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TECHNICAL
R E P O R T



Community Policing and Violence Prevention in Oakland

Measure Y in Action

Jeremy M. Wilson, Amy G. Cox, Tommy L. Smith,
Hans Bos, Terry Fain

Sponsored by the City of Oakland



Center on Quality Policing

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The research described in this report was conducted jointly by RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment (ISE), a division of the RAND Corporation, and the Berkeley Policy Associates (BPA), for the City of Oakland.

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Preface

In response to rising crime and violence, Oakland voters passed the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act of 2004, more commonly referred to as Measure Y. With a nearly \$20 million annual investment, Measure Y is a 10-year initiative designed to facilitate community policing, foster violence prevention, and improve fire and paramedic service. To assess progress toward reaching the goals of Measure Y, the legislation also set aside funding for an independent evaluation of the programs it funds. This evaluation was funded by the city of Oakland and was a joint effort by Berkeley Policy Associates (BPA) and the RAND Corporation.

This report assesses the progress of the programs funded by Measure Y by answering several key performance questions:

1. Are the funded programs implemented as intended by Measure Y?
2. Are Measure Y resources being spent to provide services to the target communities?
3. What are the main achievements of programs funded through Measure Y?
4. What implementation challenges do those programs face?
5. How are these challenges being addressed?
6. Do the individuals being served appreciate and benefit from the programs?

The report also offers lessons for improving implementation of the Measure Y programs, based on this assessment.

In combination, answers to the questions above provide an assessment of both the *process* of implementing the Measure Y programs and the *impact* of those programs once implemented. At this point, not enough time has passed since the implementation of the Measure Y programs to comprehensively assess their impact; thus, this document focuses primarily on the process of implementation. Subsequent documents will focus on the impact of the programs.

This report was written with Oakland city officials and Oakland residents in mind. The analysis should be useful in shaping their discussions about progress and in informing their decisions about improving program implementation. The report should also be of interest to other communities seeking a comprehensive approach to improving police-community partnerships and preventing violence; program administrators who manage programs similar to those funded by Measure Y; and researchers who study policing, violence prevention, and community capacity.

This report is one of many recent RAND studies on violence prevention, community problem-solving, and police-community relations. These studies include:

- *Police-Community Relations in Cincinnati: Year Two Evaluation Report*, by Greg Ridgeway, Terry Schell, K. Jack Riley, Susan Turner, and Travis L. Dixon, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, TR-445-CC, 2006.
- *Police-Community Relations in Cincinnati*, by K. Jack Riley, Susan Turner, John MacDonald, Greg Ridgeway, Terry Schell, Jeremy M. Wilson, Travis L. Dixon, Terry Fain, Dionne Barnes-Proby, and Brent D. Fulton, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, TR-333-CC, 2005.
- *Community Policing in America*, by Jeremy M. Wilson, New York: Routledge, 2006.
- *Reducing Gun Violence: Results from an Intervention in East Los Angeles*, by George Tita, K. Jack Riley, Greg Ridgeway, Clifford A. Grammich, Allan Abrahamse, and Peter W. Greenwood, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1764-NIJ, 2003.
- *Interventions to Reduce Anti-Social Behaviour and Crime: A Review of Effectiveness and Costs*, by Jennifer Rubin, Lila Rabinovich, Michael Hallsworth, and Edward Nason, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, TR-446-NAO, 2006.
- *Assessing Racial Profiling More Credibly*, by Greg Ridgeway and K. Jack Riley, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RB-9070-OAK, 2004.

The RAND Center on Quality Policing

This research was conducted within RAND's Center on Quality Policing (CQP), which was established in 2006 as part of RAND's Safety and Justice Program within RAND's Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment (ISE) research division. CQP's mission is to help guide the efforts of police agencies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. In addition to focusing research and analysis on police-community relations, force planning (e.g., recruitment, retention, training), performance measurement, cost-effective best practices, and use of technology, the CQP conducts outreach to the law enforcement and policymaking communities across the United States through dissemination of information and formal and informal activities.

Questions or comments about this report or about CQP should be addressed to CQP's Associate Director, Jeremy Wilson (Jeremy_Wilson@rand.org); questions or comments regarding the overall Safety and Justice Program should be addressed to its Director, Greg Ridgeway (Greg_Ridgeway@rand.org). Information about the CQP is available online at http://www.rand.org/ise/centers/quality_policing/. Information about the Safety and Justice Program can be found at www.rand.org/ise/safety.

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Summary

Introduction

In response to rising crime and violence, Oakland voters passed the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act of 2004, more commonly referred to as Measure Y. With a nearly \$20 million annual investment, Measure Y is a 10-year initiative designed to facilitate community policing, foster violence prevention, and improve fire and paramedic service. The community-policing and violence-prevention components of Measure Y, which are the focus of this report, have as their overarching goal the reduction of violence in the city of Oakland. This goal is to be achieved by increasing police presence and effectiveness and expanding the availability and utilization of services for youth, former prisoners, and victims of violence. The legislation set aside funding to be provided by the city for an independent evaluation of the progress being made toward reaching these goals. That evaluation, described in this report, was funded by those resources and was a joint effort by Berkeley Policy Associates (BPA) and the RAND Corporation.

The report evaluates the progress of the programs funded by Measure Y and presents findings from the first year of implementation. It provides answers to the following key performance questions, which were adopted by the Measure Y Oversight Committee:

1. Are the funded programs implemented as intended by Measure Y?
2. Are Measure Y resources being spent to provide services to the target communities?
3. What are the main achievements of programs funded through Measure Y?
4. What implementation challenges do those programs face?
5. How are these challenges being addressed?
6. Do the individuals being served appreciate and benefit from the programs?

This report also offers lessons for improving implementation of the Measure Y programs, based on the assessment. The focus of the first-year evaluation is primarily on implementation (questions 1, 2, 4, and 5 in the list above); in subsequent years, the evaluation will focus more on outcome and impact-related questions.

To perform our assessment, we used a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative methods include structured interviews with department and program managers and staff, review of program and management documents, and focus groups with community stakeholders and program participants. The quantitative methods include analysis of program data on officer deployments, crime reports, and violence-prevention program data, which include participant background characteristics, participation patterns, and achievement of program milestones.

Components of Measure Y

The Measure Y funding supports community policing (implemented by the Oakland Police Department (OPD)), violence-prevention programs (implemented by different public and private agencies across a range of program strategies), and fire and paramedic services. The latter are not included in this evaluation, which focuses exclusively on community policing and violence prevention. The community-policing component of Measure Y provides funding for 63 new police officers, as well as their equipment and training. The violence-prevention component supports street outreach, violence-prevention activities in schools, prisoner reentry services, after-school employment and sports programs, gang-prevention programs, and services for victims of domestic violence and sexually exploited minors. Altogether, 2,302 people received individual services funded by Measure Y through these programs during the first nine months of the first program year, and 22,173 participated in group activities (City of Oakland, Office of the City Administrator, May 2007). The Measure Y funds are administered by the City Administrator's Office, with oversight from the Measure Y Oversight Committee. The day-to-day operation and oversight of the violence-prevention program, including the Measure Y database, are performed by the Department of Human Services (DHS).

Findings on the Community-Policing Program

The early evidence on the implementation of the Measure Y community-policing program is not altogether positive. The deployment of problem-solving officers (PSOs), which is the cornerstone of the community-policing initiative, has been delayed because of a lack of available PSOs and has been frustrated by a lack of equipment and training, frequent transfers of officers out of their beats, and infringement on the PSOs' time. It appears that a combination of financial constraints and administrative challenges has undermined this implementation. It is unclear whether the current reorganization of OPD will improve the department's focus on community policing or will further compromise its implementation by diverting discretionary resources into the reorganization effort. Our research found that PSOs can make a positive difference in the neighborhoods they serve when they are given time to establish relationships with the residents and time to do their jobs. This suggests that the city should make finding ways to fully implement and adequately support the deployment of its PSOs a priority.

Aside from insufficient deployment of PSOs, the implementation of community policing in Oakland is compromised by a lack of community participation. Community meetings involving the PSOs are generally poorly attended by residents and business leaders, and some of those who do participate report being intimidated and harassed by neighborhood criminals, particularly in high-stress neighborhoods.

Findings on the Violence-Prevention and Reentry Programs

The violence-prevention programs—27 programs run by 18 grantee organizations within 15 strategies—have generally been implemented according to plan, albeit in some cases with expected start-up delays. For the most part, programs appear to be providing the services they are intended to provide. However, attracting new participants, especially from traditionally

underrepresented groups, such as truants and individuals who are not connected to existing community infrastructure, is an ongoing challenge for some programs. Staff turnover also has been a problem for several of the Measure Y grantees. Because most grantee organizations are small, staff turnover or other organizational turmoil has sometimes resulted in significant disruption of program services and implementation delays.

The requirement to use a city-administered database to monitor enrollment and participation was an important start-up challenge for many programs. Although meetings to introduce the database were a productive networking opportunity for Measure Y–funded programs and effectively supported the introduction of the database to the funded programs, moving from using the database as a quarterly reporting tool to using it as an effective ongoing program-management and planning tool is a challenge for both the programs and DHS. The database also has not reached its full potential in terms of supporting and facilitating collaboration among programs that serve similar populations of at-risk youth. However, it has proven to be a powerful tool for analyzing and monitoring Measure Y program participation patterns over time and will greatly facilitate future outcome-data collection and analysis.

Early analysis of participation data collected by Measure Y–funded programs suggests that program retention and the intensity of services received are relatively low. The programs appear to have little trouble attracting program participants and reaching out to the city’s youth, but they often report providing fewer hours of service than planned. Promoting intensive and consistent participation at the individual level is a challenge for many programs. In some cases, this may be a function of inconsistent data entry, but it may also represent a more fundamental problem that is inherent in implementing programs targeting at-risk youth. The extant literature on youth programming suggests that social and educational programs need both high intensity and strong retention to make a lasting difference in the lives of young people. Some of the funded programs are quite successful at this, however, and could function as models for others.

Focus groups of participants in Measure Y–funded service programs indicated that these programs are appreciated by the youth who participate in them. Key positive characteristics of programs cited by focus groups include the provision of safe spaces, role models who are old enough to be accomplished but young enough to be able to relate to and communicate with participants, other positive relationships with program staff, development of new and useful skills, exposure to the outside world, and activities that replace boredom and “hanging out” with meaningful and enjoyable pursuits.

Review of program data and discussions with program managers and staff suggest that DHS has provided little day-to-day oversight or direction to individual Measure Y–funded programs and to public agencies that receive Measure Y funding. City staff report that they withhold program funds when quarterly contractual benchmarks are not met, and several programs had not recorded any program data as of January 2007. While most of these program-data issues were resolved in later iterations of the Measure Y database, staff at a number of programs acknowledged that they did not enter program data in the database until the end of their contract quarter, thereby making the data unusable for day-to-day program management and monitoring by DHS or the program managers themselves. Discussions with program staff indicated that city administrators do not regularly monitor program intake statistics and participation rates more frequently than quarterly. DHS organizes regular meetings that bring funded programs together for networking and training and has secured separate foundation funding to support these meetings. However, we did not observe a widespread increase in col-

laboration and synergy among the funded programs or between the programs and their public partners. On the other hand, there have been some examples of successful collaboration, and these are documented in Chapter Three of this report.

The City Administrator’s Office and DHS engage in dialogue with the other public partners funded through Measure Y—OPD and the Oakland Unified School District (OUSD)—through established channels and meetings. OPD also makes monthly reports to the Measure Y Oversight Committee at its regular meetings. Aside from these meetings, we did not see much evidence that the city actively engages its funded public partners about the implementation of their Measure Y program activities or coordinates Measure Y activities across these agencies. This is understandable, because DHS and OPD administer distinctly different funding streams within Measure Y. However, such lack of active coordination fails to fully support the integration of funds and activities toward the single citywide objective that Measure Y is intended to foster.

Recommendations

We offer some recommendations for improving the Measure Y programs and the city’s oversight of them, based on our findings and analyses.

Overall Recommendations

- The city should consider *increasing its day-to-day oversight* of Measure Y–funded activities and programs to ensure that individual programs have maximum impact and that programs and public agencies increase their collaboration and the coordination of their services.
- The city and its partner agencies should be *more forthcoming, deliberate, and strategic in their communications with the general public*, to increase the initiative’s reach, leverage, and impact.
- The city should expand its efforts to *host periodic seminars, conferences, or roundtable events* to promote collaboration and networking among funded agencies and programs.

Recommendations for Community Policing

- The city should *actively manage police workforce levels* by formally assessing its police personnel experience to develop and implement evidence-based lessons for building and maintaining the workforce.
- The city should *deliver on the mandate of providing one PSO per beat*.
- OPD should *stabilize PSO assignments* by creating a way to limit transfers and make them more transparent, and to smooth the transitions when they occur.
- The city should *foster broader community participation* by fully staffing the PSO workforce, limiting PSO transitions, and incorporating community input and greater transparency in the PSO deployment process; developing a process to make the Community Policing Advisory Board (CPAB) reflect more of the desires of the communities it represents and limiting the time members can serve; and finding safe places for community residents to meet.

- OPD should *enhance and institutionalize problem-solving training and resources* by such means as developing a community-policing guidebook and creating a community-policing resource website.
- OPD and the Neighborhood Services Division should consider working together to *integrate and utilize problem-solving databases* to catalogue problems, document progress, and summarize outcomes, potentially featuring the database on a community-policing website.
- OPD should *promote coordination among police units* by strategically leveraging all its (and the community's) resources to develop creative ways to facilitate collaboration and information exchange among OPD's units.
- OPD should *leverage funding for equipment* and secure the resources necessary to equip the PSOs.

Recommendations for Violence-Prevention Programs

- Programs should *use graduates of violence-prevention programs* as peer mentors where possible.
- The city should *use the Measure Y database more proactively* to monitor program activity, encourage program collaboration, and provide guidance for program recruitment, retention, and service provision.
- The city should *encourage programs to use the Measure Y database* to actively manage their caseloads and monitor their own program performance and participation patterns.
- The city and programs should *promote Measure Y citywide* by encouraging more-active engagement with community members (individual residents, businesses, and community organizations).
- The city should *continue to leverage other funds and resources*—including financial resources, volunteer activity, and citizen awareness—to maximize the impact of Measure Y on the community.

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This report was made possible by the generosity and assistance of many people. We wish to thank all those who participated in our assessment, including the staff of the Oakland Police Department, the Neighborhood Services Coordinators, the leaders of the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Councils, and the staff from each of the Measure Y–funded crime-prevention and prisoner-reentry programs. We owe special thanks to Deputy Chief David Kozicki, Sergeant Carlos Gonzalez, Daphne Markham, Claudia Albano, and Marie Mason for facilitating the community-policing interviews, focus groups, interviews, and data acquisition. The quality of this report was also enhanced significantly by Paul Steinberg and Janet DeLand, who helped edit the report; and by comments from Megan Beckett, Susan Turner, David Sklansky, and Greg Ridgeway. Sara Bedford and Anne Marks of the Oakland Department of Human Services provided critical information, assistance, and guidance, and Anne Campbell-Washington was instrumental in serving as a liaison among all those involved in this work.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

BPA	Berkeley Policy Associates
CBSE	crew-based sheltered employment
COST	coordination-of-services team
CPAB	Community Policing Advisory Board
CRT	crime-reduction team
DHS	Department of Human Services
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GED	General Equivalency Diploma
JRT	job-readiness training
Measure Y	Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act of 2004
MISSEY	Motivating, Inspiring, Supporting and Serving Sexually Exploited Youth
NCPC	Neighborhood Crime Prevention Council
NSA	negotiated settlement agreement
NSC	Neighborhood Service Coordinator
ONERT	overnight advocates
OPD	Oakland Police Department
OUSD	Oakland Unified School District
PSA	police service area
PSO	problem-solving officer
RFP	request for proposal
SARA	scanning, analysis, response, and assessment
TA	teaching assistant
YSIMS	Youth Services Information Management System

Introduction

Background

After declining in the late 1990s, criminal activity in Oakland began to increase in the 2000s. Since 2000, murders, rapes, and robberies have shown especially significant increases, and the high and growing murder rate is causing a great deal of concern among residents and policy-makers. In 2005, 93 people were murdered in the city, for a rate of 23 murders per 100,000 Oakland residents, the third-highest murder rate among cities in California with more than 100,000 residents (after Richmond and San Bernardino) and the 19th highest in the United States (FBI, 2005).

In November 2004, Oakland voters voiced their concern about the increase in violent crime in the city and their intent to do something about it by overwhelmingly passing a ballot measure that created the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act (also known as Measure Y), which provides \$19.9 million a year for crime-prevention activities, including placing former felons into jobs, subsidizing youth violence-prevention programs, and authorizing and funding 63 new police officers (Measure Y, 2004). The additional police officers would increase the Oakland police authorized force from 739 to 802 officers. The funds for Measure Y are being raised through a parcel tax and a surcharge on parking in commercial lots. The measure had broad support among city agencies and politicians, including the Mayor's Office, a broad coalition of Oakland community organizations, the Oakland Police Department (OPD), the Oakland Fire Department, the Department of Human Services (DHS), and the City Council. Of the total Measure Y revenues (not including an annual \$4 million for fire and paramedic services), no less than 40 percent must be allocated to the specific violence-prevention programs approved by the City Council. The remaining 60 percent of the funds are to be allocated to the community and neighborhood policing services and are also to fund an independent evaluation of Measure Y (between 1 and 3 percent of the funds are set aside for this purpose annually).

Measure Y was developed by the City Council, DHS, OPD, the Alameda County Probation Department, the Oakland Unified School District (OUSD), and several community-based and faith-based organizations. Its intent is to jointly promote community policing, youth violence prevention, and successful prisoner reentry through the creation of a highly integrated system of social service, police, and criminal justice programs that will provide extensive services to neighborhoods and residents in need of positive outcomes. Specifically, Measure Y requires that funds raised through it be spent in accordance with the following purposes, specified in Oakland City Council Resolution 78734 (July 20, 2004):

1. Community and neighborhood policing: hire and maintain at least a total of 63 police officers assigned to the following specific community-policing objectives:
 - a. Neighborhood beat officers: each community policing beat shall have at least one neighborhood officer assigned solely to serve the residents of that beat to provide consistent contact and familiarity between residents and officers, continuity in problem solving and basic availability of police response in each neighborhood;
 - b. School safety: supplement police services available to respond to school safety and truancy;
 - c. Crime reduction team: at least 6 of the total additional officers to investigate and respond to illegal narcotic transactions and commission of violent crimes in identified violence hot spots;
 - d. Domestic violence and child abuse intervention: additional officers to team with social service providers to intervene in situations of domestic violence and child abuse, including child prostitution;
 - e. Officer training and equipment: training in community-policing techniques, establishing police–social services referrals and equipping officers provided in this paragraph, the total costs of which shall not exceed \$500,000 in any fiscal year that this ordinance is in effect.
2. Violence prevention services with an emphasis on youth and children: expand preventive social services provided by the City of Oakland, or by adding capacity to community-based nonprofit programs with demonstrated past success for the following objectives:
 - a. Youth outreach counselors: hire and train personnel who will reach out, counsel and mentor at-risk adolescents and young adults by providing services and presenting employment opportunities.
 - b. After- and in-school programs for youth and children: expand existing City programs and City supported programs that provide recreational, academic tutoring and mentoring opportunities for at-risk adolescents and children during after-school hours; expand truancy enforcement programs to keep kids in school.
 - c. Domestic violence and child abuse counselors: make available counselors who will team with police and the criminal justice system to assist victims of domestic violence or child prostitution and to find services that help to avoid repeat abuse situations; expand early childhood intervention programs for children exposed to violence in the home at an early age.
 - d. Offender/parolee employment training: provide parolee pre-release employment skills training and provide employers with wage incentives to hire and train young offenders or parolees;
3. Fire services: maintain staffing and equipment to operate 25 fire engine companies and 7 truck companies, expand paramedic services, and establish a mentorship program at each station with an amount not to exceed \$4,000,000 annually from funds collected under this ordinance.
4. Evaluation: not less than 1 percent or more than 3 percent of funds appropriated to each police service or social service program shall be set aside for the purpose of independent evaluation of the program, including the number of people served and the rate of crime or violence reduction achieved.

This evaluation does not include the funding provided to the Fire Department for fire and emergency services. These services will not be discussed in this or future Measure Y evaluation reports.

Measure Y funds problem-solving officers (PSOs) who provide community policing in the Oakland neighborhoods; school-safety officers focused on truancy enforcement and school safety; a new crime-reduction team (CRT) to respond to criminal activities citywide; additional Special Victims Unit officers for domestic-violence and child-abuse intervention programs; and officer training and equipment. Given the direct and substantive interaction of PSOs with the community, our evaluation of community policing focuses primarily upon the PSOs and the extent to which they are trained, equipped, and deployed.

Measure Y also provides funding for a range of violence-prevention strategies, listed in Table 1.1. Within those broad strategies, Measure Y funds a series of programs that target youth on probation or parole; truant, out-of-school, or suspended youth; youth and children exposed to violence; and post-incarceration youth and young adults. After Measure Y was approved by the voters, it took several years for the new taxes to be collected, to obtain City Council approval of the violence-prevention strategies, to administer a competition to select grantees, and to complete contracts with those selected. All of the violence-prevention strategies chosen were considered likely to reduce violence, on the basis of evidence either in Oakland or in other cities. The track records of individual programs and service providers that applied for funding under these strategies were then scrutinized for proven effectiveness, adherence to identified best practices, and management capacity. Because of this multistage selection process, most of the selected programs did not initiate their Measure Y–funded activities until the summer and early fall of 2006.

Objectives

Measure Y includes funding and provision for a 10-year evaluation, with annual reports designed to provide formative feedback on program management and operations. These reports will be used to continuously improve performance of the programs funded by Measure Y and to document its implementation and impacts. The first evaluation is to be performed jointly by Berkeley Public Associates (BPA) and the RAND Corporation.

This report, the first of this evaluation effort, is based on data through April 1, 2007, and describes approximately nine months of Measure Y program implementation.¹ It focuses primarily on the challenges and accomplishments of program start-up and does not address ongoing program operations, long-term program participation patterns, or participant outcomes. However, collection of data on outcomes has begun, and program outcomes will be evaluated in subsequent reports. The lack of extensive outcome data in this report should not be interpreted as evidence of a lack of program effectiveness.

The evaluation is guided by six specific research questions, which were developed and officially adopted by the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Oversight Committee.² These questions (shown in Table 1.2) will be revisited in annual evaluation reports; the current report focuses primarily on implementation questions, and subsequent reports will focus more on outcome and impact questions.

¹ It also examines community policing since its implementation at the beginning of 2006.

² Measure Y also authorized the formation of this citizen watchdog committee to monitor the implementation and operation of Measure Y–funded programs and activities.

Table 1.1
Measure Y Violence-Prevention Strategies and Grantee Programs

Strategy	Grantees
Youth outreach and comprehensive services	
Street outreach Intervenes with community-based mentoring, case management, and supportive services	East Bay Agency for Children East Bay Asian Youth Center Leadership Excellence Youth ALIVE! Youth UpRising
Outreach to sexually exploited youth Connects these youth to supportive services and safe environments	Alameda County Interagency Children's Policy Council
Sports and recreation Intervenes with recreational activities	Leadership Excellence Sports 4 Kids Youth UpRising
Special services to children and youth exposed to violence	
Family-violence advocacy Intervenes to reduce the negative effects of domestic violence exposure on children and youth	Family Violence Law Center
Mental health services Provides mental health services to children and youth in abusive households	Family Violence Law Center
Youth support groups Supports older youth exposed to violence, including sexual exploitation and domestic violence	Family Justice Center
Diversion and reentry services	
Project Choice Provides intensive and comprehensive case management to ex-offenders	Allen Temple Housing and Economic Development Corporation The Mentoring Center Volunteers of America Bay Area
Pathways to Change Provides intensive and comprehensive case management to youth on probation	The Mentoring Center
Restorative justice Trains community members to provide alternative conflict resolution	Attitudinal Healing Connection, Inc.
Employment and training	
Intensive reentry employment Provides employment training to ex-offenders	Allen Temple Housing and Economic Development Corporation Youth Employment Partnership Volunteers of America Bay Area
Crew-based sheltered employment (CBSE) Provides job training and experience to ex-offenders in housing program	Volunteers of America Bay Area
After-school jobs and subsidized summer employment Provides at-risk youth with job readiness and employment skills training	Bay Area Video Coalition Youth Radio Youth Employment Partnership
Transitional jobs Places youth on probation or parole directly into unsubsidized employment with support services	Youth Employment Partnership Allen Temple Housing and Economic Development Corporation
School-based strategies	
Safe Passages/OUR Kids Middle-School Model Provides assessment, case management, and supportive services to Oakland public middle-school students	Alameda County Health Care Services Agency
2nd Step Violence Prevention Curriculum and middle-school peer conflict resolution Teaches skills to reduce conflict, behavioral problems, and suspensions in Oakland public middle schools	Oakland Unified School District Office of Student Services

Table 1.2
Evaluation Research Questions

Question	Intent
1. Are the funded programs implemented as intended by Measure Y?	To determine whether the newly funded programs and activities are consistent with the intentions of the voters who approved the measure and taxed themselves accordingly.
2. Are Measure Y resources being spent to provide services to the target communities?	To determine whether the programs reach the neighborhoods and demographic groups that are most adversely affected by violent crime and its antecedents.
3. What are the main achievements of programs funded through Measure Y?	To determine whether the programs make a difference; in early stages, to describe program milestones, such as ability to recruit and serve significant numbers of participants and beneficiaries.
4. What implementation challenges do those programs face?	To determine what difficulties were associated with implementing an ambitious, multifaceted, and large-scale initiative.
5. How are these challenges being addressed?	To determine how programs and departments have responded to difficulties they encounter when implementing new programs and activities, such as adjusting their program models or operations to resolve initial shortcomings, and the effectiveness of such adjustments.
6. Do the individuals being served appreciate and benefit from the programs?	To determine whether targeted individuals are satisfied with the program services they receive and whether these services impact their immediate outcomes and long-term life trajectory.


The final question asks about the ultimate success of Measure Y. In the first year, this is addressed primarily by describing participants' program experiences in their own words and by documenting stakeholder perceptions of OPD's community-policing efforts. Another key objective of this question is to determine whether Measure Y and its sponsored activities and programs actually reduce violent crime in the most affected neighborhoods. In subsequent years, program effects will include extensive quantitative analyses of program outcomes based on administrative data and stakeholder assessments.

Conceptual Model Guiding the Evaluation

Figure 1.1 summarizes the conceptual model underlying Measure Y as we visualize it for the purpose of this evaluation. It lays out how the new revenue raised through Measure Y is expected to lead to positive outcomes for program participants, Oakland neighborhoods, and the citizens of Oakland. The figure is divided into three distinct causal pathways, shown in different colors. These causal pathways interact with one another and share some intermediate steps and outcomes, as indicated by the arrows. However, to some extent, each of them can be documented and analyzed separately, in terms of both their implementation and their intermediate outcomes. Each of the causal pathways follows a linear path from program funding (revenues), through implementation, to short- and longer-term outcomes.

The first (orange) pathway, at the top of the figure, denotes the causal model underlying the community-policing strategy. The Measure Y funding on the left is intended to increase the strength of the Oakland police force and promote community-policing strategies, such as the deployment of PSOs. These deployments are expected to increase both police presence and community engagement in violence prevention and problem-solving. The problems to be solved include antecedents for criminal activity and violence; solutions would obviously reduce violence. Oakland residents, especially those in the more violent neighborhoods, would feel

Figure 1.1
Measure Y Logic Model



NOTE: Funding for fire and emergency services is not included in this evaluation.

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safer as a result of both having problems addressed and the decrease in violence. In this first evaluation year, we focus primarily on the first step in this sequence, looking for evidence that community policing is being implemented as intended.

The second major causal pathway, shown in blue at the bottom of Figure 1.1, focuses on the Measure Y-funded violence-prevention programs. The first step in this pathway is the additional funding that is available to programs with proven track records of success via a competitive request-for-proposal (RFP) process administered by DHS. As discussed in Chapter Three, several programs (and DHS itself) have also managed to leverage Measure Y funds to attract

resources from other agencies and funders. In the model, such leveraging of funds is shown as a separate resource component.

The next step of this part of the model identifies the myriad of programs and strategies that benefit from these funds. As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, these range from school-based violence-prevention curricula to crew-based sheltered employment (CBSE) programs for parolees. Each of the strategies has its own underlying logic model, developed in a series of meetings facilitated by BPA, DHS, and the City Administrator's Office. Each of these meetings included all agencies in each strategy. Working together, the evaluators, the city, and the individual programs developed a graphic logic model for each strategy that identified program inputs, short-term outcomes, and longer-term outcomes. These elements would then guide program development and operations, as well as implementation monitoring, outcome research, and database design.

Although some of these steps (such as the outcome measurement in the Measure Y database) were not implemented until the end of the first program year, the logic-model meetings were useful in that they brought distinct programs together around a single strategy, helped bring the evaluators up to speed on the individual programs and their background and objectives, and helped the city refine its contract monitoring and management. The logic models illustrated that many programs share short- and/or long-term outcomes, even across different program strategies. Programs also work together, reach out to similar target populations, and sometimes share participants. To represent these overlaps in a single causal logic model, we show short-term outcomes (e.g., positive engagement, access to employment, support) and longer-term outcomes (e.g., improvements in health, self-esteem, academic engagement, and employment; less recidivism and gang involvement) linked as blocks to all these programs. This does not mean that each of the violence-prevention program strategies has the same expected outcomes, but as a group, the strategies are expected to affect the outcomes with which they are associated. In turn, all of these outcomes are expected to contribute to reductions in crime and violence in Oakland as a whole and in the specific schools and neighborhoods served by the individual violence-prevention programs.

The third causal pathway explored in the evaluation is shown in green between the policing pathway and the violence-prevention pathway. This third pathway directly captures the administrative and coordinating role of the city, DHS, and the Measure Y Oversight Committee. By effectively overseeing and supporting the efforts of the violence-prevention programs and OPD, these city entities can impact not only the effectiveness of each of the two main strategies, but also how well they are integrated and work together to form a comprehensive violence-prevention initiative—the stated purpose of Measure Y. This aspect of the initiative is a combination of supportive and proactive oversight and management and a concerted effort to build partnerships, data-sharing infrastructure, and true synergy between different programs. The resulting outcome is that programs are streamlined, duplication of services is avoided, and there is strong collaboration and partnering among agencies and organizations. Eventually, this will cause the violence-prevention and community-policing efforts to sustain one another and will create a lasting initiative that reaches the scale of the community as a whole and is sustained (and supported by citizens and voters) over time.

Our evaluation examines all three of the causal pathways shown in Figure 1.1. We were able to progress further into some pathways than others, but for the most part, we focus on the left side of the figure.

Approach

Documenting the process and interim achievements of program implementation of OPD's community-policing efforts and the youth violence-prevention programs required a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative methods include structured interviews with program managers and staff, review of program and management documents, and focus groups with community stakeholders and program participants. The quantitative methods include analysis of program data on officer deployments, crime reports, and violence-prevention program data, which include participant background characteristics, participation patterns, and achievement of program milestones.

We used the following data-collection and analytical approaches: (1) review and analysis of key documents associated with the initiative and its implementation, including the city audit of Measure Y spending, the RFP and successful proposals for the funded violence-prevention programs, materials submitted to the Measure Y Oversight Committee, and written communications between city managers and funded programs; (2) analysis of administrative data collected with the CitySpan management information system³ and OPD deployment and crime data; (3) site visits to all funded organizations and interviews with key staff and managers; and (4) focus groups with participants in selected programs and community-policing stakeholders. We have also begun to collect outcome data from partner agencies (OUSD and the Alameda County Probation Department), which will be linked with the CitySpan data for future outcome analysis.

In this report, we analyze intake and participation data for all the funded programs. We present demographic profiles of their participants, as well as available data on the amount and nature of program participation that was recorded in the database. However, as discussed below, the data were not sufficiently complete to enable us to present complete demographic and participation profiles of Measure Y participants. As a result, most of our findings are based on site visits, interviews, and participant focus groups.

The qualitative data collected through the site visits and focus groups are presented here on three levels: for individual programs, for program strategies, and across all programs. Our key findings for *individual programs* provide snapshots of the programs, which document the breadth of program activities supported by Measure Y and the extent of individual accomplishments and challenges encountered by each program. However, it is important to acknowledge that these snapshots do not fully represent each of the programs.

The process analysis of *program strategies* can be more conclusive, since we are able to generalize across multiple programs. However, we found significant variation in program implementation within some strategies, such as youth outreach, after-school programming, and prisoner-reentry programs. Different Measure Y programs engaged in the same program strategy often serve very different populations of participants in different parts of the city and may use different approaches to recruit participants and engage them in program activities. As a result, it is difficult to formulate implementation findings for a strategy as a whole at this early stage of the implementation process.

³ The CitySpan database was created under a separate contract between DHS and CitySpan, Inc., as a tool for contract management and as an integrated management information system with which the funded programs could manage their services and collaborate with one another.

Finally, we analyze qualitative program data *across all programs*—violence-prevention programs and community-policing activities. Such a comprehensive analysis is important, because it sets the stage for subsequent citywide outcome analysis. The bottom line is whether the Measure Y funding is translated into actual program services being delivered to the youths and adults who most need them across a wide range of program strategies and organizations. In Chapter Four, we attempt to formulate a series of overarching conclusions about the implementation of Measure Y’s programs and activities.

Limitations

Evaluation Time Frame

The primary limitation of this evaluation is that it covers only part of the first year of implementation of the Measure Y–funded programs and activities. As a result, it is difficult to predict from our findings whether the initiative will be successful, either in terms of supporting community policing and violence prevention in Oakland or in terms of its ultimate objective, i.e., reducing violence and crime. More time and more data will be needed to draw conclusive answers about the effectiveness of Measure Y and its implementation. However, understanding the initial challenges in the start-up of Measure Y–funded programs and activities and identifying areas for improvement will help in making future program operation and management more effective in achieving long-term program success.

Data Limitations

An important data limitation is the lack of a clear “counterfactual” for Measure Y—that is, we do not know what would have happened in the absence of the initiative and the funding it made available. In future years, our analyses should approximate a counterfactual for Measure Y, focusing on trends over time in service use, community-policing implementation, participant outcomes, and crime statistics. However, at this point, we can only describe how Measure Y resources are spent, who participates in Measure Y activities, and how individual participants value their access to the services available to them.

We were unable to obtain the background characteristics and participation patterns of early participants in some programs because the CitySpan database was not fully operational for the entire program year for all the Measure Y–funded programs. The variation in program data is reflected in the descriptions of program services, which combine data from program reports, site visits, focus groups, and the CitySpan database. Together, these sources offer a valid depiction of the status and accomplishments of the programs, but they do not always constitute a comprehensive assessment of all the program services delivered.⁴

Several Measure Y–funded programs delayed their utilization of the CitySpan database because of concerns about the confidentiality and safety of the system. Many Measure Y participants have criminal records or other reasons for not wanting their identity to be known to city agencies, which makes storing and sharing their data on a centralized system problematic.

⁴ Our site visits were relatively short and did not systematically include interviews with all staff members or observation of all program activities at each site. As a result, our findings are not fully representative and may inadvertently highlight particular positive or negative features for some programs. In our general discussion, therefore, we combine the individual findings across the programs and site visits to present a more general set of observations and conclusions.

To address this problem, a third-party encoder facilitates the matching of de-identified participant data.⁵ With this encoder in place, all funded Measure Y programs have agreed to enter participant data in the database, and public agencies such as OUSD and the probation department have also agreed in principle to share their outcome data with the system.

Analyzing Citywide Effects of Measure Y on Crime and Delinquency

Analysis of program effects on longitudinal crime data usually uses a so-called interrupted time-series design, in which trend data are plotted over time and sudden changes in these data are connected to events and initiatives that coincide with the change in the trend. The potential difficulty with this type of analysis is that other events may coincide with the implementation of the program, making it difficult to isolate the causal process actually responsible for the observed effect (these events are referred to as *confounding variables*). Also, a positive change (resulting from a public program, for example) may sometimes be offset by negative changes resulting from demographic or economic factors. Therefore, it is difficult to reliably identify meaningful program effects by analyzing a single time series of measures. This is especially true when there are few post-program data points, as is the case with this first-year evaluation. Thus, we have not attempted to evaluate impacts on citywide or neighborhood crime trends. We do, however, present an overview of those trends, and we identify examples of problem-solving success as reported by key stakeholders in the community-policing sector. These trends will form the basis for impact analyses that may be conducted as early as next year.

Organization of This Report

Chapter Two describes and analyzes the implementation of the community-policing component of Measure Y, and Chapter Three analyzes that of the youth violence-prevention programs administered by DHS, including youth outreach, after-school, and sports and recreation programs; programs for sexually exploited minors; school safety, domestic violence, and mental health strategies; and programs that serve youths and young adults who reenter society after having been incarcerated. These two chapters present results in terms of the six evaluation questions. Chapter Four presents a summary analysis of program implementation overall and some conclusions, along with some recommendations for Measure Y program administrators and policymakers.

Appendix A compiles the interview instruments used in the analysis. Appendix B provides the exact penal codes we used in defining 14 categories of violent crime for our analysis in Chapter Two of police service areas (PSAs), and Appendix C provides a more detailed

⁵The negotiation of this data-matching strategy was a significant milestone for Measure Y and its evaluation. From the start of the evaluation, a key objective of the data system and the evaluation plan was to link individual program participants' identifiers to data systems maintained by public partners, including OUSD, OPD, and the county probation department. Initially, individual programs and the Measure Y Oversight Committee were reluctant to allow such matching, but after a series of meetings involving BPA, CitySpan, DHS, and representatives from several Measure Y programs, the third-party encoder system was implemented. With this system, the privacy of participating youth and young adults is not compromised in any way; only the Measure Y-funded programs and the independent third-party encoder have access to the identifiers of participating youth, and only BPA and the partner agencies have access to the outcome data. Although the development of this solution delayed several evaluation and data-analysis activities, its successful resolution will allow the collection and analysis of high-quality universal outcome data on all Measure Y participants for the duration of the 10-year evaluation effort.

summary of violence at the PSA level. Appendix D presents descriptions of all the violence-prevention programs evaluated in Chapter Three. Finally, Appendix E provides the dates of violence-prevention-program site visits conducted for this evaluation.

The Implementation of Community Policing in Oakland

Background

On June 11, 1996, the Oakland City Council passed Resolution 72727 to establish community policing in Oakland. The resolution explained that “community policing creates a working partnership between the community and the police to analyze neighborhood problems, set priorities, develop strategies, and work together to improve the quality of life in our neighborhoods.” It has since been reaffirmed and amended several times, including the reaffirmation by the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act of 2004 (Measure Y). The common theme is that community policing involves a partnership between the police, the community, and other city departments, as well as a commitment to collaboratively solve issues of ongoing public concern.

As in many other communities, problem-solving is a primary feature, if not *the* primary feature, of community policing in Oakland. Problem-solving policing (or problem-oriented policing) is a response to the incident-driven model of policing (i.e., a focus on response time to calls for service and randomized patrol), which several studies have concluded fails to address community concerns about crime, disorder, and fear of victimization (see, e.g., Kelling et al., 1974; Kansas City Police Department, 1980).

This chapter assesses community policing in Oakland following the implementation of Measure Y and attempts to gauge how much and how the city has implemented it. Determining the extent of implementation is a necessary precursor to assessing outcomes and can identify lessons that will help the city improve its future problem-solving efforts.

The assessment does not formally consider whether Oakland’s form of community policing is appropriate for the city or whether other forms would be more effective. Through its various resolutions, Oakland has already defined its preferred approach to community policing, so our assessment focuses on evaluating this approach and emphasizes deriving lessons to facilitate its implementation and ultimate effectiveness.

We address the implementation of community policing broadly; that is, we do not limit our analysis to activities funded only by Measure Y. In practice, problem-solving activities are indistinguishable on the basis of their root funding source. As a matter of equity, persons receiving problem-solving services funded by the general fund (the only funding source prior to Measure Y funding) want to know they are getting the same quality of service as those receiving service funded by Measure Y, and vice versa. In addition, we are called by the language of Measure Y to examine the entire city. The measure states that “each community policing beat shall have at least one neighborhood officer” (Measure Y, 2004, p. 4). Residents with whom we spoke expressed their strong desire for a safer city, and they viewed Measure Y as a means

to that end, not as an end in and of itself. Finally, we did not always know whether officers we interviewed were funded by Measure Y or by the general fund, because the officers themselves were not sure (and we could not verify their status because, to ensure them confidentiality, we did not record their names or beat assignments). We therefore review problem-solving in terms of activities and issues related to both Measure Y and non-Measure Y PSOs. However, where it is important and possible to do so, we point out key differences between them.

Because the PSO program is not yet fully implemented, it is too early to conduct an outcome analysis to assess the impact of PSOs in their communities. Our intent at this time is to inform public discourse about the form, substance, and pace of implementation so that the city and its stakeholders can assess how satisfactory the implementation is, given other priorities, challenges, constraints, and desires.

We examined information obtained from many sources, including PSO deployment information and crime statistics—the former enabled us to assess PSO implementation in calendar year 2006, and the latter enabled us to examine changes in the level of violence between 2005 and 2006.

We also engaged key stakeholders through in-depth discussions, focusing primarily on those who are involved in community policing at the tactical level but also, to some extent, on those involved at the political level (described below). These discussions took place between January and March 2007. Among other general inquiries, we sought to learn stakeholders' role in community policing, strengths and weaknesses in implementation, initial impacts, obstacles, and lessons.

We interviewed 20 staff from OPD. The interviews ranged from 17 minutes to 75 minutes, with most taking around 30 to 40 minutes. We invited all 30 PSOs to participate and ultimately interviewed 14 of them, some of whom were supported by Measure Y and some by the general fund. The remaining six OPD staff varied in rank from officer to deputy chief and held assignments relevant to this assessment. To protect the identities of our respondents, we use the term *OPD supervisors* for those above the rank of officer. The interviews followed a prepared protocol of questions (shown in Appendix A) but used an open-ended format that allowed questions to be answered as they came up, permitted respondents to take their answers in the directions they felt most important, and invited additional discussion as it might emerge.

We also held discussions with Community Policing Advisory Board (CPAB) members, Neighborhood Service Coordinators (NSCs), and Neighborhood Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) leaders. (We describe the structure and operation of each of these groups in the following section.) As we did with the PSOs, we sent these individuals letters of introduction that explained the study and requested their participation. We used the same open-ended approach in these interviews that we used with OPD staff, although we asked slightly different sets of questions (also shown in Appendix A). Interviews with the NSCs were held as focus groups rather than individually, as were most of the NCPC interviews. We spoke with nine of the 14 CPAB members (individually in phone interviews), 10 of the 14 NSCs (in two focus groups), and 19 NCPC leaders (in three focus groups and five individual phone interviews). Interviews with CPAB members lasted 30 to 60 minutes each; the NSC focus groups lasted approximately two hours each; and the NCPC focus groups had from one to seven members present and lasted between one and two hours. It was difficult to represent the NCPC leaders because of the sheer number of them. To ensure a broad representation of views and experiences while keeping the focus groups to a size conducive to frank discussions, we invited one leader (typically the chair, a co-chair, or the president) from each beat's NCPC to participate.

By the nature of their positions, we expected these individuals to be the most knowledgeable about the issues we planned to discuss.

The interviews gave us some insights into the initial success of community policing and problem-solving. We asked each stakeholder group about its perception of the effectiveness of community policing and whether it could cite initial observations or evidence that would suggest problem-solving is working. We have also begun compiling data on violence from OPD that will serve as a baseline outcome measure for future evaluations. We summarized these data to examine the extent to which violence appears to be increasing or decreasing and to provide context about the environment in which the PSOs entered communities and began their work.

As in any study that involves sampling, it is important to keep in mind the potential for selection bias to influence results. Those who agreed to participate in the discussion could have ideas, experiences, and comments that are different from those who chose not to participate or could not do so. This potential may be greatest for the PSOs and NCPC leaders, whose non-response rate was greater than that of CPAB members and NSCs.

Oakland's Approach to Community Policing

Community policing has been adopted by communities throughout the United States to improve police-community relations, foster problem-solving partnerships, and improve crime prevention.¹ Unfortunately, assessing the implementation and effectiveness of community policing as a crime-prevention tool is difficult, because there is no universal definition of community policing, and its implementation is as varied as the communities that embrace it (Wilson, 2006a).

In Oakland, community policing is pursued primarily through problem-solving, which the city operationalizes both through OPD's PSOs and through the NSCs and NCPCs (discussed below).² Ultimately, Measure Y mandates that at least one PSO be assigned solely to conduct problem-solving in each of the city's 57 community-policing beats.³

Problem-solving involves grouping multiple incidents as a problem so that the underlying conditions that lead to the incidents can be addressed (Goldstein, 1979, 1990). It focuses police attention on addressing the root causes of community concerns rather than the symptoms of the problems. The key to problem-solving is the application of a focused, systematic process. Many departments, including OPD, have adopted some form of Eck and Spelman's (1987) Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (SARA) problem-solving model. Officers identify problems in the scanning stage and then gather and analyze information to learn about their scope, nature, and root causes in the analysis stage. In the response stage, the police, in

¹ Arguably the most comprehensive and best-documented example is that of Chicago. For discussions of Chicago's experience, see Skogan (2006), Skogan et al. (1999), and Skogan and Hartnett (1997).

² Neighborhood watches are also part of Oakland's community-policing partnership. Various respondents noted that their role has been somewhat marginal and feeds into the NCPCs and that there is a need to increase their capacity and integration into the larger community-policing effort. Since 2005, the Neighborhood Services Division has been attempting to revitalize neighborhood watch and the neighborhood services program more generally by implementing a plan it developed with OPD. For more information about this plan, see City of Oakland, Office of the City Administrator (2005).

³ OPD distinguishes between patrol beats and community-policing beats. Generally speaking, each patrol beat comprises two to three community-policing beats. Unless otherwise noted, beats in this study refer to community-policing beats.


partnership with other organizations, formulate and implement potential solutions. Finally, in the assessment stage, the effectiveness of the solutions is evaluated. The process begins anew if the problem still appears to exist.

A number of studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of problem-solving in resolving incidents of crime and disorder (Eck and Spelman, 1987; Kennedy et al., 2001; Skogan and Frydl, 2004; Weisburd and Eck, 2004).⁴ Many agencies that claim to have conducted problem-solving successfully have not uniformly and rigorously implemented each stage of the SARA model, rendering its application less than full and consistent (Braga and Weisburd, 2006; Riley et al., 2005a).

Our interviews with stakeholders indicated that community policing in Oakland can be thought of as occurring on two levels. On the political or strategic level, OPD, the CPAB, the Measure Y Oversight Committee, and the city (which includes the City Council, the Mayor's Office, and the City Administrator's Office) work together to interpret, plan for, and assess community policing pursuant to Measure Y and Resolution 72727, as amended. On the operational or tactical level, OPD, NSCs, and NCPCs, with guidance from the political level, collaborate to implement the substance of community policing, mostly through problem-solving (priorities are set by the NCPCs for their neighborhoods). Figure 2.1 shows these relationships schematically.

OPD obviously plays a central role in community policing. It interacts with all stakeholders and is the only recipient of Measure Y community-policing funds, which explains why most (but not all) of our assessment centers on it and its problem-solving activities. OPD serves as an intermediary between the political and operational community-policing stakeholders. It

Figure 2.1
Levels and Stakeholders of Community Policing



⁴ The Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services and the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing have now produced more than 40 problem-solving guides for addressing problems such as gun violence, identity theft, loud car stereos, pan-handling, prescription fraud, and rave parties (see <http://www.popcenter.org/>).

must interpret and translate strategy into tactical application, while meeting its other operational demands and constraints. This manifests itself primarily in the deployment of PSOs.⁵

Broadly speaking, the mission of the CPAB is to advise OPD and the city on community-policing implementation and to serve as the voice of the community. According to Section 5.3 of Oakland City Council Resolution 79235,

The Community Policing Advisory Board shall oversee, monitor, and report at least annually on the implementation of Resolution 72727 C.M.S. and provide recommendations to the Mayor, City Council, City Administrator, and Chief of Police on further steps necessary to carry out its objectives (p. 4).

The CPAB is charged with certifying and assessing NCPCs for compliance (and mediating disputes over these issues). It comprises 15 members, three of whom are appointed by the mayor, eight by councilpersons (one for each of the eight councilpersons), one by the board of commissioners of the Oakland Housing Authority, one by the OUSD board of trustees, and two by the Oakland Home Alert steering committee. The CPAB holds regular monthly meetings that are open to the public.⁶

Through the City Council, the Mayor's Office, and the Measure Y Oversight Committee, the city's role in community policing is focused on broad issues pertaining to oversight of resources and legislative adherence, as well as political influence.

Established under Resolution 72727 in 1996, NSCs are OPD civilian employees (who also report to the Neighborhood Services Manager in the City Administrator's Office) who serve as a point of contact for Oakland residents in need of city services, especially as they relate to crime or crime prevention. They attend NCPC meetings, train City Council and neighborhood-watch leaders and help organize their groups, collaborate with PSOs on neighborhood needs, and assist residents requiring city services related to these needs. They aim to empower residents to advocate on their own behalf with regard to crime in their neighborhoods. In short, they help the community participate in community policing by serving as a bridge between OPD, the rest of the city, and community residents.

NCPCs are community groups that meet regularly to help reduce crime in a particular police beat. According to Section 4.3 of Oakland City Council (2005) Resolution 79235,

Neighborhood Councils shall strive to include representatives of a variety of organizations sensitive to community needs and interests, such as, but not limited to, community organizations, service groups, Home Alert groups, church organizations, youth groups, labor unions, merchant associations, school parent-teacher organizations, as well as interested members of the community.

All participants, including the NCPC leaders, are volunteers who meet monthly to address issues in their neighborhoods. The meetings are public, and NSCs and problem-solving officers are expected to attend (as described below, other police staff also attend).

We now turn to addressing the six evaluation questions within this context.

⁵ Consistent with the Measure Y legislation, OPD also characterizes community policing in terms of problem-solving implementation, according to respondents and public reports (e.g., OPD, 2006).

⁶ For additional background on the CPAB, see <http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/osv/ad-bd-role.html>.

Are the Funded Programs Implemented as Intended by Measure Y?

The Measure Y–funded program for OPD is community policing as delivered by the PSOs. Two major benchmarks for assessing the implementation of community policing as intended by Measure Y are coverage (how much) and substance (how). Although OPD netted 19 additional PSOs in 2006, bringing the year-end total up to 34 officers (before slipping back to 30 in March 2007), this is obviously shy of the 57 mandated by Measure Y.⁷ Stakeholders typically did not fault OPD for this, generally seeing the problem as something that happened to OPD as opposed to something OPD made happen. Some felt that the City Council is responsible for OPD’s staffing shortage, because it instituted a police hiring freeze in 2003.⁸ Although many social programs do take longer to implement than the original legislation intended, in part because much legislation is focused on creation and definition of programs rather than on implementation (see, for example, Klerman and Cox, 2007; Klerman et al., 2007), NCPC leaders and other stakeholders hold the city (collectively) responsible for not delivering the 57 PSOs as required by Measure Y.

The answer to the question of whether the substance of community policing is delivered as mandated also appears to be, “Not yet, but progress is being made.”⁹ Although we found numerous examples of PSOs, NSCs, and community partners joining forces to address serious problems, there is uncertainty about the extent to which this has occurred and whether the process has been as effective as possible. Some communities have clearly not received Measure Y’s required PSOs, and in many of those that did receive a PSO, he or she was reportedly pulled out of the beat for other routine and systematic assignments, transferred to another position within OPD, or ill-equipped. Measure Y funding for equipment and training has been spent on Measure Y needs, but this funding has not been enough to fully equip and train even the current modest level of PSOs. Thus, equipment and training provisions have been implemented to the extent possible, but their scope is not sufficient to the task at hand. Many of the respondents—although not all—believed the program design was good but was *de facto* not realized. They viewed community policing as not implemented as intended, because the resources in Oakland have not all been integrated to address crime and violence, because there is not one PSO per beat as the legislation required, and because OPD has directed PSOs to work on assignments that pulled them out of their designated beats (e.g., patrol, robbery task forces, pooled problem-solving teams). While staffing shortages certainly contribute to officers

⁷ Some respondents noted that some communities also do not have an NSC—or at least not one that is effective—which limits the impact of the PSOs specifically and of community-policing generally. With 14 NSCs covering 57 beats, they are three shy of being fully staffed. NSCs report covering two to six beats each, with four to five beats being the most common workload. Although NSCs are not part of Measure Y, some NSCs and one CPAB member contend that having one NSC per beat, just as there is to be one PSO per beat, would be ideal, since it would allow NSCs to focus on their assigned beat and accomplish significantly more.

⁸ The city’s 2003–2005 adopted budget instituted a hiring freeze at OPD, which yielded an \$8.1 million savings. Thirty sworn positions and six civilian positions were frozen, and 47 vacant civilian positions were eliminated (Oakland City Manager, 2003). The city lifted the hiring freeze when Measure Y went into effect in order to hire the officers the measure mandated.

⁹ More broadly, the NSCs see the PSO program as part of a longer history of community policing in Oakland. They described community policing as beginning in Oakland in 1994, expanding and reaching a peak of success between 1997 and 2000, and then contracting between 2000 and 2004. They viewed the passage of Measure Y as the next generation of the tradition of community policing. Thus, they contend that community policing has not yet reached the promise of the legislation, nor has it achieved the success of earlier community policing. NCPC leaders also expressed this sentiment.

being pulled out of their assigned beats, the practice also belies a fundamental difference in how senior OPD personnel and many in the community define the role of the PSO. NCPC leaders in general define the PSOs as serving the needs of their designated beats and contend that they learn what those needs are by focusing exclusively on them (i.e., spending time in the beats, building relationships with the businesses and residents in the beats, and studying crime statistics for the beats). Reactions to the limits of implementation ranged from understanding to a complete lack of faith in the city and OPD, with most respondents expressing frustration.

OPD, however, more often views the mission of PSOs as encompassing anything that might benefit a beat. In this sense, assigning PSOs to respond to calls for service in their designated beats and pooling them for a robbery task force does solve problems in their beats, even while solving problems in other beats as well.

On a related matter, the unanticipated turnover in the PSOs assigned to beats has shaken the trust of the community and degraded police-community relations. NCPC leaders repeatedly stressed the importance of building relationships (with businesses, residents, and the NSC) for the success of the program and said that the frequent changes in PSOs prevented those relationships from developing.

The following subsection assesses community policing in terms of the deployment and coverage of the PSOs. The rest of the chapter explores the implementation of community policing relative to key substantive areas. Additional analysis can be found in the responses to the remaining evaluation questions, most notably in the section describing the challenges to implementation of community policing.

Deployment and Coverage of PSOs

Measure Y requires OPD to hire at least 63 additional community policing officers and directs that

each community policing beat shall have at least one neighborhood officer assigned solely to serve the residents of that beat to provide consistent contact and familiarity between residents and officers, continuity in problem solving and basic availability of police response in each neighborhood (Measure Y, 2004, p. 4).¹⁰

This requirement raised OPD's authorized strength of sworn officers from 739 to 802 (Department of Human Services and Oakland Police Department, 2005). Of these sworn officers, PSOs have been the only ones "assigned solely to serve the residents of [a] beat." OPD already had 14 PSOs when Measure Y passed, so this required it to deploy 43 additional PSOs to cover all 57 community policing beats (Oakland Police Department, 2006).¹¹ OPD's staff shortage has rendered the goal of deploying a full-time PSO in every beat a challenge.

Now with an authorized strength of 803 sworn police staff, OPD completed four academy classes (graduating 76 officers) and a lateral transition course (graduating three officers) in 2006 and began two more academies by the end of the year (see also Finance and Manage-

¹⁰ A CPAB member stressed that to be most effective, beats should have multiple PSOs, and NSCs should only be assigned only one or two beats each.

¹¹ Measure Y dictates that at least six officers are also to be assigned to a crime-reduction team, with any remaining assigned to school safety, domestic violence, and child-abuse intervention, and that \$500,000 can be spent each year on officer training and equipment.

ment Agency and OPD, 2007). Although a full staffing analysis is beyond the scope of this assessment, we note that as of December 31, 2006, OPD's sworn strength was 713, which is 11 percent under its allocated level (Finance and Management Agency and OPD, 2007). OPD is not unusual in having difficulty meeting its staffing demands; police organizations throughout the United States have been experiencing similar challenges (Rostker, Hix, and Wilson, 2007; Wilson, 2006b; Riley et al., 2006; O'Brien, 2006; Woska, 2006; Riley et al., 2005a; Raymond et al., 2005; Taylor et al., 2005).¹²

PSOs can be classified on the basis of their funding as either Measure Y or generalists. The Measure Y officers, according to the legislation, are to be assigned to only one beat. By contrast, generalists (funded by the city's general fund) are likely to be assigned to multiple beats until the PSO unit is fully staffed. According to deployment data provided by OPD and other records (Oakland City Administrator, 2006), OPD had 18 PSOs, including 4 Measure Y PSOs, at the beginning of 2006. By year's end, it had 34 officers deployed, 20 of whom were Measure Y (as of January 2007, the number of officers deployed had fallen to 30, according to OPD personnel). During this time, OPD increased its overall problem-solving capacity from 32 percent to 60 percent of full deployment.

OPD's goal is to deploy 40 percent of each class that finishes field training to Measure Y positions (i.e., no entering officers will be assigned to Measure Y positions, but each time a class completes field training, a number of veteran officers equaling 40 percent of the class will be deployed to Measure Y positions); remaining officers are to be deployed to patrol watches (Oakland City Administrator, 2006). OPD uses this "split" as a guide. It determines actual deployment based upon current staffing needs, demands for service, and other restrictions such as legal mandates and agreements. Three OPD classes finished field training in 2006, providing three occasions to deploy additional PSOs. According to OPD data, PSO deployments represented 35 percent of the first class, 29 percent of the second, and 47 percent of the third. There were 46 field-training graduates, and OPD deployed 17 PSOs, for a 37 percent deployment rate.

Given that there are not enough PSOs to deploy one to each beat, several must cover multiple beats. Table 2.1 summarizes the number of beats to which officers were assigned as of the end of 2006. Two of 20 Measure Y officers were responsible for multiple beats, whereas 7 of 14 generalist officers had multiple-beat responsibilities.

PSO coverage provides some useful context for assessing implementation. It enables us to examine how much time PSOs spend engaging in activities that could logically be considered problem-solving and how much they spend in other activities that are dedicated to the beat (i.e., time that is not allocated to another purpose). At the broadest level, there are three amounts of

¹² Police departments across the country, including many in California (e.g., Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, and San Francisco), are struggling to maintain or reach their desired workforce strength. Current staff shortages are exacerbated by pending baby-boom-generation retirements, military call-ups, local budget crises, increased competition for qualified applicants, and changing generational preferences. Many police agencies report particular difficulty recruiting minority and female officers. Further complicating matters, traditional crime and violence problems are growing in many communities, including Oakland, at the same time that the duties of the police have expanded and evolved to include, among other responsibilities, community problem-solving activities, homeland security, human trafficking, and cybercrime activities. This requires not only more staff, but also an expanded officer skill set. Constantly responding to day-to-day operations, police agencies typically do not have the time, resources, or expertise to assess their challenges and conduct the analyses necessary to develop evidence-based lessons for meeting their personnel needs.

Table 2.1
Number of Beats for Which PSOs Were Responsible as of December 31, 2006

Responsibility	Measure Y PSOs	Generalist PSOs	Total PSOs
One beat	18	7	25
Two beats	1	3	4
Three beats	0	0	0
Four beats	0	2	2
Five beats	1	1	2
Six beats	0	1	1
Total	20 (25)	14 (32)	34 (57)

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses indicate the total number of beats for which the PSOs are responsible.

time to consider: the total amount of possible PSO time as stipulated by Measure Y, the total amount of possible PSO time given the number of PSOs and their staggered deployment, and the actual dedicated PSO time. For simplicity, we assess time in number of PSO days.¹³

Officers work four days per week in 10-hour shifts. Since there are 52 weeks per year and 57 beats, this translates into a total of 11,856 (4 days × 52 weeks × 57 beats) possible full-time PSO days each year. This is the PSO coverage envisioned and stipulated by Measure Y, but this level was not reached in 2006 because there were fewer than 57 officers deployed, and many of those who were deployed started partway through the year.

Using the PSO deployment dates OPD provided, we were able to calculate the possible full-time PSO days given the date at which the 34 officers were deployed, which was 4,604 PSO days. Therefore, OPD could potentially provide only about 39 percent of the PSO time required by Measure Y.

In practice, numerous factors (e.g., responding to emergency calls, training, injuries) can further limit the time officers can spend on their PSO duties. We have calculable data for four of those factors. First, seven of the 34 officers were on extended sick leave or modified duty (e.g., resulting from an injury) at some point during 2006 (our calculation does not include regular sick days). Extended leaves preclude PSOs from engaging in their problem-solving duties for a longer-than-routine period. Such leaves diminished dedicated PSO time by about 796 days (the equivalent of about 3.8 full-time PSOs for a year). Second, OPD deployed the officers to patrol so that they could respond to calls for service one shift per week, or 25 percent of their weekly time, from April 1, 2006, through January 31, 2007.¹⁴ In addition, OPD loaned four PSOs to patrol for six weeks in early 2006. (OPD also loaned the three PSO sergeants to patrol from April 29 to July 21, 2006, but this is not reflected in the PSO coverage

¹³ Ideally, we would measure coverage in terms of actual activities dedicated to the PSO's beat (problem-solving or otherwise). Unfortunately, the available data do not provide sufficient detail to allow us to measure coverage that way. Nonetheless, our interviews with the PSOs indicated that they are engaged in problem-solving work when they are not on extended sick leave or modified duty or on patrol.


¹⁴ Many respondents criticized OPD's decision to assign PSOs to patrol. Although one OPD respondent claimed the practice was not ideal, he argued that it would allow them to see problems on their beat that they would not normally see. Just after the PSOs were taken off patrol one day per week, they were assigned to work on robbery suppression one day per week throughout OPD's service area. An OPD respondent explained that taking PSOs out of their beats is justified, because robbery is a crime that affects all beats. Still, some CPAB members said that PSOs are given so many assignments they do not have time to address problems and priorities on their beats. Furthermore, NSCs reported that PSOs are pulled out of their beats up to the equivalent of about two shifts per week.

calculations.) Third, three PSOs transferred from the PSO program, resulting in a permanent unit change. Finally, OPD promoted two PSOs, also resulting in a permanent unit change.

When deployment dates and time spent on extended sick leave or modified leave were accounted for, PSO coverage was reduced by 853 days due to patrol assignments (the equivalent of about 4.1 full-time PSOs) and 84 days due to unit changes and promotions (the equivalent of about 0.4 full-time PSOs). After accounting for deployment dates and subtracting the time officers were on extended sick leave or modified duty, the time they spent on patrol, and the time lost due to unit changes and promotions, we found that officers conducted about 2,871 days of dedicated PSO time (the equivalent of about 13.8 full-time PSOs). Thus, officers spent about 62 percent of the total amount of all possible PSO time (given the number of PSOs and their deployment) as PSOs and 24 percent on problem-solving as envisioned by Measure Y. Figure 2.2 summarizes the coverage in terms of meeting the Measure Y objective of one full-time PSO officer per beat.

The estimate of PSO coverage actually overstates the amount of dedicated PSO time in the community, because a number of other activities also limit it. Many of these are important and necessary for officers and arguably are related to problem-solving. For example, at the beginning of every shift, there is a lineup where supervisors share information with the officers. According to the PSOs, each lineup can last from five minutes up to an hour. PSOs also must attend training and appear in court. One PSO explained that aggressive officers have to spend so much time in court, they may get to spend only five hours in the community on a given week. Like all officers, PSOs also have various forms of off-duty time (e.g., sick days, vacation, etc.) that are routine and expected.

Figure 2.2
Actual Versus Potential Problem-Solving Coverage, 2006



Many PSOs spend time responding to emergency calls, either because they are closest to the incident or to assist patrol officers who might be in danger. Some reported responding to calls very rarely, while others reported doing so on a daily basis.

Most PSOs report partnering with another PSO to conduct problem-solving activities. Some CPAB members and NCPC leaders felt this was necessary to improve officer safety and to address complex problems. But it can create inefficiencies, if, for example, the officers spend time attending their partners' community meetings and driving back and forth across beats. Of course, driving time may also create inefficiencies for officers working alone who must cover multiple beats that are not contiguous. Although we do not have information on individuals with whom PSOs form ad hoc partnerships or the substance of the partnerships, we know from the beat assignments that 14 PSOs (12 of whom are Measure Y) ride in pairs because of a shortage of vehicles. This information at least provides a sense of the proximity in which they conduct their work. Of the seven PSO partner teams, four are assigned to beats that are in some way contiguous and three are not. There are seven PSOs who do not formally ride together but who are responsible for multiple beats. The beats of five of these PSOs are contiguous, and those of two are not.

Finally, we consider coverage on the basis of PSO time in Oakland's most stressed areas, as determined by the city's stressor index. This list categorizes each of the city's beats as high, medium, or low stress (Measure Y, 2006). According to DHS and OPD (2005), communities experience very different levels of violence, and Measure Y resources should be distributed to reflect those differences. OPD deploys PSOs according to this index, so communities with the highest amount of stress receive officers first (Oakland Police Department, 2006; also reiterated by OPD supervisors).¹⁵

Table 2.2 summarizes the amount of dedicated PSO time expended in beats corresponding to their stress levels. This obviously assumes that officers worked where they were assigned, which many respondents suggested did not always occur. Based on the best available data, just over half of the PSO days were spent in high-stress beats, and almost one-third of the days were spent in low-stress beats. In terms of problem-solving coverage, comparing the number of dedicated PSO days completed with the number of possible dedicated PSO days for the year by stress level shows that the high-stress beats had the highest proportion of full PSO coverage (59 percent), followed by the medium- (23 percent) and low-stress beats (12 percent). It should be noted that, again, this analysis includes both PSOs funded by Measure Y and generalist PSOs.

This section illustrated the pace and status of PSO implementation given organizational constraints and decisionmaking. To the extent that PSOs are effective and improve community conditions, outcomes will reflect the level of implementation. While it is up to the city and its stakeholders to decide the appropriateness of the pace of PSO implementation, they should

¹⁵ City staff assess each beat, using 11 crime, economic, and education indicators. For a description of the methodology, see Department of Human Services and OPD (2005). One NCPC leader and some NSCs criticized this index on the basis of indicator selection; because its construction was not transparent; and because in some beats people are too afraid to report crime, so the beats are not listed as highly stressed as they should be. Another NCPC leader felt that the index was detrimental because it pitted neighborhoods against each other in a competition for officers and because many residents were completely unaware of the index and its use in PSO assignment. An OPD supervisor explained that the index is needed to rank the work because often the people with the greatest need do not have the greatest voice. Also supporting the index, one CPAB member explained that the index is not perfect, but it leads to the most appropriate results and is very useful.

Table 2.2
Allocation and Coverage of Problem-Solving Relative to Beat Stress, 2006

Stress Level	Number of Beats	Possible PSO Days	Actual PSO Days	Allocation of PSO Days (%)	Coverage per Stress Level (%)
Low	35	7,280	863	30	12
Medium	9	1,872	425	15	23
High	13	2,704	1,583	55	59
Total	57	11,856	2,871	100	24

not expect the program to achieve full effects until it is fully implemented, and slower implementation also makes it more difficult to attribute outcomes to the PSO efforts.

Stability of PSO Assignment

An important way to assess whether PSOs are able to “provide consistent contact and familiarity between residents and officers, continuity in problem solving and basic availability of police response in each neighborhood” (Measure Y, 2004, p. 4) is by examining the extent to which PSOs are removed from their beats. OPD staff provided data regarding the reassignment and transfer of PSO staff between January and December 2006. According to these data, summarized in Table 2.3, OPD did not reassign any PSOs from one beat to another in 2006. However, various types of formal transfers (mostly extended sick leaves or modified duty due to injuries and loans to patrol) resulted in 16 occasions on which a PSO had to leave his or her assigned beat (one PSO’s sick leave actually began in December 2005, but it extended into 2006). Some of the transfers involved generalists who served multiple beats. In addition, all three PSO sergeants were loaned to patrol for approximately three months. According to OPD staff, officer time spent on patrol was paid for by the general fund, not Measure Y dollars.

The Scope of Community Policing Activities

The responsibilities of all PSOs are complex. Their shifts are a balancing act of competing priorities received from neighborhood community meetings, individual citizens, superior officers, and political leaders, as well as from their own neighborhood observations. They prioritize these demands on the basis of the urgency and the source of the request. Balancing the demands is further strained by departmental needs that fall outside the officers’ PSO duties, such as spending one of their four weekly shifts on patrol (a practice that ended on January 31, 2007) and assisting with emergency-call responses (as explained above, this occurs at their

Table 2.3
Reassignment and Transfers That Impacted the PSO Program, 2006

	Transfers					Total
	Reassignment of PSO Beat	Sick Leave/ Modified Duty	Loan to Patrol	Permanent Unit Change	Promotion	
PSO	0	7	4	3	2	16
PSO sergeant	—	0	3	0	0	3

NOTE: The total is not the number of individual PSOs but the number of times these changes affected a PSO. PSO loans to patrol lasted six weeks and are not related to the one day per week PSOs spent on patrol between April 1, 2006, and January 31, 2007. PSO sergeant loans to patrol lasted 12 weeks.

discretion and for some officers is a daily occurrence). Despite these demands, officers we interviewed were largely positive in their attitudes and committed to their duties.

Many officers had a hard time answering what a typical day is like as a PSO because there was no typical day. Nevertheless, they described a relatively consistent variety of activities. Different officers focus on some tasks more than others, depending on the direction of their supervisors, their own skills and experience, and the needs of their beats. As one officer explained:

There is no typical day after lineup; it changes every day. An example of a day could be: 1 day a week I do patrol, another day I may be trying to [eliminate drug activity from a specific house], another day narcotics enforcement, another day [working to reduce prostitution], another day municipal code violation (minor offenses, drinking in public, etc).

Many officers reported spending much of their time communicating with residents and responding to community requests. Yet both NCPC leaders and OPD supervisors expressed the desire for officers to spend less time in their cars and more time interacting with the community, e.g., walking in their beats and talking to residents.

Some NSCs and an OPD supervisor explained that PSOs and NSCs support each other in problem-solving and that each takes the lead depending on the type of problem needing attention. NSCs reported that such combined efforts went further in solving community problems than efforts by either group could go alone. They noted that most problems can be resolved without police involvement (and that the distribution of problem types varies by neighborhood), which means that to the extent that NSCs and NCPCs can help solve these problems, PSOs can focus on those that require police work. In this sense, the NSCs and NCPCs enable Measure Y money to be used more efficiently.

Still, PSOs spend much of their time addressing multiple, myriad issues widely defined as problems. They report working on anywhere from three to 15 problems at a time.¹⁶ These vary from arranging for cars to be towed and dealing with barking dogs to eliminating drug sales and use from houses. Some CPAB members believe PSOs are working on too many problems at once, making them less effective than they could be. Similarly, an OPD supervisor noted that PSOs should not be spending time towing cars and addressing issues that other parts of OPD are supposed to be handling.

PSOs also spend some of their time on what they refer to as “SARA projects.” These are longer-term projects that are supposed to have ongoing, central documentation and often involve drug arrests or neighborhood blight issues.¹⁷ According to one PSO, “We have SARA projects that we deal with—problem projects that you deal with and ultimately get results for. [SARA projects are] longer projects: an abandoned house where there is litter, broken cars maybe.” The database of SARA projects was one of the few sources of documentation of PSOs’ work that PSOs identified. However, although many mention the database, it is not used consistently.¹⁸ PSOs reportedly do not spend much time on these kinds of long-term problems.

¹⁶ One NSC reported that NSCs, who generally are responsible for more beats than PSOs, work on upward of 60 problems at any one time.

¹⁷ The NSCs explained that all the problems addressed by them and PSOs are SARA problems; it is just that some are chosen to be SARA projects for briefings that illustrate what the PSOs are doing.

¹⁸ We requested more-detailed information regarding the SARA projects and database but did not receive it. However, we hope to include such detail in future evaluation reports.

Community Relations

Consistent with the community-policing goals of Measure Y, all of the PSOs interviewed recognized that a central component of their responsibility is their relationship with the community. Even those with the least community interaction reported that they have community responsibilities that differentiate them from officers in other units. At a minimum, this means attendance at the monthly community meetings in their beat, which all PSOs understand is part of their job: “We go to community meetings. That’s probably the biggest piece—I tell them what’s going on in their place.”¹⁹ As some PSOs have more than one beat, this means attendance at all of the NCPC meetings in their assigned area. Most NCPC leaders reported that PSOs did indeed attend their meetings and that they were sometimes accompanied by sergeants or lieutenants, although a few reported that their meetings were not regularly attended by a PSO.

The few PSOs who reported problems with the meetings or with the NCPCs tended to be those who admitted certain deficiencies, such as “not being real good at the beat health stuff, community meetings, going and talking to a lot of folks and figuring out what their problems are.” However, most expressed appreciation for the people who helped run the meetings, and most saw their attendance as important for community perceptions of the police department, even though attendance was one more demand on their time. Most PSOs were positive about their supervisors’ attendance, although some reported that supervisors made unrealistic promises at meetings, which strained later relationships with the community when the PSO could not fulfill them.

Most PSOs viewed their position as very community-oriented, and several reported good relations with the people in their beats, although some NCPC leaders and an OPD supervisor wished to see the PSOs get out of their cars more frequently and interact more with the community. The best community relations were reported by PSOs who were in regular communication with, and available to, community members through e-mail or cell phones and who responded to those communications diligently. PSOs who were the least likely to be in close contact with members of the community and who were the most enforcement-oriented simply had less to report about community relations; this does not necessarily mean that relations were bad. Many PSOs were eager to help residents and expressed a desire for more participation from the community to help them meet the community’s needs. They particularly wished that more residents would be involved in community meetings. As one PSO with an apparently good community relationship stated:

My beat loves me. One of the problems is that, well, education. There’s probably 35,000 residents there, and the same 5 to 15 people come to the meetings. That’s the thing about community policing—there’s not much community coming.

Service Orientation

Most PSOs define their problem-solving duties as the leading, if not the entire, effort in the department’s community-policing strategy. Officers had the same general concept of commu-

¹⁹ OPD also requires patrol and crime-reduction-team officers to attend one neighborhood council meeting per quarter. An OPD respondent and some neighborhood council leaders believed this is not effective, because many attend the same meeting at the same time (somewhat overwhelming the NCPC), attend meetings that are not in their assigned areas, or do not participate in the meetings.

nity policing—positive relations with the community—but different specific ideas about what community policing as a PSO means. This is at least partly because different beats in the city have different policing needs, and also because officers have their own skills and experiences on which to draw. Most described regular communication with the community as a key element, ranging from a minimum of attending NCPC meetings up to keeping in regular e-mail or cell-phone contact with various members of the community. According to one PSO, “As community policing officers, we are trying to become that bridge between the police department and the community, trying to answer questions or provide information.”

At the same time, many PSOs reported having strong enforcement approaches to their positions and making more arrests as PSOs than when they are on patrol. One commented that it is difficult to solve problems when it is necessary to focus so much on enforcement.²⁰ Although many leaned toward a strong enforcement approach, there was a range, from “We’re real enforcement focused” to “You have to get supervisory approval for a lot of arrests—which is good.” This range is partly a reflection of the PSO’s beat, lieutenant, and skills. As one officer stated, “I’m pretty enforcement oriented, because that’s all I know how to do. But then you’ll have people in [other beats] who talk to merchants, etc.” Echoing the enforcement orientation, an OPD supervisor said:

They fall back into the standard way of police thinking—that they can arrest their way out of a problem. So they arrest more. I think their commanders think that too and encourage that. So part of it is to expose them to more resources to help them.

Many PSOs do not see the two approaches as necessarily being in conflict; they report having both strong enforcement and strong community-policing orientations. This reflects the lack of a hard and fast definition of community policing. There is sometimes a tension between the two approaches that reflects the lack of clarity about what is expected of the PSOs. As one officer said,

I think it was originally intended with a focus of community policing, but the powers that be want to see arrests, and it’s become more of that. I haven’t felt it directly, but some people have. And the fact is, there are people who terrorize a neighborhood, and if you arrest them, there will be a domino effect. But continued enforcement is really important, because there is always someone to replace them.

By definition, the decision about what strategy to use at a given moment is left largely to the discretion of the officer. As part of community policing, officers are charged with adopting the strategy that is appropriate to the problem at hand. In some instances, enforcement might be most appropriate; in others, working more directly with the community and other agencies might be most appropriate. What is not known is whether the PSOs’ assessments of what is needed is on target.

Some PSOs raised questions about change in the PSO unit and its autonomy over time. They mentioned that the unit serves the same function as other, now defunct, units (including a community-policing unit and a beat-health unit) but with a different name. Other PSOs saw

²⁰ CPAB members had mixed views of how OPD uses the PSOs. One noted that OPD views PSOs as bodies to use as it sees fit and that focusing on quality-of-life issues, which is what the community wants, is antithetical to the OPD’s focus on arrests. But another was impressed with OPD’s use of PSOs.

such an evolution continuing in that the unit would eventually take over the CRT unit. As one officer put it, “It’s been the same in new forms—community policing, CRT, now PSO, which is basically CRT working for the lieutenant. But they all fail because no one teaches you how to do it.” Similarly, one stated:

It’s a new unit, they’re still identifying what we do. . . . I think that down the line, they’ll probably turn us into a [unit focused on responding to issues related to drugs]. I think down the line, they’ll phase out CRT and have us pick it up. So you got the citizens to pay for what they already had—because they already had CRT.

An OPD supervisor agreed that many PSOs assume a CRT role (i.e., an enforcement approach, primarily as related to drug crimes), especially given CRT’s drastic understaffing (28 of 48 authorized officers), but that is acceptable if it is in their assigned beat.

Summary of Planned Versus Realized Implementation

It appears that progress has been made in implementing community policing, but it is still far from full implementation. Table 2.4 summarizes what our analysis revealed about whether and to what extent community policing has been implemented as intended. These findings, along with others described in the following sections, can serve as benchmarks for change in future evaluation reports.

Are Measure Y Resources Being Spent to Provide Services to the Target Communities?

As intended, Measure Y’s community-policing resources are being spent to provide services to the target communities, because every community in Oakland is part of community polic-

Table 2.4
Planned and Realized Implementation of Measure Y Community Policing

Item	Planned	Realized
Deployment and coverage		
Number of PSOs	57	34
Percentage of new officers assigned to Measure Y	40	37
Coverage within and across beats (percentage)	100	24
Allocation across beats	More in high-stress beats	Accomplished
Beats per PSO	Each of 57 beats has a dedicated PSO	25 beats have dedicated PSOs
Stability of PSO assignment	Beats have a consistent PSO	Beats frequently have their PSO transferred
Scope of community-policing activities	Wide range as needed	Wide range but scope is unclear
Community relations	Expected improvement	Improved in many beats, but varies
Service orientation	No overt plan	Varies from service to enforcement

ing.²¹ However, some communities receive more of these resources than others. The stressor index was created in part because it was not possible to fully implement the entire PSO program at once. Although there is debate about the validity of the index, it provided an objective means for assigning PSOs to beats as they joined the program and to alert communities (at least the ones that knew about it) about their position in line to receive a PSO.

As noted previously, just over half of the available PSO days (of both the Measure Y and general-fund PSOs) were spent in high-stress beats (although it is not possible to determine the extent to which each PSO actually spent this time in his or her beat), and PSO coverage was greatest in these beats. This suggests that OPD has implemented problem-solving efforts across beats of differing stress levels.

Many neighborhood council leaders were not clear about where Measure Y resources were going, as taxes continued to be collected while implementation was far from complete. A lack of transparency, perceived or real, about how resources were being spent resulted in public suspicion of city and OPD officials. This was made worse after reports that OPD had spent Measure Y resources on PSO wages for the days those officers were on patrol (the money was later returned to Measure Y coffers).

When asked how the unused PSO dollars are being spent, an OPD respondent explained that OPD's appropriation will begin to run a deficit starting in 2008 as a result of labor costs increasing at a higher rate than was estimated in the Measure Y funding (i.e., personnel costs increased more than expected and budgeted for). To make up this difference, OPD will allocate all previously unspent funds to cover the costs of PSOs in future years. As a result, the community will not eventually receive the amount of problem-solving that it failed to get because of staff shortages in these early years; perhaps more fundamentally, it raises the question of the long-term sustainability of deploying one PSO for each of the 57 beats as costs continue to rise. We requested but did not receive from the City Administrator's Office and OPD information regarding who determined the Measure Y funding amounts relative to PSO personnel, training, and equipment costs; the process for determining/estimating these costs; the substantive ways in which the funding has fallen short and the amount of funding that is actually needed; and whether OPD was ever expected to cover any Measure Y PSO costs from its existing budget.

What Are the Main Achievements of Programs Funded Through Measure Y?

One of the fundamental hopes of Oakland's voters is that community policing will help build partnerships and ultimately reduce violence. Although an outcomes assessment cannot be performed until later in the program, we explore initial achievements below. First, to provide meaningful context for understanding the environment in which the problem-solving efforts are taking place, we discuss Oakland's violence problem and how it is changing. This serves as a benchmark for success in later years.

²¹ This section addresses issues of allocating staff where they need to be, i.e., getting resources to the right areas. We focus more on the substantive activities on which resources are spent than on the actual dollars, because there is a separate formal and ongoing auditing process for Measure Y funds and activities. That process is discussed at each Measure Y Oversight Committee meeting. Further details about the Measure Y expenditures can be found in the minutes of those meetings at <http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/council/agendas-calendars.cfm>.

Changes in Violent-Crime Rates in 2006

Starting on October 23, 2006, we received weekly crime reports from OPD. Prior to that, OPD provided data on all crimes reported between August 1, 2004, and October 22, 2006. We combined all this information into a single database for analysis. We then defined police service areas (PSAs) based on the beat number listed for each crime, in accordance with OPD's beat districting.²² Using these data, we defined 14 categories of violent crime, based on the California penal code: murder, attempted murder, robbery, attempted robbery, assault, battery, rape, attempted rape, kidnapping, carjacking, shooting at building/vehicle, child abuse, elder abuse, and domestic violence. Appendix B provides the penal codes used for these definitions.

The data we present include more types of violent crimes than are included in other reports. Nonetheless, our data still may not reflect all the violence in Oakland. As in any analysis of crime, the offenses listed are only those reported to OPD, and many crimes go unreported to the police.²³ The extent of underreporting of other crimes can vary substantially from year to year. Homicide figures are less vulnerable to underreporting and are therefore generally considered more reliable than data on other crimes. Also, the crime frequencies in this analysis are not consistent with other violent-offense types and estimates the city has prepared or reviewed previously—e.g., in OPD, February 13, 2007; Measure Y, 2006; Department of Human Services and OPD, April 12, 2005—for two reasons. First, our violent-offense types are generally more inclusive of specific crimes than those used elsewhere, so our estimates are likely to be higher. To be as comprehensive as possible, we examined every offense in the dataset for possible inclusion in a particular offense type. Including more offenses provides a larger picture of violence and increases the likelihood of seeing broad changes that may have occurred. It is likewise true that changes in specific crime occurrences can offset others within the offense type (e.g., one type of assault can increase, while another decreases, thereby masking their individual variation); this is always a risk when crimes are summed to form an index.

Second, for unknown reasons, many offenses were not assigned a valid beat number, so they could not be attributed to a specific PSA. We separated violent crimes without confirmed beats into a distinct category in all the analyses broken down to the PSA level so that the way we accounted for them would be clear and to illustrate change in reporting over time. We do not know how our approach compares to other offense summaries, because whether or how these offenses have been counted by others is not clear.

It is hoped that problem-solving will help reduce violence through sustained, concerted, and focused action among all the problem-solving participants. To get a sense of the effort this entails, it is helpful to explore the extent and characteristics of the violence problem and how it is changing as problem-solving officers are deployed. A total of 15,320 violent crimes in Oakland were reported to police in 2006, an increase of 20.8 percent over the 12,687 reported

²² PSA 1 (West Oakland) includes beats 01X, 02X, 02Y, 03X, 03Y, 04X, 05X, 05Y, 06X, and 07X; PSA 2 (North Oakland) includes beats 08X, 09X, 10X, 10Y, 11X, 12X, 12Y, 13X, 13Y, and 13Z; PSA 3 (San Antonio) includes beats 14X, 14Y, 15X, 16X, 16Y, 17X, 17Y, 18X, 18Y, and 19X; PSA 4 (Fruitvale) includes beats 20X, 21X, 21Y, 22X, 22Y, 23X, 24X, 24Y, 25X, and 25Y; PSA 5 (Central East Oakland) includes beats 26X, 26Y, 27X, 27Y, 28X, 29X, 30X, and 30Y; and PSA 6 (East Oakland) includes beats 31X, 31Y, 31Z, 32X, 32Y, 33X, 34X, 35X, and 35Y.

²³ For discussions about how crime is measured, why crimes go unreported, and problems measuring crime, see Mosher, Miethe, and Philips (2002); Duffee et al. (2000); and MacKenzie, Baunach, and Roberg (1990).

in 2005.²⁴ More violent offenses were reported in 2006 than in 2005 in all categories except kidnapping, which declined slightly. Table 2.5 shows the numbers of violent crimes reported in Oakland in 2005 and 2006. The largest increases were in shooting at occupied buildings or vehicles (87.1 percent), murder (61.4 percent), and attempted rape (37.5 percent). The most common types of violent crime—robbery, assault, battery, and domestic violence—all increased markedly in 2006.

The volume of violence and its dynamic nature could affect the implementation of community policing, for example, by creating difficulties in prioritizing and managing problem-solving activities. Given that strategic, focused efforts are generally more effective than efforts aimed more broadly (a fundamental premise of problem-oriented policing), the extent to which crime is concentrated may influence problem-solving effectiveness. Since violence in Oakland was not concentrated within any particular type of offense, it is useful to further unravel the nature of violence to determine whether it or its increase is concentrated geographically. Figure 2.3 shows the number of violent crimes reported in 2005 and 2006 for each of the six PSAs in Oakland and those for which a PSA could not be assigned, showing that each experienced an increase. Although fewer violent crimes were reported in PSAs 2 and 3 than in others in both 2005 and 2006, the rate of increase was virtually identical across all six PSAs. Appendix C provides a more detailed summary of violence at the PSA level.


New PSOs have been deployed during this across-the-board upswing in violence in Oakland, which makes focusing their efforts and having a strategic impact all the more difficult. The overall 20.8 percent increase in violent crimes reported in 2006 compared with those reported in 2005 was not driven by a single PSA or a single type of crime. The increases in total violent crimes reported in each PSA were all within 3.1 percent of the city total. The same was true for reported violent crimes where the PSA was unknown. While there were variations between PSAs about which violent crimes were reported more or less often in 2006

Table 2.5
Numbers of Violent Crimes Reported in Oakland, 2005 and 2006

Offense Type	2005	2006	% Change
Murder	88	142	61.4
Attempted murder	13	14	7.7
Robbery	2,657	3,406	28.2
Attempted robbery	291	338	16.2
Assault	2,083	2,726	30.9
Battery	2,343	2,654	13.3
Rape	460	516	12.2
Attempted rape	8	11	37.5
Kidnapping	342	339	-0.9
Carjacking	343	389	13.4
Shooting at building/vehicle	278	520	87.1
Child abuse	829	981	18.3
Elder abuse	51	68	33.3
Domestic violence	2,901	3,216	10.9
All violent offenses	12,687	15,320	20.8

²⁴ About 8 percent of the violent offenses that occurred between 2005 and 2006 reportedly took place at five locations within the city.

Figure 2.3
Violent Crimes Reported in Oakland, 2005 and 2006, by PSA



RAND TR546-2.3

than in 2005, the overall trend was upward, particularly for the most commonly reported violent crimes.

Perceived Evidence of Progress and Success

Several CPAB members claimed that community policing is not working well, citing evidence such as rising violence, poor community participation in NCPCs, and OPD's emphasis on patrol and limited community dialog. Some NSCs suggested that community policing has only somewhat helped to coordinate city services, in part because their positions, like those of the PSOs, are not fully staffed. They also felt their communication with the PSOs has been reduced because their offices have been relocated from the Eastmont police substation, from which PSOs work, to City Hall.

However, many PSOs believe they are building relationships with their communities, and NCPC leaders confirm that they and other residents have been empowered by community policing through increased information about city services, crime, community mobilization, and leadership training. Other CPAB members and NSCs pointed to various indicators of progress, such as the responsiveness of OPD and its improved ability to meet effectively with community groups, improved police-community partnerships in solving problems, greater coordination of city services, the community's feeling of inclusion, connections NSCs are forming with communities, and the dedication and training of PSOs. NCPC leaders also pointed to the personal accountability of the PSOs as a significant success. Some CPAB members and NSCs also felt that although it was not the norm, community policing was working extremely well in isolated areas; and NCPC leaders said the same of the relationships between the community groups and PSOs. Both OPD and the CPAB referred to the collaboration between the Youth UpRising program and OPD as a major accomplishment that is breaking down barriers between the police and Oakland's youth.

Many PSOs, CPAB members, NSCs, and NCPC leaders reported observing a positive impact from recent community-policing activities; others did not observe this impact or felt it was not significant, in part because there were not enough PSOs.²⁵ It is important to note that at that time, a number of PSOs had been in the PSO unit for less than six months, perhaps not long enough to make any impact. Some of those who did report a positive impact described it as limited or temporary and as hard to measure. When asked about seeing initial impacts, one PSO said, “Oh yeah, oh yeah. But now new bad guys are popping up. I basically weeded a few guys, and new weeds came up.” A CPAB member also explained that problems go away but then come back or move to another location, which suggests that the root causes of the problems have not been alleviated. Specific accomplishments reported include lowering crime in “hot-spots,” reducing liquor sales, cleaning up blighted properties, and eliminating drug sales in individual houses (frequently cited by many OPD personnel), which led to less garbage, drug use, and auto burglary.

What Implementation Challenges Do Programs Face?

Staffing and PSO Stability

Incomplete staffing of PSOs specifically and of OPD in general was the main implementation challenge described by most stakeholders. The staffing shortage limited the ability to do problem-solving and led to community mistrust of city officials and OPD. This challenge and its detriments cannot be overstated. While many respondents expressed frustration with the police staffing shortage, this frustration was not necessarily aimed at OPD. Most simply viewed it as an unfortunate fact. Others expressed frustration with the City Council for mandating the hiring freeze in 2003 and not taking steps to correct the consequences. Among other things, the OPD staffing shortage requires beats to share PSOs, causes frequent turnover among officers, and results in insufficient numbers of other police in the community (e.g., patrol, CRTs, detectives)—all of which respondents see as antithetical to community policing.

The PSOs’ frustration was often on behalf of the department in general (e.g., patrol officers), whose duties are also affected (e.g., they were sometimes unable to set up a drug raid because the CRT was too busy). As one CPAB member put it, “[OPD] is tryin’ to do a whole lot of somethin’ with a little bit of nothin’”—and this is one of the reasons another member felt the board should not be overly critical of OPD. The CPAB generally agrees that the PSOs who are working are well-chosen, dedicated, and are doing the best they can given their less-than-desirable circumstances and that full staffing of both patrol officers and PSOs is needed.

Related to staffing was rotation or inconsistency in PSO assignments to a beat. Many of those we interviewed identified this as a major challenge to community participation, as well as to the integration of OPD with other city services for reducing violence. Although OPD contends that it has rarely reassigned PSOs and that it does so to “fill holes” in higher-stressed beats, several NSCs, NCPC leaders, and CPAB members claim their officers are removed rather frequently, and this significantly inhibits their ability to build effective partnerships with their communities. According to one NSC, one of her beats had three different officers

²⁵ Illustrating the frustration (and apparent desperation) of some residents, one NCPC leader regarded community policing as a complete failure because there has been no improvement (i.e., reduction) in her beat’s priority—drug dealing on a specific corner—in 10 years.

within 15 months. Reportedly, transition is so frequent that one neighborhood group refers to the PSO program as the “officer of the month club.” Our earlier analysis of PSO reassignments and transfers permits a comparison between stakeholder perceptions and officially recorded data. As Table 2.3 illustrates, there were no officially recorded assignments in 2006. However, on 16 separate occasions, a beat lost its PSO due to some kind of transfer.

Preparation and Training

The successful implementation of any initiative is dependent on ensuring that staff members in the new program are prepared for their work. For the problem-solving unit, this means that PSOs need to be clear about their responsibilities and trained in how to fulfill them. An OPD supervisor stated:

The PSOs are taught to improve conditions on their beat. The overarching question is if they would recommend someone buy a house in that neighborhood—anything that affects that decision is what they should do; but the difficulty is getting them to understand they don’t have to do it all themselves.

This is, of course, a very broad mandate.

Consequently, a majority of the PSOs we interviewed—including some who had received PSO training—had little clarity about job expectations from immediate supervisors, peers, or the department in general.²⁶ Many reported that they needed a clear definition of the goals and duties of the position. As one PSO stated, “The problem with Measure Y is that nobody tells you what to do. They hire you, but they don’t tell you how to do it.” Those who had been in the position less than six months expressed the greatest confusion (likely partly because none of them had completed the PSO training, as explained below). Experience in the PSO unit also provided some clarity, although several PSOs remained doubtful about whether they were doing the right thing, and this frustrated them because they wanted to fulfill their duties. Part of the difficulty in defining the PSO position is that different areas of the city have different needs and require different solutions. Thus, a clear definition also needs to include a range of possible actions.

Experiences with training were more mixed, in terms of both having received training and being satisfied with the training received. Those who had received training were generally satisfied with it. However, some who had completed the training wanted more focus and direction in their jobs or in the training itself. Others wanted further training as new issues emerged; as one PSO explained, “Honestly, the best thing I can say is you can’t get enough training. Because even if you think you know something, it keeps requiring training.” Many PSOs expressed frustration with the lack of formal training. Some reported that all PSOs had received formal problem-solving training—that it was standard procedure; however, others said they had not received it. Newer PSOs who had been in their positions for several months had not yet had any formal training. Some PSOs who had been in their positions for longer than six months also reported having received no problem-solving training. None of the PSOs we interviewed was using problem-solving resources from outside OPD, nor had they been

²⁶ A CPAB member echoed this sentiment, noting that “problem-solving officers want to do well but they don’t know how—they are mostly using common sense without training.”

made aware of such resources (e.g., problem-solving and best-practices guides, problem-solving conferences).

Like OPD, many police departments that conduct problem-solving encourage the use of the SARA model. Although many PSOs reported that they were familiar with the SARA model, they described it in ways that did not suggest a detailed understanding. One stated, “Yes [I’ve had SARA training], but a few years ago for something else. A lot is common sense.” When prompted, the PSOs were unable to identify examples of the four stages of the SARA model—scanning, analysis, response, and assessment—in their work. Therefore, it does not appear that they regularly use it.

Community Participation

One observation that is universal among all the community-policing stakeholders is that there is a need for greater community involvement. Lack of involvement is thought to result from a range of factors, including language and technological barriers, lack of interest, fear of retaliation, lack of awareness, and frustration with the transition of PSOs. Some of these factors are more relevant in some beats than in others; fear of retaliation, for example, was reported more often by those living or working in high-stress beats. Improving participation requires reaching out to people who have generally not participated directly in the community-policing process. According to NCPC chairs, the NSCs, and the PSOs, this includes the business community, youths and seniors, those with limited English proficiency, and various city entities.²⁷ For many constituents in the high-stress beats, participation reportedly consists of calling the police when there is a problem but does not involve working with NCPCs or even attending meetings.

Improving participation also means reaching out in ways that go beyond electronic communications, because many residents do not have access to computers. A small core group of attendees maintains the process, and there is a small fluid group of participants who attend only when they have a specific issue to raise. There are more city staff than community residents at some NCPC meetings. As NSCs and NCPC leaders attest, part of the difficulty of getting people involved, particularly in high-stress beats, is that some residents have been labeled as snitches for participating in community meetings, and they fear retaliation from those who commit crimes.

NSCs felt that in addition to improving safety to enhance participation, publicizing their resources and those of the NCPC, as well as problem-solving successes, would help. More fundamentally, others reported that many neighborhood residents ceased to participate in the NCPC and in crime prevention in general because PSOs changed so often that the benefit did

²⁷ Although the roles of CPAB members, NSCs, and various city employees are already part of the community-policing process, many felt they could be enhanced. NSCs claimed that if it was not for the CPAB, there probably would be no NSCs, NCPCs, or PSOs. However, they felt that the CPAB should increase its role in the community and create a selection mechanism (to replace the appointment process) so that members would more fully represent the needs and desires of their communities. To increase the CPAB’s effectiveness and legitimacy, some members and NCPC leaders agreed that communities should have a say in nominating board members, and the positions should have fixed term limits. Similarly, NCPC leaders were mixed in their reports of the effectiveness of their NSCs. Some described great relationships with their NSCs, regarded them as excellent information sources, and claimed that they fulfill an important support role. Others reported that their NSCs seemed to do little and were unresponsive to their requests. NSCs also noted the problem of some city workers being “9-to-5ers” who do not want to participate in meetings when communities request that they do so.

not outweigh the amount of time it took to teach the new PSO all he or she needed to know about the neighborhood.

Meeting Community Expectations

PSOs believe that the community was promised more from the problem-solving program than it was possible for them to deliver. This was frustrating for many, who said their efforts to help the community were thwarted by the fact that what community members expected from them was often not what they could do: “If we could narrow down expectations, we could be more effective. We are given that latitude to [narrow down what a problem is,] but the sale of the program is not that, it’s ‘bring your problems to us.’”²⁸ NSCs reported that the community often has unrealistic ideas about what kinds and numbers of problems they and PSOs can address and how quickly they can address them. Not all members of the community had unrealistic expectations, however; some were sympathetic to PSOs’ being spread thin. At the same time, PSOs reported that others expected an officer to be available to them all of the time.

Prioritizing Problems

Prioritizing the demands from the community and the command staff, as well as their own understanding of their beats (which might come from crime data or from their work there), is something the PSOs learn to negotiate on their own, because there is no set rule. As one PSO advised, “It’s supposed to be from the NCPC—the three priority areas they give you. Sometimes, it comes from command. Sometimes, it comes from crime trends. Personally, I find a problem I think is important.”

Six of the 14 PSOs interviewed noted frequent encounters with city officials, usually members of the City Council, in which the officials requested them to work on a particular problem. Sometimes, officials call the PSO directly, and other times they contact a higher OPD official (a sergeant, lieutenant, or even the chief), and the request moves down the chain of command to the PSO. One PSO explained, “City Council members get a complaint and get involved in police business all the time. They tell the lieutenant and then it comes to me.” Such requests make it difficult for PSOs to focus on problems identified by their communities. They ultimately take time away from the top three priorities set by their NCPCs to respond to requests that come down through the chain of command.

Equipment

Nearly all PSOs and OPD supervisors expressed a desire for more or better equipment. In particular, officers expressed frustration that the equipment they needed was either not available, inadequate, or not fully functional, and that their input on needs has not been taken into account. Several mentioned that they lacked cars, radios, cameras, binoculars, video equipment, a citywide working radio network, and a computer network for their laptops. Equipment that they did have, including radios and cars, was subject to frequent malfunction. As one officer stated,

Obstacles? Equipment—we have the worst equipment. You can’t get a car half the time. Half the time the computers are down, radios don’t work, etc. There’s always going to be

²⁸ Similarly, a CPAB member and some NSCs commented that the label “PSO” is problematic because it assumes that every area has problems and that every problem, large or small, should be brought to the PSO.

problems—equipment, manpower—if you could just make the equipment that we have work.

An OPD supervisor surmised that the creators of Measure Y never contemplated whether \$500,000 per year (as mandated in the legislation) would be enough for equipment, maintenance, and training. Over the past year, the largest share of this allocation was used to purchase and equip police vehicles.²⁹ OPD paid \$52,000 per vehicle (equipped with a gun rack, a cage, a trunk organizer, wiring, emergency lights and sirens, and in-car video), along with a police radio and laptop (the price does not include routine maintenance or replacement costs of the vehicle). Each officer also received a Blackberry cell phone and a Taser. There was not enough funding available to purchase enough cars for all the officers, even if two shared a car, let alone all the other needed equipment and training. In future years, OPD expects most of the available funding to be allocated to operating and maintaining the cars; operation and maintenance will cost about \$6,000 per vehicle (not counting replacement costs or collision repair), leaving little for training and other equipment. CPAB members also echo the need for more vehicles. As noted earlier, we requested but did not receive from the city information regarding who determined the Measure Y funding amounts relative to PSO equipment costs; the process for determining/estimating these costs; the substantive ways in which the funding has fallen short of the amount that is actually needed; and whether OPD was ever expected to cover any Measure Y PSO costs from its existing budget.

Internal Partnerships and Coordination

PSOs, particularly those whose beats border each other, reported working with each other often. They work much less often with officers who are not PSOs. Some reported working with a CRT, usually as a support to it. As one explained, “We try to work on our own. If we need the expertise we’d call. But more often, they [CRTs] call us.” More broadly, as recognized by PSOs, OPD supervisors, CPAB members, and NCPC leaders, overall activities do not appear to be coordinated among the PSOs, CRTs, patrol officers, and other parts of OPD. Some PSOs reported that they do not know when a CRT is engaging in efforts to reduce crime in their assigned beat and the CRTs do not know what the PSOs are doing, while others reported that the two groups communicate at least some of the time. One respondent summed it up by stating communication is good between officers but horrible between units. Several CPAB members and many others at OPD (PSOs and other OPD staff) commented that patrol officers and PSOs currently do not work closely together, which is largely due to the way OPD is organized and to patrol officers’ need to constantly respond to calls for service. An OPD supervisor also attributed patrol officers’ lack of engagement as a function of the negotiated settlement agreement, lack of leadership, and the bifurcated system of generalized and specialized officers.

Tracking Problem-Solving Activities

PSOs complete daily activity logs, which OPD supervisors review and summarize, but problem-centered tracking is largely random and inconsistent. An OPD supervisor explained that projects are supposed to be recorded in the Beat Management Information System (BIMS) (what the officers referred to as the SARA project database). Yet PSOs report that the database con-

²⁹ The vehicles purchased were supposed to be delivered in January but were not delivered until August 2007. Effects of this equipment will not be evident until the second year of evaluation.

tains a small and select set of problems that have unclear criteria for inclusion, is used inconsistently, and is not consulted later. Moreover, it does not capture the activities on which PSOs spend most of their time.

Buy-In

Support from the chief executive is a prerequisite for the successful implementation of community policing and problem-solving (Skogan, 2004; Goldstein, 1990). Most officers were reluctant to offer a strong opinion about support from the police chief and senior leaders of the department for community policing and the PSO unit. They explained that they have little contact with senior leaders. Despite the reluctance, many PSOs believe that senior staff support community policing and problem-solving and want it to succeed. As one officer put it, “Who knows. [The chief] had nothing but good things to say, but who knows if he believes it. I think they want it to be successful.” Members of the CPAB varied in their view of OPD’s commitment to community policing. Some felt the senior leaders believed in it, and others felt that they did not. At least one CPAB member assessed that it differed within the department—that some of the ranking officers believed in it, but others did not. NSCs noted a lack of support from OPD, which they felt was troubling, because experience in Oakland has shown that there is a direct positive correlation between support from senior OPD leaders and effective community policing.

Despite these various accounts, Chief Tucker and Mayor Dellums have taken public stands in support of community policing (Office of the Mayor, 2007; Tucker, 2006). CPAB members and NSCs went further, explaining that for community policing to work, it needs to be honestly and fully supported by all city leaders.

The Negotiated Settlement Agreement

Many PSOs expressed frustration with the results of the negotiated settlement agreement³⁰ for their day-to-day tasks. They felt that increased levels of documentation were particularly burdensome and limited the work they could accomplish.³¹ Officers also mentioned a decline in the risks they were willing to take (and therefore a decline in the crime that would be solved), because they were afraid that the department would not support them as it had in the past. A CPAB member disagreed, arguing that the settlement agreement has been positive, that no serious crime is going overlooked by OPD, and that the grumbling is largely on the part of senior officers who will eventually get used to the changes in procedure. Similarly, an NCPC leader concluded that OPD is better off with it, but that it is a challenge.

³⁰ Implemented after the “Riders” police misconduct scandal, the negotiated settlement agreement is an oversight measure meant to enhance organizational reform in OPD. The agreement was recently extended to 2010 (Lee, 2007; MacDonald, 2007b).

³¹ As an illustrative example, one NCPC leader pointed to the arrest of a juvenile who was found holding a marijuana cigarette in a stolen vehicle. The officers reportedly spent four-and-a-half hours doing paperwork outside his house. The NCPC leader could not attribute the paperwork to the settlement agreement, but he used the example to suggest that too much paperwork inhibits police productivity. Another explained that it takes an officer about three hours to process a truant, which makes it difficult for the police to focus on that problem.

How Are These Challenges Being Addressed?

Staffing and PSO Stability

We have not learned of any activities on the part of OPD to minimize the impact of PSO transfers, but we learned about several ways OPD has attempted to improve its staffing experience. Without full PSO staffing, OPD has attempted to assign PSOs according to the stressor index. While very few NCPC leaders knew of the index, most understood that in a shortage, higher-crime neighborhoods were more likely to get a PSO, and lower-crime neighborhoods were more likely to share one. Much of OPD's efforts appear focused on addressing the overall shortages within the organization. As noted above, OPD has pulled PSOs out of their beats to address other needs of the department, such as patrol. Similarly, through its planned reorganization (discussed below), OPD will staff patrol with all the recruits from the next two academies and will not transfer any officers to the PSO program. This, of course, helps to alleviate some problems, such as responding to calls for service, but it also creates other challenges, such as straining the relationship with communities that want to see the PSO program fully implemented and in action.

The final way OPD has attempted to improve its staffing experience is through the development and implementation of a multilevel recruitment plan aimed at boosting the number of police applicants and the ability to process them. Although the plan is focused on staffing broadly, increasing the number of new staff could indirectly improve OPD's ability to deploy officers to Measure Y positions. According to OPD personnel, this plan, developed in partnership with the city's Office of Personnel Resource Management, involves identifying a target audience (i.e., physically fit Oakland residents who reflect the demographics of the city and who may have an interest in a police career) and developing a recruiting plan aimed at them.

With the assistance of an advertising agency, the recruitment team developed a campaign entitled "It's More Than You Think," which included various tag lines and multimedia advertisements (e.g., on buses and bus shelters, billboards, BART platforms, local and cable television, multiethnic print media, the Bay Bridge, and the police administration building) that showcased OPD's positive attributes and need for officers. To facilitate information exchange and the hiring process, the recruitment team established monthly information seminars and testing dates and also improved the placement of OPD information on the city's web page. Recruitment efforts have also included information exchanges at all Oakland high schools and colleges, a revamped lateral recruitment strategy, an increase in the cadet program, and attempts to attract college students and those transitioning from military service (Finance and Management Agency and OPD, 2007). The OPD staff has also begun reviewing its selection process to identify additional activities that show promise for improving recruitment (Oakland Police Department, 2007a).

OPD began its systematic recruitment campaign in 2006. Given the time it takes to process and train recruits, if the campaign ultimately results in more officers deployed, the effect may be visible in 2006 but would more likely be evident in 2007. As noted above, a staffing analysis is not part of the Measure Y evaluation, so we did not collect data to formally assess any of OPD's recruitment challenges or efforts. However, OPD provided some data regarding academies and training that may help to indicate whether more officers are entering the ranks of OPD. In 2005, three academies and one lateral class started training, resulting in 45 officers ultimately completing field training. In 2006, four academies and one lateral class started training, resulting in 89 officers who ultimately completed field training. Of the classes that

began over this time period, OPD nearly doubled its new officer deployments (data for 2007 are not yet complete). While certainly a positive indication, our limited review cannot speak to whether these numbers are as high as they should be to address OPD's staff shortage or if effort would be better placed on other recruitment and retention strategies. In regard to retention, OPD reports a high attrition rate, due largely to baby-boomer retirements, and it says that the retirement formula has created a statewide crisis that it alone cannot address (Oakland Police Department, 2007a). As a result, OPD staff focuses on recruiting efforts and emphasizes the Employee Referral Program (Oakland Police Department, 2007a).

Preparation and Training

Shortly after we completed our PSO interviews, OPD held another "PSO school" and has been conducting training during lineups (internal briefings and discussions that occur at the beginning of each shift). According to OPD personnel, all PSOs (except one who was on long-term leave) have now received formal problem-solving training. This training, developed in partnership by OPD and the CPAB, is a one-week course that includes 32 30- to 90-minute modules.³² In partnership with the Youth UpRising community program, OPD also developed a class on tactical communication with youth, which all officers in the strategic-area command (including the PSOs) completed. This class taught officers how to talk with youth while simultaneously exposing them to police officers and police work. CPAB members argued for the expansion of PSO training on how to establish and partner with communities, how to solve problems with the community, and human relations (e.g., how people make decisions and how their actions are interpreted by the community).³³ An OPD supervisor explained that because of resource limitations, PSOs need to develop expertise in certain areas (e.g., crime prevention through environmental design) rather than all being trained in specific techniques. The challenge, as NSCs point out, is that PSOs with specialized training are sometimes reassigned elsewhere in OPD, and the communities lose that resource.

Community Participation

NSCs and NCPC leaders have tried to encourage community participation by making it safer and more accessible. Where possible, NSCs have used translation services to create documents that can be read by some of their non-English-speaking constituents. However, the lack of translated communications for all of Oakland's residents is a significant issue that they advise needs attention. To encourage participation where safety was a concern, a few NCPC leaders have arranged safe places for residents to meet with the police (usually, but not always, the PSO) to avoid being seen by criminals who might retaliate against them. However, these arrangements usually address particular incidents; trying to make regular NCPC meetings safe from criminal retaliation (where this is a concern) is problematic, because the meetings are

³² Topics include how to interact and partner with residents and community organizations, SARA and problem-solving methods, specific types of issues (e.g., nuisance abatement, domestic violence, street-level narcotics, gangs, video and audio piracy, tobacco enforcement), departmental databases and internet research, and ethics. Recent lineup training includes the service delivery system and interagency teams, code compliance and nuisance abatement, alcoholic beverage action teams, liquor-license enforcement, and briefings from various social service organizations about their services.

³³ CPAB members, NSCs, and NCPC leaders also highlighted the need for more NCPC and neighborhood-watch training about city services, their roles in problem-solving, and how to advocate for themselves. There were differing opinions about whether the CPAB or OPD should provide this training to the community. NCPC leaders also felt the PSOs and NSCs needed more training.

public. NSCs have also reached out to the communities, organized trainings for groups, and provided information to encourage residents to participate, rather than relying solely on OPD. PSO involvement in these activities is limited by staff shortages.

Meeting Community Expectations

To clarify expectations of community policing, NSCs have worked with NCPCs and neighborhood-watch groups to explain the roles of the groups, of the NSCs, and of the PSOs. PSOs have attempted to clarify expectations at NCPC meetings, but they have found this complicated by fluid community participation and superiors who continue to make promises that are difficult for them to deliver. They feel that supervisors would be more helpful if they educated the community on the PSOs' role and set realistic expectations of what they can accomplish.

Prioritizing Problems

In many instances, sergeants have relieved PSOs of the need to respond to city officials' requests directly by filtering those requests through their own desks. This has usually happened after a PSO has spent time fielding a number of such requests. The sergeants also filtered requests from lieutenants, captains, and the chief, which enabled PSOs to concentrate on their neighborhood tasks with fewer interruptions. Generally, PSOs believe even greater supervisory involvement would be helpful to limit the scope of the problems they are to address and to prioritize competing demands.

Equipment

Equipment remains a challenge, but OPD has tried to maximize what it can accomplish with the equipment funding provided by Measure Y. According to an OPD supervisor, the city's Public Works Department initially tried to charge OPD \$79,000 per package of equipped vehicle, police radio, and laptop when it sought them for the PSOs. OPD researched other options and ultimately was able to negotiate the aforementioned package price of \$52,000 per vehicle. OPD still struggles with the equipment needs of the PSOs, but the ability to save resources from the cost of vehicles helped, at least in the short run.

Internal Partnerships and Coordination

There are at least three ways OPD has attempted to improve coordination among those contributing to effective community policing. First, OPD argued that requiring PSOs to respond to calls for service one day per week to alleviate patrol would improve coordination between the problem-solving and patrol officers. As discussed previously, this was a controversial strategy that OPD ultimately abandoned.

Second, to facilitate communication between PSOs and NSCs, OPD instituted weekly meetings at the Eastmont station. The NSCs reported that this was a very useful program but that such communication needs to occur more frequently.

Finally, On March 7, 2007, Mayor Dellums and OPD Chief Tucker announced that OPD was reorganizing into from three to five districts (Heredia, 2007; MacDonald, 2007a).³⁴ Following the recommendations of a report prepared by Harnett Associates,³⁵ each district

³⁴ Ultimately, OPD decided to reorganize into three districts (Oakland Police Department, 2007b).

³⁵ At the end of 2006, outgoing Mayor Jerry Brown commissioned an assessment of OPD by Harnett Associates (Harnett, Rosenzweig, and Andrews, 2006). The report argued that OPD's reliance on the watch-commander system, which is geared

captain will command the district's patrol officer, PSO, and CRT resources. OPD also plans to deploy all the officers graduating from the next two police academies to patrol and will not be assigning any of these officers to the problem-solving unit. Most CPAB members and OPD supervisors believe this is a positive step, although one OPD supervisor felt it would be better to fully implement the PSOs prior to the reorganization. They contend that the Strategic Area Command, which currently administers the PSOs and CRTs (among other units), is at odds with community policing's geographic focus and the reorganization will help with accountability and discretion, that PSOs should be assigned to districts (so they can communicate with all district NCPCs and cover for other PSOs when they are unavailable, although an OPD supervisor noted that PSOs would always be assigned to their beat), and that it is desirable to prioritize staffing for patrol.

However, one CPAB member admitted that the community has a legitimate "beef" in that OPD has not delivered community policing as mandated, and the reorganization is a further step away from doing so.³⁶ Contending that it would help build community trust, NCPC leaders reiterated their interest in seeing community policing implemented fully without constant changes so that it would be possible to determine whether it works. They feel that because OPD continuously reorganizes and alters the implementation of its services, there is never a chance to fully implement and assess the effectiveness of community policing.

Tracking Problem-Solving Activities

Little progress has been made on improving problem-tracking at this time. An OPD supervisor explained that OPD enhanced its beat information-management system (the SARA project database) to track larger issues (beyond a single address), but that the PSOs need more training on how to use it. At the time of our interviews, PSOs did not appear to be regularly documenting their efforts. Agreeing that documentation needs to improve, the NSCs also noted that they collect no official information about their problem-solving activities. However, they referred to a new problem-tracking system that was to be implemented, which would require them to input their communities' priorities on a spreadsheet.

Buy-In

Some stakeholders perceive less than full support for community policing by key OPD officials. Regardless of whether perception is reality, many believe the new mayor is a proponent of community policing, and his support will translate into greater overall support by OPD. Chief Tucker also has made public statements affirming his support for community policing.

Negotiated Settlement Agreement

It is expected that officers will adjust to the new processes associated with the settlement agreement over time. Yet the actual extent to which it negatively influences behavior and how long it might do so is unclear, nor do we know whether this concern will be addressed in any way.

around patrol, removes geographic accountability. Among other recommendations, it suggested that OPD should instead create four to six police districts and that each district should be commanded by a captain who would control all patrol officer, PSO, and CRT resources in the district.

³⁶ Another CPAB member explained that patrol officers are taught patrol—not community policing—so it is a mistake for OPD to say it understands community policing and then say patrol comes first.

Do the Individuals Being Served Appreciate and Benefit from the Programs?

NSCs believe that neighborhood residents both appreciate and benefit from community policing. However, because of the limited roll-out of the PSO program, much of this benefit comes from other aspects of community policing, particularly the city services called in by the NSC to help solve problems.

Many NCPC leaders reported positive outcomes resulting from the work of their PSOs and were appreciative of this. They described collaborative efforts of PSOs, NCPCs, and NSCs to shut down a blighted property, reduce liquor sales, and improve community relations, for example, and they viewed these as evidence of the program's success. Some also described benefits from the training that OPD offered to residents, which they found quite helpful, especially in understanding the role of the PSOs. Yet at least as often, NCPC leaders reported seeing little or even no effect of the PSOs on ongoing problems (e.g., blighted properties) or community relations (e.g., interacting with the residents and businesses), because their PSO was either unproductive or unavailable. They were unhappy with the program, as many had had high hopes for its effectiveness when Measure Y passed. A number of NCPC leaders were reserving judgment until the program is fully staffed, believing that they will benefit from it, although they have no evidence to date.

Violence-Prevention Programs

Introduction

A key component of Measure Y and of violence prevention in general is the prevention of new crimes. Measure Y provides funds not only for the community-policing program, but also for a full set of community programs designed to prevent teenagers and young adults from engaging in criminal activity. Some of these programs are aimed at youth who have never committed a crime, while others focus on individuals who are on probation or are returning from prison and at risk of further crimes. All of the grants are supervised by DHS.

Measure Y focuses these programs on the youth who are most at risk of criminal activity or of becoming victims of crime themselves. We know from previous research that at-risk youth include those with a history of academic failure or peer-group delinquency, males, and those living under conditions such as parental criminality, family conflict, poverty, and community crime and dysfunction (Hawkins et al., 2000; U.S. Public Health Service, 2001).¹ Because the antecedents of youth violence and youth victimization are multidimensional, multifaceted interventions that target several risk factors simultaneously have a greater probability of lasting impact (Hawkins et al., 2000).

One of the strongest predictors of future criminal activity is past criminal activity. Persons who have previously been convicted are particularly likely to commit crimes, especially violent crimes, again. Recidivism rates are well documented: Within three years of leaving prison, two-thirds of former prisoners are rearrested, and half return to prison (Langan and Levin, 2002). Among those returning to prison, half do so for a parole violation, but half do so for committing a new crime (Langan and Levin, 2002). More than half of the juveniles released from prison are rearrested within the first year alone, with half of those arrests leading to convictions (Snyder and Sickmund, 2006).

Ex-offenders who do not commit additional crimes still return to the community with lower chances of becoming contributing members. They have lower-than-average rates of education, employment skills, and employment experience and higher-than-average rates of health problems (including substance abuse, mental health problems, and communicable diseases), just as they had when they entered prison (Langan and Levin, 2002).

¹ Probation departments, youth-serving organizations, and the extant literature on youth programming often refer to “at risk” youth as those who have not yet entered the juvenile justice system but have problems in school, may be in a gang, or engage in other behaviors that are predictive of future involvement with the juvenile justice system. In this report, we expand that definition to include those who have already been involved with the juvenile justice system and are returning to the community and those who have been victims of violence or are at increased risk of victimization. There are many overlaps between these groups, as those at risk of committing crimes are often also most likely to be victimized by them (see, for example, Lauritsen, Laub, and Sampson, 1991).

Given this multitude of risk factors, the need for a comprehensive approach to violence prevention is clear. Best practices for organizations involved with outreach and services to youth at risk stress the importance of healthy, enduring relationships with adults and peers. These organizations seek to create an environment where youth are able to engage in activities that allow for individual decisionmaking, so that self-sufficiency in both economic and social settings is acquired and enhanced. Activities that stress group participation, such as team sports, are especially important (Connell and Gambone, 2002). Outreach and sports programs allow youth to build mentor relationships in which they are treated with respect and provided with role models. Programs' supportive services need to have some sort of infrastructure to help consolidate and coordinate activities, and policy, funding, and programming must be coordinated and streamlined as well (Connell and Gambone, 2002).

Among programs that help recently released prisoners reenter communities and remain crime-free, those that use case management with frequent interaction and that facilitate employment, increased wages, housing, transportation, substance-abuse treatment, and strong family support are associated with lower rates of recidivism (Bernstein and Houston, 2000; La Vigne, Visher, and Castro, 2004; La Vigne and Lawrence, 2002; Metraux and Culhane, 2004; Rossman and Roman, 2003; Visher et al., 2004; Western and Petit, 2003).

Employment is perhaps the most fundamental of these factors, because it is also related to many of the others. However, recently released prisoners face serious employment barriers, including employers' hesitation to hire them, lower levels of skills and experience, and few connections that could lead to employment (Harlow, 2003; Western, Kling, and Weiman, 2001; and Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 2004). In addition, the jobs for which many recently released prisoners are qualified generally pay low wages. They may believe that they can earn more money more easily through illicit activity, even though research has shown that the wage equivalent of such activity is quite low (\$6 to \$11 per hour) (Levitt and Venkatesh, 1998). Many of the factors that are important for successful reintegration, including case management with frequent interaction, substance-abuse treatment, and transportation, are also important for employment (Rossman and Roman, 2003).

To address this situation, the city identified 15 community strategies for violence prevention under Measure Y: street outreach, outreach to sexually exploited youth, sports and recreation, family-violence advocacy, mental health services, youth support groups, Project Choice, Pathways to Change, restorative justice, intensive reentry employment, crew-based sheltered employment, after-school jobs and summer subsidized employment, transitional jobs, Safe Passages/OUR Kids Middle School Model, and Second Step Violence Prevention Curriculum and Middle School Peer Conflict Resolution. Together, the strategies are intended to provide Measure Y's comprehensive approach to reducing violence. The city used an RFP process to award competitive grants to 18 community-based organizations to administer the various programs. Most of the funded programs were already working in the community, and in many cases, Measure Y funding supplemented existing funding for similar services.

The community strategies the city identified for violence-prevention funding are shown in Table 3.1, along with the funding for each; the table also shows the various programs for

Table 3.1
Measure Y Violence-Prevention Strategies and Grantee Programs

Strategy/Funding	Grantees
Youth outreach and comprehensive services	
Street outreach Intervenes with community-based mentoring, case management, and supportive services (\$855,670 annually)	East Bay Agency for Children East Bay Asian Youth Center Leadership Excellence Youth ALIVE! Youth UpRising
Outreach to sexually exploited youth Connects these youth to supportive services and safe environments (\$225,000 annually)	Alameda County Interagency Children's Policy Council
Sports and recreation Intervenes with recreational activities (\$182,500 annually)	Leadership Excellence Sports 4 Kids Youth UpRising
Special services to children and youth exposed to violence	
Family-violence advocacy Intervenes to reduce the negative effects of domestic violence exposure on children and youth (\$491,214 annually)	Family Violence Law Center
Mental health services Provides mental health services to children and youth in abusive households (\$294,728 annually)	Family Violence Law Center
Youth support groups Supports older youth exposed to violence, including sexual exploitation and domestic violence (\$147,364 annually)	Family Justice Center
Diversion and reentry services	
Project Choice Provides intensive and comprehensive case management to ex-offenders (\$491,214 annually)	Allen Temple Housing and Economic Development Corporation The Mentoring Center Volunteers of America Bay Area
Pathways to Change Provides intensive and comprehensive case management to youth on probation (\$491,214 annually)	The Mentoring Center
Restorative justice Trains community members to provide alternative conflict resolution (\$25,000 annually)	Attitudinal Healing Connection, Inc.
Employment and training	
Intensive reentry employment Provides employment training to ex-offenders (\$560,000 annually)	Allen Temple Housing and Economic Development Corporation Youth Employment Partnership
Crew-based sheltered employment (CBSE) Provides job training and experience to ex-offenders in housing program (\$273,750 annually)	Volunteers of America Bay Area
After-school jobs and subsidized summer employment Provides at risk youth with job readiness and employment skills training (\$545,848 annually)	Bay Area Video Coalition Youth Radio Youth Employment Partnership
Transitional jobs Places youth on probation or parole directly into unsubsidized employment with support services (\$548,000 annually)	Youth Employment Partnership Allen Temple Housing and Economic Development Corporation
School-based strategies	
Safe Passages/OUR Kids Middle-School Model Provides assessment, case management, and supportive services to Oakland public middle-school students (\$240,000 annually)	Alameda County Health Care Services Agency
2nd Step Violence Prevention Curriculum and middle-school peer conflict resolution Teaches skills to reduce conflict, behavioral problems, and suspensions in Oakland public middle schools (\$510,862 annually)	Oakland Unified School District Office of Student Services

each strategy run by the 18 grantees.² The strategies vary in the number of grantee programs (from one to five) and the amount of funding designated for them, and several grantees administer programs in more than one strategy. Appendix D contains a fuller description of all 27 programs, broken out by the 15 strategies.

As indicated in the overall logic model for Measure Y, funded programs were expected to be able to leverage other funding with their Measure Y funds, thereby increasing the overall impact of the programs. Although we did not systematically assess the pre- and post-Measure Y funding situation of each individual program, several program managers claimed to have leveraged additional funding with Measure Y funds. The best example of this is the Youth Employment Partnership, which received \$825,848 in Measure Y funding across several different strategies and subsequently reported raising approximately \$2.4 million in additional funds targeted for similar services to youth and young adults at risk of involvement in violence.³

This section describes these programs from their beginnings through their implementation, along with their first-year activities that are consistent with the goals outlined by the Measure Y evaluation.

We used the following data-collection and analytical approaches for our implementation evaluation: (1) review and analysis of key documents associated with the initiative and its implementation, including the city audit of Measure Y spending, the RFP and successful proposals for the funded violence-prevention programs, materials submitted to the Measure Y Oversight Committee, and written communications between city managers and funded programs;⁴ (2) analysis of administrative data collected with the CitySpan database; (3) site visits to all funded organizations and interviews with key staff (case managers and employment trainers) and managers;⁵ and (4) focus groups with participants in selected programs.

To prepare for our site visits, we reviewed grant proposals and other available background information and compiled a detailed interview protocol that was specific to each program strategy. Program directors in all organizations were interviewed, and other key staff (case managers and employment trainers) were interviewed in several of them. In the interviews, we asked predetermined, open-ended questions, while following the lead of the interviewees into new topics as necessary (see Appendix A). Interviews ranged in length from two to three-and-

² During the year, carry-forward funds were used to fund new programs that were not included in this evaluation. These new programs include gang intervention services provided by OUSD's Alternative Education Schools in partnership with California Youth Outreach, parent education and gang-awareness services provided by Project Re-Connect, and crisis-response services provided by the Community Response and Support Network, the Alameda County Health Care Services Agency, and Youth ALIVE! These funds also provide ongoing operational support to Youth UpRising.

³ Our implementation research did not address the connection between Measure Y and other fundraising successes of the organizations it funded. However, being funded through Measure Y may have helped them raise other funds. Conducting a detailed analysis of overall funding streams for Measure Y-funded programs would be useful not only to document the ability of Measure Y to leverage other funds, but also to address the question of whether Measure Y funds replace other funds, which would be a less effective use of the new resources raised through it. After Measure Y-funded program strategies are well established, future evaluation efforts should include a detailed and comprehensive analysis of expenditure patterns, which is one way to establish the impact of a large-scale initiative like Measure Y on community infrastructure and resources (see Brecher, Silver, and Weitzman (2005) for an extensive discussion of this methodology).

⁴ Appendix E lists programs visited and the dates we visited them. The individuals we spoke with are not identified, in order to protect their privacy and the confidentiality of their responses to our questions.

⁵ Initially, we did not plan on interviewing DHS or other city staff about their management of the grants. However, because of the complexity of the Measure Y initiative and the key role of DHS in its management, we eventually interviewed these individuals as well. We discuss findings from those interviews in Chapter Four.

a-half hours. Some interviewees were recontacted when follow-up questions emerged. Transcripts of the interviews were recorded, and after each interview, we prepared detailed notes. While we promised individual interviewees and focus-group participants confidentiality, we were not able to guarantee confidentiality of their organizations. Thus, grantee staff may have been reluctant to share information that could be perceived as critical of the organization or of the city, either of which they may have feared would jeopardize funding.⁶

During site visits, which usually took place at the programs' service delivery site, observations were made about the physical plant, staff dynamics (where possible), and, where appropriate, program activities in progress. We incorporated these observations into the post-interview notes. The quarterly reports that all grantees make to the city are an important source of material documentation. Those reports include tables with target goals for client participation and outcomes reported by programs to DHS concerning those goals. Presenting the goals and benchmarks together with reports to DHS is important for two reasons: First, these data document the contractual relationship between the city and the funded programs, showing how the city formalized its expectations of program performance and how the programs reported on their achievements vis-à-vis those expectations; and second, the data provide a validity check on the administrative program data we analyzed for this report. Discrepancies indicate potential weaknesses in data entry or contract management and monitoring, which are important to highlight.

We conducted focus groups of participants in the following programs: (1) The East Bay Asian Youth Center, (2) Sports 4 Kids, (3) Youth Radio, and (4) Youth UpRising. Participants were asked about their perceptions of personal benefits from program activities, counseling, and case-management services; perceptions about their schools and neighborhoods; and what they find valuable about the programs and their advice about improving them, including what they wanted to see added to each program.⁷

Grantees use the citywide Youth Services Information Management System (YSIMS) to document basic information about the participants (e.g., age, gender, race/ethnicity, school characteristics, probation status, and parole status), their needs, their participation, and their assessments. We analyzed YSIMS data entered before April 1, 2007.

Early in the year, grantees sometimes did not record data in YSIMS. Many grantees could not enter data until CitySpan, the city, participating programs, the Measure Y Oversight Committee, and BPA reached consensus on a secure and workable strategy to fully protect participants' confidentiality, which involved strict requirements, especially for minors, that were incomplete at first. Over time, data quality and completeness improved. In interviews, many grantees reported that the data system was useful for their own internal tracking of participant and program progress.

⁶ In future iterations, it may be advisable to make interviews entirely anonymous and to present the findings without identifying individual programs. This would reduce the risk of reporting bias and might increase the overall validity of the implementation findings across the various programs.

⁷ These findings may not be representative of the universe of Measure Y-funded programs and strategies. More representative analyses will be conducted using other methods, which are currently being implemented and include analysis of data from administrative sources (for example, OUSD) and surveys administered to program staff concerning program impacts. These analyses will be presented in future evaluation reports, which may also include a wider variety of focus-group research, if we determine that focus groups are an appropriate research tool for the populations served by particular programs and strategies. This determination will be made in consultation with the programs themselves, as well as with BPA and RAND's institutional review boards.

Nonetheless, some concerns about data quality and completeness remain. The degree to which grantees have been able to fill out the data fields has varied, and grantees were not always consistent in the way they recorded data (e.g., some records had partial information). Fields pertaining to participant outcomes also were not identified by BPA or included in the CitySpan database until near the end of the program year. Recognizing the need for ongoing development and fine-tuning of the Measure Y database, the city recently contracted with an outside consultant to provide technical assistance to grantees for recording and using the data. While this portends well for future years of the evaluation, the administrative data in this first year provide only descriptive information on enrollment and service delivery.

The remainder of this section describes the evaluation of the grantees' programs, using the same six questions that guided the assessment of OPD's community-policing program as an organizing framework. This assessment is designed to describe the state of implementation in the 27 community violence-prevention programs run by the 18 Measure Y grantees. Most Measure Y funds were disbursed to these organizations beginning in July 2006, although many of the programs did not become fully operational until fall 2006.⁸ Our assessment presents information about the progress the organizations have made toward their program goals in the first 6 to 10 months. Most of the field research and data collection for the evaluation were concluded by April 1, 2007. Thus, this chapter focuses on evaluation of key implementation activities.⁹

Are the Funded Programs Implemented as Intended by Measure Y?

Because this evaluation covers the period of start-up for all of the programs, we bring extra focus to this question, introducing each grantee individually and examining each one's first-year implementation experiences. Overall, the programs funded by Measure Y are now operational.

Several Measure Y grantees established new programs or expanded existing services, which meant that new staff had to be recruited, hired, and trained before the programs could be fully implemented. Organizations that expanded programs already in existence tended to have smoother and faster implementation, but this was not universal.

Staff in all the funded programs had to learn how to use the new Measure Y database. The contract to CitySpan to develop and implement this database was approved by the City Council in August 2006, and the system was up and running that same month. All Measure Y grantees met with DHS and CitySpan several times during the summer and early fall of 2006 for database training. In addition, each program had to develop internal office procedures to collect and record intake and participation data for its activities. For some programs, this internal adjustment to data-management and data-entry responsibilities was still ongoing at the time of our site visits. However, most programs were actively using the system to track client data by November 2006, the end of the first quarter of program implementation. Client data presented in this report come from the April 2007 iteration of the database, which includes

⁸ One program, the Volunteers of America's Project Choice, began in mid-January 2007 and is therefore described only briefly in this report.

⁹ We did not systematically evaluate the adherence of programs to best practices or the suitability of the program model to achieving its objectives. These kinds of questions will be addressed in outcome research conducted in future years.

data through March 31. To the extent that we could ascertain their completeness and reliability, these data were quite clean, especially for a client management system that had been operational for only eight months. More recently, programs have been asked to collect and record outcome data for their 2006–2007 participants. Thus far, this additional data collection appears to be going smoothly as well.

During the site visits, program managers and staff reported mixed feelings about the Measure Y database. They acknowledged that the system is an important management tool, both for the city and for the individual programs, but they also reported that keeping it up to date is burdensome. Several programs reported entering program data only at the end of a quarter, when it is required for contractual purposes. Many Measure Y grantees were quite positive about the database training sessions. In addition to helping clarify the use and purpose of the data system, these sessions facilitated the broader goal of integrating violence-prevention programs by bringing together different agencies around a common theme.

An important aspect of program implementation was coordinating between the Measure Y grantees and their public-agency partners, such as OPD, the Alameda County Probation Department, and OUSD. The burden of coordination is increased by the fact that several Measure Y–funded programs bring together different agencies that share a Measure Y grant. OUSD is a key partner in identifying and serving at-risk youth, since several of the funded programs are school-based. These programs have found that it is not sufficient just to advise school staffs of their services; the staffs must value these services so that at-risk students will be referred to the programs for help.

Overall, the Measure Y grantees are executing their approved plans by hiring the necessary staff and developing programs. The administrative challenge of implementing the Measure Y database has been balanced by the system's utility in tracking services and maintaining accountability. Finally, the Measure Y grantees report working to develop strong links between social services and public-agency partners to locate and serve Oakland's at-risk youth population.

Youth Outreach and Comprehensive Services: Street Outreach and Sports and Recreation

We discuss the implementation of programs in the street outreach and sports and recreation strategies together, because they generally involve the same grantees and the same implementation issues. Street outreach programs funded by Measure Y conduct two different types of outreach. Many rely primarily on referrals from schools, probation, and other agencies. They provide intensive one-on-one case-management services to youth who are referred to them, often helping these youth access other services in return. The case-management services are limited to relatively small numbers of youth per agency.

Some programs do more broad-based outreach, either by going out into the community and actively canvassing youth or by organizing events and activities that attract at-risk youth who are not already known to the criminal justice system, school disciplinary systems, or youth-serving partner organizations. The text box below compares the street outreach efforts currently funded through Measure Y with an alternative strategy successfully implemented in Boston, where specially trained street workers engaged youth who might not already have been engaged in program services through school or other youth-serving organizations.

Table 3.2 summarizes the third quarter (through March 2007) performance benchmarks for each of the programs in the street outreach and sports and recreation strategies.¹⁰ These benchmarks were established by DHS and the contracting agency. At that point, all programs met or exceeded either intensive-outreach or case-management enrollment targets or both. However, with one exception, all programs fell short of meeting case-management or service-hour benchmarks.

The Boston Model of Street Outreach

Measure Y's street outreach strategy is based on practices from a successful youth violence-prevention program in Boston. The Boston Centers for Youth and Families (BCYF) Streetworker program targets "hard to reach" youth through direct outreach. The program is based in community centers throughout the city and also in some middle- and high-school facilities. Approximately 30 college-educated streetworkers, available 24 hours a day, conduct gang and youth outreach in targeted neighborhoods.

The street outreach programs funded by Measure Y mirror several critical components of the BCYF program, including employing primarily young, college-educated workers who "look and sound like" the youth they serve. Both in Boston and in Oakland, street outreach seeks to connect at-risk youth with a wide variety of support services, mental and physical health services, job training, and placement. Additionally, street outreach workers in both cities work to build relationships with their clientele that establish trust and provide mentorship.

A notable difference in the application of street outreach in Oakland is the method of recruiting program participants. The Boston model uses the referral method, emphasizing direct street outreach—going to the street corners and neighborhood locations where targeted youth often congregate. To date, the Oakland model has emphasized identifying participants through collaboration with schools, the police, and probation, as well as partner agencies.

It is possible that the differences in the focus of street outreach in the two cities reflect differences in the focus of the larger initiatives of which street outreach is a part. In Boston, youth violence-prevention efforts were a direct response to illicit gun markets and gang-related activity, which were viewed as the chief factors behind the increasing youth homicide rate of the mid-1990s. Measure Y has a broader objective—to "reach out, counsel and mentor at-risk adolescents and young adults by providing services and presenting employment opportunities." Many of these at-risk adolescents and young adults are readily identified in institutional settings, such as schools or juvenile detention facilities, or by institutional actors, such as police officers or probation, and program slots are quickly filled with at-risk youth through these referrals.

Nonetheless, there are presumably at-risk youth in Oakland who are completely disengaged from any institutions and who may not access Measure Y services unless recruited through direct street outreach. To the extent that these youth remain unserved and contribute to the violence in Oakland, the city is not following the Boston model.


¹⁰ This table and others refer to participants served by Measure Y programs as "unduplicated" clients; that is, the programs count each participant only once, even those who participate in two distinct episodes.

Table 3.2
Benchmarks for Youth Outreach and Sports Programs, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
East Bay Agency for Children: School to Success		
Number of unduplicated clients receiving intensive outreach	65	87
Number of youth-intensive outreach hours	216	81.7
Number of clients enrolled in case management	40	72
Number of case-management client hours	810	241.3
Number of youth enrolled in mental health services	30	24
Number of youth mental health service hours	195	112.2
East Bay Asian Youth Center: Street Team		
Number of unduplicated clients receiving intensive outreach	90	184
Number of intensive-outreach client contacts	180	623
Number of clients enrolled in case management	40	46
Number of case-management client hours	2,800	3,003
Leadership Excellence		
Number of unduplicated clients receiving intensive outreach	170	235
Number of intensive-client contacts	225	191
Number of clients enrolled in case management	37	44
Number of case-management client contacts	1,400	986
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in sports program	40	44
Number of sports-program client hours	4,800	3,214
Sports 4 Kids Third Quarter		
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled	175	173
Number of clients on leadership teams	15	23
Number of classroom-game-time client hours	17,381	6,201
Youth ALIVE!		
Number of unduplicated clients receiving intensive outreach	80	51
Number of client intensive-outreach contacts	120	147
Number of clients enrolled in case management	50	52
Number of case-management client contacts	1,400	1,259
Youth UpRising Third Quarter		
Number of unduplicated clients receiving intensive outreach	80	79
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in violence-prevention training groups	60	71
Number of violence-prevention-group client hours	2,880	1,176
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in case management	40	71
Number of case-management client hours	780	316
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in sports program	40	28
Number of sports-program client hours	6,000	2,296

Figure 3.1 summarizes program participation, using CitySpan data to show how individual contact hours and group service hours have generally increased over time. By the end of the follow-up period, the combined programs in these two strategies had provided 5,516 hours of individual case-management services and 13,552 hours of group-based services, of which 10,853 hours were provided by sports programs at Sports 4 Kids and the YMCA (through Leadership Excellence). This suggests that across programs, there has been improvement in the provision of service hours (the sports hours provided by Youth UpRising were unavailable at

Figure 3.1
Service Receipt Through Street Outreach and Sports Programs



SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan Measure Y database.

RAND TR546-3.1

the time of our data analysis). However, we note that these trends primarily occur in the largest programs—they do not relate to experiences of the smaller programs.

Table 3.3 examines more closely how the programs served youth in the last month of follow-up for this report, March 2007. These figures confirm the most serious challenge for many of these programs, program intensity and program retention. Across all the programs, average retention was 3.6 months, and average hours of case management and group services were 5.4 and 10.0, respectively, per month. Those participation rates may not be sufficient to make a meaningful difference in the lives of participating youth unless the outreach and sports programs are able to leverage their support by successfully referring participants to other agencies where they receive more-intensive services. The table does show a positive exception

Table 3.3
Participation Patterns in March 2007: Street Outreach and Sports Programs

Program	Number of Participants	Average Individual Contact Hours	Average Group Hours	Average Months of Participation
East Bay Agency for Children	67	1.9	—	3.2
East Bay Asian Youth Center	41	12.4	15.1	2.5
Leadership Excellence	115	4.7	7.3	4.2
Sports 4 Kids	52	—	12.1	4.0
Youth ALIVE!	25	6.6	—	3.5
Youth UpRising	—	—	—	—
Total	300	5.4	10.0	3.6

SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan data.

for the East Bay Asian Youth Center, which has significantly higher participation rates than the other programs, and for Leadership Excellence, which has a longer retention rate than the other programs.

We next discuss how the individual outreach and sports strategy grantees met their performance targets and the reasons they provided for why they did not if they failed to do so.

The East Bay Agency for Children's School to Success program, operated at Rudsdale High School and Community Day School, is a new initiative that was developed for Measure Y. Thus, program managers had to recruit, screen, hire, and train new staff, which, as in other newly funded programs, proved to be a lengthy process. Once fully staffed, the agency met with school officials to inform them of the scope of services available and to develop a referral process. Program staff had to establish trust with administrators and teachers, so that they would feel comfortable referring students in need of case management and mental health services to the program. School to Success was fully implemented at the two school sites by November 2006; it served 67 students in March 2007. In response to concerns about the lower intensity of case-management services in the early part of the contract year, program staff reported spending a significant amount of time on activities on the campuses that were unrelated to their assigned caseloads, including providing general supervision during student breaks and lunch and assisting in de-escalating student confrontations in the campus courtyard. Agency staff met with school-site staff to clarify the scope of services available to best utilize program staff.

As shown in Table 3.2, the program exceeded its target number of students served but did not provide enough case-management and outreach hours to students to meet those benchmarks. Background information about the clients, including risk factors, is described below.

The East Bay Asian Youth Center addressed its need to reach out to and recruit potential clients by seeking to develop a strong relationship with the Alameda County Probation Department and to improve existing ties with several schools and youth service providers, including Oakland High School, Dewey High School, Roosevelt Middle School, Youth Radio, Youth ALIVE!, Youth Employment Partnership, and Youth UpRising. It thereby set up a consistent referral stream, with an emphasis on recruiting youth who have been involved in violent incidents or offenses.

The East Bay Asian Youth Center met its benchmarks, in terms of both the number of youth who were served and the number of hours of outreach and case-management services they received. However, the program, which is located in a largely Latino neighborhood, did not receive as many Latino referrals as intended or expected despite intensive outreach at Fremont High, La Clinica, the Interagency Children's Policy Council's Sexually Exploited Minors Network, Oasis High, and the Life Academy. Therefore, to reach caseload capacity, the agency designated its Latina case manager to follow up, assess, and work with all sexually exploited females referred to it, regardless of race, in addition to the Latino referrals.

With its Measure Y grant funds, Leadership Excellence added two full-time case managers, one full-time outreach worker, and one part-time outreach worker. The program, which is located on the McClymonds High School campus in West Oakland, has branched out to network with other community organizations, including Youth ALIVE!, The Scotlan Center, and the West Oakland Neighborhood Crime Prevention Council.

As shown in Table 3.2, the program did not meet its third-quarter benchmark targets in several areas, especially target hours for its sports program. In conjunction with the YMCA, Leadership Excellence has developed a plan that includes partnerships with other sports-and-recreation-oriented organizations to refocus efforts to increase sports programming hours.

Sports 4 Kids operates two Measure Y–funded programs, one at Ruidsdale High School and one at the Community Day School. Both of these were expansions into new service areas with new clients. The site coordinators at these continuation schools were the linchpins of the programs. Their role was to introduce cooperative physical and structured skill-building activities to the transient population at the schools. Site coordinators are encouraged to display energy and enthusiasm to motivate youth who are unwilling or unable to participate in the routine activities of their regular schools. The site coordinator at Ruidsdale High School organized a basketball league and began a sports-management workshop, both of which were received positively by students. Unfortunately, that site coordinator left Sports 4 Kids, halting the program implementation at Ruidsdale for two months while another candidate was recruited, hired, and trained. The new site coordinator was hired and in place by December 2006. Then, the site coordinator at the Community Day School resigned in February 2007. Consequently, that program was suspended from February 23 until March 31, when a new coordinator was hired.

Table 3.2 shows that Sports 4 Kids served the expected number of students. Staffing problems may account for students receiving fewer hours of service than intended.

Youth ALIVE! developed a collaboration between staff, school-based health-center therapists, and the principals of each of the three Castlemont high schools through weekly meetings (called the CARE Team). The CARE Team provides client referrals, reducing the need for labor-intensive outreach efforts.

Because of some school-year start-up issues, referrals from the Castlemont school-based health center were delayed by a month, resulting in a lower number of total initial case-management client contacts. The CARE Team resumed its regular weekly meetings in October 2006, after which the number of referrals received increased.

Since receiving its Measure Y grant, Youth UpRising has hosted 13 separate violence-prevention events, including a conversation with Mayor Ron Dellums and a Thanksgiving celebration with 100 Youth UpRising members and their families.¹¹ These activities are intended to provide an opportunity for unstructured relationship-building and skill development and a positive framework for youth interaction. Youth UpRising also actively works to improve relationships between the Oakland police and youth in the neighborhood by designing and implementing a range of mutual outreach opportunities. The agency also operates a popular training program for Oakland police officers to improve their communication with youth. The officer training is provided weekly on the Youth UpRising campus, and 25 to 30 officers attend each session. In another effort to promote more-positive relationships between youth and police officers, Youth UpRising members and staff attended an Oakland Raiders game with Oakland police officers and their families.

As indicated in Table 3.2, Youth UpRising did not meet several of its benchmark targets. The program provided fewer violence-prevention group hours and individual case-management hours than planned and saw significant shortfalls in its sports program. Because of hiring delays, the basketball program did not commence until December 2006, which may account for the lower-than-expected number of sports programming hours. The position of sports and recreation coordinator was filled by November 2006, and the basketball program was in place by December 2006.

¹¹ Youth UpRising provides membership cards to all youth who participate in its services and refers to them as members.

Youth Outreach and Comprehensive Services: Outreach to Sexually Exploited Youth

The Alameda County Interagency Children’s Policy Council and its subgrantees have previously worked together informally to provide services and advocacy for sexually exploited minors. Their Measure Y grant enabled them to develop a formalized network to serve these clients. The council is also working with OPD, the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, and the Alameda County Probation Department to reach sexually exploited youth and provide them with specialized services. Such specialized services may include outreach to those in the “street” economy; provision of basic needs (food, a safe place to stay); after-hours specialized intake services; emergency medical care; emergency mental health services; transportation; safe houses where girls, especially, cannot be accessed by pimps; specialized case management, specialized placement, and transitional housing;¹² long-term psychological counseling; life-skills training; education; parenting classes; and mentoring. The council was able to leverage its Measure Y grant to secure additional resources from the United Way, Bay Area, to provide technical assistance on programs for sexually exploited minors for other Northern California jurisdictions.

Table 3.4 shows that the program did not meet all its benchmarks, making many outreach efforts but serving fewer actual clients (127) than planned (255). CitySpan data are incomplete for this grantee and its subgrantees, however, so it is not possible to present more-detailed participation data over time.

Program staff indicated that the gap in after-hours services between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. is a challenge, since most sexually exploited minors who are identified by law enforcement are approached and arrested during these hours. After-hours services are being provided, as needed, on a volunteer basis by Scotlan staff in the Sexually Abused Commercially Exploited Youth/Safe Place alternative program. Because after-hours response capabilities are necessary, referral and response patterns are being studied so that resources can be reorganized to address this issue.

The agencies also identified a lack of case-management services for sexually exploited minors, with only the Scotlan Center being equipped to provide them. Although other Sexually Abused Commercially Exploited Youth/Safe Place Alternative program subgrantees partner with other case-management services, none of the programs are specifically designed for the needs of adolescent victims of sexual exploitation. A new entity is being formed, the Motivating, Inspiring, Supporting and Serving Sexually Exploited Youth (MISSEY) Program to respond to this need.

Table 3.4
Alameda County Interagency Children’s Policy Council Benchmarks, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Number of unduplicated clients receiving intensive outreach	225	127
Number of intensive-outreach clients	675	1,278
Number of general-outreach events	11	103
Number of education/training sessions offered	75	41

¹² The stigma associated with prostitution may expose these minors to the derision of other group-home residents, which may in turn render the group home uncomfortable and encourage them to run away and/or return to exploiters. Therefore, they require placement in specialized housing.

Special Services to Children and Youth Exposed to Violence: Family-Violence Intervention and Mental Health Services

The Family Violence Law Center, the grantee responsible for special services to children and youth exposed to violence, has developed an assessment tool to diagnose post-traumatic stress disorder in children under the age of five. Using this tool, the program identifies children in need of psychological services and family counseling due to exposure to family violence. The center has also begun holding training sessions on domestic violence and emergency protective orders, and it contributes to police academy trainings for new OPD recruits.

Table 3.5 describes the third-quarter performance benchmarks for the Family Violence Law Center. The center met most of its targets in terms of the number of individuals served but provided fewer hours of case-management and counseling service than planned. During the site visit, staff members identified an unmet need for more-immediate counseling. Services at the time of acute crisis are readily available, but there is often a waiting period before clients enter psychotherapy. To meet the service-gap challenge, the center is considering implementing a short-term therapy model in which advocates can offer same-day or next-day counseling sessions with the family caseworker.

Figure 3.2 shows the monthly hours of individual services provided by the Family Violence Law Center through its Measure Y funding. Although the recorded hours may appear low, they reflect a relatively large number of clients served. Most clients who contact the program are referred to other agencies.

In March 2007, the Family Violence Law Center served 118 individuals, providing an average of 1.4 hours of individual contact time to each of them. Each individual client received an average of 1.2 months of services.


Special Services to Children and Youth Exposed to Violence: Youth Support Groups

The Alameda County Family Justice Center, located in Oakland, provides a “one-stop” location for domestic-violence services, which include support-group services for older youth who

Table 3.5
Family Violence Law Center: Family Violence-Intervention Project Benchmarks, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Number of families contacted within 48 hours of referral/police report from OPD	1,875	2,727
Number of children receiving crisis-intervention services by daytime advocates	1,125	844
Number of families contacting overnight advocates (ONERT) via phone crisis line	405	414
Number of families receiving immediate crisis intervention from ONERT by phone	105	83
Number of children receiving immediate overnight relocation and follow-up	56	57
Number of in-person overnight ONERT responses	46	57
Number of unduplicated children receiving family case-management services	220	151
Number of family case-management hours	805	218
Number of children provided mental health assessment and referral by intake coordinator	110	189
Number of children enrolled in mental health services	270	362
Number of sessions of parent/child psychotherapy provided	1,255	810
Number of site-based mental health consultations completed	960	904
Number of trainings provided to police officers on domestic violence and its impact on children	19	25
Number of police officers attending trainings	335	398
Total number of other clinical hours provided (mental health)	0	373

Figure 3.2
Service Provision by the Family Violence Law Center



SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan Measure Y database.

RAND TR546-3.2

have been exposed to violence. This new program, the Girls Justice Initiative, reaches out to youth, especially at-risk girls in the juvenile justice system or in foster care. The program also provides anger-management and social-skills training for preadolescent boys.

The program offices were set up in the Family Justice Center and the new boys-services manager was hired in September 2006. The program collaborated with the Interagency Policy Council and Alameda County Juvenile Hall to develop youth programming for detainees during the holiday season. Table 3.6 shows that the Girls Justice Initiative served more than twice as many youth in violence-prevention workshops than its benchmark but did not meet its goal of providing 15 individual therapy sessions by the end of the quarter. As a new program, much of the launch effort was spent doing outreach and making connections with potential referral partners, such as the Interagency Policy Council, Safe Passages, the Family Violence Law Center, and the Alameda County Probation Department. The Girls Justice Initiative focused on outreach and presentations to provide information to and instill confidence in other agencies and nonprofits, including Safe Passages, Youth UpRising, Youth ALIVE!, and the Scotlan Center.

Because of the start-up efforts required—acquiring office space, hiring staff, and developing collaborations with public agencies and other service providers—service delivery did

Table 3.6
Family Justice Center Benchmarks, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Number of unduplicated youth completing a 12-week group session	40	0
Number of unduplicated youth participating in violence-prevention workshops	65	105
Number of unduplicated youth finishing three individual therapy sessions	15	11

not really begin until late December 2006. Therefore, the data in the CitySpan database are incomplete and difficult to analyze for changes in participation patterns over time.

Diversion and Reentry Services: Project Choice and Pathways to Change

Project Choice is a program for ex-offenders returning to the community that involves extensive case management. Depending on their needs, participants may be enrolled in employment services, support groups, and outside services (e.g., addiction therapy), as well as frequent and ongoing interactions with their case managers. Among the four grantees that serve ex-offender youth, two (The Mentoring Center and Youth Employment Partnership) have expanded existing services to parolees relatively seamlessly, and one (Volunteers of America) developed a new program in January 2007 and reached expected levels of participation in its first few months. The fourth organization (Allen Temple) has had staffing issues that resulted in delayed implementation. Table 3.7 summarizes the benchmarks for three of the four programs. The newly started Volunteers of America program is not shown.


Figure 3.3 shows individual contact hours and group hours for the Project Choice strategy over time. The figure demonstrates the impact of the delayed start-up of the Allen Temple program, but it also shows continued low recorded participation in the January–March 2007 quarter. It is unclear whether this is the result of data-entry problems or whether the programs continue to provide fewer services than expected.

Table 3.8 shows the intensity of services and the retention of participants in the programs run by Allen Temple and The Mentoring Center, measured as of March 2007. There was significant variation in the intensity of recorded program services—Allen Temple recorded an average of 28 hours of service (individual plus group) per participant, while The Mentoring Center recorded approximately 6 hours.

Table 3.7
Diversion and Reentry-Services Strategy Benchmarks, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Allen Temple		
Number of clients enrolled in case management	50	80
Number of Project Choice intensive-case management contacts	1,500	1,020
Number of Project Choice group-session client hours	1,125	142
The Mentoring Center		
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in prerelease case management	30	30
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in postrelease case management	25	25
Number of case-management contacts	1,500	1,186
Number of unduplicated clients attending cognitive-change group sessions	30	30
Youth Employment Partnership		
Number of youth enrolled in program	93	96
Number of client case-management hours	1,733	1,745
Number of group sessions	23	23
Number of group-session client hours	2,139	2,130

Figure 3.3
Service Provision in the Project Choice Strategy



SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan Measure Y database.
 RAND TR546-3.3

Allen Temple’s reentry program seeks to assist young adults who have recently been released from prison in becoming self-sufficient and law-abiding. The organization provides comprehensive, wraparound services or referrals for services, using both Project Choice case-management and intensive reentry-employment strategies. Participants do not have to be enrolled in all programs to receive services. The employment services include short-term skills training for specific occupations (currently, custodial work, but seeking to expand to other occupations) and job-readiness training in soft skills (e.g., résumé building, interview preparation).

The implementation of reentry services at Allen Temple was delayed for a number of reasons. When the first Measure Y funds arrived in July 2006, the previously existing services were supposed to begin a new chapter. However, the executive director at the time did not continue the services. From our site visit interviews, it is not clear why this was the case. Following this, staff began to leave for other employment until only one staff member remained. Also, during this time, the board of directors asked the executive director to leave and instituted a hiring freeze. At that point, DHS stepped in and required the Allen Temple board to appoint a new executive director. DHS also trained the board and conducted two monitoring visits

Table 3.8
Project Choice Participation Patterns, March 2007

Program	Number of Participants	Average Individual Contact Hours	Average Group Hours	Average Months of Participation
Allen Temple	33	11.4	16.9	1.8
The Mentoring Center	56	2.6	3.1	3.2

SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan data.

during this time. New staff were not hired until November 2006, when the first job-readiness programs were started. By January 2007, an interim executive director was in place, with a mandate to establish a policy-and-procedures manual for the organization. The board was conducting a search for a new, permanent executive director, who was scheduled to be in place by April 1, 2007. That process was also delayed, and the new executive director finally arrived in early June. New hires resulted in the program being fully staffed, the second job-readiness training being planned (for February), and new participants being welcomed. At the same time, other components of the program, including some of the assessment tools and job-skills training, had yet to get under way.

It is not yet clear whether recent changes will translate into a Measure Y–funded program at Allen Temple that is implemented as intended.

At The Mentoring Center, which is responsible for two Measure Y–funded programs, Project Choice and Pathways for Change, implementation of all elements of the programs appears to be proceeding as planned and expected. For Project Choice, The Mentoring Center staff now work in all three Department of Juvenile Justice facilities at Stockton: 39 percent of participants come from the N. A. Chaderjian Correctional Facility; 11 percent come from the DeWitt Nelson Correctional Facility; and 46 percent come from the O. H. Close Correctional Facility. The Positive Minds Group and the Family Fatherhood Group continue to have enrollment that is reportedly higher than ever, and The Mentoring Center has hired a new part-time staff member to assist with its expanded services. The program is operating as it was proposed, with no areas dropped or new areas added.

According to the staff, intermediate goals for The Mentoring Center’s Project Choice program are being met. Although staff members report that many participants do not complete eight-hour workdays consistently for several months, they point to the fact that by January, about 40 percent of participants were able to find and maintain full- or part-time employment, about 60 percent were able to find and inconsistently maintain employment, and a small number were not yet able to show up for work. For those under 18 years of age, employment at another Measure Y program, Youth Employment Partnership, is possible; other participants work in a variety of jobs, including security work, retail work, and work at the Port of Oakland and the Coliseum. In addition, some participants return to school part time while working part time.

Because the program is an expansion of existing services, it did not appear to have any major implementation challenges. This is consistent with what we found at other expansion programs. Minor issues included ensuring that staff had adequate time for rejuvenation to avoid burnout given the substantial increase in the time they were spending in service (e.g., all day in the Department of Juvenile Justice facilities in Stockton, instead of the previous two hours per day). This was addressed by adjusting staff schedules, hiring a part-time employee, and making use of volunteers. Another challenge was the departure of the executive director in October 2006. Until the board of directors completes the search for a new executive director, that position is being filled by the previous program director, who has extensive experience at the organization.

When asked about broader challenges to successfully transitioning youth (i.e., to meeting the main program objective), staff identified housing as the greatest difficulty. They reported that approximately one-third of the youth being served by the program are not able to return home after leaving prison. Helping these and all participants find housing that meets parole criteria, that is not a negative influence, and that is stable can be quite difficult. Staff seek

first to reunite families where possible, then to find space in group homes where possible, and finally to find other individual placements. Staff also identified transportation as a challenge, since many of the jobs available to youth are multiple bus rides away from where they live.

The Mentoring Center staff also direct case managers at subgrantee organizations who serve 96 participants in the Pathways to Change program. That program targets repeat juvenile offenders who are referred by the court system, usually the public defender's office. Pathways to Change provides extensive case management through a collaborative network of community-based organizations. These subgrantee organizations include the Center for Family Counseling, the East Bay Asian Youth Center, Leadership Excellence, the Pacific News Service, Scotlan Family and Youth Center, and Youth ALIVE! Participants in the program are part of the Positive Minds Group and the Fatherhood Group. In addition, because some of the participants in the Pathways to Change program are female (unlike the all-male Project Choice program), The Mentoring Center runs a parallel Girls Group. In addition to these services, participants have access to all services provided by the subgrantees.

Like Project Choice, the Pathways to Change program has been implemented smoothly. The program has been in existence for several years, having been funded previously through the Safe Passages program, and the support-group services described above operate the same for Pathways to Change as they do for Project Choice. Finally, The Mentoring Center appears to have strong relationships not only with its subgrantee collaborators, but also with several offices within the juvenile justice system, to encourage referrals of repeat offenders.

As shown in Table 3.7, The Mentoring Center met all benchmark targets for the third quarter except the number of case-management contacts. The lower number of contacts is the result of the rapid expansion of the program, and staff have reported improvement in their ability to balance that growth with their staff size.

Once funds became available in January 2007 for the Volunteers of America's Project Choice Program, program staff moved quickly to begin hiring new staff. As of March 2007, two months after funding began, the program was fully staffed. At the time we collected data for this report, staff had gained entry into San Quentin, developed relationships with staff there, and begun the initial screening of the first 22 inmates.

Diversion and Reentry Services: Restorative Justice

The Restorative Justice strategy is one of the smaller strategies funded by Measure Y. It addresses the root causes of school and community violence by young people in Oakland through community-based alternative conflict resolution. This includes workshops, mediation efforts, and retreats, all of which are organized in schools or community settings and moderated by volunteers who are trained by and whose services are coordinated by Attitudinal Healing Connection, Inc. In December 2006, Attitudinal Healing Connection hosted an advanced-level circle-training workshop for volunteers who have committed to 30 hours each of service to implement the Restorative Justice for Oakland Youth program. After completing this training, these volunteers are available to schools and community organizations to lead workshops and mediation sessions to resolve conflicts among students and young adults. As Table 3.9 shows, the program more than met its second-quarter benchmarks for program services, in terms of both the number of volunteers who were trained to provide services and the number of youth who were served by participating in program activities. No third-quarter benchmarks were available for this program, and, unfortunately, the CitySpan database did not include data about its participants.

Table 3.9
Attitudinal Healing Connection Second-Quarter Benchmarks, December 2006

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Number of training sessions held	1	2
Number of people trained (unduplicated)	20	34
Number of circles held	12	15
Number of circle participants (unduplicated)	30	30

The organization's success in garnering support and publicity about the Restorative Justice for Oakland Youth model has increased demand for training and replication and has also led to its greatest challenge, i.e., how to respond to that increasing demand. The program has only one paid staff member, who coordinates program activities on a part-time basis. Thus, it relies heavily on volunteers to host circles in community settings, such as the West Oakland Senior Center, and institutional settings, such as Cole Middle School. The volunteers have regular, paid day jobs, which imposes a limit on the time they can devote to the Restorative Justice for Oakland Youth program, as well as a limit to overall program capacity. At the time of our site visit, Attitudinal Healing Connection was developing a strategic plan to expand its capacity and further increase its impact.

Employment and Training: Intensive Reentry Employment


The intensive reentry-employment strategy assists former prisoners who return to the community with employment services, including job-placement assistance, on-the-job training, and subsidized employment. Services in this strategy are provided by two agencies, Allen Temple and Youth Employment Partnership. Table 3.10 shows the third-quarter benchmarks for these two grantees; both appear to have met them. Figure 3.4 shows the increase in participation hours of these two agencies during the contract period through March 2007. Almost all of the hours for this strategy were recorded as group hours.

Table 3.11 shows individual participation data for March 2007. No individual contact hours during that month were reported for either program, and average monthly group hours ranged from 13.2 for Allen Temple to 22.9 for Youth Employment Partnership. This suggests that these programs are not as intensive as program staff may have intended. Youth Employment Partnership participants had spent more time in the program by March 2007 than Allen Temple participants (almost 5 months, compared with 1.3 months).

Table 3.10
Intensive Reentry-Employment Program Benchmarks, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Allen Temple		
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in employment and training services	40	79
Number of unduplicated clients placed in employment	22	22
Youth Employment Partnership		
Number of unduplicated young adult clients enrolled in job-readiness training (JRT)	32	33
Number of clients enrolled in training and work experience (YouthBuild)	21	25
Number of intensive reentry clients completing 320 hours of work experience	10	10

Figure 3.4
Service Provision in the Intensive Reentry-Employment Strategy



SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan Measure Y database.

RAND TR546-3.4

Allen Temple's employment services were implemented slowly because of the internal organizational problems described above. Nevertheless, as of the third quarter, the organization had met or surpassed its targets for employment and training programs. These figures indicate that it enrolled nearly twice the intended number of participants in those services. In view of the low participation figures per person shown in Table 3.11, this raises the question of whether Allen Temple has sufficient staff to provide effective individualized services for this many people. While staff assured us that they are able to meet the caseload, our site visit did not allow us time to interview participants to obtain their perspectives on the level and intensity of services provided.

Because the programs funded by Measure Y at Youth Employment Partnership are not new, implementation was relatively straightforward. The various components of the program—construction site, foreman, teachers, case managers—were largely in place, and the focus of the implementation was on increasing capacity.

According to staff, participants were learning both the hard and soft skills required in the work world. Sometimes this occurred through trial and error; for example, those who do not show up for class in the afternoon do not get paid for that day's work, even if they worked

Table 3.11
Participation Patterns, March 2007: Intensive Reentry Employment

Program	Number of Participants	Average Individual Contact Hours	Average Group Hours	Average Months of Participation
Allen Temple	29	0.0	13.2	1.3
Youth Employment Partnership	8	0.0	22.9	4.9

SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan data.

all morning. Sometimes other aspects of the youths' complicated lives, such as demands from unhealthy and unsupportive family members or past moving violations that make getting a driver's license difficult, get in the way. Staff reported that not all youth stayed with the program very long. Older participants were more easily influenced by outside attractions, and many struggled with the very structured nature of the program.

Employment and Training: Crew-Based Sheltered Employment

The CBSE strategy takes a special approach to providing employment services to individuals who return from prison. By grouping participants into work crews that are closely managed and given a great deal of support, it provides participants with a more structured reentry into employment, which may increase the likelihood of long-term employment success. Table 3.12 shows the benchmarks for the only grantee active in this strategy, the Volunteers of America. While the organization was successful in enrolling the targeted number of clients (16), it was not able to meet its targets for the number who completed all six months of the program and the number who were placed in unsubsidized employment.

Although the program was new to the Volunteers of America, implementation challenges appear to have been minimal and limited to the first few months of the program, which began in July 2006. The crew chief was hired shortly after funds were first received, and the first participants arrived soon thereafter. According to staff reports, the program successfully launched all its components, including a warehouse for the crew's tools and classroom, coordination with city departments for municipal work sites, and assignment of the first participants.

However, the program was having little success getting participants to remain for the entire six months. Most were leaving after a few weeks into the program. To address this problem, the Volunteers of America staff made several changes. First, rather than depending on parole agents and the managers of other centers for referrals, they began to call the referred participants' case managers to help determine whether they were ready to make a six-month commitment to come to work every day at 7:00 a.m.

Second, staff scrutinized their own screening process and strengthened it to ensure that applicants were clear about what the program entailed (e.g., by showing them the warehouse, the lockers, and the uniform) and that the staff was choosing applicants who were ready to change.

Finally, staff noticed that participants often complained about the minimal pay (between \$7.50 and \$8.50 per hour, depending on length of time in the program), and they began to emphasize the non-cash benefits of the program, including gaining job skills and experi-

Table 3.12
Crew-Based Sheltered Employment Program Benchmarks, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in crew-based sheltered employment	16	16
Number of unduplicated clients completing six-month program	8	3
Number of unduplicated clients placed in unsubsidized employment	6	2
Number of subsidized-employment client hours	7,500	7,917

ence¹³ that would enable them to qualify for a permanent job. Retention rates have reportedly improved. Staff have since reported that a key remaining challenge is limited resources. They expressed the desire for additional funds to expand the program to two to three crews (i.e., 16 to 24 participants at any given time).

Employment and Training: After-School Job Training and Summer Subsidized Employment

Three organizations—the Bay Area Video Coalition, Youth Employment Partnership, and Youth Radio—provide after-school and summer jobs for Oakland youth. These jobs are intended to provide them with constructive activities when they are not in school, employment skills that will benefit them in the long run, and incentives to remain in school and avoid criminal activity. Table 3.13 shows the benchmarks for these three organizations. As in many of the other programs, enrollment targets were met but total hours were not.

Figure 3.5 shows the individual and group-activity participation for this strategy. Participation appears to have been highest in the summer and fall of 2006. This reflects the importance of summer jobs to this strategy: More than 60 percent of all hours of Youth Employment Partnership programs occurred in July–September 2006.

Table 3.14 shows the intensity of participation as recorded in the CitySpan database in March 2007. Although all three of the grantees met their overall-participation benchmarks, only Youth Radio also met its program-retention benchmarks. The Bay Area Video Coalition and Youth Employment Partnership were not able to retain their participants as long as they had intended. Similarly, the participation data in Table 3.14 suggest that Youth Radio provides more-intensive services to its participants than do the other two grantees.


The Bay Area Video Coalition/Youth Sounds program hired former program graduates as teaching assistants (TAs) to assist in classroom management and instruction. This had the dual purpose of providing professional development for the TAs and offering the participants

Table 3.13
After-School Job Training and Summer Subsidized Employment Benchmarks, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Bay Area Video Coalition		
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in after-school job training	25	33
Number of clients completing one semester of training	20	22
Number of clients completing two semesters of training	8	0
Number of clients completing a portfolio	8	0
Youth Employment Partnership		
Number of unduplicated youth clients enrolled in after-school job training	100	100
Number of clients completing 180 hours of work experience	50	27
Youth Radio		
Number of unduplicated clients enrolled in after-school job training	25	30
Number of clients completing six-month training program	11	11

¹³ Participants gain expertise in landscaping skills, plant identification (distinguishing nonpoisonous from poisonous), weeding, trenching, digging firelines (but not putting out fires), tool identification and usage, painting, repairs, clean-up, street cleaning, grounds maintenance, digging, and using lawn and landscaping equipment.

Figure 3.5
Service Provision in the Intensive Employment and Training Strategy



SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan Measure Y database.

RAND TR546-3.5

peer-to-peer education and support. In response to the demand for training in music or video production, Youth Sounds added an additional day per week of programming. It also coordinated several field trips, held monthly movie nights, presented a lunchtime open-mike event, and helped produce a Literacy Fair and Parent Night.

Program staff reported that initially they received few referrals from other Measure Y agencies or police. In response to these recruitment challenges, program staff increased their outreach efforts, for example, by initiating conversations with police officers stationed at McClymonds High School. As a result, by the third quarter, 33 clients were enrolled, compared with the target of 25, although the delayed start for most of them meant that none had completed two semesters of training or a portfolio by the end of the third quarter in March 2007.

During the summer of 2006, Youth Employment Partnership and its Measure Y partners enrolled youth in the Mayor's Summer Jobs Program. This program serves youth who are still in school but who are at risk of criminal activity because of chronic truancy, behavior problems, etc. Participants receive a salary of \$7 per hour for up to 120 hours of work and addi-

Table 3.14
After-School Job Training and Summer Subsidized Employment Participation as of March 2007

Program	Number of Participants	Average Individual Contact Hours	Average Group Hours	Average Months of Participation
Bay Area Video Coalition	18	0.9	15.5	4.9
Youth Employment Partnership	32	0.0	7.1	3.4
Youth Radio	13	3.2	38.1	4.1

SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan data.

tional bonuses for pre-employment and life-skills training. In addition, the program links the employment to participants' performance in school (for example, by promising future employment to participants who stay in school). Youth Employment Partnership enrolled 111 young people in this program and began job training and employment in early July 2006.

Table 3.13 shows that the program was able to meet most of its objectives throughout the program year, except for the number of clients completing 180 hours of work experience. This shortfall may be in part due to timing. Although the contract to provide after-school job training was enacted in July 2006, program activities did not commence until school started in September. Thus, initial program resources were dedicated to enrolling participants in the Mayor's Summer Jobs Program.

Participants in Youth Radio's Community Action Project learn to master media skills, including broadcast reporting, digital editing, music production, and graphic design. At the time of our site visit, program participants had just finished production of nine weekly public-affairs broadcasts on a local public radio station, 89.3 KPFB. From October 23 through December 18, 2006, the Community Action Project participants were responsible for all aspects of the production of a weekly live one-hour radio broadcast, including research, scripting, and hosting. Show themes included independent and corporate media, dating violence, conflict resolution, and the environment. The evaluation team observed the production of a broadcast on healthy relationships. Program participants performed all aspects of the broadcast production under the supervision of the Community Action Project instructors and project coordinator, but with minimal intervention.

An initial challenge mentioned by program staff during the site visit was the program's inability to provide adequate services to students who needed additional mental health support. At program start-up, the agencies that referred students were themselves not ready to provide support services. Youth Radio utilized its connections to identify supportive resources for program participants. As other Measure Y programs became operational, Youth Radio began its second semester of training with new participants, with supportive services in place.

Employment and Training: Transitional Jobs

The transitional-jobs strategy is another job-focused prisoner reentry strategy providing job placement in private sector employment for ex-offenders. At the outset, the two grantees in this strategy were Allen Temple and the Youth Employment Partnership. Allen Temple now contracts with America Works to provide services under this strategy. The Youth Employment Partnership did not implement the strategy as planned, as discussed further below. In agreement with DHS, it reallocated the funds originally allocated to the operation of this strategy to a new summer-jobs program for youthful ex-offenders. Benchmark data for this strategy are shown in Table 3.15.

Table 3.15
Transitional Jobs Strategy Program Benchmark, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Allen Temple		
Number of clients enrolled in case management	0	89

Because this strategy had relatively few participants and CitySpan data on it were limited, we did not analyze patterns of transitional-jobs participation over time. The CitySpan database included data for 16 participants in the program operated by Allen Temple/America Works. The data showed that these participants had spent only an average of 1.5 months in the program and had recorded only 14.8 hours of group participation.

As noted, Allen Temple subcontracts its transitional-jobs program to America Works, a national program that places ex-offenders who are employment-ready in private employment. Since it had ongoing experience opening and operating the program in other cities, America Works became operational in Oakland relatively quickly. The office opened in September and had begun placing ex-offenders in entry-level jobs within the first month. Allen Temple provides referrals, which have been ongoing throughout Allen Temple's organizational challenges. This has enabled Allen Temple to serve 89 participants in this strategy, despite its third-quarter performance benchmark being set at 0.

Youth Employment Partnership started a transitional-jobs program using its Measure Y funding. Its plan was to receive referrals of employment-ready ex-offenders from Allen Temple and The Mentoring Center and place them in jobs. However, the referrals were not forthcoming, and the ex-offenders that Youth Employment Partnership encountered through its relationships with probation and parole departments were not employment-ready and therefore not eligible for the program. Realizing that the program would not work as planned, staff engaged in discussions with the city and decided to discontinue it. They also decided to use the funds that were already dispersed for the first year to create an intensive summer-jobs program for 30 ex-offender youth between the ages of 18 and 24. This program mirrors the summer-jobs program the organization runs for youth who are still in school but provides more supportive services and develops a plan for the participants' long-term self-sufficiency. For eight weeks in summer 2007, participants spent mornings at Youth Employment Partnership developing their long-term plans and afternoons in part-time employment.

School-Based Strategies

A number of Measure Y-funded programs are operated in Oakland middle and high schools in partnership with OUSD. These include the Safe Passages/OUR Kids Middle School Model, operated by the Alameda County Health Care Services Agency; the Second Step Violence Prevention Curriculum; and the Middle School Peer Conflict Resolution Program. Benchmarks for these three programs are shown in Table 3.16. Some benchmark targets in this table have a value of 0, reflecting the staggered implementation of this strategy. OUSD in some cases exceeded its targets by implementing a curriculum ahead of schedule. Individual-level participation data were unavailable for these programs, because they were not yet recorded in the CitySpan database at the time of our analysis. More information about the programs is provided in the discussion below.

The Safe Passages/OUR Kids School Model operated by the Alameda County Health Care Services Agency has been implemented at Westlake and Elmhurst middle schools. The model includes coordination-of-services teams (COSTs), as depicted in Figure 3.6.


Table 3.16
Oakland Unified School District Benchmarks, March 2007

Benchmark	Target	Actual
Percentage of Head Start/Family Day Care/Even Start receiving Unit I	50	100
Percentage of OUSD Child Development Centers receiving Unit I	50	97
Percentage of elementary schools receiving Unit I	50	71
Percentage of Second Step schools receiving Unit I	50	55
Percentage of Head Start/Family Day Care/Even Start receiving Unit II	40	86
Percentage of OUSD Child Development Centers receiving Unit II	40	80
Percentage of elementary schools receiving Unit II	40	32
Percentage of Second Step schools receiving Unit II	40	45
Percentage of Head Start/Family Day Care/Even Start receiving Unit III	0	32
Percentage of Child Development Centers receiving Unit III	0	36
Percentage of elementary schools receiving Unit III	25	6
Percentage of Second Step schools receiving Unit III	30	47
Percentage of Second Step schools receiving Units IV and V	30	21
Percentage of middle schools receiving all nine Too Good for Violence lessons	35	11
Number of parent-education workshops completed	15	22
Percentage of school sites implementing violence-prevention curriculum	60	86
Number of referrals from staff and students to peer mediation	200	711
Number of mediations completed at 21 sites	450	711
Number of follow-up interviews completed at five sites	60	395
Number of student-conflict mediators	300	298

The purpose of the COST is to make sure that students who need help do not fall between the cracks or are not repeatedly handed from one service provider to another. To accomplish this, the COST centralizes case management and coordinates the services and activities of the individuals shown in the figure. The team includes the OUR Kids site coordinator and case manager, a school-based therapist (under contract with Alameda County), the Second Step teaching coordinator, and a conflict-resolution coach, whose position is also funded through Measure Y, in partnership with the school district. In addition, the COST includes a disciplinary-hearing case manager (for students facing expulsion) and other school staff. Convened by the OUR Kids site coordinator, the COST meets weekly to screen students for services, refer them to services most suited to their needs, and monitor their status.

Because of acute need at their target schools, Safe Passages staff have provided crisis intervention, teacher support, and services other than the planned case-management and mental health services. They had to educate the Elmhurst administration about the specific services and capabilities of the OUR Kids model, including the COST system. Although the COST acts as a buffering system to best match participant needs with program services and prevent case-manager overload, Safe Passages anticipates that OUR Kids case managers will still be asked to respond to crisis situations, such as breaking up fights in the schoolyard. Safe Passages tracks the occurrence of these incidents but not their duration, since these activities are considered “nonbillable” (i.e., the costs are not charged to Measure Y).

Figure 3.6
OUR Kids Middle School Model COST Organization Chart



RAND TR546-3.6

The Second Step curriculum, taught in OUSD K–8 classrooms, has been in Oakland schools since the 2001–2002 school year. With Measure Y funds, the district has been able to maintain current levels of program implementation and extend the curriculum to new schools. It was found to be effective in a subset of schools that received the curriculum as part of the Safe Passages program (Safe Passages, 2004) and is now taught in all Oakland middle schools. OUSD has employed several part-time consultants to support Second Step implementation. Because Second Step is a curriculum and does not provide social services, it is categorically different from the other Measure Y–funded programs. As such, it is exempted from using the Measure Y database. Nonetheless, OUSD does track program activities. Table 3.17 lists the number and percentage of participants receiving the first semester of the Second Step curriculum.

Few implementation problems were indicated during our site visit. In November 2006, one of the Second Step coaches resigned, and a replacement started January 10, causing a gap in services for some students. Another consultant serving a small number of elementary schools resigned, and one of the parent educators was reassigned to take over implementation in those schools. The district is seeking funds to hire one additional coach to serve the K–5 schools that have not received coaching to date, including Jefferson Elementary, which just rejoined Second Step after trying another curriculum. Consultants cannot provide coverage for every classroom needing support; thus, school sites have been encouraged to hire substitute teachers to free teachers already trained in the Second Step curriculum to provide lesson modeling and coaching for their peers. This is expected to build long-term internal capacity.

The Middle School Peer Conflict Resolution Program works to reduce out-of-school suspensions by providing students with behavioral skills to minimize fighting and other campus

Table 3.17
Second Step Curriculum Implementation

	Total Enrollment	Number of Students Completing Unit I
Head Start		
Total	994	945
Percent		95
Family Child Care Homes		
Total	58	44
Percent		76
OUSD Child Development Centers		
Total	1,424	1,007
Percent		71
OUSD Elementary Schools		
Total	18,456	8,690
Percent		47
OUSD Middle Schools		
Total	4,431	2,312
Percent		52

disruptions. The Mendez Foundation, publisher of the conflict-resolution curriculum, provided districtwide training in November 2006. By January 2007, 289 student conflict managers had been training at 21 middle schools, and 90 students had participated in mediation sessions.

Are Measure Y Resources Being Spent to Provide Services to the Target Communities?

The youth targeted by Measure Y–funded programs are considered to be at risk because they reside in communities plagued by violence and crime, they have engaged in delinquent behavior, they have witnessed or have been victims of violence, or they have been convicted of crimes themselves. To reach this target population, many Measure Y grantees employ two primary methods: locating or operating their programs in Oakland’s most affected communities, and working with OPD, the probation department, OUSD, and other grantees. Grantees working with ex-offenders identify them through the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, parole officers, and probation officers. However, as discussed above, only about 11 percent of the participants in Measure Y–funded programs are recruited through pure street outreach (canvassing youth who “hang out” on street corners).¹⁴ This is not surprising, because it is more difficult to recruit participants who have expressed no interest in a particular program service and do not yet have a relationship with a public or private partner agency than it is to recruit those who have relationships with these entities.

¹⁴ Schools are the source of 35 percent of all referrals for Measure Y–funded programs.

Table 3.18 shows the aggregate distribution of program participants by neighborhood. The programs primarily serve young people in East and West Oakland neighborhoods that experience high levels of crime.

Grantees also target their services by positioning program activities in or near schools in troubled communities. For example, Leadership Excellence's The Bridge program and the Bay Area Video Coalition's Next Generation Partnership programs provide services at the McClymonds Education Complex in West Oakland. Youth ALIVE! draws its participants from the Castlemont Community of Small Schools in East Oakland. Youth Uprising is located next to the Castlemont campus, from which it draws many of its participants. The Community Day School, Dewey High School, and Rudsdale High School are continuation high schools, and although the composition of their student populations can fluctuate, their student bodies usually include a high number of delinquent or chronically truant youth, allowing Measure Y grantees like the East Bay Agency for Children and Sports 4 Kids to reach their target population as intended by Measure Y. Table 3.19 lists the Oakland schools with more than 10 Measure Y participants. (Schoolwide programs that are operated by OUSD are not shown.)

In addition to locating programs at schools, coordination with the schools is a critical element of reaching targeted youth. For example, Youth ALIVE!'s CARE Team identifies at-risk youth, assesses their needs, and refers them to Youth ALIVE! for case management as appropriate. Collaboration with the schools and other school-based grantees plays a significant role in ensuring both that the target population is served and that duplication of services across agencies and programs is avoided. Another collaborative effort pursued by several Measure Y grantees involves working with partners in the criminal justice system; such efforts include the Family Violence Law Center's work with OPD.

Allen Temple, The Mentoring Center, and Volunteers of America, which all work with ex-offender youth, reported maintaining strong and long-standing relationships with parole officers through the efforts of the grantee staff, especially as parole staff change. For example, The Mentoring Center's access to youth requires cooperation with staff at the Department of Juvenile Justice and the parole board, as the program there begins well before youth leave prison. Youth Employment Partnership reported less interaction with parole officers because of its focus on employment. Volunteers of America works with parole officers to identify potential participants for its employment program.

Table 3.18
Distribution of Participants, by Neighborhood, July 2006 Through March 2007

Strategy	Fruitvale	East Oakland	San Antonio	West Oakland	North Oakland	Lakeshore	Downtown
After-school jobs	3.2	19.4		56.5	14.5	3.2	
Family violence	13.2	38.7	7.8	14.2	3.8	1.5	5.7
Outreach, sports, recreation	12.0	43.3	12.7	20.5	3.7	1.5	3.8
Reentry, Project Choice	18.7	41.5	5.2	14.9	1.7	1.4	11.4
Safe Passages	—		—		—	—	—
Second Step	22.2	55.6	3.7	11.1			3.7
Sexually exploited minors	15.9	36.6	2.4	26.8	2.4		1.2
All strategies	13.6	40.3	8.5	18.1	3.8	1.4	5.3

SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan database.

Table 3.19
Oakland Schools with More Than 10 Measure Y Participants

School	Number of Clients
Bunche Academy	18
Castlemont–Business and Information Technology	34
Castlemont–East Oakland School of the Arts	30
Castlemont–Leadership Prep High	29
Community Day School	81
Dewey Academy	82
McClymonds–Best	41
McClymonds–Excel	87
McClymonds–Kismet	22
Oakland High	133
Oakland Tech	34
Rudsdale Continuation	177
Skyline	22
University Preparatory Charter Academy	11

SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan database.

By definition, the programs that are focused on reentry strategies reach their intended participants, since release from prison is an eligibility requirement. Grantees establish ex-offender status in one of two ways. Some work with participants prior to their leaving prison, while others work with probation or parole officers to identify already released participants. The case management that is a part of these programs includes parole- or probation-officer contact information. All the grantees administering reentry programs acknowledged that they serve the youth who are the most committed to the program. This means that the hardest to serve, those with the least commitment and often the fewest skills, are not participating. While this is understandable from the point of view of grantees who are operating with limited resources and trying to affect as many lives as possible, it also suggests that there are hard-to-serve eligible populations that these programs are unable to engage.

As noted at the outset of this chapter, more boys and young men are at risk of criminal activity than girls and young women. Twice as many male youth commit violent acts as female youth (U.S. Public Health Service, 2001). Yet, as Table 3.20 shows, only 38.5 percent of participants in all the programs are male. However, much of the female participation is in programs that are targeted toward victims, rather than toward youth who are at the highest risk of criminal activity (i.e., programs in the strategies that provide special services to children and youth exposed to violence).

Focusing only on the youth outreach and comprehensive services, diversion and reentry services, employment and training services, and school-based strategies, we find a different gender distribution: 57.7 percent of the participants in these programs are male, and 42.3 percent are female. Although this proportion is much closer to what is suggested by research, it indicates that grantees may be serving more young women than is optimal given young men's much greater risk of involvement in violence.¹⁵ It must be noted, however, that rates of violent

¹⁵ Rates of violent crime among young women continue to be well below those of their male counterparts. A recent study found that girls accounted for 15.5 percent of juvenile arrests for violent crime in 2003, up from 13.9 percent in 1994 (Shelden, 2004; Chesney-Lind and Shelden, 2004).

Table 3.20
Participants in Violence-Prevention Strategies, by Gender

Strategy	Female	Male
After-school jobs	37.9	62.1
Family violence	89.5	10.5
Outreach, sports, recreation	44.6	55.4
Reentry, Project Choice	16.0	84.0
Safe Passages	100.0	
Second Step	39.4	60.6
Sexually exploited minors	100.0	
All strategies	61.5	38.5

SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan database.

crime among young women have recently shown greater increases than rates among young men, and this may justify an increased focus on young women.

In all, it appears that many of the services funded by Measure Y generally are reaching the targeted populations.

The CitySpan data include some more-direct measures of whether the youth who are most at risk of violent behavior are utilizing Measure Y services. These include data on whether participants are on probation or parole, have been suspended or expelled from school, have been truant from school, or have been victims of violence. Table 3.21 shows the rates of each of these risk factors among participants in each of the funded strategies. Most of the youth served in the after-school jobs and outreach, sports, and recreation strategies had poor school attendance when they enrolled in the programs. Many were also suspended, expelled, and victims of violence. The concentration on students with such risk factors reflects the focus of the Measure Y legislation and the efforts by DHS to compel the programs to reach out to youth most in need of violence-prevention services.

The majority of participants in the family-violence, sexually exploited minors, and after-school jobs strategies were themselves victims of violence. This was also true for a significant share of those in the outreach, sports, and recreation strategy. As expected, all participants in the reentry and Project Choice programs were either on probation or on parole.

Table 3.21
Percentage of Participants Experiencing Key Risk Factors, by Strategy

Strategy	Truant	Suspended or Expelled	Victim of Violence	On Probation	On Parole
After-school jobs	56	34	56	15	0
Family violence	0	0	90	0	0
Outreach, sports, recreation	66	19	24	10	0
Reentry, Project Choice	0	0	0	35	63
Sexually exploited minors	0	0	94	83	0

SOURCE: BPA calculations from CitySpan database.

What Are the Main Achievements of Programs Funded Through Measure Y?

Most of the Measure Y violence-prevention grants were awarded as late as July 2006, so the question of achievements of Measure Y–funded programs will be addressed more thoroughly in later evaluations. Nonetheless, there are achievements that can be seen in this first year. As noted earlier, most programs have exceeded or nearly met enrollment targets. Grantees also reported developing new relationships with partner agencies and working to strengthen existing ones, which is necessary for carrying out the planned activities.

For participants, time spent in the programs may be in activities designed to improve their outcomes, such as peer support groups, employment search and preparation, and mental health counseling. The employment programs and Project Choice programs have been especially effective in increasing participant time spent in constructive activities. Employment is one of the strongest predictors of remaining crime-free after incarceration. Staff in the intensive case-management programs report that, provided with repeated alternatives, participants' motivation and abilities to remain lawful and to become self-supporting increase with the length of time they remain in the programs.

Future evaluations will seek to assess the long-term impact of programs on participants' criminal offenses, recidivism, self-sufficiency, and satisfaction.

What Implementation Challenges Do Programs Face?

The implementation challenges the Measure Y grantees face include unforeseen events, such as losing critical staff members, the length of time it takes to hire additional staff, and breakdowns in the participant referral process. And finally, there is the innate challenge of serving a population with multiple urgent needs.

Some of the challenges of fully meeting program objectives stem from the need to start a wide range of demanding program activities simultaneously. For example, Youth UpRising's sports and recreation program coordinator was not hired and fully in place until November 2006. The absence of key staff in a brand new program can severely impact implementation progress, sending program managers scrambling to fill gaps in order to keep programs on track and meet objectives.

Some of the Measure Y grantees had difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of participant referrals to meet their targets. Programs such as the East Bay Asian Youth Center have invested significant efforts in establishing partnerships with other community-based organizations and public agencies, which has been helpful in identifying and serving at-risk youth of different ethnic backgrounds. However, this kind of diversification and expansion is difficult to initiate and sustain. Despite the East Bay Asian Youth Center's continued efforts to reach out to Latino-based organizations, the county probation department, and schools with significant Latino populations, there has been minimal response and few referrals of Latino participants into the center's programs. Other programs have also experienced difficulties expanding beyond their traditional base.

At the same time, some Measure Y grantees face a demand for services beyond the scope of their expertise or greater than their capacity. For example, case managers at the Safe Passages/OUR Kids program at Elmhurst Middle School were initially overwhelmed by the scope and nature of the service requests they received. These case managers did not have difficulty

getting a sufficient number of participant referrals; the problem they faced was the type of referrals they received. Many students at Elmhurst need an array of services, but not all of them need case management or mental health care, the type of services that OUR Kids case managers are equipped to provide.

Some of the challenges faced by the Measure Y grantees, such as staff attrition, are common to any organization. Yet because most of the funded programs are in small, nonprofit, community-based organizations, the loss of a staff member can be a significant setback in program progress. Measure Y grantees have worked to create links between themselves and other youth-serving organizations, but when these links break down, efforts to provide services can be severely impacted. In some cases, such linkages have led to increased demand, often beyond the capabilities or capacity of the grantee.

The challenges that programs face also depend partly on the type of program. Some Project Choice staff, for example, described problems of being able to spend time with the youth. Some parolees who were not initially interested in the program later became so, sometimes after leaving and returning. Others said they were interested in the program but could not stay committed to it or to a job because of negative distractions from their pre-incarceration life. All the programs, and indeed Measure Y in general, balance finite resources with a continual stream of new youth to serve. Those that serve parolees reentering society face the challenge of helping participants successfully make a positive transition over a long period of time when new parolees need the same services.

The same organizations are regularly challenged by the lack of affordable, safe, and eligible housing for new parolees. Allen Temple has some housing available and plans to build more, Volunteers of America has some housing available, and The Mentoring Center continues to seek locations and partners with which to build appropriate housing. Nonetheless, housing remains one of the most frequently mentioned difficulties for organizations working with paroled youth.

Employment programs have not been able to serve all those who wanted to participate. When asked how they might change their programs if given unlimited resources, staff of both employment programs chose program expansion to serve more people over alternatives such as more-intensive services for harder-to-serve clients or development of complementary supportive services. This is consistent with the fact that the number of slots funded for employment and training programs is a fraction of the number of parolees and youth who have not been incarcerated but are at risk. For Measure Y as a whole, this suggests that citywide employment or crime statistics may not be good indicators of the success of these programs. For example, Youth Employment Partnership and the Volunteers of America's crew-based sheltered employment may improve long-term outcomes for program participants, but if they are able to reach only 10 percent of eligible youth, they may not have a significant impact on citywide employment or crime rates.

Many programs, particularly the reentry programs, also face the challenge of reaching the hardest-to-serve populations. One can argue that limited resources are best spent on those who are most likely to respond to the investment. At the same time, there are individuals who do not volunteer to participate in these programs or who drop out soon after enrollment who may require more-intensive or different treatment than is currently available.

Some grantees have faced internal organizational challenges that were broader than their Measure Y-funded programs. These include the organization and staffing issues faced by Allen

Temple and Sports 4 Kids. Such institution-specific challenges will have to be resolved if those organizations are to be successful.

All the programs are challenged by their ability to coordinate their services so that the benefits they offer complement each other. Participants sometimes have to choose between programs that are designed to complement each other because the programs occur at the same time of day. This limits the chances of those who need wraparound services to make a successful transition in their life (for example, new parolees).

Finally, participants in four organizations offered suggestions for improving their programs during focus-group discussions. Most of the suggestions involved expanding the options that are already available. For example, youth said they wanted the following:

- A wider range of activities. In the sports programs, for example, they would like swimming, weight rooms, baseball, and golf added to the available options.
- A wider range of experiences, including field trips that get them out of Oakland and out of the small, circumscribed worlds of their neighborhoods. One youth who was born and raised in Oakland said he would like to “get us away from everyday life.”
- More speakers who come from backgrounds like theirs who have succeeded in life. One young man talked about a speaker “who used to be a gang member. He [the speaker] talked about how he turned his life around. Now he’s at UC Berkeley.”
- More incentives, such as stipends.

How Are These Challenges Being Addressed?

Some of the solutions proposed or utilized by the Measure Y grantees to address challenges were a matter of continued program implementation, such as hiring staff. Other solutions included the reallocation of resources and the reassessment of strategies.

Staff at Youth UpRising, which was able to complete the full implementation of its program, report that a new basketball program has been well received by participants, that it reinforces other violence-prevention and conflict-resolution activities, and that it even reaches spectators who remain after games and practices to listen to the coach instruct players on the techniques and values of cooperation and teamwork.

To meet its full caseload capacity, the East Bay Asian Youth Center has reassigned the Spanish-speaking caseworker originally designated to work with Latino participants to work with other at-risk youth. The program still seeks to strengthen ties with other organizations and agencies to obtain referrals so that its caseload will reflect the diversity of the communities it serves.

Other solutions have required recruiting or replacing staff, reassigning caseloads, reeducating partners, and rethinking service delivery. The Mentoring Center is addressing the issue of not having sufficient time by using peer support and group sessions, rather than having all meetings be one-to-one between a case manager and a participant. While the support groups are facilitated by a member of the staff, it is hoped that they can continue to include more participants with little or no increase in the number of staff. The Volunteers of America Project Choice staff acknowledge that time of eligibility may be an issue for some participants in their six-month program, but, given that the program is still being rolled out, it is too early to know whether this will be the case.

The Mentoring Center staff described a recent effort to build housing for their participants that was stalled because it could not get a neighborhood to approve it. However, the organization continues to work toward developing housing. Allen Temple is also in the midst of building additional housing.

Allen Temple has included staffing and management in its board-directed reorganization, and a new executive director arrived in June 2007. While these organizational issues are taken seriously by the Allen Temple board of directors, they will continue to require ongoing review and assessment to ensure that Measure Y funds are being targeted toward their intended purposes. In response to its staffing difficulties, Sports 4 Kids has retained the services of a recruiter to improve its applicant screening process and has developed specific hiring and placement criteria.

Do the Individuals Being Served Say They Appreciate and Benefit from the Programs?

Participation levels are an important indicator of whether participants value a program. Staff-reported participation in the employment programs (Project Choice and Youth Employment Partnership) is high: Participants were reportedly active in most outreach, employment, and prisoner reentry programs for 3 to 5 months, on average, as of April 2007. Given that it took some time to get the programs to consistently enter data in CitySpan, such retention rates are encouraging, although longer-term data are needed to confirm this finding.

Focus-group discussions with participants in four of the programs also offer a direct measure of participants' appreciation. Overall, focus-group participants say they are satisfied with their programs. They indicated that the programs offer positive alternatives in neighborhoods where there is a dearth of positive options. One young man said, "Without Sports 4 Kids, there would be no sports up here."

Youth in Sports 4 Kids expressed disappointment about days on which they cannot have outdoor activities. These include rainy days or days "when no one wants to play." Because Sports 4 Kids is run on the campus of a continuation school, the number of participants fluctuates throughout the year—sometimes, there are too few participants to field full teams.

Several of the Measure Y grantees in the youth outreach strategy, including the East Bay Asian Youth Center and Youth UpRising, employ young counselors, often current or former residents of the target neighborhoods and sometimes alumni of the programs. The strategy presumes that these counselors will have greater credibility with the participants because of their similarity of backgrounds and experiences. We received some confirmation of the effectiveness of this strategy in the group interviews. Focus-group participants called them "real" and were willing to accept guidance from them because they share a common experience: "They are not people who come from the outside and say that they understand you when they do not."

While participants reported that they were happy to have places to go where they can "keep out of trouble" and "stay off the streets," they also appreciate the classes and activities that give them opportunities to develop new skills. These include career-related skills such as music production, digital photography, silk screening, and radio-program production. Many of the youth appreciated the opportunities to be challenged and a more relaxed atmosphere for trying new things. One young man liked the freedom to explore at his own pace: "They got

things to do and they don't pressure us to do anything we don't want to. I can get on computers and do something that I haven't done before."

Participants in programs that exposed them to the wider world—of college and work or places beyond Oakland—found those experiences both illuminating and exciting. Two of the programs brought in speakers and took the youth on field trips. One program, Youth Radio, paid participants a stipend of \$150 for their work.

The evaluation team asked focus-group participants to identify changes in themselves, including the ways that they think, feel, and act, since participating in the programs. Some of those in a program that emphasizes self-control and anger management as part of leadership training said that they had learned to control their temper. Several of those involved in sports activities were satisfied with their improved athletic skills; others said they had learned responsibility from team sports. Participants in job-training programs also emphasized, variously, "being more responsible" and "dress-up training."

Some of the youth reported positive changes in their attitudes toward school, including greater interest in and commitment to learning. Some teens are beginning to see the value of school, saying that it will allow them to "get to a higher goal," "get a scholarship," or reach a goal in life rather than being "stuck." One mentioned no longer cutting school. Not everyone reported improved attitudes toward school, however. One participant said, "I really didn't like school. I still feel the same." Another participant who attended the same school said, "The principal is crappy. The everyday harassment made my life hell." Some were silent. One young man felt picked on at school and saw the program as a refuge.

In future reports, we will describe participants' experiences and outcomes, using data collected from various sources across all the funded programs.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

As of spring 2007, the Measure Y violence-prevention programs had been contracted and funded for approximately nine months, and the police department was still in the midst of its attempts to recruit for and staff the full contingent of Measure Y–funded officers. In this chapter, we present some conclusions and develop recommendations based on our early findings. To further inform these conclusions, we interviewed four additional staff members during August and September 2007, including DHS staff and managers, the former Measure Y program administrator in the City Administrator’s Office, and representatives from the Measure Y Oversight Committee. The protocol used for these interviews is included in Appendix A. In addition to providing additional data for the evaluation, these interviews confirmed that many of the implementation challenges we found in early 2007 had been recognized by city program managers and were being addressed during the summer and early fall.

Conclusions on Measure Y Progress

The early evidence on the implementation of Measure Y is not altogether positive, especially for the community-policing component. The deployment of problem-solving officers (PSOs), which is the cornerstone of the community-policing initiative, has been delayed because of a lack of available officers and has been frustrated by lack of equipment, inadequate training, frequent transfers of officers out of their beats, and infringement on the PSOs’ time. It appears that a combination of financial constraints (including the unspent money that now must be saved to cover future personnel costs) and various administrative challenges has undermined the implementation of the initiative. It is unclear whether the current reorganization of OPD will improve the department’s focus on community policing or will further compromise its implementation by diverting discretionary resources into the reorganization effort. Our research shows that PSOs can make a positive difference in the communities they serve when they are given time to establish relationships with the neighborhood and time to do their jobs. This suggests that the city should make finding ways to fully implement and adequately support the deployment of its PSOs a priority.

Implementation of community policing in Oakland is also compromised by a lack of community participation. Community meetings involving the PSOs are generally poorly attended, and some of the citizens who do participate report being intimidated and harassed by criminals.

Our field research and analysis of Measure Y service data indicated that the violence-prevention programs are meeting enrollment targets, but many are not yet meeting service delivery targets. In some cases, service provision has been delayed due to recruitment or staffing issues. During our field research, staff and managers at several programs commented on the early challenges of expanding their services with the new Measure Y resources. These challenges included the need to forge relationships with new partners; the difficulty of attracting new participants, sometimes from groups they did not traditionally serve; and the need to expand services for specific Measure Y target groups such as chronic truants. Staff turnover has also been a problem for several Measure Y grantees. Because of the small size of most grantee organizations, staff turnover or other organizational turmoil has resulted in significant disruption of program services and implementation delays. DHS staff have actively assisted programs in addressing these challenges by facilitating meetings between grantee organizations and city agencies, by providing advice and technical assistance, and by playing an active role in improving the governance of organizations with serious organizational and leadership problems.

The requirement to use a city-administered database to monitor enrollment and participation was an important start-up challenge for many programs. To assist the programs, the city and its CitySpan database partner held a number of meetings to explain the database and provide technical assistance. Measure Y programs reported that these meetings were a productive networking opportunity for them. In spring 2007, when we began receiving CitySpan data, some Measure Y-funded programs were not yet using the database consistently and effectively. Some programs waited until the end of the fiscal quarter to enter their data rather than using the database as an ongoing case-management tool. This also limited the ability of DHS administrators to monitor the funded programs on an ongoing basis. In our recent interviews, DHS staff reported that this issue had been resolved and they are now able to continuously monitor the programs they are responsible for. DHS staff expressed the hope that the database would become even more effective if grantees will begin to share their data with one another to facilitate coordinated service delivery and program-to-program referrals. Also, the addition of outcome fields for all the programs is expected to encourage the grantees to better manage and document participant outcomes and will enable DHS staff to monitor both participation and outcomes on an ongoing basis.

Early analysis of participation data collected by Measure Y-funded programs suggests that program retention and the intensity of services received are relatively low. The programs appear able to enroll program participants and meet outreach targets, but many reported providing fewer hours of service than planned. Promoting intensive and consistent participation at the individual level appears to be a challenge for many programs. To some extent, this may be a function of inconsistent data entry, but it also may be indicative of a more fundamental challenge that is inherent in the implementation of programs that target at-risk youth. The extant literature on youth programming suggests that social and educational programs need both high intensity and strong retention to make a lasting difference in the lives of young people. A few of the funded programs are quite successful in this regard (for example, Youth Radio) and could function as a model for others.

Focus groups with participants in Measure Y-funded service programs, observations of program activities, and interviews with program staff suggest that participants who are active in the violence-prevention programs appreciate them. The high participation rates of the prisoner reentry programs is particularly positive evidence that these programs engage participants.

At the time of our site visits and data analysis, review of program data and discussions with managers and staff at funded programs did not provide much evidence of DHS oversight and direction. Grantees appeared to operate largely on their own, and although Measure Y was an important additional funding source for them, there was little evidence of a shared purpose of identity among them. With some important exceptions, there was also little evidence of new linkages between programs and public agencies such as OUSD or OPD.

Subsequent discussions with DHS staff revealed that DHS staff members frequently interact with their grantees, monitor grantee progress, and use contract deliverables to encourage grantees to meet their intended service targets and serve the groups targeted by Measure Y. DHS also has organized several grantee meetings and participates in a wide range of roundtables and stakeholder groups to coordinate youth mental health services, gang prevention, parolee services, and other violence-prevention efforts.¹

Our failure to find much evidence of these coordinating activities during our site visits may have been due to the timing of our visits and their focus on documenting program start-up. It also may be that coordination and oversight activities became more intensive or effective after we concluded the site visits. There is a fundamental dilemma in developing and executing a funding strategy like Measure Y's, in which many established programs receive supplemental funding to expand their services. Such an approach supports established programs and addresses the needs of a wide range of participant subgroups, but the lack of concentrated funding can compromise efforts to create and reinforce a common purpose and focus across the various grantees.

On a practical level, our early analysis of the CitySpan data found relatively low levels of program retention and service intensity. We also found specific data problems that were discussed in detail in Chapter Three. These findings suggest that DHS should continue to closely monitor the participation data for every funded program in order to improve program performance. The database offers excellent opportunities for proactive hands-on management and guidance by city staff, and this potential should be exploited as much as possible.

Recommendations for Improving the Measure Y Programs

On the basis of the above conclusions, we offer some early recommendations for improving the Measure Y programs. We first present some overall recommendations, and then some specific recommendations for the community-policing and violence-prevention programs.

Measure Y Programwide Recommendations

Increase Oversight of Measure Y Activities. The city should consider increasing its oversight of Measure Y–funded activities. Although the Measure Y Oversight Committee monitors spending and receives progress reports about police staffing and other implementation efforts, and DHS regularly oversees program activities in the violence-prevention strategies, there is

¹ For example, DHS staff participate in the Reentry Advisory Committee, which includes county probation and parole departments, San Quentin, the Northern California Youth Correctional Facility, County Behavioral Health Care, the county's Workforce Investment Board, OPD, and service providers. DHS also participates in the Alameda County Violence Prevention Committee, the Safe Passages Board, the Oakland Truancy Advisory Board, the Pathways to Change Policy Council, the Workforce Investment Board and its youth council, the OPD Juvenile Desk Strategy Group, and the Sexually Exploited Minors Network, among other groups.

insufficient oversight of Measure Y activities as they are implemented on the ground. The City Administrator's Office, DHS, OPD, and the Measure Y Oversight Committee should provide more proactive input into the management of key program objectives, including training, outfitting, and deploying of PSOs; sustaining high levels of retention and participation in violence-prevention programs; and increasing collaboration among programs and between programs and public agencies.

DHS must have reliable information about who is being served by the Measure Y grantees and about the level of services individual participants receive, and the Oversight Committee must receive up-to-date information not only about how Measure Y funds are spent, but also about the level of service that is being provided and how grantee programs and public agencies are collaborating.

Improve Communication with the Public. The city and its partner agencies should be more forthcoming and deliberate in their communications with the general public about Measure Y. On numerous occasions in meetings and data-collection activities, we encountered public frustration and skepticism concerning the city's violence-prevention activities, and especially its community-policing efforts. The public feels ill-informed and feels that it is not at the table when important decisions are made. Improving communication with Oakland residents would not only improve the public image of Measure Y, it might also increase the ability of funded programs to reach out to potential participants (and volunteers). It also could improve citizen participation in community meetings with OPD, especially if meeting participants were better protected. Ultimately, Measure Y is unlikely to succeed unless it effectively leverages community participation and commitment to change.

The city should host periodic seminars, conferences, and roundtable events to promote collaboration and networking among funded agencies and programs. It is unfortunate that mandatory database training was needed to bring together programs whose staffs admit that they might not have worked together otherwise. Many of the Measure Y grantees already rely on each other and on public agencies for most of their participant referrals. An increase in networking opportunities could improve the ability of grantees to reach out to underserved groups that are not part of their traditional constituencies.

Integrate and Focus Measure Y Activities. The city should develop ways to foster the larger purpose of the Measure Y initiative. Program administrators should make more targeted efforts to brand the Measure Y initiative to increase awareness among participants and the public that activities they benefit from are part of a coordinated citywide effort. The city should also consider concentrating its Measure Y funds in the future on the strategies that prove to be most successful and that have the greatest impact. City administrators and policymakers should continually examine where Measure Y's resources have the greatest impact and should redistribute resources to those areas whenever possible.

Community Policing

This is a unique time in the city of Oakland. Despite several challenges—many of which are significant but none insurmountable—the circumstances in Oakland are fortuitous for implementing community policing. The passage of Measure Y not only provides resources to subsidize much of the cost of community policing (there is nothing to suggest that *only* Measure Y resources should be spent for this purpose), it empirically and unequivocally demonstrates the preference for community policing on the part of Oakland residents. Their belief in this philosophy is such that they are willing to tax themselves to see it implemented. Moreover, Mayor

Dellums and Chief Tucker publicly are proponents of community policing, community and city stakeholders are incredibly motivated and have been attempting to mobilize, and initial successes serve as constant reminders of what can be accomplished when the pieces are in place and the system works properly.

As in any city, the environment in Oakland is complex. The implementation of community policing may be facilitated or impeded by myriad issues, such as resources, community desires and involvement, staffing needs, politics, and other city priorities. It is up to the city and its stakeholders to determine the appropriateness of the quality and pace of implementation given Oakland's circumstances. Based on our assessment, the recommendations below should help improve the implementation of community policing in Oakland.

Actively Manage Police Workforce Levels. One of Oakland's most fundamental challenges to public safety and police-community relations is police staffing. The difficulty of maintaining, let alone building, the police workforce impedes not only community problem-solving but also other important police functions, such as patrol and investigations. This makes providing the form, substance, and amount of police service the public prefers a significant challenge for OPD, which in turn diminishes the community's trust and faith in the police.

Given the police staffing difficulties and their impact on overall police-community relations, the city should formally assess its police personnel experience to develop and implement evidence-based lessons for building and maintaining the police workforce. By "building" and "maintaining" we do not mean any kind of reorganization. Rather, we are referring to actively managing the workforce level to improve OPD's ability to recruit and retain enough officers to fully staff the organization and meet its service needs. This is best done through an analysis of its experience that examines how attractive, competitive, and strategic the department is in terms of characteristics associated with recruiting and retaining officers, such as employment qualifications, the length and substance of the hiring process, academy completion, recruitment and retention strategies, marketing, incentives, officer career progression and promotion, level and structure of compensation and benefits, morale, civilianization, and legal mandates and restrictions. This could be accomplished through an organizational assessment (and built upon the current recruitment plan), using comparative case studies and empirical studies of workforce development. The analysis would provide the city with information necessary for developing and implementing a tailor-made, evidence-based strategy for cost-effectively improving police staffing. This recommendation also relates to the problem of staffing for PSOs (discussed below).

Provide One PSO per Beat. As discussed in Chapter Two, PSO coverage in 2006 was 24 percent of full implementation, and nearly every stakeholder identified the lack of PSOs as the primary community-policing implementation challenge. If the city is truly interested in implementing community policing, it must make good on the mandate to deliver one PSO per beat as soon as possible. Most stakeholders are sensitive to OPD's overall staff shortage and fully recognize the need for more officers assigned to patrol, CRTs, investigations, and elsewhere. However, until residents see that there is a PSO working in every beat, they will continue to distrust the city's claims to be pursuing community policing in earnest. This is the largest impediment by far to building a true partnership between the community and the police.

Stabilize PSO Assignments. Further straining police-community relations is the perception that OPD constantly removes PSOs from their beats. This frustrates the community and further breaks down trust between residents and OPD, making it that much more difficult to build trust in the future. For community policing to be successful, OPD must find a way to

limit actions that pull PSOs out of their beats, make such occurrences more transparent, and smooth the transitions when they occur.

There is no doubt that OPD is often placed in a difficult position, such as when a PSO in a high-stress beat wishes to transfer out of the unit. When a new PSO is assigned to the unit, OPD must make the difficult decision between filling an open position created by the departure or assigning the PSO to the neighborhood next in line and already waiting to receive one.

The stressor index is only the first step in making that decision, since its use is not well-known by the community and there is no established procedure for filling departures. At the very least, OPD needs a system for making such deployment decisions and for ensuring as much community continuity as possible. This system must be transparent and vetted through the community. In the end, this would provide full information to all involved, thereby limiting surprises, questions, and ultimately, discontent. This problem may be alleviated once the PSO unit is fully staffed, particularly if OPD incorporates more than 57 officers in its PSO unit. If this occurs, the additional PSOs could work in higher-stressed beats, partner with other PSOs on solving more-difficult problems, and temporarily cover for other PSOs who are on extended sick leave or modified duty. This obviously is not easy to do and requires some planning, but it would speak volumes to the community about OPD's commitment to community policing.

Foster Community Participation. The community must be engaged for community policing to work. This does not mean that every citizen must actively participate, but greater involvement would result in activities and plans that are more reflective of the community as a whole. It is apparent that more people want to be involved than are currently active, but they choose not to for reasons varying from fear to futility.

To encourage greater community involvement, OPD, NSCs, and current community partners must work together to actively promote participation² and to reduce or at least mitigate the barriers to it. Fully staffing the PSOs, limiting PSO transitions, and incorporating community input and greater transparency in the PSO deployment process will significantly improve community buy-in, as would developing a process to make the CPAB better reflect the interests of the community, at least as expressed by the NCPCs, and limiting the time members can serve. In beats where residents feel unsafe, finding safe places and ways for them to meet without fear of criminals is a challenge because a primary goal of these meetings is to coordinate with a broader segment of the population, which generally requires broader communication to encourage public participation. The community-policing partners must be creative in finding additional ways to mobilize without fear of retaliation. In short, the community feels that its voice falls on deaf ears, and when residents do try to speak, some fear for their personal safety, so they disengage. This is most acute in Oakland's high-stress neighborhoods, where problem-solving is most needed.

Enhance and Institutionalize Problem-Solving Training and Resources. What is community policing? What does a PSO do? The answers we received to such questions varied among

² Skogan (2006, p. 111) explains that as part of implementing community policing in Chicago, the city and police invested heavily in promoting the importance of attendance at beat meetings (the equivalent of NCPC meetings). To foster participation, they distributed flyers, hung posters, encouraged organizations and their members to get involved, developed mailing lists from sign-in sheets, stapled beat maps and lists of upcoming meetings to pizza-box lids, posted schedules on the Internet, went door-to-door encouraging participation, and created newsletters, billboards, and television spots.

and within stakeholder groups. Everyone generally understands that the police and the community are supposed to work together, but they do not fully understand how. This has led to numerous suggestions for training, particularly for PSOs and NCPCs. PSOs need greater clarification of their roles, responsibilities (e.g., what exactly constitutes a “problem?”), and tools for solving problems and building community partnerships. NCPCs need more training with regard to realistic expectations of PSOs and NSCs, roles of all city resources, what they can accomplish on their own and how, and effective community organization practices. Not only do these groups not receive enough training—indeed, it appears that some of them have not received any—the training they receive needs to be consistent and ongoing, particularly for the NCPCs, where participation is fluid. The training offered also must be the “right” training—giving the PSOs and NCPCs what they most need when they need it.

While OPD now has standardized problem-solving training and virtually all PSOs have received it, training for the NCPCs appears far less standard and occurs on an ad hoc basis—or not at all for those that do not have a PSO or NSC assigned to them. The tools of problem-solving are important, but even more basic are the needs for greater clarification of what problem-solving is and who does what. This requires OPD and its partners to formally articulate and clarify the actors and activities of community policing.

One way to do this is to develop a community-policing guidebook, which all stakeholders may find extremely helpful. Such a document, drafted in partnership among OPD, the Neighborhood Services Division, the CPAB, and community representatives, would describe each of the partners in the problem-solving process, their roles and responsibilities (i.e., the division of labor), ways in which they should prioritize their time, and what should and should not be expected of them. The guidebook should also lay out the process for identifying, reporting, prioritizing, and addressing problems. It should be clear enough so that everyone knows who is responsible for what, but general enough so that it can be tailored to the unique characteristics of each beat. It would inform everyone about what they need to do and would also promote greater understanding about what to expect from others. Community involvement in developing such a guidebook is critical to get stakeholders’ buy-in. The guidebook could be distributed to all of them and would be particularly helpful as a training resource for getting new PSOs, NSCs, and NCPC and neighborhood-watch members up to speed with community policing.

A guidebook is a relatively low-cost way to supplement formal training and keep everyone refreshed about the roles and responsibilities of community policing, especially in regard to problem-solving. Another cost-effective way to do this would be to create a community-policing-resource web site. Such a web site, which could have publicly open and secure components for registered and vetted partners, could serve as a clearinghouse for community policing in the city and could effectively help promote community governance more broadly. The site could serve as a repository for training modules (e.g., presentations, handouts) for all partners that could be accessed at any time. This would help people who want to revisit certain training sessions, but it would be most important for those who are new to community policing and have not yet received formal training.

The site could also pull together information that is currently spread across various city web sites, such as descriptions and contact information for city agencies, PSOs, and NSCs. The community-policing guidebook could be posted on the web site, along with Measure Y reports. To promote effective problem-solving strategies, the web site could catalog and link to

best practices, systematic reviews of interventions, conferences, evaluations, how-to manuals, and problem-solving guides.³

The web site would serve as a valuable resource to PSOs, NSCs, NCPCs, and neighborhood watches. It could also be used by OPD to communicate with residents. However, the information on the web site should also be made available in print form as part of a community-policing library, because many of Oakland's residents do not have computer access. These materials should be located in a public location, such as a library, where residents could access them conveniently and without fear of others learning of their participation in community policing. They could also be duplicated at OPD's Eastmont substation and City Hall to promote their use as resources for the PSOs and NSCs.

Integrate and Utilize Problem-Solving Databases. To further facilitate effective problem-solving and foster greater public confidence in the city's commitment to community policing, OPD and the Neighborhood Services Division could consider working together to create a problem-tracking database to catalog problems, document progress, and summarize outcomes.⁴ It could build upon the SARA project database OPD is already using and the spreadsheet the Neighborhood Services Division is developing. Use of the database must be made efficient and easy so as not to overly burden the PSOs and NSCs.

Documenting all problems in a database may help PSOs, NSCs, and community partners focus more on substantive problems; ease transitions when new PSOs, NSCs, and community leaders replace others who leave their positions; promote best practices, since all partners can learn what others have tried and the effectiveness of those efforts; promote greater knowledge of beat-level issues and activities on the part of patrol officers, CRTs, residents, and other city staff; and demonstrate to everyone the extent to which problem-solving is conducted and is successful. This database could be a feature within the community-policing web site described above.

Promote Coordination Among Police Units. Lack of coordination and information-sharing among OPD's various units, particularly the PSOs, CRTs, and patrol officers, was an issue raised by several stakeholders. Addressing the most pressing problems in some beats requires OPD to strategically leverage all its (and the community's) resources, so developing creative ways to facilitate collaboration and information exchange among OPD's units could only help to improve its problem-solving effectiveness. Many of the respondents believe the new reorganization into districts will facilitate this process. Creating an up-to-date problem-solving database could also help by keeping all OPD units informed about current problem-solving efforts. (CRTs could also post information regarding their activities related to specific problems.) OPD should consider additional ways to promote coordination.

³ For examples of the kinds of information and resources that could be placed on the web site, see the Cincinnati Police Department's "Community Problem-Oriented Policing" web site, available at <http://cagisperm.hamilton-co.org/cpop/>, and particularly its "Problem-Oriented Policing Best Practices Library," available at <http://cagisperm.hamilton-co.org/cpop/library.aspx>; the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, available at <http://www.popcenter.org/default.cfm>; the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, available at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/>; "Blueprints for Violence Prevention Overview" from the University of Colorado at Boulder's Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, available at <http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/>; the Campbell Collaboration, available at <http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/index.asp>; and the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, available at <http://www.ncjrs.gov/>.

⁴ As an illustration, the Cincinnati Police Department has developed a problem-tracking database that sorts problems by community, district, and type of problem and provides a summary of progress on each stage of the SARA problem-solving model. The database is available at <http://cagisperm.hamilton-co.org/cpop/review/review.aspx>.

Leverage Funding for Equipment. PSOs have achieved successes despite not being fully equipped. However, the lack of equipment—or at least the lack of functioning equipment—appears to significantly impede reaching their true effectiveness potential. This obviously is a resource issue. OPD has attempted to maximize Measure Y equipment funding and has prioritized expenditures relative to its greatest need (cars), but the funding available simply is not enough to fully equip (and train) the officers. For the full mandate of community policing to be realized, OPD and the city must find additional ways to leverage the Measure Y equipment funds and equip the PSOs.

Violence-Prevention Programs

Our findings suggest a number of specific recommendations for violence-prevention strategies in the upcoming years of Measure Y.

Use Graduates of the Programs as Peer Mentors Where Possible. As the programs mature, participants who have made a successful transition to a stable life in Oakland will begin to emerge. These youth can serve as peer mentors to newly released youth, guest speakers, and contacts for employment. Of course, parole regulations will necessarily limit the extent of contact, but given staffing and resource constraints, such volunteers can be very useful as extensions to existing staff. Moreover, giving back to new parolees can be a positive experience for these peer mentors as well.

Coordinate Organizations and Programs. Affording more or more-effective networking opportunities in the context of collaborative planning or information-sharing could engender stronger ties and more-effective working relationships between all Measure Y service providers. Many of the grantees rely on each other and public-agency partners for participant referrals. Some organizations have discussed making or receiving referrals from other agencies, while others reported that they wanted referrals but had not received them. In addition, services from different organizations that could complement each other sometimes have conflicting schedules (e.g., daytime employment hours that conflict with daytime support groups or substance-abuse treatment). Periodic seminars, conferences, or roundtable events that the city hosts among the Measure Y grantees, OUSD, and probation and juvenile facilities should seek to address these coordination issues. The city also should consider increasing the frequency of its grantee meetings, which currently take place only sporadically.

Next Steps for the Evaluation

The next phase of the evaluation of Measure Y will likely have a stronger outcome focus than the evaluation presented in this report. Depending on the outcome of ongoing discussions with the city and the Measure Y Oversight Committee, the evaluation team plans to analyze more information about problem-solving activities, CitySpan outcome data, and data from public partners (OUSD and the Alameda County Probation Department). These data may be supplemented with a survey of 2007 program participants, as well as surveys of stakeholder satisfaction of community policing. In general, we believe that it would be helpful if the implementation and outcomes of the funded programs and activities were evaluated from the perspectives of multiple stakeholders wherever possible. This would help to mitigate the problem of informants who are directly affiliated with certain programs and agencies not always being the most unbiased informants about the success of program implementation at those agencies.

Interview Protocols

PSO Interviews

1. Are you a Measure Y Problem Solving Officer (PSO)?
2. When did you begin your assignment and how many beats do you cover? What in your view is the biggest problem(s) in this beat?
3. As a PSO, how do you actually spend your time? What activities are included in a “typical” day on the job? What proportion of your time is spent in problem-solving?
4. How do you choose which problems you will address?
5. Do you address more than one problem at a time? What are some examples of problems you have addressed?
6. How do you decide the way in which you will attempt to resolve the problem?
7. How do you know when problems are resolved?
8. Can you provide examples of successful and unsuccessful problem-solving attempts? What made them so?
9. Does anyone else work with you in solving problems (e.g., other PSOs, other officers, community groups or members, other city officials)? With what other groups and organizations do you interact?
10. Do you discuss problem-solving with other PSOs? Your supervisor? Have you communicated with any other police agencies or professional associations about problem-solving or reviewed their problem-solving material (e.g., problem-solving guides)?
11. What, if anything, undermines your ability to effectively problem-solve?
12. After becoming a PSO, have you ever been assigned to spend any time on patrol? If so, how much time, and what was the period in which you spent this time on patrol?
13. How frequently, if at all, have you had to answer calls for service while conducting problem-solving activities?
14. How, if at all, does your actual day-to-day experience as a PSO differ from the original definition of the role? How does it differ from that of other PSOs?
15. What kind of data are you collecting to document your activities as a PSO?
16. How have things changed since before Measure Y? Do the Measure Y PSOs have different duties or responsibilities than the non-Measure Y PSOs?
17. What kinds of direction, oversight, and feedback are you being given, if any, and by whom?
18. What kind of training have you received that was specific to your role as a PSO? Are you continuing to receive training on an ongoing basis?

19. How do the chief and other high-ranking staff view PSOs? How do other officers view them? How do you view them? Are Measure Y PSOs viewed differently or treated differently than other PSOs?
20. What obstacles have you encountered in your role as a PSO? To what extent have you been able to overcome these obstacles? Did you ask for and receive help when you encountered obstacles? How are you overcoming them?
21. If you had a choice, would you prefer to remain in this assignment or to be transferred elsewhere? Why?
22. Describe how the community has accepted, or failed to accept, you in your role as a PSO. What is the community reaction to the PSOs?
23. How much of a difference do you see in the community as a direct result of your deployment as a PSO? What form(s) do these differences take?
24. What do you think would be the best way to measure the impact you have had?
25. Has any other initiative occurred in the city or your beat(s) that could affect crime and violence?
26. What do PSOs do who are on modified duty? Does a beat receive any form of problem-solving when its PSO is on modified duty or leave?
27. How could the PSO program be improved?
28. Who else should we speak with to learn about the implementation and impact of problem-solving? Who would represent the community perspective?
29. What else do you feel would be important for us to know in assessing the implementation and impact of the PSO program?

PSO Supervisor Interviews

1. Describe your role as a problem-solving supervisor. How do you actually spend your time? What activities are included in a “typical” day on the job?
2. What in your view are the biggest problems in your police service areas (PSAs)?
3. Are there any beats that do not have a PSO? How are PSOs assigned to beats? Are there some beats where no PSOs want to work? How, if at all, do PSOs fit into a larger community-policing strategy?
4. Do the PSOs address more than one problem at a time? What are some examples of problems they have addressed?
5. How do you know what the PSOs are doing? What proportion of the PSOs’ time is spent problem-solving?
6. How do you know if the PSOs are effective at implementing the problem-solving process and resolving problems?
7. What, if anything, undermines your PSOs’ ability to effectively problem-solve?
8. How, if at all, does the implementation of the PSO program differ from the original intent?
9. Describe any differences that you see in terms of how the PSOs are implementing the problem-solving process. Are some more effective than others? If so, why, and how do you know?
10. What kind of data are you collecting to monitor the implementation process and the performance of your PSOs?

11. What kind of training have you received that was specific to your role as a PSO supervisor? Are you continuing to receive training on an ongoing basis?
12. How do the chief and other high-ranking staff view PSOs? How do other officers view them? How do you view them? Are Measure Y PSOs viewed differently or treated differently than other PSOs?
13. What obstacles have you encountered in your role as a PSO supervisor? To what extent have you been able to overcome these obstacles? Did you ask for and receive help when you encountered obstacles? How are you overcoming them?
14. Did you choose this position? If so, why? If you had a choice, would you prefer to remain in this assignment or to be transferred elsewhere? Why? What does this position mean for your career?
15. Has any other initiative, program, or event occurred in the city or your PSAs that could affect crime and violence in the PSAs?
16. Did many officers express interest in becoming PSOs? What qualities make the most effective PSO?
17. Who else should we speak with to learn about the implementation and impact of problem-solving? Who would represent the community perspective?
18. How many years of service have you completed?
19. Can you provide examples of successful and unsuccessful problem-solving attempts? What made them so?
20. Does anyone else work with the PSOs in solving problems (e.g., other PSOs, other officers, community groups or members, other city officials)? With what other groups and organizations do they interact?
21. Do you discuss problem-solving with the PSOs? Do you provide them any kind of problem-solving information or guides?
22. What kinds of direction, oversight, and feedback are you being given, if any, and by whom?
23. What kinds of direction, oversight, and feedback do you provide your PSOs?
24. Describe how the community has accepted, or failed to accept, the PSOs. What is the community reaction to the PSOs? How do you know?
25. How much of a difference do you see in the community as a direct result of the PSOs in your PSA? What form(s) do these differences take?
26. What do you think would be the best way to measure the impact of the PSOs?
27. How could the PSO program be improved?
28. Have any of your PSOs ever been assigned to spend any time on patrol? If so, how much time, and what was the period in which they spent this time on patrol?
29. How frequently, if at all, have your PSOs had to answer calls for service while conducting problem-solving activities?
30. How have things changed since before Measure Y? Do the Measure Y PSOs have different duties or responsibilities than the non-Measure Y PSOs?
31. What do PSOs who are on modified duty do? Does a beat receive any form of problem-solving when its PSO is on modified duty or leave?
32. What else do you feel would be important for us to know in assessing the implementation and impact of the PSO program?

CPAB Interviews

1. Describe CPAB and its mission?
2. How would you describe your relationship with OPD?
3. How, if at all, is community policing implemented differently than it should be (theory vs. practice)?
4. What, if any, are the initial impacts of community policing?
5. What part of community policing is working well?
6. What part of community policing is not working well?
7. What are the most significant challenges facing the implementation of community policing?
8. What can be done to facilitate or improve community policing?
9. What else do you feel is necessary for us to know in assessing community policing/problem-solving?

NSC and NCPC Interviews

1. Describe NSCs/NCPCs and their mission?
2. How would you describe your relationship with OPD/PSOs?
3. How, if at all, is community policing implemented differently than it should be (theory vs. practice)?
4. Describe your role in the problem-solving process.
5. What, if any, are the initial impacts of community policing?
6. What part of community policing is working well?
7. What part of community policing is not working well?
8. What are the most significant challenges facing the implementation of community policing?
9. What can be done to facilitate or improve community policing?
10. What else do you feel is necessary for us to know in assessing community policing/problem-solving?

Interviews with Allen Temple, The Mentoring Center, Volunteers of America, and Youth Employment Partnerships

1. Program documents
 - a. Annual Report
 - b. Annual financial report (if different)
 - c. Any other materials pertaining to programs funded by Measure Y
2. Funding allocation
 - a. Where does Measure Y money get allocated (i.e., what specific program areas)?
 - b. Are these areas paid for entirely by Measure Y resources or are Measure Y resources pooled with other resources to pay for them?

3. Can you describe the specific program areas paid for by Measure Y funding?
 - a. What services do the program areas provide?
 - i. Employment
 - ii. Housing
 - iii. Government financial aid
 - iv. Social networks
 - v. Drug/alcohol rehabilitation
 - vi. Other
 - b. Who are the clients?
 - i. Who qualifies for services?
 - ii. Who actually receives services?
 - iii. How many clients do you serve?
 - c. How do you find or attract these clients?
 - d. Are you able to serve all clients, or do you have to turn clients away?
4. Program goals
 - a. What are the goals of the areas of your program that are funded by Measure Y?
 - b. How does the staff work toward these goals?
 - c. Which of these goals has the program been able to accomplish?
 - d. Which of these goals have not been accomplished? Why—what obstacles are in the way?
 - e. Have any of the goals been revised? Why?
 - f. What other accomplishments has the program achieved?
5. Implementation
 - a. Did you have a plan for implementing the program prior to obtaining the Measure Y funds?
 - i. If yes, describe the plan—is there documentation?
 - ii. If no, did you make a plan later, or did you make implementation decisions as issues came up? Please describe.
 - b. What parts of implementation went smoothly or as planned?
 - c. What challenges did you face in implementing these programs?
 - d. Are there any other remaining challenges to full implementation? Describe.
6. Client experience
 - a. Do the individuals being served benefit from the programs? How do you know?
 - b. Do the individuals being served appreciate the programs? How do you know?
 - c. Do clients have input in revising the program, or do clients' experiences shape the program in any way? How?

Interviews with East Bay Agency for Children, East Bay Asian Youth Center, Leadership Excellence, Youth Alive!, Youth UpRising, Alameda County Interagency Children’s Policy Council, Sports 4 Kids, Family Violence Law Center, Attitudinal Healing Connection, Bay Area Video Coalition, Youth Radio, Alameda County Health Care Services Agency, Oakland Unified School District Office of Student Services

Executive Director/Program Manager Questions

Background

1. How many years have you been with this organization?
2. Please describe your role in the organization?
3. How many years have you been working with youth in some capacity and/or in violence prevention?

Program-Level Questions

4. Please describe the services you provide using Measure Y funds. *(The interviewer should go in already knowing this but should confirm or probe about specific details and get an update on implementation progress.)*
5. Have there been any changes in the services you provide as a result of Measure Y?
6. Has your Measure Y grant changed your primary services? If so, how?
7. Has the way in which you recruit participants or receive referrals changed since you received your Measure Y grant? Please explain.
8. Has the Measure Y grant affected your relationships or partnerships with other organizations? Please explain.
9. Has the way in which you identify families or children or receive referrals changed since Measure Y was adopted? If so, why, and how have these methods changed? [Family Violence and Mental Health Services Probe]
10. What are the challenges you face in identifying families and children? [Family Violence and Mental Health Services Probe]
11. What are the challenges you face in collaborating with other organizations to provide services to these families or children? [Family Violence and Mental Health Services Probe]
12. Do you have a waiting list for your program? If so, how many people are on the waiting list? How long do people have to wait to receive services if they are on the waiting list?
13. Has Measure Y made it easier, more difficult, or had no effect on the number of at-risk youth you are able to provide services to? Please explain.
14. Has the number of at-risk youth that you serve increased, decreased, or remained the same since you have received Measure Y funds?
15. What did you hope to achieve or accomplish with the addition of Measure Y funding for your program? Have you been able to accomplish or achieve these goals? If not, what has impeded your progress? If yes, why do you think you were able to accomplish your goals?

Program/Direct Services Staff

Background

1. How long have you been here? How long have you been doing this type of work?

2. How many years have you been with this organization?
3. What is your role in the organization? What kind of interaction with program participants do you have?
4. How many years have you been working with youth and/or violence-prevention programs?

Program-Level Questions

5. How do you get assigned a client?
6. What is your most common source of referrals? What are the challenges you face in recruiting participants and getting referrals?
7. What is, on average, the amount of time between referral and a program participant receiving services?
8. Who are your clients?
9. What are some of the primary needs of your program participants? Are there some important commonalities among them?
10. Who do you think are the youth best served by your program? In other words, is there a particular group of youth with particular risk factors that your program seems to be more successful with in terms of preventing their participation in violent or criminal activities? If there is such a group, why do you think you are more successful with this group?
11. How many cases do you handle in a day? A week? What is your typical day like?
12. How often do you meet with participants? What kinds of topics do you discuss or activities do you engage in when you meet with them? How long is your average case? Do you generally feel like you have enough time to work with and meet participant needs?
13. When do program services end? What typically happens to program participants after your program services end?
14. How do you keep track of your cases? How about your clients' progress? Whom do you have to report to? How often?
15. Do you track participant progress in your program? What kind of tracking do you do? Do you also provide any reports to other staff, your Executive Director, referral sites, or any others? If so, what types of reporting do you do?
16. Do you use the Measure Y database? How useful is it?
17. What's the hard part of your job?
18. What is your program's biggest challenge? How are you and [NAME OF PROGRAM] staff working to address this challenge? (*Probe for issues other than administrative concerns, such as spending too much time on paperwork.*)
19. What logistical challenges do you face in placing and maintaining participants in employment? [After-School Jobs probe]
20. What's the best part of your job?
21. What have been some of your most important accomplishments with your Measure Y program to date?

California Penal Codes Used to Define Categories of Violent Crime

Crime	California Penal Codes
Murder	PC187(A)
Attempted murder	PC664/187(A)
Robbery	PC211, PC212.5(A), PC212.5(A)
Attempted robbery	PC213(B), PC664/211, PC664/212.5(A), PC664/212.5(B)
Assault	PC220, PC240, PC241, PC241(B), PC241.2(A), PC241.6, PC244, PC244.5(B), PC245(A)(1), PC245(A)(2), PC245(A)(2), PC245(B), PC245(C), PC245(D)(1), PC245(D)(2), PC245(D)(3), PC245.5(A), PC422
Battery	PC242, PC243, PC243(A), PC243(B), PC243(C), PC243(C)(1), PC243(D), PC243(D), PC243.1, PC243.2(A), PC243.2(A)(1), PC243.3, PC243.35(A), PC243.4(A), PC243.4(B), PC243.4(C), PC243.4(D), PC243.4(D), PC243.4(D)(1), PC243.6
Rape	PC261(A)(1), PC261(A)(2), PC261(A)(3), PC261(A)(4), PC261(A)(5), PC261(A)(6), PC261.5, PC261.5(A), PC261.5(B), PC261.5(C), PC261.5(C), PC261.5(D), PC262(A)(1), PC262(A)(2), PC262(A)(4), PC264.1, PC266, PC266A, PC266C, PC266H, PC266H(A), PC266H(B), PC266I, PC266I(A), PC266I(A)(2), PC266I(A)(3), PC266I(B), PC266J, PC286(A), PC286(B)(1), PC286(B)(2), PC286(C), PC286(C)(1), PC286(C)(2), PC286(D), PC286(F), PC286(G), PC288A(B)(1), PC288A(B)(1), PC288A(B)(2), PC288A(C), PC288A(C)(1), PC288A(C)(3), PC288A(D), PC288A(D)(1), PC288A(D)(2), PC288A(D)(3), PC288A(F), PC288A(F)(1), PC288A(G), PC288A(I), PC288.5(A), PC289(A), PC289(A)(1), PC289(A)(2), PC289(B), PC289(D), PC289(D)(3), PC289(E), PC289(H), PC289(I), PC289(J), PC289.5
Attempted rape	PC664/261, PC664/286(B)(1), PC664/286(B)(2), PC664/286(C), PC664/286(D)
Kidnapping	PC207(A), PC207(B), PC207(D), PC208(B), PC209(A), PC209(B), PC209(B)(1), PC210, PC210.5, PC236, PC237, PC237(A), PC278, PC278.5, PC278.5(A)
Carjacking	PC215(A)
Shooting at building/vehicle	PC246, PC246.3, PC247(A), PC247(B), PC374C
Child abuse	PC273A, PC273A(1), PC273A(2), PC273A(A), PC273A(A), PC273A(A)(1), PC273A(B), PC273AB, PC273D, PC273D(A), PC273D(A), PC273G, PC288(A), PC288(B), PC288(B)(1), PC288(B)(2), PC288(C), PC288(C)(1), PC288(C)(2), PC288(C)(2), PC288.2(B), PC288.5(A), PC270, PC270.5(A), PC271, PC271A, PC647.6, PC647.6(A), PC647.6(C)(1), PC647.6(C)(2)
Elder abuse	PC368(A), PC368(B), PC368(B)(1), PC368(B)(1), PC368(C), PC368(D), PC368(E)
Domestic violence	PC273.5, PC273.5(A), PC273.55, PC243(E), PC243(E)(1)

NOTE: The text of all California penal codes is available online at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/html/pen_table_of_contents.html.

Violent Crimes Within Oakland Police Service Areas

More violent crimes were reported in 2006 than in 2005 in all six Oakland police service areas (PSAs). Tables C.1 through C.6 present the numbers of reported violent crimes in individual PSAs. As Table C.1 shows, there was an 18.2 percent increase in violent crimes reported in PSA 1 (West Oakland) in 2006 over those reported in 2005. Domestic-violence crimes in PSA 1 increased at more than double the rate for the city overall, while the rate of increase in robberies reported was less than half that of the entire city. The largest increases were in murder, kidnapping, elder abuse, and assault. Decreases occurred in attempted robbery, attempted rape, and carjacking. The infrequent occurrence of attempted rape resulted in the large percentage drop for that offense.

Table C.2 shows violent crimes reported in PSA 2 (North Oakland). The overall number reported in 2006 was 19.4 percent higher than the number in 2005. The large percentage increases in attempted murder and shooting at occupied buildings or vehicles are somewhat misleading, since these are relatively rare crimes. The number of reported carjackings and instances of elder abuse were actually lower in 2006 than in 2005.

Table C.1
Violent Crimes Reported in PSA 1 (West Oakland), 2005 and 2006

Offense Type	2005	2006	% Change
Murder	19	28	47.4
Attempted murder	2	2	0.0
Robbery	513	571	11.3
Attempted robbery	65	63	-3.1
Assault	425	535	25.9
Battery	510	588	15.3
Rape	63	80	27.0
Attempted rape	2	1	-50.0
Kidnapping	56	75	33.9
Carjacking	64	61	-4.7
Shooting at building/vehicle	75	91	21.3
Child abuse	103	118	14.6
Elder abuse	6	8	33.3
Domestic violence	446	555	24.4
All violent offenses	2,349	2,776	18.2

Table C.2
Violent Crimes Reported in PSA 2 (North Oakland), 2005 and 2006

Offense Type	2005	2006	% Change
Murder	8	12	50.0
Attempted murder	1	4	300.0
Robbery	395	491	24.3
Attempted robbery	36	59	63.9
Assault	224	274	22.3
Battery	291	326	12.0
Rape	45	52	15.6
Attempted rape	1	1	0.0
Kidnapping	30	39	30.0
Carjacking	30	19	-36.7
Shooting at building/vehicle	17	44	158.8
Child abuse	85	108	27.1
Elder abuse	18	15	-16.7
Domestic violence	339	371	9.4
All violent offenses	1,520	1,815	19.4

PSA 3 (San Antonio) had the smallest increase in violent crimes reported among the six PSAs, 17.8 percent more in 2006 than in 2005 (see Table C.3). But more-common violent crimes such as robbery and assault increased by more than 35 percent each. Reports of elder abuse, kidnapping, rape, shootings at buildings and vehicles, and child abuse were slightly lower in 2006 than in 2005. The largest increases in PSA 3 were in murder, carjacking, robbery, and assault.

The largest increase in violent crimes reported in 2006 over those reported in 2005 occurred in PSA 4 (Fruitvale), which saw an overall increase of 23.9 percent (Table C.4). Relatively rare crimes such as elder abuse, attempted rape, murder, and shooting at occupied buildings or

Table C.3
Violent Crimes Reported in PSA 3 (San Antonio), 2005 and 2006

Offense Type	2005	2006	% Change
Murder	9	13	44.4
Attempted murder	1	1	0.0
Robbery	416	578	38.9
Attempted robbery	33	39	18.2
Assault	204	277	35.8
Battery	253	277	9.5
Rape	57	56	-1.8
Attempted rape	0	2	
Kidnapping	43	39	-9.3
Carjacking	26	37	42.3
Shooting at building/vehicle	32	31	-3.1
Child abuse	89	88	-1.1
Elder abuse	6	5	-16.7
Domestic violence	375	376	0.3
All violent offenses	1,544	1,819	17.8

Table C.4
Violent Crimes Reported in PSA 4 (Fruitvale), 2005 and 2006

Offense Type	2005	2006	% Change
Murder	13	23	76.9
Attempted murder	4	4	0.0
Robbery	510	715	40.2
Attempted robbery	78	74	-5.1
Assault	309	414	34.0
Battery	344	394	14.5
Rape	66	87	31.8
Attempted rape	1	2	100.0
Kidnapping	57	48	-15.8
Carjacking	50	74	48.0
Shooting at building/vehicle	39	89	128.2
Child abuse	129	141	9.3
Elder abuse	5	22	340.0
Domestic violence	489	507	3.7
All violent offenses	2,094	2,594	23.9

vehicles were reported much more often in 2006 than in 2005. Kidnapping and attempted robbery were reported less often, but robbery and assault increased markedly. Another commonly reported violent crime, domestic violence, increased by 3.7 percent in PSA 4.

Table C.5 shows the changes in reported violent crimes in PSA 5 (Central East Oakland), where overall violent offenses reported increased by 21.5 percent in 2006 over those in 2005. As in other PSAs, the most commonly reported violent crimes such as robbery and assault saw large increases. Only kidnapping and attempted murder were reported less often in 2006 than in 2005. The large percentage drop in attempted murder and the increase in elder abuse were due to their relatively infrequent occurrence. The increase in murder was lower in PSA 5 than

Table C.5
Violent Crimes Reported in PSA 5 (Central East Oakland), 2005 and 2006

Offense Type	2005	2006	% Change
Murder	25	34	36.0
Attempted murder	5	2	-60.0
Robbery	421	506	20.2
Attempted robbery	43	45	4.7
Assault	434	579	33.4
Battery	419	492	17.4
Rape	87	89	2.3
Attempted rape	3	3	0.0
Kidnapping	76	69	-9.2
Carjacking	73	80	9.6
Shooting at building/vehicle	62	109	75.8
Child abuse	146	190	30.1
Elder abuse	5	13	160.0
Domestic violence	642	756	17.8
All violent offenses	2,441	2,967	21.5

in any other PSA in Oakland, but reports of murders were still up 36.0 percent in 2006 over those in 2005.

PSA 6 (East Oakland) also experienced an increase in reported crimes larger than that of Oakland as a whole, with 21.8 percent more violent crimes reported in 2006 than in 2005 (Table C.6). Reports of attempted robbery and shooting at occupied buildings or vehicles more than doubled, and twice as many murders were reported in 2006 as in 2005. Kidnapping, elder abuse, and rape were reported less often in 2006 than in 2005, domestic-violence reports increased by 6.2 percent, and double-digit increases occurred in other commonly reported crimes such as robbery (44.5 percent), assault (25.6 percent), and battery (10.8 percent).

Table C.7 shows the change in rates of violent crimes for which a valid beat number was not available. The most commonly reported violent crime in both 2005 and 2006 in these PSAs was child abuse, which rose 32.0 percent. Assault, another commonly reported crime, rose 69.1 percent in 2006. Overall, the 27.0 percent increase between 2005 and 2006 in violent crimes reported in unknown PSAs was greater than the increase in any of known PSAs except for PSA 4.

Table C.6
Violent Crimes Reported in PSA 6 (East Oakland), 2005 and 2006

Offense Type	2005	2006	% Change
Murder	14	28	100.0
Attempted murder	0	1	
Robbery	299	432	44.5
Attempted robbery	24	49	104.2
Assault	406	510	25.6
Battery	381	422	10.8
Rape	61	58	-4.9
Attempted rape	0	2	
Kidnapping	64	46	-28.1
Carjacking	92	108	17.4
Shooting at building/vehicle	49	139	183.7
Child abuse	130	142	9.2
Elder abuse	8	5	-37.5
Domestic violence	519	551	6.2
All violent offenses	2,047	2,493	21.8

Table C.7
Violent Crimes Reported in Undetermined PSAs, 2005 and 2006

Offense Type	2005	2006	% Change
Murder	0	4	
Attempted murder	0	0	
Robbery	103	113	9.7
Attempted robbery	12	9	-25.0
Assault	81	137	69.1
Battery	145	155	6.9
Rape	81	94	16.0
Attempted rape	1	0	-100.0
Kidnapping	16	23	43.8
Carjacking	8	10	25.0
Shooting at building/vehicle	4	17	325.0
Child abuse	147	194	32.0
Elder abuse	3	0	-100.0
Domestic violence	91	100	9.9
All violent offenses	692	856	23.7

Grantees Funded by Measure Y

This appendix describes the 18 Measure Y–funded programs, categorized by the 15 strategies. We describe the programs in detail, then list contact information for each at the end of the appendix. The strategies that the city has identified for violence-prevention funding are listed in Table D.1 (which is the same as Table 3.1), along with their associated funding. Also listed are the 27 programs run by the 18 grantees.

Youth Outreach and Comprehensive Services: Street Outreach

The street outreach strategy includes school and community-based programs that provide outreach and case management, mentoring, one-on-one counseling, referrals to services, and advocacy. These programs target disengaged youth to provide them role models and supportive services to foster resiliency in the face of multiple risk factors. Grantees in this strategy are the East Bay Agency for Children, the East Bay Asian Youth Center, Leadership Excellence, Youth ALIVE!, and Youth UpRising.

The East Bay Agency for Children

The East Bay Agency for Children is located in a residential area near Lake Merritt, but program services are provided at Dewey and Rudsdale High Schools. These are continuation schools that allow students who do not attend the regular high schools because of truancy, behavioral problems, or low academic achievement the chance to earn sufficient academic credits to graduate. The School to Success program provides outreach, case management, and mental health services to increase school attendance and decrease involvement in violence.

The East Bay Asian Youth Center

The East Bay Asian Youth Center is a community-based agency located near the 880 freeway southeast of downtown Oakland. The center's Street Team program provides street outreach, case-management services, and support groups for chronic truants, school dropouts, suspended/expelled students, and juvenile offenders residing in the San Antonio and Fruitvale neighborhoods. The East Bay Asian Youth Center also operates the Streetside Production program, which provides activities such as silk screening, graphic arts, photography, and video production.

Table D.1
Violence-Prevention Strategies and Grantee Programs

Strategy/Funding	Grantees
Youth outreach and comprehensive services	
Street outreach Intervenes with community-based mentoring, case management, and supportive services (\$855,670 annually)	East Bay Agency for Children East Bay Asian Youth Center Leadership Excellence Youth ALIVE! Youth UpRising
Outreach to sexually exploited youth Connects these youth to supportive services and safe environments (\$225,000 annually)	Alameda County Interagency Children's Policy Council
Sports and recreation Intervenes with recreational activities (\$182,500 annually)	Leadership Excellence Sports 4 Kids Youth UpRising
Special services to children and youth exposed to violence	
Family-violence advocacy Intervenes to reduce the negative effects of domestic violence exposure on children and youth (\$491,214 annually)	Family Violence Law Center
Mental health services Provides mental health services to children and youth in abusive households (\$294,728 annually)	Family Violence Law Center
Youth support groups Supports older youth exposed to violence, including sexual exploitation and domestic violence (\$147,364 annually)	Family Justice Center
Diversion and reentry services	
Project Choice Provides intensive and comprehensive case management to ex-offenders (\$491,214 annually)	Allen Temple Housing and Economic Development Corporation The Mentoring Center Volunteers of America Bay Area
Pathways to Change Provides intensive and comprehensive case management to youth on probation (\$491,214 annually)	The Mentoring Center
Restorative justice Trains community members to provide alternative conflict resolution (\$25,000 annually)	Attitudinal Healing Connection, Inc.
Employment and training	
Intensive reentry employment Provides employment training to ex-offenders (\$560,000 annually)	Allen Temple Housing and Economic Development Corporation Youth Employment Partnership
Crew-based sheltered employment (CBSE) Provides job training and experience to ex-offenders in housing program (\$273,750 annually)	Volunteers of America Bay Area
After-school jobs and subsidized summer employment Provides at risk youth with job readiness and employment skills training (\$545,848 annually)	Bay Area Video Coalition Youth Radio Youth Employment Partnership
Transitional jobs Places youth on probation or parole directly into unsubsidized employment with support services (\$548,000 annually)	Youth Employment Partnership Allen Temple Housing and Economic Development Corporation
School-based strategies	
Safe Passages/OUR Kids Middle-School Model Provides assessment, case management, and supportive services to Oakland public middle-school students (\$240,000 annually)	Alameda County Health Care Services Agency
2nd Step Violence Prevention Curriculum and middle-school peer conflict resolution Teaches skills to reduce conflict, behavioral problems, and suspensions in Oakland public middle schools (\$510,862 annually)	Oakland Unified School District Office of Student Services

Leadership Excellence

Leadership Excellence, in downtown Oakland's business district, operates The Bridge Street outreach program, which provides intensive case-management services. It also operates RISE, a semester-long peer support program available to students at McClymonds High School in West Oakland. The case-management services provide one-on-one guidance to youth, referred by the outreach workers, who are identified as being most in need of personal mentorship. RISE provides continued guidance and leadership-development skills at the McClymonds High School for youth who have already participated in Leadership Excellence's intensive five-day leadership camp, Camp Akili.

Youth ALIVE!

Youth ALIVE! is headquartered just north of downtown Oakland. The agency's Castlemont Caught in the Crossfire program targets at-risk youth at the Castlemont Community of Small Schools complex in East Oakland. The complex includes the Leadership Preparatory High School, the Castlemont Business and Information Technology School, and the East Oakland School of the Arts. Castlemont Caught in the Crossfire is an extension of Youth ALIVE!'s original services in Alameda County's Highland Hospital in Oakland. At Highland Hospital, Youth ALIVE! reaches out to young gunshot victims and their families. Caught in the Crossfire seeks to reach young people before they become the victims of violence by providing mentoring, referrals to physical or mental health services, advocacy, and assistance with personal matters, such as obtaining a state identification card.

Youth UpRising

Youth UpRising is located in a 25,000-square-foot building in East Oakland. The facility was once a vacant supermarket owned by Alameda County; it was converted with funding from the county and city of Oakland. It contains media production space, classrooms, dance studios, lounge areas, and a café operated by young people from the community. Youth UpRising offers a range of activities, including job training, college application preparation, media production, one-on-one case management, dance and basketball instruction, and violence-reduction and conflict-resolution training.

Youth Outreach and Comprehensive Services: Outreach to Sexually Exploited Youth

The outreach to sexually exploited youth strategy focuses on the well-being of sexually exploited minors by connecting them to supportive services, with the ultimate goal of extricating them from the illicit street economy. These youth often not only suffer from abuse, but may also have mental health issues, learning disabilities, and substance-abuse problems and may be chronic truants or runaways. They require intake, case management, and supportive services to assist them to transition into safe and stable living situations. Immediate concerns, such as housing and medical care, are first addressed to stabilize program participants. Emotional and physical support then follows to mitigate trauma and restore self-esteem. Ultimately, the supportive process focuses on developing life skills to support self-sufficiency (Alameda County Interagency Children's Policy Council, 2003). The Alameda County Interagency Children's Policy Council coordinates the work in this strategy.

The Alameda County Interagency Children’s Policy Council

The Interagency Children’s Policy Council is located in San Leandro in an Alameda County facility that also houses the Alameda County Health Care Services Agency. The subgrantees who form the Sexually Exploited Minors Network are located throughout Oakland. Asian Health Services is located in Oakland’s Chinatown; CAL-PEP and the George P. Scotlan Youth Center provide services in West Oakland; the Covenant House provides services in North Oakland; and Dream Catcher operates in downtown Oakland. The Sexually Abused Commercially Exploited Youth/Safe Place Alternative program seeks to meet the needs of commercially sexually exploited minors by providing them with physical and mental health services, case management, outreach, and education. Table D.2 summarizes the services provided by each of the subgrantees.

Youth Outreach and Comprehensive Services: Sports and Recreation

Sports and recreation programs provide recreational activities coupled with mentoring to develop pro-social behaviors. These activities are designed to build confidence and self-esteem and promote teamwork and cooperation while providing alternatives to negative influences.

Three organizations administer programs in this strategy, Leadership Excellence, Sports 4 Kids, and Youth UpRising. Leadership Excellence and Youth UpRising were described above.

Sports 4 Kids

Sports 4 Kids runs the Sports Opportunities for Understanding, Leadership and Education program, which provides recreational activities in conjunction with mental health support, adult mentors, and the teaching and practice of nonviolent behavior at Community Day School and Rudsdale High School. The program provides structured class-time game sessions, as well as sports and youth-development activities during lunch and at other times throughout the week.

Table D.2
Sexually Exploited Minors Network Services

Organization	Services
Asian Health Services/Banteay Srei	Health, education, and outreach services targeted to the increasing number of Southeast Asian women at risk for sexual exploitation. Focus is on trafficking.
CAL-PEP	Health, case-management, and outreach services targeted to African American youth in the “street” economy. Focus is on prostitution.
Dream Catcher/Xanthos	The only emergency youth center in Alameda County equipped to take in sexually exploited minors.
George P. Scotlan Youth and Family Center	Case-management services, including mental health referrals, life-skills training, and mentoring in the West Oakland USD
Covenant House	Outreach and transportation services targeted to homeless and transient youth.

Special Services to Children and Youth Exposed to Violence: Family-Violence Advocacy and Mental Health Services

Through the family-violence advocacy and mental health services strategies, Measure Y funds organizations that serve young children and older youth who have been exposed to family and other forms of violence. These programs attempt to identify children at the earliest point of exposure to violence so that intervention services may be rendered and the children can be placed into environments where reoccurrence is diminished. This, in turn, is expected to reduce future violence by those who were exposed to it during their childhood (Catalano, Loeber, and McKinney, 1999). The intervention connects survivors with supportive services and legal advocacy. The associated mental health services are targeted to children under five years of age who witnessed or were victimized by violence in the home. The family-violence advocacy and mental health services strategies are administered by the Family Violence Law Center.

The Family Violence Law Center

The Family Violence Law Center operates Measure Y–funded services at the Alameda County Family Justice Center in Oakland. In this secure central location, families experiencing domestic violence can receive comprehensive services, including crisis intervention, legal assistance, medical and mental health care, employment and social services referrals, and law enforcement. Together with subgrantees Safe Passages, Center for Child Protection/The DOVES Project, Jewish Family and Children’s Services, Parental Stress Services, Inc., and Through the Looking Glass, the center operates a coordinated program called the Family Violence Intervention and Prevention project, whose services are summarized in Table D.3.

Family violence intervention and prevention staff and police investigators work together to conduct domestic-violence case review and follow-up. This close partnership ensures that program staff can locate and assist children who are exposed to domestic violence, thereby possibly breaking the intergenerational cycle of violence that often results from such exposure.

Special Services to Children and Youth Exposed to Violence: Youth Support Groups

The youth support group strategy is a mental health model offering therapy and support to adolescents who have been exposed to family violence or sexual exploitation. Research suggests that violence-prevention services should be sensitive to the needs of at-risk girls suffering from low self-esteem and at-risk boys who have experienced unstable early childhoods (Ellickson

Table D.3
Family Violence Intervention and Prevention Project Partners and Services

Organization	Services
Safe Passages	Intake coordination: initial assessment and source referral
The Center for Child Protection, The DOVES Project	Family case management
Jewish Family and Children Services	Mental health services and case management
Parental Stress Services, Inc.	Mental health services and case management
Through the Looking Glass	Mental health services and case management
International Institute of the East Bay	Legal assistance

and McGuigan, 2000). The goal is to assist them in building positive futures. The youth support groups are administered by the Family Justice Center.

The Family Justice Center

The Family Justice Center houses the Girls Justice Initiative, which provides support to the older children of families receiving domestic-violence services and sexually exploited minors. The Girls Justice Initiative works with girls between the ages of 15 and 18 who are Oakland residents and at risk or under the supervision of the juvenile justice or foster care system. The Girls Justice Initiative provides support groups and therapy that focus on critical thinking, skills in healthy relationships, job readiness, and other life skills. In partnership with the Interagency Policy Council's Sexually Exploited Minors Network, it also provides cognitive behavioral intervention for sexually exploited girls, linking them with resources, education, and support to increase their self-sufficiency and reduce the risk of continued abuse and possible incarceration. The Girls Justice Initiative, with its partner Safe Passages, also works to teach anger management, skill building, and problem-solving techniques to boys 6 through 17 years of age.

Diversion and Reentry Services: Project Choice and Pathways to Change

The Project Choice strategy follows a city initiative by the same name (funded partly by the Department of Justice) to provide intensive and comprehensive case management to youth returning from prison. Project Choice began in 2001 as the city's effort to provide ex-offenders between the ages of 16 and 30 with the tools necessary to become contributing members of society. Pathways to Change follows a similar strategy for court-referred youth who are on probation. Both programs involve an intensive case-management or coaching relationship. For Project Choice, this begins while the young offenders are still in prison (usually at some point in the last year of incarceration) and continues after they are paroled. The case management includes access and referrals to a wide range of services, including employment and training, mental health and substance-abuse treatment, housing, and health care.

The Mentoring Center's Measure Y activities are all Project Choice and Pathways to Change programs. Allen Temple and the Volunteers of America also use the Project Choice model for some of their activities.

Allen Temple

Allen Temple's reentry program seeks to assist young adults who have recently been released from prison in becoming self-sufficient and law-abiding. The organization pursues this objective by providing comprehensive, wraparound services or referrals for services, including case management, housing referrals, maturation of attitudes and belief systems, job training, job-readiness training, substance-abuse treatment referrals, life-skills training with one-on-one mentors, and medical referrals. Individuals participate in those programs that are necessary to their becoming economically, socially, and psychologically stable. The organization thus involves both Project Choice case-management and intensive reentry-employment strategies. Participants do not have to be enrolled in all programs to receive services. The employment services include short-term skills training for specific occupations (currently, custodial work,

but the program is seeking to expand to other occupations) as well as job-readiness training in soft skills (e.g., résumé building, interview preparation).

Allen Temple serves youth 18 years of age through the early 30s who are returning from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Division of Adult Institutions' San Quentin State Prison. Participants self-select into the program after hearing informational presentations while still in prison. These presentations are delivered to inmates at San Quentin who are scheduled to be released in 60 to 90 days. Participants may also enroll after receiving an informational flyer in the mail through Allen Temple's direct-mail marketing to advertise the program. Regardless of the source of referral, anyone walking in the door looking for services is brought into the program and given an orientation, followed by an assessment of his or her needs, scheduled training to fill those needs, and ongoing intensive case management.

The Mentoring Center

The Mentoring Center works to provide support and opportunities for young people, especially those on probation or parole who are highly at risk of reoffending. They use model mentoring,¹ training, advocacy, and technical assistance to help youth reach their full potential. The organization has been operating since 1991 and currently has a staff of five full-time and two part-time employees. Its Measure Y programs include a Project Choice program in which they work with young men who are preparing to leave or have recently left California correctional facilities and a similar Pathways to Change program for young men and women on probation who have been referred by the court for assistance in moving away from further crime. The center has received funding from Measure Y to expand these previously existing programs.

A successful transition for the youth in the program is one that results in the youth having a satisfying, crime-free life and becoming self-supporting. The primary intermediate goal is an enduring change in mindset that will enable the other intermediate goals—stable employment, stable housing, and stable relationships. This is accomplished through a variety of material and social-psychological resources. Material resources include bus passes, grocery cards, referrals for housing, and referrals for jobs (depending on eligibility). Social-psychological resources include one-on-one case management and two support groups, the Positive Minds Group and the Family Fatherhood Group.

The Project Choice program at The Mentoring Center provides support to young men as they move from incarceration in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Division of Juvenile Justice to a life in Oakland. The program begins by working with youth while they are still in prison and then remaining connected to them as they transition back into life on the outside. The Mentoring Center serves teenage through early 20s youth who are returning from the three California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Division of Juvenile Justice² institutions at Stockton (DeWitt Nelson Youth Correctional Facility, O. H. Close Correctional Facility, and N. A. Chaderjian Correctional Facility). The ex-offenders are eligible to participate in the programs if they are returning to Oakland.

Participants begin the program while they are still incarcerated. Program staff visit the facilities on Wednesdays and Fridays and spend two hours at each. They have developed extensive relationships with prison officials and parole officers at the prisons. Within the prisons,

¹ Model mentoring occurs when the mentor models the desired behavior, as opposed to the mentor simply advising and teaching. With model mentoring, participants can model their lives after those of their mentors.

² Formerly the California Youth Authority.

The Mentoring Center staff run workshops with groups of participants, meet with participants one on one, and meet with parole agents and prison officials regarding participants. The goal of this activity is to build and maintain relationships with potential participants and with prison and parole officials. When an individual is scheduled to leave the facility, staff usually pick him up at the gate and drive him back to Oakland. This allows for important one-on-one debriefing time. Once in Oakland, the youth arrives at his housing placement, usually in a group home or with family, and then begins participation in the programs at the center.

The Pathways to Change program serves repeat juvenile offenders who are on probation (i.e., they are not incarcerated). Participants are usually referred by the public defender's office after they have offended again. Staff review their histories and interview them and their parents to determine if they are appropriate for the program. If staff believe that a youth would be helped by Pathways to Change (primarily if she or he makes a commitment to participate), then she or he is enrolled. A case-management plan is adopted, and the youth begins to participate.

The Mentoring Center manages the Pathways to Change program and runs two support groups (described below), but case managers for the program come from six subgrantees. These organizations, which are located throughout the city and specialize in serving different communities, are the Center for Family Counseling, East Bay Asian Youth Center, Leadership Excellence, Pacific News Service, Scotlan Center, and Youth ALIVE!

Participation in both of the diversion and reentry-services programs includes detailed case management and two support groups. The Fatherhood Family Group is focused on growing up male in today's society and is aimed at helping the most troubled young men gain some maturity. The Positive Minds Group is also aimed at maturation and is slightly more advanced than the Fatherhood Family Group. Many participants attend both groups. Those who participate regularly in The Mentoring Center programs are also eligible to receive assistance such as bus passes and grocery-store cards.

The focus in all of the elements of the two programs, particularly the support groups, is on a change in mindset, in patterns of thinking. The philosophy that underlies this focus is that a change in belief systems is the essential foundation for changes in behavior. One staff member said, "We noticed that what most people do is behavior modification. But you need the stimulus to stay consistent. We don't focus on outcome, we focus on mind." The approach uses the following model of change:

Mind → Thought → Action → Outcome

This model assumes that while one is working with clients on various aspects of their lives, changing their mindset provides the foundation necessary to maintain the other changes they make. Staff of The Mentoring Center also work with participants on finding employment and stable housing and on creating a plan to fill all of their waking hours with some constructive activity. One staff member said, "I tell them if you have all that extra time, you are going to go back to jail."

Volunteers of America

The Volunteers of America is a national organization founded in 1896 to assist “those in need rebuild their lives and reach their full potential.”³ Its Bay Area office, also opened in 1896, has a staff of 11 employees, plus volunteers for a variety of social service programs. With Measure Y funding, the Volunteers of America expanded to open the CBSE program and, more recently, a Project Choice model program. Although these two intensive reentry programs are new for the organization, working with parolees is not new; Volunteers of America has run two residential facilities for nonviolent offenders released from prison or parolees that serve 500 men annually with housing, employment, substance-abuse programs, job search and placement, stress management, victim awareness, and life-skills services.

The Volunteers of America’s Project Choice program first received funds in January 2007. The program is open to men between the ages of 18 and 35 who are incarcerated in San Quentin State Prison and are returning to Oakland on parole. They may be violent or nonviolent offenders, but they may not be sexual offenders. The program is designed to facilitate a successful (i.e., lawful, self-supporting, and satisfying) reentry into society through intensive case management in the first six months after release from prison.

Like the other programs that use the Project Choice model, the Volunteers of America program uses a hands-on, relationship-oriented approach to navigating the challenges of reentry. The program begins with group and one-on-one meetings between participants, program staff, prison officials, and/or parole officials. During this time, staff assess the potential participants to determine who is likely to need full-time coaching and who would likely need less-intensive coaching. Also, while still in San Quentin, at least some men are connected with a licensed social worker, who helps lay the groundwork for establishing (or reestablishing) relationships with children, wives or girlfriends, parents, or other family. Once the participants return to Oakland, they attend courses on life skills and anger management through a subcontracted agency, Healthy Oakland. Throughout this process, the men remain in an ongoing relationship with a coach (the case manager) who acts as mentor, advocate, and guide. The success of the program depends largely on the trust built between coach and participant, the willingness of the participant to follow the program, and the motivation of the coach.

Diversion and Reentry Services: Restorative Justice

Restorative justice is an alternative conflict-resolution concept that acknowledges and seeks to redress the harm caused by crime and also addresses the underlying motivations behind delinquency. It responds to victims’ needs and emphasizes that offenders must contribute to repairing the damage they caused. Restorative justice offers several benefits to traditional systems of retributive justice, including diverting minor cases from the formal judicial system, reducing incarceration rates, and involving victim advocates in the system (Quinn, 1998). This strategy is implemented by Attitudinal Healing Connection, Inc.

Attitudinal Healing Connection, Inc.

Attitudinal Healing Connection runs the Restorative Justice for Oakland Youth program, which facilitates and hosts restorative justice training for various community members, edu-

³ See <http://www.voa.org/>.

cators, and youth-services professionals. The program uses a conflict-resolution process that involves a series of discussions, called *circles*, to examine the cause and effect of conflicts and to arrive at a resolution based on group consensus. The process is depicted in Figure D.1.


Employment and Training: Intensive Reentry Employment and Crew-Based Sheltered Employment

Two strategies focus on employment and training activities for youth returning to Oakland from prison. Intensive reentry-employment services range from short-term, unpaid training classes for particular occupations (e.g., custodian) to providing part-time paid employment combined with part-time GED (General Equivalency Diploma) classes. CBSE provides a six-month training course for full-time paid employment for eight parolees. Participants in programs of both strategies have a case manager and access to other services, but the focus of the strategies is on helping parolees gain job skills, establish work histories, and move along a road to financial self-sufficiency. Grantees include Youth Employment Partnership and Allen Temple (for intensive reentry employment) and the Volunteers of America (for CBSE).

Volunteers of America

The CBSE program is the first Measure Y-funded program run by the Volunteers of America. Its main objective is to provide young men recently released from prison with the skills to become fully employed and financially self-sufficient. The program teaches hard and soft job skills (i.e., technical knowledge and employer expectations and relationships, respectively) and

Figure D.1
The Restorative Justice for Oakland Youth Conflict-Resolution Model



gives participants full-time experience applying these skills for six months. At the end of the six months, Volunteers of America staff assist the program graduates in their search for a permanent job. The hope is that participants will be able to land a permanent job with the city, because of the stability of those jobs.

The program is open to nonviolent, non-sex-offending men aged 18 to 35 living in Oakland. Applicants are drawn from the residential facilities for parolees run by the Volunteers of America and from referrals from other agencies (including from The Mentoring Center and Allen Temple). Applicants are interviewed and screened to determine their level of readiness for full-time employment and their level of commitment to the program. This process includes a clear explanation of the kind of work offered, the work schedule, the wages, and the non-cash benefits of the program. Applicants who choose and are chosen to participate in the program begin work the same day the screening process ends. Thereafter, they work Monday through Thursday in outdoor municipal job sites and spend Friday in a classroom setting learning about the upcoming job. The work crew consists of eight participants and is led by a crew chief—a Volunteers of America employee who acts as boss, coach, and mentor. Central tenets of the program thus include suitable screening of participants, clear communication about the program's benefits, and the skills of the crew chiefs.

Youth Employment Partnership

Youth Employment Partnership was established in 1973 to provide employment training to Oakland youth. It works to fulfill this mission through multiple employment and education programs for at-risk youth, including after-school jobs, summer jobs, career tryouts, and a charter high school for school dropouts, funded by 42 grants from local, state, and federal government agencies and private foundations. Youth Employment Partnership has received Measure Y funding to extend this work to Oakland youth released from the Division of Juvenile Justice.

Youth Employment Partnership has two Measure Y-funded programs, the after-school job-training services for up to 110 at-risk youth described previously and intensive training and employment services for up to 24 young adults who are on probation or parole. Both programs are based on the premise that young adults will not have stable lives until they are able to become financially self-sufficient—that is, until they have enough earning potential to make illegal activity less attractive. The focus is therefore on learning job skills. The youth on probation or parole learn construction job skills, and those in the after-school program learn skills in a variety of career areas based on their interests (e.g., construction, technology, child care). Because future employability depends partly on whether one has a high school diploma, participants have to be working toward a diploma or GED as a requirement of the programs. Youth coming from the Division of Juvenile Justice are in GED classes four hours a day and work in construction four hours a day. Similarly, Youth Employment Partnership staff work with participants to get them drivers' licenses, a requirement for most entry-level positions.

Youth Employment Partnership serves teenage to early 20s youth returning from the Division of Juvenile Justice institutions at Stockton. All participants have case managers who help with access to other services as needed, including mental health counseling, substance-abuse treatment, child-care services, and court representation, usually through referrals. The emphasis of the program, however, is on employment and learning job-related skills. These include not only how to use a particular piece of construction equipment, for example, but

also how to act on the job (e.g., arriving on time, following directions, not talking on cell phones).

Employment and Training: After-School Jobs and Summer Subsidized Employment

Programs in this strategy provide employment training for at-risk youth in a variety of occupations. Grantees include The Bay Area Video Coalition, Youth Radio, and Youth Employment Partnership. Some of them require regional-level collaboration with local governments, industries, and communities to build effective programs that can create a “pipeline” into employment for participants (Stoller, 2007).

These employment training programs seek to provide at-risk youth with specific marketable job skills and with intangible job-readiness qualities that are necessary to find and maintain gainful employment. By presenting enjoyable and exciting job opportunities, the programs also seek to reinforce the importance of completing high school as a gateway to similar job opportunities in the future.

The Bay Area Video Coalition/Youth Sounds

Bay Area Video Coalition runs a program called Next Generation Partnership, which provides technology training, literacy intervention, professional development, and employment services on the McClymonds High School campus.

Youth Radio

Youth Radio has been operating in Berkeley, but it is moving to a downtown Oakland location in 2007. Its Community Action Project provides job training and paid work experience, emphasizing skill building and responsibility for eligible high-risk youth through hands-on media-production workshops.

Youth Employment Partnership, Inc.

In addition to its intensive reentry-employment program, Youth Employment Partnership runs the Career Try-Out program, which provides after-school training and paid internships for at-risk youth. It is operated in conjunction with the East Bay Asian Youth Center (in the Fruitvale/San Antonio neighborhoods), Youth UpRising (in East Oakland), and the George P. Scotlan Center (in West Oakland). Youth Employment Partnership also recruits youth for The Mayor’s Summer Jobs Program, which provides paid summer internships and paid job-readiness skills workshops.

Employment and Training: Transitional Jobs

The transitional-jobs strategy is aimed at youth on probation or parole who, with supportive services, can move directly into standard employment. It includes benchmarks regarding participants’ wages, number of hours, and job retention. The grantee assists in placing participants in initial jobs where they work at least 30 hours per week and in enabling them not only to keep the employment, but also to advance in it. Grantees provide supportive services,

including case management and service referrals. Unlike the funds for other grants, which are dispersed up front, funds for transitional-jobs programs are performance-based, dispersed to grantees only for those participants who attain benchmarks of employment placement, retention, and advancement.

There are two Measure Y grantees using this strategy, Allen Temple and Youth Employment Partnership, both of which are described above. Particular aspects of their transitional-jobs programs are described below.

Allen Temple

Allen Temple subcontracts its transitional-jobs program to America Works, a national program that places ex-offenders who are employment-ready in private employment. America Works staff assist in job placement, retention, and advancement, and Allen Temple provides supportive services. America Works had ongoing experience opening and operating its program in other cities, so it became operational in Oakland relatively quickly. The office opened in September 2006 and was placing ex-offenders in entry-level jobs within the first month. Referrals come from Allen Temple and have continued throughout Allen Temple's organizational problems.

Youth Employment Partnership

Youth Employment Partnership was started with Measure Y funding for a transitional-jobs program. It was to receive referrals of employment-ready ex-offenders from Allen Temple and The Mentoring Center whom it would then place in employment. The referrals were not forthcoming, and the ex-offenders that Youth Employment Partnership encountered through its relationships with probation and parole departments were not employment-ready and therefore not eligible for the program.

School-Based Strategies: Safe Passages/OUR Kids Middle-School Model

Several Measure Y strategies target youth within the school environment. Suspensions from school have been shown to be a primary risk factor for future criminal behavior. Specifically, suspensions for violent offenses are a clear indicator for future violent behavior (Catalano, Loeber, and McKinney, 1999). Targeted interventions for at-risk youth are therefore made available to children and youth at OUSD school sites. These school programs include teaching coping skills for loss, impulse control, anger management, problem-solving, conflict resolution, and depression management. They also feature strong linkages between the schools and community mental health services (Safe Passages, 2004).

Safe Passages

Safe Passages is a partnership between the East Bay Community Foundation, the city of Oakland, Alameda County, and OUSD that provides support for troubled children and their families. Safe Passages uses four strategies, including middle-school intervention, which is managed by the Alameda County Health Care Services Agency.

Alameda County Health Care Services Agency

The Alameda County Health Care Services Agency operates the Safe Passages/OUR Kids Middle School Model in 21 Oakland middle schools. The program focuses on the most at-risk middle-school students, providing case management and mental health service referrals.

School-Based Strategies: Second Step Violence Prevention Curriculum and Middle-School Peer Conflict Resolution

The Second Step Violence Prevention Curriculum was developed to control aggressive behavior in children in grades K–9 that could lead to delinquency, substance abuse, truancy, and mental health issues. It is a social-emotional learning program that addresses the relations between social cognitions and pro-social behavior. It was adopted by Safe Passages and OUSD to reduce suspensions and violence in Oakland schools. The peer conflict-resolution program is implemented to prevent the escalation of conflicts in middle schools with high rates of truancy, playground and classroom conflicts, office referrals, and suspensions. Prior research has found that children who are taught the Second Step curriculum are more likely to prefer pro-social goals, require less adult intervention, and behave less aggressively (Frey et al., 2005). This strategy is administered by the OUSD Office of Student Services.

The Oakland Unified School District

OUSD implements the Second Step Violence Prevention Curriculum in all Oakland Head Start sites, Family Day Care Centers, and K–8 schools. It also implements a peer conflict-resolution program at 21 middle schools with high rates of truancy. The Committee for Children, a Seattle-based nonprofit developed the Second Step Curriculum. This nationally renowned, research-based curriculum teaches children empathy, problem-solving, and anger management through role-playing and teacher coaching.

Grantees

East Bay Agency for Children
303 Van Buren Ave
Oakland, CA 94610
510-268-3770

Allen Temple
8501 International Blvd
Oakland, CA 94621
510-544-8910

East Bay Asian Youth Center
2025 E. 12th St
Oakland, CA 94606
510-533-1092

The Mentoring Center
1221 Preservation Park Way
Oakland, CA 94612
510-891-0427

Leadership Excellence
1924 Franklin St, #201
Oakland, CA 94612
510-267-9770

Volunteers of America Bay Area
1601 Harbor Bay Parkway, Suite 150
Alameda, CA 94502
510-473-0500 ext 222

Youth ALIVE!
3300 Elm St
Oakland, CA 94609
510-594-2588 ext 300

Youth UpRising
8711 MacArthur Blvd
Oakland, California 94605
510-777-9909

Alameda County Interagency Children's
Policy Council
1000 San Leandro Blvd, Suite 300
San Leandro, CA 94577
510-618-3457

Sports 4 Kids
517 Fourth St
Oakland, CA 94607
510-893-4180

Family Violence Law Center
P.O. Box 22009
Oakland, CA 94623
510-208-0220

Family Justice Center
470 27th St
Oakland, CA 94612
510-267-8800

Attitudinal Healing Connection
3278 West St
Oakland, CA
510-652-5530

Youth Employment Partnership
2300 International Blvd
Oakland CA 94601
510-533-3447

Oakland Unified School District Office of
Student Services
1025 Second Ave
Oakland, CA 94606-2212
510-879-5375

Bay Area Video Coalition
1611 Telegraph Ave # 450
Oakland, CA 94612
510-836-2660

Youth Radio
1701 Broadway Ave
Oakland, CA 94612
510-251-1101

Alameda County Health Care Services
Agency
1000 San Leandro Blvd, Suite 300
San Leandro, CA 94577
510-618-3452

Measure Y Violence-Prevention Program Site Visits

Grantee Program	Date
Youth ALIVE!	November 2, 2006
East Bay Agency for Children	November 7, 2006
Sports 4 Kids	November 14, 2006
Youth Radio	November 20, 2006
Leadership Excellence	November 21, 2006
Family Violence Law Center	November 29, 2006
East Bay Asian Youth Center	December 8, 2006
Youth UpRising	December 20, 2006
Alameda County Interagency Children's Policy Council	January 19, 2007
The Mentoring Center	January 24 & 25, 2007
The Allen Temple	January 25, 2007
Youth Employment Partnership	January 26, 2007
Attitudinal Healing Connection	March 12, 2007
Oakland Unified School District, Office of Student Services	March 16, 2007
OUR Kids Safe Passages	March 23, 2007
Family Justice Center	March 30, 2007

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