the effect of race from other explanations for stop outcomes, it provides little information about the behaviors of police officers and citizens that could improve police-community relations.

The analysis of videotaped interactions addresses this shortcoming by documenting how race is related to police and citizen behavior, regardless of the behavior's cause. The data sources and analysis conducted in Chapter Four are designed to document these inequalities so that we better understand the community relations difficulties, but the data source is inadequate to determine whether the citizen's race directly caused those differences. For example, it is not possible to match incidents for 54 separate neighborhoods within a random sample that includes only 75 interactions of each type. For this reason, every difference we find as a function of driver race (e.g., asking passengers for identification) may actually be caused by different police practices in different neighborhoods, rather than by racial profiling.

In short, the analysis of video recordings is designed to identify why many Cincinnati citizens are convinced that racially biased policing takes place, but it cannot convincingly determine whether racially profiling actually occurs. The current data source does not allow us to rule out plausible alternative explanations for the observed inequalities. The RAND research team believes that understanding why citizens perceive racially biased policing is essential to improving police-community relations. Both the current report and the year-one report identify police behavior that fosters the perception of racial bias. The fact that white and black officers treat black citizens differently is a substantial barrier to improving relations with this community, even if it is inadequate evidence of civil rights violations.

Overall, our analysis of traffic stop data found limited evidence of actual, systemic racial profiling of individuals, that is, racially unequal police behavior that is uniquely attributable to the driver's race (though some officers' practices seem irregular). Separate from this issue of documenting actual racial profiling, the analysis of videotapes shows why a substantial proportion of Cincinnati believes that there is a problem with racially biased policing. This analysis also suggests specific changes that are likely to reduce this perception.

## **Satisfaction of Police Officers Working in Cincinnati**

The officer survey was repeated in year two<sup>4</sup> because we obtained relatively few responses from officers to the year-one survey. As described in more detail later in this document, we made significant changes to the survey, fielded more of them, and revised the process by which we contacted the officers. As a result, we obtained a much larger number of responses this year than last and can now better generalize to the population of CPD officers as a whole. However,

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<sup>4</sup> *Year two* refers to the current report and the data used in it.

the response *rate* remained low. With a response rate of 27 percent, those who chose to respond to this survey could differ systematically from those who chose not to respond. The survey was voluntary and anonymous, so it is not possible to discern what differences might exist between responders and nonresponders.

For those who responded to the survey, the findings indicate a high level of commitment to their jobs, but, at the same time, these officers suffer several strains from the community and citizens with whom they interact. The majority of responding officers thought that the media and the black community complained unfairly about racial profiling and police abuse of authority. That feeling was consistent across officers of different races.

Police officers who responded to the survey also appear to have been knowledgeable about community policing. While the majority of officers who responded to the survey viewed enforcing the law as their highest priority, they also reported that informal interactions with citizens are an important method for solving problems and solving crimes. Officers who responded to the survey expressed a high level of agreement that community residents should help shape the priorities of police work. However, half of the officers responding did not think that officers should try to solve non-crime-related problems in their district. They generally felt that proactively stopping cars and “checking people out” were components of good police work.

### **Citizen and Officer Satisfaction with the Complaint Process**

The complaint survey assessed the perceived fairness of the complaint process, the level of input that citizens and officers have in the process, and the final resolution and its justification. In a change from our 2005 survey, officers and complainants received surveys along with the letter describing the complaint’s adjudication. Results from the complainant survey are based on the eight citizen and 11 officer surveys returned of the 55 that were distributed. The small number of responses prevents us from drawing any inferences about the population of all citizens or officers involved in official complaints. For those who did respond to the survey, the complaint review process appears to be following up with an investigation and a meeting with the complainants. Five of the eight citizens who responded did not feel that the process was fair nor were they satisfied, though three of those who did not have their complaint sustained were still satisfied with the process, indicating that the complaint’s final outcome did not necessarily dictate respondents’ satisfaction with the complaint process. The eight citizens who responded fell into two categories. The first were involved in minor incidents in which officers were alleged to have been disrespectful or had not provided proper or timely service. There were four such cases. The second category of respondents alleged serious violations including excessive force, improper pointing of firearms, and discrimination, and these respondents indicated that they wanted nothing less than the officer terminated from the police force. Four surveys fell into this category. Using data from the Citizen Complaint Authority’s (CCA’s) 2005 annual report, the complaints do not seem to be disparately associated with interactions between nonblack officers and black residents. Black and nonblack residents were equally likely to file complaints with the CCA against white officers.

## Summary and Conclusions

The second-year evaluation report has two objectives. The first is to report on key issues—the context of crime in Cincinnati, the analysis of motor vehicle stops, and the analysis of video records—that RAND will evaluate in every year of the contract. The second objective is to report baseline findings on officer perceptions and experiences with complaint adjudication that were not achieved in year one because of low response rates. By mutual agreement with the parties, RAND has not conducted analyses of staffing, CPD problem-solving interventions, or a survey of police-citizen interactions this year, nor will these be conducted in the remaining years of the evaluation. These components of the year-one evaluation have been eliminated because they are, respectively, covered by a consent decree, addressed sufficiently by the monitor team in its oversight responsibilities, or unlikely to ever provide scientifically valid results because of the unwillingness of people contacted to respond to the survey.

In most respects, the year-two evaluation provides the same implications for the collaborative agreement as did the year-one evaluation. It is not surprising that few changes were observed, because most of the data used in the current report were collected before the parties received RAND's year-one report. In short, we should not expect to see definitive progress toward the collaborative agreement's goals in this report.

Before turning to summary comments, we must point out one overarching issue. Both the motorist stop and video analyses conclusively show that blacks endure longer stops than do nonblacks. The analysis based on the stop data concludes that the difference in stop duration cannot be attributed to racial profiling of black drivers, as nonblack drivers in similar situations are detained for the same length of time. The analysis of video recordings, however, demonstrates that traffic stops for black drivers are, on average, longer when the officer is not black. Although this finding is not evidence of racial profiling, this police behavior is likely to lead to perceptions of racially biased policing in the community. As such, it represents a barrier to improved police community relations.

### Data Issues

There were substantial improvements in the data quality over year one such that the problem of missing data is considerably reduced. Last year, in the video analysis task, 55 percent of the tapes requested were not available, compared to 40 percent this year. In addition, improvements were evident throughout 2006 such that by the final quarter only approximately one-third of the requested tapes were not available to be sent. As with last year, 10 percent of incidents could not be identified on the tapes that were sent because of mismatched time information or technical problems with the tapes. This yields an overall missing rate of 45 percent instead of last year's 60 percent. As with last year, these types of missing data are not related to either officer or driver race. The quality of the recordings themselves is approximately the same as last year. The largest quality problem was that the audio from the driver was not audible in approximately one-third of the incidents. As in the year-one report, we do not have evidence to suggest that the missing data threaten the validity of our findings, though this possibility cannot be rejected either.

Improvements were also seen in the motorist stop data. In the year-one report on CPD's 2003–2004 traffic stop data, an estimated 20 percent of the vehicle stops were not documented and 16 percent of the contact cards were missing important information. In the 2006 data, it appears that only about 3 percent of the stops were not documented and 3 percent of the completed contact cards were missing important data. Since this report analyzes data and incidents from calendar year 2005, the improvements in data quality reflect CPD efforts to improve compliance with CPD policies and procedures that were occurring even before the December 2005 delivery of the first report covering 2003 and 2004 data. Therefore, CPD was already improving its data collection systems even before delivery of last year's report.

### **Progress Toward the Goals of the Collaborative Agreement**

The collaborative agreement specifies five key areas where progress is desired: the development of proactive police-community partnerships on problem-solving; building relationships between the police and the community; improving CPD's staffing, training, and management practices in multiple dimensions; ensuring fair and equitable treatment for all community members; and developing methods to increase support for the police. This year's report cannot provide a full picture of progress toward these five goals of the collaborative agreement because some evaluation tasks that contribute greatly to the overall assessment (such as the community survey) were not scheduled to be conducted. Nevertheless, we can provide some insights on issues of progress toward the goals.

**Develop Proactive Partnerships in Community Problem-Solving.** The officer survey contains an important finding about community problem-solving efforts: By a large majority, officers agree that citizen input is vital to developing effective problem-solving strategies. However, half the officers perceive that community members are unwilling participants in such problem-solving activities, a finding that was reinforced in last year's report when we noted limited community participation in problem-solving activities. It is unclear at this point whether the police and community are on the right trajectory for developing a proactive partnership on problem-solving. It appears, however, that the foundation for building such a partnership exists among the police, albeit with some skepticism.

**Build Relationships Between Police and Communities.** This year's analysis reinforced a key finding from last year's report: Black citizens in Cincinnati, by virtue of the neighborhoods in which they live and the generally higher rates of crime in those neighborhoods, are more likely than nonblacks to experience proactive policing strategies such as increased law enforcement presence and aggressive traffic enforcement. Such strategies place a greater burden on law-abiding residents living in the areas where the enforcement occurs.

It may not be possible to field a proactive enforcement strategy that affects all neighborhoods in the city equally. That does not mean, however, that the police are helpless to combat negative community perceptions that may be raised by their activity. Much of the force's interaction with the citizenry comes through vehicle stops. The department should thus pay special attention to maintaining and improving, where needed, the tenor and tone of these interactions. In addition, for blacks there is an elevated likelihood of being stopped without the resulting imposition of a citation. To the degree that such stops are necessary, it would be helpful to have the stops be as short as possible. Investment in infrastructure that shorten and improve

processes, such as license checks, could pay off disproportionately with the black community to the extent that they were the beneficiaries of such investments.

**Ensure Fair, Equitable, and Courteous Treatment.** CPD policing data show, just as in the year-one report, that CPD allocates resources disproportionately to a small slice of Cincinnati neighborhoods. Presumably, this allocation reflects policy decisions that the police command staff make in response to crime trends, calls for service, and other strategic factors. As in our year-one report, this means that, on average, black citizens in Cincinnati are likely to be experiencing substantively different kinds of policing than nonblack citizens. In particular, to the extent that police resources are disproportionately deployed to black neighborhoods, black residents are more likely to encounter the police engaging in proactive policing, such as questioning pedestrians, checking identification, and strict enforcement of vehicle registration and equipment requirements. However, similarly situated black and nonblack residents should enjoy the same treatment by the police. That is to say, two citizens who are in the same neighborhood doing the same thing at the same time of day should be treated the same, regardless of the citizens' or officers' races. Our year-two analysis of contact card data did not find a pattern of significant racial bias, once incidents had been equated on these situational factors. Evidence from the video recordings does suggest, however, some racial inequalities may exist. In particular, it appears that black and nonblack officers are not policing in the same manner, with nonblack officers more likely than black officers to scrutinize black passengers and more likely to pursue equipment violations against black motorists. Additional efforts need to be made within CPD to ensure a high degree of consistency in police methods, priorities, and behaviors, regardless of race. While the current data do not demonstrate a pervasive pattern in which CPD officers use a citizen's race in determining who to stop, cite or search, our findings should not be interpreted as suggesting that current CPD policies, procedures, and priorities are optimal. As we suggested in last year's report, we recommend that CPD review the possible sources of the white officer effects and implement training or reforms designed to remediate it.

**Create Methods to Foster Support of the Police.** The results from the survey of police officers point clearly to a series of major stresses, including the officers' perception that blacks complained and the media reported unfairly about racial profiling and police abuse of authority. The good news is that the vast majority of officers who responded think that community input is essential to problem solving. This note of optimism, however, is balanced against the fact that only half of the responding officers expect citizen cooperation in such endeavors. Thus, even though most officers who responded are satisfied with their career choice, they also perceive significant challenges associated with the profession. Some of these perceived challenges come from within the police department or city government. A significant fraction of the responding officers perceive that they have insufficient protection against unreasonable lawsuits, difficulty communicating with management, and insufficient recognition of superior job performance. As was reported last year, there are no easy solutions to these strains. The survey findings suggest that solutions reside in improving relations both with the community and with management.