Migrant women in the European labour force

Current situation and future prospects

Jennifer Rubin, Michael S. Rendall, Lila Rabinovich, Flavia Tsang, Constantijn van Oranje-Nassau, Barbara Janta

Prepared for the European Commission, Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunity
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

RAND® is a registered trademark.

© Copyright 2008 European Commission

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the European Commission.
This research was commissioned by the European Commission to improve understanding of the labour market outcomes of migrant women in the EU, and of the policies that affect these outcomes. The study is timely in the context of changing labour needs, increasing migration flows and the feminization of migration in Europe. Given the European economic and social agendas for growth, equality and social cohesion, this study aims to contribute to understanding migrant women’s participation in the European labour force.

The empirical results of the study are based primarily on analysis of the anonymised EU Labour Force Survey. Labour force participation, unemployment, involuntary part-time employment, temporary-contract employment, and degree of concentration in low-skill occupations are used in evaluating the labour market outcomes of third-country migrant women relative to native-born women, relative to other EU-born women and relative to third-country migrant men. In-depth analysis of migrant women’s labour market outcomes in Spain provides a deeper understanding of the large-scale programs that have regularised the legal statuses of migrant women in those countries. The work-life balance outcomes of third-country migrant women are also examined in depth in order to understand connections of the very low rates of employment of third-country migrant women with young children.

This report is relevant for policy makers and researchers with an interest in migration, gender equality and employment outcomes, and to NGOs and others working to facilitate labour market integration of migrants and women.

RAND Europe is an independent not-for-profit policy research organisation that aims to improve policy and decision making in the public interest, through research and analysis. RAND Europe’s clients include European governments, institutions, NGOs and firms with a need for rigorous, independent, multidisciplinary analysis. This report has been peer-reviewed in accordance with RAND’s quality assurance standards.

For more information about RAND Europe or this document, please contact:

Dr Jennifer Rubin

RAND Europe
Westbrook Centre
Milton Road
Cambridge, CB4 1YG
Tel: +44 1223 353 329
Email: jkrubin@rand.org
# Table of contents

Preface ....................................................................................................................... iii  
Table of figures ............................................................................................................ ix  
Table of tables ............................................................................................................. xiii  
Executive summary ..................................................................................................... xv  
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... xxvii  

## Introduction  ............................................................................................................ 1  
1.2 Objectives of this study ..................................................................................... 1  
1.3 Demography, labour and immigration: the European context ...................... 3  
1.4 Definitions and terminology ........................................................................... 7  
1.5 Methodology ................................................................................................... 11  
1.6 Structure of the report ..................................................................................... 15  

## CHAPTER 2  
Migrant women’s position in the EU labour force ......................................... 17  
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 17  
2.2 What are the factors affecting migrants’ participation in the labour force? ...... 17  
2.3 Labour force participation of migrant women in Europe ................................. 22  
2.4 Discussion ....................................................................................................... 41  

## CHAPTER 3  
Migrant women’s “double disadvantage”......................................................... 43  
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 43  
3.2 What is the “double disadvantage” of migrant women? ............................... 44  
3.3 Double disadvantage in Europe: unemployment, underemployment and temporary employment of migrant women ...................................................... 45  
3.4 Discussion ....................................................................................................... 57  

## CHAPTER 4  
Distribution of female migrant labour across occupations in the EU .......... 59  
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 59  
4.2 Theories of occupational concentration by gender ......................................... 60  
4.3 Sectors of employment of migrant women workers ........................................... 61
4.4 Migrant women’s occupational distribution: the EU situation ................. 68
4.5 EU-born versus third-country migrant women ........................................... 72
4.6 Discussion .................................................................................................... 73

CHAPTER 5 Labour market integration of skilled migrant women................. 77
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 77
5.2 Situating skilled and highly-skilled migration ............................................. 78
5.3 Skilled migration in Europe ........................................................................ 84
5.4 Education levels and labour-force outcomes of migrant women in Europe ... 85
5.5 Employment commensurate with education levels ..................................... 93
5.6 Discussion .................................................................................................... 95

CHAPTER 6 Role of policies and legislation ................................................. 99
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 99
6.2 Economic theory of migration and integration .......................................... 100
6.3 Social, economic and cultural integration of migrants ............................... 101
6.4 Labour market integration policies .............................................................. 103
6.5 Introduction to the case studies ................................................................. 109
6.6 Case study 1: Spain’s extraordinary regularization programmes ............... 110
6.7 Case study 2: Work–family reconciliation policy and migrant women’s labour market integration ................................................................. 120

CHAPTER 7 Emerging policy questions ....................................................... 141
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 141
7.2 The policy challenges .................................................................................. 141
7.3 Tackling the policy challenges ................................................................. 143
7.4 Re-valuing the work of migrant women .................................................... 144
7.5 Creating an evidence base ......................................................................... 145

REFERENCES .................................................................................................... 147
Reference List ................................................................................................. 149

APPENDICES .................................................................................................... 161
Appendix A: Verified countries ........................................................................ 163
Appendix B: Data to accompany Chapters 2 to 6 ............................................. 166
Table of figures

Figure S1: Migrant women’s labour force participation rate (LFPR) deficits relative to native-born women, by years of residence, 2005 ........................................................... xvii

Figure S2: Unemployment or underemployment as a proportion of the third-country migrant labour force of women and men and of native-born women, 2005........................................................................................................ xix

Figure S3: Occupational concentration amongst EU-born and third-country migrant women, 2005 ........................................................................................................ xx

Figure S4: Distribution of high education native-born, other EU-born and third-country migrant women by occupation skill level, 2005................................................................. xxii

Figure 2-1a: Migrant women as a proportion of the total female labour force (%), pre-Accession EU countries, 2005 ...............................................................................................23

Figure 2-2: Labour-force participation rates of third-country migrant women, compared to EU-born migrant and native-born women, selected countries, 2005.........................................................................................................................25

Figure 2-3a: Women aged under 35 as a proportion of women aged 15 to 64, pre-Accession EU countries, 2005 .................................................................................................27

Figure 2-4a: Labour force participation rates of third-country migrants compared to native-born women matched by age, selected countries, 2005...........................................29

Figure 2-5a: Family-demographic profile: Third-country migrant women, selected countries, 2005 ..........................................................................................................................31

Figure 2-6a: Labour force participation rates, third-country migrant women by children’s ages, pre-Accession EU countries, household reference person or partner only, 2005..................................................................................................................33

Figure 2-7: Labour force participation rates, third-country migrant compared to native-born women matched by children’s ages and women’s ages if no children under 15 years old in household, pre-Accession EU countries, 2005...........................................35

Figure 3-1: Unemployment rates by labour-force participation rates of third-country migrant women, selected countries, 2004 .............................................................................45

Figure 3-2: Unemployment rates of third-country migrant women and men and native-born women in four country groups, 2005 .............................................................................46
Figure 3-3: Migrant disadvantage for third-country migrant women and men compared to native-born women and men, 2005

Figure 3-4: Migrant disadvantage for third-country migrant women and men compared to that for EU-born migrant women and men, 2005

Figure 3-5a: Unemployment rates of third-country migrant women by family status, 2005

Figure 3-6: Migrant versus native-born women’s unemployment rates, matched by family status and age

Figure 3-7: Involuntary part-time employed third-country migrant and native-born women, 2005

Figure 3-8: Unemployed or underemployed third-country migrant women and men and native-born women in four country groups, 2005

Figure 3-9: Temporary employment contracts, third-country migrant women, third-country migrant men and native-born women, 2005

Figure 4-1: Occupational concentration of native-born women, migrant women, native-born men and migrant men in 14 EU countries, 2005

Figure 4-2: Occupational concentration amongst EU-born and third-country migrant women in 14 EU countries, 2005

Figure 5-1: Proportion of native-born women, EU-born migrant women, and third-country migrant women by level of education, ages 15–64, selected countries, 2005*

Figure 5-2: Labour market participation of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women by level of education, ages 15–64, 14 EU countries, 2005

Figure 5-3: Employment rate of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women by education level, 14 EU countries, 2005

Figure 5-4: Unemployment rate of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women by education level, 14 EU countries, 2005

Figure 5-5: Employment commensurate with education level for high-education native-born women, migrant women and migrant men in 14 EU countries, 2005

Figure 5-6: Employment commensurate with education level for high education EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women in 14 EU countries, 2005

Figure 6-1a: Employment rates of third-country migrant women by family status, 2005

Figure 6-2: Proportion of employed women with children under 5 years old using formal childcare services
Figure 6-3a: Percentages with children under 14 years old wishing to work more (and reduce caring time), third-country migrant versus native-born women, 2005.................................................................................................................................137
Table of tables

Table 2-1: Differences in labour-force participation rates for third-country migrants and matched native-born women, by years of residence, 2005 .................................................. 38
Table 5-1: Positive and negative effects of skilled migration .................................................. 81
Table 5-2: Percentage of women (15–64) in jobs for which they are overqualified, by region of birth, for selected European countries, 2003–2004 ................................................................. 83
Table 5-3: Skilled migration into the UK by region of origin, 1975–1999 ................................ 85
Table 5-4: Labour force participation of women with high education levels by countries, 16 EU countries, 2005. ................................................................................................. 89
Table 5-5: Unemployment rate of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women with high education levels in 16 EU countries, 2005 .................................................................................................................. 92
Table 6-1: Admissions policy and international recruitment .................................................. 104
Table 6-2: Immigrant stock in Spain by region and country (2006) ........................................ 111
Table 6-3: Labour force participation and unemployment rates of third-country migrant women by country of birth, Spain 2001 ................................................................. 111
Executive summary

Given the demands of the Lisbon Strategy for economic growth, it is important to note that Europe is experiencing high levels of labour demand across a wide range of sectors in the economy. According to research conducted for the European Commission, many EU Member States are experiencing serious skill shortages, particularly of qualified IT workers, healthcare professionals, engineers, and education and social service personnel. These shortages not only hamper productivity and growth in the EU; they can also undermine national and regional targets in the provision of health, education and social services. Demand for unskilled labour is also high; according to European Commission figures, there are around three million unfilled jobs across Europe.

Additionally, the Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men calls for progress in areas such as the reconciliation of work, private and family life, and the elimination of gender stereotypes in society. The roadmap also underlines the need to combat the multiple discrimination faced by migrant women. As the research in this report highlights, these substantive areas of gender equality require facilitation of all women’s participation in the workforce through the provision of a range of support services and facilities.

In this broader context, sustained and well-managed immigration will be required to meet the needs of the EU labour market, and ensure social cohesion, inclusion and equity across Europe. However, in order to help address these contemporary challenges, migrant women and men must be able to participate in their receiving countries’ labour forces.

The case for studying the role and situation of migrant workers, both women and men, is thus compelling, and this has become an area of increasing research interest. In addition, there are more specific reasons to focus on the particular situation of women migrants in the labour market. First, there is a relative dearth of informative research on the issue – studies have traditionally focused on the experiences of migrant men in their receiving economies. Second, women make an increasingly significant economic contribution – including women migrants – to families and communities through paid work (they have always done so through unpaid work). And third, in order to address inequalities between women and men in line with gender equality and social justice agendas we need information about their current situation.

Against the backdrop of these challenges and gaps in information, this study presents an overview of the situation of women migrants in the EU labour market; indicates key features of women migrants’ participation in the EU labour force revealed by this analysis; raises issues and challenges related to women migrants’ integration to work in Europe; and investigates lessons from some existing programmes and policies with the potential to
address the integration of women migrants into labour markets. Through the present analysis, and assessment of selected policies and programmes, this study highlights a need to better integrate the gender dimension into relevant immigration policies, and the migration dimension into gender policies.

The objectives of this study are to better understand the labour market outcomes of migrant women in the EU, and the policies and programs that potentially affect these outcomes. Migrants are defined in this report as having a foreign country of birth. They include both foreign nationals and naturalised citizens. The study’s focus is on migrant women born outside the EU ("third-country migrants"). For additional analytical insights, migrant women from third countries are compared with migrant women born in other EU countries, and with native-born women and third-country migrant men. Third-country migrants constitute the large majority of all female migrants (third-country plus those with EU countries of birth) in the labour forces of all countries except Luxembourg and Belgium in our study.

The empirical results of this report are based primarily on analysis of the anonymised EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) dataset, for the year 2005. The results of our LFS analyses are initially from the 20 EU countries in 2005 for which third-country migrant women can be identified, and subsequently from the 14 EU countries whose ‘foreign-born’ women are primarily from movement between countries and not the reconstitution of political boundaries. Countries omitted due to unavailability of variables or adequate-sized samples to identify third-country migrants are Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Malta. Countries omitted due to reconstitution of political boundaries are the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Poland and Slovakia. A major advantage of the year 2005 for our study is that the EU LFS in that year included an ad hoc module on “Reconciliation between Work and Family Life”. Because we find that migrant women are much less likely than are native-born women to combine employment with having young children, this module offers especially useful insights into a gendered analysis of migrant women’s labour-market challenges and outcomes.

1.1.1 Determinants of migrant women’s labour force participation

Four country groupings emerge from comparisons of the labour force participation rates of third-country migrant women with native-born women in the same country. In the ‘old’ migrant-receiving countries (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Austria), the labour force participation rates of third-country migrant women are substantially lower than those of native-born women. In the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Spain and Portugal), the labour force participation rates of third-country migrant women are much more closely the labour force participation patterns of the ‘old’ migrant-receiving countries than of the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries. Finally, in the ‘accession’ countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic and Hungary), a very heterogeneous pattern of labour force participation is found.

Migrant women in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries are on average younger, and this partly explains their higher labour-force participation than native-born women. Additionally accounting for differences in marital and family status and education removes
almost all of the difference in the labour-force participation rates between migrant and native-born women in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries. Accounting for differences in socio-demographic characteristics, however, changes little the labour-force participation deficits of third-country migrant relative to native-born women in the ‘old’ migrant-receiving and Nordic countries.

Two major determinants of migrant women’s lower labour-force participation rates are age of youngest child, and how recently the migrant woman arrived in the receiving country. Having a child under 5 years old reduces the labour-force participation of migrant women much more than it does for native-born women. This is especially significant for explaining migrant-native differences in labour-force participation because third-country migrant women are much more likely to have young children in their households than are native-born women.

**Figure S1: Migrant women’s labour force participation rate (LFPR) deficits relative to native-born women, by years of residence, 2005**

![Figure S1: Migrant women’s labour force participation rate (LFPR) deficits relative to native-born women, by years of residence, 2005](image)

**Source:** EU LFS 2005

**Notes:** ‘LFPR deficit’ is measured by the difference between migrant women’s labour force participation rate and native-born women’s labour force participation rate. Results control for differences between migrant and native-born women’s ages, marital statuses, ages of youngest child and education.

In the ‘old’ migrant-receiving countries, but not in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries, very low labour-force participation rates are seen among third-country migrants during their initial years in the receiving country, when compared to native-born women with otherwise similar socio-demographic characteristics (see Figure 1). Consistent with adaptation of migrant women to the receiving-country labour market, these initial labour-force participation deficits are much reduced, and in some cases (Austria and Luxembourg) eliminated, with additional time lived in the receiving country. Because the initial labour-force participation deficits are so large in the old migrant-receiving countries, however,
even after six to ten years in the country the labour-force participation rates of third-country migrant women in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the U.K. are still all at least 15 percentage points lower than those of native-born women with comparable socio-demographic characteristics.

1.1.2 Migrant women’s double disadvantage in the labour market

Unemployment, involuntary part-time employment and temporary-contract employment are used to evaluate the labour-market ‘double disadvantage’ of being both a migrant and a woman. Unemployment of third-country migrant women is much greater relative to native-born women in the ‘old’ migrant-receiving countries than it is in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries of Southern Europe. Across the EU, the unemployment rates of third-country migrant women are 2.7 percentage points higher than those of third-country migrant men (14% and 11.3% respectively).

Of the two dimensions of disadvantage (gender and migrant), the migrant unemployment differential (for women) is generally larger than the gender unemployment differential (for migrants). Comparing EU-born migrant women with those born in third countries reveals a third axis of disadvantage: third-country migrant women’s unemployment rates are 5.6 percentage points higher than those of EU migrants (14% and 8.4 respectively). This suggests that factors other than migration itself are key to understanding the labour-market disadvantages of third-country migrant women.

A novel contribution of the present study to the literature on migrant disadvantage is its consideration of underemployment (involuntary part-time employment) and short-term (temporary-contract) employment. Underemployment and temporary-contract employment are especially important for evaluating migrant women’s disadvantage in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries of Southern Europe, as both these forms of employment disadvantage are common in those countries. They are also consistently more prevalent among third-country migrant women than among native-born women in these countries.

Underemployment is not only more common among migrant women than among native-born women. It is also more common among migrant women than migrant men. Taking into account underemployment accordingly accentuates the ‘gender disadvantage’ dimension of migrant women’s ‘double disadvantage’ in both old and new migrant-receiving countries. This is seen in Figure 2, where we sum proportions unemployed or underemployed of the labour forces of migrant women, native-born women and migrant men.
Temporary-contract employment is a further source of migrant women’s employment disadvantage. The highest proportions of temporary-employment contracts among employed migrant women are seen in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries of Southern Europe, and in Cyprus and the Czech Republic in the Accession group. In both Spain and Cyprus more than half of employed migrant women have temporary contracts. Of the ‘old’ migrant-receiving and Nordic countries, only in Sweden do migrant women have a high proportion with temporary-employment contracts. Migrant women’s disadvantage on the temporary-contract employment measure is related mostly to the migrant dimension. Regarding the gender dimension, very similar proportions of migrant women and migrant men are in temporary-contract employment in most of the countries analysed.

This results in a consistent ‘double disadvantage’ conclusion for migrant women in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries: ‘unemployment and underemployment’ is more prevalent among migrant women than among native-born women, and is more prevalent still than among migrant men. In the ‘old’ migrant-receiving and Nordic countries, where migrant men’s proportions unemployed or underemployed exceed those of native-born women, the ‘migrant’ dimension of disadvantage appears to be especially high. That is, the difficulties in obtaining employment or full-time employment faced by migrant women in the ‘old’ migrant-receiving and Nordic countries appear to be due to their third-country migrant status more than to their being female third-country migrants.

1.1.3 Occupational segregation and concentration of migrant women
Occupational segregation and concentration have been researched widely in connection with both gender and racial/ethnic inequalities in the labour force. The concept of segregation in the labour market is usually used to refer to the tendency for men and women to be employed in different occupations from each other. Concentration refers to
the tendency of different groups in the labour force to be represented in higher proportions than others in certain types of occupations or sectors of employment.

Studies of worldwide migration have shown that the majority of migrant women workers are employed in service sector occupations (e.g. catering, domestic, and healthcare occupations). In some regions, women migrants are also found in the manufacturing sector. Within the services sector, demand for female migrant labour is increasing in low-skilled jobs such as domestic work – including cleaning and child care, hotel cleaners and waitresses - as well as in skilled occupations such as nurses and other health care workers. Significant numbers of migrant women are also involved in prostitution and the sex industry – some of them involuntarily through trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Our analysis of the EU LFS data reveals both a high degree of gender segregation within the labour market (i.e. women and men, both native-born and migrant, tend to do different jobs in the economy) but also a significant incidence of concentration in a small number of job types. While rates of concentration in particular occupations differ, migrant and native-born women tend to work in the same occupational sectors. Moreover, the data show that migrant women are more highly concentrated in a few occupational sectors (62% of them working in five sectors) than are migrant men (43%) and native-born women (55%). That is, a larger proportion of migrant women are employed in a few occupational sectors than the proportion of native-born women or migrant men concentrated in the same number of occupational sectors.

**Figure S3: Occupational concentration amongst EU-born and third-country migrant women, 2005**

**Source:** EU LFS 2005

**Notes:** * Data are for Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

In addition, migrant women are more highly concentrated in occupations that typically require lower skill, with sales and services elementary occupations and personal and
protective services accounting for two-fifths of all migrant women’s employment. Their concentration in the lowest skilled sectors limits their rights as workers, their mobility in the labour market, their opportunities for career progression, and their chances for human capital development.

Disaggregating the category of ‘migrant women’ into the two sub-groups, EU-born and third-country migrant women, reveals that the latter group are much more highly concentrated in a few low-skilled occupational sectors than are EU-born migrant women (see Figure 3). The ‘total’ in each box denotes the aggregate percentage of the group (migrant women, native-born women, migrant men and native-born men) employed in the occupation sectors with the highest concentration of workers. Within this distribution, third-country migrant women are more highly concentrated than EU-born migrant women in the two lowest skilled occupation sectors (sales and services elementary occupations and personal and protective services). While the sectors of occupation identified through the LFS do not allow for a finer level of detail in the actual jobs that migrant women hold, the data provide clear evidence of occupational concentration of migrant women in low skilled sectors, including those encompassing domestic, catering, hotel and healthcare employment. The high levels of concentration of third-country migrant women in these sectors indicates that their integration into the EU labour force is at best fractional; they have jobs but lack many of the rights and opportunities that full integration entails, which is often compounded by their status as illegal immigrant. This situation highlights that even when migrant women are actually employed, the quality of their employment tends to be poor, exposing them to social and economic vulnerability.

1.1.4 Labour market integration of skilled migrant women

Immigration of skilled, and particularly of highly-skilled workers, has in recent years become an important element in the economic development and innovation policies of industrialised nations. This is because some of the skills necessary to improve competitiveness and growth in the global economy are so specialised and in such short supply that they need to be sourced globally. Migrant women employed at the highly-skilled level represent only a minority of these sought-after workers, however, although their numbers have been increasing during the past decades. The preponderance of men in the ranks of highly-skilled migrants is in part a reflection of the fact that immigration policies of developed nations tend to favour medical, upper-level management, engineering, information technology and physical research skills. Given continuing disparities in the proportion of third-country men and women who go into these careers, individuals with the relevant skills are still more likely to be men than women.

Nonetheless, the proportion of women migrants who hold a tertiary degree is, in many regions, almost on a par with that of immigrant men. It is likely that the lower rates of employment of skilled migrant women relative to skilled native-born women and skilled migrant men is attributable to problems in the recognition of foreign degrees, as well as factors such as country of origin attitudes regarding women’s employment, language barriers, and immigrants’ limited access to public sector jobs. The latter in particular affects women more significantly than men, because the professions in which women tend to be concentrated are those which are predominantly regulated by the public sector.
In the present study, the issue of the integration of high-education migrant women is examined with reference to two key research questions. The first is whether the integration of migrant women in the labour market varies by education level. In order to do this, we compared EU-born migrant women, third-country migrant women, and native-born women of low, medium and high education across three different indicators: labour force participation, employment and unemployment rates. The second question focused on the extent to which high-education migrant women in Europe were employed in occupational sectors commensurate with their skill levels.

In relation to the first question, our analysis suggests that across all three groups, higher education levels improve integration into the labour force when measured through labour force participation, unemployment rates and employment rates. Nonetheless, for higher education levels, the situation of third-country migrant women is systematically worse than that of their counterparts of equivalent education. That is, third-country migrant women of high education level have lower rates of labour force participation, higher unemployment rates and lower employment rates than their counterparts. In contrast, low education third-country migrant women exhibit very similar labour market participation and employment rates as low education native-born women, although the former are significantly more likely to be unemployed. EU-born migrant women are in a more favorable situation than third-country migrant women across the three indicators at all levels of education.

**Figure S4: Distribution of high education native-born, other EU-born and third-country migrant women by occupation skill level, 2005**

![Bar chart showing distribution of high education migrant women by occupation skill level]

**Source:** EU LFS 2005

**Notes:** * Data are for Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

In examining the question of jobs commensurate with education, the present study’s analysis of 2005 EU LFS data indicates that a significant minority of migrant women with high education levels are employed in low skilled sectors of the economy. High-education migrant women are more ‘at risk’ than native-born women of equivalent education of being ‘under-employed’, that is in employment that requires a lower level of education than they hold. Third-country migrant women of high education levels are more likely
than either native-born or EU-born migrant women to be employed in low-skilled sectors of employment. High-education migrant women born outside the EU are twice as likely to be employed in low skill jobs as EU-born and native-born women with the same level of education (see Figure 4).

The higher incidence of ‘de-skilling’ amongst third-country migrant women is yet another indicator of the systematic disadvantage faced by this group in the EU labour force. It also suggests the importance of taking into account not only the standard quantitative measures of labour force outcomes (such as participation and employment rates) but also measures of the underemployment of migrant women relative to the skills they bring to the EU labour markets.

1.1.5 The role of policies and legislation

The study undertook two case study analyses. In the first, the effect of Spain’s ‘exceptional’ regularisation process of 2005 on migrant women was analysed. This is an informative case study as regularisation is a policy deliberately targeted towards the integration of migrants into the work force. Two-fifths of the 700,000 applicants for the 2005 regularisation were women, the majority of whom were employed in domestic service occupations. The initial impact of the programme was therefore largely in regularising migrant women in domestic employment, although there are some indications that the regularisation allowed some migrant women to move into better paid jobs. Regularised migrants employed in domestic services occupations (who are mostly women) remain vulnerable. Spain’s Special Regime of Domestic Workers regulating domestic employment does not include unemployment benefits, mandatory written contracts in all cases, or recognition of professional illnesses and accidents. The demand for migrant women in domestic service employment in Spain arises from an equal gender opportunities agenda that applies primarily to native-born women; public infrastructure and services for domestic and care responsibilities is provided directly but indirectly in the form of migrant women who allow native-born women to better reconcile work and family life.

In the second case study, the extent to which the labour market outcomes of migrant women are influenced by the same work-life balance policies as native-born women across Europe was explored qualitatively and quantitatively. Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark and Sweden were analysed in more detail as examples of three different welfare models. Access to key gender equality measures such as the provision of childcare and guarantees of return to work after maternity leave may be less available to migrant women than native-born women due to immigration policies that do not allow for work permission of wives or other family members of migrant men, and due to greater difficulties obtaining permanent employment.

Potential problems of access of migrant women to the benefits of work-family reconciliation policies and programmes are suggested by of EU LFS findings of much lower employment rates of migrant women than native-born women with children less than 5 years old. Access to employment appears to be more limiting than access to work-family reconciliation policy measures such as subsidised child-care. Among migrant women who are working, use of formal child-care tends to be similar to that of native-born women in the same country. In response to questions about work-family balance, however,
migrant women with children are much more likely than are native-born women to report wishing to work more (or to work in the case they are currently not working).

1.1.6 Emerging policy questions

This study looked specifically at the position and level of integration of migrant women in the EU labour market. Our analysis found that third-country migrant women’s frustrated efforts to participate more fully in the labour force, with full use of their skills, are seen in their higher unemployment, more frequent part-time employment because of inability to find full-time work, greater likelihood of temporary-contract employment, and higher incidence of ‘de-skilling’ compared to EU-born migrant women, native-born women and migrant men. These are all indicators of difficulties integrating third-country migrant women into the labour force. Our research also reveals significant differences between Member States in levels of integration of migrant women measured through these indicators. However, the empirical analysis afforded by the EU LFS does not elucidate drivers underlying migrant women’s differential outcomes in different Member States.

Put together, the findings in this study indicate that barriers other than education levels, numbers of children, and willingness to work, influence migrant women’s outcomes in the labour force. While these other barriers may include lack of language proficiency and unfamiliarity with the labour market of the receiving country, the study suggests the possibility that structural, systemic obstacles are also at play. These may include inadequate provision of adequate housing (i.e. in locations conducive to better employment outcomes), limited rights (especially for certain groups of migrants such as asylum seekers or irregular migrants) to access key public services, and discrimination in the labour market on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, religion and/or gender.

This suggests that there may be traction to be gained by implementing policies both for improving and expediting migrant women’s integration, and for reducing discrimination. Through an assessment of two policy responses to the specific challenges that migrant women face in the EU labour force (namely the regularization policies in Spain and work-family reconciliation measures across the EU), the study found that a ‘policy mix’ is likely to be required that tackles migrant women’s disadvantage in the labour force from different angles. A multiplicity of factors, which are often deeply entwined, affect a migrant woman’s propensity to participate in the labour force, for example number of children, level of education and skills, language proficiency, as well as factors extrinsic to the migrant herself, such as legal barriers and discrimination. Initiatives addressing these issues within a coordinated approach are likely to achieve better outcomes than those tackling individual aspects in isolation. The evidence from our policy case studies is particularly telling in this respect: single policies (such as regularization or work-family reconciliation packages) which address specific aspects of migrant women’s situation in the labour force are necessary but insufficient to produce the expected results. However, developing coherent, comprehensive policy approaches that confront these challenges and help optimise women migrants’ contributions to their host societies continues to be a challenge in the EU.

One of the main challenges is that the evidence available on the situation of migrant women is still erratic and research in this field is still limited. The often segmented, compartmentalised nature of policy-making also militates against the development of a suite of measures tackling migrant women’s disadvantage from multiple perspectives. The
development of a coherent policy approach to confront the challenges faced by migrant women in the EU labour force can also be hindered by political conjuncture. For example, fears about the pressures placed by immigrants on public services, communities and cultures, as well as concerns about the threat of terrorism, have become widespread amongst citizens in immigrant-receiving countries in the EU, contributing to a lack of political appetite for measures to help immigrants integrate into their host societies. Rather, political emphasis is increasingly placed on measures to 'control' and 'manage' migration.

These barriers to the development of comprehensive policy approaches to improving migrant women’s opportunities in the labour force need not be intractable. First, current governmental and non-governmental interest in migration can be harnessed to ensure that a robust evidence base is built on the situation of migrant women in the EU labour force, which includes existing and ongoing research. Second, in many ways the EU has become an important actor in setting migration policies, not least because of the removal of internal borders and strengthening of the common external border. With the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon the formal responsibilities of the EU and the effectiveness of its decision making processes will further increase. Given the shared concerns across Europe both with managing migration and optimising its positive impacts on receiving societies, the EU may want to explore how best to support the exchange of information and good practices. Third, against the background of intense public interest, but also some open hostility towards immigrants, there is a growing need for a stronger, more balanced pan-European debate about the social and economic contribution of immigration and immigrants to the region. It is imperative to provide evidence to allay public concerns not only about security, crime and social cohesion, but also possible mistrust and resentment about the development of measures that are perceived to favour migrant workers. Governmental and European institutions have an important role to play in this respect, given their power in shaping perceptions and understandings of migration and the contribution of immigrants to host societies.

Finally, the study highlights the increasing need for immigration and integration policies to focus on the specific situation of migrant women, targeting their economic and social inclusion in receiving countries. This integration and inclusion will require removing barriers to full labour force participation by those migrant women who seek full time and permanent work, but who are instead limited to part-time and insecure positions with few if any benefits. Integration and inclusion will also mean finding ways to include skilled and educated migrant women in the labour force in work commensurate with their education and skill levels. Finally, better social and economic integration of migrant women would be facilitated by re-valuing the work of migrant women in receiving economies. The skills and capacity that all women provide European economies are increasingly significant given the agenda for jobs and growth. The European agenda for greater gender equality specifically calls for facilitation of this female participation. However, it is not always acknowledged that until now many women’s growing participation at work has been facilitated by migrant women’s increasing participation in the caring and domestic work that in most households was traditionally the province of native-born women. These migrant women, in a sense, are increasingly providing the infrastructure that facilitates higher numbers of
native-born women to enter paid employment, especially in medium and high skill occupations.

While providing employment to a significant proportion of migrant women, work in the domestic and care sector remains problematic. A growing body of evidence suggests that the unregulated, insecure and privatised nature of migrant women’s domestic service leaves them vulnerable, facilitating the occurrence of labour exploitation and human rights abuses. The protection of domestic and care workers and the provision of security and benefits are crucial to ensure that the economic and social successes of some are not built on inequalities and on exploitation of others. These changes require effective and practical measures and policy instruments. Such changes also require a systemic re-valuation of domestic and care work, its role in the economy and in society and its contribution to the welfare of communities if the rights and opportunities of domestic and care workers are to be realised.
Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the European Commission for commissioning this research, and the Steering Committee for sharing their insights and engaging constructively with us through the course of the study. We would also like to specifically thank Anette Bjornsson, our project officer, for her interest and commitment throughout the project.

We are also grateful to Professor Joni Lovenduski and Professor Virginie Giraudon, who shared their expertise with the research team.

We would like to thank all of the colleagues with whom we had lively and interesting discussions about migration, gender and work through the research and writing of this report. Thanks are due to Jan Tiessen for his part in making this project possible, and to Jonathan Grant, Lynne Saylor and Lynnette Gilbert who provided valuable input at various stages. Finally, we are grateful to Aruna Sivakumar and Chris van Stolk who provided useful and insightful feedback during the quality assurance process.
Introduction

1.2 Objectives of this study

There is growing European interest in immigration as migrants become an increasingly significant presence in Member States (MS). Immigration in Europe, if managed well, has the potential to address many key challenges facing certain Member States, including population ageing, the constantly changing demands of economies, and increased need for competitiveness in the global economy. In order to help address these contemporary challenges, migrants must be able to participate in their receiving countries’ labour forces. At the same time, immigration is increasingly prominent on public and policy agendas in many European countries.

The heightened prominence of the issue of immigration in public debates and policy agendas comes from several directions. For example, there has been increasing interest in immigration and the global movement of people due to concerns around terrorism, which has been associated with pressure towards tighter controls on immigration. At the same time, economic and labour market perspectives emphasise the need for migrants to fill the skill and labour needs of European economies, even as there is concern from certain quarters that an influx of migrant workers can have detrimental effects on wages and employment amongst native workers.

At the same time, human rights and social justice agendas increasingly acknowledge the particular challenges faced by migrants, and advocate measures to improve their social and economic outcomes, and to ensure that their rights are upheld. This perspective is particularly significant given the widespread recognition of the abuses faced by the most vulnerable migrants – frequently undocumented or illegal – often women and children.

These various perspectives, priorities and concerns, however, press for different and apparently contradictory approaches to migration – restriction and control; liberalization and protection for migrants; and targeted labour market approaches and protection for native workers. The growing interest in and concern around immigration raises questions about whether, how and how much immigrants contribute to receiving societies; and how best to integrate them into the receiving economies so as to optimise outcomes for the receiving economy and communities, and for the migrants themselves. While there is no conclusive evidence of the economic contribution of migrants to European economies yet,
further understanding of the situation of migrants in those economies, their experiences in the receiving communities and the barriers to participation faced by migrant workers can go a long way to answering some of these questions.

The case for studying the role and situation of migrant workers is thus compelling, and this has become an area of increasing research interest. In addition, there are also other, more specific, reasons to focus on the particular situation of women migrants in the labour market. Over the last two decades, there has been growing recognition among researchers and policy-makers that women form an increasingly significant proportion of all migrants, particularly labour migrants (women have also traditionally been dominant in family reunification flows). This trend is commonly known as the feminisation of migration. In spite of the growing feminisation of labour migration, however, there is still a relative dearth of informative research on the issue; because men have traditionally been perceived as the primary workers, studies have traditionally focused on the experiences of migrant men in receiving economies. However, perceptions that it is more important for men to work than women have changed in recent decades. This changing perception is associated with a desire for greater equality between women and men, and the reality that women - including women migrants – make an increasingly significant economic contribution to families and communities through paid work (although they have always done so through unpaid work).

There is a range of informative studies of individual sectors, countries and groups, of women migrants’ experiences that have begun to provide glimpses of the situation of some migrant women in certain countries or jobs. However, there has as yet been no systematic analysis to provide a fuller picture of the situation of migrant women across the EU. Without this overview, it is difficult to situate existing research in a broader framework and to understand its significance in relation to the wider European situation. Against the backdrop of these challenges and gaps in knowledge, this study presents an overview of the situation of women migrants in the EU labour force; indicates key features of women migrants’ participation in the EU labour force, as revealed by this analysis; raises issues and challenges related to women migrants’ integration to work in Europe; and investigates lessons from some existing programmes and policies with the potential to address the integration of women migrants into labour markets. Through the present analysis, this study highlights a need to better integrate both the gender dimension into relevant work and migration policies, and the migration dimension into gender and labour market policies.


4 Analysis of World Values Survey data, 1995, 2005 (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

5 Piper, “Gendering the Politics of Migration”, International Migration Review, 133–164.
1.3 **Demography, labour and immigration: the European context**

Across Europe, fertility rates are falling and people are living longer, changing the demographic landscape of the region. It is estimated that by 2050, one in three Europeans will be more than 65 years old, up from one in six in 2000. Lower fertility rates and an ageing population are likely to lead to a shrinking labour force and a decline in the proportion of the population in employment – hence a rise in the ratio of those dependent on state support to those who are economically active (a growing dependency ratio). In fact, EUROSTAT has estimated that by 2050 the old-age dependency ratio (those aged over 65 as a percentage of the population aged 20–64) will double between 2000 and 2050. By the middle of the century, there will be one person aged 65 or over for every two aged 20–64.7

In addition to a shrinking labour force and growing dependency ratios, Europe is experiencing high levels of labour demand across a wide range of sectors in the economy. According to research conducted for the European Commission, many EU Member States are experiencing serious skill shortages, particularly of qualified IT workers, healthcare professionals, engineers, and education and social service personnel.8 These shortages not only hamper productivity and growth in the EU; they can also undermine national and regional targets in the provision of health, education and social services. Demand for low-skilled labour is also high; according to European Commission figures, there are around three million unfilled jobs across Europe.9

Taken together, these developments could threaten the Lisbon Strategy for jobs and growth.10 In this context, sustained and well-managed immigration will be required to meet the needs of the EU labour market and ensure the region’s future prosperity.11 Management of immigration in order to optimise outcomes for migrants and facilitate their integration and contribution to receiving economies is also central to ensuring social cohesion, inclusion and equity across Europe.12

1.3.1 **An agenda for gender equality**

Migrant women require a particular focus, both in response to their vulnerability to exclusionary processes as migrants and, specifically, women migrants, and because of the

---

6 Grant et al., *Should ART be part of a population mix?*, RAND Corporation.
8 Boswell, Stiller and Straubhaar, *Forecasting labour and skills shortages*.
11 Commission of the European Communities, *Green paper on a EU approach to managing economic migration*.
12 It is worth noting, however, that how best to ‘manage’ migration to ensure economic prosperity and social cohesion is still an open question. There is no migration management system that is widely agreed upon as the optimal arrangement, nor is there a widely agreed definition of what social cohesion is and how to measure it.
need to improve all women’s opportunities in line with the Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men.\textsuperscript{13} The Roadmap calls for progress in six key areas from 2006–2010, including equal economic independence for women and men; enhancing reconciliation of work, private and family life; promoting equal participation of men and women in decision-making; eradicating gender-based violence and trafficking, eliminating gender stereotypes in society and promoting gender equality outside the EU.\textsuperscript{14} As the research in this report highlights, these substantive areas of gender equality require facilitation of all women’s participation in the workforce through provision of a range of support measures and facilities.

1.3.2 \textbf{Migration flows to Europe}

Migration flows to Europe have changed in character over the last few decades. Significant waves of “guest workers” arrived in Europe between the 1950s and early 1970s, in response to a great demand for labour, particularly that of low education workers.\textsuperscript{15} \textsuperscript{16}

Following the oil crisis in the 1970s, the need for “guest workers” declined drastically, making many migrant workers redundant. In countries such as Germany, which had set up an intense recruitment policy in the preceding decades, it was expected that migrants would eventually return to their countries of origin. However, many of these labour migrants have settled in their receiving countries and been joined by their spouses and children under family reunification programmes, further pushing up the number of foreign-born residents in the EU.\textsuperscript{17}

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Western Europe faced a new wave of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe. The Balkan wars also caused a further surge of asylum seekers. This increasing external migratory pressure and the fact that the Schengen agreement had largely abolished border controls intensified the debate about a common immigration policy, which culminated in the immigration policy adopted at the Tampere Summit in October 1999.\textsuperscript{18}

Globally, migration streams have continuously increased. According to UN estimates, the number of migrants worldwide has reached 191m accounting for about 3% of the global population. There has also been a noted feminization of immigration to Europe. About half of all migrants (49.6%) are women. Net migration into the EU has also risen in the last few years. Some estimates suggest that the numbers of immigrants in the EU is approximately 4 per thousand (higher than the United States’ 3.3 per thousand), including


\textsuperscript{14} Commission of the European Communities, \textit{A roadmap for equality between women and men}.

\textsuperscript{15} Doomernik, \textit{The effectiveness of integration policies towards immigrants and their descendants in France, Germany and The Netherlands}.

\textsuperscript{16} Doomernik, \textit{The effectiveness of integration policies towards immigrants and their descendants in France, Germany and The Netherlands}.

\textsuperscript{17} Ray, \textit{Practices to promote the integration of migrants into labour markets}.

\textsuperscript{18} United Nations, \textit{Trends in Total Migrant Stock: 2005 Revision}.
people born both within and outside the EU.\textsuperscript{19} Of these, a significant proportion is irregular migrants; irregular migration has been estimated at between 23-50% of total migration into the EU.\textsuperscript{20}

1.3.3 The situation of migrant women in the EU labour force

Against the background of the demographic developments threatening Europe’s competitiveness and growth, and the possible implications for social cohesion, inclusion and equity of continued immigration into the region, a thorough understanding of the particular situation and challenges facing migrant women in the EU is a pre-requisite for the formulation of effective policies and measures to manage immigration. This study builds on, and contributes to, a gradually increasing corpus of research providing evidence that migrant women face greater disadvantage than both native-born women and migrant men across a range of areas of welfare including housing, health, access to services and, crucially, employment.

Our analysis of statistical data indicates that, when measured through a range of indicators – including participation rates, employment, unemployment and whether employment is commensurate with education levels – migrant women fare worse than both native-born women and migrant men. There are, however, differences in the labour market outcomes of migrant women with different characteristics. One of the most striking findings of this research is that, disaggregating migrant women into those born within the EU and those from third-countries, it becomes apparent that third-country women migrants face even greater levels of disadvantage in the EU labour force than all other groups: more than EU-born migrant women, migrant men and native-born women. Indeed, in many instances, EU-born migrant women outperform not only third-country migrant women but also native-born women and migrant men in the EU labour market. While outside the scope of the present study, if migrant men were also disaggregated into those born within and those born outside the EU, this would contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the way in which gender, race, ethnicity and region of birth interact to determine different migrants’ labour-force experiences.

There are serious policy, economic and social implications to the negative labour-force outcomes of third-country migrant women, who are the main focus of this research. For example, if migration is to play a role in mitigating some of the current and future pressures on labour demand by increasing the supply of labour (and improving matching of skills to jobs), the low participation rates, high unemployment levels and incidence of “de-skilling” amongst third-country migrant women are of urgent policy concern. The negative labour force outcomes of third-country migrant women also hamper progress in the areas of equity and rights. However, as the policy discussion in this study indicates, discrete immigration and integration policies are unlikely to address these issues effectively. Instead, our research suggests that an integrated, coordinated policy approach (a policy “mix”) is necessary to improve the labour force outcomes of migrants, women in particular; and thus to realise the societal gains of immigration. Moreover, given the

\textsuperscript{19} Diez Guardia and Pinchelmann, \textit{Labour Migration Patterns in Europe}.

\textsuperscript{20} Diez Guardia and Pinchelmann, \textit{Labour Migration Patterns in Europe}. 
particular challenges of providing social and economic opportunities to migrant women in Europe, it is crucial that immigration policies consider gender issues ("gender-mainstreaming"), but also that gender policies incorporate specific measures to address the situation of migrant women ("immigration-mainstreaming"). These policy issues are examined in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7 of this report.

1.3.4 The EU integration agenda
EU Member States are currently confronting both social and economic integration challenges resulting from increasing migratory flows into the region.

The challenge of integrating migrant women and men into the labour markets of the European Union is mostly the remit of the individual Member States’ national authorities.21 However, common approaches to integration are drawn at the EU level with the aim of addressing some of the shared integration challenges faced by member states.

Immigrant groups are identified as disadvantaged and are at particular risk of negative outcomes from processes of social exclusion in almost every Member State. This means that migrants have worse outcomes than the native-born population on a number of welfare and social inclusion indicators, such as employment and unemployment rates, school drop-out, income from employment, and access to good quality housing.22 Moreover, these outcomes tend to interact and reinforce each other in different ways; for example housing plays an important part in influencing integration in the labour force, as housing-related issues such as location and availability of public transport affect an individual’s access to employment.

In line with policy priorities such as those formulated by the Lisbon Agenda for growth and jobs, the Hague Programme23 and the Tampere European Council of 199924, the Commission adopted a common Framework for the Integration of third-country Nationals in the European Union, aimed at establishing a coherent European framework

---

21 The integration of migrants into the labour market of their receiving country is here broadly defined not only as their participation in the labour force, but also with reference to outcomes concerning employment and unemployment rates, wages, and employment commensurate with skills, which are equitable within the wider receiving society.

22 European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.

23 The Hague Programme, adopted by the European Commission in 2004, underlined the need for greater co-operation and co-ordination of the integration policies of member states and EU initiatives in this field. The common basic principles proposed as a foundation for future initiatives in the EU include an emphasis on employment as a key aspect of the integration process of migrants, and on education as critical to helping immigrants integrate into the receiving society and being economically successful and active. (It is worth noting that the common basic principles place the burden of responsibility for integration upon the immigrant rather than the receiving society, for example by emphasising that the immigrant should respect local values, participate in education, cultural life and employment, and work towards ‘civic citizenship’ (Niessen, Niessen and Niessen, Locating immigrant integration policy measures in the machinery of the European Commission.).

24 The Tampere European Council gave rise to the EU integration framework, which included conclusions regarding a Common EU Asylum and Migration Policy. These conclusions include the need for the fair treatment of Third Country Nationals (TCNs), and the objective that long-term legal residents are able to enjoy a set of uniform rights comparable to those of EU citizens (Niessen, Niessen and Niessen, Locating immigrant integration policy measures in the machinery of the European Commission.).
for integration. One of the cornerstones of this framework is a series of EU mechanisms to support Member States’ actions, which include National Contact Points on Integration, Handbook on Integration, an integration website, a European Integration Forum and annual reports on migration and integration. Taking into account existing EU policy frameworks, the Framework provides new suggestions for action both at EU and national level.

The Commission’s Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment, published in 2004, is another instrument setting a common European strategy for the integration of migrants. The Communication states that the successful integration of new and settled migrants is key to the promotion and maintenance of social cohesion and economic efficiency. The Communication, and the European Parliament resolution that followed, recognised that “different groups of migrants require different policies for integration”, that women are “a substantial majority of immigrants, including those of second and third generation, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants”, and that they are the victims of discrimination on the basis of both gender and origin, and that such discrimination also affects second and third generation immigrants.

While this communication and resolution acknowledge the diversity of migratory experiences and its gender dimension, other frameworks often do not highlight the particular needs of women migrants, whose integration into the social, cultural and economic life of the receiving society tends to occur at a different pace, to a different extent and may be of a different quality from that of migrant men.

Nevertheless, promoting equality between women and men in the labour force, and increasing women’s labour force participation, are stated goals of the European Union. In its Roadmap 2006–2010 for equality between men and women, the European Commission commits itself to greater gender equality, and especially to reducing the multiple disadvantages of migrant women and women belonging to different ethnic groups. Greater co-ordination between the integration and gender equality agendas could contribute to the development of a stronger platform for action on the integration of migrant women into the EU labour force.

1.4 Definitions and terminology

This section defines key terms used in this report.

1.4.1 Migration versus mobility

This study focuses on migration of third-country migrant women into the EU. Inter-EU movement of people is commonly referred to as “mobility” and, as agreed with the

---

25 European Commission, A Common Agenda for Integration.

26 European Parliament resolution on: Commission of the European Communities, Communication on immigration, integration and employment.


28 Commission of the European Communities, Communication on immigration, integration and employment. 15–16.
Commission, falls outside the scope of this work. The distinction between the two terms “migration” and “mobility” is not completely clear-cut, however, and the terms are often used interchangeably in EU policy papers, conflating phenomena that have very different policy exigencies and implications. For example, “mobility partnerships”29 address non-EU migration; and the Commission’s 2002 “Action Plan on Skills and Mobility” uses the term “migration” for movements of EU and non-EU nationals.

(Im)migration mostly describes the movement of non-EU nationals, also called Third Country Nationals (TCNs), to the EU and is often approached by governments and the public as something that needs to be controlled, managed, monitored and/or prevented. The European Commission runs the Eurodac system and is developing the VISA Information System to help reduce asylum seeking and visa shopping. The system also negotiates return clauses in bilateral agreements and supports third-countries in developing effective visa and people flow control policies as well as capacity building through its AENEAS programme.30

By contrast, (labour) mobility is mostly used to describe the movement of EU citizens within the EU, which has a positive connotation and is actively supported by the Commission, in particular DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunity. Labour mobility is firmly based at the core of the EU’s existence; the free movement of EU citizens within the EU is one of the Union’s core tenets. The free movement of workers was established in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and guarantees EU citizens the right to live and work in all member states. The Commission claims that the right of free movement is “perhaps the most important right of Community law […] and an essential part of EU Citizenship.”31

The case of EU enlargement could be very fertile ground for researching the effects of the change in the legal status of new accession country citizens and how this affected the overall cost incurred or benefit gained, from migration, by the recipient country, the migrant and the country of origin. Recipient countries were treating Central and Eastern European citizens as migrants. However, after their countries of origin became EU members their status changed to mobile workers, with the right of establishment and freedom to move and work across the EU.32 Enlargement is in some ways the world’s biggest ever naturalization programme. In this context, there might be lessons to be learned from the change in treatment and the effect on the chances for women migrants to succeed in professional careers. Thus the newly gained “mobility” of citizens from new Member States may in fact tell us something about the effectiveness of, and problems with liberal and supply driven migration systems.

31 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/free_movement/index_en.htm
32 Most EU member states have used transitional arrangements to restrict the free movement of workers from new member states for a limited period. Today, only six of the EU-15 countries maintain some restrictions for workers from member states who joined the Union in 2004.
(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/free_movement/enlargement_en.htm)
1.4.2 Foreign-national versus foreign-born migrants
Most EU Member States use nationality rather than country of birth as their standard criterion in demographic and socio-economic analyses. As a consequence, when a foreigner acquires citizenship of an EU Member State, they are no longer included in the statistics as a "non-national resident". Ignoring naturalised migrants results in the exclusion of between one- and two-thirds of the migrant population, depending on different member states’ naturalization practices and their migrant compositions by duration of residence. The country-of-birth definition provides for a more comprehensive analysis of immigration not confounded by differences in naturalization policies across member states or changes in these policies over time. Choice of the “foreign-born” definition, moreover, is not only a statistical definition issue. Using the more comprehensive, “foreign-born” definition allows for naturalization to be analyzed as one potential determinant of labour market outcomes. That is, naturalization may then be considered as a policy variable to be considered in addressing the labour market problems faced by migrant women. Access to public sector employment, in particular, depends in many government agencies in EU countries on being a citizen of that country or of another EU country. The OECD notes a lower proportion of foreign-born women in public-sector jobs. Reduced access to public sector employment is likely to be especially relevant to female migrants, as public sector employment is often considered to be more favourable to achieving a work–family balance. Public sector employment is, in general, also less subject to job instability.

It is possible, therefore, that the “non-EU national category may be over-represented by individuals who have neither the human capital nor the financial resources to undertake the naturalization process, especially in MS that have complicated and/or strict criteria.”

Consistent with this, the economic position of the foreign-born population in the EU-15 is much more similar to that of Europe’s total population than is the foreign-nationality population, whose economic position is much less favourable.

1.4.3 Excluding countries whose “foreign-born” women are due to political boundary changes
The numbers of non-EU “foreign-born” women in the Baltic countries and Slovenia are misleadingly high, as almost all those categorised as “foreign-born” are probably the result of political boundary changes rather than the movement of women between countries. We

53 Münz, Migrants in Europe and their Economic Position.
54 Nevertheless, a caveat to this point is that the labour market experiences of foreign-born migrants who spent most of their lives – including their childhood – in their destination country may be different from those of foreign-born migrants who moved to their destination country later in life.
58 Ray, Practices to promote the integration of migrants into labour markets, 7-8.
base our criterion, for inclusion of “foreign-born” women as “migrants”, on the definition of an “international migrant” recommended by the United Nations as a person who changes his or her country of usual residence\(^4\). From data provided to us from the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) by Eurostat, women born in the countries of the former Soviet Union (USSR) accounted for between 97 and 99.6% of all non-EU migrant women in the three Baltic countries in 2005. Because the large majority of these women are aged over 45 and had lived in their present country of residence for more than 10 years (the maximum “years of residence” category in the LFS), it is probable that these are largely not international migrants, having never changed their country of residence (they instead moved within the USSR).

Similarly, women born in the countries of the former Yugoslavia account for 92% of Slovenia’s “foreign-born” women, and again the large majority of these women are aged over 45 and had lived in their present country of residence for more than 10 years. We show in Chapter 2 that these political re-drawings have created very different age distributions of “foreign-born” women from those of voluntary migration, and that the labour-force participation rates of “foreign-born” women in these countries after controlling for these unusual age distributions tend to be much more similar to the labour-force participation rates of “native-born” women than would be expected in the case of true international migration. For these reasons, we exclude the Baltic countries and Slovenia from our detailed analyses of labour-force participation in Chapter 2; and from our analyses, in Chapters 3 to 5, of migrant disadvantage and educational and occupational features of migrant labour-market outcomes.

The problem of the false identification of “migrants” also applies in the cases of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, but is less clear cut. A substantial number of “foreign-born” women in Poland and Slovakia may also be falsely identified, due to political boundary changes following the Second World War. As we show in Chapter 2, the age profiles in these two countries are uncharacteristically old for migrants. Our analyses of detailed country-of-birth tabulations provided to us by Eurostat indicate that these are mostly women who have been living in Poland or Slovakia for over 10 years. For Poland, since no border changes have occurred since the end of the Second World War, only the oldest of the 2005 working-age population could have been directly affected by earlier boundary changes. Based on the similarity of the (very old) age distribution of third-country migrants in Poland and of their countries of birth to those of the Baltic countries, however, it appears that many of Poland’s “foreign-born” migrant women are indeed the result of boundary redrawing at the end of the second world war. For this reason, we exclude Poland from the analyzed countries. The Czech and Slovak Republics include “false migrants” due both to boundary redrawing at the end of the Second World War and the post-Soviet splitting of Czechoslovakia. The two countries’ profiles of “foreign-born” women, however, differ greatly, with Slovakia’s being much older and dominated by those with more than 10 years’ residence. A large majority of the women living in Slovakia who were born in another EU country were likely to have moved between parts of what was then a unified country (Czechoslovakia). For this reason, too, we exclude Slovakia from the

---

\(^4\) United Nations “Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration Revision 1”.
analyzed countries. On the basis of its younger and more recently-arrived migrants from both EU and third-countries, we retain the Czech Republic in most of our analyses of the labour-market outcomes of third-country migrant women. However, we provide cautious interpretations due to the possible mixing of real and false migrants in the overall “migrant women” figures for that country.

1.4.4 Labour force participation, employment and unemployment

Three related measures are typically used to understand differences in access to employment: the labour force participation rate and the employment rate each use as their denominator the population of working age, and differ only by whether individuals currently in the labour force have a job (the employed) or do not have a job and are currently searching for one or waiting to take up a position (the unemployed). The unemployment rate has as its denominator those in the labour force only. Partly to fill a gap in the existing literature, we consider the unemployment rate as our main indicator of labour market disadvantage in this report. The implicit model of labour market behaviour underlying the unemployment rate measure is a two-step process of first, entering the labour market and second, finding employment. In reality, the two steps are not always separate or sequential. In particular, a high unemployment rate can also have the behavioural effect of reducing the size of the labour force, to the extent that a high unemployment rate may discourage entry to the labour force. High rates of unemployment, specifically among non-EU migrant women, are expected to be an especially important deterrent wherever being a non-EU migrant is itself a factor in finding a job (e.g., difficulties associated with non-native language, foreign citizenship or discrimination).

1.5 Methodology

This research was conducted primarily through a review of relevant literature and an analysis of the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) data. Given the multi-faceted nature of the questions researched here, the study also involved reviews of literature on, most notably, migration, gender, employment and labour markets, demographic change, trafficking, and European policy on all of the above. While the analysis aimed to capture the most significant and pertinent literature available on the issues addressed in this study, resource constraints precluded full reviews of all the relevant literature and full exploitation of all available data sources. We refer immediately below to population data sources that measure migration stocks and flows in checking the comprehensiveness of the LFS in estimating total migrants and recent migrant entries to EU countries. In later chapters, especially Chapter 6, we also refer to additional information from population sources. Population data sources are limited, however, in both their detail and their cross-national comparability. The dimension of gender is typically missing in compilations, for example for such key characteristics as migrant entry category and definitions of migrant

41 We use here the standard, International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of unemployment. See, for example, Jouhette and Romans, “EU Labour Force Survey: Principal results 2005”.
flows, even in total, are for different periods based on different definitions of having “settled” in the receiving country. The empirical results of this report are based mainly on our analysis of the 2005 anonymised EU LFS data files (Eurostat 2006). The EU LFS is compiled annually by Eurostat from the quarterly LFSs of the EU member states and of additional participating countries in the European Economic Area (Charlier and Franco 2005). The EU LFS is the main source of statistical reporting on the labour-force activity of both the total populations and the migrant populations of the EU and associate countries. It has also become the main source for in-depth quantitative analysis of Europe’s migrant labour force.

1.5.1 Quality and limitations of the EU Labour Force Survey

While we identify the EU LFS as the best single dataset, we are aware that the quality of data varies over time and across countries. Countries omitted from our analyses of the 2005 anonymised EU LFS data files, due to unavailability either of variables or of adequate-sized, reliable samples to identify third-country migrants are Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Malta. The data for Finland and Malta were not made available to this project due to their limitations in respect of migrants in those countries. The data for Germany, Ireland and Italy do not allow for identification of third-country migrants, as the country of birth variable is missing.

Any survey of Europe’s immigrant populations, however, will experience some problems of incomplete inclusion of migrants. In particular, recently-arrived migrants, migrants with poor language skills, and migrants in unauthorised residence or with unauthorised work statuses in the receiving country will be at higher risk of non-inclusion in a sample survey. Non-inclusion can occur through either being missed by the sampling frame (non-coverage) or through sampled migrants not responding to the survey (non-response). Survey weighting schemes at the country level for non-inclusion will partly solve the problem of underestimation of migrant numbers, but will not necessarily correct for differential non-coverage and non-reporting. In three recent studies, the quality of the EU LFS for migrants has been addressed. Both Münz and Fassmann and Martí and Ródenas compare weighted estimates of migrants in the LFS to totals from census or register sources for around the year 2000, when most countries last conducted a census of population. Münz and Fassmann calculate that migrants were underestimated in the LFS by about 20% overall. The proportion of migrants missed is much higher in some countries, while

---

relatively low in others. In general, the newer migrant-receiving countries, in southern Europe, Ireland and the Nordic countries, had the largest deficits. According to Martí and Ródenas, LFS estimates of total migrants were only 44% of the population total in Greece; 58% in the population total in Spain; 70% in Portugal; 76% in Sweden; and 87% in Denmark. In the remaining EU-15 countries of our analyses, LFS estimates of total migrants were within 10% of those of the population data source.

While non-response by unauthorised migrant residents or workers is often assumed to be the main source of underestimation in surveys, this represents an incomplete and partially misleading picture of the sources of migrant underestimation. The total foreign-born population estimated, from any given survey, will typically include components from both the authorised and unauthorised resident foreign-born populations. This is the assumption behind “residual” methods of estimating the unauthorised foreign-born population, in which an estimate of authorised migrants based on immigrant admission records is subtracted from either a census or survey-based estimate (appropriately adjusted) of the total migrant population. The assumption that migrants will avoid contact with surveys in which the respondents are guaranteed anonymity is already questionable. Further, in the European context, where “regularization” programs held recently in all four southern European countries of the EU-15 may require the migrant to provide evidence of having lived in the country over a given period, migrants who are inclined to be distrustful of the anonymity of government surveys many nevertheless be inclined to respond.

Two major sources of non-inclusion of migrants in the LFS are likely to be: getting migrants into the sampling frame; and language difficulties of migrants soon after arrival. Martí and Ródenas (2007) often find very large discrepancies between LFS estimates of migrants arriving within the last year and dedicated migration flow estimates for the recently arrived, while Rendall, Tomassini and Elliot (2003) find that in the UK these are lower for returning migrants and migrants from other EU countries than for overall migrant flows. Countries have different criteria, however, for inclusion in the sample or sampling frame. Spain, in particular, requires that the household declares an intention to stay in the country for more than a year, whereas in other countries the criterion is mostly in months (typically 3, 4, or 6). This is likely to delay bringing both authorised and unauthorised migrants, including those whose original intentions to stay a shorter time were not ultimately realised, into the sample. On the other hand, those (mainly Nordic) countries whose sampling frames are drawn from their official population registers are very likely, as a consequence, to differentially omit unauthorised migrants from their LFS.

Harmonization of definitions and data collection practices is very high for labour market outcomes, with derived variables using internationally accepted definitions of labour force

48 Passel “The Sise and Characteristics of the Unauthorised Migrant Population in the US”; Jo Woodbridge “Sizing the unauthorised (illegal) migrant population in the United Kingdom in 2001”.
50 For an illustration of the potential uses of the LFS to study migrant flows under the assumption that the quality of the data is sufficiently high, see Bailly, Mouhoud and Oudinet, Les pays de l’Union européenne face aux nouvelles dynamiques des migrations internationals, Revue Française des affaires sociales, 33-59.
participation, unemployment, occupation, industry, and education. There is greater variation, however, in the collection of migration variables and inclusion of migrants in the LFS than there is overall in the LFS data. Other studies using the EU LFS have noted inconsistencies, including missing education in some countries in at least one earlier year (1998) of the LFS. Our own analyses revealed that another key variable “years of residence” was missing for a large number of cases in both France and Austria before 2003 or 2004. For these reasons, we chose to conduct our analyses only for the year 2005, aggregate across quarters for 2005, and not to combine 2005 with earlier years’ LFS data.

The anonymised files limit detail of variable coding to prevent disclosure. The most important constraint this imposes on our study is through country of birth being classified into three categories only: native-born; born in another EU country; and born outside the EU. We complement this limited categorization with special requested tabulations from Eurostat, as noted above when discussing our analyses of the country origins of “foreign-born” women in countries experiencing political boundary changes; while for Spain we conduct additional analyses using the 2001 Census to evaluate labour-force participation by country of origin.

To assure the internal validity of our treatment of the data, and to assure comparability with other EU LFS statistical analyses, we first conducted a replication analysis. This consisted of reproducing, where possible, basic labour market statistics for all migrants and for migrant women. We used as our standard for comparison the OECD’s (2007) Immigration Outlook publication. The latest year published in that report is 2005, and therefore we use the year 2005 to conduct this replication analysis, even though data for 2006 are now available. The EU country results are provided to the OECD by Eurostat. As the producer of the EU LFS harmonised files that we use in this report (Charlier and Franco 2001), Eurostat provides authoritative treatment of the data as a standard for comparison. The files that Eurostat have available to them, moreover, are more detailed than those available to us. Eurostat’s treatment therefore also allows us to identify data problems that appear to be specific to the anonymised LFS files available to our project team. For example, we note below the problem that there is no breakdown of country of birth within EU and non-EU groups in the anonymised files, and that “country of birth” is missing entirely for Italy and Ireland in the anonymised files. In Appendix Table A1, we provide a qualitative tabulation of the results of our verification analyses conducted as part of the empirical analyses of this report.

To summarise our country inclusions and exclusions in our main analyses of EU LFS data, we initially consider 20 countries from among the 27 in the EU. We exclude Germany, Italy and Ireland due to missing data on EU versus non-EU country of birth as it prevents us from identifying third-country migrants. We exclude Finland and Malta due to LFS data being unavailable to the project. We exclude Bulgaria and Romania due to their entry to the EU being after 2005. As noted in section 1.3.3 above, we also exclude the three

---

51 There are, however, some breaks in labour market data series, especially unemployment, and some minor differences by country in minimum labour forces ages used. For details of these breaks and differences, see http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/employment/info/data/eur_1998/LSF_LFS_COMPARABILITY.htm

52 Kogan, “Labor Markets and Economic Incorporation among Recent Immigrants in Europe”, p. 700.
Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Slovenia, Poland and Slovakia due to the large proportions of “foreign-born” women in those countries whose status is due to political boundary changes and not to international migration.

A further major advantage of the 2005 LFS for our study is that in 2005 the EU LFS included an *ad hoc* module on “Reconciliation between work and family life”\(^{53}\). Among the questions this allows us to address are differences between migrant and native-born women in their use of formal childcare. This module aids us in addressing the second case study objectives of evaluating this aspect of gender equality policy for migrant women. More generally, it further facilitates a gendered understanding of the reasons for migrant women’s labour force participation and other labour-market outcomes\(^{54}\). While other approaches to analysing migrant women’s labour-market outcomes have extended to earnings disadvantages\(^{55}\), we prefer instead to use the rich data of the LFS to extend analysis towards a broader than usual range of indicators of migrant women’s labour market activity, employment status and behaviour and attitudes towards combining family and labour-market activity.

### 1.6 Structure of the report

This report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the current situation of migrant women workers in the EU labour force. This chapter is based primarily on analysis of the Labour Force Survey data. Chapter 3 introduces the concept of migrant women’s “double disadvantage”, and outlines how this phenomenon will be analyzed in this project. Chapter 4 discusses the occupational segmentation of women migrants in the labour force, providing evidence of the sectors in which migrant women in the EU are more highly concentrated. In Chapter 5, the issue of skilled migrant women is examined, paying particular attention to the incidence of “brain waste” or “de-skilling” among third-country migrant women in EU countries. An overview of policies employed by receiving countries to foster and support the integration of immigrants in the labour force follows in Chapter 6. This chapter also presents the two case studies conducted for this project on the impact of policies on the integration of migrant women into the labour force.

---

\(^{53}\) Eurostat, “Reconciliation between work and family life”.

\(^{54}\) The same country exclusions do not necessarily apply to the special data available from the 2005 LFS Ad Hoc Module on Work and Family Reconciliation, and Ireland is therefore included in these analyses. Children’s ages, on the other hand, are not identifiable from the Ad Hoc Module file for France, whereas they are in the main anonymised EU LFS files.

CHAPTER 2  
Migrant women’s position in the EU labour force

- Migrant women have low rates of participation in the labour force early on when migrating, especially in the ‘old’ migrant-receiving countries of Western Europe. This effect is found when comparing migrant women’s participation rates to otherwise similar native-born women’s participation rates.
- This deficit is greatly reduced, and in some cases (Austria and Luxembourg) eliminated, with time lived in the receiving country.
- However, even after more than ten years in the receiving country, labour-force participation rates of migrant women in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the U.K., all remain more than 10 percentage points below those of comparable native-born women.
- Southern Europe is an interesting exception to these findings, as rates of labour force participation by migrant women in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries of Southern Europe are similar to those for comparable native-born women. This effect is found even during migrant women’s initial years in the receiving country.
- Migrant women in the EU are much more likely to have a child of pre-school age at home. They are also much more likely to be out of the labour force when they have a pre-school age child.

2.1  
Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the position of migrant women in the European labour force. The chapter begins with a theoretical discussion of some of the factors affecting migrant women’s participation in the labour force, identified through a review of relevant literature. The chapter then moves on to examine the labour-force participation rates of migrant women in the European countries for which adequate data were obtained, paying particular attention to the differences between native-born, EU-born migrant and third-country (non-EU) migrant women.

2.2  
What are the factors affecting migrants’ participation in the labour force?
Key to developing suitable strategies and policies to improve migrant women’s position in the labour market is a thorough understanding of the factors influencing their labour
market performance. Previous research has identified a range of factors that influence the success of immigrant women in European labour markets. It must be noted that most of these factors – with perhaps the notable exception of the presence of children and family structure – affect both men and women migrants’ labour market participation. Some of them affect native-born as well as migrant women, for example educational attainment and skills, and the presence of children. But it is the combination of both sets of factors which presents particular challenges for migrant women’s successful integration into the labour market.

First, some researchers point out the importance of educational attainment and skills in determining labour market participation. Women with secondary or tertiary education are more likely to participate in the labour market and less likely to be unemployed. However, this effect is less marked in the migrant female population than it is for non-migrant women. Thus it appears that the returns on education are lower for immigrants than for nationals.

In addition, migrants’ academic and vocational qualifications acquired in their home countries are often not recognised and/or not accepted in the receiving country. This may reflect in the migrants’ low level of participation in employment, as well as their concentration in low-skill sectors.

Secondly, children and family structure are another important factor associated with migrant women’s rates of participation in the workforce. As in the non-migrant female population, rates of participation fall as the number of children increase. This effect is also more marked depending on the age of the children, with younger children being associated with lower participation. This finding is linked to the presence of what is called a supportive environment, which tends to affect people’s ability, rather than willingness, to participate in the labour force. For example, availability and access to day-care facilities are important in determining whether women in particular will be able to seek, gain and maintain employment. This issue is common to both nationals and migrants, although it is possible that migrant women face particular obstacles in accessing information about services available and their rights to such services. In a number of EU countries, immigrant women are more likely than native-born women to cite childcare responsibilities as a reason for remaining outside the labour force.

The influence of marital status has also been researched. Some studies of labour market outcomes for immigrants have found that having a spouse reduces the likelihood of a migrant women participating in the labour force, while others find this effect is not

---

56 Heron, Migrant women into work – what is working?
57 Peracchi and Depalo, Labor market outcomes of natives and Immigrants.
58 Dumont and Isoppo, The Participation of Immigrant Women in the Labour Market.
59 Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment,
60 Dumont and Isoppo, The Participation of Immigrant Women in the Labour Market.
61 Heron, Migrant women into work – what is working?
significant for the female immigrant population. Type of migration is likely to be relevant here, as women migrants are more likely to immigrate under family reunification provisions, and have consequently greater difficulties obtaining employment, as many receiving countries place constraints on the rights to employment of migrants with family reunification visas.

The length of stay in the destination country relates to rates of participation and employment in the labour force. Migrant women who have been in the receiving country longer generally have considerably higher rates of participation and employment than newer arrivals. However, exceptions to this finding are also important. This effect is either not found, or is much less evident, in the southern and central European countries, Ireland, and Luxembourg. While the employment-driven nature of recent waves of immigration is a major shared characteristic across these countries, the Luxembourg “exception” points towards highly internationally mobile, high education subgroups among Europe’s women migrants. In the UK, for example, while both the participation and employment rates of recently arrived migrants are lower on average than other migrants, presence in intermediate and higher occupations is also greater among those women most recently arrived. Other research suggests that this is likely to be in part due to women’s increasing participation in the world of trans-national corporate transfers, and in part due to recruitment in specific intermediate- and high-skilled occupations (eg, as health professionals and associate professionals).

Studies of immigrant populations from multiple countries of origin point to the importance of the country of origin as a determinant of labour market success. Marked differences can be seen between countries within and outside the OECD, as well as between continents of origin. For example, migrants from Latin America, other European countries and the OECD tend to have a higher participation rate than those from other regions such as Africa. These differences might be rooted in different cultural

62 Peracchi and Depalo, Labour market outcomes of natives and immigrants; Dumont and Isoppo, The Participation of Immigrant Women in the Labour Market.

63 Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment.

64 Peracchi and Depalo, Labour market outcomes of natives and immigrants; Dumont and Isoppo, The Participation of Immigrant Women in the Labour Market.

65 Dumont and Isoppo, The Immigrant Women in the Labour Market; Dumont and Liebig, Labour Market Integration of Immigrant Women.


68 See eg; Adserà and Chiswick, Are There Gender and Country of Origin Differences in Immigration Labor Market Outcomes across European Destinations? Also: van Tubergen, Maas and Flap, “The Economic Incorporation of Immigrants in 18 Western Societies, 704-727.

69 Dumont and Isoppo, The Participation of Immigrant Women in the Labour Market.
backgrounds, as van Tubergen et al (2004) show, as well as in more or less significant language barriers as described in other studies.70

Not surprisingly, language skills as a characteristic of the individual migrant also have a strong influence on labour market success, as shown in several studies.71 Immigrants may have poor language ability in the language of the receiving country, which is considered by policy-makers and researchers to be an important barrier to successful social, economic and cultural integration.72 While it can be argued that participation in employment or education and training opportunities enable the development of language skills, in practice many migrants are unable to take advantage of these opportunities without prior language ability.73 While other factors also affect integration into the labour force, “the degree of fluency is a strong predictor of the chances of obtaining and keeping employment and of increased earning levels”.74

It is important, however, to note the difficulties in determining actual versus reported language skills. Because the information we have on language ability tends to be derived from survey data and is therefore self-reported, it is possible that individuals may under- or over-estimate their own language skills.

The social and cultural environment is also an important determinant in the integration of migrants – and other disadvantaged groups – into the labour force. Empirical research has shown that discrimination may seriously impede the labour market access of immigrants and other disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities (although not all immigrant and ethnic minority groups suffer discrimination to the same extent; for example in the Netherlands, Moroccan immigrants appear to be more discriminated against in the labour market than immigrants from Turkey, when other factors have been accounted for).75

In the case of women migrants, gender theories suggest that cultural values and perceptions often restrict the extent to which women can participate in the labour force, and determine what kinds of work are acceptable to them.76 Unfavourable cultural attitudes to women’s labour-force participation may be present in the migrant’s country or culture of origin and may also prevail in the receiving country.

Other factors can have a strong effect on migrants’ integration into the receiving country’s labour force. Housing, for example, is one such key element. The lack of affordable quality

70 Adserà and Chiswick, Are There Gender and Country of Origin Differences in Immigration Labor Market Outcomes across European Destinations?
72 See for example: Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment.
73 Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment.
74 Heron, Migrant women into work – what is working? 6.
housing in the areas in which migrants settle – typically deprived urban areas in which there are established immigrant communities – can act as a barrier to integration into the labour force. This not only affects both female and male migrants but, often, can also be detrimental to the labour force participation of native-born disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities.

Finally, **nationality, civic citizenship and legal status** all have an impact on the integration of migrants into the labour force. The Tampere Summit’s conclusions established that one of the aims for the integration of migrants in the EU should be to offer long-term legal-resident third-country nationals the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the member states in which they settled. Policy-makers and experts hold that nationality can make an important contribution to integration by giving the migrant a sense of belonging, as well as guaranteeing *de jure* participation in the political, civil, social, cultural and economic life of the country in which they live. Nationality can also contribute to integration into the labour market, for example by removing restrictions to certain occupations such as high-level posts in public companies, from which non-EU citizens are often excluded. As mentioned in the previous chapter, an OECD report notes that a lower proportion of foreign-born women hold public-sector jobs. Reduced access to public sector employment due to employment restrictions on the basis of nationality is likely to be especially relevant to female migrants, as public sector employment is often considered to be more favourable to achieving a work–family balance. Nonetheless, it has been recognised that the attainment of citizenship is not a panacea for all the challenges faced by migrants, such as discrimination, lack of language skills and low participation in the labour force.

In addition, a migrant’s **legal status** can determine their integration into the labour force. For example, women who come to the EU for family reunification purposes may have visas which restrict their rights to employment. Policies to improve women migrants’ integration into the labour market must also address the legal constraints they may be facing.

---


2.3 **Labour force participation of migrant women in Europe**

The focus of the empirical analyses in this chapter is on the factors that differentiate the labour-force participation rates of migrant women across EU countries. We follow the standard reporting practice (e.g., Jouhette and Romans 2006) in our definitions. The labour force participation rate is defined in accordance with International Labour Organization (ILO) standards as the “labour force”, consisting of employed plus unemployed people aged from 15 to 64, divided by the population in the same age range. We first compare migrant and native-born women by age and parenting status. This status is defined by the age of the youngest child, that is “under 5” or “5 to 14 years old”. Nationality and time since arrival in the country are further used to compare migrants between countries.

Analysis is for 2005, the most recent available year of LFS data at the time of conducting this study. We exclude Germany, Italy and Ireland from the analysis due to missing data on EU versus non-EU country of birth, and we exclude Finland and Malta due to unavailability of LFS data to the project. Other countries are unavailable for some of the analyses in this chapter, notably Sweden and Denmark for the analyses of age of youngest child because the “Relationship to Household Reference Person” variable is missing. For all statistics, we average over four quarters. This increases statistical precision allowing the lower statistical threshold of the annual LFS minimum level to be applied.

2.3.1 **The size of the female migrant labour force and its EU/non-EU composition**

We first compare the sizes of the female migrant labour forces of the 20 available EU countries relative to their total labour forces. Because a focus of this chapter, and indeed the entire project, is on understanding the particular position of migrant women from outside the EU, we describe the estimated sizes of the female migrant labour forces separately for those from inside and outside the EU, and we order the presentation of countries’ migrant labour forces on the countries’ proportions of third-country migrants. We describe these proportions separately for the “pre-Accession” countries in the EU before the 2004 Accession round (see Figure 2-1a) and for the “Accession” countries that entered the EU in 2004 (see Figure 2-1b).
Looking first at the 11 pre-Accession countries included in our analysis, an initial observation is that it is no longer the case that the “old” migrant-receiving countries of the EU have the highest proportions of migrants in their female labour forces. While southern Europe was formerly a migrant-sending region, it now has proportions of female migrants that are comparable to or greater than those of the countries that formerly received southern European migrants. Spain, in particular, with 14.0% of its female labour force made up of third-country migrants, now has easily the highest proportion among the 11 countries considered. The next highest proportion is that of one of the “old” migrant-receiving countries, Austria, with 11.0% of its female labour force now made up of third-country migrant women. Greece’s third-country migrant women makes up 8.8% of its total female labour force, exceeds that of France (8.2%), and the UK (7.2%). Portugal’s 7.2% exceeds that of Luxembourg (6.3%), Belgium (6.0%) and Denmark (4.8%).

A second feature of contemporary Europe’s migrant situation that is reflected in Figure 2-1a is the dominance of women from non-EU countries of birth among all foreign-born women. With the very prominent exception of Luxembourg, and also of Belgium, both of which include large inter-European government organizations, third-country migrants account for more than two-thirds of all foreign-born women in each of the countries.
Figure 2-1b: Migrant women as a proportion of the total female labour force (%), Accession EU countries, 2005

The proportion of third-country-born women in the labour forces is much more varied in the “Accession” countries (see Figure 2.1b). Migrant women constitute less than 2% of Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary’s total female labour forces. The proportions of third-county-born women in the other five Accession countries analyzed, however, are between 4 and 19%. These are misleadingly high proportions to the extent that they are due to political boundary changes rather than the voluntary movement of women between geographical territories. For the Baltic countries, for example, women born in the former Soviet Union will account for significant proportions of all migrant women, and similarly women born in Yugoslavia will account for a significant proportion of Slovenia’s “foreign-born” women. The division of Cyprus into Greek- and Turkish-controlled areas, and the transfers of population that took place following the partition, are likely to be partly responsible for the large proportion of foreign-born women in its labour force. We do not have the breakdowns by country of birth in the anonymised LFS, however, that would be needed to quantify these observations. We are nevertheless able to show that these political redrawings have created very different age distributions of “foreign-born” women from those of voluntary migration, and that the labour-force participation rates of “foreign-born” women in these countries after controlling for these unusual age distributions tend to be much more similar to the labour-force participation rates of “native-born” women than would be expected in the case of regular migration processes. For these reasons, we focus our detailed results and discussion of the unique determinants of third-country migrant women’s labour-force participation rates, below, on the pre-Accession countries.
2.3.2 Female labour-force participation rates by migration status

Next we compare the labour-force participation rates of migrant women born outside the EU (third-country migrant women) with the rates both of EU-born migrant and native-born women in the pre-Accession countries (see Figure 2.2). We do not consider Accession countries in this three-way comparison as EU-born migrant women are not consistently found there in sufficient numbers to allow for statistical comparison. The countries are placed in ascending order of third-country migrant women’s labour-force participation rates.

Figure 2-2: Labour-force participation rates of third-country migrant women, compared to EU-born migrant and native-born women, selected countries, 2005

Source: Labour Force Survey

There are two outstanding features of this graph. First, the labour-force participation rates of third-country migrant women are different from, but not systematically lower than, those of native-born women. Second, with the exception of Luxembourg, the labour-force participation rates of EU-born migrant women fall between those of native-born women and third-country-born migrant women, but are more similar to those of native-born women than to those of third-country-born migrant women.

On the first point, third-country migrant women have higher labour-force participation rates (LFPRs) than native-born women in the three southern European countries (Portugal, Spain, and Greece). The largest difference is in Spain, where third-country women’s LFPR is 70.1% while native-born women’s is only 56.8%. The difference is 10 percentage points in favour of third-country migrant women in Portugal (77.1% versus 67.3%), and 6 percentage points in Greece (60.4% versus 54.1%). In six of the remaining eight countries, however, the LFPR of native-born women exceeds that of third-country migrant women by more than 10 percentage points. The largest gaps are in Denmark, the
Netherlands and Belgium, where native-born women’s LFPRs exceed those of third-country migrant women by 16 or 17 percentage points. Belgium has the smallest proportion of its third-country migrant women in the labour force (44.0% of all those aged from 15 to 64). In Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands, just over half (55%) of third-country migrant women of working age are in the labour force.

On the second point, in almost all countries the differences between the LFPRs of EU-born migrant women and native-born women tend to be small. The main contrast is therefore with third-country migrant women. Only in Luxembourg are third-country migrant women’s LFPRs more similar to native-born women’s. Therefore, it is apparent that in the majority of countries in which third-country women’s LFPRs are lower than the LFPRs of native-born women, they are also lower than the LFPRs of EU-born migrant women by almost the same magnitudes. In the southern European countries where their LFPRs are higher than the LFPRs of native-born women, however, they are higher than the LFPRs of EU migrant women again by similar magnitudes.

2.3.3 Female labour-force participation rates by migration status and age

Because migration is highly concentrated among younger adults, the more recent the countries’ migration inflows, the younger their foreign-born populations relative to their native-born populations. We use the proportion under 35 years of age to compare the youthfulness of foreign-born and native-born women of labour-force ages (15 to 64 years old) in the pre-Accession and Accession EU countries (see Figures 2-3a and 2-3b). We limit comparisons to third-country-born versus native-born women. The age distributions of native-born women in the pre-Accession countries are very similar to each other, all having between 36 and 40% under the age of 35 among all 15–64-year-old women. These are much more similar than are the age distributions of third-country-born women.

As expected in the pre-Accession EU countries, the “new” migrant-receiving countries tend to have the youngest migrant women. Spain has easily the youngest, with 55% of those born outside the EU being under 35 years old. Denmark’s third-country-born women are the next youngest, however, with 49% being under 35. This may reflect its large numbers of asylum seekers and their family members in recent periods. The other two southern European countries, Portugal and Greece, are next with slightly fewer than half aged under 35. Even in the “old” migrant-receiving countries, however, migrants have a younger age distribution than do native-born women in all but France. In France, as many as 30% of all third-country migrants are aged 50 to 64 (results not shown). Many of these are likely to be children born abroad to French nationals in countries including Algeria, although the anonymised LFS data do not allow us to quantify this component.

The age distributions of native-born women in the Accession countries are again similar across countries. They are typically younger than in the pre-Accession countries however, with those aged under 35 comprising between 40 and 46 per cent of women aged 15 to 64 years old in all the countries. A great variety of ages are seen among third-country migrant women in the Accession countries. In the Baltic countries, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, third-country-born women are much older than the native-born populations of those countries. These are likely due to political boundary changes noted above. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Cyprus, on the other hand, each has younger migrant women than native-born women of working age.

Source: Labour Force Survey
Age is typically highly associated with labour force participation, although in more complex ways for women than for men. At the youngest ages, many women and men may still be in full-time studies, while at the older ages, retirement is common. For women, exit from the labour force to engage in full-time parenting is also common. Women from earlier cohorts, moreover, were more likely to leave the labour force for full-time parenthood, resulting in lower LFPRs among older women due to these “cohort” effects. In general among the EU countries analyzed here, LFPRs are higher at younger ages, although with considerable variation both across the pre-Accession and Accession countries. Because, as we saw above, native-born women in pre-Accession countries are older than migrant women, however, their age distribution tends to depress their LFPRs relative to the LFPRs of migrant women. In Figure 2-3a, we control for these age distribution differences between the native-born and third-country-born women in the pre-Accession countries. We achieve this by matching the native-born women’s age distribution to that of the third-country-born women of that country\(^84\). Use of this matching method allows for simple interpretation of differences between groups based on an adjusted outcome variable of interest for the different distribution of one or more predictor variables. Here the LFPR of native-born women is adjusted by matching their age distribution to that of third-country migrant women in the same country. The effect of this matching on age is to increase native-born women’s LFPRs. This widens the LFPR gap in those countries in which native-born women’s participation exceeds third-country migrant women’s; and reduces the LFPR gap in those countries in which third-country migrant women’s participation exceeds native-born women’s. In Belgium, the gap grows to a massive 24 percentage point difference, while in the Netherlands and Denmark it grows to 20 percentage points. In all the other countries outside of southern Europe, including Luxembourg, third-country migrant women’s LFPR deficit becomes at least 10 percentage points. Of the southern European countries, in Spain and Portugal the LFPRs of third-country migrant women continue to be higher than those of native-born women, though by smaller margins. In Greece, matching on age eliminates the higher LFPR of third-country migrant women.

---

Figure 2-4a: Labour force participation rates of third-country migrants compared to native-born women matched by age, selected countries, 2005

In most of the Accession countries, there is little difference between the LFPRs of third-country migrant and native-born women after matching on age distribution (Figure 2-4a). The only exceptions are Poland and the Czech Republic, where there are significant deficits, and Cyprus, where the LFPR of migrant women exceeds that of native-born women. In these cases, adjusting the LFPR tends to reduce the gap between native-born and foreign-born women. The resulting gaps are especially low in those countries with the highest proportions of “foreign-born” women. This is particularly so for the Baltic countries whose native-born women are oldest. Only in Poland does a large difference remain. The finding of generally similar LFPRs in the Accession countries is consistent with the “foreign-born” women being products of political boundary changes rather than migration processes in the usual sense. For this reason, we focus on migrant women in the pre-Accession countries for the remainder of this chapter.
2.3.4 **Migrant and native-born women’s labour-force participation by family status**

We next investigate the role of migrant women’s family responsibilities. We do this by comparing statistics for third-country migrant women and native-born women and by comparing third-country migrant women between “new” and “old” migrant-receiving countries. We first compare distributions of women by family status (Figures 2-5a and 2-5b), and then compare the associations between LFPRs and family status for migrant and native-born women (Figures 2-6a and 2-6b). Finally, we evaluate how much of the differences in LFPRs between migrant and native-born women can be explained by their differences in family statuses (in Figure 2-7). To anticipate our main conclusions, we find that: (1) migrant women are much more likely than native-born women to have a youngest child under 5; (2) migrant women with young children are much less likely than native-born women to participate in the labour force when they have a young child; and yet (3) the differences in parenting statuses between migrant and native-born women do not explain why migrant women in the “old” migrant-receiving countries participate much less in the labour forces of those countries, nor why migrant women in the “new” migrant-receiving countries participate substantially more in the labour forces of those countries.
We first compare proportions with a youngest child under 5, with a youngest child aged between 5 and 14, and without any children under 15 years old between third-country migrant women and native-born women. We only consider here women who are either the household reference person or the spouse/partner of the household reference person. This
selection provides a consistent means of identifying children across the countries.\textsuperscript{85} In Figures 2-5a and 2-5b), we have placed the countries within each group in ascending order of third-country-born women’s labour-force participation rates within the “old” and “new” migrant-receiving country groups. This ordering reveals no clear pattern of women with young or any children being more common in countries with lower third-country migrant women’s labour-force participation.

In both the “old” and “new” migrant-receiving countries, third-country migrant women are much more likely than native-born women to have at least one child under 5 years old in the household, and are much less likely than native-born women to have no child under 15 years old in the household. Spain has the largest proportion of third-country migrant women with a child under 5 (38.5%), but the Netherlands (34.1%) and France (32.8%) both have substantial proportions, while Portugal (27.9%) and Austria (26.7%) have similarly lower proportions. Despite the differences in their history of receiving migrants, then, there do not appear to be strong systematic differences between the family statuses of third-country migrant women in “new” and “old” migrant-receiving countries.

The contrast in third-country migrant and native-born women’s family statuses, however, is large. The contrast is mainly seen in the much higher proportions of third-country migrant women with at least one child under 5 years old. While it is around 30% for these migrant women in working age (see Figure 2-5a), the proportion is only around 20% for native-born women (see Figure 2-5b). This would be an important difference that might explain migrant women’s lower labour force participation, but only if having a child under 5 years old keeps women out of the labour force. We next find that while it appears to do so strongly for third-country migrant women, it does not for native-born women.

\textsuperscript{85} In results not presented here, we experimented with an alternate definition that included all women of working ages, but with less clear identification of ‘own children’. The main conclusions did not change.
Figure 2-6a: Labour force participation rates, third-country migrant women by children’s ages, pre-Accession EU countries, household reference person or partner only, 2005

Figure 2-6b: Labour force participation rates, native-born women matched to migrant women's ages, education and marital statuses: by children’s ages, pre-Accession EU countries, household reference person or partner only, 2005

Source: Labour Force Survey
In Figures 2-6a and 2-6b, we compare the LFPRs of third-country migrant and native-born women for the three family status groupings of Figures 2-5a and 2-5b: youngest child under 5, youngest child aged 5 to 14, and without any children under age 15 in the household. Again the comparison is between third-country migrant women and native-born women, and between “old” and “new” migrant-receiving country groups. In Figure 2.6b, native-born women in each of the three groups by age of child are matched to have the same age, education and marital status distribution as third-country migrant women with children of the same ages.

The most striking contrast is seen between the patterns of LFPRs of migrant and native-born women with a youngest child under 5 years old versus those with a youngest child aged 5 to 14 years old. In every country except Portugal, the LFPR of migrant women with a child under 5 is much below that of women with a youngest child aged 5 to 14, or with no children under 15. In contrast, the LFPRs of native-born women with a child under 5 are similar to those of native-born women with a youngest child aged 5 to 14 in all countries.

Finally, we bring together ages of children and ages of women without children in Figure 2-7. Here we compare the labour-force participation rates of third-county migrant women to native-born women after adjusting the native-born women’s family status and age distributions (of women without children under 15) to match those of third-county migrant women. The overall conclusion is that age and family status of migrants can explain neither the much lower labour-force participation rates of third-country migrant women in the “old” migrant-receiving countries, nor the higher labour-force participation rates of non-EU migrant women in the “new” migrant-receiving countries of southern Europe. Matching the native-born women by both children’s ages and, if no children are present, the woman’s own age, serves to slightly accentuate rather than diminish the differences between migrant and native-born women’s labour force participation in the “old” migrant-receiving countries, while it brings the native-born women’s participation rates only slightly closer to those of migrant’s in the “new” migrant-receiving countries.

It may seem counter-intuitive at first, that adjusting native-born women’s family status distributions to have the same proportion with a child under 5 years old does not bring their labour force participation closer to that of migrant women. The explanation of this paradox is that only for migrant women does having a child under 5 years old have a substantial negative association with their labour force participation. This finding is itself very interesting. There may be any of several, or a combination of, explanations for this finding. For example: cultural norms in the migrants’ country or community of origin may play a part; lower incomes may make access to childcare more difficult; or the absence of social support/social capital/networks may make finding childcare more difficult. We return to this finding when examining, in more detail, the labour-force participation of women with young children in the Chapter 6 case studies. There we consider one of these potential drivers – the possibility that migrant and native-born women have unequal access to policies and programmes designed to promote work–family reconciliation and gender equality. In the present chapter, we conclude only that parenting status differences between migrant and native-born women are not sufficient to explain any of the participation gaps – explanations for the differences in the effect of having a child under 5 between migrant and native-born women on labour force participation are needed.
On the factors particular to migrants, we will continue in the following chapter to take advantage of opportunities to compare third-country and EU migrants and to investigate factors that are particular to being a migrant versus those that are particular to being a migrant from outside the EU. In this chapter we will investigate labour-force participation by numbers of years since arrival, a factor found to be important in the expected direction (the longer the time in the country, the greater the labour-force participation) by Dumont and Liebig in most, but not all, countries86.

2.3.5 **Do migrant women's labour-force participation deficits close with time in the receiving country?**

We next address a key question posed in both scholarly and policy domains: Whether, and by how much, migrant women’s labour-force participation becomes more similar to that of native-born women over time. We are especially interested in whether the large overall labour-force participation deficits observed in the “old” migrant-receiving countries are seen equally among women who have recently arrived and women who have already lived a number of years in those countries. When using the phrase “over time”, we mean the years since the women’s arrival in the receiving country. This concept of time is represented by the “years of residence” variable in the EU LFS.

Previous studies by OECD researchers using the EU LFS have generally found employment rates and labour-force participation rates of foreign-born and foreign-nationality women to increase with the longer they stay in the country. However, there

---

86 Dumont and Leibig, Labour Market Integration of Immigrant Women.
have also been significant exceptions to this general finding. Dumont and Liebig describe the gap in the employment rates of native-born women and foreign-born women in their first five years of residence in 16 EU countries. They find substantially lower employment rates among migrants in just over half these countries, the exceptions being the new migrant-receiving countries of southern Europe and Ireland, and in the Accession countries. In an analysis of selected western and northern European countries, Liebig found the employment rate gap declines, with the exceptions being Belgium and, over the first 10 years, Denmark and the Netherlands. For Denmark, Liebig analyzes differences in employment rates from those of native-born women separately for OECD and non-OECD migrants, and finds greater initial deficits and greater reductions in the deficit with years in the country for non-OECD migrants. Dumont and Isoppo find, for labour-force participation gaps between foreign nationals and citizens, that Belgium and the southern European countries are exceptions to the general trend of increasing labour-force participation rates with increased length of time in the country. Lemaitre found that employment rates increase as foreign-born women stay longer time in the country, in Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands, but not in the UK.

Of these studies, only Lemaitre includes controls for differences between migrants at different lengths of stay or for differences between migrants and native-born women. Dumont and Isoppo, whose multivariate analyses do not include years of residence, suggest that the generally declining rates of labour-force participation with age in Belgium could explain the Belgian anomaly of no increase in labour force participation with length of time in the country. According to this argument, since migrant women at older ages have usually been in the country longer, this could partially explain their less than expected growth in labour-force participation with time in the country. This type of argument suggests that the appropriate analytical approach is to compare migrant women at different durations not with each other but, instead, with native-born women with comparable characteristics relevant to labour force participation.

Other methodological issues are raised by Dumont and Isoppo. They also note the two limitations of the “pseudo-cohort” method used in all these studies. The first is that women of different migrant cohorts are compared at a given point in time. The second is that no account is taken of trips out of the country. Specific to their study, they note the limitation that no account is taken of naturalization. This process moves migrants out of the “foreign national” and into the “citizen” category with time in the country, and may do so selectively, for example, among migrants with greater labour-market success. In this case, increases in labour-force participation with time in the country will be underestimated. An opposite bias, however, can be introduced when using the foreign-

87 Dumont and Leibig, Labour Market Integration of Immigrant Women.
89 Dumont and Leibig, Labour Market Integration of Immigrant Women.
91 Lamaitre (2007)
born definition as it includes also “citizen immigrants” — the children of citizens living abroad. In countries including France and the UK that have experienced the return of citizens in the post-colonial period, for example, some of the foreign-born will have entered the country as international-migrant children accompanied by their native-born parents. To compare their labour-force participation to that of foreign-born women who have recently arrived in the country, very few of whom will be overseas-born children of native-born parents, introduces a bias in favour of finding increasing labour-force participation with years of residence in the country. This can be expected to influence the results for France, where as many as 30% of all third-country migrants are aged 50 to 64 (results not shown). While this type of “citizen immigrant” was more common also in the UK in the 1950s and 1960s, the much younger age distribution of the long-term foreign-born migrant population there and among the other countries considered indicate that citizen immigrants are likely to constitute a small proportion of all migrant women of working age in 2005 in all duration categories. Therefore we do not expect this to be a large biasing factor for the present study.

Lemaitre considers that limitations of the pseudo-cohort method are responsible for the lack of any improvement in the employment rate of migrant women in the UK with years of residence in the country. He argues that more recent migrant cohorts arrived in the UK under a regime of increasingly labour-oriented migration, and that they are therefore not comparable to earlier migrant cohorts who have now more years’ residence in the country. Under this hypothesis, earlier migrant cohorts do not display improvements in employment rates with time in the country because they are fundamentally different from recent migrant cohorts. An alternative, though possibly complementary, explanation offered by Rendall and Salt is related to Dumont and Isoppo’s second point on movement out of the country after arrival. There are known to be high rates of return and onward migration among foreign-born women from high-income countries. This gives rise to possible downward bias in labour-force participation with years of residence due to the selective emigration of women with the highest rates of labour-force participation. Women from other high-income countries are likely to be especially prominent among these “high turnover” migrants. In the present study, we consider only migrants from third-countries. While in the UK, these will include migrants from high-income countries, especially North America and Oceania, in most continental European countries the third-country migrants are more often from low-income countries and therefore likely to have a lower turnover. This will reduce bias due to the presence of these “high turnover” migrant women with high initial labour-force participation rates.

A further factor not controlled for in any of the above studies, and which is controlled for in the analyses of the present study, is differences in the family statuses of migrant women.

---


93 Lemaitre (2007), ibid.


95 Rendall and Ball, ibid.
at different lengths of time in the country. As we saw immediately above, migrant women with pre-school age children have much lower labour-force participation rates. Rapid entry to motherhood after arrival in the country has been observed to occur among migrants in Sweden and in France. The interpretation of why migrants’ labour-force participation rates increase with time in the country would then involve two factors: the greater likelihood of recently-arrived migrant women having pre-school-age children; and the very strong negative association of pre-school-age children on migrant women’s labour-force participation. The first is generally considered to be a “distributional factor”: Migrants’ overall labour-force participation rates are lower because they differ in their characteristics. The second is considered alternately to be a “behavioural” or “discrimination” factor: Migrant women with similar characteristics have different labour-force participation rates either because they have different preferences, possibly related to cultural origins, or because they face less favourable circumstances due to individual or institutional discrimination than do native-born women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2-1: Differences in labour-force participation rates for third-country migrants and matched native-born women, by years of residence, 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Native-born women’s labour-force participation rates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matched native-born to third-country migrant women (all years of residence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matched native-born (on third-country migrant women with year of residence less than 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matched native-born (on third-country migrant women with year of residence 5 to 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matched native-born (on third-country migrant women with year of residence 10 or more)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third-country migrant women’s labour-force participation rates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third-country migrant women (all years of residence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third-country migrant women with year of residence less than 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third-country migrant women with year of residence 5 to 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third-country migrant women with year of residence 10 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>differences (migrant LFPR - matched native-born LFPR)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third-country migrant women (all years of residence), versus matched native-born women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third-country migrant women with year of residence less than 5, versus matched native-born women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third-country migrant women with year of residence 5 to 10, versus matched native-born women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third-country migrant women with year of residence 10 or more, versus matched native-born women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations from the Labour Force Survey

---

In Table 2.1, we present the estimated gap between third-country migrant and native-born women, after matching the native-born women to have the same age, marital status, education, and age-of-children as the third-country migrant women of that duration-in-country group. The duration-in-country groupings are 0–5 years, 6–10 years and >10 years, comparable to the OECD studies. The age groups are 15–24, 25–34, 35–49 and 50–64. Marital status is divided into never-married (single), married, and previously married (divorced, separated and widowed). Education groups are “low”, “medium” and “high” according to whether they have lower-secondary or less, upper-secondary, or tertiary qualifications (see Chapter 5).

The upper panel shows the native-born women’s labour-force participation rates at the same ages, education, marital statuses, and ages of children as for third-country migrants in the three duration groups. The overall results, and those for Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg and Austria, indicate that the characteristics of recently-arrived migrants (0–5 years) are slightly more favourable for their labour-force participation than are the characteristics of migrants that have been in the respective countries 6–10 years (see the uniformly higher labour-force participation rates of native-born women matched to the characteristics of migrant women 0–5 years in the country compared to those of native-born women matched to the characteristics of migrant women 6–10 years in the country), and are more favourable still than those of migrants who have been in the country more than 10 years. This indicates that the effect of time spent in the country on the labour-force participation rates of third-country migrant women will be underestimated when considering those of the second panel. Here we see that, overall, labour-force participation rates increase only from 59% for those in the country 0–5 years, to 61.5% for 6–10 years, and to 63.0% for more than 10 years. There are increases of 20 percentage points between recent migrants (0–5 years) and long-term migrants (over 10 years), however, in the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg and Austria; and increases of 15 percentage points in Greece; 10 percentage points in Belgium; and 7 percentage points in the UK. Only in Spain and Portugal do the results go in the opposite direction, though by small amounts.

In the third panel, the measure is of differences in the labour-force participation rates between third-country migrants and native-born women with similar characteristics. Here, the results are more strongly supportive of the “integration” hypothesis that migrant women’s labour-force participation becomes more similar to that of native-born women with time lived in the country. Overall, the migrant-native labour-force participation gap declines from a 15 percentage-point deficit for women who have been in the country for 0–5 years, to a 10 percentage-point deficit for women in the country for 6–10 years, and to a 5 percentage-point deficit for women in the country more than 10 years. The migrant-native labour-force participation gap declines are especially great with years in the country in the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg, and Austria. Labour-force participation deficits are of between 25 and 40 percentage points among third-country migrants who have lived in those countries for only 0–5 years and are between 0 and 10 percentage points among third-country migrants who have lived in those countries for more than 10 years.

In Belgium and the UK, countries that previous studies had identified as exceptions, we also find that labour-force participation rates appear to become more similar to those of native-born women with increasing time spent in the country. In Belgium, in particular, a 35 percentage-point labour-force participation deficit among women in the country 0–5
years only reduces to 18 percentage points among women in the country 6–10 years, although this deficit does not reduce any further among third-country migrant women in Belgium over 10 years. In the UK, there is some decline in differences between migrant and native-born women’s participation rates, though this is only seen between women in the country 6–10 years (a 17 percentage-point deficit) and those in the country over 10 years (an 11 percentage-point deficit). This is also consistent, however, with a pattern of relatively high labour-force participation among women who do not remain long in the UK before returning or migrating onwards that masks an otherwise substantial convergence in the participation rates of third-country migrant women who remain in the country more than 5 years.

Among the three southern European countries, in contrast, only in Greece is there a labour-force participation deficit among those women in the country 0–5 years. Consistent with this, only in Greece is there a gain in the labour-force participation rates of migrants compared to native-born women with time lived in the country. The migrant labour-force participation rate is eliminated for women in Greece for 6–10 years, and is transformed into a higher participation rate among migrants with more than 10 years in the country than among equivalent native-born women.

Finally, the “all years of residence” rows for each of the three panels of Table 2.1 provide a multivariate analysis of the overall labour-force participation rate differences between third-country migrant and native-born women across these nine countries for which we have a full set of variables. The 8.6% lower overall labour-force participation rate difference (61.7% for third-country migrant women versus 70.3% for matched native-born women) provides an estimate of the impact of third-country migrant status on their labour-force participation, controlling for their age, education, marital status and family status (age of youngest child). In five of the nine countries analyzed, the migrant participation deficit after controlling for differences from native-born women on these variables relevant to labour-force participation exceeds 10 percentage points. All of these five countries are from the “old” migrant-receiving group. Thus this combination of demographic characteristics and differences in human capital, as represented by education level, is insufficient to explain the substantially lower labour-force participation rates of third-country migrants in the majority of “old” migrant-receiving countries. In the three “new” migrant-receiving countries plus Austria, however, the labour-force participation rates of third-country migrants are within five percentage points of comparable native-born women.

The estimated labour-force participation rates of third-country migrant women in the three southern European countries are slightly above those of matched native-born women. However, the differences are small enough for us to be able to conclude that controlling for differences in demographic and human capital characteristics of third-country migrants versus native-born women in those countries essentially eliminates the raw finding of migrants’ higher labour-force participation rates.
2.4 **Discussion**

The empirical analyses thus far have only begun to highlight the various factors that may explain the levels of labour force participation among third-country migrant women. We can think of these factors as being of three types: (1) those factors general to all working age people – in particular, the human capital variables of work experience and level of education; (2) those factors particular to women; and (3) those factors particular to migrants. We reserve treatment of human capital (specifically education level) for Chapter 5. For the factors particular to women, we investigate these in the following chapter when contrasting their effect on migrant men with their effect on migrant women. We also continue to contrast EU and third-country migrants in the next chapter to better understand the migration disadvantage and how migrant origins instead account for these differences. The first case study of Chapter 6 investigates this latter question in greater detail for Spain, simultaneously the (pre-Accession) country with the highest migrant proportion in its female labour force and one of the countries in which migrant labour force participation exceeds that of native-born women’s labour force participation.

Further, the findings on the stronger role of parenting status for the labour force participation of migrant women than native-born women point towards the fruitfulness for further investigation of factors including number and ages of children, and differences in migrant women’s ability to achieve a satisfactory work–family balance in different countries. This investigation is undertaken in the second case study of Chapter 6. Policy analysis in this case study considers the range of factors relevant in achieving a satisfactory work–family balance and how they differ between EU countries.


3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter analyzed the labour force participation in Europe of third-country migrant women, and compared it to that of EU-born migrant women and native-born women. In this chapter, we investigate the so-called ‘double-disadvantage’ experienced by migrant women in the labour force. The chapter focuses on unemployment, involuntary part-time employment and temporary-contract employment to evaluate the labour-market ‘double disadvantage’ of being both a migrant and a woman. The unemployment and involuntary part-time employment rates, and proportions of those employed who have temporary contracts among third-country migrant women are compared to those of native-born women and third-country migrant men. For unemployment, third-country migrant women’s rates are compared also to those of EU-born migrant women.
3.2 What is the “double disadvantage” of migrant women?

This chapter aims to investigate the so-called ‘double disadvantage’ experienced by migrant women in the labour market. This double disadvantage arises from an environment of unequal opportunity in the labour market, which negatively affects both women and migrants. Women migrants have been shown to have more difficulties integrating into the labour market than both native-born women and migrant men. Migrant women, in a sense, face a double battle; first to migrate and integrate as foreign-born people in their host country, and then to overcome the gender bias in the labour market as well as in other areas of social, political and economic life. Being from a country outside the EU, moreover, introduces a third axis of disadvantage. This third axis can be related to previous studies that have investigated differences among migrant women by country of origin.

While in general these earlier studies have framed their analyses in terms of labour-market discrimination against migrants and women, we also note studies that have interpreted observed differences as being due to cultural orientations among immigrant women from some origins towards family roles, or to a mix of cultural and labour market discrimination factors. The analyses here do not attempt to estimate how much of the differences between migrant women’s and either migrant men’s or native-born women’s labour market outcomes can be attributed to discrimination. The analyses are descriptive, and do not control for human capital differences between migrant and native-born women. By analysing in this chapter only outcome measures for women who have already entered the labour market, however, the arguments for cultural factors will in general be less persuasive than they might be for labour-force participation itself. A novel contribution of the present study, moreover, is its consideration of multiple indicators of employment disadvantage, not only the employment status and earnings that previous studies have considered.


98 Francoise Farah (2006) Female Migrants: Bridging the Gaps Throughout the Life-Cycle, Selected Papers of the UNFPA-IOM Expert Group Meeting, NY.


3.3 Double disadvantage in Europe: unemployment, underemployment and temporary employment of migrant women

Previous work on migrant women’s “double disadvantage” has focused on labour force participation. Here we consider disadvantage in terms of employment outcomes of migrant women in the labour force. We consider three dimensions of disadvantage of third-country migrant women: unemployment, involuntary part-time employment and temporary employment. We consider involuntary part-time employment as a form of underemployment. This allows us to integrate it analytically with unemployment. The main “disadvantage” comparisons we make are to native-born women. We also make comparisons to migrant men and to EU-born women. The latter comparison permits additional insight into the meaning of the “migrant” dimension of disadvantage.

3.3.1 Labour force participation and unemployment rates

First we use visual means to explore the possibility of unemployment discouraging labour-force participation, by relating the 2004 unemployment rates for third-country migrant women in 12 countries to their labour-force participation rates, in Figure 3-1. The expected inverse relationship implied by the hypothesis that unemployment discourages entry to the labour force is found, but is far from uniform. At the extremes, Poland and Belgium’s very low labour-force participation rates, as noted in the previous chapter, are consistent with their high unemployment rates (28.9% and 23.9% respectively), while Portugal’s very high labour-force participation rate is consistent with its low unemployment rate (9.6%) relative to that of third-country migrant women in the 12 countries examined here.

Figure 3-1: Unemployment rates by labour-force participation rates of third-country migrant women, selected countries, 2004

---


104 Dumont and Isoppo, ibid.
On the other hand, while Hungary and the UK’s unemployment rates are the lowest among those for third-country migrant women in these 12 countries (at 6.7% and 7.2%), their labour-force participation rates are not especially high. Similarly, while Spain’s unemployment rate among third-country migrant women (17.8%) puts it marginally among the worst half of our 12 countries, the labour force participation rate of third-country migrant women is the second highest, at 67.4%. The overall inverse relationship of Figure 3.1, however, suggests that higher unemployment rates among third-country migrant women may indeed reduce labour force participation. This adds to the value of the unemployment rate as a statistic to focus on in improving our understanding of the sources of migrant women’s labour market disadvantage.

3.3.2 Unemployment

We first compare the unemployment rates of third-country migrant women with the unemployment rates of native-born women and non-EU migrant men. We do this for the 14 countries in 2005 for which we have data available to reasonably identify women as migrants. This means that of the 25 countries in the EU in 2005, we exclude Finland, Germany, Ireland and Italy among the pre-Accession (“EU-15”) countries, and we exclude the Baltic countries, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia among the Accession countries (see again Chapter 2). The remaining 14 countries are grouped into: (1) “old” migrant-receiving countries; (2) Nordic countries; (3) “new” migrant-receiving countries; and (4) Accession countries. Within each of the country groups, the countries are ordered by the third-country migrant women’s unemployment rates (see Figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2: Unemployment rates of third-country migrant women and men and native-born women in four country groups, 2005

Source: Labour Force Survey
In the previous chapter, we identified a pattern of migrant versus native-born women’s labour force participation that favoured migrant women in the newer migrant-receiving countries of southern Europe over migrant women in the older migrant-receiving countries. We also found that the outcomes of migrant women in the Nordic countries were more similar to the older migrant-receiving countries than to the newer migrant-receiving countries of southern Europe. Finally, we identified a heterogeneous “pattern” in the Accession countries. A similar summary view is obtained when these four country groupings are used to understand the patterns of disadvantage experienced by third-country migrant women relative to native-born women with respect to unemployment. In particular, the unemployment disadvantage of non-EU-born women is consistently large on the migrant dimension in the “old” migrant-receiving and Nordic countries, but is much smaller for the “new” migrant-receiving and Accession countries. Unlike the participation disadvantage, however, there is no consistently strong gender dimension to migrant unemployment disadvantage. In particular, the ratio of unemployment rates between migrant and native-born women in the “old” migrant-receiving and Nordic countries is matched or exceeded by that for migrant to native-born men.

Migrant women’s unemployment rates in the “old” migrant-receiving and Nordic countries exceed 10 per cent in all except the UK. The highest migrant women’s unemployment rates are found in Belgium (26.9%), France (20.5%) and Sweden (18.0%). In the majority of the “old” and Nordic countries, moreover, migrant men have unemployment rates that are equally high. The exceptions are Belgium, France and Luxembourg, where migrant men’s unemployment rates are around five percentage points lower than migrant women’s unemployment rates. The absolute levels of native-born women’s unemployment in most of the “old” and Nordic countries, meanwhile, are much lower, at around 5%.

In the southern European and Accession countries, the contrasts in unemployment rate by gender tend to be greater than those in migrant versus native-born status. In particular, while migrant women’s unemployment is around 15 per cent in Spain, Greece and the Czech Republic, migrant men’s unemployment is below 10 per cent in each. Migrant and native-born women’s unemployment rates are generally similar in these two groups of countries. The Czech Republic is the only country in these two groups with a substantially greater female than male unemployment disadvantage.
We explore further the migrant disadvantage for women versus that for men, by contrasting both migrant men and migrant women with their native-born counterparts. Figure 3-3 shows the ratios of third-country migrant women’s unemployment rates to native-born women’s unemployment rates; and the ratios of non-EU migrant men’s unemployment rates to native-born men’s unemployment rates. The country groupings and ordering in this graph are the same as in Figure 3-2.

Our first observation is that the pattern of migrant disadvantage in unemployment is strikingly similar between women and men (the exception being for the more heterogeneous Accession countries). Our second observation is of a much stronger migrant unemployment disadvantage for both women and men in the “old” migrant-receiving and Nordic countries than in the southern European and the Accession countries.

Looking first at migrant disadvantage in the "old" migrant-receiving and Nordic countries, third-country migrant women’s unemployment rates are between 1.8 times and 3.2 times higher than those for native-born women; and non-EU migrant men’s unemployment rates are similarly between 1.6 times and 3.3 times higher than native-born men’s. For both men and women, the UK has the lowest and Belgium the highest ratio of migrant disadvantage. The unemployment migrant disadvantage is at least as great for men as for women in these two groups of countries. In particular, the unemployment rates of third-country migrant men in Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and the Netherlands all exceed those of native-born men by a factor of more than 3, and the same ratios are between 2.5 and 3 for men in Denmark and Sweden. While the heavy “humanitarian” entry-category
composition of migrants in the latter two countries has been cited as an explanation of their large migrant–native employment differences, this source is less able to explain the large migrant–native employment differences in Austria and the Benelux countries.

In the southern European countries, in contrast, neither women nor men experience a strong migrant disadvantage in unemployment. The ratio of migrant to native-born unemployment is in the range of 1.0 to 1.4 times the unemployment rates of native-born women or men in all three countries. Similarly to the “old” migrant-receiving and Nordic countries, where there is unemployment disadvantage, it is at least as likely to be felt among migrant men as among migrant women.

In the three Accession countries analyzed, migrants are seen to have lower unemployment rates than their native-born counterparts in more cases than they have higher unemployment rates. Only in the Czech Republic do migrant women have higher unemployment rates than native-born women, and only in Cyprus do migrant men have higher unemployment rates than native-born men.

Figure 3-4: Migrant disadvantage for third-country migrant women and men compared to that for EU-born migrant women and men, 2005

Source: Labour Force Survey

In Figure 3-4, we further explore the migrant disadvantage experienced by third-country women and men by comparing their unemployment with that of foreign-born women and men from inside the EU (“EU-migrant women and men”). Third-country migrant

---

disadvantage is again seen to be primarily a phenomenon of the “old” migrant-receiving and Nordic countries. Unemployment rates are largely similar between third-country and EU-born migrants in the newer migrant-receiving countries of southern Europe and the Accession countries.

In the “old” migrant-receiving and Nordic countries, third-country migrant women’s unemployment rates are around double those for EU-born migrant women. The major exception is Denmark, where third-country migrant women’s unemployment is only 1.2 times that for EU migrant women. Third-country migrant men in these countries experience at least as great an unemployment disadvantage relative to their native-born counterparts as do third-country migrant women. In particular, in Sweden, Belgium and Luxembourg, the ratios of third-country to EU-born men’s unemployment rates are around 3; while only for Sweden is the third-country female unemployment rate as much as three times as high as that for EU migrant women.

In contrast, in neither the group of “new” migrant-receiving countries of southern Europe nor the group of Accession countries is there a consistent unemployment advantage for EU-born migrants over third-country migrants. Viewing Figures 3-3 and 3-4 together for the “new” and Accession country groups, only in Spain is there a consistent migrant disadvantage – that is, higher third-country migrant unemployment than both native-born and EU-born for both women and men. Even for Spain, the ratio of unemployment rates, between third-country migrants and their native-born or EU-born counterparts, never exceeds 1.5. These are much lower ratios of migrant disadvantage than seen in the “old” migrant-receiving and Nordic countries.

3.3.3 Migrant and native-born women’s unemployment by family status

For a smaller group of the above countries, we are able to compare and contrast unemployment rates by women’s family status. Just as we did in Chapter 2 for labour-force participation rates, we compare women in three family statuses: youngest child under 5; youngest child aged 5 to 14; and no children under age 15 in the household (see Figures 3.5a and 3.5b). Five “old” and three “new” migrant-receiving countries are compared. As in the previous chapter, the analysis is restricted to those women who are either the household reference person or partner of the reference person. Native-born women with no co-resident children under 15 years old are again matched to have the same age distribution as third-country migrant women with no co-resident children under 15.
Children, especially when aged under 5, are associated with higher unemployment in their mothers. This is seen among both migrant and native-born women, and in both “old” and “new” migrant-receiving countries. Having a youngest child under 5 years old is in all cases associated with higher unemployment than for women with no children; and is, in most cases, associated with having higher unemployment than for women with a youngest child aged 5 to 14 years old. While this is a consistent pattern, the magnitudes of difference in unemployment rates by family status are relatively small. There is no unemployment-rate parallel, moreover, to the striking contrast observed in the previous chapter between the patterns of labour-force participation of migrant and native-born women with a youngest child under 5 years old versus those with a youngest child aged 5 to 14 years old.

The most striking contrast in unemployment rates is still that between migrant and native-born women in the “old” migrant-receiving countries. In each of the three family statuses, migrant women have far higher rates of unemployment than do native-born women. Belgium is still the extreme case: As many as 35% of migrant women with a child under 5 years of age are unemployed; as are 27% of women with a youngest child between 5 and 14 years old; and 20% of women without a child aged under 15. A similar gradient by family status is found for migrant women in France: Unemployment is 23% for women with a child under age 5; 20% for women with a youngest child between 5 and 14 years old; and 17% for women with no co-resident child aged under 15. In the other “old” migrant-receiving countries (UK, Austria and the Netherlands), unemployment rates are in the range of 7 to 13%.

Source: Labour Force Survey
For native-born women too (see Figure 3-5b), having a child aged under 5 is also associated with a higher unemployment rate: approximately 10% in France, Belgium, Spain, Greece and Portugal, though only around 5% in the UK, Austria and the Netherlands. All these unemployment rates are higher than the unemployment rates for native-born women with no co-resident children under 15, and are also mostly higher than the unemployment rates for native-born women with children aged 5 to 14 years old. The magnitudes of difference in the unemployment rates between native-born and migrant women are similar, however, between those with and without children. It is therefore difficult to conclude that age and family status are major factors explaining either: (1) the much higher unemployment of migrant women in the “old” migrant-receiving countries; or (2) the much lower unemployment differential between migrant and native-born women in the “new” migrant-receiving countries than in the “old” migrant-receiving countries. We show this quantitatively in Figure 3-6, where we compare the unemployment rates between migrant and native-born women, after matching native-born women to migrant women’s family statuses and, for women without children, their ages.
Matching the family statuses and ages of women with no co-resident children among native-born women to the distributions for migrant women hardly changes their unemployment rates at all. Migrant women in the “old” migrant-receiving countries continue to have unemployment rates that are between 2 and 3 times as high as native-born women, while migrant women in the “new” migrant-receiving countries have unemployment rates that are between 1 and 1.5 times as high only as those of native-born women.

3.3.4 Involuntary part-time employment and temporary-contract employment

In addition to difficulty in finding and keeping a job, migrant women may also experience greater difficulties than either native-born women or migrant men in securing a full-time job of unlimited duration. We separate these difficulties analytically into consideration of underemployment and temporary-contract employment. We identify underemployment through responses of women to the LFS question asked of part-time employment as to why they were employed part time. Those responding that were unable to find a full-time job are classified as underemployed, or involuntary part-time employed.

Part-time employment is much more common among women than men. In results not shown, the overall proportions in part-time employment (voluntary or involuntary) were found to differ little between migrant women and native-born women. In many cases, working less than full-time hours is by choice. However, our analyses of EU LFS data show that part-time employment taken because of unavailability of full-time employment is much more prevalent among migrant women than among native-born women. Part-time employment is more common among women in the “old” migrant-receiving and Nordic
countries, and women in those countries are more likely to be part-time employed by choice, as compared to in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving and Accession countries. This holds for both migrants and the native-born.

We bring these two offsetting differences together in Figure 3-7, where proportions of the third-country migrant and native-born female labour forces in involuntary part-time employment are compared for the three groups of countries (old, Nordic and new) for which EU LFS statistical reliability thresholds are met for all countries. A clear migrant disadvantage is seen here. In every country, the proportion of the migrant labour force involuntarily part-time employed exceeds the proportion of the native-born labour force involuntarily part-time employed. In France, Denmark, Sweden and Spain, more than 10% of the female migrant labour force is involuntarily part-time employed. In approximately half of the 11 countries shown, the proportion for migrant women is more than double the proportion for native-born women. In particular, for all three of the “new” migrant-receiving countries, approximately double the proportion of migrant women in the labour force than native-born women in the labour force are involuntarily part-time employed.

Figure 3-7: Involuntary part-time employed third-country migrant and native-born women, 2005

Conceptually, involuntary part-time employment shares with unemployment the property that the individual is unable to secure as many hours of employment as she or he desires. While the unemployed individual is unable to secure any hours, the involuntarily part-time employed individual is unable to secure full-time hours of employment. She or he is therefore appropriately described as “underemployed”. This type of underemployment is not only more common among migrant women than among native-born women, it is also more common among women than men. Involuntary part-time employment therefore adds to the “double disadvantage” of migrant women. This is seen in Figure 3-8, where we
sum both migrant women’s and migrant men’s proportions of their respective labour forces that are unemployed or underemployed, and compare these with native-born women’s proportions of unemployed or underemployed.

**Figure 3-8: Unemployed or underemployed third-country migrant women and men and native-born women in four country groups, 2005**

While too few migrant men are involuntarily part-time employed to show those results separately, we are able to show their combined unemployed or underemployed proportions for all 14 countries of the four country groups. A uniform pattern of ‘double disadvantage’ is seen for this combined measure except in the Accession countries. Excess unemployment or underemployment is generally greatest between migrant and native-born women in the ‘old’ migrant-receiving and Nordic countries, reflecting their excess unemployment previously seen plus a varying additional excess of underemployment. Excess unemployment or underemployment is also now seen between migrant and native-born women in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries, whereas this was not a clear pattern when unemployment only was compared (see again Figure 3-1b). Using the ‘unemployed or underemployed’ measure also shows migrant men to be more advantaged than native-born women. This makes for a stronger overall ‘double disadvantage’ conclusion for the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries than for the ‘old’ migrant-receiving and Nordic countries, in which migrant men’s proportions unemployed or underemployed exceed those of native-born women. Finally, the picture is again more mixed among the Accession countries, with only the Czech Republic illustrating a clear migrant women’s disadvantage over both native-born women and migrant men.
Whereas part-time employment is more prevalent among the ‘old’ migrant-receiving and Nordic countries, temporary-contract employment is generally more common in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries, though it is also quite common in the Nordic countries\(^{106}\). When migrant status is taken into account, temporary-contract employment is seen to be a further source of disadvantage. While only about half of all temporary-contract employment is involuntary, we combine all forms of temporary-contract employment in order to achieve statistically reliable estimates for both migrant women and migrant men in all four country groupings (see Figure 3-9). Both full-time and part-time employment are included here.

**Figure 3-9: Temporary employment contracts, third-country migrant women, third-country migrant men and native-born women, 2005**

![Figure 3-9: Temporary employment contracts, third-country migrant women, third-country migrant men and native-born women, 2005](image)

Source: Labour Force Survey

The highest proportions of temporary-employment contracts are seen in the ‘new’ migrant-receiving countries of southern Europe, and in the southern European country (Cyprus) of the Accession group. Migrant women’s disadvantage, however, is generally limited to the migrant dimension. Regarding the gender dimension, very similar proportions of migrant women and migrant men are in temporary-contract employment in most of the countries analysed.

In both Spain and Cyprus more than half of all employed migrant women have temporary contracts. The next highest are in Sweden, Portugal, Greece and the Czech Republic, with between 24 and 29% of employed migrant women having temporary contracts. In contrast, only in Spain and Portugal do more than 20% of employed native-born women

---

have temporary contracts. One caveat, however, is that we have not controlled for age differences between migrant and native-born women. Temporary contracts are much more common among younger employees\(^{107}\), and we saw in the previous chapter that migrant women are younger on average than native-born women, and are especially young in the two countries, Cyprus and Spain, seen to have the highest proportions in temporary-contract employment. Further analysis controlling for differences in age composition between migrants and native-born women would be useful here.

### 3.4 Discussion

The first conclusion from the comparisons above are that there is, above all, a large unemployment disadvantage for third-country migrant women living in the traditional migrant-receiving countries of the EU. These women’s large disadvantage too, when compared to EU-migrant women, suggests that their migrant status (that is, having been born outside the receiving country) is not the only important determinant of their disadvantage. Instead, it is likely to be a combination of their individual characteristics and their interaction with the receiving country environment. Further empirical work to apportion the overall unemployment disadvantage between the various individual and societal factors, and empirical and policy analysis to understand what are these societal factors, are therefore important next steps. The present analysis, however, indicated that one major factor, that of women’s parenting status, is unlikely to explain much of their migrant disadvantage.

A second conclusion from the empirical analyses of the present chapter is that underemployment and temporary employment are additional, important sources of migrant women’s labour market disadvantage. Taking these into account is especially important for evaluating migrant women’s disadvantage in the “new” migrant-receiving countries of southern Europe. Both involuntary part-time employment and temporary-contract employment are especially common in those countries, and are uniformly more common among migrant women than among native-born women in those countries. This is an important addition to the comparisons of migrant versus native-born women’s labour-force participation and unemployment, neither of which alone revealed clear patterns of disadvantage for migrant women.

\(^{107}\) Hardarson (2007) ibid.
CHAPTER 4  Distribution of female migrant labour across occupations in the EU

4.1 Introduction

Chapters 2 and 3 examine the situation of third-country (non-EU) migrant women workers in the EU labour force, focusing particularly on labour participation and on unemployment; and comparing the outcomes for them with those for EU-born migrant women, native women and migrant men. In this chapter, we examine the distribution of employed third-country migrant women across occupation groups in the EU labour force. Occupational distribution data show the type of jobs in which particular groups of workers are employed, and also the degree of concentration of each group in the various areas of employment. The specific situation of skilled migrant women, however, is considered in Chapter 5.

The chapter opens with a theoretical discussion of the occupational concentration and segmentation, by gender, in the labour force. Based on a review of relevant literature, the chapter then identifies the specific occupations that have the highest concentrations of third-country migrant women. Finally, the chapter examines EU LFS data on occupational concentrations of third-country migrants. This distribution is then compared to that of EU-born migrants, native-born women and migrant men.

- Migrant and native-born men and women tend to work in different sectors of employment, displaying high levels of occupational segregation by gender
- Women are more highly concentrated in fewer types of jobs than men, whose employment tends to be more widely dispersed across the labour market
- Migrant and native women tend to be employed in similar kinds of jobs, although migrant women, especially those from outside the EU, are more highly concentrated in low skill jobs, with concurrently low income and low status, and which provide limited opportunities for human capital development.
4.2 **Theories of occupational concentration by gender**

Occupational segregation and concentration have been researched widely in connection with both gender and racial/ethnic inequalities in the labour force. This research encompasses a vast literature, a comprehensive discussion of which is outside the remit of this report. However, it will be useful to elaborate briefly on a few of the broad understandings of gendered labour relevant to the specific phenomena under discussion.

The concept of segregation in the labour market is usually used to refer to “the tendency for men and women to be employed in different occupations from each other”. Concentration refers to the tendency of different groups in the labour force to be represented in higher proportions than others in certain types of occupations or sectors of employment.

Occupational segregation has persisted in most industrialised nations to varying degrees in spite of the introduction of race and gender anti-discrimination legislation in Europe, North America and other developed regions. Researchers have long argued that occupational segregation is a labour market imperfection which reflects discrimination and inequality in the labour market. Occupational segregation has also been highlighted as the main source of sex and racial or ethnic differentials in earnings and of certain groups’ (women, black and ethnic minorities’) disadvantaged position in the labour force.

Gender segregation of labour markets exists all over the world, and competing theories have attempted to explain their persistence. Neo-classical or human capital theories focus on supply-side factors, such as differences in aptitudes and qualifications, and preferences of individual workers; or demand-side factors, such as employment preferences determined by rational economic decision-making.

Labour market segmentation theories, however, assume that labour markets are segmented, and argue that while individuals and institutions within these segments act as economically rational actors, it is difficult for workers to move from one sector to another. Labour market segmentation theories divide the labour market into different sectors, for example a “primary” sector with jobs of higher pay, opportunities for promotion and working conditions, and a “secondary” sector with jobs of lower wages, few opportunities for promotion, and worse working conditions. While useful in that they highlight and often describe the existence of segregated labour markets, these theories fail to explain why labour markets are segregated by sex, in particular given evidence that women’s outcomes are often worse than men’s even when their human capital endowment is comparable.

Theories that start from questions about the significance of gender in social and economic life highlight the impact of non-labour market variables on occupational segmentation by gender. Such theories tend to focus on the influences of discrimination, socio-cultural

---


109 Hakim, *Social change and innovation in the labour market*, Oxford University Press, UK.


norms, and perceptions about the different roles of men and women in society on occupational segregation by gender.\textsuperscript{112}

These three perspectives, and the numerous theories developed within them, highlight important, and complementary, aspects of the gender segregation in labour markets and thus provide a useful framework for the analysis of the occupational segmentation of migrant women in Europe.\textsuperscript{113}

While there is longstanding and ongoing academic and policy interest in gender segregation, interest in the specific challenges faced by women migrants in a gendered and segmented labour force is more recent. To inform growing interest and concern around this issue, this chapter examines the distribution of migrant women across sectors of employment.

4.3 Sectors of employment of migrant women workers

Studies of worldwide migration have shown that the majority of migrant women workers are employed in the services sector (e.g., catering, domestic, and healthcare occupations). In some regions, women migrants are also found in the manufacturing sector. Relatively few migrant women work in the agricultural sector.\textsuperscript{114} Within the services sector, demand for female migrant labour is increasing in low-skilled jobs such as domestic work – including cleaning and childcare, hotel cleaners and waitresses – as well as in skilled occupations such as nurses and other healthcare workers.\textsuperscript{115}

This section describes the main sectors of employment for migrant women workers identified by research in the field, reviewed for this study.

4.3.1 Domestic and care work

The demand for women migrant workers in low-skilled occupations, particularly domestic service, is often “high and sustained since they represent a form of ‘replacement mobility’ for female nationals who are freed from household and care responsibilities to take up

\textsuperscript{112} Anker, “Theories of occupational segregation by sex”, International Labour Review 136:3, pp. 315-339.

\textsuperscript{113} More nuanced debates within the gender and work literature attempt to unpick the relationship between gender, caring and disadvantage/devaluing of work. This is interesting because of the suggestion, increasingly borne out by the research, that poor pay and conditions are not so much influenced by being female as by participating in occupations that are predominantly female. This builds on an established and well evidenced argument that there are demonstrable tipping effects whereby when enough women got in to a career/profession/occupational sector it tended to become devalued – for example the move from clerks to secretaries

\textsuperscript{114} Moreno-Fontes Chammartin, “Female migrant workers in an era of globalization”, in Female migrants: bridging the gaps throughout the life cycle, International Migration Programme, International Labour Organization, Geneva.

\textsuperscript{115} Moreno-Fontes Chammartin, “Female migrant workers in an era of globalization”, in Female migrants: bridging the gaps throughout the life cycle, International Migration Programme, International Labour Organization, Geneva.
other positions in the labour market”. Throughout Europe, statistics show that the demand for domestic workers has increased significantly over the last two decades. A study from the UK, for example, showed that the amount spent on domestic workers had gone from £1.1 billion in 1987 to £4.3 billion in 1997. This was a period in which the labour force participation of women in the UK increased significantly, from about 65% in the early 1980s to over 75% by 2001.

A number of Asian countries provide temporary workers’ visas to women for employment as domestic workers. This is not common in Europe, where migrant women in domestic work tend to be undocumented. Nonetheless, a few EU Member States, such as Spain and Italy, have regularised a significant number of undocumented women migrants employed as domestic workers.

In Italy, for example, a large number of women migrants are in a more “regular” situation (i.e. legally have the right to work) than men migrants since domestic labour, where the majority of migrant women are employed, is considered an area of labour shortage. The work permits issued to these workers, however, tend to be temporary and do not allow the migrant women to bring in family members, not even their children, from their countries of origin. Many of these workers do not qualify for the family reunification programmes to bring spouses and children because, given their employment as domestic workers, they are unable to accumulate the necessary income and gain access to adequate housing which are requirements to qualify for family reunification.

4.3.2 Nursing and health care

In the last few years, the number of nurses and other health professionals migrating for work has increased significantly. Public Services International, a federation of over 500 public sector trade unions from 140 countries, registered dramatic growth in the numbers


120 Even when immigrants’s status is regularised, domestic work itself is often irregular, ie no taxes are paid. Thus they are not illegal but just not registered as workers. That has consequences for insurance, social security and pensions, for example. In Belgium there is a scheme – not specifically for migrants – whereby registration is supported through a very low tax rate and subsidies. This provides significant additional security in occupations where traditionally many female migrants work, including domestic work.


of nurses from third-countries employed in the UK (as well as in Canada and the United States). This organization revealed that nearly half of all nurses employed in the UK in 2001–2 came from third-countries, particularly Philippines, India and South Africa. 

In addition, in the context of population ageing and other factors such as the restructuring of the healthcare sectors, national healthcare provision in some European countries is undergoing a shortage of nurses and other healthcare workers. For example, the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) was experiencing an estimated shortfall of over 20,000 nurses in 2004. The UK is not alone in this nursing shortage: according to national statistics, Germany and the Netherlands are each 13,000 nurses short. In France, 18,000 nurses leave the public sector every year. This shortage and attrition of native-born nurses does not seem likely to end any time soon, and while this carries on, it will continue to provide employment opportunities for women migrant workers in Europe.

In spite of the fact that nurses and other qualified health professionals are considered “skilled” workers, it is worth noting that they are still likely to be poor in their countries of origin, and to earn lower wages than other qualified migrants in their countries of destination. In addition, due to gender discrimination and socio-cultural power differentials in their countries of destination, women migrant workers in the health and other professions are more likely than men to be the victims of violence, exploitation and abuse.

4.3.3 The catering and hotel industry

The hotel and catering industry is a significant employer of both migrant men and women workers. An OECD report states that the hotel and catering sector is one of the biggest employers of migrants, including large numbers of undocumented ones. Spain, for example, employs the largest proportion of workers in the tourism sector in the EU. About 14.5% of employees in the hotel and restaurant industry are non-nationals. Of these foreign workers, 52% are women.

---


While some migrant workers in these industries have legal right of abode and employment, a significant number do not. For example, research suggests that there are large numbers of undocumented Chinese immigrants working in Chinese restaurants across Europe, and of Latin Americans employed in hotels and restaurants in southern Europe. While it is clear that undocumented migrants in this sector are subject to worse working conditions than their native-born counterparts, even with regular employment working conditions for migrants tend to be worse, for example due to “short-term contracts without possibility of renewal, low wages, low working hours, and low-skilled and physically demanding jobs.”

4.3.4 Self-employment and employment in ethnic enclaves

The concepts of “ethnic enclaves” or “ethnic economies” typically refer to “a geographical cluster of ethnic firms with vertical integration of co-ethnic manufacturers, and consumers”. These enclaves, studied by researchers both in the United States and in Europe, were often seen by researchers as environments which provided a path of upward mobility for immigrants. The social networks created in these enclaves were key to enabling newly arrived immigrants to eventually start businesses of their own.

More recent research into ethnic economies, however, has revealed that extensive use of unpaid labour, often provided by women, has been one of the key factors enabling many such economies’ businesses to survive. Since the mid-1990s, researchers have paid increasing attention to the gendered aspect of the labour structures of ethnic enclaves. Studies in Chinese, Colombian and Turkish enclaves in the US and Europe have shown that enclave labour provides women with lower wages and fewer opportunities for advancement than it does men. In addition, benefits are minimal and working conditions tend to be difficult.

There is very limited data on self-employment among migrant women in Europe, but existing research suggests that they are “a tiny minority compared to the population of salaried women, and that there is a strong heterogeneity among them.”

---


134 Hillman, A look at the ‘hidden side’: Turkish women in Berlin’s ethnic labour market, Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Page 2.


Migration, sex work and human trafficking

Introduction

Over the last few years, governments and international organizations have become increasingly concerned about the problems of migrant women’s involvement in sex work and trafficking for sexual exploitation. The problem is relevant in a discussion on migrant women in the European labour force because many migrant women are trafficked and/or voluntary sex workers and are therefore subject to some of the same or additional challenges that other migrant workers face. Further, it is clear that policy levers discussed in the report and elsewhere for dealing with the challenges of migrants and migrant women do not necessarily reach migrant and trafficked sex workers. Despite growing concern, a key challenge in understanding the phenomenon is the lack of reliable data and statistics. This poses a serious obstacle for the development of evidence-based strategies and policies to combat trafficking and to address the specific issues arising from migrant women’s participation in the sex industry in Europe.

This section aims to highlight some of the key challenges in developing policy to address these issues. The section opens with a brief overview of human trafficking and women migrants’ involvement in sex work. This is followed by a snapshot of some existing policy approaches, including the intersection of policy levers to tackle the perceived challenges of sex work, trafficking and migration. Ultimately, this discussion focuses on the interconnectedness of these three areas for policy and, in turn, their relevance to discussions around the integration of migrant women in the European labour force.

Background

The United Nations estimates that each year between 300,000 and 600,000 women are illegally brought into Europe alone, and about 80% of them are involved in sex work. Observations drawn from IOM’s global dataset suggest that more than 81% of trafficked victims are women, of whom 74% are 25 years or younger. These estimates do not account for the numbers of immigrant women engaged in sex work voluntarily, which is likely to be significant; for example, one study estimates that of approximately 25,000 sex workers in the Netherlands, about 50% are third-country immigrants. In Italy, it has been....

---


139 http://www.un.org/WCAR/e-kit/migration.htm


suggested that between 19,000 and 25,000 immigrant women work as prostitutes, only about 2,000 of whom are victims of trafficking.\textsuperscript{142}

Research on migrant women involved in sex work has tended to conflate “trafficking” with “prostitution”, blurring the distinction between those who engage in sex work willingly and those who are commercially exploited sexually and subjected to forced sex work.\textsuperscript{143} This is compounded by confusion regarding the distinctions between trafficking, smuggling and migration, and the lack of consensus on how to define trafficking.\textsuperscript{144} Some research, however, suggests that for many migrant women, work in the sex industry is a choice made on the basis of expected financial gains and other opportunities.\textsuperscript{145} Most likely, the trajectory of many migrant women in the sex industry includes some elements of both coercion and choice. Nonetheless, there is agreement on the drivers of trafficking and sex work amongst migrants which are primarily seen as poverty; gender and race inequalities; the globalization of labour and services markets; low barriers to transport and travel; social and economic turmoil as a result of war and conflict; and, significantly, demand from the organisers and users of the sex trade.\textsuperscript{146}

Traditionally, sex trafficking flows to Western European nations were primarily from Northern and Central African, Latin American and Asian developing countries. However, from the 1990s, an increase in sex trafficking has been observed from eastern and south-eastern Europe, with Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova being key suppliers of sex workers.\textsuperscript{147}

Trafficking for sexual exploitation has numerous negative implications, for the individual and public health, human rights, crime and justice, social cohesion, and gender equality. For example, in their destination countries, migrant and trafficked sex workers are exposed and expose their clients to risks to their physical health. Migrant and trafficked sex workers are additionally exposed to risks to mental health and welfare, in addition to the risk of arrest and deportation since in many receiving countries their work is illegal and their

\textsuperscript{142} Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (accessed January 2008: http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/italy.htm)


immigrant status is often irregular as well. Moreover, unlike the case of migrant sex workers who are not subject to commercial exploitation, trafficking for sexual and other labour re-directs the economic and social benefits of migration from the individual migrant and their family to the traffickers and trade organisers.

Migration, sex work and human trafficking: challenges for policy

In spite of the limitations of available data, a number of policies and legal instruments have been developed in the field, in particular dealing with trafficking of women for sexual exploitation. The actions of the EU have focused on the development of punitive measures against migrant sex workers and those organising and managing the sex trade; measures have focused on law enforcement, and the identification, protection and eventual deportation of victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation, although the effectiveness of these interventions in reducing the harms from sex work and the incidence of human trafficking is yet to be evaluated.

Policies addressing the prevalence of voluntary sex work amongst immigrants have not received as much attention but this phenomenon also presents important challenges. There is a range of policy approaches that have been implemented in European countries to deal with voluntary sex work, many of which appear to converge on the aim of eradicating it; these are called abolitionist measures. While not advocating sex work or the sex industry, a few states have implemented other types of policies to regulate and mitigate harms from sex work, acknowledging that the sex industry will persist. For example, despite public disapproval of prostitution, the Netherlands decriminalised voluntary sex work in 1999, when agencies including the police, local authorities and health and social services stepped up their collaborative work towards harm minimization in the sex industry. However, while workers with valid residence permits have benefited in terms of access to health, safety and other rights, it is possible that the policy could have unintended consequences for immigrant workers in the sex industry who are not eligible for regular employment, needing to “move underground and become effectively invisible to the authorities.” In another example, in 1999 Sweden criminalised the purchase of sex work but not its sale.

---


but observers have argued that a key unintended consequence of this policy is that it drives sex work underground and leads to a reorganization of the sex industry, rather than its decline.154

In the same way that measures to tackle prostitution do not effectively address the specific challenges associated with migrant women involved in sex work, policies aimed at improving conditions and the integration of migrants can fail to address the needs of immigrant sex workers. For example, in countries such as Spain where regularization programmes for irregular migrant workers were conducted, those working in the sex services sector were excluded; they did not qualify for regularization because they are not in lawful employment, which is a condition of eligibility.

Attention to the multifaceted challenges of women’s migration, work in the sex industry and human trafficking would have benefits in terms of improving conditions for migrant workers and integrating them into the labour force in their receiving countries. There are currently distinct, at times conflicting, policies to address the challenges associated with trafficking, sex work and migration. This is particularly important because, as analysts have observed, “policies designed to control and restrict immigration can actually fuel markets for ‘trafficking’ and ‘smuggling’ and contribute to the creation of irregular migrants (‘trafficked’, ‘smuggled’ or otherwise) as a pool of cheap and unprotected labour”.155 Further, attempting to restrict or eradicate sex work (through focusing on sex workers) has historically been confounded by the persistence of markets for underground “invisible” sex workers. The sex industry continues to absorb some of this “cheap and unprotected labour”, in a poorly regulated, partially criminalised market in which the incidence of abusive practices persists.156 The gravity of some of the perverse and sometimes “unintended” consequences of policies attempting to address the challenges of human trafficking, sex work and immigration goes to underscore the need for more integrated and coherent consideration of what the aims of policy are and should be, what the impacts of existing policies have been, and lead to informed and strategic thinking about how best to achieve agreed objectives.

4.4 Migrant women’s occupational distribution: the EU situation

In analysing the occupational distribution of migrant women in the EU, it is necessary to have a comparison group in order to assess if migrant women’s concentration by occupation is unusual. Here, the two comparison groups are native-born women and migrant men. Analysis of data from the European Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) for 2005 provides an overview of the occupational distribution of migrant women in the labour


force in the 15 countries\textsuperscript{157} for which migrants can be identified, and allows for a comparison of their distribution with those of native-born women and migrant men, as shown in Figure 4-1. The Figure indicates the occupation sectors with the highest concentration of individuals for each of the four groups.

**Figure 4-1: Occupational concentration of native-born women, migrant women, native-born men and migrant men in 14 EU countries, 2005\textsuperscript{158}**

---

\textsuperscript{157} These 14 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom.

\textsuperscript{158} The ‘total’ in each box denotes the aggregate percentage of the group (migrant women, native-born women, migrant men and native-born men) employed in the occupation sectors with the highest concentration of workers.
The occupational sectors identified through the LFS data are wide categories that encompass large numbers of jobs. The occupational sectors with the highest concentration of migrant women include the following types of jobs:

- **Personal and protective service workers:** housekeeping and restaurant service workers; personal care and related workers, eg childcare; and other personal service workers such as hairdressers, beauticians and valets.

- **Sales and services elementary occupations:** street vendors, door-to-door and telephone salespersons; shoe-cleaning and other street service elementary occupations; domestic and related helpers, cleaners and launderers, building caretakers and window cleaners; messengers and doorkeepers; and garbage collectors and related labourers.

- **Office clerks:** secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks; library and mail clerks – eg filing personnel; material-recording and transport clerks, eg stock clerks; and numerical clerks, eg book-keeping clerks.

- **Other associate professionals:** finance and sales associate professionals, eg estate agents and insurance representatives; business services agents and trade brokers, eg employment agents and trade brokers; administrative associate professionals, eg administrative secretaries; and customs, tax and related government associate professions, eg customs and borders inspectors.

Source: Labour Force Survey

Note: The proportion employed in other occupational sectors is not shown.
• Models, salespersons and demonstrators: fashion and other models; and shop, stall and market salespersons and demonstrators.

Three key findings emerge from the data presented in Figure 4-1 above. First, the data confirm a high degree of occupational segmentation by gender for migrants across the EU; that is, migrant men and women tend to work in different occupational sectors, doing different types of jobs. While most native-born and migrant women are concentrated in the service sectors of the economy (working as sales assistants, secretaries, domestic workers and so forth), migrant men tend to concentrate in industry and agriculture. The data also provides evidence of gender segmentation across the whole EU labour market, and not just among migrants; men and women, both native-born and migrant, are employed in distinct occupational sectors of the economy.

Second, the data show that migrant women are more highly concentrated in a few occupational sectors than are migrant men and native-born women. That is, a larger proportion of migrant women are employed in a few occupational sectors than the proportion of native-born women or migrant men concentrated in the same number of occupational sectors. Of the three groups, migrant men appear to have the lowest level of occupational concentration in particular sectors of the economy. It is worth noting, however, that while migrant women are more concentrated in a few occupational sectors than native-born women, native-born women experience more occupational concentration than native-born men (56% of native-born women are concentrated in five sectors of employment whereas only 40% of men are concentrated in the same number of sectors).

Third, the data indicate that over half of native-born women and nearly two-thirds of migrant women are not only concentrated in a few sectors of the economy, but these sectors are in the lowest skilled segments, which typically entail low status, low pay, and limited rights and scope for mobility within the labour market. Some of these sectors, like the sales and services elementary occupations, and personal and protective services, are typically sectors which demand “unskilled, rudimentary, menial, repetitive, interchangeable, and substitutable or expendable labour”.159 Within these low-skilled sectors, additional years of experience do not have a significant impact on earnings, earning profiles are relatively flat, and there is high instability and turnover.160 The limited scope for human capital development in these sectors and the few opportunities for career progression restrict workers’ opportunities to move up in the career hierarchy into more competitive sectors and jobs.

The pattern of female employment across occupations in the 14 Member States analyzed is broadly similar for native-born and migrant women; that is, they are generally over-represented in the same occupational sectors. The five sectors of employment with the highest concentration of female workers are the same for both categories. There are, however, two key differences. First, migrant women’s occupations seem to be even more highly concentrated in a small number of sectors than that of native-born women. Whereas


160 Ibid.
the top five sectors of employment for the former concentrates 63% of all women migrants, the proportion of native-born women working in these sectors is 56% This shows a greater diversity of areas of employment for native-born women than for migrant women. 

Second, within the top five highest-concentration occupation groups, the largest proportion of migrant women is concentrated in the sales and services elementary occupations (over 23%), which typically entails jobs requiring the lowest levels of skills, whereas the sector concentrating the largest proportion of native-born women workers is that of office clerks (just over 15%), which can be considered a medium-skill occupational sector. Personal and protective services, a low-skilled occupational sector, is the second highest employer of both native-born and migrant women (12.5% and 16.7% respectively).

The LFS data show a number of interesting patterns of occupational distribution of migrant women across the 14 Member States. For example, only in Ireland, Denmark and Belgium do the top five sectors of occupation for migrant women include the life sciences and health professions (which include nursing, midwifery, doctors, dentists, veterinarians, biologists and others). In these countries, 8.6% and 7.4% of migrant women respectively are employed in this sector, although their distribution across the different sub-categories is not revealed in the LFS data. Even though nurse migration to the UK has been a focus of much research, this sector is not among those with the highest concentrations of women migrants. This finding is interesting in view of the significant emphasis on nurse migration in the research and debate about migrant women workers.

4.5 EU-born versus third-country migrant women

The analysis presented above illustrates how migrant women face a “double disadvantage” in the labour market. Their concentration in the lowest skilled sectors limits their rights as workers, their mobility in the labour market, their opportunities for career progression, and their chances for human capital development.

It is noteworthy, however, that not all migrant women face the same level of disadvantage regarding occupational distribution. Disaggregating the category of “migrant women” into the two sub-groups, EU-born and third-country migrant women, reveals that the latter group are even more highly concentrated in a few low-skilled occupational sectors than EU-born migrant women. Figure 4-2 illustrates this point.161

161 Data on EU-born versus third-country migrant women were obtained for only 13 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, United Kingdom, France, Greece, Hungary, Sweden, Luxembourg and Portugal. There is no data to disaggregate EU-born versus third-country migrants for Italy and Ireland. Only a single category of ‘migrant’ is identifiable in data from these two countries, which is why they were excluded from the analysis for Figure 4.1.
Within this distribution, the figure indicates that third-country migrant women are more highly concentrated than EU-born migrant women in the two lowest skilled occupation sectors (sales and services elementary occupations, and personal and protective services). Even though EU-born migrants experience a higher degree of occupational concentration than native-born women, they remain in a more advantageous position than third-country migrant women in relation to their distribution across sectors of the economy.

4.6 Discussion

This chapter has considered the distribution of migrant women across occupational sectors in the EU, comparing their situation with the distribution of migrant men and native-born women.

The literature on the occupational distribution of migrant women in Europe is extensive. In this literature there is broad consensus that migrant women are highly concentrated in a few sectors, and that these sectors tend to be in the lowest skilled segments of the economy. In particular, migrant women have been found to be highly concentrated in the domestic, catering and hotel, and healthcare sectors.

Our own analysis of the LFS data broadly affirms findings from the literature. While the sectors of occupation identified through the LFS do not allow for a higher level of detail into the actual jobs that migrant women hold, the data provides clear evidence of the
occupational concentration of migrant women in low-skilled sectors, including those encompassing domestic, catering, hotel and healthcare employment. The review of literature complements this analysis by providing a more qualitative overview of migrant women’s occupational concentrations and distribution.

While our analysis of the LFS data confirms that migrant women face a “double disadvantage” vis-à-vis migrant men and native-born women in relation to occupational distribution (in view of the former’s higher concentration in a small number of low-skilled occupations), the data also indicates that third-country migrant women fare even worse than EU-born migrant women. That is, they are even more highly concentrated in the lowest skilled sectors of the economy, which is an indicator of what can be termed the “triple disadvantage” of third-country migrant women. As mentioned earlier, low-skilled sectors of employment typically entail limited opportunities for upward mobility, restricted rights, lower wages, and instability. The high levels of concentration of migrant women, especially from outside the EU, in these sectors indicate that their integration into the EU labour force is at best fractional; they have jobs but lack many of the rights and opportunities that full integration entails. This situation highlights the fact that even when migrant women are actually employed, the quality of their employment tends to be poor, exposing them to social and economic vulnerability.

While causality is difficult to establish, two main interpretations are typically offered to explain differences in occupational distribution and concentration, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Alternatively, it is sometimes argued that concentration in low-skilled occupations reflects underlying differences in human capital; in the context of this research this would mean that migrant women’s skill and education levels are lower than those of native-born women or migrant men. This hypothesis, however, does not appear to explain all the differences in the occupational concentration of the three groups. As we shall see in the next chapter, a significant proportion of migrant women with medium- and high-education levels are employed in sectors for which they are over-qualified. Nevertheless, the influence of other human capital endowment factors, such as language skills and resourcefulness in a foreign labour market, remain outside the scope of this research and therefore empirically untested.

The other commonly used hypothesis to explain differences in occupational distribution is that these arise from ethnic, racial and/or gender discrimination in the labour market. This hypothesis is even harder to test empirically. Research has found, however, that labour-market discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, nationality, race, and gender, often results in occupational and earnings differences even when workers have the same skills. Migrant women, especially those born outside the EU, may face discrimination along many of these lines simultaneously, placing them at an even greater disadvantage in the labour market than native-born women or migrant men.

163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
It is likely that the high concentration of migrant women, especially from outside the EU, in the lowest skilled sectors of the economy is a result of human capital issues (lack of language proficiency, unfamiliarity with the labour market of the receiving country), and systemic barriers that may not necessarily be overtly or intentionally discriminatory but whose end result is disadvantage. A more finelygrained understanding of the reasons for occupational distribution is required in order to inform policy and decision-making to improve the integration and opportunities of migrant women in the EU labour force.
5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we examine in closer detail the situation of one particular sub-group of third-country migrant women: those who are categorised as skilled or highly skilled (in this report we also refer to skilled and highly skilled workers as high education workers; more on this below). One reason for doing so is that considering the position of relatively skilled workers provides some traction on questions about labour market integration. Low-skilled workers may be expected to be working in less prestigious, more insecure, less well-remunerated or low status jobs. However, investigating whether or not there is a gap between the skill levels and employment attainment of workers is one way of assessing the ability of those workers to integrate into the labour market; and of revealing the extent to which the labour market may be “stacked” against them.

The chapter begins with a synthesis of current debates on skilled migration, paying particular attention to existing literature on skilled migrant women. It then examines whether, and to what extent, the labour market performance of migrant women differs from that of native-born women at three different levels of education – low, medium and high. The chapter then provides an overview of the situation of skilled third-country migrant women in the EU labour force: comparing participation, employment and unemployment rates of skilled third-country migrant women, EU-born migrant women, native-born women and, in some instances, migrant men.
5.2 **Situating skilled and highly-skilled migration**

The transnational movement of skilled men and women in the last few decades of the 20th century has been associated with a shift towards post-industrial, knowledge-based economies in the developed world.\(^{165}\) Immigration of skilled, and particularly of highly-skilled, workers has in recent years become an important element in the economic development and innovation policies of industrialised nations. This is because some of the skills necessary to improve competitiveness and growth in the global economy are so specialised and in such short supply that they need to be sourced globally.\(^{166}\)

One of the key issues in discussing migration of skilled workers is how to define “skilled”. Although there is no universally agreed definition, researchers and experts have traditionally treated all migrants with a tertiary education as skilled, although a distinction is made between “skilled” and “highly skilled” migrants. The former includes nurses and teachers, whereas the latter includes doctors, scientists and IT experts.\(^{167}\) This has important implications for the analysis of the gendered aspects of skilled migration, as migrant women with post-secondary education and qualifications tend to be concentrated in the “skilled” rather than “highly skilled” sector of the labour force. Throughout this chapter we adopt these definitions; “low, medium and highly skilled” are considered equivalents to “low, medium and high education” and are used interchangeably.\(^{168}\)

Female foreign labour employed at the highly-skilled level represents only a minority, though numbers of migrant women employed at the highly skilled level have been increasing over recent decades. They are normally employees of transnational companies or international institutions in IT-related occupations or in other highly specialised professions such as medicine, academia and finance. Nevertheless, worldwide, a smaller proportion of women are recorded as high-skilled migrants than men.\(^{169}\) For example, in 2004, only 12% of all “green card” permits awarded by Germany to foreign workers in the science and technology sector were for women migrants (although it is unclear if this is representative of the number of applications Germany received from women for IT Green Cards).

---


\(^{168}\) It is worth noting, however, that existing research suggests that skills and education are not necessarily equivalent; for example, two people with identical education may have different skills, which account for some of the variation in the labour market outcomes of people with the same qualifications (see, for example: Allen, J. and van der Velden, R. (2001) Educational mismatches versus skill mismatches: effects on wages, job satisfaction and on-the-job search, *Oxford Economic Papers* 3:434-452; also: Chevalier, A. (2003) Measuring over-education: *Economica* 70:3).


\(^{170}\) It is difficult to establish, however, whether the proportion of female skilled migrants relative to male is representative of the proportion of women with tertiary degrees relative to men, which varies widely from country to country, particularly in the developing world.
The preponderance of men in the ranks of highly-skilled migrants is in part a reflection of the fact that the immigration policies of developed nations tend to favour medical, upper-level management, engineering, information technology and physical research skills. Given continuing disparities in the proportion of men and women who go into these careers, individuals with the relevant skills are still more likely to be men than women.171

Nonetheless, the proportion of women migrants who hold a tertiary degree is, in many regions, almost on a par with that of immigrant men. An OECD study reports that the share of immigrant women holding a tertiary degree is, on average, 3 percentage points lower than the share of immigrant men with an equal level of qualifications.172 It is likely that the lower labour force participation rate of skilled migrant women relative to skilled native-born women and skilled migrant men is attributable to problems in the recognition of foreign degrees, as well as factors such as country-of-origin attitudes regarding women’s employment, language barriers, and immigrants’ limited access to public sector jobs. The latter in particular affects women more significantly than men, because the professions in which women tend to be concentrated are those which are predominantly regulated by the public sector.173

While the analysis of skilled migration has provided important insights into its impacts, both for the sending and receiving countries, the gendered aspects of skilled migration have been largely neglected until recently.174 In studies of the new global economy, elite men with careers in finance, science, management and technology dominate the global flows of human capital, and the focus on women is on their domestic and care roles as the wives of these skilled migrants.175 With the exception of research on nurse migration, these studies tend to overlook the skilled women who, due to rising levels of education and qualifications, are also increasingly involved in the global flow of skilled human capital as professionals rather than as providers of unpaid labour, such as child-caring and house cleaning within their own homes.176

5.2.1 The “brain drain”
Debates about skilled migration are inextricably linked to the notion of the “brain drain”. The concept of the brain drain refers to the permanent or long-term international emigration of skilled people from their country of origin. Much literature and analysis are concerned with the loss of human capital that the “brain drain” entails for countries of

emigration, particularly those in the developing world where these resources are limited.\textsuperscript{177} \textsuperscript{178} The expression was first coined by the (UK’s) Royal Society in the 1950s and 1960s to describe the outflow of scientists and other highly qualified professionals to the United States and Canada. In the following decades, however, the “brain drain” came to signify a South–North phenomenon of movement of skilled migrants.\textsuperscript{179}

The recruitment of qualified workers from third-countries has important implications for the migrants' country of origin. While these countries may benefit from increased remittances from the migrant workers, the out-migration of qualified nurses and other workers contributes to the “brain drain” in developing countries. Three main issues have been the focus of analysis regarding the “brain drain” phenomena:\textsuperscript{180}

1. the loss of productive skilled labour from countries where it is, or could potentially be, useful; and the extent to which countries invest in training citizens who will then use their skills elsewhere, leading to a loss of investment
2. the extent to which such losses are compensated by the return migration of individuals with superior skills or by flows of remittances
3. the manner in which skilled migrants are under-utilised in their countries of destination – such that migration results in skill loss (brain waste) rather than a skill gain.

In spite of a paucity of reliable data on the extent of skilled and highly skilled migration, some studies show that the numbers of skilled migrants is significant in some countries, relative to the total population. For example, it has been estimated that up to 60\% of all Ghanaian doctors trained in the country in the 1980s have left the country. In Sudan, 17\% of doctors and dentists, 30\% of engineers and 20\% of university lecturers left the country to work abroad in 1978.\textsuperscript{181} Some small-island economies, such as Grenada and Jamaica, are losing more doctors and nurses to emigration than they require for their own development needs.\textsuperscript{182}

The debate, however, has become increasingly balanced, and researchers have sought a deeper understanding of the positive aspects of skilled migration. Table 5.1, from an International Labour Organization report, summarises some of the positive and negative aspects of skilled migration.


Table 5-1: Positive and negative effects of skilled migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive effects</th>
<th>Negative effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Opportunities for education and professional development for migrants, not available in their countries of origin</td>
<td>• Net decrease in human capital stock, especially of those with valuable professional experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inflow of remittances and foreign exchange</td>
<td>• Reduced growth and productivity due to lower stock of human capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Return of skilled persons increases local human capital, transfer of skills and links to foreign networks</td>
<td>• Reduced quality of essential services, especially in health and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Technology transfers, venture capital and investment by diasporas</td>
<td>• Loss in investment by governments through provision of public funds for the education of skilled (potential) emigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Circulation of brains promotes integration into global markets (India, Taiwan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The increasing numbers of highly skilled female migrants from developing countries, coupled with persistent inequalities in access to tertiary educational opportunities for women in these countries, raises concerns of shrinking numbers of skilled female workers in the sending countries. An OECD study shows that in Africa and Latin America, and to a lesser extent in Asia, women with tertiary qualifications are more likely to emigrate than similarly qualified men. Measured in relation to three key indicators (infant mortality, under-five mortality and secondary-education enrolment) the study found that the differential emigration rate of skilled women and men has a significant negative developmental impact on the migrant’s country of origin.

5.2.2 “Brain waste”

“Brain waste”, the loss of skill through under-utilization or under-recognition of the qualifications and experience of migrant workers, affects both the countries of destination and the migrant workers themselves. For the receiving country, “brain waste” implies the inefficient, sub-optimal use of valuable human capital. For the migrant worker, the lack of recognition of skills and qualifications usually involves lower wages and worse working conditions. In many cases, “brain waste” means that the skilled migrant – usually a woman – is not participating in the labour force at all.


For example, a qualitative study of migrant female nurses in the UK shows that many nurses experienced considerable downgrading of their skills, felt their skills were not appreciated and fully recognised, and were often confronted with racism and xenophobia. These experiences, however, tended to be more pronounced in the private sector than amongst those employed by the National Health Service (NHS).\textsuperscript{185}

A study of the situation of migrant women in OECD countries shows that immigrant women are more susceptible to “brain waste”, i.e. to hold higher qualifications than those usually required for the jobs they have. This is true for migrant women from all countries, and particularly true for migrants from non-OECD nations.\textsuperscript{186} Table 5-2 provides an overview of the “over-qualification” phenomenon for a few European countries. As the table shows, “over-qualification” of migrant women is present in all of the countries to different extents. Whereas in Hungary and France the difference in “over-qualification” between native-born and migrant women is not very pronounced; in countries such as Spain and Greece there is a very significant gap between the rates of “over-qualification” amongst native-born and migrant women, particularly those from non-OECD countries.

\textsuperscript{185} Allan, H. and Aggergaard Larsen, J. (2003) "We need respect": experiences of internationally recruited nurses in the UK. London: Royal College of Nursing.

Table 5-2: Percentage of women (15–64) in jobs for which they are overqualified, by region of birth, for selected European countries, 2003–2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>Foreign-born</th>
<th>Foreign-born from non-OECD countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another way in which the "brain waste" occurs is through the neglect of the skills and qualifications that migrant women bring into receiving countries as the dependants of male skilled migrants or through family-reunification visas. Many skilled women in dual-career households put their own careers on a slower track in order to migrate with their families in response to their husbands’ emerging opportunities to work on international sites within
their companies.\textsuperscript{187} In many countries, women entering through these channels face restrictions to entering employment, and while some do find work, many fail to have their qualifications recognised.\textsuperscript{188} In addition, their lack of social and family networks often prevents them from entering employment, as they are required to look after their children and homes.\textsuperscript{189} In addition, some researchers have documented that the qualifications of migrant women, particularly those who migrate as dependants of a skilled husband, are often not recognised to the same extent as those of men.\textsuperscript{190}

5.3 Skilled migration in Europe

There is a dearth of reliable data on the extent of skilled migration for the EU as a whole. Estimates from 2001, for example, suggest that about 4.3\% of senior managers, and 3.1\% of professionals and technicians across the EU were foreign nationals.\textsuperscript{191} While countries of origin are not specified, citizens of countries which later became EU members are probably included in the estimates.

More comprehensive data exists from individual EU member states. Research from the UK, for example, shows that between 1975 and 1999, skilled migration into the country constituted a significant proportion of all migration. Table 5-3 illustrates the pattern of skilled migration into the UK by region of origin.


\textsuperscript{188} However, this trend is starting to reverse in some EU member states. In Germany, for example, a new immigration act introduced in recent years provides settlement permits to highly qualified persons from “third countries”. “Highly qualified” includes academics, teachers with senior positions, and professionals with special professional experience and above-average salaries. Interestingly, the family members of such highly skilled migrants receive the same residence permit and \textit{unrestricted access to the labour market}. In Italy, working-age family members who arrive in the country on family-reunification visas are also allowed to enter the labour force (Niessen, J. and Schibel, Y. (2005) Immigration as a labour market strategy: European and North American perspectives, Migration Policy Group).


Table 5-3 shows that labour migration to the UK includes a significant proportion of skilled migrants not only from Europe and other developed countries, but also from third-countries including, but not exclusively from, the Indian subcontinent.

Interestingly, additional data suggests that, unlike their counterparts from the developed world, skilled migrants from developing countries are unlikely to return to their countries of origin following emigration. In fact, some observers argue that return migration to developing countries is generally characterised by negative self-selection, and is seldom chosen by the highly skilled unless sustained economic growth occurred in their country of origin, as shown by return migration of high skilled migrants to Korea and Taiwan following economic growth in the 1990s. Others, however, claim positive self-selection of return migrants back to countries in which there are large earnings differentials between high-skilled and low-skilled workers.

### 5.4 Education levels and labour-force outcomes of migrant women in Europe

A starting point for this chapter’s analysis of the association between the employment outcomes and education levels of migrant women, is an overview of the education distribution of migrant women compared to that of native-born women.
A first glance at Figure 5-1 indicates that the education distributions of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women are broadly comparable. A closer look, however, reveals interesting differences. In particular, the proportion of low-education third-country migrant women is higher than that for both native-born and EU-born migrant women (41% versus 34% and 31% respectively). Conversely, the proportion of medium-education third-country migrant women is lower than those for native-born and EU-born migrant women (37%, 43% and 42% respectively). Interestingly, the proportion of high-education third-country migrant women and native-born women is equal (23%), and lower than that of EU-born migrant women (27%).

The evidence presented above suggests that, in spite of policies to facilitate their movement into the region, the EU has been unable to attract as many high-education immigrant women as low- and medium-education ones. As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, this may in part be due to the fact that policies to attract high education migrants tend to favour men, who tend to be more highly concentrated in the fields of interest to Europe (notably IT and science).

For our analysis of the situation of migrant women by education level, focusing specifically on labour-force participation, employment and unemployment, we use the Labour Force Survey data aggregated for the 14 EU countries of Chapter 4 (see again Figure 4-1). In particular, this section aims to explore how the labour market performance of migrant women differs from that of native-born women at three different levels of education – low, medium and high. The rest of the chapter then examines the specific situation of migrant
women with high education levels, and investigates the extent to which they are employed in jobs commensurate with their education level. We consider women with tertiary qualifications as having a “high” level of education, those with qualifications between upper-secondary and post-secondary as having a “medium” level, and those with a lower secondary education or less as “low” education.

Overall, our findings are similar to those for OECD countries\(^1\), where high-education immigrant women fare worse in the labour market performance vis-à-vis native-born women, and where high-education immigrant women from certain regions of origin fare especially poorly (non-OECD or non-EU countries). We again differentiate between migrant women according to whether they come from non-EU or EU countries.

5.4.1 Labour force participation

Considering first labour-force participation rates (see Figure 5-2), the finding holds for all groups that women’s labour force participation increases as their education level increases.

![Figure 5-2: Labour market participation of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women by level of education, ages 15–64, 14 EU countries, 2005](source: Labour Force Survey)

The data, however, shows that higher-education migrant women from third countries have a lower participation rate than that of both native-born women and EU-born migrants. The difference in participation rates is less pronounced between native-born and third-country migrant women for women with medium education levels, while participation rates are higher amongst low-education third-country migrant women than among low-education native-born women. EU-born migrant women have the highest labour-force participation rates for low-education women, and correspondingly have the lowest differential in labour force participation by education level.

What this indicates is that, while overall participation rates across all three groups increase as education levels increase, high-education third-country migrant women face a greater disadvantage in terms of participation rates than do low-education migrant women vis-à-vis the other two groups. While the data does not reveal the reason for these disparities, it is possible that low-education migrant women (EU and third-country born) are more willing than native-born women to take up the types of jobs that are available to them given their qualifications and skills. Conversely, more high-education native-born and EU-born migrant women may be more willing to participate in the labour market than third-country migrant women of equivalent education. This could be due to a variety of supply, demand and institutional factors affecting the willingness or ability of third-country migrant women to participate in the labour force: unfamiliarity with employment opportunities available; lack of language skills (supply factors); discrimination along gender and/or ethnic/racial lines in the labour market (factors that may be influencing demand); lack of recognition of qualifications; or visa restrictions on employment (institutional factors which affect both supply and demand).

**High-education migrant women**

By aggregating the data for all selected countries, Figure 5-2 disguises important differences in the labour-force participation rates of migrant and native-born women between countries. In Table 5-4, we compare the labour-force participation rates of high education women in selected countries for which we are able to compare third-country and EU-born migrants with native-born women. While there are major differences between countries, these provide few clear patterns by the groups of countries identified in the previous chapters (southern Europe’s “new” migrant-receiving countries, Accession countries and traditional migrant-receiving countries). For example, while in Portugal, third-country migrant women have a marginally higher labour-force participation rate than native-born women, in Greece, high education third-country migrant women have a labour-force participation rate that is nearly 15 percentage points lower than native-born women. Among the four traditional migrant-receiving countries examined, however, consistently large deficits in the labour-force participation rates of third-country migrants vis-à-vis high education native-born women are seen.
Table 5-4: Labour force participation of women with high education levels by countries, 16 EU countries, 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Native-born women</th>
<th>EU-born migrant women</th>
<th>Third-country migrant women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 14 (no Italy and Ireland)*</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “n.a.” indicates that the figure is not available due to lack of data
*Note: Italy and Ireland, which do not have information on third-country migrants, are excluded from the average values for All 14.
Source: Labour Force Survey

5.4.2 Employment rates
The data on employment rates of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women (see Figure 5-2) show, again, that migrant women with high education levels are at a greater disadvantage vis-à-vis native-born women than are migrant
women with lower education levels. As with labour-force participation rates, while the employment rate of native-born and third-country migrant women with low education levels are almost on a par, that of EU-born migrant women is significantly higher.

**Figure 5-3: Employment rate of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women by education level, 14 EU countries, 2005**

![Employment rate chart](chart.png)

Source: Labour Force Survey

**High education migrant women**

As with participation rates, the employment rate of high education migrant and native-born women varies considerably from country to country (results not shown; see in Appendix B Table B9). In Luxembourg, for example, the difference in employment rate between native-born women and third-country migrant women with high education level is substantial, and to the disadvantage of third-country migrant women: 83.0% and 51.1% respectively among native-born and third-country women. In contrast, third-country migrant women with high education levels have slightly higher employment rates than native-born women in Portugal (88.2% and 84.1% respectively).

5.4.3 **Unemployment rates**

An analysis of unemployment rates in the selected countries also shows that for third-country migrant women with high education levels the rates are twice as high as those of both native-born and EU-born migrant women (see Figure 5-4). The unemployment rates of third-country migrant women with medium- and low-education levels are also higher than those for native-born women with comparable levels of education. Consistent with the results on labour-force participation and employment, however, the unemployment

---

196 Like in Chapter 4, analysis of EU-born versus third-country migrant women’s outcomes is based on data from 13 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Italy and Ireland are excluded because the category ‘migrant’ cannot be disaggregated into EU-born and third-country migrant.
rate of EU-born migrant women is lower than that of the other two groups for women of low education levels.

**Figure 5-4: Unemployment rate of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women by education level, 14 EU countries, 2005**

![Bar chart comparing unemployment rates of native-born women, EU-born migrant women, and third-country migrant women by education level.](chart.png)

Source: Labour Force Survey

**High-education migrant women**

Aggregate data on unemployment rates again conceal important differences between countries. A detailed look at the unemployment rates of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women with high education in the different countries reveals that while, in some, the differences in favour of native-born women are significant; in others the unemployment rates are more similar; and in yet other countries, the trend is reversed (see Table 5-5).
### Table 5-5: Unemployment rate of native-born women, EU-born migrant women and third-country migrant women with high education levels in 16 EU countries, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Native-born women</th>
<th>EU-born migrant women</th>
<th>Third-country migrant women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>(8.5)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>(14.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 14 (no Italy and Ireland)*</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “( )” indicates that the figure has low statistical reliability due to small sample size.
Note: “.” indicates that the figure is unreliable and not publishable, due to very small sample size.
Note: “n.a.” indicates that the figure is not available due to lack of data.
*Note: Italy and Ireland, which do not have information on third-country migrants, are excluded from the average values for All 14.
Source: Labour Force Survey.

As the data show, third-country migrant women with high education levels have significantly higher unemployment rates than native-born women in all countries for which data is available.
5.5 Employment commensurate with education levels

The efficient deployment of available skills is a significant area for research and analysis on immigration. Interest in this area has been at least partly raised by research conducted for the European Commission revealing that many EU Member States are experiencing serious skill shortages, particularly of qualified IT workers, healthcare professionals, engineers, and education and social service personnel. These shortages not only hamper productivity and growth in the EU (and thus progress towards becoming “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”, a strategic goal set out in the Lisbon Agenda); they can also undermine national and regional targets in the provision of health, education and social services. Thus questions are being asked about the nature or causes of this shortage.

Interestingly, those studying the problem do not normally attribute skills shortages in Europe to an aggregate shortage in the supply of labour; typically, these shortages arise from poor matching between labour supply and demand. Policy interventions to address this problem include efforts to increase occupational and geographical mobility (the latter of which has been a core part of the European Employment Strategy), and educational reforms to improve the match between the skill base of the population and the available jobs. These reforms, however, do not typically have an impact on labour supply in the short or medium term. In addition, changes in demographic patterns across Europe (lower fertility rates, earlier retirement ages) mean that even with reforms to improve the match between the domestic supply and demand of labour, a shrinking workforce could exacerbate skills shortages in the future.

In this context, labour migration is one possible tool to address skills shortages. While in many EU countries legislation has been changing over the last two decades to facilitate the immigration of skilled labourers to fill skill gaps, a great deal of skilled migration occurs beyond the scope of this legal framework. In particular, many skilled women – with medium or high education levels – arrive in the EU legally through family reunification, or through illegal channels.

Our analysis of the EU LFS reveals that, in spite of the existence of policies favoring high skilled migrants, a significant minority of migrant women with high education levels are employed in low skilled sectors of the economy, in jobs that are not commensurate with their qualifications. In fact, high-education migrant women are more likely than native-born women to be employed in jobs not commensurate with their education level (although they are less likely to be in this situation than similarly skilled migrant men, a surprising fact deserving further examination, but which is beyond the scope of this research). Figure 5-5 shows the distribution of migrant women, native-born women and migrant men with high education in low, medium and high skill jobs.

---

197 Boswell, Stiller and Straubhaar, Forecasting labour and skills shortages.

198 Boswell, Stiller and Straubhaar, Forecasting labour and skills shortages.

199 Boswell, Stiller and Straubhaar, Forecasting labour and skills shortages.

200 Mahroum, Europe and the immigration of highly skilled labour, International Migration 39:5.

201 It is worth noting that the employment of highly educated women in medium skills occupations does not necessarily mean poor integration, as it is often the case that people with high education achievement work at
Figure 5-5: Employment commensurate with education level for high-education native-born women, migrant women and migrant men in 14 EU countries, 2005

Source: Labour Force Survey

Disaggregating the data on migrant women into EU-born and third-country migrant women provides a more nuanced picture, as Figure 5-6 shows.

junior level positions for example at the start of their careers (fresh graduate from universities), or following a career change.
These data shows that high-education third-country migrant women are about twice as likely to be employed in low skill jobs as EU-born migrant women with the same level of education. Interestingly, in fact, high-education EU-born migrant women are less likely to be employed in low skill jobs than any of the other three groups: third-country migrant women, native-born women and migrant men. This finding confirms that third-country migrant women with high education face systematic disadvantage in the labour force as women of non-EU origin.

5.6 Discussion

This chapter centred on two main research questions. The first one was whether the integration of migrant women in the labour market varies by education level. In order to do this, we compared EU-born migrant women, third-country migrant women, and native-born women of low, medium and high education across three different indicators: labour force participation, employment and unemployment rates.

Our analysis suggests that across all three groups, higher education levels improve integration into the labour force when measured through labour force participation, unemployment rates and employment rates. Nonetheless, for higher education levels, the situation of third-country migrant women is systematically worse than that of their counterparts of equivalent education. That is, third-country migrant women of high education level have lower rates of labour force participation, higher unemployment rates and lower employment rates than their counterparts. In contrast, low education third-country migrant women exhibit very similar labour market participation and employment rates as do low education native-born women, although the former are significantly more
likely to be unemployed. EU-born migrant women are in a more favorable situation than third-country migrant women across the three indicators at all levels of education.

The data does not allow for an assessment of the reasons why high-education third-country migrant women experience such systematic disadvantage in the labour market when measured through the three indicators listed above. It could be argued, however, that a number of demand, supply and institutional factors are at play. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this disadvantage may be due to problems in the recognition of foreign degrees – which would affect migrant men also – as well as factors such as country of origin, attitudes regarding women’s employment, language barriers, and immigrants’ limited access to public sector jobs. The latter in particular affects women more significantly than men, because the professions in which women tend to be concentrated are predominantly regulated by the public sector.202 Gender, racial and/or ethnic discrimination may also explain some of the lower labour force participation, higher unemployment and lower employment rates of high-education third-country migrant women in the labour market. Closer inspection of the specific reasons behind the systematic disadvantage of high-education third-country migrant women in the labour force would be necessary to inform the formulation of appropriate policy responses.

The second research question examined in this chapter focused on the extent to which high-education migrant women in Europe were employed in occupational sectors commensurate with their skill levels. As mentioned before, the data analyzed here indicates that a significant minority of migrant women with high education levels are employed in low skilled sectors of the economy, in jobs that are not commensurate with their level of education. High-education migrant women are more “at risk” than native-born women of equivalent education of being “over-educated” or perhaps more accurately given the need for high-skilled workers “under-employed”, that is, in employment that requires a lower level of education than they hold.203 Interestingly, however, the picture changes dramatically when the data on migrant women of high education are disaggregated into EU-born and third-country migrant women. This analysis shows that high-education migrant women born outside the EU are twice as likely to be employed in low skill jobs as EU-born women with the same level of education. In fact, high-education EU-born women are less likely to be employed in low skill jobs than any of the other three groups: third-country migrant women, native-born women and migrant men. The higher incidence of “de-skilling” amongst third-country migrant women is yet another indicator of the systematic disadvantage faced by this group in the EU labour force. It also suggests the importance of taking into account not only quantitative measures of labour force outcomes (such as participation and employment


rates) but also qualitative ones (for example the extent to which jobs are commensurate with education).

In order to gain greater insights into the reasons for the high proportion of high-education third-country migrant women being in jobs not commensurate with their qualifications, a number of questions require further examination. For example, the LFS data analyzed here does not provide information on the type of qualifications high-education women have, and the extent to which these match the skills needs of the receiving economies. As with other types of labour market outcomes, such as unemployment and employment, described above, the reasons behind the higher incidence of “de-skilling” (brain-waste) amongst high-education third-country migrant women than amongst all other groups need to be probed further as well. In addition to barriers such as problems with the recognition of qualifications, lack of language skills and/or familiarity with the labour market, and gender or racial/ethnic discrimination, another possible explanation for the high incidence of “de-skilling” faced by high-education third-country migrant women (and men, 28% of whom are employed in low skilled occupational sectors\(^{204}\)) might be that education and skills acquired abroad are less valued than when acquired domestically.\(^{205}\)

There are, however, two important issues to note in this respect. First, not all migrants will have acquired their education and skills in their country of origin; a significant proportion will have migrated at young ages and received some or all of their education in their receiving country. It is therefore possible that the country where education and skills were acquired have an impact on the labour market outcomes for migrant women. One possible way of examining the impact on labour market integration of the country where human capital development took place, would be to compare the outcomes of migrants with similar education levels but whose education and skills were acquired domestically, within the EU or in third-countries. The LFS data obtained in the course of this research did not allow for this analysis. However, our analysis of the LFS data suggests that EU-born migrants, many of whom will have acquired their education in their countries of origin, are less likely to experience “de-skilling” than third-country migrants. This suggests the possibility that a higher value is placed on human capital developed within the EU than in third-countries.

The second point to consider is the extent to which the value attached to education acquired in different countries and regions is based on accurate assessments of the quality of this education, or on subjective judgment. In either case, it is probably the case that education and skills are “imperfectly portable”\(^{206}\) across national borders, and that measures to improve the match of education, skills and jobs are necessary both to better integrate migrant workers and to improve the efficient use of valuable human capital in the receiving economy. Addressing this mismatch of migrants’ skill levels and employment may be especially pressing given increasing tensions arising from concerns in many countries about migration levels. In several European member states there is growing concern amongst the native-born populations that too many migrants are coming into

\(^{204}\) Source: Labour Force Survey (our own analysis).


\(^{206}\) Ibid.
their countries. However, it appears that much of the tension arises from a sense of threat experienced amongst lower education native-born workers. In some respects their perception of threat is justified – they are the most likely to experience pressure on wages and competition for jobs, given the positions migrants are most likely to take up. While further research is needed into the reasons behind the “de-skilling” of migrant workers, our analysis suggests that migrant workers could be employed in higher skilled occupational sectors. As stated earlier, it is possible that this more efficient matching would address some of the skill shortages and improve economic competitiveness and generate growth.

Of course many, if not the majority, of migrant workers will still be employed in relatively low-skilled jobs. However, it is also possible that facilitating the employment of high-education migrants in higher-skilled occupations would also reduce friction with, and hostility from, those who currently experience migration as a threat. This facilitation could not only improve economic efficiency and fill skill gaps, it would also improve quality of life and opportunities for migrants who would access better work as well as perhaps lower levels of prejudice in their new receiving communities. While determining the measures and policy levers that are likely to facilitate this employment commensurate with skills levels is a complex goal requiring commitment and engagement from numerous parties, it is worth pursuing for the many potential gains for the economy, the migrant workers and the native-born population. Given the particular challenges faced by third-country migrant women, the pursuit of such policy levers should maintain a focus on the particular challenges and needs of this group. To this end, the following chapter focuses on policy case studies, considering their impact on migrant women’s employment.207

207 Further research, which elucidates the extent of the potential match between currently underemployed migrants and existing skill gaps in receiving economies, would be a step forward in understanding the potential for existing migration flows to achieve these aims if mechanisms were put in place to facilitate matching. Such research should also look at the extent to which better matching would also alleviate friction caused by competition for work in receiving communities. Determining this would require qualitative research on perceptions and experiences of immigration by receiving communities; and quantitative assessment of the scale of the likely change in numbers of migrants accessing each of the skill levels if effective mechanisms were put in place to facilitate matching.
Many and diverse policies are implemented by different EU Member States to integrate migrants into the labour force. Few of these specifically address the challenges and needs of migrant women.

The Spanish regularisation policies are an example of an integration policy that targets migrant women and men in a uniform way. Out of approximately 700,000 migrants regularised in Spain in 2005, 41% were migrant women. Most of these were employed in the domestic sector.

While many migrant domestic workers were able to move out of this sector following regularisation, the majority of those regularised were still employed in this sector after two years. The domestic sector usually entails low wages, low status, limited opportunities for career progression and human capital development, and limited recourse to basic workers’ rights such as unemployment benefit and written employment contracts.

Work-life balance policies provide another example of interventions that aim to facilitate labour market integration; as general support measures they address women’s specific needs but do not normally include special provisions for migrant women.

This study suggests that, in many countries, migrant women in the workforce are able to use formal childcare services at mostly similar rates to their native-born counterparts. In other countries such as Ireland and Belgium, however, a smaller proportion of employed migrant women use formal childcare than their native-born counterparts.

In addition, migrant women are less likely than native-born women to be employed when they have a child under 5 years of age, and those with children are much more likely than are native-born women to report wishing to work more (or to work if they are currently not employed).

6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of policies put in place in different EU countries towards the integration of migrants into the labour force. The extent to which these policies address the specific needs of migrant women will be discussed. This broad policy
context provides the analytical background for two case studies given later in the chapter. The case studies, which examine the regularization policies in Spain and work–family reconciliation policies across Europe, aim to provide a more in-depth discussion of the impact of policies on the integration of migrant women into the labour force.

Through the policy overview and case studies, this chapter examines the extent to which national and European policies can influence, and optimise, the participation of migrant women in the European labour force. It also looks at whether migrant women workers’ needs, as workers and as migrants, are taken into consideration and met by these policies.

6.2 Economic theory of migration and integration

Economic theory suggests that migrants’ integration into the labour market of the receiving country – particularly as measured by the upon-arrival immigrant–native earnings gap – is based on the international transferability of human capital. The transferability of human capital can be determined to some extent by the migration motive. For example, economic migrants are likely to exhibit a lower earnings disadvantage upon arrival than those migrating for family reunification, or as asylum seekers or refugees.

Text box 6-1: Family reunification

Family reunification is an important element of migration policy in the EU. Family reunification is not only a way of bringing families together, but also an indispensable instrument for facilitating successful integration of third-country nationals into the EU. Researchers and policy makers recognise that family represents a fixed point of reference for immigrants in the new receiving country and functions as a support network, and are thus able to positively influence the employment prospects of newly arrived migrants. In response to this, the European Commission produced a Council Directive in 2003 on the right to family reunification, which supports its view that family reunification is necessary to make family life possible and to facilitate the integration of third-country nationals into a Member State. Under this Directive, Member States have the right to adopt or maintain more favourable provisions (the Directive does not apply in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark). There are a number of restrictions to family reunification provisions. These include the following.

- Reunification is limited to nuclear families.

---


• There are no provisions for unmarried partners, adult children, or relatives in the ascending line.
• The sponsor must have at least one year’s residence and have reasonable prospects of securing permanent residence.

In addition, Member States may impose other conditions, such as restricting the access of some family members to employment, and requiring that the sponsor have access to adequate accommodation and sufficient resources without recourse to public funds. More detailed analysis of the impact of family reunification policy on the integration and employability of migrants require further research, which is beyond the scope of this report.

According to a number of empirical studies from Europe, the US, Canada and elsewhere, country of origin differences also have a strong influence on the integration and performance of migrants in the labour market of the receiving country. That is, migrants from those countries with relatively high skills levels, and whose skills can be easily transferred to the receiving countries, usually perform better than migrants from other countries. Changes in the country of origin mix of migrants usually explain changes in the performance of migrants in the labour market.

In addition, some studies have also shown that economic migrants (ie those who migrated due to prospects for increased income and standard of living) have significantly higher wages than those who migrated for family or political reasons. It is important to note, however, that migration under family reunification, asylum seeking and other non-economic visa programmes do not “preclude other meanings, intentions and strategies” for migration. The association between labour-force participation and performance on the one hand, and family reunification on the other, might reveal less about women migrants’ motives than about structural constraints on migrant women’s opportunities in the receiving country. This may indicate that, as economic theory suggests, migration motives have a strong influence in the performance of migrants in the labour market.

6.3 Social, economic and cultural integration of migrants

There are a number of studies that examine integration policies and programmes, including those addressing the integration of migrants into the labour force, in different EU Member States. These, however, tend to focus on interventions from countries

---


that have substantial experience in settling immigrants, while there is little information on integration policies and programmes in new EU Member States. In addition, a significant proportion of publications focus primarily on the integration policies themselves rather than paying systematic attention to the actual integration processes of migrants in their destination countries. Finally, there is limited robust research on the impact of policies on migrant women in particular.

The existing studies reveal diverse approaches to integration, which reflect different social and cultural biases, economic priorities and political pressures. In France, for example, integration policies have emphasised assimilation, and no specific “minority” policy exists. However, a number of labour market interventions – such as to prevent redundancies – have been put in place over the recent which, while not directed specifically at migrants, benefit them significantly due to their over-representation in the low-skilled sectors or unemployed segments.

Sweden, in contrast, has developed “one of the most comprehensive immigrant integration programmes in Europe”, with an emphasis on multiculturalism, equality, freedom of choice and partnership. Non-citizens with legal leave to remain in Sweden enjoy the same social, economic, education and (partial) political rights as citizens. The effectiveness of both approaches is likely to be in part context dependent, but there are also general lessons to be learned which we hope to address through in-depth cases studies later in this chapter.

Given the range of integration policies in place across the EU, and the lack of systematic research in the field, there is uncertainty regarding the extent to which the integration strategies of various Member States fit within the wider EU employment and economic objectives. Of particular relevance to this study are the Lisbon goals of raising overall employment rates to 70% by 2010, and to narrowing the labour force participation gap between men and women by raising women’s employment rates to 60%.

Text box 6-2: Circular migration

Circular migration has been defined as “the fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or permanent movement which, when it occurs voluntarily and is

---


linked to labour needs of countries of origin and destinations, can be beneficial to all involved. Circular migration, like all types of international movement, has impacts for the receiving country, the sending country and the individual migrant.

At the level of the receiving country, circular migration can help to respond to changing economic and social conditions by facilitating flexibility in the labour market. For the sending countries, circular migration brings the potential to contribute to development with returning migrants being a direct source of human capital and, often, material investment. The impact of circular migration on migrants themselves is more complex as, on the one hand, it includes the possibility of working legally in destination countries and a regular source of income that can be accumulated in a relatively short period of time, while maintaining strong family and social networks in their country of origin. On the other hand, it limits their options for employment mobility and for settling in the receiving countries, where employment and wage conditions may be better than in the migrant’s country of origin. Moreover, migrants forced to return to their countries of origin prematurely may fail successfully integrate in both sending and receiving communities. Reliance on the work of one family member also creates dependency behaviour in the migrant families.

Circular migration presents a flexible policy instrument that can potentially bring benefits to all actors involved; nevertheless, the receiving countries’ objectives with regards to circular migration are likely to have an important impact on its effectiveness. At present, receiving countries’ objectives reflect different priorities, from simply filling labour market gaps and helping combat irregular migration, to an interest in maximising the possible gains of return migration for the development of origin economies and societies. In order to achieve the positive spin-off effects of circular migration, certain criteria need to be fulfilled. There is evidence that some conditions – such as longer-term contracts, options for re-entry, portability of social security benefits and a possibility of a permanent residence status – have a positive effect on the migrants and facilitates return to their countries of origin.

6.4 Labour market integration policies

The literature on integration policies identifies a number of different approaches to ensuring the successful integration of migrants into the labour force of the receiving country. Policies on recruitment and admission, language training and vocational skills are

---


223 Ibid.
some of the most common. Anti-discrimination efforts are also prevalent, although anti-discrimination measures do not always focus exclusively on migrants. Interventions on factors exogenous to the labour market – such as affordable housing, healthcare and childcare – are considered important by researchers and policy-makers but are not always effectively targeted and delivered to migrant workers that need this kind of support.

We can distinguish between two types of policies promoting the integration of immigrants into the labour force. First, some policies are targeted primarily or exclusively at migrants. Second, there are general support measures which can be open to migrants, and which aim to foster the labour-force integration of migrants and nationals alike. The two case studies in this chapter (sections 6.6 and 6.7) examine the impact of one policy of each type on migrant women’s labour market integration.

Before analyzing the impact on migrant women’s labour-force integration, of two particular policies in more detail through the case studies, this section provides an overview and brief description of a sample of general and targeted labour-force integration policies intended to help immigrants – and other groups considered disadvantaged – to successfully join the labour force. The broad characteristics of these policies are described here, but their implementation and specific attributes vary from country to country.

6.4.1 Admissions policy and international recruitment
There are different types of immigrant admission policies focusing on recruitment. These can be divided into the following three broad categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection criteria</th>
<th>Type of programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human-capital based</td>
<td>♦ Points system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>♦ Access to graduates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>♦ Access to entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector-driven</td>
<td>♦ Temporary/seasonal labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>♦ Fast-track work permits for particular sectors/occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based</td>
<td>♦ Work permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>♦ Regularization/earned adjustment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In practice, recruitment policies tend to be mixed. For example, in a point system for government-sponsored human capital recruitment, additional points may be given to an applicant if he or she already has a job offer in their country of destination.\textsuperscript{226}

Legal recruitment of migrant workers in the industrialised world tends to target highly-skilled male-dominated occupations such as IT workers, and (low-skilled) temporary migrant workers for sectors such as construction and agriculture. As a result, women’s opportunities to migrate legally to industrialised countries continue to be more limited than men’s, except in very specific sectors such as nursing.\textsuperscript{227}

In Europe, there is increasing interest in tapping into the global market for highly skilled workers. Germany, for example, introduced a “green card” policy for IT professionals from third-countries\textsuperscript{228}, while France implemented a “scientific visa” to fast-track the work permits of scientists from non-European Economic Area countries. In addition, Sweden and the Netherlands provide tax incentives to highly skilled professionals both from the EU and from third-countries. Ireland has one of the most de-centralised work permit processes in Europe, whereby any consular office in the world can grant work permits to any person who meets their criteria (which is basically holding a job offer from an Irish company).\textsuperscript{229}

In response to concerns about the “brain drain” effect of international recruitment, some countries are introducing constraints on the active recruitment of certain categories of workers from specific countries and regions. For example, the UK National Health Service has restricted its own recruitment of healthcare professionals from over 150 developing countries. In the Netherlands, the Foreign Employment Act was introduced which also restricts the recruitment of nurses from a number of developing nations.\textsuperscript{230} Other schemes have been developed to increase the active engagement of the diaspora communities in the development of their home countries. One good practice example that is regularly quoted is the MIDA (Migration for Development in Africa) project of the IOM (International Organization for Migration), which supports circulation of competencies and sharing of experience as well as investment in the development of the home countries. However these programmes tend to be expensive and until now only have a limited reach, though it may be too early to judge their full impact. Additionally, the extent to which this and other recruitment programmes target and reach women is unclear.

\textsuperscript{226} Niessen, J. and Schibel, Y. eds. (2005) Immigration as a labour market strategy – European and North American perspectives, Migration Policy Group.


\textsuperscript{228} Unlike the American one, the German green card is a temporary visa and does not grant the migrant permanent right of abode and employment.


6.4.2 Naturalization

Naturalization occurs when the state grants citizenship to an immigrant, and is a policy used to differing degrees in immigrant-receiving countries in Europe and elsewhere (notably in the US). The policy of naturalization responds to a view prevalent amongst policy-makers that citizenship is a central step towards the full and successful integration of immigrants. However, naturalization is not always widespread; by 1997, for example, only 1.57% of the total Turkish population of just over two million (which included second-generation residents) had been naturalised in Germany.231

The effect of these policies on the outcomes for migrants themselves (including their specific impact on the outcomes for migrant women) and the receiving countries’ absorption capacity still needs to be determined. A study of the impact of German and French naturalization policies suggests that naturalised immigrants do better than non-naturalised ones in the domains of occupational status, unemployment and education. However, disaggregated by country of origin, the impact of naturalization is not homogeneous. For example, naturalised immigrants of North African origin (and their children born in France) do not fare much better than their non-naturalised counterparts.232 The finding that the impact of naturalization varies according to country of birth of the immigrant means that it is likely that, while important, naturalization does not guarantee effective integration into the receiving society and labour force. It is difficult to isolate the direct effects of naturalization; immigrants who gain citizenship are not randomly selected individuals but differ from others in both observable characteristics (such as education and qualifications) and non-observable ones.233

6.4.3 Incentive schemes

Different types of incentive schemes have been implemented in various European countries to increase the integration of disadvantaged groups, including immigrants, into the labour market. In the 1990s, for example, employers in the Netherlands that hired a long-term unemployed person would be exempt from paying social security contributions for that person for up to four years, and would receive a one-time subsidy. Under this scheme, ethnic minorities were considered long-term unemployed after one year of unemployment, as opposed to two years for all other applicants. In Sweden, labour costs were subsidised if an unemployed person was hired, with higher subsidies provided to those who hired unemployed immigrants.234 235


234 It is worth noting, however, that in the early 1990s only 2.7% of all non-Swedish nationals were migrants from outside the Nordic region. (Bohning, W.R. and Zegers de Beijl, R. (1998) The integration of migrant workers in the labour market: policies and their impact, International Labour Organization, Geneva.)

Although many of these incentive schemes include special provisions for the integration of immigrants, these tend to be under-represented amongst the schemes’ participants, despite the fact that as a group, immigrants are over-represented amongst the unemployed. For example, data from Amsterdam shows that long-term unemployed native-born people were twice as likely as long-term unemployed people of Moroccan or Turkish origin to participate in employment creation schemes set up by the Dutch government. In addition, these generalised labour market policies usually lack special measures to address the specific needs of migrant women. In the absence of special provisions to promote employment amongst migrant women, it is likely that incentive measures would benefit migrant men to a greater extent as a result of gender biases in the labour market.

### 6.4.4 Language training

Language training has been ubiquitous in traditionally receiving countries in the EU since the massive inflows of migrant workers on guest worker visas in the 1970s. They are one of the few direct integration policies targeted specifically at immigrants who lack the basic language skills to participate in the labour market. In France, for example, the *Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles* (FAS) includes funds used for language courses and training for newly-arrived immigrants such as refugees and those in family reunification programmes.

In some countries, these policies are extended only to some categories of immigrants. Germany, for example, has generous social security and language training benefits for immigrants of German ethnic origin and for refugees, for which other types of immigrants are not eligible. However, since the mid 1990s, the German government has established language courses for first and second generation immigrants from other countries, particularly Turkey, in order to improve their chances of integration into the labour market. Because immigrant women face particular challenges in integrating into the labour market, the Federal Employment Services funds language training for over 24,000 women every year.

France’s integration policy for legal residents includes a “residency and integration contract”, established in 2004. This contract highlights the mutual responsibilities of the newly arrived immigrant and the French nation. In addition to this contract, the State is committed to providing language training to immigrants as well as training on life in France, while it is expected that the immigrant commits to completing his or her training.

---


238 Other funds within the FAS are available for general policies such as in the areas of housing, urban regeneration and so forth (Doomernik, J. (1998) *The effectiveness of integration policies towards immigrants and their decedents in France, Germany and The Netherlands*, International Labour Organization, Geneva).


Education and skills

Education and skills training tend to be general policies that aim to enhance the labour market integration of disadvantaged groups including, but not exclusively, immigrants. The importance of education and skills for the successful labour-force integration of immigrants has been acknowledged by policy-makers and researchers. An OECD report on education for immigrants states that, given the pivotal role of education for success in working life, education and training are key factors contributing to the integration of immigrants into labour markets. Education and training can also help immigrants overcome language barriers and facilitate the transmission of the socio-cultural norms and values of the receiving society that provide the basis for social cohesion. In Germany in the 1990s, for example, a number of these programmes were in place, such as offering support for disadvantaged youth in on-the-job training. According to German data, thousands of foreigners participated in these programmes, a large majority of whom were unemployed. According to one expert, “[j]udging from the overall size of the foreign population relative to Germany’s population at large, it seems safe to assume foreigners to be more likely to be among their beneficiaries than native-born Germans”. It is unclear whether data exist to support this assumption. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, research suggests that general labour market policies appear to benefit native-born people to a greater extent than foreigners in most immigrant-receiving countries. As with other integration policies, the distributive aspects of education and skills training initiatives amongst migrant men and women require further examination.

Anti-discrimination policies

There is a large body of evidence demonstrating that migrants are in many ways at a disadvantage in the labour market compared with the native-born population of the receiving society. Some of these problems are associated with issues such as inadequate education and training, non-recognition of qualifications gained abroad or inadequate command of the receiving country’s language. But, in addition, migrants often experience discrimination in the labour force on the grounds of their ethnic background, nationality and gender.

Discrimination is said to occur “when migrants are accorded inferior treatment relative to nationals, in spite of comparable education, qualifications and/or experience.” Research carried out for the International Labour Organization (ILO) indicates that discrimination against migrant workers is widespread and pervasive in most, if not all, immigrant-receiving countries. Immigrants tend to experience discrimination in areas such as access to jobs and training opportunities, work allocation and promotion within enterprises, and terms and conditions of employment. Discrimination not only constitutes a violation of migrants’ human rights as laid down in international treaties, it also hampers the migrants’

---


integration into the labour market of the receiving country and leads to social exclusion and vulnerability.\textsuperscript{244}

In many EU Member States, anti-discrimination policies and legislation have been put in place, and EU directives on the matter developed, to address some of these challenges. Often, these policies are not solely targeted at immigrants but cover a number of other groups, such as the disabled, citizens of minority ethnic and racial backgrounds, and the elderly.\textsuperscript{245} The impact of anti-discrimination measures depends largely on the degree of compliance and engagement by both the public and the private sector, but the evidence on this across the EU is limited. The extent to which anti-discrimination interventions affect migrants in general and migrant women in particular is therefore still debatable.

\section*{6.5 Introduction to the case studies}

The following sections provide a more in-depth discussion of the impact of two specific policies on the integration of migrant women into the labour force: the regularization programmes undertaken in Spain, and the range of work–family reconciliation policies in place across Europe.

The Spanish regularization programmes constitute an informative case study for a number of reasons. First, regularization is a policy deliberately targeted at migrants and designed to contribute to their integration into the labour force. While it does not include any specific gender-related provisions, the policy allows for an analysis of the differential impact of the policy on migrant men and migrant women. Second, and following from the first point, data on the impact of the regularization programmes enables us to consider the interaction between the actual policy and other factors – in particular country of origin – that influence the labour market outcomes for migrant women. Third, the case study contributes to understanding the “southern Europe exception” of greater parity with native-born women in labour force participation and unemployment rates. Finally, the case study holds insights that may be valid for other countries facing similar migration control problems, particularly Italy and Portugal, which similarly have large flows of undocumented migrants and have also adopted large-scale “regularization” policies as a means of dealing with them.

The macro-structural case study on work–family reconciliation policies, in Europe, aims to contribute to our understanding of the impact of general support measures on the labour-force outcomes of migrant women in a number of ways. First, the case study allows for an investigation of the extent to which the labour market outcomes of migrant women are influenced by the same work–life balance policies as native-born women across Europe. Unlike the Spanish case study, which focuses primarily on the impact of a policy on migrant women as compared to migrant men, this case focuses on the differential impact of a particular policy (or set of policies) on migrant women as compared to native-born women. Second, by comparing the impact of the policies on migrant and native-born women.


women, the case study allows us to identify indicators of potential problems of access for migrant women to the benefits of those policies and programs. Third, as a study of one type of policy across a number of countries, its findings can provide meaningful insights for a wider range of countries across the EU.

6.6 Case study 1: Spain’s extraordinary regularization programmes

Over the last twenty years, Spain has implemented five regularization processes, whereby varying numbers of illegal migrant workers were granted work and residence permits. This case study aims to understand the impact of these regularizations on third-country migrant women’s participation in the Spanish labour market.

6.6.1 Background

Up until the 1980s, Spain, like Italy, Greece and Portugal, was a country of emigration; Spanish citizens migrated first to countries in South America and later, after the second world war, to more industrialised countries in the rest of Europe.246 In the 1980s, however, this migratory pattern began reversing, and Spain became a net immigration country; that is, the numbers of people migrating into Spain from abroad exceeded the number of Spaniards leaving the country.247 This corresponded with Spain’s accession in 1986 to the European Union and a period of accelerated growth, whereby between 1986 and 1990 over two million jobs were created in the country, more than in any other European country in the same period.248 The largest migration flows, however, have taken place from the mid 1990s onwards, when the numbers of African, Latin American and European immigrants increased significantly.249 We saw in Chapter 2 that this has resulted in one of the largest and youngest migrant female labour forces in the EU.

The migratory flows into Spain have particular distinguishing features. Firstly, its geographical proximity to Morocco makes Spain a gateway to Europe for citizens of African countries250. Secondly, due to its historical, cultural and economic links to the region, immigration from Latin America is of growing importance, and has prompted some observers to argue that there is an increasing Latin-Americanization of immigration into Spain.251 So while in 1996 out of the top 15 countries of origin of new immigrants to

---

Spain, 19.5% were from Latin America, by 2005 this had gone up to 40%. In 2006, a third of new immigrants to Spain were from Latin America.\textsuperscript{252}

Table 6-2 shows the composition of the total immigrant population in Spain in 2006, as compiled from data on regional population registers by the National Institute of Statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By region</th>
<th>Number of foreign residents</th>
<th>Percentage of total immigrant stock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,021,808</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1,064,916</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27 and Ukraine</td>
<td>1,028,678</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>709,174</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>219,040</td>
<td>7.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to the apparent Latin-Americanization of immigration to Spain over the last few years, the gender composition of migratory flows into the country has also changed. This is because Latin American immigration since the late 1990s has been “feminised”, that is, a majority of immigrants from this region have been women (55% in 2004, versus 34% in the case of immigration from Africa, and about 50% in the case of immigration from Europe and Asia).\textsuperscript{253} While still significant, the proportion of women migrants from Latin America has decreased over the last decade, due in part to family reunification and the regularization programmes of the last few years, after which regularised women are reunited with their husbands and other family members in Spain. Thus, while in 1996 the proportion of women migrants from the region was 60.8%, by 2005 this ratio had decreased to 53.9%.\textsuperscript{254}

Table 6-3: Labour force participation and unemployment rates of third-country migrant women by country of birth, Spain 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, region</th>
<th>Labour force participation rate (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ecuador</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Colombia</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{252} SOPEMI (2007) \textit{International Migration Outlook 2007}, OECD.


\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
In Spain, as in other European countries, migrant labour market outcomes vary by country of origin. Using Census data for 2001, we are able to compare labour-force participation rates and unemployment rates, by region, of third-country migrant women’s origin; and, within regions, compare countries with the largest numbers of migrants in Spain (see Table 6-3). As a point of reference, Spanish-born women’s labour force participation rate (LFPR) was 48.3%, while their unemployment rate was 19.0% in 2001. As we saw in Chapter 2, an older age distribution among native-born women of working age explains part, but not all, of the lower labour-force participation among native-born women, but has no substantial effect on the unemployment rate comparison.

While Latin American women have a language advantage in the labour market compared to women from other countries, the labour-force participation rates and unemployment rates are equally favourable for women from Eastern Europe and Asia. As seen elsewhere in Europe, the region with the lowest rate of labour force participation of women is the Middle East and North Africa (45.2%). The difference between native-born women and women of specific countries of origin, however, is smaller than has been noted in some countries; with the extreme case being that of North African women’s labour force participation in Belgium, which is only 17%. We also note that these differences in

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>LFPR</th>
<th>UNR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Morocco</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Algeria</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Guinea</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nigeria</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Romania</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bulgaria</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ukraine</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• China</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Philippines</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Spain 2001 census

255 These data were obtained from the IPUMSi microdata collection of University of Minnesota (Minnesota Population Center).

256 Dumont and Isoppo (2005, p.13), ibid.
labour-force participation rates by country of origin tend to be the inverse of differences in recent childbearing between migrant women in Spain by continent and country origin.\textsuperscript{257} This is consistent with the strong negative association between labour-force participation and having young children for third-country migrant women seen in Chapter 2 for Spain and elsewhere in the EU.

Country-of-origin differences are also seen between migrant women from different regions. The unemployment rates of women from Africa are particularly high, at 22.4\% for the Middle East and North Africa, and 23.1\% for women from sub-Saharan Africa. The 18.4\% and 18.3\% unemployment rate for women born in Eastern Europe and Latin America respectively however, are marginally lower than the 19.0\% rate for native-born women; while the 16.1\% rate for women born in Asia is substantially lower.

6.6.2 The occupations of women migrants in Spain

Precise estimates of the size of the migrant workforce are not possible due to the fluidity of movement and the substantial numbers of undocumented workers. According to OECD data, migrant workers account for nearly 10\% of the labour force in Spain.\textsuperscript{258} Out of these, it is estimated that a significant proportion are undocumented workers; official data currently estimates over a million (equivalent to about a third of all migrants in Spain). Other sources suggest a much larger number of both total and undocumented migrants than suggested by official estimates. By another estimate, women constituted 38.8\% of all immigrant documented workers in the country in 2006.\textsuperscript{259}

Most of the migrant women in employment in Spain work in the services sector; in 2006, 89.7\% of third-country immigrant women were employed in this sector.\textsuperscript{260} It was estimated in 2004 that as many as 91.7\% of documented domestic workers were foreign-born women, particularly from Latin America (26.9\% Ecuadorian, 14.9\% Colombian and 10.7\% Peruvian).\textsuperscript{261}

Within the service sector, domestic, care and cleaning work, and the catering industry, account for a significant proportion of immigrants.\textsuperscript{262} These sectors provide low-skilled, poorly paid jobs, not readily accepted by Spanish nationals, and increasingly occupied by irregular migrants. Because of the large numbers of undocumented workers they employ, these sectors are considered part of the Spanish underground or hidden economy.\textsuperscript{263}


\textsuperscript{258} OECD (2007) International Migration Outlook, SOPEMI.


\textsuperscript{261} Ibid.


Service activities employing undocumented migrants can be broadly categorised as services for firms (hotels and restaurants, for example), and services for people. It is in the personal services sector (cleaning, domestic service, caring for dependent people, etc) where the “underground economy has become absolutely widespread in Spain… Here not only firms but also households have externalised part of their care and domestic tasks and responsibilities to workers irregularly hired”. While this sector employs both male and female migrants, the sector is very highly feminised. The services sector is, therefore, one of the most important employers of irregular women migrants.

The expansion of the service sector as a source of employment for migrant workers (women in particular) has been associated with “[t]he characteristics of the Spanish welfare state, the ageing population, the increasing participation of women in the labour market and the unequal distribution of domestic and care work between women and men”. The minimalist nature of the Spanish welfare state has meant that with population ageing and increasing female labour force participation emerged the need for a cheap labour force to support families and households with their caring responsibilities (particularly caring for children and elderly people).

Studies of the labour market integration of third-country migrant women in Spain indicate that domestic work is a common entry point into the labour market, particularly for those arriving through irregular channels. The longer a migrant woman has been a resident in Spain, the greater her degree of employment mobility; some women in domestic employment will, with time, move to jobs in other sectors and eventually a number may become self-employed. A number of the self-employed will remain in the domestic service sector (which means that they will register with social security as self-employed, and may work in more than one household), while others will move to employment in hotels and other branches of the service sector.

6.6.3 The regularization of undocumented migrant workers

Large scale regularization programmes have taken place in a number of EU countries over the last twenty years. For example, since 1986 four large regularization programmes were launched in Italy; in the last programme, about 300,000 illegal migrants were regularised in 1998/99. In 1997/98, Greece launched a regularization programme for which the government received 375,000 applications (out of a total of approximately 4.3m irregular workers in the labour force at the time). Across Europe, around 3,719,200 migrant workers have been regularised since the 1980s; in the last wave (between 2000 and 2005) over 2m workers were regularised in Spain, Greece, France, Italy and Portugal. These

---

policies were largely triggered by uncontrollable numbers of immigrants that could not be extradited and were barred from full integration due to their (lack of) legal status.

Between 1986 and 2005 five “exceptional” regularization processes were implemented in Spain, in addition to the yearly quota system in operation in the country since 1993. The regularization processes, in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000 and 2005, had two main aims. On the one hand, they aimed to “bring to the surface the stocks of undocumented foreigners that due to their lack of recognised legal status were pushed towards the underground economy, did not enjoy some of the most basic rights, and were exploited and increasingly marginalised”. On the other hand, the regularization of undocumented workers would generate additional contributions to the social security system through taxes. From the 1986 programme, each subsequent regularization drive had the aim of correcting the shortcomings of previous ones (by providing an opportunity for those who were unable to regularise in the previous programme, or by ensuring those who were issued permits and then could not renew them could regain them).

The first regularization, in 1986, granted temporary work and residence permits to only 23,000 of the 44,000 applicants. One year later, only 13,000 of those whose application was accepted were able to retain their permit, due to the strict renewal requirements in place. “Together with the strict legislation, the lack of a specialised agency staffed by experienced personnel and supplied with the necessary resources, contributed to perpetuate the existence of a large group of undocumented migrants.”

While the numbers of permits granted in the 1991 regularization was over four times that of 1986 (about 110,000 applications were accepted), the numbers of undocumented migrants in the country had also increased during that time. In 1993, therefore, the Spanish government introduced a system of quotas whereby a number of work and residence permits (between 20,000 and 40,000) were granted every year to migrant workers who would fill those jobs that Spanish nationals would not take. Then, in 1996, a new regularization process of limited scope was put in place, with the aim of addressing some of the problems that migrants with permits were facing in renewing them. About

---

269 The quota system was established as a mechanism to regulate immigration into Spain from non-EU countries. The policy of quotas sets a maximum number of permits per year to work in activities that are recognised as experiencing labour shortages, particularly in domestic service, construction and agriculture; about 30,000 work permits are issued a year. It has been argued that rather than acting as an instrument for managing non-Community immigration, the quotas have in fact served to regularise the situation of immigrants who were already residing illegally in Spain (Sole, C. and Parella, S. (1999) *The social partners and economic immigration into Spain*, European Industrial Relations Observatory Online (accessed October 2007: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1999/04/feature/es9904214f.htm)


272 Ibid.

22,000 permits were granted, in this instance, with applicants having numbered approximately 25,000.\textsuperscript{274}

The year 2000 saw a much larger regularization program, when some 163,000 applicants, out of about 245,000, were legalised. A further 36,000 were granted permits after 57,000 appealed the procedure. Around that time, 20,000 Ecuadorian migrants (out of 25,000 Ecuadorian applicants) were legalised in a special process aimed at workers of this nationality.\textsuperscript{275} Through regularizations and the quota systems, the Spanish government regularised about 630,000 illegal immigrants between 2000 and 2002.\textsuperscript{276}

In 2005 the latest regularization process in Spain took place, where nearly 700,000 applications were presented. This process differed from previous ones, in that the key requirement was that the migrant worker would not be able to apply for regularization themselves; rather, employers would have to submit applications on their behalf. Only self-employed domestic workers (i.e. working for more than one household) were allowed to submit applications for themselves. Other requirements included: the absence of a criminal record, the migrant’s continuous presence in Spain at least since August 2004, prior registration in a town hall, and an identification card.\textsuperscript{277} Most of the 700,000 applicants were regularised following the 2005 process.

6.6.4 \textbf{The impact of the 2005 regularization programmes on migrant women’s labour market outcomes}

Little is known about the impact of the regularization programs on immigrants’ labour market outcomes such as wages, human capital development (e.g. improved skills and education levels), labour-force participation and employment rates, their occupational distribution in the economy, and their participation in the hidden economy.\textsuperscript{278} This is in part due to serious knowledge gaps about irregular migration, but also, in the case of Spain, due to limited available research on the issue. Nevertheless, drawing on available statistical and other data, it is possible to make a partial assessment of the impact on migrant women of the 2005 regularization programme – the largest one in Spain to date.

According to official Spanish data, of all applications presented, 41% were from women. While data show that the 2005 regularization increased the percentage of successfully regularised migrant women (from 36.4% in 2005 to 39.7% in 2006), it is interesting to note that most of this change was experienced amongst eastern European migrant women.\textsuperscript{279} That is, while the percentages of Latin American, African and other

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{275} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{276} Ibid.


documented women migrants remained virtually unchanged following the programme, that of eastern European migrant women grew from 37.1% in 2005 to 43.8% in 2006. The percentage of documented Latin American migrant women was 49% in 2005 and 51% in 2006, and that of African women was 16% in 2005 and 17.3% in 2006. While the proportion of documented migrants from Latin America who are women is on a par with that of men, African women migrants have been unable to benefit from the regularization programme as much as their male counterparts, leaving a large majority of them (82.7% in 2006) undocumented.

In terms of the occupational sectors from which applications were received for the 2005 regularization, 31.7% were from the “household” employment sector alone, and 83.4% of the applicants from this sector were women.\textsuperscript{280} Official Spanish data shows that between 2005 and 2006, female regular employment in the domestic sector grew considerably (by 8.2 percentage points), a change experienced amongst the three main groups of women migrants in Spain: eastern European, African and Latin-American.\textsuperscript{281}

However, after a significant jump in the numbers of regularised domestic workers between 2005 and 2006, the sector experienced a decrease of over 20% in the number of regular domestic workers from 2006 to 2007. This decrease was experienced mostly among domestic workers originating from Eastern European countries, but also Latin America, and to a lesser extent Asia and Africa.

6.6.5 Discussion

Women’s participation in the Spanish labour force has been growing steadily over the last decade.\textsuperscript{282} At the same time, Spanish policy-makers have increasingly emphasised the importance of the “reconciliation of work and family life”, and of gender equality, which reflects a growing interest in helping Spanish women juggle work and family responsibilities.\textsuperscript{283} The emerging reconciliation and gender equality agenda responds to women’s growing participation in the labour force, as well as to accelerating growth and higher incomes over the same period.

This agenda, however, highlights the limitations of the public care infrastructure and services, particularly in relation to the care of children, the elderly and other dependent persons, which would enable more native-born women to become actively involved in the labour force by shifting care responsibilities to the public sector. The large stocks of immigrant women willing to take up low-skilled, poorly paid domestic and care jobs, act as a replacement for household and care labour for native-born women who are employed in the formal sectors of the economy. Many jobs in the domestic and care sectors were created

\textsuperscript{280} The hotel sector presented 10.36% of all applications, about evenly distributed between women and men.\textsuperscript{280} Construction and agriculture constituted 35.4% of all applications, most of them (94.92%) from men (Pajares, M. (2007) Inmigracion y mercado de trabajo. Informe 2007, Documento del Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigracion, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, España).


not as a result of women increasing their participation in the labour force, but simply due to higher incomes among the native-born population.\textsuperscript{284} Latin American migrant women in particular, due to common language and religion, provide “suitable” labour to fulfil these care roles.\textsuperscript{285}

As the data presented above shows, most migrant women who applied for permits through the regularization programme were employed in the domestic sector. Regularised migrants employed in domestic and caring services, however, remain vulnerable and are only partially integrated into the labour force. The Spanish legal framework categorises paid domestic work as different from other types of work, as reflected in the Special Regime of Domestic Workers regulating domestic employment. This regime does not include unemployment benefits, mandatory written contracts in all cases, and recognition of professional illnesses and accidents.\textsuperscript{286} The large numbers of irregular migrants working in the domestic sector are in an even more vulnerable employment situation.

In this context, “[d]omestic workers are represented as a solution to the care problem or, even, as a solution to women’s inequality… The rights of domestic workers are represented as subordinate to issues of ‘reconciliation’, middle-class families’ life quality, economic growth and increased employment”.\textsuperscript{287} The equal opportunities agenda applies primarily to native-born women; public infrastructure and services for reproductive responsibilities is not provided directly but indirectly in the form of migrant women who can allow native-born women to better juggle work and life.

Another finding emerging from the data and literature analyzed here is that a migrant’s region of origin was strongly associated with the likelihood of them benefitting from the programme. As we saw, while Eastern European and Latin American women experienced relatively high levels of regularization (compared to men from the same regions), African women lag far behind both their male counterparts and fellow women migrants from the other two regions. One possible explanation for this is the lower employment rates of North African migrant women compared to North African migrant men and to migrant women from other regions. One of the conditions of eligibility for the 2005 regularization programme was the ability to demonstrate having been in employment for the preceding one year. Official Spanish data show that overall, substantially fewer migrant women than migrant men of African origin are in the workforce; less than 25% of all African migrants in employment are women.\textsuperscript{288} In contrast, nearly 70% of all Latin American migrants and over 60% of all migrants from eastern European countries who are employed are women. The ability to qualify for, and therefore benefit from, the regularization programmes is tied


\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{287} Ibid. Page 276.

to previous employment status. As a result, the regularization programme could be said to have a selective effect whereby those who are outside the workforce (in this case, African women) are the least likely to be able to benefit from the initiative.

Similarly, it is possible that a vertical segmentation of the effects of regularization has taken place, whereby women of higher education levels are more likely to benefit from the regularization programmes. A decline in the numbers of regularised domestic workers following the 2005 programme could be seen as an indication that the regularization allowed some women to move into better paid jobs. It is also possible that the women who moved out of the domestic sector were those with higher education levels, who were able to benefit from the programme by having increased access to jobs more commensurate with their skills.

In addition, it is worth noting that an unintended consequence of the decline in the numbers of regularised migrant women in the domestic sector could be the creation anew of vacant positions in this sector in Spain, which would have been filled by other, mostly irregular, migrants. There is no evidence that the demand for domestic workers in Spain – as for other low skilled jobs – will decrease in the near future, barring a radical change in government policy, which means that the domestic sector will continue to provide employment to migrant women looking for jobs.

Finally, it is also important to note that because most of these permits were valid for only one year, it is possible, as was the case with previous regularization programmes in Spain and other countries, that many regularised migrants would return to “irregularity” following the expiry of their permits. This problem, also experienced in Greece and Italy, would have been compounded by the complex process for renewal of permits.

Further research and data gathering would be required for a definitive assessment of the impacts of the regularization programmes on the labour market outcomes of migrant women in Spain. In spite of the limited data available for a thorough analysis at this stage, existing data suggests that, while undoubtedly beneficial for a few, the regularization programmes are unlikely to benefit a large proportion of the most disadvantaged migrant women; i.e. those who are unemployed or out of the labour force altogether and those who, due to low education levels, are less able to move out of the domestic sector, which as discussed above, entails limited rights and scope for job mobility. An important policy instrument in the management of migration, regularizations alone can only have a partial effect on the integration of migrant women into the Spanish labour force.


6.7  Case study 2: Work–family reconciliation policy and migrant women’s labour market integration

6.7.1  Objectives

The objectives of this second case study are to understand the extent to which the labour market outcomes for migrant women are influenced by the same work–life balance policies as native-born women across Europe, and to identify indicators of potential problems of access for migrant women to the benefits of those policies and programs.

6.7.2  Background

In order to achieve the Lisbon objective of making Europe “the most competitive and the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”, it is essential to increase the labour market participation in Europe, especially the number of women in paid employment, as women’s labour force participation has historically been lower than that of men. The goal set by the EU is to increase female labour market participation rates to 60% across the EU. Gender equality policies play a central role in the realization of these goals. The EU’s policy approach in this regard includes legislation, gender mainstreaming and positive actions. The elimination of inequalities and promotion of gender equality in the EU is to be achieved in accordance with the EC Treaty that addresses gender equality. Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty deal with the subject of gender mainstreaming; Article 141 focuses on equality between women and men in matters of employment and occupation; and Article 13 concentrates on sex discrimination within and outside the work place. In addition, gender equality is also promoted and strengthened through the Roadmap for Equality between women and men. The Roadmap for Equality, developed in partnership with the Member States and other actors, sets out a number of priority areas for action for the 2006–2010 period. This set of policies aims to address the barriers to increased female labour force participation in the EU. One of these barriers is the extent of women’s care and domestic responsibilities, what the gender and labour literature called “reproductive work”. In order to achieve the goal of increased female labour force participation, a range of adequate policies facilitating the reconciliation of work and family life was put into practice.

The topic of flexible working patterns and gender-equality in the workplace is therefore firmly on the European Union agenda. The early EU recommendations were mainly on the issues of occupational segregation and equal pay; more recent policies put more emphasis on support for families and working parents. The initiatives that have been undertaken from 1992 onwards include council recommendations on childcare (92/241/EEC), certain aspects of the organization of working time (93/104/EC) and

---

balanced participation of women and men in family and working life (2000/C 218/02). The EU recommends that member states should encourage initiatives to enable women and men to reconcile their occupational, family and upbringing responsibilities arising from care of children (Art.1 1993), flexible and diverse childcare services should be provided to working parents, some special arrangements were recommended in regard to parental leave (maternity and paternity leave) as well as recommendations on sharing parental responsibilities. In general, the EU initiatives aim to encourage member states to create more child- and family-friendly societies.

While there is a range of policy instruments to improve women’s access to, and opportunities in, the labour force, this case study focuses primarily on what are here termed work–life balance policies; that is, the range of services and arrangements provided for workers including parental leave, flexible working hours, job protection after childbirth, and the provision of childcare and financial support for parents. This case study aims to assess the effect of work–life balance policies on migrant women’s labour force outcomes.

Research has indicated that general labour-force support measures, such as work–life balance policies, open to the entire population, primarily benefit nationals rather than migrants despite the fact that immigrants are over-represented amongst the unemployed and have lower labour-force participation rates. This is to a large extent because “equality in practice can be seriously hampered by lack of access, generally for practical reasons like insufficient knowledge (eg as a result of language barriers) of rights and the benefits to be had by participating in such general schemes”. This case study tests this hypothesis by examining the extent to which work–life balance measures impact on migrant women’s labour force outcomes as compared to those of native-born women.

6.7.3 Work–life balance policies in EU member states

While the EU can make general recommendations, the implementation of policies directly affecting workers is the responsibility of individual member states. In general, all EU countries have introduced some initiatives to improve work–life balance; however, large differences in the extent to which the state supports working parents in their domestic and care responsibilities are still present between countries.

The topic of gender equality policies has attracted considerable interest in Europe, and it is believed that the variations in policies to achieve work–life balance across Europe are the

---

295 For example, EU targets set during the European Council in Barcelona in 2002, state that, by 2010, member states should provide childcare facilities for 90% of children between three years old and the mandatory school age, and for 33% of children under three years old. In order to enable parents to use these services, it has been emphasised that it is crucial that these childcare facilities are affordable, accessible and of good quality. Member states were also advised to further support and promote more equal share of responsibilities for care of children between men and women (http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equity/gender_mainstreaming/familylife/family_life_reconciliation_en.html).


main reason for differences in female LFPRs in member states. The level of women’s labour market involvement is considered a result of the combination of the provision of public social services relieving women of the burden of dependents’ care, with access to paid leave and public transfers, which further enable women to combine family responsibilities and labour market participation. Because these rights differ between member states, women’s involvement in paid employment also varies between countries.298

To discuss the cross-national differences in policy provisions, this case study is based on Esping-Andersen’s typology of European welfare “regimes”.299 Analysis of social rights of individuals as shaped by their labour-market position allows Esping-Andersen to distinguish three main welfare regime models in Europe, the:

- **social democratic model**, present mostly in the Scandinavian countries
- **conservative model**, present in corporatist states of western and southern Europe (Germany, France, Austria, Italy, Spain300)
- **liberal model**, typified by the US, and only the UK in Europe.301

### 6.7.4 Gender equality policies in central and eastern Europe

The situation in “transition” countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is absent in the Esping-Andersen analysis and, as a result, these new EU member states are not subject to his typology. Because these ex-communist countries share similar experiences of previously moderate fertility and high labour-force participation, but have all undergone major transformations during the transition to a market economy period, they are usually described as one model302. During the socialist period, female LFPRs were traditionally

---


301 Esping-Andersen did not classify the UK as a liberal welfare model. According to his criteria, until 1980s UK combined certain elements of the social democratic and liberal elements, however in the last 20 years the welfare system was largely liberalised (Kofman, E. 2005 *Gendered migrations, livelihoods and entitlements in European welfare regimes*, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development).

higher in the CEE region than in West Europeans countries. Women’s work in this period was seen as essential to build the national economies. In order to facilitate female contribution to the economy, greater gender equality was promoted and “numerous programmes were therefore put in place (…) allowing women to combine their dual role as mothers and workers”.

However, during the transition period, reductions in the previously extensive system of public childcare drastically reduced female labour market participation. The sharp decrease in public expenditure in areas such as cash transfers to families, education and health affected women’s paid employment outcomes. Nevertheless, a gradual improvement in the programmes and policies supporting working parents has been observed in recent years.

6.7.5 Differences between native-born and migrant women’s access to services

The Esping-Anderson typology in general corresponds well with the provision of childcare in particular countries. However, migrants’ labour market outcomes not only depend on the welfare state itself, but are also influenced by other factors such as “entry” categories of immigration, and integration and citizenship policies.

The topic of the relationship between labour market outcomes and the welfare rights of third-country migrant women in European countries has not been extensively researched. Few studies analyse the variations between European welfare states and what effect this has on the employment of migrants. The existing literature on childcare-related social benefits and the citizenship rights of migrant women is also limited. Below we present a synthesis of the available data on these issues, in order to provide an overview on the relationship between gender-oriented policies and labour market outcomes. To present this overview, countries representing particular welfare systems were selected.

Restrictions to the labour market and consequently limited accessibility of childcare provision: Germany – an example of a conservative welfare regime

The post-war cohorts of migrants can be classified in two broad categories: ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler) and guest workers. At that time, the guest worker labour migration was predominantly male; however, the small number of migrant women that were entering the country until the mid-1970s had relatively high labour market participation rates compared with native-born women, whose role was mostly perceived as family-makers.


Ibid, p. 100.

Ibid.


Compare with Erdem, E. and M. Mattes, 2003, "Gendered policies – gendered patterns: female labour migration from Turkey to Germany from 1960s to 1990s", in Ohliger, R., Schönwälder, K and T.
In recent years, Germany limited labour immigration. Currently, the majority of immigrants arrive in Germany for family reunion (mostly women), and as refugees and asylum-seekers. The persistence of traditional gender relations with the male breadwinner model, and the fact that entitlement to public assistance is work-related, mean that women in Germany are in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis men in the labour market.

In Germany, there is a close relationship between labour market status and the provision of social assistance. Entitlement to social benefits is related to work performance; rigorous work tests are applied based on the principle that the level of benefits is equivalent to contributions.

First of all, immigrants arriving in the country within family reunion programmes have restricted access to the labour market for the first two years after arrival. As a result, “the reunited family has had to meet the test of economic self-sufficiency based on the single income of the male breadwinner”. This limited access to paid employment further weakens women’s ability to obtain permanent residence and citizenship in the receiving country. This is because, in order to be granted permanent residence, workers are required to contribute for five years to the social insurance system. Additionally, although the time spent on childcare counts towards workers’ contribution records, these periods are not classified as satisfactory to meet the requirement for an unrestricted residence permit.

The entry categories also stratify the status and access to social rights of refugees and asylum seekers. As it has been described above, access to social benefits is closely linked to the right to work in Germany. Therefore, restrictions in refugees’ and asylum seekers’ access to the labour market determine their entitlement to public assistance. The tolerated immigrants (unsuccessful asylum seekers) have the right to take up employment after six years of residence, and they are not entitled to family reunification rules, or to family allowances. On the other hand, people with recognised refugee status enjoy the wide range of social rights and access to employment.

From the 1990s Germany significantly tightened the immigration restrictions, at the same time imposing stricter rules to the exercise of welfare rights. The procedures to become permanent residents and citizens are more restrictive as all applicants are required to be financially self-sufficient. However, the limited availability of programmes aimed at migrants, as well as the conditions to entry employment and insufficient provision of social

---


308 Until 2000, when the new regulations came into force, the restrictions on the arriving family member were for the period of 4 years. See Morris, L. 2002, Managing migration. Civil stratification and migrants rights, London: Routledge, p. 35 in Sainsbury, D. 2006, op. cit.


310 Ibid.

311 In March 2007, Germany’s policymakers reached an agreement that provide residency permits for asylum seekers whose applications were denied but whose deportations have been deferred for legal or economic reasons. Compare with <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?fID=593>, accessed November 2008.

312 Ibid.
benefits make it extremely difficult for some migrant groups (especially women) to achieve similar labour market outcomes as native-born residents.  

**Inclusive immigration regime: Sweden – a social-democratic model**

Sweden has experienced similar migration patterns as Germany. In the post-war period, the largest immigrant groups were workers; from the mid-1970s, family reunification, refugee and humanitarian migrants become the dominant patterns of immigration.

The Swedish migration regime aims to redistribute a wide range of benefits for all residents, thus not having the stratifying effect as that in Germany. In addition, the rules for family reunification are quite generous and migrants have equal cultural and political rights as Swedish citizens. Less rigorous work and contributions requirements were gradually implemented in the Swedish welfare system from the early 1980s, with little differentiation in social rights according to entry category. In general, migrants can legally work in Sweden after a short period of residence, and they also have the right to social assistance. Contrary to Germany, eligibility to access public support is not work-related, and all residents have rights to public support regardless of their employment status.

Gender equality policies are well developed in Sweden and are based on the principle that the state should help women to reconcile domestic/care and employment-related duties. The aim of extensive benefits and childcare leave is to increase female attachment to the labour market. For example, the opportunity to take extended paid leave(s) makes women more likely to return to work after a period of childbearing. Parents are entitled to a generous 450 days compensated leave per child, with an additional 180 days for multiple births. That leave can be used at any time the parents prefer, until a child is 8 years old. The level of compensation during the time of leave depends on prior earnings; on average parents receive 80% of their previous income up to an income ceiling. Parents not employed prior to the birth of their child are eligible only to a fixed amount of €6.7 per day. In this way, the Swedish welfare system encourages individuals to participate in the labour market before having children, so as to fully benefit from childcare leave. Job security is guaranteed and the regulations on job protection for parents returning from the parental leave are extended to a period of 18 months after the childbirth. In addition, parents have the legal right to work shorter hours until the child is 8 years old.

The system of public childcare offers universal coverage and is based on children’s needs. Parents have access to highly subsidised childcare services, and although the total cost of

513 Ibid.
515 These benefits include: unemployment benefit, occupational injury benefits, parental benefits, national health insurance and child and housing allowance.
516 Sainsbury, op. cit.
fees increased significantly in recent years, the price is still much lower than the actual market value of these services. Publicly-funded childcare facilities are therefore extensively used by parents, with 76% of children aged 1–5 attending public day nurseries in 2000. Childcare use for very young children (0–2 years) is also very high, with 65% of children reported to be in the childcare facilities in 2003.

Comparative studies on the labour force participation of mothers living in Britain, Germany and Sweden, which represent different welfare models, found that there are no differences in these three countries in the rate of return to work after the birth of the first child. Women living in Sweden, however, are more likely than British and German women to return to work after having a second and/or third child. In addition, in Germany and Britain the level of education of women plays a significant role in determining their labour market participation, with women with higher human capital more often returning to work than their less-educated counterparts. The educational attainment was less important in Sweden, where “also less educated women have entered the labour force by the time the child is two years old”.

The universalistic welfare state and the extensive provision of childcare services are key factors explaining the high female employment rates and relatively high fertility rates in Sweden. Interestingly however, although migrant women can access these services to the same extent as native-born women, their labour market outcomes are different. Some authors argue that labour market outcomes are not only related to access to public services, but also reflect the background and country of origin of immigrants. Immigrants coming from countries with different levels of development and cultural values than Sweden (for example, asylum seekers coming from particular countries) may still keep certain forms of behaviour associated with their country of origin. In this respect, third-country migrant women may prioritise their role as a family maker over labour market participation. “The impact of (...) cultural norms, perhaps being related to less equal gender roles, could produce more 'conservative' patterns of behaviour, where women who are more oriented towards family responsibilities are less active in the labour market”. A study on childbearing dynamics in Sweden identified considerable differences in behaviour between immigrant groups representing different nationalities. Women from Turkey, Vietnam and in particular from Somalia show very fast progression to become a mother, at the same time having weak links with the labour market. Quite generous access to social security benefits may actually act as a disincentive to work for many migrant

---

319 Pylkkanen, E., op. cit.
women, with the so-called “speed-premium” on the next birth acting as an additional factor encouraging them to stay at home. Furthermore, because childcare is institutionalised and delivered in public settings, it poses limited opportunities for migrant women to work in childcare occupations.

There are two other factors that may explain weaker migrants’ attachment to the labour market. Although available literature does not describe these factors as gender-specific, they can, to a certain degree, help us to understand why migrant women are not achieving the same labour market outcomes as native-born Swedish women. First of all, the Swedish economic crisis of the 1990s brought limited availability of jobs and a high unemployment level. As a consequence, migrants coming to Sweden during that time were in a disadvantaged position to find employment. It is argued that previous inactivity negatively influences employability of migrants, while lack of Swedish-market experience deteriorates the chances of their gaining employment even further. The severe economic crisis explains the situation of most refugees and asylum seekers, who were coming to Sweden in large numbers during that period.

The second factor influencing labour market outcomes of migrants is the extent to which they have previous Swedish work experience. Although there are specific migrant-inclusion programmes helping newcomers to integrate better within Swedish society, by acquiring essential linguistics skills and having their foreign educational credentials recognised, immigrants “are lacking country-specific human capital valued by employers. Experience gained in the Swedish labour market makes migrants’ skills more useable and that, in turn, contributes to their productivity” because employers in general value more receiving-country work experience. It may explain the situation of Swedish migrant women who come primarily for family reunification. Initial difficulties in entering the labour market may be perceived by them as a discouraging factor and negatively influence their subsequent employment-related initiatives.

Denmark – a social-democratic model with more recent immigration

Denmark, like many other Western European countries, recruited guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s. Even though these workers were not originally supposed to stay in Denmark for a long period, many of them are still residing in the country. The rapid

---

526 “So called ‘speed-premium’ for mothers who intend to have another child soon after the previous child. A mother is guaranteed to have the same level of compensation without returning to employment if there is not more than 30 months in between the childbirths. The main purpose of this rule was to stimulate fertility among Swedish mothers” in: Pylkkänén and Smith, op. cit.
527 In many European countries migrant women are over-represented in childcare sector.
530 Ibid.
growth of an immigrant population can be observed in the last twenty years, with family reunification members, asylum seekers and refugees constituting the largest proportions of newcomers. This is reflected in there being younger migrant women here than in most other EU countries, as was seen above in Chapter 2. It has been observed that, although migrants have access to the same level of social assistance and are subject to an intensive integration programme upon arrival, they do not achieve the same labour-market outcomes as the Danish nationals. Currently, faced with an ageing population and labour shortages, Denmark is trying to attract more labour immigrants. From 2002, a job-card initiative has been operating to facilitate the recruitment of people with the professional qualifications demanded by employers.

Analysis of the situation in Denmark is interesting as it shares the same welfare ideology as Sweden and has similar labour market characteristics for native-born workers. It allows us to examine in more detail the role of a welfare state on the employment patterns of migrant women, and to what extent provision of gender-oriented policies differentiate labour market outcomes for native-born and migrant women.

Compared with Sweden, Denmark offers less-generous leave provision for parents in terms of duration and financial compensation, with less focus on shared responsibility in childcare between parents. In order to be eligible for maternity leave, women are required to have a regular income during the latest 13 weeks before childbirth. The leave starts 4 weeks before the expected date of delivery and is extended to another 14 weeks after the birth. From 2002, an additional 32 weeks of parental leave is offered to parents. It can be taken by either parent, but they cannot be on leave at the same time.

The level of compensation during leave depends on the sector of the mothers’ employment. Usually full-wage compensation is offered for public sector workers, while private sector employees’ compensation is calculated according to the rules of the unemployment insurance system and is typically in the range of 60–70% of previous earnings, with a maximum of 90%. Because more women than men work in the public sector, which guarantees full-compensation during parental leave, and when in the private sector women tend to earn less than men, there is a strong economic incentive “to let the mother use (...) parental leave, which could have been shared between parents.”

Families in Denmark, similarly to Sweden, have access to publicly provided, highly subsidised childcare services, thus childcare coverage rates are high. It is reported that 64%

---


334 For some unions and public sector the length of pre-birth maternity leave is 8 weeks.

335 Up to 2002, it was 10 weeks and parents still tend to be on paternal leave for a period of 10 weeks only.


337 More than 50% of all working women are employed in the public sector. Pylkkanen and Smith, op. cit.

338 Ibid, p. 11.
of 0–2-year-old children and about 92% of children aged 3–5 are in registered childcare. The governmental regulations state that parents can pay up to 30% of the total cost of childcare provision, and low-income families can usually use childcare services for free. The large subsidies for childcare encourage parents to use the facilities, even if parents are not working, thus there is an excess demand for places in many regions. Private and informal childcare is sometimes used, with about 3–4% of women in Denmark engaged in untaxed childcare activities.

The other gender equality regulations include job security upon parent’s return from leave and flexible work arrangements for parents. Contrary to Sweden, only parents employed in the public sector have the right to work shorter hours in Denmark. In addition, they are entitled to have up to 10 days off work annually with full pay if the child is ill.

The sector of the parent’s employment has a strong effect on their return to work after childbirth. A study of working conditions in the private and public sector in Denmark found that public sector employment usually offers more family-friendly working conditions. Therefore mothers in the public sector are more likely to return to work after a period of childbearing than their private-sector counterparts.

Another important aspect differentiating between Sweden and Denmark is the proportion of part-time workers. While in Sweden, part-time work is popular among parents of young children, with 46% of mothers working part-time in 1998, in Denmark, the proportion of part-time workers has been declining in recent years, reaching the level of only 17% of all employed women in part-time arrangements (compared to 43% in 1983). In addition, women in Sweden are more likely to have shorter career breaks if there are young children at home; with Danish mothers more likely to stay at home with their children. It seems that women in Denmark either work full-time or do not work at all.

In general, migrants in Denmark enjoy similar social rights as Danish nationals; however, the regulations have been considerably tightened in the recent years. There is an intensive integration programme for migrants coming on humanitarian grounds, with tuition in the Danish language and culture to facilitate the better integration of newcomers. Family-reunification migrants have to sign a declaration of integration, and commit themselves to

---

339 Immervoll and Barber, op. cit.
340 Pylkkonen and Smith, op. cit.
341 In general, priority to access childcare services is given to individuals who are either working or are registered as unemployed.
342 Ibid. The high level of taxation in Denmark discourages women to work as childcare providers as part of the legal economy, and therefore these services are usually provided in the underground economy. For most of these women, it is a part time job, with 10 or less hours weekly.
343 Some privately employed workers have the right to 14 days leave annually to care for unwell child.
345 Pylkkonen and Smith, op. cit.
making an effort to learn the Danish language and becoming self-dependent through gainful employment.\textsuperscript{346}

The general barriers to the labour market in Denmark are similar to those in Sweden. Migrants in Denmark were also hit by the economic recession in the 1990s and it is possible that they still experience the negative effects of that downturn. It is argued that the recent progress in the labour market outcomes of migrants is more related to the decrease in the unemployment rate than to increased participation rates.\textsuperscript{347}

With regard to gender-specific barriers, the majority of Danish women work in the public sector, which is perceived as a more family-friendly type of employment. A third of all jobs in Denmark are in the public sector, thus difficulties in accessing this type of employment disadvantages migrants and so affects their overall economic performance. It has been noted however that, overall, the penetration of immigrants in the public sector in Denmark is greater than in most other European countries\textsuperscript{348}, although gender-specific analysis is not provided. An unequal distribution of women migrants across public and private sectors may still, therefore, be a factor in explaining their LFPRs being lower than those for native-born women.

Currently, the largest proportion of third-country migrant women falls into the category of family reunification and humanitarian migrants, and it has been reported that these women face several difficulties upon arrival to Denmark. First of all, their foreign qualifications are not easily recognizable by employers; second, they usually possess lower levels of educational attainment than native-born Danish women. Significant gaps in the rates of employment are observed during the first years of arrival, and it is possibly that slow labour market entry has an important impact on their later career and earnings progression in Denmark. In addition, the “flexicurity” of the Danish system with very limited employment protection and a high degree of social security, is sometimes described as having a negative impact on work incentives, in particular for the low skilled workers group. In practice, flat-rate social security schemes are on a comparable level to the wages of low-skilled workers, thus “immigrants tend to be overrepresented among those who may find themselves in a so-called ‘unemployment trap’”.\textsuperscript{349} As reported by Schultz-Nielsen, “more than a third of employed immigrants would only experience marginal income losses if they would be unemployed, and more than one in five would even be financially better off”\textsuperscript{350}. Because a high level of social benefits may de-motivate migrants to take up employment\textsuperscript{351}, there were some changes made to the policies; and now migrants currently receive a lower-level of social assistance in the first seven years of their stay in Denmark.

\textsuperscript{346} Immervoll and Barber, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{347} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{348} Liebing, T., op. cit., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{349} Liebing, T., op. cit., p. 37-38.
\textsuperscript{351} Although it is not the case for native-born Danish workers.
Although the employment rates of migrant women are considerably lower than native-born women, the gender gap is small in the EU context. Similarly, the pay gap experienced by migrant women in Denmark is lower than the pay gap of female migrants residing in other European countries.352

In general, it is believed that intensive integration programmes play a major role in the overall performance of Danish migrant women. The employment-related schemes, targeted at migrant women, are based on the mentoring principle allowing migrant women to acquire a better understanding of the Danish labour market and the necessary skills to be successful in gaining valuable employment there.353

Privatised childcare – United Kingdom – liberal model
The post-war immigration pattern to the United Kingdom can be characterised as a colonial model. The formerly colonial links meant that the majority of migrants were coming from the old colonies and taking up mainly low-skilled jobs in industrial and service industries. From the 1970s, the inflow of workers decreased significantly. However, most migration was still labour-related. At present, workers constitute the largest migration group in the UK, counting for more than 50% of total inflows.354 Current migration programmes, in general, favour skilled migrants. Migration regulations are slowly moving in the direction of a points-based immigration system, and this, in turn, will make it even more difficult for low-skilled workers to enter the British labour market.355

The second biggest category of people coming to the UK is made up of family members joining the primary migrant worker. In general, family reunification schemes grant family members leave to enter on the same conditions as the migrant worker, meaning that they have the same legal and social rights to settle and work in the UK.356 In practice, family members have free access to the labour market and are not restricted in undertaking employment.

The liberal labour market rights are not, however, supported by state initiatives to provide assistance for working parents. Although gender equality policies are promoted in Britain, “British governments have followed a market-based approach to the provision of childcare services”357. Lack of accessible and affordable childcare of acceptable quality is the main deterrent to women’s labour market activity, and it has the largest effect on low-income families. The public provision of childcare is usually limited to some pre-school education for 4-year-old children and selective nursery provision for families with special social needs.

352 Liebing, T., op. cit.
353 Ibid.
354 Kofman, op. cit.
The majority of pre-school childcare is provided by the private sector meaning that “access to formal childcare is largely income dependent”.

A qualitative study examining how the immigrant families manage to work and care for young children in various European countries found that, in Britain, there are large differences in childcare provision between families of different social and financial status. The small sample of families analyzed does not allow researchers to draw conclusions that can be applied to the whole migrant population in the UK, however some patterns of migration that shape and explain the strategies for work–life balance were identified. In general, long-term highly qualified professional migrants represent the dual-career model. They can afford private childcare facilities and extensively use formal services. This delegation of childcare responsibilities means that both parents can advance their professional careers by actively participating in the labour market.

The situation of low-earning families is rather different. Economic pressures to work (low income) and pressures from work itself (long working hours, atypical hours) shape childcare practices. These two factors mean that the provision of childcare is mostly negotiated within the family, with women sacrificing their employment to look after children. The high cost of paid childcare is the main factor influencing migrant women’s decision to cut the number of working hours, take up part-time work, work on alternate shifts (with the partner) or give up work completely. This mother-centred strategy of childcare characterises many low-paid immigrant families in Britain trying to reconcile work and childcare.

The state’s emphasis on market-oriented childcare solutions, and consequently placing the burden of childcare responsibilities on families, strengthens the inequalities between those who can afford to pay for child day-care facilities, and the disadvantaged groups (low-income, migrants) who cannot. Exclusion from the labour market does not result from not having the right to work (as in Germany). It is, rather, influenced by the difficulty, and sometimes even inability, to combine family responsibilities and paid employment. The privatization of childcare system is one of the main reasons explaining differences in labour force participation between various migrant groups. This contrasts with the situation in Denmark and Sweden, where even low- and average-income families usually have access to formal care provision (typically low-cost).

---

360 In case of short-term migration of professionals more common is a male breadwinner model. Compare with Ibid.
362 Although in general migrants outperform native-born British in terms of financial contribution to the economy (amount of taxes paid, percentage of workers in professional occupations etc.), this is the case for migrants coming from other developed countries (the US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada). Migrants coming to the UK from other countries are more often found in low-paid occupations (Rendall, M.S. and J. Salt (2005) “The foreign-born population” Ch.8 in Chappell, R (ed.) Focus On People and Migration, London: Palmgrave).
Another factor contributing to the disadvantaged position of migrant women in the UK is related to their access to maternity leave. In general, all employees are eligible to benefit from parental benefit, regardless of their nationality. However, there is an important distinction between the category of “employee” and “worker”, with workers having fewer rights to benefits. The category of worker covers most agency workers, short-term casual workers and some freelancers. Workers have rights to maternity, paternity and adoption pay (but not leave). Because migrant workers (especially low-skilled ones) are more likely to work for agencies (rather than directly for an employer) and on temporary contracts, they may in fact enjoy fewer social rights than native-born workers, and this, in turn, may influence their labour market outcomes.363

6.7.6 Cross-national comparisons of migrant and native-born mothers’ employment and childcare use

Previous analyses of the labour-force participation rates of foreign nationals versus citizens have shown that the influence of children may be different between these groups; but that the association of this migrant status with labour force participation varies substantially from country to country.364 The combination of welfare-regime and immigrant inclusion policy typologies described above provides a framework for understanding these inter-country differences. If migrant women have equal access to family–work reconciliation programmes and policies as native-born women, then the same policies that operate in a powerful way to differentiate the labour market outcomes of native-born women across Europe should operate similarly to differentiate the labour market outcomes of migrant women. If migrant women have less access, due to possible structural barriers that exclude migrant women, then different patterns may be seen for migrant women than for native-born women with family care responsibilities.

Following the empirical analyses of the association of family status with migrant and native-born women’s labour force participation (Chapter 2) and unemployment (Chapter 3), we compare now the employment rates of third-country migrant and native-born women in the eight countries for which we have adequate data in the EU LFS on women’s family status. We compare the employment rates of women with children under 5 years old with the employment rates of women with children only aged between 5 and 14 years old. If access to childcare is similar between migrant and native-born women, the employment rates of migrant women with children under 5 relative to those with children 5 to 14 should be similar to those for native-born women. The results are shown in Figure 6-1a for third-country migrant women and in Figure 6-1b for native-born women. We retain the “old” migrant-receiving and “new” migrant-receiving groupings used in Chapter 3 for this analysis. Note, however, that these two groups have a different meaning in the “welfare regimes” typologies. In Esping-Andersen’s typology, they are all in the same, “conservative” regime group. In others’ typologies, the southern European countries form a more familistic group, separate from the five north and west European countries in the first migrant-country group.

363 http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Parents/Moneyandworkentitlements/Parentalleaveandpay/DG_10029285

Looking first at the differences for third-country migrant women (Figure 6-1a), in all but Portugal, the employment rates of migrant women with children under 5 years old are lower than the employment rates of women with children aged 5 to 14 years old only. In the five “old” migrant-receiving countries, the employment differences are large, at around 15 percentage points lower for women with children under 5 years old. The largest difference by children’s ages, however, is found in Greece, where migrant women with children under 5 have an employment rate more than 20 percentage points lower than that for women with children aged 5 to 14 years old only.

Source: Labour Force Survey

Looking first at the differences for native-born women (Figure 6-1b), in all but Portugal, the employment rates of native-born women with children under 5 years old are lower than the employment rates of women with children aged 5 to 14 years old only. In the five “old” migrant-receiving countries, the employment differences are large, at around 15 percentage points lower for women with children under 5 years old. The largest difference by children’s ages, however, is found in Spain, where native-born women with children under 5 have an employment rate more than 20 percentage points lower than that for women with children aged 5 to 14 years old only.

Source: Labour Force Survey
The pattern of employment rates by family status is much different for native-born women (see Figure 6-1b). The dominant pattern is for women with children under 5 to have employment rates equal to those for women with children aged 5 to 14 only. Austria and France are the only exceptions to this pattern. Even in those cases the gap in the employment rates by family status is less than for migrant women.

These large differences, between the rates for third-country and native-born women, are suggestive of greater problems of access to work–family reconciliation policies and programmes, particularly those involving the provision of childcare. This possibility may be explored using data from the 2005 LFS ad hoc module on the Reconciliation between Work and Family Life. Included in this module are women with children under 14 years old. They are asked questions including whether they are using formal childcare of any kind if working, and whether they are satisfied with their balance of time in work and carer roles. The preliminary analyses by Eurostat show that the social democratic countries of Denmark, Finland and Sweden have the highest overall rates of childcare use, but also that Belgium, France and Portugal all have relatively high rates of childcare use. Immigrant sample sizes are sufficient in seven countries for us to be able to compare childcare use between third-country migrant women and native-born women with at least one child under 5 years olds (see Figure 6-2).

**Figure 6-2: Proportion of employed women with children under 5 years old using formal childcare services**

![Bar chart showing the proportion of employed women with children under 5 years old using formal childcare services by country. The chart includes data for Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Austria, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. The rates are shown for migrant and native-born women.](chart.png)

Source: Labour Force Survey

These results suggest that, in general, migrant women in the workforce are able to use formal childcare services at mostly similar rates to native-born working women. In those countries including Belgium and Portugal in which formal childcare is commonly used, relatively high proportions of working migrant women also use these services. Although

---

native-born women’s use of formal childcare is greater in Belgium and Ireland, the country of residence appears to be a bigger determinant of migrant women’s use of childcare than is their migrant status. The countries in which migrant women have the lowest rates of childcare use (Austria and the Netherlands), for example, are countries in which native-born women have equally low rates of childcare use (respectively 10 and 15% of women with children under 5).

When women with children under 14 years old (regardless of whether the women are currently working) are asked if they “Wish to change the organization of their working life and care responsibilities”, however, migrant women are much more likely than native-born women to say that they “wish to work or work more (and reduce caring time)”, and somewhat less likely than native-born women to say that they “wish to work less to have more time for caring”. These results are shown in Figures 6-3a and 6-3b.
In all four of the “old” migrant receiving countries, migrant women are more than three times as likely to report wishing to work more than are native-born women. The absolute difference is greatest in the Netherlands, where 22% of migrant women versus only 7% of native-born women with children under 14 report wishing to work more. However, 11% of migrant women in the UK, 8% in Belgium, and 7% in Austria also report wishing to work more, compared to only 5, 2 and 2% respectively of native-born women with children. It is noteworthy too that in the “new” migrant-receiving countries of Greece and Spain, where migrant women’s labour-force participation rates are similar to those of native-born women, 6 and 11% of migrant women respectively wish to work or work...
more, compared to only 2 and 4% of native-born women. Migrant women are either no more likely or less likely than native-born women to report wishing to work less and have more time for caring (see Figure 6-3b). Native-born women in Greece and Spain are most likely to report wishing to work less and have more time for caring. As many migrant women in those countries (7 and 10% respectively), however, report wishing to work less as report wishing to work more. This is in strong contrast to the “old” migrant-receiving countries, where wishing to work more is consistently more common. The Netherlands is again the most extreme example, with only 2% of migrant women wishing to work less, and 22% wishing to work or to work more than they do currently.

6.7.7 Discussion

Various aspects of the immigration and welfare regimes have an influence on the labour market performance of migrant women living in the selected countries that were analysed in this case study. Integration and gender equality policies influence female migrants’ attachment to the labour market. As shown in the case studies analysis, integration programmes have a positive impact on migrants’ performance, while policies helping to reconcile work and domestic duties are an additional factor than contributes to better incorporation of migrants in the labour market. Although sometimes availability and access to social transfers may discourage migrants to take up jobs (in particular low-skilled migrants working in low-paid occupations), usually social childcare assistance have a positive effect on the employment rates of migrant women. Sweden and Denmark being examples of countries with the extensive maternal support, and are also reporting the smallest gender- and pay-gap between native-born and migrant women in Europe. Limited access to the labour market (Germany) and financial difficulty in making use of some forms of childcare provision (the UK) mean that migrant women residing in these countries may find themselves in a disadvantaged position when compared to their native-born counterparts.

The effects of welfare regimes and immigrant admission regimes, however, may be counteracting. Immigration status and motivation for entering the host-country play an important role in shaping employment experience of migrant women, with those who come for the work purpose usually achieving better outcomes. Migrants arriving to European countries on the family reunification and humanitarian grounds, in particular if they are coming from culturally and socially distant countries are usually more disadvantaged in the labour market, especially in the first years upon arrival. This is seen for the immigrant admission regimes in the Nordic countries, in which almost no avenues for labor migration from outside Europe have existed in recent decades, leaving only asylum seeker and spouse routes. Because asylum seeker admissions are based primarily on evidence of political suppression, a condition visibly affecting men more than women due to their greater participation in the political spheres of migrant sending countries, primary applicants are more likely to be male migrants. Women may either follow or accompany the primary applicant as a spousal migrant. Both refugee and tied-migrant

---

status have been associated with poorer initial labour-market outcomes than primary labour migrants\textsuperscript{368}.

While many of the European countries with Social Democratic and Conservative regimes have very few avenues open for “third-country” labour migration, this is much less the case for either the Liberal regime of the U.K. or for the “new” migrant-receiving countries of Southern Europe and Ireland\textsuperscript{369}. The U.K. is especially notable as one of the few developed countries anywhere to admit more migrants currently through work-related paths than through family unification. Work-related admissions have also become very common in Southern Europe. This has occurred especially through “regularisation” programs in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain that have sought to give legal work and residence permission to undocumented immigrants already living and working in the country. Under these programs, regularisation is made contingent on the migrant’s having a job (e.g., Spain) or showing evidence of having paid into employment-based social security or social welfare funds (e.g., Portugal). The labour force participation and employment of migrant women in countries with entry programs and regularisation programs favouring labor migrants, both male and female, are therefore likely to be higher than in those countries whose female migrants come primarily through humanitarian and family unification admission routes.


\textsuperscript{369} OECD (2006; 2007), op cit.
7.1 Introduction

Migration is rapidly becoming one of Europe’s main policy challenges of the 21st century. Both push and pull factors, as well as the increasing availability and ease of transport, are driving an increase in migratory movement – creating opportunities as well as challenges for receiving countries, migrants and countries of origin. The role of migration in mitigating some of the current and future pressures on labour demand, its impact on security and social cohesion, and issues around the rights of migrants (especially women migrants) are particular foci of attention.

This study looked specifically at the position and level of integration of migrant women in the EU labour market. Our analysis found that third-country migrant women have lower labour-force participation rates, higher unemployment levels, a higher degree of occupational concentration in low skilled jobs with poorer conditions, and a higher prevalence of “under-employment” and “de-skilling” compared to EU-born migrant women, native-born women and migrant men. These are all indicators of difficulties incurred in integrating third-country migrant women into the labour force. Our research also reveals significant differences between Member States in their levels of integration of migrant women measured through these indicators. However, the empirical analysis afforded by the EU LFS does not elucidate drivers underlying migrant women’s differential outcomes in different Member States.

Put together, the findings in this study indicate that barriers other than education levels, numbers of children, and willingness to work, influence migrant women’s outcomes in the labour force. While these other barriers may include lack of language proficiency and unfamiliarity with the labour market of the receiving country, the study suggests the possibility that structural, systemic obstacles are also at play. These may include inadequate provision of suitable housing (i.e., in locations conducive to better employment outcomes); limited rights (especially for certain groups of migrants such as asylum seekers or irregular migrants) to access key public services; and discrimination in the labour market on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, religion or gender.

7.2 The policy challenges

The findings of this research suggest that there may be traction to be gained by implementing policies both for improving and expediting migrant women’s integration,
and for reducing discrimination. There are myriad policies that can contribute to the effective integration of migrants – especially migrant women – into the labour market of receiving countries. For example, for integration, policies that improve affordability and accessibility of language training may be helpful given the evidence that language is a barrier to integration into the labour force. Increased visibility of, and wider access to, support services such as employment advice and training could also make important contributions. There are also a raft of directives and procedures – that could be more carefully utilised, monitored and enforced where necessary – to reduce discrimination including instituting effective complaints procedures, using information campaigns, and highlighting the role of public bodies as “model employers”.

Through an assessment of two policy responses to the specific challenges that migrant women face in the EU labour force, and in countries within the EU (namely the regularization policies in Spain and work–family reconciliation measures across the EU), the study found that a “policy mix” is likely to be required that tackles migrant women’s disadvantage in the labour force from different angles. A multiplicity of factors, which are often deeply entwined, affect a migrant woman’s propensity to participate in the labour force, for example the number of children she has, her level of education and skills and language proficiency, as well as factors extrinsic to the migrant herself, such as legal barriers and discrimination. In view of this, initiatives addressing these issues within a coordinated approach are likely to achieve better outcomes than those tackling individual aspects in isolation. The evidence from the case studies in Chapter 7 is particularly telling in this respect: single policies (such as regularization or work–family reconciliation packages) that address specific aspects of migrant women’s situation in the labour force are necessary but insufficient to produce the expected results. However, developing coherent, comprehensive policy approaches that confront these challenges and help optimise women migrants’ contributions to their receiving societies continues to be a challenge in the EU.

One of the main challenges in the development of coordinated approaches within a “policy mix” is that the evidence available on the situation of migrant women is still erratic and research in this field is still extremely limited. This seriously compromises the ability of decision-makers to develop sound, effective and evidence-based policies. For example a lack of understanding of the skills base of migrant women can hamper efforts to optimise their placement in, and contribution to, the labour force and to society as a whole. As shown in Chapter 6, a significant proportion of migrant women in the EU labour force are employed in jobs not commensurate with their skill levels. This high incidence of “de-skilling” amongst migrant women hinders the EU’s aim of “skilling-up” its workforce and increasing its global competitiveness. Expanding and improving the evidence base on migrant women’s skills and their current situations in the labour force could help develop policies to harness their potential and improve both their own outcomes and collective well-being.

The often segmented, compartmentalised nature of policy-making also militates against the development of a suite of measures tackling migrant women’s disadvantage from

---


multiple perspectives. Lack of co-operation, co-ordination and information-sharing both horizontally (across government departments and across Member States) and vertically (with relevant local and supra-national institutions), and of departmental objectives and imperatives, often prevent what UK policy-makers have called joined-up policymaking, ie the co-ordinated development of policy on a particular area, such as migration, transport or youth. The differences in the situation of migrant women in the labour forces of different EU Member States compound the difficulties of developing and implementing an effective, coherent and meaningful policy approach. Even though this kind of co-operation in policy-making has its weaknesses (most notably the difficulty of assessing impacts given the need for more complex performance measures and monitoring structures, and concerns over accountability), it also has the potential to deliver stronger, more effective policy.

In addition, the development of a coherent policy approach to confront the challenges faced by migrant women in the EU labour force can also be hindered by political conjecture. For example, fears about the pressures placed by immigrants on public services, communities and cultures, as well as concerns about the threat of terrorism, have become widespread amongst citizens in immigrant-receiving countries in the EU. These fears, whether founded or unfounded, contribute to a lack of political appetite for measures to help immigrants integrate into their receiving societies. Rather, political emphasis is increasingly placed on measures to “control” and “manage” migration, even as governments are also trying to “steer towards new policies that recognise an objective economic and demographic demand for new immigration in future decades”. Public animosity against immigrants and contradictory political demands in terms of migration policy may impede the development of comprehensive, sustained approaches to integrating migrant women, and men, into “host” labour forces and societies.

7.3 Tackling the policy challenges

These barriers to the development of comprehensive policy approaches to improving migrant women’s opportunities in the labour force need not be intractable. First, current governmental and non-governmental interest in migration can be harnessed to replace the current limited research on the situation of migrant women in the EU labour force with a robust base of evidence. Developing a coherent, thorough research agenda for Europe, which Member States can take forward, could make an important contribution in this direction. In addition, and of equal importance, is the creation of an evidence base about what policies work in integrating migrants, women in particular, into the labour force. This evidence is necessary to inform effective policy-making.

Second, in many ways the EU has become an important actor in setting migration policies, not least because of the removal of internal borders and strengthening of the common external border. With the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the formal responsibilities of the EU and the effectiveness of its decision-making processes will further increase. Given the shared concerns across Europe, both with managing migration and optimising its positive impacts on receiving societies, the EU may want to explore how best to support  

the exchange of information and good practices. Among such practices would be the encouragement of the approach of joined-up policy-making within Member States. A step in this direction has been the establishment of National Contact Points on Integration and the Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners, published by the European Commission in 2007 in all EU official languages. Moreover, while primary responsibility for action on integration lies with the Member States, the EU has unique policy levers at its disposal to make an important contribution in this respect. For example, in view of its competence in areas such as the development of mainstream strategies on employment, social inclusion and health, the EU has opportunities to influence national policy to promote the integration of migrant women into the labour force.

Third, against the background of intense public interest, but also open hostility towards immigrants, there is a growing need for a stronger, more balanced pan-European debate about the positive contribution of immigration and immigrants to the region. It is imperative to allay not only public concerns about security, crime and social cohesion, but also possible mistrust and resentment about the development of measures that favour migrant workers. Governmental and European institutions have an important role to play in this respect, given their power in shaping perceptions and understandings of migration and the contribution of immigrants to receiving societies.373 As one researcher put it, “[t]he public has had little explanation of the rationale for migration policies and has not accepted that migration is a necessary part of Europe’s future and that it can bring benefits”.374 But there is more to this than communication, as governments should strive to develop consistent evidence and policies – across departments – that express a coherent view of the need for migrant labour, the role and rights of migrants, the relevance of their contributions, and also their responsibilities and duties. Given this, there is potentially a role for the EU to promote leadership at national and local level that will foster a more balanced public debate in which facts about migration and its place in the future of the region are in the public domain.

### 7.4 Re-valuing the work of migrant women

Throughout the study, wider questions about the cultural, social and economic value accorded to the work of both migrants and women – and migrant women in particular – insinuate themselves. The need to “make the case” for migration is increasingly pressing, especially given the three interrelated realities of demographic change in Europe, increasing labour force participation of women, and growing evidence that migrants, in this research migrant women, are frequently doing work that the native population does not take up.

The skills and capacity that women provide to European economies are increasingly significant given the agenda for jobs and growth. The European agenda for greater gender equality also calls for facilitation of this female participation. However, it is not always acknowledged that until now women’s growing participation at work has been facilitated by migrant women’s increasing participation in the caring and domestic work that in most

---


households was traditionally the province of native-born women. These migrant women, in a sense, provide the infrastructure that enables higher numbers of native-born women to enter paid employment, especially in medium- and high-skill occupations.

While providing employment to a significant proportion of migrant women, work in the domestic and care sectors is riddled with difficulties. A growing body of evidence collected from ethnographic and life-history approaches to the study of migrant women’s experiences suggests that the unregulated, insecure and privatised nature of migrant women’s domestic service leaves migrant women vulnerable to exploitation and facilitates the occurrence of labour exploitation and human rights abuses.\(^{375}\) The protection of domestic and care workers and the provision of security and benefits are crucial to ensure that the economic and social successes of some are not built on inequalities and the exploitation of others. These changes not only require effective and practical measures and policy instruments; a systemic re-valuation of domestic and care work, their role in the economy and in society and their contribution to the welfare of communities and societies is also necessary if the rights and opportunities of these workers are to be realised. This ties in with the imperative that quantitative indicators of employment (such as unemployment and labour-force participation rates), are addressed alongside the quality of employment for migrant women – as well as for migrant men, native women and disadvantaged groups – discussed in previous chapters.

7.5 Creating an evidence base

Research across several areas and from a range of approaches is needed to inform an effective strategy for improving the situation of migrant women in the European labour force. The accumulating evidence already points both to a range of possible choices and measures. Some of the possible interventions are available within the existing policy framework and agenda.

There are, however, two key challenges in developing a robust evidence-base to inform effective policy to integrate women into the labour force. First, many policies targeting migrants in general have been subject to evaluations which often fail to take into account the policy’s specific impact on migrant women, who tend to have rather different experiences than men (a point clearly illustrated in the case study of Spain’s regularization policies in Chapter 6 of this report). This “gender blindness” is unfortunately still all too common in policy evaluations, and has serious implications for understanding a policy’s effectiveness, as well as for developing ways to address its weaknesses. Second, the impact of general support policies on migrants (and migrant women specifically) is often overlooked in favour of an analysis of impact at an aggregate level. The case study on work–life balance policies, which are general support measures not targeted specifically at migrant women, indicates that while beneficial for other groups these policies may not have equally positive impacts on migrant women. Research into general support policies which could improve outcomes for women should also pay particular attention to their

impact on migrant women specifically, in order to avoid over- or under-estimation of effects and to improve policy design and delivery.

Text box 7-1: A research agenda for evidence-based policy

While providing significant and valuable insights into the situation of migrant women in the EU labour force, and its policy implications, this study also highlights possible directions for future research on issues requiring further study to inform effective policy. Some of these issues involve “descriptive” research, which maps a particular phenomenon, for example the impact of religion on labour market integration, the effect of modes of entry and legal status on labour force outcomes, and so forth. Crucially, further research is also sorely needed on the impact of different existing and potential policy and regulatory approaches on the economic and social outcomes of migrants, in particular, and on the receiving societies and communities as a whole. Some of the questions emerging from this study include: How do public care infrastructure and work–life balance policies affect the types of employment that migrant women access? What are the most effective ways of providing education and skills training to migrants, especially women, so that an aggregate positive effect on migrants’ labour force outcomes can be experienced? What is the impact of different regulatory approaches to domestic work on the working conditions and economic and social welfare of migrant women domestic workers? How can employers, including public administrations, be encouraged to play a positive role in the full and equitable integration of migrant workers? How can key infrastructure and services (such as housing, healthcare, and employment advice) be delivered to migrants in ways that contribute to their social and economic integration? What does “gender mainstreaming” immigration policies, and “immigration mainstreaming” gender policies really entail in practice?

In spite of, or possibly because of, the challenges of developing a robust evidence base for policy- and decision-making in the area of migration, there is a great need for initiatives for, and investment in, the development of our understanding of the situation of migrant workers and relevant policies. It is hoped that this study, together with others that precede and complement it, will form the basis for an intelligent, coherent research agenda to inform policy-making in Europe.


Coalition Against Trafficking in Women http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/italy.htm


Global Forum on Migration and Development. Highly skilled migration: balancing interests and responsibilities. Background paper prepared for the First Meeting of Global Forum


SOPEMI. *International Migration Outlook 2007*, OECD.


Appendix A: Verified countries
Table A1: Verification results derived from the EU LFS Anonymised Files, 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total migrant labour force verified?*</th>
<th>Female migrant employment rates and unemployment rates verified?**</th>
<th>Total non-national labour force verified?***</th>
<th>All &quot;yes&quot;?</th>
<th>All &quot;no data&quot;?</th>
<th>First two criteria verified?</th>
<th>At least one of the first two criteria verified and neither contradicted?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no (-0.55%)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>no (-0.2%)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total "yes"**** | 14 | 16 | 13 |
| Total "no"       | 2  | 1  | 1  |
| Total "no data"  | 7  | 6  | 9  |
| Sum total        | 23 | 23 | 23 |

Notes:


**** The processed data are in agreement within 0.1% of the published data for total migrant labour force, and within 0.5% of the published data for both the migrant women’s employment rates and unemployment rate.
Appendix B: Data to accompany Chapters 2 to 6
Table B1: Migrant labour force breakdown by male/female and EU/third-country, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Migrant labour force as % of total labour force</th>
<th>EU-born migrants</th>
<th>Third-country migrants</th>
<th>(Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>1,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>1,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All 14</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.6%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,633</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,531</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,028</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Force Survey

Notes:
- * Although the table listed 16 countries, the sum total in the bottom of the table represents only the total of 14 countries. Italy and Ireland are omitted from this “All 14” total because data for distinguishing EU-born and third-country migrant are unavailable.
- “n.a.” indicates that the figure is not available.
### Table B2: Labour market participation rates of native-born, all migrants, EU migrants and third-country migrants in selected EU countries by gender, ages 15–64, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(Percentages)</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>All migrants</th>
<th>EU-born migrants</th>
<th>Third-country migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 14*</td>
<td></td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Force Survey

Notes:

- Labour market participation rate is the total labour force, ie the total number of employed and unemployed persons, as a percentage of the working age population.
- * Although the table listed 16 countries, the sum total in the bottom of the table represents only the total of 14 countries. Italy and Ireland are omitted from this “All 14” total because data for distinguishing EU-born and third-country migrant are unavailable.
- “n.a.” indicates that the figure is not available.
Table B3: Employment rates of native-born, all migrants, EU migrants and third-country migrants in selected EU countries by gender, ages 15–64, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>All Migrants</th>
<th>EU-born Migrants</th>
<th>Third-country Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 14*</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Force Survey

Notes:
- Employment rate is the number of people in employment as a percentage of the working age population.
- * Although the table listed 16 countries, the sum total in the bottom of the table represent only the total of 14 countries. Italy and Ireland are omitted from this “All 14” total because data for distinguishing EU-born and third-country migrant are unavailable.
- “n.a.” indicates that the figure is not available.
Table B4: Unemployment rates of native-born, all migrants, EU migrants and third-country migrants in selected EU countries by gender, ages 15–64, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>All migrants</th>
<th>EU-born migrants</th>
<th>Third-country migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male Female</td>
<td>Male Female</td>
<td>Male Female</td>
<td>Male Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3.9 4.6</td>
<td>10.8 10.5</td>
<td>6.1 7.8</td>
<td>12.4 11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6.5 8.4</td>
<td>15.3 19.1</td>
<td>6.9 11.3</td>
<td>21.8 26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>4.2 6.7</td>
<td>6.7 6.1</td>
<td>6.3 13.2</td>
<td>6.8 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>6.4 9.7</td>
<td>9.8 16.1</td>
<td>13.4 15.9</td>
<td>2.7 16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.3 5.0</td>
<td>8.6 10.5</td>
<td>4.3 9.3</td>
<td>10.6 10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7.7 9.2</td>
<td>12.9 17.3</td>
<td>6.2 10.0</td>
<td>15.4 20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6.2 15.4</td>
<td>6.7 15.6</td>
<td>9.8 17.0</td>
<td>6.3 15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7.1 7.4</td>
<td>3.0 6.4</td>
<td>3.3 8.9</td>
<td>2.9 5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4.5 3.8</td>
<td>5.9 6.3</td>
<td>n.a. n.a.</td>
<td>n.a. n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.2 9.7</td>
<td>6.8 14.5</td>
<td>n.a. n.a.</td>
<td>n.a. n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>3.0 4.5</td>
<td>4.2 7.5</td>
<td>3.4 6.6</td>
<td>9.6 13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.7 4.5</td>
<td>10.8 10.0</td>
<td>6.2 5.5</td>
<td>11.8 11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7.0 9.1</td>
<td>8.3 10.4</td>
<td>7.8 13.7</td>
<td>8.5 9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6.8 11.9</td>
<td>9.1 13.8</td>
<td>6.5 11.2</td>
<td>9.5 14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.8 6.6</td>
<td>14.9 13.3</td>
<td>6.2 6.0</td>
<td>19.6 18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.0 4.1</td>
<td>7.3 6.6</td>
<td>5.6 4.5</td>
<td>7.9 7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All 14</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.2 7.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.1 12.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.3 8.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.3 14.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Force Survey

Notes:
- Unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force
- * Although the table listed 16 countries, the sum total in the bottom of the table represent only the total of 14 countries. Italy and Ireland are omitted from this “All 14” total because data for distinguishing EU-born and third-country migrant are unavailable.
- “n.a.” indicates that the figure is not available.
Table B5: Labour market participation rates of native-born women, all migrant women, EU migrant women and third-country migrant women by education levels, ages 15–64, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>All migrants</th>
<th>EU-born migrants</th>
<th>Third-country migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All 14</strong></td>
<td><strong>84.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>70.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>77.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Force Survey

Notes:
- “High” indicates the highest qualification achieved is tertiary education or advanced research qualification (ISCED 5-6); “medium” indicates the highest qualification achieved is between upper secondary and post-secondary education; “low” indicates the highest qualification achieved is between pre-primary and lower secondary education.
- Labour market participation rate is the total labour force, i.e., the total number of employed and unemployed persons, as a percentage of the working age population.
- * Although the table listed 16 countries, the sum total in the bottom of the table represent only the total of 14 countries. Italy and Ireland are omitted from this “All 14” total because data for distinguishing EU-born and third-country migrant are unavailable.
- “n.a.” indicates that the figure is not available.
Table B6: Employment rates of native-born women, all migrant women, EU migrant women and third-country migrant women by education levels, ages 15–64, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>All migrants</th>
<th>EU-born migrants</th>
<th>Third-country migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All 14</strong></td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Force Survey

Notes:
- “High” indicates the highest qualification achieved is tertiary education or advanced research qualification (ISCED 5-6); “medium” indicates the highest qualification achieved is between upper secondary and post-secondary education; “low” indicates the highest qualification achieved is between pre-primary and lower secondary education.
- Employment rate is the number of people in employment as a percentage of the working age population.
- * Although the table listed 16 countries, the sum total in the bottom of the table represent only the total of 14 countries. Italy and Ireland are omitted from this “All 14” total because data for distinguishing EU-born and third-country migrant are unavailable.
- “( )” indicates that the figure lacks statistical reliability due to small sample size.
Table B7: Unemployment rates of native-born women, all migrant women, EU migrant women and third-country migrant women by education levels, ages 15–64, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Native-born</th>
<th>All migrants</th>
<th>EU-born migrants</th>
<th>Third-country migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 14*</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Labour Force Survey

Notes:
- “High” indicates the highest qualification achieved is tertiary education or advanced research qualification (ISCED 5-6); “medium” indicates the highest qualification achieved is between upper secondary and post-secondary education; “low” indicates the highest qualification achieved is between pre-primary and lower secondary education.
- Unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force.
- * Although the table listed 16 countries, the sum total in the bottom of the table represent only the total of 14 countries. Italy and Ireland are omitted from this “All 14” total because data for distinguishing EU-born and third-country migrant are unavailable.
- “( )” indicates that the figure lacks statistical reliability due to small sample size.
- “.” indicates that the figure is unreliable and not publishable, due to very small sample size.
- “n.a.” indicates that the figure is not available.