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TECHNICAL REPORT

U.S. Combat Commands’ Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative

A Training Manual

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Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
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Summary

This document is a manual for the Geographic Combat Commands (GCCs) to use in training personnel assigned to GCCs for participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises. Its purpose is to help the GCCs deal with the normal issues arising from staff turnover and sometimes insufficient institutional memory. Since the inception of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003, 36 of these exercises, which constitute the core of PSI’s regular, sustained activities, have been planned and carried out.

This training manual is one of two documents covering RAND’s recent work on PSI for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The companion document, which both draws from and contributes to the material in this manual, focuses on the enhancement of PSI’s effectiveness through its enlargement to include five key countries that have so far chosen not to participate in PSI (i.e., the “holdout” countries).

This manual consists of nine sessions of lectures and seminars, each programmed for one or two hours. The sessions are structured so that the number of sessions used and/or the time allocated to an individual session can be reduced to fit the GCC’s training purpose and available time. The material covered in the nine sessions is as follows:

- **Session 1: PSI History and Background.** This session addresses PSI’s creation in 2003, its purpose, its role as an activity (not an organization or an international agreement) aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and its conduct of interdiction training exercises.
- **Session 2: PSI Design and Interdiction Principles.** The focus in this session is on how PSI works to serve its purpose, the central role of PSI’s Operational Experts Group (OEG), and the basic interdiction principles that provide the basis for voluntary cooperation among the 93 countries affiliated with PSI.
- **Session 3: U.S. Laws Relevant to PSI.** This session concentrates on the legal basis for the military support that the United States provides to PSI, as well as on the criminal and civil legal infrastructure authorizing intelligence collection, export control, and border control among the activities embraced by PSI.

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2. Originally planned as a syllabus, this document evolved into a training manual over the course of the project.
Session 4: International Agreements Relevant to PSI. This session addresses the various international agreements that provide legitimacy for PSI by making nonproliferation a universal norm. The agreements are briefly described in groups covering counterterrorism, United Nations Security Council Resolutions, bilateral ship-boarding agreements, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and U.S.-sponsored programs that assist other countries in detecting concealed WMD items.

Session 5: Incentives and Disincentives for PSI Participation. This session focuses on the incentives and disincentives that have figured in the choice made by more than 90 countries to affiliate with PSI and in the choice of the five “holdout” countries (China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia) to refrain from affiliation. Both the public-good and the collective benefits resulting from PSI are discussed, along with the national benefits accruing to PSI affiliates. Also considered are the disincentives that some countries associate with PSI: possible abridgement of their sovereignty, compromise of their independent foreign policy, limits on the right of innocent passage, and possible violation of the law of the sea.

Session 6: Detection of WMD, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials. This session covers the detection of illicit WMD items, by which we mean WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. The WMD items are grouped according to whether they are radioactive or nonradioactive (this second category includes chemical and biological weapons and agents), and the different systems and techniques for detecting WMD items are then discussed separately for the two groups.

Session 7: PSI Exercises and Lessons Learned. This session addresses the what, when, and who questions associated with the 36 exercises that PSI activities have encompassed since 2003—the effect that these exercises have had on the will and determination of nations to counter proliferation, the strength of and coordination among the countries and agencies participating in the exercises, and the expanded range of countries that engage in the exercises.

Session 8: Responding to Issues Challenging PSI. This session considers several challenges and objections to PSI that have arisen. The challenges and objections and appropriate responses to them are discussed in relation to specific topics: the law of the sea, the right of innocent passage, uncertainty about the circumstances in which PSI interdiction efforts would actually be applied, and the putative U.S. dominance of PSI that causes some countries to be concerned that PSI affiliation will imply closer association with U.S. policies than they would like.

Session 9: Enhancing Capabilities for PSI Participation. A nation’s affiliation with PSI—and the frequency and intensity of its participation—is entirely voluntary. This session is concerned with the ways in which PSI’s exercises and discussions can affect the capabilities of participating countries; in other words, how participation can improve customs and invoicing practices, enhance inspection and detection capabilities, increase the sharing of information related to suspected proliferation activities, increase the interoperability of communications and other systems, improve interdiction and decisionmaking processes, and aid in identifying and, where necessary, interdicting transshipment of WMD items.
Note to the Reader

Between the writing of this volume and that of the earlier, companion volume, changes occurred that affect some information relevant to both volumes: (1) There are now 93 countries, rather than 91, participating in PSI. (2) The number of PSI exercises that have been conducted is now 36, not 34. (3) Documents formally located on U.S. government Web sites have ceased to be at those sites, primarily because they have been moved to archival locations in reflection of the change in the U.S. administration that occurred on January 20, 2009. The numbers, documents, and URLs in this training manual are current as of February 2009.