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R E P O R T

Exploring Patterns of Behaviour in Violent Jihadist Terrorists

An analysis of six significant
terrorist conspiracies in the UK

Lindsay Clutterbuck, Richard Warnes

Prepared for the Airey Neave Trust

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Preface

This report, prepared for and funded by the Airey Neave Trust, presents the results of research into the six terrorist groups/cells and their 38 core individuals who had taken part in the six most serious terrorist conspiracies and attacks in the UK between 2004 and 2007, all of which were driven by the ideology of violent Jihadism as espoused by Al Qaeda. In each case the terrorists successfully launched or unsuccessfully attempted an attack, or were arrested and convicted of conspiring to carry out a terrorist attack, exhibited any specific types of behaviour. The research provides a detailed examination of the behaviours exhibited by violent Jihadist groups/cells and the individuals within them in order to see if particular types of behaviour were present that could help to indicate their intentions.

The report should be of interest to government officials dealing with managing investment programs related to innovation and sustainable development, policymakers in the domain of technology policy, researchers studying the field of science and technology, and research and development centres in private companies.

All terrorist groups or cells intending to carry out an attack using an improvised explosive device (IED), irrespective of their motivation or cause, must plan and prepare for their act of terrorism. They must acquire or make explosives and a detonator, and devise and construct a means of initiating the explosion. If they cannot purchase or steal explosives, they must make their own from legitimately available materials. To carry out these tasks, they need to find premises in which they are safe and where their activities will not arouse suspicion. Once they have met these needs, they will require information in order to select a target and to plan the attack. They may need forged or fraudulent documents to gain access where it is denied to them and weapons to support the attack or prevent capture. They will also require somewhere to live (ideally away from the premises where they are constructing the IED), and the means to communicate with each other and to travel around. To finance all of these things, they need money.

Terrorist attacks involving the use of IEDs appear to conform to a cycle consisting of four broad phases, starting with planning, moving on to preparations, then implementation and finally escape. However, the increasing use by certain terrorist groups of suicide attacks has caused this cycle to alter. Suicide attacks still require planning and preparation, although with more specialised elements than before, while the attack itself can be implemented in a variety of different ways. Obviously, for the suicide attacker, no escape plan is required, but in the aftermath of this type of attack, the exploitation of its propaganda value is now far more sophisticated than just a claim of responsibility by the group or the release of a

more detailed justification. In this type of attack the cycle becomes one of planning, preparation, implementation and exploitation.

While these attack cycles and the functional requirements at their core can be found at the heart of virtually all terrorist groups or cells, the way they achieve them varies according to the environment in which the group/cell are operating. As an example, the tactics, weapons, explosives, targeting and intelligence gathering techniques of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) – who conducted a campaign of terrorism in Northern Ireland and mainland Britain from the early 1970s onwards – evolved in different ways to suit the terrain in urban centres like Belfast or rural areas like South Armagh. In many areas, the IRA could rely on the silence of the community as they conducted their activities. This was not the case during the periodic extension of their attacks onto the British mainland, particularly against targets in London, and consequently they had to operate in a different, more clandestine manner.¹

By the early 1980s, the IRA had refined their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) not only to suit the circumstances in Northern Ireland but also when they were operating on the British mainland. The mainland was regarded as “enemy territory” and the IRA members involved took great trouble to blend in and be as unobtrusive as possible. When acting in this way, sometimes under direct observation from counter-terrorism surveillance teams, they exhibited a variety of behaviours specifically related to the task they were performing. Outside of these, they deliberately behaved in a way almost indistinguishable from anyone who has to live, travel and work in London or elsewhere on the British mainland. As the threat from Irish Republican terrorism began to reduce with the development of the peace process from 1997 onwards, the threat from a different source began to increase dramatically. This time it was violent Jihadism inspired by the ideology of Al Qaeda (AQ).

This first became apparent as increasing numbers of UK citizens travelled abroad to Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq to take part in what can be described as violent Jihad. In November 2000 it manifested itself in an attempt to launch terrorist bomb attacks in Britain. Two men of Bangladeshi origin and with no known links to any terrorist group were arrested in possession of 70 kg of the home-made explosive known as HMTD (hexamethylene triperoxide diamine), home-made detonators and mechanical timers.² Eventually, the Security Service linked the attempted attack or attacks to Al Qaeda.³ By the year 2007 at least six concerted attempts, all driven by violent Jihadism, had been made to carry out mass casualty attacks in the UK. One, the so-called 7/7 attacks, resulted in the deaths of fifty two people in four linked suicide bombings on the public transport network in London on 7 July 2005.

Like the IRA, the violent Jihadist groups/cells responsible for the attacks, failed attacks, attempted attacks and attack conspiracies in the UK all needed to carry out particular tasks related to the core elements of planning and preparation. These included the design and

¹ See O’Callaghan (1998), pp.142–48, for an inside account of how the “England Department” operated in the 1980s. See also McGladdery (2006), chapters 4–6, and Oppenheimer (2009).

² BBC News, 27 February 2002.

³ BBC News, 13 August 2006.

construction of an IED and the selection of a target. However, in addition to the behaviour of the groups/cells as a whole, individuals participating within them also undertook specific actions on their behalf; the very nature of violent Jihadism itself also seemed to generate a number of other, specific personal behaviours in its adherents. Taken together, these individual behaviours, relating to the functional aspects of terrorist attacks and those specifically associated with violent Jihadism, may help to identify the mindset of those who exhibit them.

The aim of this research was to see if individuals who had taken part in the six most serious terrorist conspiracies/attacks in the UK exhibited any types of behaviour that could be viewed as particular to the conspiratorial, planning or preparatory phases of their attacks and, if this proved to be the case, whether those behaviours could have indicated their ultimate intentions. All of the attacks and conspiracies took place between 2004 and 2007 and all were driven by the ideology of violent Jihadism.

It was decided early on in the research design that if these types of behaviour did occur in individuals, examining them in isolation from the environment they occurred in could be misleading. The data gathering and analysis was therefore carried out within the context of each group/cell the individuals were operating in and for comparative purposes data was also collected on the characteristics exhibited by each of the six groups/cells.

Group/cell characteristics were of two types, either intrinsic or consequential. Intrinsic characteristics are fundamental in nature, such as the number of individuals operating in the core group/cell, the age range of its members, and so on. Consequential characteristics flowed from their conspiratorial behaviour and overall activities of the group/cell members. These in turn were driven by its aims and how its members set about the task of trying to achieve them – for example, whether the group/cell were committed to using suicide attacks or whether its members attended training camps in Pakistan. The six groups/cells were compared across a range of characteristics of both types.

Having carried out an analysis at the group level, the next stage was to repeat the process at the level of the individual and to study both their characteristics and their behaviour. By looking at the behaviour only of individuals who have been convicted of the most serious types of terrorist attack conspiracy (or who killed themselves in pursuit of this aim) the research was able to focus on individuals who were unequivocally known to be involved in terrorism and whose behaviour had been subjected to the extremely close scrutiny of the criminal justice investigative process. A total of thirty-eight individuals were examined: thirty-three had been convicted for their part in attacks or conspiracies and five others had killed themselves in suicide attacks.

Finally, it must be emphasised that our research was not an attempt to discover or construct a profile of any particular type of individual (an endeavour that is counter-productive and ultimately doomed to failure, as terrorism is too diversified and complex a phenomenon to yield anything as simplistic as a profile of its participants), nor was it an attempt to identify any single type of behaviour in an individual as being a diagnostic indicator of their involvement in planning or preparing terrorist attacks. This would be difficult but perhaps not impossible in certain circumstances. For example, in the UK, the manufacture or possession of explosives of any type has been very strictly controlled for well over a century. Their possession or preparation by an individual is therefore highly

likely to be illegal per se, irrespective of motive.⁴ While this would not be a definite indicator of terrorist intent, if such behaviour was observed a police investigation into a potential link to terrorism would be certain to occur.

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⁴ Legislation to control the making of IEDs (then called “infernal machines”) was first introduced in 1883 as a result of a series of bomb attacks in London and elsewhere carried out by Irish-Americans. Targets included the House of Commons, railway stations and trains on the London Underground railway. See Short (1979).

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Summary

The aim of this research was to see if individuals who had taken part in the six most serious terrorist conspiracies and attacks in the UK exhibited any specific types of behaviour before or during the conspiratorial, planning or preparatory phases of their attacks and, if this proved to be the case, whether those behaviours could have indicated their ultimate intentions. All of the attacks and conspiracies took place between 2004 and 2007 and all were driven by the ideology of violent Jihadism.

The empirical research is based around the premise that no matter what their background or cultural origin, terrorists will exhibit certain types of behaviours, both as groups and as individuals, during the planning and preparation phases of an act of terrorism. Previously much research in this field has focused on constructing profiles based on the characteristics of particular individuals involved in terrorism, or who potentially may become involved in it. This approach has at best proved inconclusive and at worst has been time consuming and counter-productive. Horgan argues that “profiling the individual and his/her presumed associated qualities has no future in serious analyses of either the terrorist or the pathways to radicalization.”⁵

In contrast, the research here provides a detailed examination of aspects of the behaviours exhibited by violent Jihadist groups/cells and the individuals within them prior to and during the time they conspired, planned and prepared to commit an act of terrorism. To ensure its validity and relevance, data have been drawn from the six most significant conspiracies involving violent Jihadist groups/cells, which occurred in the United Kingdom between 2004 and 2007. In each case the terrorists successfully launched or unsuccessfully attempted an attack, or were arrested and convicted of conspiring to carry out a terrorist attack.

Having introduced the research in greater detail, the report goes on to outline the history and backgrounds of the six main conspiracies, before examining the organisational and general characteristics of the groups/cells involved. It then examines in detail both the group and individual behaviours of those violent Jihadists involved, before looking at the behaviours associated with attack planning and preparations. Finally, the report raises the question of whether such past behaviour can indicate potential future intentions and, if so,

⁵ Horgan (2008), p.92.

whether such behavioural indicators might be used to signal the possibility of individual or group involvement in the planning and preparation phases of a terrorist attack.

As a prerequisite to answering this question, the report identifies the generic behaviours the six terrorist groups/cells share with others also attempting or carrying out mass casualty attacks using explosives. It also identifies many behaviours specific to violent Jihadism and terrorism. The six UK case studies show there are three categories of such behaviours developing from “radicalisation”, to “transition to violent Jihad” and then to “terrorist attack planning and preparation”. While these categories of behaviour overlap and can be seen in certain individuals as stages over time leading towards their decision to conspire and implement a terrorist attack, they are not deterministic. Individuals may exhibit behaviours associated with the “upper level” of one category without ever proceeding on to the next.

Using the categorised data from the six case studies, the report demonstrates that there are certain distinctive behavioural characteristics displayed as a result of planning, preparing and implementing an act of terrorism. While accepting that additional refinement and testing will be necessary to identify “signal indicators” of use to police and security forces, these findings open up the possibility of identifying through their behaviour individuals and groups engaged in the planning and preparation of a terrorist attack, thus allowing such attacks to be prevented or disrupted before they can be implemented.

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1.1 **An overview of relevant research**

There have been numerous publications of case study research focused on specific groups who use terrorism.⁶ A far smaller number examine terrorist behaviour in detail and often the concentration is on specific areas of a group's organisation, its activities or perhaps on a single aspect of behaviour relating to a sample of individuals.⁷

Some examine the various tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) utilised by terrorist groups/cells to carry out preparations, identify targets and conduct attacks. These include publications examining the TTPs of specific terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or more generally those of particular types of organisations, such as militant Jihadist groups.⁸ In addition, a number of publications have looked at terrorist TTPs in broader terms, examining activities and behaviours amongst a range of terrorist groups. The research of Jean-Luc Marret, Bard O'Neill and Malcolm Nance are examples.⁹ However, few of them go so far as to utilise a large number of specific data sets as a basis for a comparative analysis of terrorist groups/cells operating in the same environment and the behaviour of the individuals within them.

The first published attempt to use demographic and biographical information to try to analyse the individuals who participated in what is referred to as the "global Salafist Jihad" was undertaken by Marc Sageman in 2004.¹⁰ He investigated the backgrounds of 172 individuals worldwide who had been involved in violent Jihadism between the mid-1990s and 2003. He used seventeen variables, grouped under the headings of "social background", "psychological make-up" and "circumstances of joining the Jihad". Some of the variables are characteristics in the sense used in this research (for example, age, geographical origins) and some were behaviours (for example, crime and criminality). His main conclusions arise from the application of a social network analysis to this data, although he also highlights a number of particular Salafist behaviours.

⁶ For example, on the IRA see English (2004) and Coogan (1995); on Sendero Luminoso see Strong (1992); on the Red Army Faction see Aust (2008). There are many others.

⁷ For example, see Jackson (2005) and Bergen & Pandey (2006). The focus of both is on the educational background of violent Jihadists

⁸ See Bowyer-Bell (1990), Poole (2004) and Oppenheimer (2009).

⁹ Marret (2002), O'Neil (2005) and Nance (2003).

¹⁰ Sageman (2004); and also Sageman (2008).

By 2006, three other researchers had taken a similar methodological approach. Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke gathered biographical data on 373 terrorists associated with “global Salafist Jihad”.¹¹ They used twelve variables, most of them selected for their relevance to issues of nationality and immigration status. Also included were data on whether or not they were converts to Islam. Not unexpectedly, their conclusions focused mainly on the immigration and nationality status of participants and the implications of the findings for the immigration authorities in the USA.

Petter Nesser, a researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) gathered a variety of data from open sources on an unspecified number of individual case studies of Jihadis in Europe to look for “insights into the composition and group dynamics of the cells”.¹² His initial published findings concentrate on the development of a typology of the members of these cells. Nesser characterises them according to four main roles: the “entrepreneur”, “the impressionable whizz-kid”, “the misfit” and “the drifter”.

Concentrating on the period from 2001 to 2006, Edwin Bakker utilised 242 biographies to describe thirty-one case studies of “Jihadi terrorism” in Europe.¹³ He used fifteen variables to categorise his analysis. Bakker acknowledges the influence of the methodological approach of Sageman and uses his research results from 2004 in order to carry out a comparative analysis. His overall conclusion is that “European Jihadi terrorists are rather different from Sageman’s global Salafi terrorists... in particular [in] age, family status, and socioeconomic and geographic background”, but are not too dissimilar in the circumstances of how they became involved in Jihadism.¹⁴

In 2007, Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt of the New York Police Department published their study entitled “Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat”. They carried out a comparative analysis of “prominent homegrown groups/plots” from the USA, Canada, Australia, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.¹⁵ Various aspects of individual and group behaviour exhibited by actual and potential violent Jihadists from a number of different countries were identified and then used to draw up a “conceptual framework for understanding radicalization in the West”. The framework in turn was used to analyze “three post-September 11 U.S. homegrown terrorism cases”, namely Lackawana, New York; Portland, Oregon; and Northern Virginia.

This research takes a different approach. Rather than collecting and aggregating data from as many case studies as possible, then looking for similarities and differences within each category, irrespective of differences in organisation, modus operandi or geographic location, it concentrates on a very detailed examination of thirty-eight violent Jihadis. These were the core members of six different groups or cells all of whom were involved in the planning, preparation and implementation of terrorist attacks in the UK over a three-year period, from 2004 to 2007.

¹¹ Leiken & Brooke (2006).

¹² Nesser (2006).

¹³ Bakker (2006).

¹⁴ Bakker (2006), p.56.

¹⁵ Silber & Bhatt (2007).

All of them therefore operated in broadly the same environment and did so during the same relatively short period of time. It is hoped that by adopting this focused approach, better insights can be obtained into their organisation, functions and behaviour.

In the context of this research, the words below are assigned the following definitions:

- *Violent Jihadism (VJ)*: The violent actions of groups and individuals that are inspired, incited and encouraged by the religion, ideology and actions of Al Qaeda or related groups.
- *Terrorism*: The use or threat of violence to advance a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.¹⁶
- *Group/Cell*: A number of individuals who act together with a common purpose and may be encouraged, inspired or incited in their actions by another group/cell.
- *Conspiracy*: An agreement between two or more individuals to pursue a course of conduct resulting in or amounting to a criminal offence.¹⁷
- *Characteristic*: An innate factor that forms part of the wider attributes of an individual or a group/cell.
- *Behaviours*: The actions or reactions of an individual or a group/cell.

1.2 Research design

This research has used data gathered on both the characteristics and behaviours of thirty-eight individuals who operated in six separate violent Jihadist groups/cells. Each of the groups/cells were actively planning or preparing to launch terrorist attacks against targets in the UK between 2004 and 2007 and in all instances they implemented their planning and preparations with the objective of causing mass casualties.

All the data were obtained from open sources, whenever possible using information that arose directly from the criminal investigations and trials of thirty-three of the individuals. In the case of Operation Crevice (the longest trial in UK legal history, stretching from March 2006 to May 2007) court records of evidence were also used. However, to obtain as full a picture as possible, other trials and reports emanating from them were examined to identify further pertinent information.

In some cases, the trials of additional individuals alleged to have been directly involved in a conspiracy took place over subsequent years (for example, Mohammad Momin Khawaja in relation to Crevice, convicted in Canada in October 2008). Others have been brought to trial since the trial of the main conspirators, usually in connection with some aspect of the original conspiracy (in the cases of both 21/7 and 7/7, for example). Finally, there have been trials of other individuals that indicate the wider dimensions and connections of the original conspirators, such as the presence of four of the 21/7 conspirators at a “training

¹⁶ Based on the UK Terrorism Act 2000, s.1, as amended by the Counter Terrorism Act 2008. The word “violence” has been used here to replace the word “action” as used in the legislation in order to give a sharper focus to the research.

¹⁷ After UK Criminal Law Act 1977, s.1.

camp” in the UK and of two of them at a paintballing session organised by Mohammed Hamid (subsequently convicted at a separate trial of organising terrorist training and incitement to murder).¹⁸ There have been both convictions and acquittals in all these cases and where relevant information has come to light, it has been used to populate the research datasets.¹⁹

Data were gathered on the characteristics and behaviours of both the groups/cells and the individuals they contained. The behaviours looked for in individuals were those where they were acting on behalf of their group/cell and, in addition, where they were behaving as individuals but were doing so in ways that could in turn be of potential relevance to their radicalisation and subsequent involvement in violent Jihadism and terrorism.

At the group/cell level, the collected data are organised into nine characteristics exhibited by each group/cell and into twenty-five different behaviours the group/cell may or may not have displayed. Further data on the presence of thirty types of behaviour relevant at the group/cell level were also gathered on individuals when they were acting on behalf of their group/cell.

The data on the individuals forming the groups/cells were categorised according to six characteristics and twenty-nine types of potentially relevant behaviour they exhibited in their wider lifestyles as individuals.

All the data are presented in a series of Tables contained in Appendices A to C. Tables in Appendix A generally refer to “behaviours and characteristics of the group/cell” and hence are prefixed with the letters (“BCG”). Tables in Appendix B refer to “individuals acting on behalf of the group/cell” (“IBG”) and those in Appendix C to “individuals’ personal behaviour” (“IPB”). While the majority of the Tables focus on just one characteristic or behaviour, others contain multiple characteristics or behaviours – such as Table BCG.2, Appendix A.

The research framework utilised to process the data for this research was based predominantly around variants of grid-based “truth tables” and prime implicant charts. These are similar in design to those used in the process of “minimisation”, highlighted in the development of Qualitative Comparative Analysis by Charles Ragin, and in his subsequent writings.²⁰ In this original capacity, the “truth tables” are used to identify those factors, or independent variables, that are “necessary” (along with other factors), or “sufficient” (on their own), to cause a particular event to happen or a result to occur. In essence, the “truth tables” allow a researcher to “minimise” the number of relevant variables by identifying and removing those which are neither “necessary” nor “sufficient”, ultimately leaving only the “prime implicants” or critical factors common to all cases.

¹⁸ *The Times*, 8 March 2008.

¹⁹ An inquest into the deaths of the four suicide attackers in the 7/7 group/cell has not been held. An inquest into the deaths of their victims reported its findings and recommendations on 5 May 2011.

²⁰ Ragin (1987).

Table 1-1: Generic example of a “prime implicant chart”

	ABC	AbC	ABc	aBc
AC	X	X		
AB	X		X	
Bc			X	X

Thus, in the example shown above in Table 1-1, where an upper case letter denotes the presence of a factor and a lower case its absence, only two “prime implicants” in the vertical axis, AC and Bc, cover all four primitive expressions on the horizontal axis. In this case, therefore, using “combinatorial logic”, the three “prime implicants” in the vertical axis can be minimised down to the two “prime implicants” AC + Bc, in order to cover all four primitive expressions in the horizontal axis.²¹

Using similar logic, the tables in this research are designed to enable the reader to rapidly identify those factors that appear significant in the six case studies being examined, along with those factors that are replicated across the other terrorist conspiracies being examined. They further allow the identification of those factors that are distinct to a particular cell. However, rather than designing the various tables and populating them with data obtained from qualitative interviews, textual analysis or the processes of “Open” and “Axial” coding utilised in Grounded Theory, the tables were instead based around potentially relevant factors (selected as a result of the previous operational policing experience and academic research of the authors) and populated with the open-source data previously described.²²

The majority of the tables displayed in this research, including Table 1-2 below, reflect the design of “truth tables” and their vertical axis indicates the case study (in this instance the operational or other names given to the six conspiracies examined in the research). Likewise, in the majority of cases the horizontal axis displays the various independent variables applicable to that particular table. Such independent variables include the demographics of terrorist cell members, their individual and collective behavioural patterns, and the TTPs used by these conspiratorial cells in their actual or attempted

²¹ Ragin (1987), p.97.

²² Grounded Theory is a “constant comparative” methodology relying on an inductive approach to qualitative data. For more details of its use and applicability, see Warnes (2009). For an extended empirical example of its use in the field of terrorism and counterterrorism, see Fielding & Warnes (2008).

terrorist attacks. In a small number of examples, for ease of display and analysis, the axis has been reversed, with the vertical axis displaying the independent variables, and the horizontal axis the cases, while other simpler tables merely list a single item of data in relation to the relevant terrorist conspiracy.

Table 1-2: Generic example of a research table

	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 2	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 3
CREVICE			
RHYME			
7/7			
21/7			
OVERT			
SEAGRAM			

These tables were then populated with data obtained from various types of open-source publications, including details and information obtained from official reports, academic peer-reviewed papers and books, journalistic publications and newspaper articles. Where possible, the veracity of these data was corroborated against other publications and sources to confirm its accuracy. This ensured that the tables both covered those issues pertinent to individual, group and operational behaviours amongst violent Jihadists and at the same time that the factors and issues incorporated in them were as accurate as possible. It also ensured that the issues covered in the tables were grounded in operational practicality, rather than any theoretical abstract.

Data were gathered on the following categories of group/cell behaviour and group/cell characteristics (full data categories and tabulated results are in Appendix A):

- Size of group/cell (by number of most closely involved individuals)
- Key characteristics and behaviours of group/cell leaders
- Predominant nationalities of origin and ethnic/cultural heritage of group/cell members
- Converts and re-engaged Muslims as active participants
- External group/cell connectivity (includes links to Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda-like groups/cells in Pakistan and UK links between the groups/cells)
- Modus operandi (eg, suicide attack, remote IED detonation)
- Attack planning and preparation as a group/cell (e.g. use of information gathering, target reconnaissance activity)
- Explosive and explosive substances (eg, type and how acquired/produced)
- Premises used for attack planning and preparation (eg, rented, bought)

- Target type attacked, selected or considered (eg, crowded public places, commercial aircraft)
- Training (in Pakistan and in the UK).

Data were also gathered on these categories of behaviour of individuals when they were acting on behalf of their particular group/cell (full data categories and tabulated results are in Appendix B):

- Training and travel (eg, internet use, indirectly relevant training, aspects relating to training in Pakistan, the UK and other countries, training as individuals or with others in the group/cell)
- Use of documents to advance terrorist activity (eg, bank accounts, credit cards, passports)
- Use of criminality to further terrorist activity (eg, to acquire money or materials)
- Weapons acquisition (Firearms and explosives)
- Behaviour during preparations for a terrorist attack (eg, preparation of “suicide videos”, writing wills or letters, use of deceptive acts to disguise terrorist activity or not to appear as a Muslim).

Finally, data were gathered on certain characteristics and potentially relevant personal behaviour in individuals (full data categories and tabulated results are in Appendix C):

- Sex
- Age
- Marital status
- Children
- Residency and citizenship
- Religion (eg, changes in religious devotion or practices, associations with a “radical preacher” or their followers, changes in dress and attitudes)
- Social relationships (eg, collection of violent Jihadist propaganda material, withdrawal from family and friends, dropping out of employment or education)
- General lifestyle (eg, previous involvement in crime, recruiting close friends or family to the conspiracy, travelling abroad with an organised Islamic charity).

Once populated with this data, the research tables were subjected to a frequency analysis, with the results expressed as percentages. This information was then collated, evaluated and interpreted in order to provide the research findings on which the written case study material is based. Consequently, the research, as it was designed to be, was deliberately “grounded” in order to examine a “real world” situation and to ensure the results it generated were as practically focused as possible.

1.3 **Outline of this report**

Chapter Two examines the context and background in which the six groups/cells were rooted. It looks at how the threat of attacks in the UK from violent Jihadist groups/cells

has evolved since the first one was disrupted in November 2000 and then it briefly outlines the major events and incidents that occurred during each of the six conspiracies at the core of this research: Crevice, Rhyme, 7/7, 21/7, Overt and Seagram.

Chapter Three focuses on how the groups/cells were organised. It examines relevant examples of the characteristics and behaviours of the six groups/cells, certain characteristics of its members and leaders and their behaviour when they were carrying out activities on behalf of the group/cell, and their behaviour relating to their lifestyles where it may have some bearing on their involvement in violent Jihadism.

Chapter Four examines how the groups/cells functioned and their behaviour and that of the individuals within them when they were engaged in planning, preparing or implementing terrorist attacks in the UK.

Chapter Five draws the threads together and explores the feasibility of using a behaviour-based approach to develop “signal indicators” from the greater number of potential indicators that appear to exist. These potentially could be used as a means to warn of the involvement of violent Jihadist groups in terrorist attack planning and preparations, or at least to give an indication of the trajectory such a group/cell might be set upon.

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to set out the background and context of the six groups/cells in which all of the individuals involved in their terrorist activities operated. Individuals are also referenced here if it assists in achieving this, but a fuller and more detailed examination of the characteristics and behaviour of individuals across all the groups/cells is undertaken in Chapters Three and Four.

It should also be borne in mind that these six groups/cells are not the only ones to have attempted or carried out terrorist attacks in the UK. The first attempt came to light in November 2000 when two men of Bangladeshi origin were arrested in possession of a large quantity of home-made explosive, detonators and timers. One, Moinul Abedin, was found guilty of planning to cause an explosion.²³ The target and motive were unknown at the time but in 2006 the Home Secretary made clear the government's belief that this was an Al Qaeda (AQ) plot targeted against the UK.

An American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami was the target of an AQ-driven plot in December 2001 when Richard Reid, a convicted petty criminal from London who had converted to Islam, boarded as a passenger and tried to detonate explosives concealed in his shoes when the plane was over the Atlantic Ocean. Two years later, Saajid Badat was arrested and found guilty of conspiring to mount the same type of attack as Reid, although when the time came for him to carry it out he had refused to do so. A complicated chain of events in 2002 (designated Operation Springbourne) led to the trial of nine individuals resident in the UK but originally from North Africa. They were charged with conspiracy to manufacture and use in terrorist attacks the biological toxin ricin. Only one, Kamal Bourgass, was convicted.²⁴

As well as the increasing involvement of UK nationals in terrorist conspiracies aimed at the UK, a similar trend can also be seen from as early as the mid-1990s concerning their involvement in terrorist suicide attacks in other countries. Sayyad al-Falastini died in Bosnia in December 1995 when the car bomb he was preparing detonated prematurely, while Mohammed Bilal died driving a vehicle packed with explosives into a military barracks in Kashmir in December 2000. Two more individuals from the UK, Asif Hanif and Omar Sharif, died on 30 April 2003 in Tel Aviv, Israel, as they carried out suicide attacks on a crowded seafront bar called "Mike's Place". Hanif's suicide belt exploded, killing three people. Sharif's belt failed to explode and he ran off; his body was later found in the sea.

²³ BBC News, 27 February 2002.

²⁴ BBC News, 13 April 2005.

Other types of conspiracies and attempts to carry out violence falling short of the most destructive kinds have also occurred. They have involved both individuals and groups driven by the ideology of violent Jihad. In January 2007, for example, five men from Birmingham were arrested and later convicted for their various parts in a conspiracy to kidnap a Muslim British Army soldier with the intention of filming his beheading and then releasing the footage over the Internet.²⁵ May 2008 saw Nicky Reilly, a convert to Islam known as Mohammad Rashid Abdulaziz Saeed-Alim, try to detonate bombs made from caustic soda and kerosene in a restaurant in Exeter. They failed to detonate fully and the only injuries were to Reilly himself. Reilly was said to be suffering from Asperger's syndrome and the court was told he had a mental age of ten, thus making him particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Subsequent analysis of his computer showed he had been given "encouragement and information" by two unidentified individuals.²⁶

The cases outlined above are not the full extent of the attacks, attempted attacks and conspiracies targeted against the UK, nor do they reveal the scale and scope of other terrorist-related activity occurring in the UK. However, the examples given serve to illustrate the environment that evolved with increasing rapidity from the year 2000 onwards and that in turn gave rise to the six UK case studies that form the basis of this research.

2.2 The six case studies

A total of six violent Jihadist groups/cells in the UK were examined for this research (see Table BCG.1, Appendix A). They cover a time span of just over three years from 30 March 2004 (Crevice) to 30 June 2007 (Seagram). However, if the preliminary stages of Crevice are included (from about June 2003) the period of their activities lengthens to approximately four years.

Two groups/cells were disrupted in 2004 (Crevice and Rhyme), two carried out their attacks in 2005 (7/7 and 21/7), one was disrupted in 2006 (Overt) and one carried out two attacks in 2007 (Seagram). To date (May 2011), no more groups/cells or attack conspiracies appear to have reached the same level of operational maturity as these did, nor have any more similar attacks occurred.

A brief summary in chronological order is given below of each of the groups/cells and their main activities. This will enable the research-derived characteristics of each group/cell and the behaviour of their members to be seen in context.

2.2.1 Operation Crevice

The first significant attempt to plan and prepare a terrorist attack in the UK in the aftermath of 9/11 began to gain momentum from the middle of 2003, although a number of the individuals involved not only knew each other in previous years but had also already become radicalised enough to make the contacts in Pakistan that would lead to what become known to the police and Security Service as Operation Crevice. As such, it eventually became the largest ever counter-terrorist operation in the UK and led to the longest-running trial in British legal history.²⁷

²⁵ *The Guardian*, 19 February 2008.

²⁶ *The Guardian*, 16 October 2008.

²⁷ Metropolitan Police Service (2007).

The leading figure in the conspiracy was Omar Khyam, a British citizen of Pakistani descent who had first travelled to Pakistan to try to undergo training for violent Jihad in 2000, just after he had turned eighteen years old. From 2003 onwards, he met with others in the UK and Pakistan and, posing as tourists, they attended an ad hoc training camp near Malakand, Pakistan, where they experimented with making explosive from ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder. In November 2003, they purchased 600 kg of ammonium nitrate fertiliser in the UK and kept it in a rented storage facility in West London.

As preparations were underway, another conspirator arrived in the UK from Canada. He was Mohammad Momin Khawaja and his role was to provide Omar Khyam with a remote-controlled detonator to set off the IED they intended to construct. By now the conspirators were under constant visual and audio surveillance by the police and Security Service and they were heard to discuss a wide variety of potential targets. The decision was taken to halt the conspiracy and eight men were arrested on 30 March 2004. Khawaja had been arrested in Canada the day before.

It took until 30 April 2007 for the legal process to end in the UK with the conviction of five individuals, including Omar Khyam. Over a year later, Khawaja was also convicted in Canada. An unusual aspect of the trial in the UK was the use of one of the conspirators, Mohammed Junaid Babar, who was in custody in the USA, as a prosecution witness. He undertook the same role in Canada at Khawaja's trial and once more in the UK at a trial for another separate conspiracy to acquire machine guns and shoulder-launched missiles.

2.2.2 **Operation Rhyme**²⁸

Operation Rhyme effectively commenced as a counter-terrorism operation on 15 June 2004 when surveillance was first placed on the main conspirator, Dhiren Barot. This was done as a consequence of his link to certain computer files discovered following the arrest in Lahore, Pakistan, of Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, an important communications facilitator in the AQ network. The files fell into two categories. First came a series of detailed research reports on targets at four main sites in the USA that had been compiled in 2000 and early 2001. Second, a highly detailed methodology of how to plan for and carry out mass casualty terrorist attacks using vehicles adapted to hold containers of flammable gas and thus to become IEDs.

It soon became apparent that Barot was the leader of a group/cell of at least seven others, all of whom appeared to be actively involved in supporting his activities. Born a Hindu, Barot had converted to Islam in the mid-1990s and soon after left the UK for Pakistan where he underwent violent Jihadist training. He fought in Kashmir and later became a trusted operative for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a man described as “the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks”.²⁹

As might well be expected of someone with this background, Barot showed himself to be a meticulous planner, researching in great depth the options available to build the most powerful IED he could. To help him in this task, he recruited and used individuals whom he had known for many years, assigning each one a specific task to help him with the research and planning. On 4 August 2004, Barot was arrested, quickly followed by an additional thirteen others. Barot and seven others were charged with conspiracy to murder and over the course of the next two years

²⁸ For a fuller account of Operation Rhyme and Dhiren Barot, see Clutterbuck (Forthcoming 2011).

²⁹ 9/11 Commission (2004), p.145.

Barot pleaded guilty and was sentenced to forty years imprisonment (later reduced on appeal to thirty years); six others also pleaded guilty and one was found guilty.

2.2.3 **7/7**

On 7 July 2005, four suicide IEDs comprised of home-made peroxide-based explosive carried in rucksacks were detonated almost simultaneously on the London public transport network. Three went off on the underground system and one on a local bus. Deliberately timed to coincide with the morning rush hour and with the IEDs enhanced with metal fragments, the blasts claimed fifty-two lives and injured hundreds of others. The four violent Jihadists responsible for the attacks were also killed when they detonated their bombs.

Three members of the group/cell were of Pakistani origin: Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain. They travelled by car from Leeds to Luton on the morning of 7 July, joining the fourth member, Jamaican convert to Islam Germaine Lindsay, at Luton station before catching the train together to King's Cross station in London. Here they split up and entered the London Underground. Khan, the leader of the group/cell, boarded a westbound Circle Line train, Tanweer an eastbound Circle Line train and Lindsay a southbound Piccadilly line train. The fourth member of the group/cell, Hussain, also appeared to enter the Underground. All were carrying rucksacks containing their IEDs. At 0850hrs three of the devices were detonated: Khan was close to Edgware Road station, where his device killed six people; Tanweer was between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations, where seven people were killed; and Lindsay detonated his IED between King's Cross and Russell Square stations, killing twenty-six people.

Five minutes after the near simultaneous detonations, the fourth member of the group/cell, Hasib Hussain, came back out of the underground at King's Cross, before apparently buying a battery. He attempted to phone his now deceased colleagues and headed onto the Euston Road. It is believed he then travelled to Euston station where he boarded a number 30 bus travelling towards Marble Arch. Due to the closures affecting the Underground following the earlier explosions, the bus was packed and when Hussain detonated his device at 0947hrs in Tavistock Square, he killed thirteen people. Possible reasons for Hussain's delay in launching his attack include the failure of his original battery to trigger the detonator or delays on the Northern Line. Whatever the reason, Hussain's attack merely added to the level of carnage, the demands on the emergency services and the complexity of the ensuing investigation.

During these follow-up investigations, searches of properties in the Beeston, Thornhill, Holbeck and Hyde Park areas of Leeds resulted in the recovery of peroxide-based explosives, which were also found in the car the group had left on the morning of the attack at Luton station, along with a handgun. Several men were arrested and charged with assisting the 7/7 bombers. After lengthy trials, Waheed Ali and Mohammed Shakil were found not guilty of assisting the bomb attacks, but were convicted of the lesser offence of attending training camps in Pakistan.

2.2.4 **21/7**

Two weeks after the 7/7 attacks, on 21 July 2005, an attempt was made by another group/cell of violent Jihadists to inflict a similar series of attacks on the London transport network. However, while the four IEDs used for the attacks (and one that was abandoned) were constructed using a similar peroxide-based home-made explosive to the 7/7 attacks, they failed to explode. Although the detonators appeared to have worked, causing small blasts, the main charges did not ignite. Unlike the 7/7 group/cell, where three of the four members traced their descent back to Pakistan,

this group/cell consisted of five individuals from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia in the Horn of Africa, and a sixth from Ghana in West Africa.

During the early afternoon of 21 July 2005, the cell members deployed themselves across the London transport network ready to launch their attack. At 1230hrs Ramzi Mohammed attempted to detonate his device on a tube train at the Oval Underground station. Ten minutes later, both Hussain Osman and Yassin Hassan Omar also attempted to detonate their devices, respectively at Shepherds Bush and Warren Street stations. Finally, at 1300hrs the leader of the cell, Muktar Said Ibrahim, attempted to use his device on a number 26 bus near Hackney. A fifth bomber, Manfo Kwaku Asiedu (aka Sumaila Abubakari), appears to have decided to abort his attack, and his unused IED was found two days later, discarded in Little Wormwood Scrubs park. Following the failure of the IEDs to detonate, the would-be suicide bombers managed to evade capture.

Follow-up investigations identified the violent Jihadists involved and Yassin Hassan Omar's abandoned flat in New Southgate, North London, was identified as the location where the group/cell had constructed their IEDs. Hundreds of bottles of peroxide used for this purpose were recovered from there. Consequently, a major operation to arrest the cell before they could launch a further attack was set in motion by the police and intelligence services. The following day, in a tragic case of mistaken identity, Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead in London by Metropolitan Police firearms officers after boarding an Underground train at Stockwell station. Officers believed he was the suspect Hussain Osman and that he may have been carrying another IED. It was later discovered that on 26 July 2005, Osman, whose brother and father lived in Italy, had made his way there via a Eurostar train from Waterloo station, and subsequently the Italian security services began to monitor his movements.

The following day, the first arrest occurred, when Yassin Hassan Omar was detained by armed West Midlands Police in a flat in Birmingham, having managed to travel from London disguised by a woman's burka. On 29 July 2005, having been traced to a flat in Notting Hill, London, where they had been lying low, Muktar Said Ibrahim and Ramzi Mohammed were arrested after a standoff with Metropolitan Police firearms officers. That same day, Italian police arrested Hussain Osman in the Rome suburb of Tor Pignattara and he was later extradited. Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, who had abandoned his attack and dumped his IED, was also identified and arrested.

Following lengthy trials, in July 2007 at Woolwich Crown Court the four failed bombers were jailed for life for conspiracy to murder and sentenced to a minimum of forty years in prison. In the case of Asiedu, the jury was unable to reach a verdict; however, he agreed to plead guilty to the lesser charge of conspiracy to cause explosions and in November 2007 was sentenced to thirty-three years imprisonment. In addition, Adel Yahya, a colleague of the 21/7 bombers, was originally arrested and charged with assisting in the planning of the attacks. However, after the jury at his original trial failed to reach a verdict, he pleaded guilty to the lesser offence of collecting information useful in the preparation and committing of a terrorist attack. Yeshi Girma, the wife of Hussain Osman, was jailed for fifteen years for failing to inform the authorities of the conspiracy, while a number of other relatives and friends of the cell members were also imprisoned for having prior knowledge of the conspiracy or for aiding and abetting the fugitives following their failed attacks.

2.2.5 Operation Overt

In June 2006, as a result of intelligence work, the authorities placed British national Ahmed Abdullah Ali under surveillance following his return to the UK from Pakistan. Ali was believed to

have links to Rashid Rauf, another British national of Pakistani origin, who was thought to have contacts in the AQ network within Pakistan. In the ensuing intelligence and surveillance operation named “Overt”, Ali’s colleague Assad Sarwar was identified purchasing a quantity of material that could be used in the construction of home-made explosives. Subsequently a flat in Forest Road, Walthamstow, East London, rented by the group/cell’s leader Ali, was identified as a bombmaking factory, while additional individuals such as Tanvir Hussain and Umar Islam were linked to the conspiracy.

Investigations confirmed that the group/cell were constructing peroxide-based liquid explosives that they planned to smuggle onboard passenger aircraft disguised in 500 ml plastic drinks bottles. The group/cell’s intention appeared to have been to bring down possibly up to ten passenger aircraft that had departed from Heathrow Airport on transatlantic routes from the UK to various destinations in North America. However, as the operation continued to gather intelligence and evidence, news arrived that Rashid Rauf had been arrested in Pakistan, allegedly at the instigation of the US authorities. Given Rauf’s links to the conspirators, it was decided that the operation would now urgently have to go into its executive phase and on the night of 9 August, up to twenty-five arrests were made in London, High Wycombe and Birmingham.

Eventually nine men, including Ahmed Abdullah Ali, Assad Sarwar, Tanvir Hussain and Umar Islam, were charged with offences related to the conspiracy and their trial began in April 2008. In November, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on any of the charges relating to the conspiracy to target aircraft, although they found Ali, Sarwar and Hussain guilty of conspiracy to murder. In September 2009, a second jury found Ali, Sarwar and Hussain guilty of conspiracy to murder in relation to the use of liquid bombs to target airline passengers. Consequently, on 14 September all three were sentenced to life imprisonment, with Ali having to serve a minimum of forty years, Sarwar thirty-six years, and Hussain thirty-two years. Another conspirator, Umar Islam, was convicted on a separate charge of conspiracy to murder.

2.2.6 **Operation Seagram**

This was last of the groups/cells to form and, to date (May 2011), was the last to carry out a major terrorist attack in the UK. In the early hours of the morning of 29 June 2007, a Mercedes car packed with gas cylinders, petrol and nails was parked outside the “Tiger Tiger” nightclub in Haymarket, London. The IED failed to fully ignite and the device was successfully defused. At the same time, another Mercedes was towed away from nearby Cockspur Street as it had been parked illegally. At the car pound it was soon found to contain an IED similar in size and construction to the Haymarket vehicle. It too had failed to detonate.

By the following day, 30 June, the police and intelligence services had begun to close in on the group/cell. On the same day, a burning Jeep Cherokee was driven into the main doors of the terminal building at Glasgow airport. The vehicle contained two men, Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed, and was packed with petrol and gas cylinders. They were both arrested and Ahmed was taken to hospital with serious burns. He died five weeks later. His brother, Sabeel Ahmed, was later arrested in Liverpool and charged with failing to disclose to investigators a note and a will he had received from his brother.

Both of the attacks were carried out by Abdullah and Ahmed. Abdullah was born in the UK of Iraqi descent but was primarily brought up in Iraq. He had recently returned to the UK to work as a hospital doctor. Ahmed was from Bangalore in India and an engineering PhD student. Sabeel

Ahmed was also a doctor in the UK, as was a fourth individual who was later found not guilty of involvement in the attacks.

These are the events that form the backdrop to the research. The following chapter examines in detail how the six groups/cells were organised in order to carry out their activities.

3.1 Introduction

In order to put the subsequent analysis into context, the focus of the previous chapter detailed the histories and backgrounds of each of the six groups/cells. This chapter looks in greater detail at how the groups/cells and the individuals within them were organised to carry out their objectives. It examines the characteristics and behaviours of the groups/cells and the individuals operating within them in three main categories: their motivation and aims, their members and their leaders.

3.2 The motivation and aims of the groups/cells

3.2.1 Motivation

There is no doubt that the motivation driving the actions of all the six groups/cells was the form of violent Jihadist ideology espoused by AQ. It is encapsulated in the “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders” issued by the World Islamic Front, an alliance between Osama bin Laden and the leaders of four other groups, which calls on all Muslims “to kill the Americans and their allies... in any country where it is possible to do it”.³⁰

The impact of violent Jihadist propaganda of this type is seen clearly in the behaviour of many group/cell members. Nineteen individuals (50 per cent) are known to have viewed or collected violent Jihadist propaganda in the form of written material, CD-Roms, DVDs or downloads from websites (see Table IPB.18, Appendix C). This occurred within all six of the groups/cells. A smaller number of individuals, seven (18.4 per cent), went a stage further and shared their material with others, either in person or via the Internet (see Table IPB.19, Appendix C).

The role of a number of “radical preachers” in the UK in radicalising individuals and encouraging them to “fight Jihad” in other countries is now well known. The most prominent included Abu Hamza al Masri, convicted in 2006 on charges of incitement to murder and racial hatred, Sheikh Abdullah Faisal (a Jamaican convert, born Trevor Forest), convicted in 2003 on five counts of soliciting murder, and Omar Bakri Muhammad (the former leader in the UK of Hizb ut-Tahrir

³⁰ The relevant section of the fatwa, addressed to all Muslims, states: “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip”. Bin Laden (1998).

and founder of Al-Muhajiroun), who fled the UK in 2005 in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks.³¹ Each one of these, and others, are known to have played some part in shaping the views and actions of group/cell members.

Six individuals (15.8 per cent) in four of the groups/cells (Crevice, 7/7, 21/7 and Seagram) are known to have become particularly interested in the teachings of various radical preachers (see Table IPB.16, Appendix C). The numbers of individuals involved in this way increases to twelve (31.6 per cent) when the personal association of group/cell members with radical preachers is examined (see Table IPB.17, Appendix C). Specific examples include the interest shown in Sheikh Abdullah Faisal by Germaine Lindsay of the 7/7 group/cell, the influence of Omar Bakri Muhammad on various individuals in the Crevice group/cell, and the impact of another “preacher”, Mohammed Hamid, on four members of the 21/7 group/cell.³²

3.2.2 The influence of AQ in Pakistan on the aims of the groups/cells

For a number of reasons, both ideological and practical, the opportunity taken by groups/cells to undergo training in Pakistan for violent Jihad and terrorism seems to have been critical to their development and the commencement of the conspiracies they went on to undertake. It was in Pakistan that the majority of them not only received practical training with weapons and explosives but, as importantly, they were also able to connect to, and be influenced by, individuals who were steeped in the ideology and practical mechanics of violent Jihad.

For researchers restricted to material in the public domain, it is impossible to say whether or not these individuals were members of, or were linked to AQ, or whether the links were to individuals or groups who were not AQ but espoused its cause. For the purposes of describing our research results, “Al Qaeda” is used as an overarching term to describe their allegiances, whatever they may truly have been. It may not be an accurate description in every case but this does not detract from the significant role “Al Qaeda” in Pakistan played in the inspiration, encouragement, guidance, facilitation and exploitation of these conspiracies.

Table BCG.5 in Appendix A looks at the links known to exist between the six groups/cells and AQ or similar groups in Pakistan. It shows that there are links present in five groups/cells (83.3 per cent) involving nine individuals (23.7 per cent). The exception is Seagram, where no one was found to have undergone training in Pakistan – although one member, Bilal Abdullah, may have joined insurgent forces in Iraq during May 2006, prior to returning to the UK once more when he began to put together the elements of the Seagram group/cell.³³

In the case of 21/7, one individual in the group/cell provided the sole link. In the remaining four cases (66.6 per cent), Crevice, Rhyme, 7/7 and Overt, two or more individuals were linked to AQ or AQ-inspired groups or individuals in Pakistan. In almost all these cases, the linkage was first made or further developed when individuals from the UK underwent military-style training in camps (some of them several years before – for example, Dhiren Barot from Rhyme in 1996 or Omar Khyam from Crevice in 2000; see Table BCG.2, Appendix A) or when they organised this type of training for others they later went on to conspire with in the UK (for example, Ahmed Abdullah Ali from Overt).

³¹ BBC News, 9 August 2005.

³² See, respectively, The Stationary Office (2006), p.18; *The Guardian*, 1 May 2007; and *The Times*, 8 March 2008.

³³ *The Sunday Times*, 8 July 2007.

Table BCG.13 in Appendix A indicates that a link to violent Jihadism in Pakistan specifically through training there can be found in all but one of the five groups/cells (83.3 per cent). Across the five relevant groups/cells, seventeen individuals (44.7 per cent) are known to have undergone training in Pakistan. The maximum number trained in this way was in Crevice, where all seven of them (100 per cent) had undergone training at some stage of their lives.

The minimum number trained in a group/cell was one, in 21/7, and he was the self-appointed “emir” of the group, Muktar Said Ibrahim. He claimed to have also had training in Sudan in 2003 and was known to have been in Pakistan from late 2004 until March 2005.³⁴

Two individuals from 7/7 (50 per cent), its leader Mohammad Sidique Khan and his lieutenant Shehzad Tanweer, received training in Pakistan and, like five of the members of Crevice, they undertook it together. This pattern of group/cell members training together in Pakistan was also seen in Overt, where it also involved two individuals, once more its leader, Ahmed Abdullah Ali, and his lieutenant and bombmaker, Assad Sarwar. Overall, three groups/cells (50 per cent) contained two or more individuals who had trained together in Pakistan (Crevice, 7/7 and Overt), while two groups/cells (33.3 per cent) had undertaken activities or training together in the UK (7/7 and 21/7).

The importance to the conspiracies of training in Pakistan and the connections the participants were able to forge there is not solely reflected in the number of individuals who underwent this activity. It is even more sharply delineated when the individuals who underwent it and how they are spread across the groups/cells is examined. The leaders of five groups/cells had undergone training in Pakistan and often had done so on more than one occasion (the exception being Seagram; see Table BCG.2, Appendix A). This aspect will be returned to later on in this chapter when the group/cell leaders are examined more closely.

Finally, a definite catalytic effect on the development of the attack conspiracies in the UK following training in Pakistan can be seen. The pattern of group/cell members returning to the UK from training in Pakistan, followed by a rapid commencement or escalation of an attack conspiracy involving them, was observed in the four groups/cells (66.6 per cent) where training in Pakistan was known to have taken place (Crevice, 7/7, 21/7 and Overt). In the fifth case, Rhyme, a very similar process occurred but here the group/cell leader, Dhiren Barot, returned from Pakistan where it is believed he had presented his plan for an attack to members of AQ “with the intention of getting their permission and the resources to mount attacks in the UK”.³⁵

The ideology of a global violent Jihad carried out against the “enemies” of Islam, as defined by AQ and its exponents of international terrorism, underpins all six UK conspiracies. The next section examines how it was translated by the six groups/cells into the practical realities of devising the aims and modus operandi of terrorist attacks.

3.2.3 Aims

At first sight, there appears to be a great diversity between the attacks, either those carried out or those in the process of being planned or prepared. They ranged in scope from home-made IEDs deployed against aircraft in flight and on underground trains, through to vehicle-borne explosive devices (VBIEDs) left in a London street, and even the crashing of a vehicle filled with flammable

³⁴ BBC News, 11 July 2007a.

³⁵ BBC News, 7 November 2006.

material into an airport terminal building. In terms of the TTPs they used or intended to use, there are great variations (see the following chapter for an analysis of the TTPs). However, there is an underlying common factor that transcends all of the apparent differences: each of the attacks was intended to cause mass casualties amongst the civilian population.

In three cases, 7/7, 21/7 and Overt, the concept of operations was identical: to carry out separate, coordinated and near-simultaneous mass casualty bomb attacks, each one initiated by a member of the group and whose self-inflicted death was a planned and essential element of the attack. A total of twenty individuals (52.6 per cent) were therefore involved in planning, preparing or implementing this specific type of mass casualty attack. A fourth group/cell, Seagram, was also prepared to carry out a suicide attack, albeit one of a different nature and in different circumstances (see Table BCG.6, Appendix A).

The two other groups/cells (Crevice and Rhyme) gave no indications of planning or preparing to carry out suicide attacks, preferring to pursue the remote detonation of IEDs as their main option. Seagram was the sole case where a suicide attack involved the use of a vehicle. It was also unusual as the attack was carried out in haste after the failure of the two VBIEDs they had planted in London the previous day, and when they knew the police were probably aware of their identities and at least their approximate location. Seagram illustrates the point that once a group/cell has all the flammable or explosive material it requires, a suicide attack can be quickly prepared and put into action, although it may not be a very effective one.³⁶

Chapter 4 follows on from the aims and concept of operations of the groups/cells and looks at exactly how they went about trying to achieve them through the use of a wide variety of TTPs. The rest of this chapter the way that certain characteristics and behaviours exhibited by the groups/cells and their members affected their overall structure and functions.

3.3 Characteristics and behaviours of groups/cells relevant to their structure and function

3.3.1 Size

The size of the six groups/cells range from Seagram, the smallest with three core members, to Overt, the largest with ten core members (see Table BCG.1, Appendix A).³⁷ The average size was between six to seven (6.3) core members and the nearest groups/cells to this size are 21/7 with six members and Crevice with seven. The most “successful” in terms of achieving their objective of carrying out almost simultaneous, coordinated suicide attacks was the 7/7 group/cell who had four members. In turn, they are closest in size to Seagram, the smallest group/cell and one of only two other groups/cells able to launch their attacks (although they ultimately failed to achieve their primary objective).

³⁶ The same switch through force of circumstances, from a planned series of attacks over time to a quickly mounted suicide attack, was also seen in the actions of the Madrid cell when trapped in Leganes by the Spanish police. For a full account see Vidino (2006), pp. 291–335.

³⁷ An eleventh individual arrested at the same time as the main Overt conspirators was convicted of possessing a bombmaking manual. However, in the light of the judge’s comment that while he was “ready, willing and able” to help terrorists but was “not a radicalised or politicised Islamist” and was sixteen years old at the time of the offence, he has not been included as a core member. See BBC News, 26 October 2007.

3.3.2 Links in the UK between groups/cells

Four of the six groups/cells (66.6 per cent) had links in the UK to at least one other of the groups/cells (see Table BCG.5, Appendix A). They are Crevice, 7/7, 21/7 and Overt. There appears to be no common operational link between all of them, with Crevice linked only to 7/7 through a number of circumstances, while 21/7 was linked to Overt through phone contacts between their respective leaders.³⁸ It is likely that this is not the sum total of the linkages within the wider context of violent Jihadist activity in the UK, as other links may be known but are not in the public domain, while yet more may be known only to the relevant conspirators.

There are also links between the groups/cells and other conspiracies. The conviction of Kazi Rahman in November 2005 for attempting to procure machine guns and shoulder-launched missiles revealed circumstances which lead back directly to the members of Crevice, several of whom he knew through time spent with them in training camps in Pakistan.³⁹ In a similar vein, in July 2007 the conviction of Omar Altimimi, a man with links to AQ and to terrorists in Europe, also revealed a link to Rhyme through his possession of both a contact number for a member of that group and computer files detailing the Rhyme trademark attack concept of flammable gas canisters packed into cars.⁴⁰

Where an individual or group/cell does not yet have the required contacts and access to engage in “real” training in Pakistan or perhaps elsewhere overseas, they may instead try to undertake some form of training in the UK that may be of indirect use to them. Table IBG.2 in Appendix B shows that this “indirect” training occurred in four out of the six groups/cells (66.6 per cent) and it involved at least thirteen individuals (34.2 per cent). The exceptions were Rhyme and Seagram.

During these activities, individuals in the groups/cells may come in to contact with other, similarly minded potential Jihadists. In the UK, two groups/cells, 7/7 and 21/7, mainly undertook this type of activity. As a group, 7/7 went on a white water rafting trip a few weeks before the attacks, while Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer went camping in the UK “with others” in April 2003.⁴¹ In the case of 21/7, five of the six individuals in the group/cell (83.3 per cent) had attended an outdoor “training camp” in the UK during May 2004, along with others who did not go on to become part of their conspiracy.⁴² They also attended other outdoor and training activities, again with others, this time organised by Atilla Ahmet (a former bodyguard of Abu Hamza al Masri) and Mohammed Hamid (who referred to himself as “Osama bin London”).⁴³ Both were subsequently jailed for their part in these activities.

3.3.3 Aspects of training and travel

The way the groups/cells utilised training to carry out their aims has already been covered. It will now be examined once more, from the perspective of the individuals who underwent it. Prior to the participation of individuals in overseas training, six individuals (15.8 per cent) took the time

³⁸ *Daily Mail*, 9 September 2008.

³⁹ BBC News, 30 April 2007a.

⁴⁰ *The Times*, 6 July 2007.

⁴¹ The Stationary Office (2006), p.17.

⁴² *Daily Mail*, 18 January 2007.

⁴³ *The Times*, 8 March 2008.

and effort to research and sometimes purchase camping, hiking and survival equipment prior to their departure from the UK (see Table IBG.3, Appendix B).

In Crevice and 7/7, good evidence for this type of behaviour is found in one strand of a conversation that took place in 2004 between Omar Khyam, leader of Crevice, and Mohammad Sidique Khan, who was later to become leader of 7/7.⁴⁴ No one from Rhyme, Overt or Seagram appeared to be involved in this type particular type of activity.

Eighteen individuals (47.4 per cent) are known to have taken part in some form of training directly relevant to terrorist TTPs (see Table IBG.4, Appendix B). It should be noted that at least one individual who had done so was present as a member of every one of the six group/cells: both 21/7 and Seagram had one each, 7/7 had two, Rhyme three and Overt four, while all seven members of Crevice had undergone some form of direct terrorist TTP training.

In order to receive violent Jihadist training, seventeen individuals (44.7 per cent) spread across five groups/cells had travelled to Pakistan to do so (see Table IBG.5, Appendix B). The majority did so in the run-up to their particular conspiracy but others had first done so several years before. Some had travelled on more than one occasion.

Four others (10.5 per cent) had received some form of violent Jihadist training or military-like experience in countries other than Pakistan (see Table IBG.6, Appendix B). Locations included Kashmir in India (Omar Khyam from Crevice, Dhiren Barot from Rhyme); the Philippines (Dhiren Barot from Rhyme); Sudan (Muktar Said Ibrahim from 21/7) and Iraq (Bilal Abdulla from Seagram, although this cannot be fully corroborated). It should be noted that all of them were later to become leaders of their own respective groups/cells.

In terms of the groups/cells, in four cases (66 per cent) a number of individuals had undergone some form of training or related activity with one or more other members of the group/cell (Table BCG.14, Appendix A). In three cases this had occurred in Pakistan and in two cases it had occurred in the UK. The 7/7 group/cell was unique in that they did this both in Pakistan (when Khan and Tanweer travelled there) and in the UK (when Hussain and Lindsay were also involved). No examples of this type of behaviour were seen in Rhyme or Seagram.

An almost equal number of individuals (ten, 26.3 per cent) who undertook training in Pakistan did so with others who were later involved in their conspiracy. In comparison, nine (23.6 per cent) did so with others who were not involved (see Tables IBG.7 and IBG.8, Appendix B). However, their distribution varies between the groups/cells. In Crevice and Overt, more individuals travelled from the UK, met up at some point during their time in Pakistan and then carried out their subsequent activities together. Prior to their later involvement with the other members of the group/cell, individuals from Crevice and Rhyme travelled separately to Pakistan for training on other trips.

In 21/7, Muktar Said Ibrahim travelled to Pakistan in December 2004 with two individuals who have never returned to the UK and who may be dead. They were carrying large amounts of cash, cold weather clothing and equipment, and the pages from a first aid manual on how to deal with ballistic injuries.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ BBC News, 1 May 2007.

⁴⁵ BBC News, 11 July 2007b.

Table IBG.9, Appendix B, shows that across all the groups/cells except Seagram, a total of fourteen individuals (36.8 per cent) actively began to engage in activities to plan and prepare a terrorist attack in the UK on their return to the UK from a trip Pakistan that had involved some form of violent Jihadist training.

Finally, Table IBG.10, Appendix B, highlights the difficulties faced by counter-terrorism practitioners in differentiating between the visits to Pakistan or Afghanistan made by the conspirators for the reasons detailed above and other visits they made there, often with family or friends, where no ulterior motive was known. These apparently innocuous trips occurred in four of the six groups/cells (66.6 per cent) and involved six (15.8 per cent) individuals.

3.4 **Characteristics and behaviours of group/cell members relevant to group/cell structure and function**

The focus now moves on from the characteristics and behaviours seen in the six groups/cells themselves and from the behaviour used by individuals in pursuit of the aims and objectives of the group/cell. We will first examine a limited number of six basic characteristics seen in individuals and then concentrate on potentially relevant types of behaviour they are known to have exhibited in the wider context of their lifestyles.

3.4.1 **Sex and age range**

All thirty-eight of the individuals in the six groups/cells examined in this study were male (100 per cent). However, one female (Yeshe Girma, the wife of Hussain Osman from 21/7) was convicted of having prior knowledge of the attacks and failing to disclose it and also of assisting Osman to escape in the aftermath of the group/cell's failure. Her sister, Mulu Girma and the new wife of Yassin Hassan Omar, Fardosa Abdullahi, were also jailed for their part in assisting with the escape of the conspirators.⁴⁶

Table IPB.1, Appendix C, sets out in six categories the ages of all of the individuals in the six groups/cells. No individuals involved were juveniles (under sixteen years old), nor was anyone involved over the age of forty.⁴⁷ The greatest number in an age category is almost equally divided between 20–25 years (36.8 per cent) and 26–30 years (39.5 per cent). Only two individuals (5.3 per cent) fell below this range and were in their late teens while seven (18.4 per cent) fell into the upper age range category of 31–40 years.

An examination of the age categories across all the groups/cells adds some specificity to the general pattern (see Table IPB.2, Appendix C). Both of those in their late teens were found in 7/7 and this group/cell also included the youngest of all the conspirators (Hasib Hussain at eighteen years). The oldest conspirator was found in Overt (Mohammed Shamin Uddin at thirty-six years). The spread of ages in Crevice is unusual as the conspirators were split almost evenly into only two age categories, with four individuals at 20–25 years and three at 31–40 years. The individuals making up Seagram were all from a single category (26–30 years).

⁴⁶ *The Guardian*, 12 June 2008.

⁴⁷ At the time of the offence, the ages of the main individuals in the “soldier kidnap” plot were 43, 36, 29 (x2) and 30 years old. See BBC News, 29 January 2008.

3.4.2 Marital status and children

Overall, twenty-five (65.8 per cent) of the conspirators were single (unmarried), while twelve (31.6 per cent) were married and one was with a partner (see Table IPB.3, Appendix C). The Rhyme conspirators were almost all single (seven out of eight). The exception may have been Dhiren Bharot, the group/cell leader, as it is claimed he married during a period of time he spent in Thailand, although no details of his wife have been found.⁴⁸

Table IPB.4, Appendix C, sets out by group/cell the number of individuals who had children. There are ten of them (23.6 per cent). Unsurprisingly, the groups/cells containing the most unmarried conspirators were also those where they had no children (Rhyme and Seagram). The opposite also applies; two of the groups/cells with the most children were those where the most members were married (Overt and Crevice). Ramzi Mohammed in 21/7 falls outside the general pattern for both marriage and children as he was unmarried but had two children with the same partner.⁴⁹

3.4.3 Residency and citizenship

Residency in a country and citizenship of it are obviously different but they are shown together in Table IPB.5, Appendix C, to try to illuminate the concept of “identity” as it relates to each conspirator. Twenty-seven individuals (71 per cent) were connected to the UK by citizenship through birth or right of residency. Of these, the majority (twenty three) were born in the UK. The next highest category was foreign nationals resident in the UK, amounting to eight individuals (21 per cent).

In terms of the spread across the groups/cells, the highest proportion of those born in the UK was seen in Overt (nine out of ten) and, almost equally, in Rhyme (seven out of eight). The odd man out in Rhyme was their UK-raised, foreign-born leader Dhiren Barot. No members of 21/7 were born in the UK, although three out of four had UK citizenship.

In certain cases, citizenship can be very difficult to establish, even with full access to government records. For example, it took a considerable amount of official investigation into the 21/7 group/cell before Manfo Kwaku Asiedu from Ghana was finally identified as being likely to be Sumaila Abubakari, also believed to be from Ghana. It is thought that a short while after his initial arrival in the UK from Ghana (using a false passport), Abubakari moved into lodgings and then took the identity of their former tenant (Asiedu), who had been detained in a mental institution.⁵⁰

3.4.4 Nationality, cultural heritage and origins

A full analysis of the myriad variations of nationality, citizenship, upbringing, long- or short-term residency, ethnic descent and cultural heritage of each of the thirty-eight individuals is beyond the scope of this research. Seagram is a microcosm of how complicated these issues can become. Bilal Abdullah was born in the UK of Iraqi parents (hence he was entitled to UK citizenship) and left the UK for Iraq with them when he was one. He returned to take up residence in the UK in 2006 after obtaining his medical qualifications in Iraq. His co-conspirator, Kafeel Ahmed, was born in Saudi Arabia of Indian parents and was mainly brought up in Bangalore, India.

⁴⁸ See, for example, *Daily Mail*, 8 November 2006.

⁴⁹ BBC News, 9 July 2007.

⁵⁰ BBC News, 9 November 2007.

Table BCG.3, Appendix A, encapsulates for the six groups/cells whether the majority of individuals in them were born or raised in the UK, whether their descent and heritage was from Pakistan or the Horn of Africa, and the presence in each group/cell of any other nationalities, heritage or origins. Four out of six groups/cells (66 per cent) had a majority of their members either born or raised in the UK, while the same proportion also had a Pakistani background or cultural heritage. In both cases, the four groups/cells were the same, namely Crevice, Rhyme, 7/7 and Overt.

With the exception of Overt, individuals with nationalities other than those represented by the majority could also be found in five (83.3 per cent) of the groups/cells. In Crevice, it was Algeria (Rahman Adam aka Anthony Garcia), in Rhyme it was India (Dhiren Barot), in 7/7 Jamaica (Germaine Lindsay) and in 21/7, Ghana (Sumaila Abubakari aka Manfo Kwaku Asiedu).

3.5 The personal behaviours of group/cell members

The types of behaviour examined in this section were not directly relevant to the planning and preparation phases of a terrorist attack but that may have arisen as the individual became radicalised over time. They therefore may have occurred prior to the point that an individual made their decision to become involved in terrorist activity. Equally, they may also have happened while they were engaged with terrorist planning and preparations. Some behaviours may have changed or ceased as the conspiracy advanced (for example, an individual may no longer voice in public their support for AQ or for violent Jihadist attacks). Other examples are found where behaviours tended to become more prominent or acute as an individual became more deeply involved in the conspiracy (increasing withdrawal from their immediate family, for example). They are set out here in three broad categories: religious attitudes and practices, social relationships and general lifestyle.

3.5.1 Behaviours relating to an individual's religion and religious practices

Table IPB.6, Appendix C, shows nineteen individuals (50 per cent) were described by others as being religiously observant. However, no individuals in the Rhyme group/cell were described in this way. Three individuals in Overt, one in Crevice and one in 7/7 were described by others as being devoutly religious (see Table IPB.7, Appendix C). Eight individuals (21 per cent) who were known to be religiously observant also exhibited a religious intensification over time and did so to a degree that became noticeable to others (see Table IPB.8, Appendix C).

The wearing of clothing traditionally associated with Islam in preference to western clothing was seen in eleven individuals (28.9 per cent) (see Table IPB.10, Appendix C). None of them were in Seagram or Rhyme but seven (out of a total of ten) were in Overt.

Table IPB.11, Appendix C, indicates that sixteen individuals (42.1 per cent) attended activities at religious schools or at other, more informal religious "study circles". However, no examples were found of individuals who also ceased to attend the mainstream mosque, or attended it increasingly infrequently in favour of these alternative religious activities.

Table BCG.4, Appendix A, shows the distribution of Muslim converts across the groups/cells. A person can be described as a "convert" to a religion if they have changed their adherence to it from another, different religion. Four individuals (10.5 per cent) of the total had converted to Islam. Dhiren Barot in Rhyme, who was brought up as a Hindu, was the most prominent in terms of his leadership of the group/cell, his background of many years of involvement in violent Jihadism and

his well-documented close links to AQ.⁵¹ All the other converts to Islam had a Christian background, and in the 7/7 group/cell, Germaine Lindsay's mother converted to Islam shortly before he himself did so in about 2000.⁵² Lindsay was married to a convert to Islam, as was the partner and mother of Ramzi Mohammed's children.

A factor that emerges from the data concerns the situation where a previously non-religious or minimally religious individual not only becomes markedly more religious, but does so with an exceptionally rigid adherence to its teachings, strictures and tenets. In the context of this research, all the conspirators are Muslim and the individuals who had drifted away from Islam before vigorously re-engaging with it prior to then becoming radicalised usually had some familiarity with its practices by reason of their birth and early upbringing within it.⁵³ Table IPB.9, Appendix C, shows this phenomenon of "re-engagement" with their pre-existing religion (ie, Islam) was seen in thirteen individuals (34.2 per cent) across four of the groups/cells (66.6 per cent). The exceptions were Rhyme and Seagram.

The backgrounds of these re-engaged Muslims also seem to be of a similar type. Not only were they not seen as practicing Muslims, they also seemed to have led lifestyles in their recent past that were at odds with the teachings of their inherited religion.⁵⁴ Table IPB.26, Appendix C, shows that nine individuals (23.7 per cent) in four groups (Crevice, 7/7, 21/7 and Overt) were of this type.

Re-engagement behaviour is at its most concentrated in 21/7 where five of the six individuals in the group/cell were re-engaged Muslims in the sense described here. Three of them had led strongly westernised lifestyles prior to their re-engagement with Islam and later involvement with violent Jihadism.

Two groups/cells contained both individuals who were re-engaged Muslims and others who were converts to Islam, namely 7/7 (one of each) and Overt (three re-engaged Muslims and two converts to Islam). Interestingly, Rhyme is the only group where none of the behaviours related to religion were found by the research, with the exception of one. Its leader, Dhiren Barot, was a convert to Islam from Hinduism (Table BCG.4, Appendix A).

3.5.2 Behaviours relating to an individual's social relationships

During the research, a variety of behaviours associated with the social relationships of individuals and that may have been of possible relevance to violent Jihadism were actively searched for. They included any noticeable withdrawal from contact with their families (a process seen in four individuals, 10.5 per cent) (see Table IPB.12, Appendix C); whether they increasingly confined their social contacts to within a small circle of like-minded individuals (eight individuals, 21 per cent) (see Table IPB.13, Appendix C), and whether they attempted to impose their own strict

⁵¹ For example, by 1999 he was a protégé of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and a known AQ operative. See 9/11 Commission (2004), p.150.

⁵² The Stationary Office (2006), p.18.

⁵³ The phenomenon of Muslim re-engagement also occurs in other conspiracies outside of these six – for example, the "soldier beheading plot" where the leader "had been a keen footballer and cricketer [and] turned from a drinker and smoker to an extremist obsessed by the speeches of Bin Laden and Abu Hamza". See *The Guardian*, 19 February 2008.

⁵⁴ Examples of some past individual behaviours associated with those who have "re-engaged" are drinking alcohol, smoking tobacco, taking illegal drugs, attending clubs and dating women, involvement in crime and criminality. Once they had re-engaged, some dropped out of their job or education in order to devote more time to their religion or religious causes (see Tables GL.5, GL.8, GL.12, GL.13).

interpretation of religious practices and obligations or their own intolerant world-view on their family, friends or others (five individuals, 13.1 per cent) (see Table IPB.14, Appendix C).

In terms of the spread of these behaviours across the groups/cells, the members of 7/7 showed the greatest number of individuals who withdrew from the presence of their families (two out of four) and also those who confined their social contact to within a small group of like-minded individuals (three out of four). However, none of these individuals made any documented attempt to impose their own behaviours and world-view on their family or friends. Two individuals (5.3 per cent), one in 21/7 and one in 7/7, argued or reacted strongly against others when their own views were questioned or challenged (see Table IPB.15, Appendix C).

The teachings of charismatic radical “leaders” or “preachers” (such as Omar Bakri Muhammad and Abu Hamza al Masri) were known to be influential with six individuals (15.8 per cent), including three in 21/7 (see Table IPB.16, Appendix C). This number increases to twelve individuals (31.6 per cent) when personal associations with this type of “preacher” were examined (see Table IPB.17, Appendix C). Once more, the greatest numbers were in the 21/7 group/cell (five out of six), followed by Crevice (three out of seven).

3.5.3 Behaviours relating to an individual’s general lifestyle

A final group of seventeen behaviours, some of them linked together, can be categorised as relating to the personal lifestyle of an individual rather than to the part they played in a group/cell. These were tracked across all thirty-eight members of the six groups/cells.

Tables IPB.18 and IPB.19, Appendix C, show the number of individuals who acquired and then shared violent Jihadist propaganda. It usually took the form of written material, downloads from websites or other types of media. Evidence of its possession was found to be common, occurring in nineteen individuals (50 per cent) across all six groups/cells. A smaller number of seven individuals (18.4 per cent) were known to have shared their “collections” with others but they were only found in two groups/cells, Crevice and 21/7.

The next seven types of behaviour were likely to have been noticeable to others outside of the conspiracies. However, only in the cases of three individuals (7.9 per cent) did it alter to such a degree over time that others close to them but outside the group/cell commented on it (see Table IPB.20, Appendix C). Two of them were in 7/7 and one in Seagram. Table IPB.21, Appendix C, shows the same numbers were seen by others as not only “changing” enough for them to notice it but also for the change to be associated by them with a particular event. In 7/7, for example, Germaine Lindsay spent ten days away from his family in November 2004, allegedly in London at the Regent’s Park Mosque and the Leeds Grand Mosque. His wife described his behaviour as being “changed for the worst” after this event.⁵⁵

Table IPB.22, Appendix C, indicates that six individuals (15.7 per cent) dropped out of education or their job and began to devote increasing amounts of time to aspects of their religion and beliefs. A number of individuals (seven, 18.4 per cent), spread across all the groups except one (Rhyme) openly expressed to others their support for AQ or the carrying out of violent attacks against “the West” (see Table IPB.23, Appendix C). A smaller number (five, 13.1 per cent) openly expressed their dislike of “the West” and its culture, politics and morals but once more, no instance of this was found in Rhyme (see Table IPB.24, Appendix C). Perhaps this is an indication of a higher

⁵⁵ *Daily Mail*, 24 September 2005.

level of operational fieldcraft and hence security precautions implemented by that group/cell. One individual in Seagram was the only known example to express a hostile view of other Muslims for their particular beliefs (see Table IPB.25, Appendix C). Three individuals (7.9 per cent) had openly expressed their support for suicide attacks, including one in Crevice, a group/cell that showed no indications of employing such a tactic (see Table IPB.27, Appendix C).

The attendance of individuals at religious schools, study circles or similar gatherings is seen in Table IPB.11, Appendix C. Overall, sixteen individuals (42.1 per cent) engaged in this behaviour. There was a fairly even spread across the groups/cells, with between 2 and 4 individuals in each – apart from Rhyme, where there was no sign of this behaviour. In percentage terms, 100 per cent of the members of Seagram engaged in this activity, with approximately 50 per cent of the members of Crevice, 7/7, 21/7 and Overt also participating.

Table IPB.28, Appendix C, contrastingly shows seven individuals (18.4 per cent) attended meetings of a more directly political and extremist nature. They were only found in two groups (Crevice and Seagram) and only two external organisations were involved (Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun). However, the two aspects of religion and politics do not seem to be mutually incompatible, as two out of the three members of Seagram (66.6 per cent) associated with Hizb ut-Tahrir also attended religious gatherings. Five out of seven individuals in Crevice (62.5 per cent) were associated with a different political group, Al Muhajiroun, and three of these individuals also attended outside religious “study circles”.

Crime and/or some involvement with criminals or criminality featured in the pasts of ten individuals (26.3 per cent). They were found in all the groups/cells except Seagram (see Table IPB.29, Appendix C). Nine individuals (23.6 per cent) in four groups/cells had previously been dealt with by the criminal justice system, either by way of an arrest, a charge or a caution (see Table IPB.30, Appendix C). The exceptions were Rhyme and Seagram. Perhaps the most significant example is Muktar Said Ibrahim, the leader of 21/7: he had a conviction for indecent assault when he was fifteen years old, and as the result of his conviction for two violent robberies he was detained for five years in a young offenders institution. At the time of the attacks he was the subject of an arrest warrant for assault.⁵⁶

The question of what type of individual was recruited by the members to join their conspiratorial group/cell is an important one. The results in Tables IPB.31 and IPB.32, Appendix C, help to throw some light on this aspect. Seven individuals (18.4 per cent) who were recruited or involved in the conspiracy were members of the recruiters close family, often a brother.⁵⁷ They were found in three groups/cells, Crevice, 21/7 and Overt, and involved at least two individuals per group. Nine individuals (23.7 per cent) in four groups, Crevice, Rhyme, 21/7 and Overt, were recruited by or became involved as the result of an approach by a long-standing or close friend already in the conspiracy. The leader of Overt, Ahmed Abdullah Ali seemed to favour this method, recruiting at least four individuals (including his lieutenant, Assad Sarwar) after meeting them during a variety

⁵⁶ BBC News, 11 July 2007a; *Daily Mail*, 11 July 2007.

⁵⁷ This does not include Sabeel Ahmed, who was convicted of withholding information of the terrorist activities of his brother Kafeel in the Seagram group/cell, as he was not aware of the information before the attacks took place, nor does it include the younger brother of Omar Khyam in Crevice who admitted accompanying him to Pakistan and undergoing violent Jihadist training but who was acquitted of all the charges when tried in the UK.

of activities ranging from attending a mosque to participating in informal lectures at an East London school.⁵⁸

When taken together, both Crevice and 21/7 had six individuals each that used this family/trusted friend approach to recruitment. It does not appear to apply to 7/7 or Seagram. Indeed, it may be more widespread than indicated in the Tables as, in a series of trials after the conviction of the main conspirators in 21/7, a further ten individuals were convicted for participating in differing aspects of the conspiracy or assisting in the escapes of the perpetrators after the failed attacks. Seven of them had family connections to the conspirators and three of them were friends and neighbours.⁵⁹

The final behaviours examined related to whether any cell members participated in “charitable” activities to further their Jihadist ends (see Tables IPB.33 and IPB.34, Appendix C). Overall, twelve individuals (31.6 per cent) collected money to be sent abroad to support “the Mujahideen”. This only involved two groups/cells, with five individuals in Crevice and seven individuals in Overt participating in it. However, it was only in Overt that this activity was carried out through the work of an organised Islamic charity based in the UK.⁶⁰ Three (7.9 per cent) had also travelled abroad with an Islamic charity. All of them were in Overt. They had travelled to Pakistan to assist in its activities among the Afghan refugees there.⁶¹ No other group appeared to be involved in this kind of activity.

In a behaviour related to this, six individuals (15.8 per cent) took an active part in collecting hiking/camping or related equipment in the UK in order to send it abroad (Table IBG.3, Appendix A). Almost all of them (four) were in Crevice, but there were one each in both 7/7 and 21/7.

3.6 Characteristics and behaviours of the leaders of the groups/cells

It is not possible to analyse the organisation of the groups/cells without becoming aware of certain individuals within each of them who seemed to play a particularly significant role in so many of their activities. This is reflected in a number of the characteristics and behaviours already discussed in this chapter. In the case of each of these individuals, they were the leaders of the groups/cells and were acknowledged as such by the group/cell members themselves and others on the outside. They were:

- Omar Khyam (Crevice)
- Dhiren Barot (Rhyme)
- Mohammad Sidiq Khan (7/7)
- Muktar Said Ibrahim (21/7)
- Ahmed Abdullah Ali (Overt)
- Bilal Abdullah (Seagram).

⁵⁸ BBC News, 8 July 2010b.

⁵⁹ BBC News, 11 July 2008.

⁶⁰ BBC News, 8 July 2010b.

⁶¹ Other individuals convicted in the UK of offences linked to violent Jihadism also used Islamic charities to travel to “lands of Jihad”; for example, both Sajid Badat and Abu Hamza al-Masri visited Bosnia in the 1990s.

Table BCG.2, Appendix A, sets out some of the key characteristics and behaviours as they specifically relate to the leaders of each of the six groups/cells.

3.6.1 **Age, marital status and children**

The average age of the group/cell leader was twenty-eight, which puts them into the same range (26–30) as 39.5 per cent of the group/cell members (see Tables IPB.1 and IPB.2, Appendix C). However, there is some variation across the groups/cells, with the youngest leader being Omar Khyam at twenty-five and the oldest being Dhiren Barot at thirty-three.

Only one, Mohammad Sidique Khan, was married (although there are uncorroborated reports that Dhiren Barot had a wife living in Malaysia). Khan also differs from the other group/cell leaders in that he had one child and his wife was pregnant with a second when he killed himself and six other people on the Underground train at Edgware Road on 7 July 2005. The other four leaders were single.

3.6.2 **Heritage and origins**

In terms of their heritage and origins, three leaders were born in the UK of Pakistani heritage (Khyam, Khan, Ali), one was a long-term resident of the UK and of Indian heritage (Barot), one was born in the UK of Iraqi heritage (Abdullah), and one was a UK citizen of Eritrean birth and heritage (Ibrahim). One was a convert (Barot) and one was a re-engaged Muslim (Ibrahim).

Amongst the leaders, the most variety in their characteristics relates to their origins rather than their age and marital status and these in turn are not markedly different from those across all the group/cell members.

In contrast to the characteristics outlined here, there are much more striking similarities in the behaviours they exhibited and the focus of these is strongly on the knowledge, contacts and expertise they brought to their groups/cells. Sitting at the centre of all three of these elements of their leadership lies their connections to Pakistan, and in Pakistan itself lies their connections to AQ or AQ-like groups or individuals with the same ideology and motivation. These behaviours are examined below.

3.6.3 **Experiences of violent Jihad and connections to AQ**

Table BCG.2, Appendix A, shows that five of the six leaders (83.3 per cent) had links to AQ or AQ-like groups or individuals in Pakistan during the period of their particular conspiracy. In addition, all six leaders (100 per cent) had links to violent Jihad in countries other than the UK and in every case these links were forged before the commencement of their group/cell conspiracy against the UK. Links were created in three ways: by attending training camps to gain military-like training; by meeting individuals in Pakistan steeped in the ideology of violent Jihad; and, for at least one of them (Dhiren Barot), by participating in violent Jihad itself. The background and history of each of the leaders as it relates to these aspects is set out below:

Omar Khyam (Crevice)⁶²

Khyam's political awareness and interest in violent Jihadism began to crystallise by the time he was sixteen. At the age of eighteen, he attended his first training camp in Pakistan, travelling there secretly in January 2000 after telling his family he was going to France. By

⁶² BBC News, 30 April 2007c.

the time his family had located him and sent him home, in his words he had learned “everything I needed for guerrilla warfare in Kashmir”. In 2001, he returned and ended up in Afghanistan, then under the Taliban regime. For Khyam, the invasion of Iraq by Coalition forces in March 2003 was the spur for him to travel to Pakistan and allegedly make contact with a senior AQ figure, Abdul Hadi. Once there, he helped to organise a training camp for trusted individuals from the UK. The conspiracy to attack the UK developed during this period in Pakistan.

Dhiren Barot (Rhyme)⁶³

Barot was nearly twenty-four years old when he left the UK in September 1995 to undertake paramilitary and terrorist training in Pakistan.⁶⁴ After this, he appears to have taken part in paramilitary actions in Kotti, Kashmir, and in 1998 he became “a lead instructor at a Jihadi training camp in Afghanistan”.⁶⁵ Probably as a result of his background and potential, he became a protégé of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a very significant member of AQ described by the 9/11 Commission as a “terrorist entrepreneur” and “the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks”.⁶⁶

Also during 1998 or 1999, Barot spent time in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, working with Riduan Ibn Isamuddin, also known as “Hambali”. Hambali was a key figure in Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a group then closely associated with AQ and who carried out the two bomb attacks in Bali on 12 October 2002, killing 202 people.⁶⁷ Barot’s role at the time was to coordinate AQ terrorism in Southeast Asia by ensuring Hambali and JI acted in accordance with AQ aims and objectives.⁶⁸ In 1999, Barot attended another terrorist training camp. This was Camp Hudaybiyah in the Philippines, set up and run by JI.⁶⁹

Finally, Barot began to put his training into action on behalf of AQ when in August 2000 he travelled from the UK to the US with Nadeem Tarmohammed, a long-standing friend and three years later, a co-conspirator in Operation Rhyme. They visited New York City and Washington, DC, and compiled four targeting assessment reports for AQ based on the information they had gathered.⁷⁰ By early 2004, Barot was in Pakistan to brief his AQ contacts on a plan he had been developing himself over the last year and that he was anxious to put into practice in the UK.⁷¹ On his return to the UK, operational preparations began in earnest.

⁶³ For a fuller account of Dhiren Barot as an operative for Al Qaeda, see Clutterbuck (Forthcoming 2011).

⁶⁴ BBC News, 7 November 2006.

⁶⁵ Southern District Court of New York (undated).

⁶⁶ 9/11 Commission (2004), p.145.

⁶⁷ BBC News, 8 November 2008.

⁶⁸ 9/11 Commission (2004), p.150–51.

⁶⁹ *Metro*, 6 November 2006.

⁷⁰ Southern District Court of New York (undated).

⁷¹ BBC News, 7 November 2006.

Mohammad Sidique Khan (7/7)

Much still remains unclear about Khan's activities in Pakistan. He is believed to have been in Pakistan for two weeks in 2003 and to have received some form of training. He may have visited previously. However, the critical period was from 19 November 2004 to February 2005 when he went to Pakistan with Shehzad Tanweer, his lieutenant. During this period, Khan may have received further training and is "likely [to have had] some contact with Al Qaeda figures". Both of them could have recorded their "suicide videos" during this trip; perhaps the clearest indications to date of the link to AQ is seen in the release by AQ of Khan's video, the claim by Ayman al-Zawahiri shortly afterwards that AQ "launched" the attacks, and the release of Tanweer's video on the first anniversary of the attacks.⁷² He was also known to possess a series of mobile phones he used exclusively in connection with planning the attacks and received a number of calls on them from public phone boxes in Rawalpindi giving "bomb-making advice and encouragement".⁷³

Muktar Said Ibrahim (21/7)

In 2003, Ibrahim left the UK and travelled to the Sudan. On his return he boasted to others of having received Jihadi training and learning how to fire rocket-propelled grenades. Even if this was not the case, in December 2004 he travelled to Pakistan and he remained there until his return in March 2005. It is believed that sometime during this period he received training or instruction of some sort concerning how to make explosive material from hydrogen peroxide and how to construct an IED with it.⁷⁴

Ahmed Abdullah Ali (Overt)

As part of a contingent from the UK helping an Islamic charity with Afghan refugees who had fled the fighting in their own country, Ali travelled to Pakistan in 2003.⁷⁵ There may have been other visits but he is known to have been in Pakistan in 2006, returning to the UK in May of that year. On his return, his luggage was covertly searched and evidence consistent with home-made bombmaking was found. By July, in the early stages of Operation Overt, he was observed downloading information concerning planes and flight times.⁷⁶

During the period he was under surveillance, Ali was in touch by email with others in Pakistan.⁷⁷ Using coded language, he gave broad details of how the preparations were developing, sought authority for a member of the group to conduct a dummy run by boarding a flight to the USA, and informed them he believed they were under surveillance but not enough to upset their plan. Finally, there were detailed exchanges concerning the "quantities and concentrations of hydrogen peroxide" they were using in their IED.

⁷² The Stationary Office (2006), p.20.

⁷³ *The Guardian*, 3 February 2011

⁷⁴ BBC News, 11 July 2007a.

⁷⁵ BBC News, 8 July 2010b.

⁷⁶ *The Guardian*, 8 September 2008.

⁷⁷ BBC News, 7 September 2009.

Bilal Abdullah (Seagram)

At the time of the Coalition invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Abdullah was in medical school in Baghdad, Iraq. His family home and business was in Fallujah, Anbar Province, a town that saw fierce fighting between the US military and the various groups resisting their presence. His medical tutor claimed Abdullah was obsessed with the resistance, constantly interrupting in class to talk about them.⁷⁸ After his arrest, a document was found on his laptop addressed to a group in Iraq called the “Soldiers of the Islamic States of Iraq” and stating “God knows that the days I spent with you were the best and most rewarding days of my life”.⁷⁹ He returned to the UK in 2006 to work as a doctor.

The previous experiences and contacts in Pakistan of the leaders of the earliest groups, Omar Khyam from Crevice and Dhiren Barot from Rhyme, made them natural choices for AQ to encourage, if not task, with carrying out attacks in the UK and for them to form their own group/cell to do so. The leaders of the other three conspiracies, Mohammad Sidique Khan (7/7), Muktar Said Ibrahim (21/7) and Ahmed Abdullah Ali (Overt), appear to have travelled initially to Pakistan with the intention of becoming “foot soldiers” in violent Jihad, but once there they were selected and tasked with carrying out UK attacks. With the exception of Barot, it appears that the concept of carrying out attacks in the UK only began to motivate the leaders and their groups when they were in Pakistan. What is more certain is that once this occurred and they returned to the UK, it then took only a short period of time before full-scale preparations were underway.

3.6.4 Group/cell leaders and the links between groups/cells in the UK

As has already been detailed, there were operational-level links between certain of the groups/cells in the UK, as well as through their activities and connections in Pakistan (see Table BCG.5, Appendix A). Crevice had links to 7/7 and 21/7 had links to Overt. On closer examination, in each group/cell the link involved the leaders (or future leaders). Omar Khyam met and talked with Mohammad Sidique Khan on several occasions prior to his departure for Pakistan in November 2004. The best publicly known example occurred on 21 February 2004, when Khyam and Khan spoke together in person and at some length.⁸⁰

There is no doubt that Khyam is the dominant individual in this exchange, with Khan acting as the acolyte eager to seek his knowledge and advice on matters relating to his own imminent departure to Pakistan for training and violent Jihad operations. They discuss camping equipment and costs, and what Khan can expect on his arrival in Pakistan, both during his time at the camp and then on operations “over the border”. Details are also discussed of how Khan can carry out various criminal scams to obtain money before his departure. The money would then be split between Khan and other “brothers” who would use it in their own efforts to participate in violent Jihad.

The links between 21/7 and Overt are more tenuous but they too were between the leaders. At his trial, it was revealed that Ahmed Abdullah Ali of Overt was known to be in telephone contact with Muktar Said Ibrahim for a period up to two months before the failed attack. The reasons for this

⁷⁸ *The Sunday Times*, 8 July 2007.

⁷⁹ *The Guardian*, 17 December 2008.

⁸⁰ BBC News, 1 May 2007.

and the subjects of their discussions are not in the public domain. However, it illustrates the point that once more it was the leaders of the groups/cells who provided the means to link different conspiracies or, in the case of Omar Khyam and Mohammad Sidique Khan, to link the leader of an active conspiracy with the leader of a future conspiracy.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the intrinsic characteristics of the six groups/cells, how the groups/cells were organised, certain personal characteristics of their members, and in more detail how the group/cell and its members behaved. The overall results fall into two categories and initial conclusions can be drawn from both of them: first, concerning the characteristics and behaviours themselves and second, the insights they give into the groups/cells, their members and leaders.

Perhaps the most important conclusion in the first category is also the most obvious one: a wide variety of specific behaviours were exhibited by the six groups/cells and many of these behaviours were related to their core aim of mass casualty attacks targeted against the general public. Surrounding these core terrorist attack related behaviours is a further set of behaviours that are more varied, particularly in relation to the behaviours of individuals, but still related to the pursuit of violent Jihadism. Within the groups/cells, individuals seem to exhibit two types of behaviours: those when they are acting on behalf of the group/cell and a further set seen more in their general lifestyle and related to their motivation of violent Jihadism.

In terms of the insights in the second category, it is clear that as well as their identical commitment to the same aim, their ideology and motivation both came from the same source, namely AQ. Further, as a country, Pakistan played a key role as a base area where the relevant knowledge, experience and expertise they required to fulfil this aim could be acquired.

It is also clear that for the majority of the individuals involved as group members, once they had decided to participate actively in violent Jihad, they could only take their ambitions so far if they remained in the UK. By the time they reached this point, they had already absorbed the violent Jihadist propaganda obtained from a variety of media sources, particularly the Internet. In addition, some individuals began to focus their attention on the teachings and exhortations of a number of the so-called radical clerics. Indeed, some went further and began to associate with them personally, or with their close followers.

The net result of this in certain individuals seems to have been to drive the radicalisation process to a point where they made a personal decision to become involved in violent Jihad. To achieve this goal, they needed to receive some form of military training and Pakistan was by far the best place in which to receive it, with its added attraction of also being a jumping-off point to put theory into practice in neighbouring Kashmir or Afghanistan. However, when they were there, a number were persuaded by AQ or AQ-inspired individuals that they would be of greater service to their cause if they returned to their homes in the UK and carried out violent Jihad there. Consequently, in these cases, the preparations for terrorist attacks in the UK began in earnest shortly after their return from Pakistan.

The next chapter examines the characteristics and behaviours of the groups/cells and the individuals within them in the context of how they set about the process of implementing their terrorist attacks and the tactics, techniques and procedures they employed to do so.

4.1 **Attack planning and preparations**

This chapter moves on from the analysis of why and how the groups/cells and the individuals within them organised themselves in order to examine the TTPs they employed.

4.1.1 **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and “dry-runs”**

Group/cell members not only acquired information and propaganda relating to violent Jihad (see Table IPB.18, Appendix C); at some stage, they became actively engaged in information and intelligence gathering activities into topics of direct relevance to committing terrorist acts (see Table IBG.1, Appendix B). A total of 18 individuals (47.4 per cent), operating within all six of the groups/cells, are known to have acquired information of this type, usually from Internet downloads, DVDs or documents such as pamphlets or books.

The groups/cells also undertook research related more specifically to targeting or other aspects of attacks (see Table IBG.20, Appendix B). Once more, this activity was found across all of the groups but a lesser number of individuals undertook this more conspiratorial work (nine, 23.7 per cent). The numbers of individuals involved per group/cell were also fewer, ranging from one each in Crevice, 7/7, Overt and Seagram to three in Rhyme.

The overall use by groups/cells of information gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance activity, as well as the planning or use of “dry runs”, is set out in Table BCG.7, Appendix A. None of these activities was found in two of the groups/cells (Crevice and 21/7) but one or more elements of it were found (or can be inferred) in the remaining four groups/cells. In the case of Crevice, the lack of these behaviours may be a function of the lack of focus by the group/cell on any particular target and this is in turn primarily a consequence of their arrest at an early stage of their preparations (see Tables BCG.11 and BCG.12, Appendix A). In the case of 21/7, the familiarity of the participants with the London Underground system and bus routes may have made the use of specific surveillance, reconnaissance or a dry run unnecessary.

Undertaking active reconnaissance against a target or target area was found in four groups/cells, the exceptions being Crevice and Seagram (see Table IBG.21, Appendix B). If only the UK is considered, it involved six individuals (15.8 per cent), four of whom were in the 7/7 group/cell. If the criteria are broadened to include the pre-9/11 reconnaissance work undertaken in the USA in 2000 by three members of the Rhyme group/cell prior to

the commencement of their conspiracy in the UK, the number rises to nine individuals (23.7 per cent).⁸¹ As a result of employing these techniques on two extended trips to the USA, Dhiren Barot was able to put together four very detailed targeting reports that would potentially have been of great use in developing the planning and preparations for any subsequent attacks.⁸²

In the case of Seagram, while no evidence was found for the group/cell or a member of it carrying out reconnaissance of their targets in London, it can perhaps be inferred by the way they located their two car bombs in particular streets at particular times. The first VBIED was left outside the main target, the “Tiger Tiger” nightclub, and the secondary VBIED was located a few streets away from it, in an area where it would impact on any crowd fleeing the first blast. It is reasonable to assume that this tactic would have required some degree of personal observation at the relevant sites. An additional example of a reconnaissance by Seagram may have occurred when its leader, Bilal Abdullah, took a taxi to Glasgow airport (the target of their last attack) just prior to the launching of their London attacks.⁸³ The reason for this visit is unknown.

A dry run prior to an attack only occurred in 7/7, but potentially one was due to occur in Overt to test the pre-boarding security at Heathrow Airport.⁸⁴ The arrests of the conspirators ensured it did not occur. With the 7/7 group/cell, the dry run was probably to ensure familiarity with the various routes, means of transport and timings relating to their journey from Leeds to London and how to gain access to the different Underground lines after they had split up on their arrival at King’s Cross station.⁸⁵

4.1.2 **Targets attacked or selected**

Different types of targets were either attacked or were selected for attack by four out of the six groups/cells (66.6 per cent) (see Table BCG.11, Appendix A). In both the fully implemented attacks on 7/7 and the failed attacks on 21/7 the targets were public transport. More specifically, they were against the passengers travelling on it and attacking London Underground trains and buses therefore enabled the group/cell to carry out its aim of coordinated mass casualty attacks.

The only other group/cell able to implement any attacks was Seagram. Here the initial target was a nightclub in central London and then, by using a secondary VBIED, the next target would have been the crowd that would have gathered in a nearby street. In the

⁸¹ For details of the activity in the USA, see Southern District Court of New York (undated).

⁸² The targets included the New York Stock Exchange, the main office of Citigroup and the Prudential World Headquarters and in Washington, DC, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. See relevant documents on the NEFA foundation website:
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Barot/Citigroup.pdf
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Barot/IMF_WorldBank.pdf
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Barot/NYSE.pdf
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Barot/Prudential.pdf

⁸³ *The Sunday Times*, 8 July 2007.

⁸⁴ *The Guardian*, 8 September 2008.

⁸⁵ The Stationary Office (2006), p.24.

event, the IEDs failed to explode. Their second attack was a hastily mounted suicide attack against passengers using the main terminal building at Glasgow airport.⁸⁶

Overt had selected for attack a number of commercial aircraft, perhaps up to ten, due to depart from Heathrow airport to various destinations across the Atlantic in the USA. Crevice and Rhyme did not appear to have made any final decisions on targeting before their arrest.

4.1.3 **Targets considered**

A much broader span of targets were considered than is indicated by just those that were attacked (see Table BCG.12, Appendix A). The greatest variety is seen in Crevice and this may be a consequence of the group/cell not having advanced far enough in their preparations to need to focus on an ultimate target. In the case of 7/7, 21/7 and Seagram, no evidence was found of any other targets being considered apart from those they actually attacked. No group/cell appeared to have considered the possibility of attacking a target associated with any other religion.

4.1.4 **“Suicide videos” and other personal communications**

The use of suicide attacks has already been examined as one aspect of the concept of operations of certain of the groups, namely 7/7, 21/7, and Overt (see Table BCG.6, Appendix A). A particular behaviour that tends to be present in a group/cell, depending on whether or not they intended to use suicide as a tactic to carry out their attack, is the making of a visual record of their justification for carrying it out. In the three groups/cells committed to plan and prepare for suicide attacks (7/7, 21/7 and Overt), so-called “suicide videos” were recorded for propaganda use in the aftermath of the planned attack (see Table BCG.8, Appendix A).

At least nine individuals (23.7 per cent) are known to have done this (see Table IBG.18, Appendix B). In Overt, six individuals recorded propaganda “suicide videos” (60 per cent of the group/cell members). In 7/7, it involved two individuals (50 per cent of the group/cell members). The first recording of this type was of Mohammad Sidique Khan, the leader of 7/7. It was broadcast by Al Jazeera on 1 September 2005, two months after the attacks, and was followed by the broadcast of a second recording from a member of the 7/7 group/cell, Shehzad Tanweer, released a year later in 2006 to coincide with the first anniversary of the attacks. The recording by Tanweer also included footage of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the deputy leader of AQ who made reference to the 7/7 attacks.⁸⁷ Taken together, this appears to be a strong indicator that AQ were at the least involved in exploiting the attacks.

Although no recording of any member of the 21/7 group was found, there is strong circumstantial evidence that at least one was made.⁸⁸ The simultaneous failure of the group to achieve the aim of their attacks and their own “martyrdom”, as well as the incriminating nature of the recording if recovered by the police, probably ensured it was destroyed rather than exploited.

⁸⁶ *The Sunday Times*, 8 July 2007.

⁸⁷ *The Guardian*, 7 July 2006.

⁸⁸ BBC News, 4 February 2008.

Not everyone in a group/cell intending to use suicide attacks took part in such recordings (for example, four individuals in Overt did not do so). All six of the “suicide videos” were found at the home of one of them, Assad Sarwar, the trained bombmaker. There was no intention for him to take part in the planned suicide attacks as his role was to rebuild the group/cell in order to carry out further attacks.⁸⁹ In addition to the recording of the messages themselves, Overt also left instructions to the media on how they were to be used (although the exact content of these is not available).⁹⁰

As well as the “suicide videos”, eight individuals (21.0 per cent) prepared a written will, testament or letter (see Table IBG.19, Appendix B). Examples are found in five out of the six groups/cells (83.3 per cent). The only group/cell that does not show either of these types of behaviour is Crevice. This may serve to reinforce the conclusion that they did not intend to use suicide as a tactic in their planned attacks. A hastily written note and will were also prepared in Seagram by both Kafeel Ahmed and Bilal Abdullah, in advance of their abortive suicide attack in Glasgow airport, but this not the same as the carefully prepared and stage-managed propaganda exercises carried out by the other groups/cells.

4.1.5 Explosives

Table BCG.9 gives details of the type of explosive each group/cell employed or attempted to employ. They are of three main types: commercially available flammable gases and liquids; a mixture based on fertiliser; and chemically prepared from precursor materials. Three groups/cells (50 per cent) chemically prepared an explosive mix based on liquid peroxide and known as TATP. One (Crevice) would have needed to prepare manually their ammonium nitrate fertiliser, before mixing it with the other ingredients. Two groups/cells (33.3 per cent – Rhyme and Seagram) chose to use flammable substances such as petrol and butane gas that would not have needed any further preparation except for the installation of a means to cause them to ignite. No attempts were made by any group/cell to acquire military or commercial explosives (such as the Semtex used by the IRA or the Goma 2-Eco used by the Madrid bombers) or black powder (as in the case of David Copeland, the extreme right-wing attacker whose IEDs killed three people in London in April 1999).

4.1.6 Premises

Table BCG.10, Appendix A, refers to the premises used by each group/cell to carry out their attack preparations, including the manufacture of their explosives and IEDs. Three of them (50 per cent – Crevice, 7/7 and Seagram) used premises they had rented specifically for the purpose. In one case (Overt), a flat in a terraced house in east London had been purchased for £138,000 to use as a safe house in the conspiracy.⁹¹

In the other two cases (33.3 per cent – Rhyme and 21/7) the conspirators used premises already lived in by a member of the group. With 21/7, this action is all the more noteworthy as the location where they carried out the highly toxic and dangerous process

⁸⁹ BBC News, 4 April 2008; *Daily Mail*, 9 September 2008.

⁹⁰ *Metropolitan Police Service*, 23 July 2010.

⁹¹ BBC News, 18 April 2008.

of preparing their explosive by using hydrogen peroxide was the one-bedroom flat where one of the conspirators, Yassin Hassan Omar, lived.⁹²

4.1.7 **Use of documents to advance terrorist activity**

Terrorist groups of all types use deception or crime to acquire money and documents to support their terrorist activities. The six case studies presented here were no exception. For example, during a conversation between Omar Khyam, the leader of Crevice, and Mohammad Sidique Khan, the future leader of 7/7, Khyam explained to Khan how to set up a credit card fraud and offered to help him do so.⁹³ The research looked for three types of behaviour relating to documents: setting up of multiple financial accounts or using false particulars (see Table IBG.11, Appendix B); acquiring official documents by the same process (Table IBG.12, Appendix B); and acquiring new passports in order to conceal past travel patterns (Table IBG.13, Appendix B).

With the sole exception of one instance in 21/7, these types of behaviour were seen only in Crevice and Rhyme and then only involved a small number of individuals (five, 13.1 per cent). In another approach to obtaining money to finance the activities of the group, Waheed Zaman from Overt drew out all the money from his personal savings account for the group/cell to use in financing their attack preparations.⁹⁴

4.1.8 **Use of criminality to advance terrorist activity**

A wider examination was made to discover if crime and criminality more generally played a role in supporting the activities of groups/cells. A total of ten individuals (26.3 per cent) acquired money for terrorist activity through the use of fraud and deception. They were concentrated in only 50 per cent of the groups/cells (Crevice, 7/7 and Overt) (see Table IBG.14, Appendix B).

Four individuals (10.5 per cent) used fraud or deception to acquire materials for terrorist activity and they were found in equal numbers both in Crevice and 21/7 (see Table IBG.15, Appendix B). When it came to the acquisition of the chemical precursors needed to manufacture explosives, nine individuals (23.7 per cent) in four groups/cells took part in this task (see Table IBG.16, Appendix B). All used false personal details and invented cover stories to disguise their true motives. Rhyme and Seagram did not need precursors as their explosive effect was to be obtained from flammable gases that could be legitimately obtained in ways that would not arouse suspicion (see Table BCG.9, Appendix A)

4.1.9 **Acquisition of firearms**

The acquisition or possession of any firearm by a group/cell would almost certainly be a criminal offence per se in the UK, where their purchase, possession and use are strictly controlled. However, one group/cell (7/7) can be clearly connected to a firearm in circumstances where it might have been part of their terrorist activity (see Table IBG.17, Appendix B). A 9 mm handgun was found in the car driven by Germaine Lindsay to Luton railway station where the group/cell assembled on the day of the attacks.⁹⁵ A

⁹² BBC News, 15 January 2007.

⁹³ BBC News, 1 May 2007.

⁹⁴ BBC News, 8 July 2010a.

⁹⁵ The Stationary Office (2006), p.3.

handgun, ammunition and silencer were recovered during the arrests in Overt but its relationship to the activity of the group was not proven.⁹⁶ A second firearm was also recovered following the arrest of a different member of Overt but, once more, there is no evidence to link its possession to terrorism.⁹⁷

4.1.10 Allaying suspicion

As the planning and preparations moved on from discussions among the conspirators to become actions and activities that might become visible to people outside the conspiracy, the need for concealment increased. This was achieved by using deception and subterfuge in two ways:

First, the concealment of activities directly related to terrorism (for example, travel to Pakistan with the intention of attending a training camp). Eight individuals (21.0 per cent) are known to have behaved in this way (see Table IBG.22, Appendix B). Methods involved the use of false names, developing a suitable cover story to explain trips and the deliberate loss or destruction of official documents or passports (see Table IBG.13, Appendix B). For example, Ibrahim Savant from Overt had two valid passports but also had applied for a third using a different identity.⁹⁸ Ahmed Abdullah Ali, the leader of Overt, commented at his trial that “a clean passport arouses, less suspicion... I’ll be honest about that.”⁹⁹

Second, the concealment of Muslim identity. This behaviour was seen in six individuals (15.8 per cent), spread across three groups/cells (Crevice, 7/7 and 21/7) (see Table IBG.23, Appendix B). In a variation of this relating to race rather than religion, Rahman Adam aka Anthony Garcia from Crevice was deliberately chosen to purchase the ammonium nitrate fertiliser to be used in the explosive mix as in the view of the group/cell leader, he appeared to look the least like a Pakistani.¹⁰⁰ This is somewhat ironic as prior to November 2002, when Garcia met Omar Khyam, he had failed to be accepted to undergo training in Pakistan as he was seen as a security risk because he was “too white” and would therefore be more noticeable.¹⁰¹

4.1.11 Other personal behaviours

Three other types of potentially relevant behaviour were observed in other cases not forming part of this research and consequently they too were looked for specifically during the pre-attack phase of each of the six groups/cells. Table IBG.24, Appendix B, shows two instances (5.3 per cent) where an individual married so close to a planned suicide attack that their actions must have been taken in the full knowledge of what they shortly intended to do. In the case of Yassin Hassan Omar from 21/7, the initial “marriage” took place over the telephone and he only spent one night and a morning with his wife before the suicide attacks took place.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ BBC News, 7 September 2006.

⁹⁷ BBC News, 10 December 2009.

⁹⁸ BBC News, 8 July 2010a.

⁹⁹ *The Guardian*, 4 June 2008.

¹⁰⁰ *The Guardian*, 27 September 2006.

¹⁰¹ BBC News, 30 April 2007b.

¹⁰² *The Guardian*, 10 July 2007.

Table IBG.25, Appendix B, reveals three individuals (7.9 per cent) who deliberately incurred debt knowing that their planned actions would mean the debt would never have to be repayed. This was seen in both Crevice and 7/7.¹⁰³ From a different aspect concerning debts, only one person (2.6 per cent) made any provision prior to an attack to pay back their personal debts.

Finally, Table IBG.26, Appendix B, shows the instances where individuals adopted and used a “kunya”, literally a “nickname”, but used by violent Jihadis more in the sense of a formal nom de guerre.¹⁰⁴ Five individuals (13.1 per cent) adopted this practice, all of them in the Crevice group/cell. This behaviour did not appear in any other group/cell.

4.2 Conclusion

The behaviours examined in this chapter are much closer in time to the ultimate undertaking of the attack and this is reflected in their practical nature. They are clearly focused on making a terrorist attack a reality. To that extent there is a strong thread of similarity between the behaviours of the groups/cells and between those of individuals. But there is also a wider degree of variation than might have been anticipated.

For example, the thoroughness of pre-attack preparations seems to vary distinctly across the groups/cells. In 21/7, there appeared to be no activity linked to preparations for the day of the attack other than the manufacture of the IEDs themselves and the preparation of the accompanying “suicide video” (or videos, this still remains unclear). In others, such as 7/7 and Overt, the conspirators undertook or planned active reconnaissance and at least one dry-run. The “suicide videos” in 7/7 were probably prepared in Pakistan some way in advance of the attack, thus simplifying their exploitation by AQ, whereas those in Overt were made in the UK by the group/cell themselves. In the latter case, their preparations also included “the instructions left for media to use them”.¹⁰⁵

A similar pattern of pre-attack surveillance and/or reconnaissance can probably be inferred in the Seagram VBIED attacks, as they must have required knowledge of the local geography for the placing of the primary and secondary VBIEDs and further knowledge of the area to select the right time to carry it out.¹⁰⁶ At the high end of sophistication in this context was Rhyme, as indicated by the activities of three of the group/cell members in New York and Washington in 2000 and the approach the group/cell was pursuing to prepare and implement attacks in the UK in 2004.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ BBC News, 1 May 2007.

¹⁰⁴ It is not the same practice as, for instance, using a false name to send or receive emails or to preserve security during telephone calls; for example, Mohammad Junaid Babar in Crevice was referred to in this context as “Kash” or “Big Dawg” while Anthony Garcia referred to himself as “John Lewis”.

¹⁰⁵ Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Osborne, Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism. Quoted in Metropolitan Police Service (23 July 2010).

¹⁰⁶ The IRA car bomb left outside Harrod’s department store in December 1983 was parked facing the wrong way on a one-way street.

¹⁰⁷ Clutterbuck (Forthcoming 2011).

Taken in their entirety, the functional behaviours show some significant variations from the attack cycle adopted by groups such as the IRA. Planning, as a distinct phase, plays a minor part in many of them (Rhyme being the exception) and where it does occur, it is often simultaneous with active preparations. There also appears to be a new phase introduced, that of exploiting the attack as propaganda after it had occurred (as opposed to just claiming responsibility for it), and this was associated with the use of a suicide attack. The use of a suicide attack also removes the need for an escape phase for the participants, although not necessarily for key individuals (the bombmaker Assad Sarwar in Overt, for example, was considered as “too precious” to undertake the attacks).¹⁰⁸

Finally, the critical catalyst that enabled the attack preparations to commence in the UK and also dictated their timing was the return from Pakistan of individuals who had travelled there to pursue their aim of violent Jihad and who had become proponents of AQ’s strategy of global terrorist attacks to advance their ideology. In the cases of Crevice, 7/7, 21/7 and Overt, the time the group/cell members spent in Pakistan proved the watershed that divided their desire to participate in violent Jihad overseas from their preparations to carry out terrorist attacks in the UK. While Rhyme differed from this pattern, the time Barot spent in Pakistan presenting his carefully constructed plans to his contacts was equally critical, since he began preparations in earnest on his return to the UK.

Now that the behaviours of the groups/cells and the individuals within them have been examined in terms of how they were organised and how they functioned, the following chapter will look at them from a different perspective. First, by examining their prevalence and then, in groups/cells and in individuals, by exploring the potential of these behaviours to act as predictive indicators that can be associated with terrorist attack planning and preparations.

¹⁰⁸ *The Guardian*, 8 September 2008.

CHAPTER 5 **Can past behaviour indicate potential future intentions?**

5.1 **Observable behaviours**

This research has examined the behaviours exhibited by six groups/cells and the individuals within them, all of whom were driven by the ideology of violent Jihadism and as a consequence carried out mass casualty attacks against the UK general public or prepared or conspired to do so. The research objective was to determine if any types of behaviour were particular to the conception, planning or preparatory phases of the attacks and, if this proved to be the case, to examine whether any of these behaviours could have indicated the ultimate terrorist intentions of the group/cell or individual exhibiting them. The data gathered and analysed are examined below, along with their potential implications for future counter-terrorism operations.

5.1.1 **Behaviours and their prevalence**

Before evaluating the behaviours, comment must be made on the characteristics that were considered to be potentially relevant to the research and hence were looked for and analysed, such as the nationalities, heritage and marital status of individuals and the size, age ranges and predominant nationalities of the groups/cells. While these and the other characteristics examined form an integral part of the overall context and understanding of individuals and their groups/cells, they are of little use as indicators of terrorist-related activity. They are either so diverse (in age, for example), so similar (in sex, for example), or they are of no relevance (marital status and number of children, for example). Therefore, any search for indicators that may be predictive and hence of some utility should be concentrated on how the individuals behaved, rather than their intrinsic characteristics.

It must be reiterated that the research design required the presence of a behaviour found in a group/cell or an individual member of the group/cell to be noted when this was the case. The lack of its presence cannot be taken to be, or inferred to be, evidence of its absence. There are two possible reasons for this: it may have been present but has not been noted in the publicly available record, or it may have been noted in the public record but not located by the research.

The data contained in the tables in Appendixes A to C therefore refer solely to finding the presence of a particular type of behaviour. The figures given can also be taken as the minimum number of times the behaviour must have occurred. It may also have occurred on other occasions, or involved other individuals, but these unseen examples cannot be

taken into account by the research. With these caveats in mind, the data forming the most prevalent behaviours can be examined.

Where behaviours exhibited by the six groups/cells and the individual members of them are recorded at 20 per cent or over, they are included in the following analysis. In this way, the least recorded behaviours, perhaps seen in just a few individuals, are not considered in depth. In Table IPB.12, Appendix C, for example, four individuals (10.5 per cent) from Crevice, 7/7 and 21/7 increasingly withdrew from the presence of their family; and in Table IPB.34, Appendix C, only individuals from Overt, representing 7.9 per cent of the total, travelled abroad with an organised Islamic charity to assist in its activities. Exclusion of such behaviours does not mean they are not relevant or that a low number indicates this is all the examples of it that exist. Also, it does not preclude its presence in other cases that do not form part of this research.

The data for the most prevalent behaviours has been carefully considered and, with a small number of exclusions that cross the 20 per cent threshold but that do not “fit” any category, the remainder have been consolidated into three categories that seem to best exemplify the context in which the behaviour occurred. Examples of excluded behaviours are the alleged involvement of ten individuals in criminality (26.3 per cent) and nine individuals who entered the criminal justice system (23.6 per cent) (Tables IPB.29 and IPB.30, Appendix C). Once these are put to one side, the three categories that emerge can be designated as “terrorist attack planning and preparation”, “transition to violent Jihad” and “radicalisation”. Each of these is now considered in turn.

Table 5.1, below, shows the prevalence of behaviour types that can be categorised as being part of terrorist attack planning and preparations.

Table 5-1: Terrorist attack planning and preparations

Prevalence of behaviour in group/cell and individuals (%)	Type of behaviour	Table in Appendix containing data
100	Group/cell controlled by a motivated and connected leader	BCG.2
100	Leader has previously been involved in VJ	BCG.2
100	Group/cell acquisition or preparation of explosives	BCG.9
100	Group/cell acquisition of premises	BCG.10
100	Group/cell consideration of targets	BCG.12
83.3	Group/cell connection to AQ in Pakistan	BCG.5
83.3	Group/cell conspiracy commences shortly after members return from VJ training in Pakistan	BCG.13

66.6	Group/cell selection of targets	BCG.10
66.6	Group/cell use of ISR and dry runs	BCG.7
50	Group/cell preparation of "suicide videos"	BCG.8
47.4	Individuals acquire information related to terrorism	IBG.1
36.8	Individuals with VJ training in Pakistan, return to UK and commence conspiracy	IBG.9
26.3	Individuals who raised money for terrorism through crime	IBG.14
23.7	Individuals involved in preparation of "suicide videos"	IBG.18
23.7	Individuals involved in target/attack-related research	IBG.20
23.7	Individuals involved in reconnaissance	IBG.21
23.7	Individual recruits close friends to the conspiracy	IPB.32
23.7	Individuals involved in acquiring explosives	IBG.16
23.7	Individuals with connection to AQ in Pakistan	BCG.5
21	Individuals who wrote a letter/will in expectation of their death	IBG.19
21	Individuals who used deception to conceal their activities	IBG.22

What can clearly be seen here across all six groups/cells is the critical role of the group/cell leader and three elements of the attack preparations that must be carried out, namely the acquisition of explosives, the acquisition of premises to operate out of, and the commencement of the process of identifying potential targets. Of lesser but also high prominence (across 83.3 per cent of the groups/cells) is the existence of one or more links between the groups/cells and AQ in Pakistan and the catalytic effect on the development of terrorist attack planning and preparations when the leader or a small number of group/cell members returned from violent Jihad training in Pakistan.

The second category of behaviours that emerges from the overall data is referred to here as "transition to violent Jihad". They are shown in Table 5.2, below. Here, the behaviours are

not directly related to preparing or carrying out terrorist attacks in the UK, but almost all of them revolve around travel to Pakistan and while there undergoing some form of training relevant to violent Jihad. In terms of their chronology, almost all these activities preceded those shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5-2: Transition to Violent Jihad

Prevalence of behaviour in group/cell and individuals (%)	Type of behaviour	Table in Appendix containing data
83.3	Group/cell connection to AQ in Pakistan	BCG.5
83.3	Group/cell where members received VJ training in Pakistan	BCG.13
66.6	Group/cell where members received VJ training with others in Pakistan	BCG.14
47.4	Individuals received VJ training outside the UK	IBG.4
44.7	Individuals received VJ training in Pakistan	IBG.5
34.2	Individuals who have undergone indirect VJ training in the UK	IBG.2
26.3	Individuals received VJ training in Pakistan with others in conspiracy	IBG.7
23.7	Individual recruits close friends to the conspiracy	IPB.32
23.7	Individuals who underwent VJ training in Pakistan with others not involved in conspiracy	IBG.8
23.7	Individuals with links to AQ in Pakistan	BCG.5
21	Individuals who wrote a letter/will in expectation of their death	IBG.19
21	Individuals who used deception to conceal their activities	IBG.22

Five behaviours seen in “terrorist attack planning and preparations” seem to fit equally well into the “transition to violent Jihad” category and hence there seems to be an overlap between the two categories. The group/cell links and the individual links to AQ in Pakistan (seen in 83.3 per cent of the groups/cells and involving 23.7 per cent of the

individuals) are the most significant. The third, individuals recruiting close friends to the conspiracy, initially seems to occur prior to travel to Pakistan for violent Jihad training and often, but not always, those who are recruited this way may then go on to travel and train together. A second round of recruiting may also occur on their return to the UK as the conspiracy and preparations to carry out terrorist attacks get under way. In both cases, the leader of the group/cell seems to be instrumental in the process, recruiting their own close friends and, in some cases, their relatives.

Two other behaviours seen in “terrorist attack planning and preparations”, individuals writing a will or letter to their families in expectation of their death (Table IBG.19, Appendix B) and the use of deception to conceal activities (Table IBG.22, Appendix B) can also apply equally to “transition to violent Jihad”.

The final category of behaviours, designated as “radicalisation”, is shown below in Table 5.3.

Table 5-3: Radicalisation

Prevalence of behaviour in individuals (%)	Type of behaviour	Table in Appendix containing data
50	Religiously observant	IPB.6
50	Individuals collect VJ material	IPB.18
42.1	Individuals attend external study circles	IPB.11
34.2	Individual re-engages with “heritage religion”	IPB.9
31.6	Individuals associate with radical preacher	IPB.17
31.6	Individuals collect money for the “Mujahideen”	IPB.33
28.9	Individuals show a preference for religious clothing	IPB.10
26.3	Individuals described as religiously observant	IPB.6
23.7	Individuals previous behaviour at odds with strictures of Islam	IPB.26
21	Individual associates with a small group of like-minded individuals	IPB.13
21	An increase in religious intensity in an already religious individual	IPB.8

The behaviours seen in the “radicalisation” category are the most distant in time from those in the “terrorist attack planning and preparations” and also seem to precede those in “transition to violent Jihad”. This may be because the behaviours exhibited were by individuals acting in their own right rather than where the individual acted on behalf of the group/cell, in which case they may not have been as prevalent. No behaviours in this category were considered appropriate to be placed in another. Overall, they are much less prevalent than the other two categories of behaviour, since in no case were they found in more than 50 per cent of the individuals examined.

In two instances (individuals who collected violent Jihad material and where individuals associated with one or more radical preachers), the behaviour was seen in individuals across all six of the groups/cells. Two groups/cells, Rhyme and Seagram, were noticeable by the absence they showed of various behaviours. Rhyme showed no behaviours in five categories above, while Seagram showed none in three. In both these groups/cells, there were no instances of individual Muslim re-engagement, showing a preference for religious clothing, or for previous behaviour being at odds with the teachings of Islam; Rhyme also showed no attendance at study circles or any individuals who were already religious showing an increase in religious intensity.


Looking at all the behaviours in the three categories, there seems a clear connection between the categories and the behaviours in them, the aims of the groups/cells and the passage of time. Initially, individuals began to coalesce around others who could influence and articulate their feelings concerning violent Jihad. This was in the phase of “radicalisation”.

After a period time, there came a point where they took a decision to “fight Jihad” and their behaviours began to change to reflect the process of preparing themselves to travel to Pakistan to undertake some form of training before putting it into practice, probably in Kashmir or Afghanistan. This phase was the “transition to violent Jihad”.

Finally, as a result of the connections that had been made when they were in Pakistan for the purpose of violent Jihad, they had begun to move in circles dominated by the global terrorist ideology of AQ or AQ-like groups. The focus then shifted towards the concept of returning to the UK in order to carry out mass casualty terrorist attacks. Almost as soon as they had returned, the third type of behaviours, “terrorist attack planning and preparations”, began to occur.

The research has established that in the case of the six groups/cells and thirty-eight individuals studied, they did show specific patterns of behaviour when they acted together as groups/cells and when they were acting as individuals but were doing so on behalf of their group/cell. It also shows that the personal behaviour of individuals may be of potential relevance if they subsequently become involved in violent Jihad activity or terrorist attacks in the UK.

The most prevalent of the behaviours fell into three different and consecutive phases that can be shown against two axes, the risk of a terrorist attack occurring on one, and time on the other (see Figure 5.1, below).

Figure 5-1: The relationship between behaviours and risk of terrorist attack over time¹⁰⁹

Behaviours falling into the category of “radicalisation” pose the lowest risk of a terrorist attack occurring. As time passes and behaviours become associated with the phase “transition to violent Jihad”, the risk of attack increases. By the time behaviours in the phase “terrorist attack planning and preparations” are seen, the risk of attack is high. The remainder of the chapter will look at the implications for counter-terrorist operations in the light of this observation.

5.2 The implications for counter-terrorism

This research indicates that the six groups/cells examined possessed certain distinctive characteristics as a result of their activities in planning, preparing and implementing acts of terrorism. The individuals operating within them also engaged in various types of behaviour that were a consequence of their involvement in the group/cell as they were the means by which the group/cell advanced their aims. Additionally, these individuals exhibited a variety of common behaviours in their general lifestyle, both before they joined the conspiracy and during it. These findings open up the possibility of identifying through their behaviour individuals and groups/cells engaged in terrorist attack planning and preparations, thus allowing them to be prevented or disrupted.

The planning and preparation phases of the terrorist attack cycle are likely to provide the best opportunities to identify any pre-attack indicators and to do so at a time when counter-terrorism operations are able to disrupt it. However, the task is not simple and the

¹⁰⁹ Source: RAND Europe.

approach to identifying pre-incident indicators and then using the results in the context of a counter-terrorism strategy needs to be a two-stage one.

5.2.1 A potential approach

Counter-terrorism operations will obviously benefit from knowing when individuals in groups/cells are in the planning and preparatory phases of a terrorist attack. Intelligence may indicate when this is occurring but in its absence, pre-incident indicators may help to focus attention and make better use of resources. However, this approach is not straightforward.

The problem of using pre-incident indicators to guide and inform counter-terrorism activity breaks down into two stages. The first is to identify what are the most indicative and consistent behaviours that are significant enough to be regarded as not just an indicator but a signal indicator of potential terrorism. The second stage is then to be able to detect these signal behaviours or activities in an operational context and in real time.

This research confirms there are a wide variety of behaviours exhibited by groups/cells and individuals operating on their behalf that can be seen during the planning and preparing of a terrorist attack (for example, weapon or explosive procurement, targeting and “dry-runs”). However, just to identify, describe and characterise them is not sufficient. To develop the wide variety of behavioural indicators into a smaller number of more focused and specific signal indicators of practical benefit in counter-terrorism, further hurdles must be overcome.

Initially, prior to their use in an operational context, as many potential indicators as possible must be identified and tested. Questions relating to how frequent or widespread they are, their reliability and whether they can be considered diagnostic must be answered. Out of all of them, only a small number are likely to be strong enough for consideration as signal indicators. They must then be validated before any reliance is placed on them.

Even when specific, recognisable behaviours and actions are generated in the course of planning or preparing a terrorist act, further issues must still be resolved before they can be of any practical use in the context of counter-terrorism. For any signal indicator to be of utility, it must also be *detectable* by others outside of the terrorist conspiracy (or at least its existence must be able to be reliably inferred or deduced by those involved in any counter-terrorism operations). Additionally, it must also be detectable *before* an attack is launched or is underway. An indicator that fulfils all the criteria outlined above but whose presence only becomes apparent during the post-attack investigation clearly has no utility as a signal indicator.

Terrorists can operate together as a group/cell, as individuals within a group/cell, or as lone attackers. In doing so, a variety of TTPs and behaviours can be seen that may well be pre-attack indicators. However, for these to be of use to counter-terrorism practitioners, they will need to be refined and validated before they can be viewed as pre-attack signal indicators. This research has examined the behaviours specifically relating to six mass casualty attacks or conspiracies, framed by their geographical location and the security environment that constrained them (the UK) and the timing of their occurrence (between 2004 to 2007). In light of these findings, it is instructive to briefly review their

applicability in the context of other manifestations of violent Jihadist terrorism both in the UK and in other countries generally comparable to the UK.

5.3 The applicability of behaviours to other contexts

5.3.1 Other significant UK group/cell terrorist conspiracies

Despite the difficulties mentioned above, there are promising signs that indicators and signal indicators can be observed, to a greater or lesser degree, in individuals involved in different cases and conspiracies other than the ones examined in this research. An example involving another group/cell in the UK is the conspiracy to kidnap a Muslim soldier in the British Army referred to previously. Several group characteristics and individual behaviours of the same type seem to be present: the links of the group/cell to Pakistan (and potentially AQ); the predominance of British-born Pakistanis in the conspiracy; the use of “charity work” among earthquake victims as a cover to visit the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area to pursue terrorist aims; and the fixation of one individual with the words of Abu Hamza al Masri and Osama bin Laden.¹¹⁰

5.3.2 UK “Lone Attackers” and terrorism

The capability and intent to carry out deadly attacks in the UK has not been the sole prerogative of individuals operating together in groups/cells. Lone individuals have also followed a similar path. An example of a lone individual who intended to take violent action on their own is Andrew “Isa” Ibrahim, a nineteen-year-old student from Bristol. Initially from a wealthy family background, he had been expelled from three schools over his unruly behaviour and drug taking and soon after he also left home. He converted to Islam, wore religious robes and gave up alcohol and tobacco. Ibrahim also went on to make his own HMTD explosive, detonator and suicide vest and reconnoitred a large shopping centre where it is believed he was going to carry out a mass casualty suicide attack.

Ibrahim carried out research on the Internet into how to make the explosives and on all aspects of suicide attacks. He actively sought out the teachings of the radical preachers Abu Hamza al Masri and Omar Bakri Muhammad, plus those of the group Al-Muhajiroun. Eventually, Muslims in his local community became so alarmed at his extremist views and behaviour that they contacted the police.¹¹¹ Even on this brief review of his behaviour, several parallels with the behaviour of individuals involved in the mass casualty attacks and conspiracies can be seen. A deeper examination of Ibrahim and other similar cases in the UK could reveal more similarities.

5.3.3 The international applicability of the behaviours

While the evidence base of this research is firmly rooted in the UK and is therefore specific to it, there is no reason that the same approach could not be successfully adopted to determine the characteristics and behaviours of violent Jihadist groups and individuals in other countries. Furthermore, a preliminary exploration of some of these groups seems to reveal some patterns of behaviour in common with those observed in the UK.

¹¹⁰ *The Guardian*, 19 February 2008.

¹¹¹ *The Guardian*, 5 June 2009; BBC News, 22 June 2009.

9/11 and the “Hamburg Contingent”¹¹²

The four individuals who were at the operational core of the 9/11 attacks, Mohamed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah, all lived together for some while in Hamburg, Germany. During this period, as a group/cell and as individuals, they exhibited a number of behaviours in common with the UK conspirators examined in this research.

For example, once they had met up and moved into the same accommodation (a situation that occurred when all four of them seemed already to be deeply immersed in the concept of violent Jihadism), they increasingly began to associate only with other like-minded individuals. As part of this, they withdrew further and further from their friends and in some cases, their families as well. The changes were very noticeable to those who knew them.

While in the process of trying to travel to Chechnya to “fight Jihad”, by chance they met an individual who connected them with “a significant AQ operative” who in turn convinced them to travel to Pakistan instead. It was there they met Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 conspiracy began in earnest.

In order to cover their absence they began to use a number of deceptions and on their return to Hamburg they became even more concerned with their security. All of them reported their passports as “lost” in order to conceal their visit to Pakistan.

As individuals, all four of them also showed certain behaviour patterns in common. On their arrival in Germany, Atta, bin al-Shibh and al-Shehhi initially were religious individuals. Some were weaker in their beliefs while others were stronger. However, by the time they lived together all of them had become religious with a zeal described in the case of Atta as “fanaticism”.

The behaviours exhibited by Ziad Jarrah, the fourth hijacker from the “Hamburg contingent”, seem to fit closely with those found by the research as being associated with the past lifestyle behaviours of re-engaged Muslims. In his early days in Beirut, he was known to enjoy parties and discos, to drink alcohol and to have girlfriends. By the time he was involved with the three other conspirators he took a hard-line stance over adherence to the teachings of Islam on all these issues. He criticised his girlfriend over what he saw as her lack of religion and the way she dressed and, as time passed, he drew apart from her. He is also known to have spent his time reading pamphlets and articles in Arabic dealing with violent Jihadism.

All of the behaviours listed above were also found in varying degrees in the six UK case studies. Of course, there were differences, with a number of key behaviours from the UK case studies being absent from the Hamburg group/cell. Perhaps the most important of them was their lack of links to AQ in Pakistan before they travelled there for the first time and that their leader, Mohamed Atta, had no previous experience of violent Jihad elsewhere and had not undergone any form of training for it anywhere. However, their activities are not given here as part of an overall comparison but to highlight the presence of a number of group/cell

¹¹² 9/11 Commission (2004), pp.160–73.

behaviours found in the UK case studies in a group/cell that had formed under different circumstances and in a different European country.

Mohammed Bouyeri and the murder of Theo van Gogh

As well similar behaviour patterns being seen in a group/cell in Germany, they also appear in the Netherlands in the case of an attack carried out by a lone individual. On 2 November 2004 the controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was shot and stabbed to death by Mohammed Bouyeri, a twenty-six-year-old man of Moroccan-Dutch origins.¹¹³ A review of the investigation into the crime showed that Bouyeri was connected to a loose network of individuals that came to be called the Hofstadt Group, although Bouyeri appears to have carried out the murder on his own and without the prior knowledge of anyone else. His past behaviours had many elements in common with those found in the thirty-eight violent Jihadists examined in this research.

He collected video films of violent attacks in “lands of Jihad” and the killing of captives, including the murder in Pakistan of the US journalist Daniel Pearl. He rediscovered the religion of his birth and changed his previous behaviour away from drinking alcohol, smoking cannabis and dating Dutch women. The changes were of such an extent that not only did he adopt a strong personal moral stance against the types of behaviour that he himself had previously exhibited, he threatened other Muslims who did not share this view or follow his actions in rejecting them.

Bouyeri discarded his western clothes and was usually seen in a djellaba and prayer hat. He became estranged from his friends until “he formed a separate little group with other people who are now in jail”. He also became a close personal follower of a “radical Muslim preacher” from Syria whose message was based on the ideology of “Takfir” (where violence against other Muslims denounced as “unbelievers” is an accepted tenet).¹¹⁴ Once more, these behaviours are found in the UK case studies.

With hindsight, the essence of all of these types of behaviours can also be seen to have occurred in varying numbers of the individuals examined in the UK data. An examination of other cases in countries similar to the UK, such as “Operation Osage” in Canada and “Operation Pendennis” in Australia, could also reveal, in varying degrees, behaviour types in common with the six UK groups/cells.

5.4 Conclusion

The analysis of the behaviours examined in the research reveals the majority of the conspiracies to be the culmination of a three-stage process. In the first stage, a significant number of individuals became radicalised to the point where they left the UK for Pakistan. In the second, they put into practice their intention to train for violent Jihad. However, at some point, as they made the transition from radicalisation to violent Jihad, the original

¹¹³ This information is drawn from Baruma (2007), pp.208–13.

¹¹⁴ See Esposito (2003), entry under “Takfir”, p.312.

intention to fight in Kashmir or Afghanistan evolved in a number of them into an intention to return to the UK to carry out terrorist attacks. This change was brought about through contact with groups or individuals who espoused the ideology of AQ and in some cases may have been closely associated with that group.

The third and final stage commenced in Pakistan, as they started to discuss and plan how they would carry out attacks in the UK. They then returned to the UK to develop the initial ideas and plans into an active conspiracy. In three cases, the preparations were implemented as terrorist attacks, with one causing fifty-two fatalities (7/7) and the other two failing to cause any casualties (21/7 and Seagram). In the third conspiracy, Seagram, attacks were launched but the VBIEDS failed in the first two attacks and no civilian casualties were caused in their second hastily-mounted attempt. This group/cell showed a number of elements in common with the other conspiracies but its focus outside the UK was Iraq not Pakistan, not Pakistan and there were no discernible links to AQ.

The analysis also revealed the criticality of the leader in the formation and activities of the group/cell. Each of the six groups/cells was led by a single, motivated individual who was committed to the concept of violent Jihad and the subsequent use of terrorism in pursuit of its aims. They had acquired the knowledge and skills to undertake attacks in the UK by participating beforehand in violent Jihad in other countries and in addition, they had associated with others who had also done so. In many instances, this period had extended over several years. Consequently, it was these individuals who had made the relevant contacts and connections the individuals in the groups/cells later relied upon in their attack planning and preparations. In turn, the group/cell leader was reliant on the encouragement, facilitation and support of AQ in Pakistan. To label these UK cases as “leaderless Jihad” is therefore a misnomer.

Similarly, the idea that these groups/cells arose directly in the UK from British born individuals who were radicalised in the UK is also not supported by this research. While many of the individuals in the case studies involved in terrorism can be regarded as being “home-grown” in the UK, the terrorism that they planned and implemented there was motivated, conceived, initiated and also to varying degrees, supported from outside the UK. In five out of the six cases, these elements came from within Pakistan.

Pakistan played a critical role. It became the desired destination for individuals who had become radicalised to the point where they wished to commit violent Jihad and once they were there, it was where their personal desire to “fight Jihad” was converted by adherents of AQ into plans for them to return to the UK and carry out terrorist attacks. When they had returned to the UK, they often remained in contact with these and other individuals in Pakistan who were linked to AQ or who espoused its ideology and methods.

During the “terrorist attack planning and preparation” phase, many of the behaviours found have been seen before in other types of terrorist groups or cells (for example, the acquisition or manufacture of explosives through a variety of methods). Other behaviours seen in this phase are more specific to terrorism driven by violent Jihad, particularly if the

intention is to carry out suicide attacks (for example, the filming of “suicide messages” to be used as propaganda by others after the attack has taken place).

The divergence from the behaviour of other types of terrorist groups and cells becomes much more marked in the phase categorised as “transition to violent Jihad”. Some similarities are seen – for example, military-style training in camps outside of their home country and the use of secrecy and deception to conceal their activities. Other aspects appear to be unique to it and these generally relate to the role played in this phase by groups/cells and individuals pursuing violent Jihad and their adherence to the ideology of AQ (examples include links to AQ, training for violent Jihad and terrorism in Pakistan and a tendency to do so with others who go on to form the UK terrorist group/cell).

The phase most removed in time from “terrorist attack planning and preparations”, namely “radicalisation”, has many behaviours specifically associated with it but these seem to have had no direct linkage to the preparations for acts of terrorism. However, during the phase there were strong influences on the motivation of individuals to leave the UK to train for violent Jihad and it was in this subsequent phase that four out of the six UK terrorist attacks, attempted attacks or conspiracies were conceived and begun (Crevice, 7/7, 21/7 and Overt).

The spectrum of behaviours and the three categories they fall into, from “radicalisation” to “transition to violent Jihad” and then to “terrorist attack planning and preparations”, has implications for counter-terrorism. As well as putting in place systems and structures to detect behaviours directly related to the planning and preparation of terrorist attacks, it may be possible to detect other behaviours that could relate to the transition to violent Jihad of an individual or group.

If such an individual or group travels to Pakistan (or elsewhere) to try to fulfil this desire but ultimately they return to the UK, it may be because they have abandoned their original intention at the behest of AQ or AQ-like individuals and intend to prepare for terrorist attacks in the UK. In turn, it may be possible to identify when the behaviour of groups/cells and individuals shows a trajectory that may take them beyond radicalisation and into making the transition to violent Jihad, and a much greater risk of a terrorist attack being prepared and carried out once they have returned to the UK or, indeed, any other country from which they originated.

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Group/cell size

Table BCG.1

Size of group/cell by number of most closely involved individuals

Total – 38 (Average size 6.3)

	Total individuals in core group/cell	Date of termination of group/ cell	Reason for termination of activity
CREVICE	7	30 March 2004	Arrested in preparatory phase
RHYME	8	3 August 2004	Arrested in planning phase
7/7	4	7 July 2005	Killed during suicide attacks
21/7	6	21 July 2005	Arrested after failed suicide attacks
OVERT	10	10 August 2006	Arrested in preparatory phase
SEAGRAM	3	30 June 2007	Arrested after failed suicide attack (one died later)

Group/cell leaders

Table BCG.2

Key characteristics and behaviours of group/cell leaders

Average age – 28 years

	Name and Age	Convert or re-engaged Muslim?	Known links to AQ in Pakistan during the conspiracy ?	Earliest known link to VJ in other countries	Travel to Pakistan for VJ purposes in 6 months prior to UK conspiracy ?	Travel to countries other than Pakistan in connection with VJ activity
CREVICE	Omar Khyam 25 yrs	No	Yes	2000 (Kashmir)	Yes	India (Kashmir)
RHYME	Dhiren Barot 33 yrs	Convert	Yes	1996 (Kashmir)	Yes	India (Kashmir) Philippines Malaysia
7/7	Mohammad Siddique Khan 30 yrs	No	Yes	2003 (Pakistan)	Yes	Afghanistan (possible)
21/7	Muktar Said Ibrahim 26 yrs	Re-engaged	Yes	2003 (Sudan)	Yes	Sudan
OVERT	Ahmed Abdullah Ali 26 yrs	No	Yes	2003 (Pakistan)	Yes	None
SEAGRAM	Bilal Abdullah 28 yrs	No	No	2004 (Iraq)	No	Iraq

Predominant national origins and heritage of groups/cells

Table BCG.3

Predominant countries of origin and ethnic/cultural heritage of group/cell members

Total groups/cells with predominant UK/Pakistan origins – 4 (66.6 per cent)

	Majority of group/cell UK born or raised	Majority of group/cell of Pakistan heritage or descent	Majority of group/cell heritage UK-Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia)	Presence in the group/cell of other nationalities, heritage or country origins
CREVICE	Yes	Yes	No	Algeria (1)
RHYME	Yes	Yes	No	India (1)
7/7	Yes	Yes	No	Jamaica (1)
21/7	No	No	Yes	Ghana (1)
OVERT	Yes	Yes	No	No
SEAGRAM	No	No	No	India (2)

Converts to Islam and re-engaged Muslims as participants

Table BCG.4

Number of active individuals by group/cell who had converted to Islam

Total – 4 (10.5 per cent)

Number of active individuals by group/cell exhibiting a change from no/minimal religious observance to noticeable religious observance of their “heritage religion” of Islam

Total – 13 (34.2 per cent)

	Number of converted Muslims	Number of re-engaged Muslims (see Table IPB.9)
CREVICE	0	3
RHYME	1 (Hindu)	0
7/7	1 (Christian)	1
21/7	0	5
OVERT	2 (Christian)	4
SEAGRAM	0	0

External group/cell connectivity

Table BCG.5

Presence in each group/cell of operational-level links to each other in the UK and number of individuals linked to AQ or AQ-like groups in Pakistan

Total groups/cells with UK linkages – 4 (66.6 per cent)

Total groups/cells with Pakistan AQ links – 5 (83.3 per cent)

Total individuals with Pakistan AQ links – 9 (23.7 per cent)

	Presence of links in UK between the six groups/cells	Presence of individuals with links to AQ or AQ-like groups in Pakistan	Number of individuals with links to AQ or AQ-like groups in Pakistan*
CREVICE	Yes – to 7/7	Yes	3*
RHYME	None found	Yes	1*
7/7	Yes – to CREVICE	Yes	2*
21/7	Yes – to OVERT	Yes	1*
OVERT	Yes – to 21/7	Yes	2*
SEAGRAM	None found	None found	None found

* includes group/cell leader

Modus Operandi

Table BCG.6

Potential method of attack by group/cell implemented, in preparation, planned for or actively considered

Total groups/cells focused on person-borne IED suicide attacks – 3 (50 per cent)

	Person-borne IED, suicide attack	IED remote/timer detonation	Vehicle-borne IED, suicide attack	Vehicle-borne IED, remote/timer detonation
CREVICE	0	Yes (possible)	0	Yes (probable)
RHYME	0	0	0	Yes
7/7	Yes	0	0	0
21/7	Yes	0	0	0
OVERT	Yes	0	0	0
SEAGRAM	0	0	Yes	Yes

Attack planning and preparations as a group/cell

Table BCG.7

Presence in the group of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and “dry-run” activities

Total groups/cells undertaking ISR – 4 (66.6 per cent)

	Known ISR activity	Surveillance of the prospective target	Reconnaissance in the area of the target	Reconnaissance on a specific target	Dry run undertaken
CREVICE	None found	None found	None found	None found	None found
RHYME	Yes	Yes (USA)	Yes (USA)	Yes (USA)	None found
7/7	Yes	None found	Yes	Yes	Yes
21/7	None found	None found	None found	None found	None found
OVERT	Yes	None found	None found	None found	Yes (?)
SEAGRAM	Yes	None found	Yes	Yes	None found

Table BCG.8

Presence of a pre-recorded “suicide message” by one or more group/cell members

Total groups/cells – 3 (50 per cent)

	Known preparation of a “suicide message”
CREVICE	None found
RHYME	None found
7/7	Yes
21/7	Yes
OVERT	Yes
SEAGRAM	None found

Explosive/explosive substances

Table BCG.9

Type of explosive or explosive substances acquired/planned for use in an attack by each group/cell

Total group/cells using chemical production – 3 (50 per cent)

Total group/cells using inherently flammable substances – 2 (33.3 per cent)

Total group/cells using mechanical production – 1 (16.6 per cent)

	Precursors: mechanical production of explosive required	Precursors: chemical production of explosive required	Inherently flammable or combustible substances	Military or commercial explosive	Black powder
CREVICE	Yes	0	0	0	0
RHYME	0	0	Yes	0	0
7/7	0	Yes	0	0	0
21/7	0	Yes	0	0	0
OVERT	0	Yes	0	0	0
SEAGRAM	0	0	Yes	0	0

Premises used for attack planning and preparation

Table BCG.10

How premises used by the group/cell for attack preparations were acquired

Total rented by group/cell members – 3 (50.0 per cent))

Total occupied by group/cell members – 2 (33.3 per cent))

Total bought specifically by group/cell members – 1 (16.6 per cent)

	Premises owned, rented or lived in by group member	Premises rented specifically for group purpose	Premises bought specifically for group purpose
CREVICE	0	Yes	0
RHYME	Yes	0	0
7/7	0	Yes	0
21/7	Yes	0	0
OVERT	0	0	Yes
SEAGRAM	0	Yes	0

Target type attacked, selected or considered

Table BCG.11

Target type attacked or selected for attack by each group/cell

Total crowded public places (including airport and entertainment) – 3 (50 per cent)

Total public transport (excluding aircraft) – 2 (33.3 per cent)

Total aircraft – 1 (16.6 per cent)

	CREVICE	RHYME	7/7	21/7	OVERT	SEAGRAM
Public transport	0	0	Yes	Yes	0	0
Public entertainment	0	0	0	0	0	Yes
Crowded public place	0	0	0	0	0	Yes
Commercial airport	0	0	0	0	0	Yes
Commercial aircraft	0	0	0	0	Yes	0
No specific target attacked or selected	Yes	Yes	0	0	0	0

Table BCG.12

Target type considered for attack by each group/cell

Total commercial airport – 4 (66.6 per cent)

Total public transport – 3 (50 per cent)

Total crowded public places – 3 (50 per cent)

Total public entertainment – 2 (33.3 per cent)

	CREVICE	RHYME	7/7	21/7	OVERT	SEAGRAM
Public transport	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	0	0
Public entertainment	Yes	0	0	0	0	Yes
Crowded public place	Yes	Yes	0	0	0	Yes
Commercial airport	Yes	Yes	0	0	Yes	Yes
Commercial aircraft	0	0	0	0	Yes	0
Utilities	Yes	0	0	0	Yes	0
Economic	Yes	0	0	0	Yes	0
Business/commercial	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Establishment/symbolic	Yes	0	0	0	Yes	0
Military/police	Yes	0	0	0	0	0
Religious	0	0	0	0	0	0

Training

Table BCG.13

Numbers of individuals in each group/cell known to have received VJ training in Pakistan and the number of groups/cells commencing attack preparations shortly after their return to the UK

Total groups/cells containing individuals known to have received VJ training in Pakistan – 5 (83.3 per cent)

Total individuals trained in Pakistan – 17 (44.7 per cent)

Total groups commencing attack preparations shortly after return of individual from Pakistan – 5 (83.3 per cent)

	Numbers of individuals by group/cell receiving VJ training in Pakistan	Group commenced attack preparations shortly after their return
CREVICE	7 (100 per cent)	Yes
RHYME	3 (37.5 per cent)	Yes
7/7	2 (50 per cent)	Yes
21/7	1 (16.7 per cent)	Yes
OVERT	4 (40 per cent)	Yes
SEAGRAM	None found	Not applicable

Table BCG.14

Groups/cells where individuals participated in a training camp or other activities with other members of their group/cell

Total groups/cells – 4 (66.6 per cent)

Total group activities in Pakistan – 3 (50 per cent)

Total group activities in UK – 3 (50 per cent)

	Group/cell activity undertaken together in UK	Group/cell members attend together training camp in UK	Group/cell members attend together training camp in Pakistan
CREVICE	None found	None found	Yes
RHYME	None found	None found	None found
7/7	Yes	No	Yes
21/7	Yes	Yes	None found
OVERT	None found	None found	Yes
SEAGRAM	None found	None found	None found

Appendix B: Dataset of an individual's behaviour when acting on behalf of their particular group/cell

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Number of individuals by group/cell who acquired terrorist-related information, propaganda and guides to terrorist TTPs, through Internet downloads, DVDs or other documents

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Number of individuals by group/cell who participated in team training of indirect relevance to terrorist TTPs (eg, physical training, paintballing, field-craft or other team-building activities)

Table IBG.3

Number of individuals by group/cell researching or purchasing camping/hiking/survival gear prior to leaving the UK

Table IBG.4

Number of individuals by group/cell who participated in training anywhere outside the UK of direct relevance to terrorist TTPs (eg, weapons, explosives handling and paramilitary training)

Table IBG.5

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have travelled to Pakistan at any time in their lives for violent Jihadist training

Table IBG.6

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have travelled elsewhere other than/as well as Pakistan for violent Jihad and/or training

Table IBG.7

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have undertaken relevant violent Jihadist training in Pakistan with others in the conspiracy

Table IBG.8

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have undertaken relevant violent Jihadist training in Pakistan with others not involved in the conspiracy

Table IBG.9

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have travelled to Pakistan for relevant violent Jihadist training and on returning to the UK, conspired to carry out a terrorist attack

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Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring multiple accounts or credit in different names

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Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring official documents with different names and personal details

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Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring new/replacement UK passport for VJ purposes

Table IBG.14

Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring by fraud or deception money or credit for use in terrorist activity

Table IBG.15

Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring by fraud or deception materials relevant to terrorist activity

Table IBG.16

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Data Tables

Tables refer to the number of individuals in all groups examined who exhibited the specified behaviour.

Training and Travel

Table IBG.1

Number of individuals by group/cell who acquired terrorist-related information, propaganda and guides to terrorist TTPs, through Internet downloads, DVDs or other documents

Total – 18 (47.4 per cent)

CREVICE	4
RHYME	5
7/7	3
21/7	2
OVERT	3
SEAGRAM	1

Table IBG.2

Number of individuals by group/cell who participated in team training of indirect relevance to terrorist TTPs (eg, physical training, paintballing, field-craft or other team-building activities)

Total – 13 (34.2 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	0
7/7	4
21/7	6
OVERT	2
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.3

Number of individuals by group/cell researching or purchasing camping/hiking/survival gear prior to leaving the UK

Total – 6 (15.8 per cent)

CREVICE	4
RHYME	0
7/7	1
21/7	1
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.4

Number of individuals by group/cell who participated in training anywhere outside the UK of direct relevance to terrorist TTPs (eg, weapons, explosives handling and paramilitary training)

Total – 18 (47.4 per cent)

CREVICE	7
RHYME	3
7/7	2
21/7	1
OVERT	4
SEAGRAM	(1) (Iraq)

Table IBG.5

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have travelled to Pakistan at any time in their lives for violent Jihadist training

Total – 17 (44.7 per cent)

CREVICE	7
RHYME	3
7/7	2
21/7	1
OVERT	4
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.6

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have travelled elsewhere other than/as well as Pakistan for violent Jihad and/or training

Total – 4 (10.5 per cent)

CREVICE	1 (Kashmir)
RHYME	1 (Kashmir and Philippines)
7/7	0
21/7	1 (Sudan)
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1 (Iraq)

Table IBG.7

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have undertaken relevant violent Jihadist training in Pakistan with others in the conspiracy

Total – 10 (26.3 per cent)

CREVICE	5
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	0
OVERT	3
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.8

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have undertaken relevant violent Jihadist training in Pakistan with others not involved in the conspiracy

Total – 9 (23.7 per cent)

CREVICE	3 (+3?)
RHYME	3
7/7	1
21/7	1
OVERT	1
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.9

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have travelled to Pakistan for relevant violent Jihadist training and on returning to the UK, conspired to carry out a terrorist attack

Total – 14 (36.8 per cent)

CREVICE	4
RHYME	3
7/7	2
21/7	1
OVERT	4
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.10

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have travelled to Pakistan or Afghanistan with family, friends or alone, with no ulterior motive known

Total – 6 (15.8 per cent)

CREVICE	3
RHYME	1
7/7	1
21/7	0
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Use of documents to advance terrorist activity

Table IBG.11

Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring multiple accounts or credit in different names

Total – 3 (7.9 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	1
7/7	0
21/7	0
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.12

Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring official documents with different names and personal details

Total – 2 (5.3 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	1
7/7	0
21/7	1
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.13

Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring new/replacement UK passport for VJ purposes

Total – 6 (15.7 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	3
7/7	0
21/7	0
OVERT	1
SEAGRAM	0

Use of criminality to further terrorist activity

Table IBG.14

Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring by fraud or deception money or credit for use in terrorist activity

Total – 10 (26.3 per cent)

CREVICE	5
RHYME	0
7/7	3
21/7	0
OVERT	2
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.15

Number of individuals by group/cell acquiring by fraud or deception materials relevant to terrorist activity

Total – 4 (10.5 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	2
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Weapons acquisition (Firearms and Explosives)

Table IBG.16

Number of individuals by group/cell involved in obtaining or attempting to obtain chemical precursors required to manufacture explosives (eg, hydrogen peroxide, acetone, ammonium nitrate, etc.)

Total – 9 (23.7 per cent)

CREVICE	4
RHYME	0
7/7	1
21/7	1
OVERT	3
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.17

Number of individuals by group/cell involved in obtaining or attempting to obtain firearms

Total – 3 (7.9 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	0
7/7	1
21/7	0
OVERT	2
SEAGRAM	0

Behaviour during preparations for a terrorist attack

Table IBG.18

Number of individuals by group/cell filming/recording justification for their actions before a planned terrorist attack (eg, "suicide video")

Total – 9 (23.7 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	1 (others?)
OVERT	6
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.19

Number of individuals by group/cell preparing a written will, letter to their family or justification of their intended actions (other than a propaganda "suicide video")

Total – 8 (21.0 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	2
7/7	1
21/7	1
OVERT	2
SEAGRAM	2

Table IBG.20

Number of individuals by group/cell undertaking targeting or attack-related research

Total – 9 (23.7 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	3
7/7	1
21/7	2
OVERT	1
SEAGRAM	1

Table IBG.21

Number of individuals by group/cell undertaking/planning to undertake reconnaissance

Total – 6 (15.8 per cent)

(Total – 9 (23.7 per cent) if reconnaissance in USA included)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	0 (3 in USA)
7/7	4
21/7	1
OVERT	1
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.22

Number of individuals by group/cell using deception to allay suspicion of terrorism-related activity (eg, use of false name for travel/purchases, behaving like a tourist when in Pakistan, using a wedding, etc., as a cover for travel, etc.)

Total – 8 (21.0 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	2
7/7	0
21/7	2
OVERT	1
SEAGRAM	2

Table IBG.23

Number of individuals by group/cell using deception in order not to appear as a Muslim (eg, regularly wears traditional Islamic dress but then, without explanation, switches to (or back to) “western” dress, shaving beard, using a “westernised” name, etc.)

Total – 6 (15.8 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	2
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.24

Number of individuals by group/cell marrying (including over the phone) close to a planned attack

Total – 2 (5.3 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	1
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.25

Number of individuals by group/cell incurring debt with no intention of repayment

Total – 3 (7.9 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	0
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Table IBG.26

Number of individuals by group/cell adopting a "Kunya" (lit. "nickname", but among VJs used as a nom de guerre)

Total – 5 (13.1 per cent)

CREVICE	5
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	0
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Appendix C: Dataset of characteristics and potentially relevant personal behaviours in individuals

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Number of individuals by group/cell who travelled abroad with an organised Islamic charity to assist in their activities

Data Tables

Tables refer to the number of individuals in all groups examined exhibiting the characteristic specified.

Sex

All thirty-eight (38) of the individuals in the six groups/cells examined in this study were male (100 per cent).

Age range

Table IPB.1

Age range by numbers of individuals per category

JUVENILE (0–15)	0	(0 per cent)
LATE TEENS (16–19)	2	(5.3 per cent)
20–25	14	(36.8 per cent)
26–30	15	(39.5 per cent)
31–40	7	(18.4 per cent)
OVER 40	0	(0 per cent)

Table IPB.2

Age range breakdown by group/cell

	Juvenile (0–15)	Late Teens (16–19)	20–25	26–30	31–40	Over 40
CREVICE	0	0	4	0	3	0
RHYME	0	0	2	4	2	0
7/7	0	2*	1	1	0	0
21/7	0	0	2	3	1	0
OVERT	0	0	5	4	1**	0
SEAGRAM	0	0	0	3	0	0
Totals	0	2 (5.3 per cent)	14 (36.8 per cent)	15 (39.5 per cent)	7 (18.4 per cent)	0

* Group/cell contained youngest conspirator, 18 years

** Group/cell contained eldest conspirator, 36 years

Marital status

Table IPB.3

Marital status of individuals by group/cell

Total individuals single – 25 (65.8 per cent)

Total individuals married/partner – 13 (34.2 per cent)

	Single	Married	Single (with partner)
CREVICE	4	3	0
RHYME	7	1 (?)	0
7/7	2	2	0
21/7	3	2	1
OVERT	6	4	0
SEAGRAM	3	0	0
Totals	25 (65.8 per cent)	12 (31.6 per cent)	1 (2.6 per cent)

Children

Table IPB.4

Number of individuals per group/cell with children

Total – 10 (26.3 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	2
OVERT	4
SEAGRAM	0

Residency and Citizenship

Table IPB.5

Numbers of individuals by group/cell linked to the UK by citizenship or residency

Total UK citizens in groups/cells – 27 (71 per cent)

	UK citizen born in the UK	UK citizen born outside the UK	Foreign national resident in UK	Foreign visitor resident outside the UK
CREVICE	3	0	2	2
RHYME	7	0	1	0
7/7	3	1	0	0
21/7	0	3	2	1
OVERT	9	0	1	0
SEAGRAM	1	0	2	0
Totals	23 (60.5 per cent)	4 (10.5 per cent)	8 (21.0 per cent)	3 (7.9 per cent)

Religion

Table IPB.6

Number of individuals by group/cell described by others as religiously observant

Total – 19 (50 per cent)

CREVICE	4
RHYME	0
7/7	4
21/7	4
OVERT	5
SEAGRAM	2

Table IPB.7

Number of individuals by group/cell described by others as devoutly religious

Total – 5 (13.1 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	0
7/7	1
21/7	0
OVERT	3
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.8

Number of individuals by group/cell exhibiting intensification of religious observance in an already religiously observant individual

Total – 8 (21 per cent)

CREVICE	3
RHYME	0
7/7	3
21/7	1
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.9

Number of individuals by group/cell exhibiting a change from no or minimal religious observance to noticeable religious observance of their “heritage religion”

Total – 13 (34.2 per cent)

CREVICE	3
RHYME	0
7/7	1
21/7	5
OVERT	4
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.10

Number of individuals by group/cell known to wear clothing signifying religion in preference to western clothing

Total – 11 (28.9 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	1
OVERT	7
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.11

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have attended external religious schools/activities (eg, with Tablighi Jamaat), or to have attended other, less formal religious “study circles”

Total – 16 (42.1 per cent)

CREVICE	3
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	4
OVERT	4
SEAGRAM	3

Social Relationships

Table IPB.12

Number of individuals by group/cell reported to increasingly withdraw from family presence

Total – 4 (10.5 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	1
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.13

Number of individuals by group/cell known to increasingly confine social contact to a selected small group of like-minded individuals

Total – 8 (21.0 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	1
7/7	3
21/7	2
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.14

Number of individuals by group/cell attempting to impose own religious practices and obligations or their own intolerant world-view on family, friends or others

Total – 5 (13.1 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	2
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.15

Number of individuals by group/cell known to react strongly/argue forcefully in public and private against opinions, world views and religious interpretations at odds with their own

Total – 2 (5.3 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	1
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.16

Number of individuals by group/cell who focused their attention increasingly on the writings/teachings of a radical “leader” or “preacher”

Total – 6 (15.8 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	0
7/7	1
21/7	3
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.17

Number of individuals by group/cell who associated in person with a radical “leader/preacher” or their close followers

Total – 12 (31.6 per cent)

CREVICE	3
RHYME	1
7/7	1
21/7	5
OVERT	1
SEAGRAM	1

General Lifestyle

Table IPB.18

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have viewed or collected violent Jihadist propaganda material in the form of written material, CD-Roms, DVDs, downloads from websites, etc.

Total – 19 (50 per cent)

CREVICE	4
RHYME	5
7/7	1
21/7	4
OVERT	4
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.19

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have viewed or shared violent Jihadist propaganda material with other sympathetic individuals (personally or online)

Total – 7 (18.4 per cent)

CREVICE	4
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	3
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.20

Number of individuals by group/cell where their overall behaviour or attitude altered markedly enough for others to comment on a noticeable “change”

Total – 3 (7.9 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	0
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.21

Number of individuals by group/cell whose overall behaviour or attitude altered markedly enough for others to comment on noticeable “change” and for them to associate it with a particular identifiable event or incident

Total – 3 (7.9 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	0
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.22

Number of individuals by group/cell who dropped out of education or left their job before increasing their commitment to their religion or increasing their involvement in extremist causes

Total – 6 (15.7 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	1
7/7	2
21/7	1
OVERT	2
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.23

Number of individuals by group/cell who openly expressed support for AQ and/or violent attacks against “the West”

Total – 7 (18.4 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	0
7/7	1
21/7	2
OVERT	1
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.24

Number of individuals by group/cell who openly expressed their dislike of “the West”, its culture, political systems, morals, behaviour, etc.

Total – 5 (13.1 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	0
7/7	2
21/7	0
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.25

Number of individuals by group/cell reported to have expressed extreme Islamist viewpoints (eg, hostile attitude towards Shia Muslims, support for takfirism, etc.)

Total – 1 (2.6 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	0
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	1

Table IPB.26

Number of individuals by group/cell whose lifestyle and behaviour in the recent past was at odds with Islamic belief (eg, use of alcohol, drugs, tobacco, dating, etc.)

Total – 9 (23.7 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	0
7/7	1
21/7	3
OVERT	3
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.27

Number of individuals by group/cell who openly expressed support for suicide attacks

Total – 3 (7.9 per cent)

CREVICE	1
RHYME	0
7/7	1
21/7	1
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.28

Number of individuals by group/cell known to have attended meetings or to have been a follower of an extremist Islamist group (eg Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun, etc.)

Total – 7 (18.4 per cent)

CREVICE	5 (62.5 per cent) – Al-Muhajiroun
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	0
OVERT	0
SEAGRAM	2 (66.6 per cent) – Hizb ut-Tahrir

Table IPB.29

Number of individuals by group/cell alleged to have committed criminal offences, have been involved in criminal activity or known to have associated with suspected criminals

Total – 10 (26.3 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	1
7/7	3
21/7	2
OVERT	2
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.30

Number of individuals by group/cell convicted of criminal offences or otherwise involved in the criminal justice system (eg, arrest, charge, caution, etc.)

Total – 9 (23.7 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	0
7/7	3
21/7	1
OVERT	3
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.31

Number of individuals by group/cell who recruited or involved close members of their family in the conspiracy

Total – 7 (18.4 per cent)

CREVICE	2
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	3
OVERT	2
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.32

Number of individuals by group/cell who recruited or involved close friends in the conspiracy

Total – 9 (23.7 per cent)

CREVICE	4
RHYME	1
7/7	0
21/7	3
OVERT	1
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.33

Number of individuals by group/cell who took an active part in collecting money and equipment in UK to be sent abroad to support “the Mujahideen”

Total – 12 (31.6 per cent)

CREVICE	5
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	0
OVERT	7
SEAGRAM	0

Table IPB.34

Number of individuals by group/cell who travelled abroad with an organised Islamic charity to assist in their activities

Total – 3 (7.9 per cent)

CREVICE	0
RHYME	0
7/7	0
21/7	0
OVERT	3
SEAGRAM	0