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Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries

The Cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Celeste Ward Gventer, Stephanie Pezard, Laurence Smallman

Prepared for the United States Air Force

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Preface

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has long worked with partner countries in the context of security. Many U.S. allies conduct similar activities, sometimes with the same partners. However, neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the combatant commands, nor the military services have the full picture of how, where, and why these allies engage the same countries; whether working together in particular areas is a worthwhile or viable option; or whether specific lessons can be learned from the experiences of our allies, for example, in the areas of planning, resourcing, and assessments. The research documented in this report is a first step toward filling these critical knowledge gaps for Department of Defense (DoD) and USAF planners, programmers, and resource managers.

This report documents research performed as part of a fiscal year 2010 study, “Support to the Air Force Campaign Support Plan and AF/A5X International Programs.” The work was sponsored by the Director of Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy, Headquarters United States Air Force (AF/A5X), and was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE. It is the latest in a series of RAND studies supporting the USAF’s efforts to work with partner air forces across the spectrum of operations.

Other RAND documents that address security cooperation and building partnerships issues include the following:


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Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine.

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Introduction

The USAF has long worked with partner countries in the context of security. Many U.S. allies conduct similar activities, sometimes with the same partners, but at a smaller scale. However, neither OSD, the combatant commands, nor the military services have the full picture of how, where, and why these allies engage the same countries; whether working together in particular areas is a worthwhile or viable option; or whether specific lessons can be learned from the experiences of our allies, for example, in the areas of planning, resourcing and assessments. The research provided in this report is a step toward filling in these critical knowledge gaps for DoD and USAF planners, programmers, and resource managers.

This report argues that USAF, and indeed DoD, should increase its awareness of the kinds of approaches, resource expenditures, and specific security cooperation activities of key U.S. allies. Knowledge of these activities is important for several reasons. Working with U.S. allies might be a good option because there are occasions when combining activities with U.S. allies can be beneficial. However, there are also occasions when, for example, U.S. and ally interests may differ in a particular country, so that partnering would not be the best option. In other instances, the partner country or countries involved may prefer to work directly with the United States or its ally, but not in combination. At a minimum, however, increasing awareness of the kinds of activities U.S. allies are conducting with partners, when, where, why, and how is very useful from a planning and resourcing perspective and can help allies speak with one coordinated voice, whenever possible and appropriate.

How U.S. allies approach working with partner countries can also offer beneficial lessons for the USAF. For example, the militaries of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) are capable, are experienced in working with civilian counterparts, and benefit from higher-level departmental guidance. Because these allies generally devote fewer resources to the security cooperation mission than the United States does, they have in many cases had to learn to economize to spread these limited resources as far as possible across the civilian and military agencies.

After comparing and contrasting the similarities and challenges among three case studies, the report discusses instances of possible best practices, as outlined in the following two sections.
Similarities and Challenges Among the Three Case Studies

This report identifies both the positive aspects and the challenges of the security cooperation approaches of three key U.S. allies—Australia, France, and the UK. Chapter Five compares each ally’s approach to security cooperation, specifically in the terms of strategic outlook, partner country selection and planning, geographic focus, types of activities, resourcing processes, and assessments and lessons learned. These findings can be used to inform current USAF thinking on security cooperation.

Table S.1 summarizes some of the major aspects of each ally’s approach to security cooperation, based on the data and analyses provided in Chapters Two, Three, and Four.

Best Practices

This report identifies several possible best practices for DoD and USAF consideration. These areas focus on improving joint and interagency partnering and planning, combining resources, and partnering with allies when national interests align.

Improving Joint and Interagency Partnering and Planning

Overall, Australia, UK, and France all have fairly tight planning processes at the joint level and have civilian counterparts in place for security cooperation. One reason for this is that they involve fewer personnel and stakeholder organizations than the United States does. Additionally, from a proximity perspective, the members of each defense headquarters staff tend to be located in or near the same building, making regular face-to-face meetings more likely, thus improving coordination. Moreover, top-level direction means that the allies’ interagency actors tend to work together using the same plan to coordinate, deconflict, address key gaps in assistance, and leverage scarce resources.

One possible best practice from this discussion might be to attempt to create smaller planning teams, perhaps focused by country or even by issue area, across the USAF, DoD, and across agencies, to the extent possible. The development of something like a country air, space, and cyberspace plan for the entire U.S. government might be one way to socialize and test a possible new joint and interagency planning process. Such a plan might consist of U.S. government—wide objectives, security cooperation programs and activities, identified resources, and metrics for assessing the plan’s effectiveness. Of course, because of the way the U.S. resourcing system is set up for security cooperation, decentralization would mean that it would be up to each agency to determine the extent to which participation in such an effort would be in its interests.

Combining Resources

The allies we surveyed all support the combining or pooling of various resources for security cooperation to some degree. These resource pools would be overseen by senior officials from defense and foreign affairs, as well as the development community in the case of the UK.

USAF leaders should consider some potential benefits of security cooperation resourcing pooling, from the perspectives of both planning and economizing resources, particularly in the context of USAF-managed security cooperation resources. Resource pooling could help take some of the mystery out of the security cooperation budgeting process for the USAF, ensur-
<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key document</strong></td>
<td>2009 white paper&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2008 white paper on defense and national security&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic outlook</strong></td>
<td>Defence engagement and defence cooperation to shore up middle-power influence; takes a joint and interagency approach to security cooperation</td>
<td>Expanding France’s cultural and economic influence and deploying to countries of operational interest</td>
<td>The review indicates that “defence diplomacy” will gain in importance and resources, while other programs, such as acquisition, diminish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner selection and planning</strong></td>
<td>Military departments prioritize their own international engagement plans; defence international engagement groups coordinate</td>
<td>A bottom-up process, with a principle of engaging partners equally; partners whose requests fit France’s strategic interests, however, have higher priority</td>
<td>A top-down process driven by the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD’s) Security Cooperation Operations Group and determined by UK national interests rather than old “force for good” position; Royal Air Force has a prioritization matrix and an Air Regional Engagement Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic focus</strong></td>
<td>South Pacific and Southeast Asia, predominantly</td>
<td>Francophone Africa and Caribbean, Balkans, Afghanistan, Middle East</td>
<td>Overseas operations (Afghanistan) and territories with a global focus, especially South America, India, Indonesia, China, and Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of activities</strong></td>
<td>Professional military education and small training teams, bilateral exercises, increasing activities in Africa. Distinguishes between defence engagement (e.g., staff talks) and defence cooperation (e.g., training)</td>
<td>Structural (5 year) and operational (annual) projects; multiservice involvement in Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities and European Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities; work through existing regional organizations, particularly in Africa</td>
<td>Emphasizes on understanding the partner country and its people, culture, and politics; and on helping shape the decisions of the partner country’s leaders; defense attachés are key as a security cooperation activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resourcing approach</strong></td>
<td>The Defence Cooperation Program funds most security cooperation activities</td>
<td>Evolving to increase pooling of education and training efforts with allies. Shifting emphasis to in-country training and education (e.g., Regional-Focused National Schools concept) for budgetary reasons</td>
<td>Defence diplomacy likely to become an official, funded military task; defense exports are taking on a higher priority; and pooled resources allocated by contact group (MOD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment and lessons</strong></td>
<td>None. Officials believe such a process would be useful</td>
<td>Ad hoc, based on qualitative impressions of mobile training teams; pilot committees assess progress on structural cooperation projects every six months</td>
<td>None. UK MOD is very interested in this topic in the context of the SDSR increase in resources and the military task concept</td>
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ing that program managers are not necessarily competing against one another for sustained or additional resources. The pooling approach would remove some authority from the program managers, which could be a positive move because coordination and deconfliction among programs have been challenging.

**Partnering with U.S. Allies**

We have identified three key areas: staff talks, exercises, and training followed by exercises. Staff talks are a key area for the Air Force to consider in the context of collaboration with U.S. allies. The USAF engages in a variety of staff talks at various levels with allies and partner countries around the world; these talks are primarily bilateral. The U.S. Air Force should consider extending the idea to multilateral staff talks, perhaps focused on a specific issue, such as security cooperation, and inviting Australia, France, and the UK to the table.

Exercises are another key area that could be ripe for partnering with key allies. The USAF hosts a number of bilateral and multilateral field and tabletop exercises with partner countries. U.S. allies could be invited to cohost a few of these exercises, starting perhaps with tabletop exercises. For example, the AF/A5X-managed Building Partnerships seminars could be used as the vehicle.1 The content of these exercises could be discussed and coordinated during USAF staff talks with the allies involved.

Another area in which the USAF might partner with an ally is training followed by exercises, which are designed to test skills and readiness after the partners are trained. Military training teams are deployed very frequently around the world by Australia, France, the UK, and the United States. However, unless an exercise was part of the original training package, many times those skills are not tested in a realistic context in the field. It would be useful for the USAF to attempt to coordinate training events with planned exercises. Here again, these kinds of events could be coordinated during the staff talks.

**Recommendations**

Recommendations for the USAF are presented under the headings of planning, resourcing, and assessing. They focus on insights from U.S. allies that could be useful for the USAF from a military service’s perspective, and as a supporting agency to the combatant commands:

- **Planning**
  - Discuss security cooperation formally with key allies during routine USAF-managed security cooperation events.
  - Consider developing air, space, and cyberspace country plans that reflect allies’ security cooperation activities.
  - Consider discussing joint and interagency planning processes with Australia and France in particular to learn possible lessons from a military service’s perspective.
  - Consider how USAF’s security cooperation activities contribute to soft power.2

---


• Resourcing
  – Explore collaboration opportunities to leverage shrinking budgetary resources devoted to security cooperation.
  – Engage the UK directly and at multiple levels on changes in defence diplomacy and budget increases as a result of the comprehensive UK SDSR as its recommendations and decisions are being implemented (starting in October 2010).
  – Consider ways to combine resources within the programs and activities USAF manages, perhaps using the pooling resourcing concept the UK and Australia use.
  – Consider several new modalities that several allies we studied employ, such as the French Regional-Focused National Schools concept.

• Assessing
  – Offer to discuss security cooperation assessments—including processes, approaches, techniques, results of recent programs, activity and country assessments—with allies during routine staff talks or perhaps in a dedicated multilateral session or workshop that would include the United States and its allies.
  – Consider offering to share security cooperation country needs and capability assessments with allies to identify potential areas of coordination and leverage U.S. or allies’ comparative advantage.
The authors wish to thank our study sponsors, Maj Gen Kip Self, Russell Frasz, and Col Mark Burns in particular, for their support and feedback during the course of this study effort. We are also grateful for the insightful discussions with officials from Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, both at their embassies in Washington, D.C., and in their respective capitals.

Special thanks go to Marco Overhaus, who took an active part in the research and facilitation of interviews for the French case study. We also wish to acknowledge the valuable contributions of our RAND colleagues Jeffrey Engstrom, Aidan Kirby Winn, and Rachel Swanger. We thank our two reviewers, Alan Gropman (National Defense University) and Stephen Larrabee (RAND), for their helpful comments and suggestions. We are most appreciative of the careful review of Michael Neumann, our communications analyst, and the help of our administrative assistants, Melissa McNulty and Cassandra Tate.

We would also like to acknowledge the participation of the following organizations in our focused discussions:

• **Australia**
  – Australian Strategic Policy Institute
  – International Policy Division, Australian Department of Defence
  – Royal Australian Air Force

• **France**
  – European Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities and Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities officials
  – Institute of International Relations
  – Joint Staff
  – Gendarmerie, Ministry of Interior
  – Ministry of Defense
  – Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs

• **United Kingdom**
  – British Defence Staff at the British Embassy Washington, D.C.
  – Ministry of Defence: International Policy and Planning, NATO European Policy, Air Staff, Naval Staff

• **United States**
  – Headquarters Air Force
    - Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements
  – Joint Chiefs of Staff
□ Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy
  – Department of Defense
□ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations
□ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
□ Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs
## Abbreviations

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZAC</td>
<td>Australia New Zealand Army Corps</td>
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<td>AREP</td>
<td>Air Regional Engagement Plan</td>
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<td>ASNR</td>
<td>Air Senior National Representatives</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory Training Team</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Building Partnerships</td>
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<td>COMIA</td>
<td>Commandement interarmée [joint command]</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSEA</td>
<td>Cours spécial de l’École de l’air [Special Air School course]</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>campaign support plan</td>
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<td>DAS</td>
<td>Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques [Directorate for Strategic Affairs (French Defense Ministry)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCP</td>
<td>Defence Cooperation Program</td>
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<td>DCSD</td>
<td>Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense [Directorate for Security and Defense Cooperation]</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIEP</td>
<td>Defence International Engagement Plan [pronounced DYE-EP]</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIO</td>
<td>détachement d’instruction opérationnelle [operational instructional detachment]</td>
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<td>DIT</td>
<td>détachement d’instruction technique [technical instructional detachment]</td>
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<tr>
<td>DITC</td>
<td>Defence International Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense [U.S.] Defence [Australia]</td>
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<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defence Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central Africa States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>État-major des armées [the French Joint Staff]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVR</td>
<td>Regional-Focused National Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROCAMP</td>
<td>European Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>Força Aérea Brasileira [Brazilian Air Force]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Fuerza Aerea Colombiana [Columbian Air Force]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACCh</td>
<td>Fuerza Aérea de Chile [Chilean Air Force]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASZOI</td>
<td>Armed Forces in the south Indian Ocean area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFCV</td>
<td>French Forces in Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFDJ</td>
<td>French Forces in Djibouti</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFG</td>
<td>French Forces in Gabon</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Headquarters U.S. Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMSO</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Stationery Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDG</td>
<td>International Deployment Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHEDN</td>
<td>Institute of Higher National Defence Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>international security cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JASDF</td>
<td>Japan Air Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAEE</td>
<td>ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes [Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>ministry of defence (UK, France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>mobile training team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OET</td>
<td>Operator Engagement Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>Project AIR FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANVR</td>
<td>Region-Oriented National Aeronautics Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>professional military education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>Royal Australian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMAF</td>
<td>Royal Malaysian Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSAF</td>
<td>Republic of Singapore Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAAF</td>
<td>South African Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of the Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF/IA</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOG</td>
<td>Security Cooperation Operations Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCTIP</td>
<td>Service de coopération technique international de police [International Police Technical Cooperation Service]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SICOFAA</td>
<td>System of Cooperation Among the Air Forces of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) and its allies have a long history of working with partner countries in the context of security cooperation as a means of building the defense capacity of the countries, maintaining and acquiring access to foreign territories for operational purposes, promoting economic and cultural ties, and strengthening relationships with partner air forces and fostering mutual security-related benefits. USAF conducts a host of activities with partner air forces around the world, including training, equipping, and field exercising, and facilitating other, less tangible activities, such as bilateral staff talks, workshops, conferences, tabletop exercises, and professional military education. Many U.S. allies conduct similar activities, albeit normally on a smaller scale in terms of resources and manpower expended, and overall number of activities.

USAF executes the security cooperation guidance it receives from the combatant commands for partner country prioritization and key focus areas, which are ultimately defined by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in the Guidance for Employment of the Force. However, neither OSD, the combatant commands, nor the military services have the full picture of how, where, and why allies engage the same partner countries; whether working together in particular areas is a worthwhile or viable option; or whether specific lessons can be learned from the experiences of U.S. allies, for example, in planning, resourcing, and assessments. The research provided in this report is a step toward filling these critical knowledge gaps for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and USAF planners, and program and resource managers.

Three key U.S. allies—Australia, France, and the United Kingdom (UK)—have arguably the most active security cooperation programs with partner air forces, behind only USAF in terms of resources (manpower and funding) devoted to this mission. Broadly speaking, all three allies, like the United States, have global interests. As such, their air forces and other security services conduct security cooperation activities with partners on a global scale, as does USAF. However, the breadth and depth of these activities vary.

This report argues that USAF and, indeed, DoD should increase their attention to the kinds of approaches taken, resources expended, and specific security cooperation activities conducted by key U.S. allies. Knowledge of these activities is important for several reasons. First, there is the option of working together: Combined activities with U.S. allies can be beneficial to all on occasion. For example, if USAF conducts training for a deployment, an ally may follow up with a tabletop or field exercise to test the utility of the training the United States provided and, thus, gain a better understanding of the overall readiness of the partner country to deploy a capability. Preparing the Georgia battalions for deployment to Iraq is an
example of U.S.-provided training being culminated by a UK exercise that tested the skills of the Georgians.

However, partnering is not always the best option. For example, U.S. and ally interests in a particular country may differ. In other instances, the partner country or countries involved may prefer to work directly with the United States or its ally, but not with both combined. At a minimum, however, increasing the visibility of where, why, and how U.S. allies conduct activities with partners is a useful endeavor that can help allies to speak with one voice, whenever possible and appropriate.

This report also argues USAF may learn beneficial lessons by observing the way U.S. allies approach working with partner countries. For example, the ability of the militaries of Australia, France, and the UK to work with civilian counterparts tends to be more pronounced than in the United States.

As stated previously, U.S. allies generally devote fewer resources to security cooperation activities than does the U.S. military. They have therefore learned—by necessity—to economize limited interagency resources wherever possible. Additional instances of possible best practices will be discussed in the context of the case study chapters.

Objectives

This report is intended to help USAF and DoD policymakers, planners, and programmers gain a better understanding of the approaches, types of activities, regional focuses, and lessons learned of a few key allies in the area of security cooperation with partner air forces. While the report does not provide an exhaustive list of each ally’s activities with every country in the world, it does provide many detailed examples; a sense of the overall regions and countries of emphasis; the types of activities typically conducted; and, very importantly, an insider’s view of each ally’s overall security cooperation program, strategy, and rationale. The report identifies common themes from each allied case study, comparing and contrasting the approaches, with an eye toward identifying some possible best practices and lessons to inform USAF’s security cooperation strategy, planning, resourcing, and assessment processes.

The research for this report considered the following key questions:

- What core strategic principles and goals are driving the ally’s security cooperation activities with third countries?
- Are there distinguishing features to the ally’s approach?
- What resources—funding, manpower, and equipment—does the ally employ for this mission?
- What types of activities are the most common (e.g., small unit training, bilateral or multilateral exercises, professional military education [PME], equipment sales, etc.), in what primary regions, and in which countries?
- Are there best practices and lessons USAF might consider in optimizing its approach to security cooperation?
- What possible collaborative opportunities for USAF are there?

1 The sheer volume of activity that U.S. allies conduct makes it difficult—if not impossible—to produce a comprehensive catalog outside the allied governments themselves. Such catalogs exist, of course, but the data produced in this kind of comprehensive way are always sensitive, and most often, classified.
A related and important objective was to directly inform USAF security cooperation planning processes. Specifically, in 2010, at the direction of the OSD in the Guidance for Employment of the Force, the Air Staff (AF/A5XW) published its first Campaign Support Plan (CSP), which highlights the security cooperation activities of USAF on a global scale. The second edition of CSP will comprehensively track and frame USAF’s security cooperation programs and activities in a context that will be helpful to USAF planners. In future years, however, CSP will highlight the key security cooperation activities of U.S. allies working with partner air forces. This report is intended to supply future CSP publications with specific data relative to Australia, France, and the UK, and to offer a sense of the methodology for collecting such data points in the future.

Research Approach

During this roughly six-month study, we undertook a number of analytic activities to accomplish the study objectives. First, the case studies were selected. The study sponsor, the Director of Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy, Headquarters USAF (AF/A5X), asked RAND to consider candidates from the pool of current Operator Engagement Talks (OET) partner countries. To develop a short list of candidates, we considered them relative to three criteria:

- conducts training outside its own territory
- conducts PME within its own territory
- conducts bilateral or multilateral exercises with third countries, not including the United States.

The results of this assessment, as shown in Table 1.1, were qualified in a simple, binary way, so as to make an initial determination.

Given these criteria, seven of 14 OET partners were candidates for in-depth study: Australia, Brazil, France, India, Japan, South Africa, and the UK. Australia, France, and the UK were selected because the volume of activities they conducted with partner air forces on a global scale far exceeded that of the other candidates. Moreover, because we would be asking for sensitive data and observations, it made sense to select allies that would likely be the most open and receptive to such requests for information and insights.

Second, once the case studies were selected, identifying the right staff to conduct the research was critical, primarily because of the sensitivity of the questions we would be asking foreign governments. Because we relied heavily on the data that these foreign governments ultimately provided, RAND team members were carefully chosen. The Australian case study was led by a researcher currently based in Canberra, Australia. The France case study was led by a French national with extensive security cooperation experience. Many reports were provided in French, so language skills were required. The UK case study was led by a retired Royal

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2 The plan is not publicly available.
3 This is a series of operationally focused staff talks that occur between USAF and partner air forces. Current partners (as of the time of writing) include Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the UK.
Navy officer who previously worked in the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), specifically on defence diplomacy issues.

Third, we reviewed the publicly available and official government documents. Of particular importance were Australia’s defence white paper and defense planning guidance, France’s 2008 white paper on defense and national security, and the UK’s strategic defence reviews (SDRs). Perhaps most importantly, the team members conducted extensive, focused discussions with allied officials, starting with the staffs of embassies stationed in Washington, D.C., and then in each case study’s respective capital city.

**Key Terminology**

It is important to discuss some of the key terminology used throughout this report. The Australians, French, and UK use their own, different concepts in their approaches to military engagement with foreign countries. Perhaps not surprisingly, none of these concepts are the same as those used in the United States; indeed, it appears that senior DoD leaders are beginning to discuss how the U.S. armed forces should evolve its military engagement concepts. For example, in a 2010 speech, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted important new ideas, suggesting that “security assistance writ large” should support the work of other U.S.

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agencies. One way of considering military engagement is within a framework that links hard power—mostly military operations—with soft power—whole-of-government activities that, according to Joseph Nye, influence foreign nations through attraction. Contributions can include training and education, humanitarian support, confidence building, equipment donation, and so on. This framework may be helpful for comparing U.S. military engagement concepts more readily with those of other nations.

In this report, the terms military contribution to soft power and military soft power are used to emphasize the broad range of possible military engagement activities. As the case studies show, these are only a few of the potential activities a nation can use to deliver its foreign policy or national objectives.

The cornerstone U.S. concepts are security cooperation and its subset, security assistance, which encompass collaboration with partner countries. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) website, security cooperation includes activities conducted with allies and friendly nations to: build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests, build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.

Examples include training and combined exercises, operational meetings, contacts and exchanges, security assistance, medical and engineering team engagements, cooperative development, acquisition and technical interchanges, and scientific and technology collaboration. Security assistance consists of “a group of programs, authorized by law that allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign governments.” Examples of these programs include foreign military sales, foreign military financing, international military education and training, and direct commercial sales. In this report, we commonly use security cooperation to mean working with partner countries in a broad sense.

Similarly, the Australians, French, and British have their own terms for describing their military engagement activities with foreign countries. The Australians use defence engagement to differentiate individual contacts from defence cooperation, which refers to a deeper, more-substantive involvement between nations. Defence engagement includes staff talks, conferences, and high-level visits. Defence cooperation includes other security cooperation activities, such as military education, training, exercises, and equipment transfers. The French use air diplomacy to refer to the large spectrum of daily air force missions. Air diplomacy includes air shows, international training, personnel exchange, temporary or permanent deployments, evacuation of nationals, and humanitarian interventions. Unlike U.S. security cooperation, French air diplomacy also includes shows of force and limited strikes.

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6 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2005. All arms of government contribute to soft power, with diplomacy often considered the main mechanism for one nation to engage another.
7 See the Frequently Asked Questions section of DSCA’s website.
9 DoD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual, 2007, which is available on DSCA’s website. A full listing of security assistance programs may be found on p. 33 of the manual.
The UK uses *defence diplomacy* to describe its military activities that contribute to soft power. These are activities that maintain international support for operations, which can range from basing to contributions, that promote UK interests, including conflict prevention, and counterproliferation, or that support other government departments.\(^{10}\)

Additionally, common terms are used to describe the specific security cooperation activities across all case study chapters. Joint PME consists of the rigorous and thorough instruction and examination of officers of the armed forces in an environment designed to promote a theoretical and practical in-depth understanding of joint matters and, specifically, of the subject matter covered.\(^{11}\)

Mobile training teams consist of one or more military or civilian personnel on temporary duty, often sent to a foreign nation, to provide instruction. Such a team’s mission is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The commander may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending on host-nation requests. These are also sometimes referred to as military training teams.\(^{12}\)

Sending advisors to foreign governments is more common in the UK and France than in the United States. Advisors are typically either military members or civil servants who are seconded to work directly within the host-nation government to provide expert advice on particular topics. Advisors may report indirectly or directly to their home countries, via their respective embassies, or may operate more or less independently.

The United States and its allies conduct staff talks, high-level visits, seminars, conferences, workshops, and the like with third countries. Typically, these kinds of events do not include the training of particular skills. These events tend more toward information exchanges; general familiarization with a specific topic of mutual interest; or, in the case of staff talks, a more-focused discussion with an outcome in mind, for example, increasing interoperability for coalition warfare.

### Organization of the Report

Each of the case study chapters (Chapters Two, Three, and Four) is relatively similar in structure and content, although the specificity of the data varies somewhat across the case studies. Each case study provides an overview of the ally’s approach to security cooperation with third countries, including the strategic outlook, partner country selection and planning, geographic focus, types of activities conducted, resourcing processes, assessments and lessons learned, and future prospects for cooperation with DoD and USAF. In terms of explicit activities in specific countries, the case study chapters provide examples rather than complete lists, because of the sensitivity of that information.

Chapter Two focuses on Australia’s approach to working with partner countries, focusing on the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), but also covering other joint entities. The chap-

\(^{10}\) This working definition was drawn from the study’s literature review and research discussions and may change as a result of the ongoing defense review.

\(^{11}\) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01D, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2009, governs joint PME.

ter discusses Australia’s approach to working with partners in two broad categories: defence engagement, which includes staff talks, workshops, conferences, and senior-level visits; and defence cooperation, which includes education and training and capacity-building, exercises, and equipment transfers.

Chapter Three focuses on France, and covers the activities of the French Air Force and other entities, such as the gendarmerie and police. The chapter discusses France’s approach to working with partners, which is broadly divided into two large categories: structural (longer term, meaning more than five years) and operational cooperation (less than one year).

Chapter Four focuses on the UK’s defence diplomacy approach to engaging third countries. This chapter considers the UK approach to soft power over the past ten years. The increasing importance of defence diplomacy within the context of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is discussed in detail.

Chapter Five provides a comparative analysis of all three case studies, identifying similarities, differences, and overall themes, focusing specifically on the allies’ strategic outlook, partner country selection and planning, geographic focus, types of activities conducted, resourcing processes, and assessments and lessons learned. The chapter also discusses possible best practices from these cases that DoD and USAF should consider, and identifies some ideas for future research to augment this study.

Chapter Six consolidates and presents our key findings and recommendations.

Appendixes A through N briefly describe each of the 14 OET partners’ security cooperation activities with third countries, which we prepared as part of a related task to this study. There are entries for the three case studies, and 11 others (see Table 1.1).
CHAPTER TWO

Australia’s Approach to Security Cooperation

Introduction

Australia is actively engaged in security cooperation activities, both in its own region and around the world. Security cooperation is a key mechanism Australia uses to engage other countries and to leverage its highly trained military force for soft power ends. This chapter provides an overview of how Australia considers and plans its security cooperation programs, as well as a representative sample of its many activities.

Australian policymakers divide these activities into two broad categories:

1. **defence engagement**, which includes staff talks, workshops, conferences, and senior-level visits
2. **defence cooperation**, which includes education and training and capacity-building (both in Australia and in the partner country), exercises, and equipment transfers.

Australian leaders have found that these activities are useful in at least three major ways. Australia’s security cooperation:

- helps shore up the stability of nations in its immediate region
- enhances acceptance of Australia as a legitimate participant in deliberations on regional and global security
- provides Australian forces unique and useful training opportunities.

Although the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is relatively small—approximately 55,000 full-time personnel total in the Australian Army, Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and the RAAF—it makes significant contributions to operations around the world and prides itself on “punching above its weight.”¹ Australia’s active participation in operations and its energetic defence engagement and cooperation programs have helped the ADF have an influence greater than its mere size may suggest.

This chapter begins with a survey of Australia’s strategic outlook and thinking, giving context to the discussion of its defence engagement and cooperation activities. The next two sections will review Australia’s approach to building the capabilities of partner nations, first from a perspective of philosophy and relationships, and then from a bureaucratic one. The chapter concludes with a review of Australia’s various defence engagement and cooperation efforts around the world.

¹ Australia maintains about 3,300 personnel deployed to 12 ongoing operations and conducts an array of defence engagement, cooperation, and training activities.
The sheer volume of Australia’s activity in this area makes it difficult—if not impossible—to produce a comprehensive catalog outside the Australian government. Because the critical guidance document that identifies Australia’s partner countries and specifies the associated objectives is classified, we relied on publicly available information and interviews with officials.

**Australia’s Strategic Outlook**

Australia is a major non-NATO U.S. ally. This close relationship is reflected in many areas of cooperation, including the countries’ respective intelligence and military services. For example, RAAF and USAF are strong partners, with the former participating in a variety of operations and exercises with U.S. forces and possessing an inventory of primarily U.S.-made equipment. For example, RAAF plans to purchase more than 100 Joint Strike Fighters in the second decade of the 21st century. Its alliance with the United States remains the central pillar of Australian national security strategy, and Australia is a major component of U.S. strategy in Asia.

**Defence White Paper 2009**

The most recent and comprehensive statement of Australian strategy is the white paper on defense released in May 2009. This document provides key insights into how Australia views the global security order and its place in it over the coming decades.

In assessing the overall strategic environment, the white paper makes a central observation: It envisions a decline in U.S. power in Asia and a rise in Chinese influence. It notes that “Australia’s strategic outlook over the coming decades will continue to be shaped by the changing global distribution of economic, political, and military power, and by the future role and weight of the United States.”

While the paper offers that the United States will remain the most influential actor through 2030 (the paper’s scope), the United States “might find itself preoccupied and stretched in some parts of the world such that its ability to shift attention and project power into other regions . . . is constrained.” At the same time, China will become a “major driver of economic activity both in the region and globally,” and “will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin.” Given the centrality of U.S. power to Australian strategy and security, this vision of the future has significant implications, and may reasonably be seen as a driving force behind the force structure proposals in the paper.

The force structure changes entail, most notably, a major expansion of Australian maritime capabilities, including

- doubling Australia’s current submarine fleet (from six to 12) by the mid-2030s
- enhancing the three currently planned air warfare destroyers with the Standard Missile 6 and possible acquisition of a fourth vessel

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2 This term, major non-NATO U.S. ally, is a formal status in U.S. law (10 U.S. Code, Section 2350a, 1989). Along with Egypt, Israel, Japan, and South Korea, Australia was one of the first countries to receive this designation. This status confers a variety of benefits, including research and development initiatives, preferred status for receiving surplus materiel, certain counterterrorism initiatives, and expedited export processing for particular technologies and training.

3 Australian DoD, 2009c, p. 30.

4 Australian DoD, 2009c, p. 33.

5 Australian DoD, 2009c, p. 34.
• acquiring eight new Future Frigates, which will be larger than current Anzac-class ships and designed with a strong emphasis on submarine detection and response
• upgrading current Anzac-class frigates
• acquiring new naval combat helicopters
• continuing acquisition of two new landing helicopter dock amphibious ships
• acquiring a new strategic sealift ship.

The white paper’s projected force would increase Australia’s total ship tonnage over the next 25 years from 150,000 to 265,000. While the emphasis in the white paper is clearly maritime, it also notes that the ADF will need to become more potent in other key capability areas, including air superiority; strategic strike; special forces; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and cyberwarfare.

Australia’s Interests, Defense Policy, and Capabilities
The 2009 white paper explicitly states Australia’s strategic interests in order. Consistent with a construct that first appears in the country’s Strategic Basis paper (a kind of predecessor document to the white papers) in 1973 and has persisted to the present day, Australia’s interests are presented in four major tiers or “concentric circles” which are, by descending order of importance:

1. a secure Australia
2. a secure immediate neighborhood
3. strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific Region
4. a stable, rules-based global security order.

To secure these objectives, Australia’s defense policy is to ensure that the ADF can act independently to secure Australia’s homeland, lead military coalitions when it has a shared stake with other countries, and make tailored contributions to coalitions led by others.

The Royal Australian Air Force
While comparatively small, the RAAF is highly trained and highly capable. The total defense budget for Australia is about A$25 billion, and the RAAF share of that is about A$4 billion.

Overall, the RAAF contains about 14,000 full-time personnel and operates about 110 combat capable aircraft, consisting of F/A-18Bs, F/A-18Fs, and AP-3Cs, as well as an assort-
ment of additional lift, reconnaissance, and training aircraft (see Table 2.1 for details). Like the other services, the RAAF is undergoing a ten-year transformation of its capabilities. It retired the F-111 in 2010, planning to replace it, as an interim solution, with the 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet (currently under delivery), until Australia receives about 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (starting 2014–2016). The AP-3C Orion fleet of 19 aircraft will be replaced with eight new aircraft, but this acquisition was recently deferred to sometime after 2020. The RAAF is also exploring acquisition of the C-27J to support its army.

The RAAF participates in a host of operations abroad, in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean, Malaysia, the Middle East, East Timor, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and elsewhere.

The RAAF operates 12 bases across Australia (see Figure 2.1 for locations) and three “bare bases” that can be activated quickly when needed. Air force personnel also work in a variety of defense bases and offices. Additionally, a small contingent of RAAF personnel operates out of Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth in Penang, Malaysia (this mission is described in greater detail later).

The RAAF provides air power in support of joint and coalition ADF operations, but also offers a strategic capability through long-range strike and air combat. It provides close air support and battlefield interdiction to ADF forces, limited movement support, and maritime surveillance and antisubmarine and antisurface capabilities. The RAAF also features a number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Total Aircraft</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Fleet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F/A-18F Super Hornet</td>
<td>Multirole jet fighter</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/A-18 Hornet</td>
<td>Multirole jet fighter</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP-3C Orion</td>
<td>Maritime patrol</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-17A Globemaster</td>
<td>Heavy transport</td>
<td>4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-737 AEW&amp;C Wedgetail</td>
<td>Early warning and control</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130H Hercules</td>
<td>Medium transport</td>
<td>12b</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-130J Super Hercules</td>
<td>Medium transport</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>CL-604 Challenger</td>
<td>VIP transport</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>B-737 Boeing Business Jet</td>
<td>VIP transport</td>
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<td>PC-9/A</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk 127</td>
<td>Fighter trainer</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K350 King Air</td>
<td>Multirole utility</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future Acquisitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>KC-30A MRTT</td>
<td>Multirole tanker transport</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Strike Fighter</td>
<td>Multirole jet fighter</td>
<td>~100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*a Delivery of a fifth aircraft is expected on October 31, 2011.

b These are being phased out in favor of the J model.
of enablers, such as over-the-horizon radar and command and control systems, that enhance its capabilities.\textsuperscript{12}

\section*{Australia's Approach to Security Cooperation}

The ADF maintains an active presence in operations, exercises, and capacity-building efforts, both in Australia and abroad. Major ADF operations include Afghanistan (about 1,200 personnel); the International Stabilisation Force in East Timor (about 400 personnel); the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (about 80 personnel); and a handful of personnel in multinational operations in Darfur, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere.

Australia’s rationale for capacity-building activities is clearly stated in its strategic documents. According to the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements for 2010–2011, Australia’s international engagement supports the country’s strategic objectives by

- contributing to regional security
- working with allies, regional partners, and others to shape a stable environment

\textsuperscript{12} Andrew Davies, "RAAF Capability Review 2010," Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Analysis 63, June 22, 2010b.
• consolidating acceptance of Australia as an obvious and legitimate participant in deliberations on regional security issues
• encouraging and assisting with the development of defense self-reliance within regional countries.\(^{13}\)

The ADF spends roughly A$100 million per year on defence cooperation and defence engagement activities, depending on the costs included.\(^{14}\) About A$95 million of this is funded under the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP), which is administered by the International Policy Division of the Australian DoD. There is also a small amount of funds available for engagement activities—travel, conference attendance, staff talks, etc.—on the order of A$3 million. In addition, each of the services sets aside a small amount of its own funding for activities undertaken with partner services. Not included in these costs, of course, are operations and maintenance funds for the personnel and equipment used in the activities.

Australia also seeks a more joint and interagency approach to capacity-building activities, when appropriate. The most notable example is the Australian Federal Police (AFP), which has become increasingly active in capacity building abroad, particularly in Afghanistan, and in Australia’s regional and international law enforcement assistance activities.\(^{15}\) The AFP is part of the attorney general’s portfolio, and the AFP Commission reports to the minister for Home Affairs.\(^{16}\)

In February 2004, the AFP established the International Deployment Group (IDG) to manage the deployment of its personnel overseas. The goal of the IDG is to “provide leadership within the law and justice sector in the delivery of offshore law enforcement initiatives.”\(^{17}\) Although the AFP has been participating in international peacekeeping and capacity-building missions for decades, the IDG facilitates and manages them. Since 2004, the IDG has grown from less than 300 officers to more than 1,000.\(^{18}\)

In addition, the ADF conducts capacity-building exercises with nations around the world, including training courses in Australia and on-site training teams in partner countries. When possible, the ADF services pool resources and conduct such activities jointly. RAAF-led exercises, for example, tend to incorporate Australian Army personnel.\(^{19}\) In addition, the Defence International Training Centre (DITC), currently located at RAAF Williams, is transitioning into a joint facility and is staffed by members of all the military services.

Partly in response to the white paper’s emphasis on alignment with strategic objectives, the Australian government is exploring ways to improve coordination and communication

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14 At the time of this writing, the Australian dollar was roughly equivalent to the U.S. dollar, hovering at about US$0.98. This is extremely high by historical standards, however.


17 AFP, 2006, p. 2.


19 Pitch Black is an example of such an exercise. We will discuss it later.
Australia’s Approach to Security Cooperation

across the services and across agencies in capacity-building activities. The next section will explore the processes involved in the development of priorities and plans in the ADF.

**Australian Security Cooperation: Structure, Process, and Priorities**

Defence conducts international engagement activities to shape the strategic environment in ways that further Australia’s national interests.\(^{20}\)

**International Engagement Plans**

Australia’s priorities and objectives for security cooperation are laid out in the classified Defence International Engagement Plan (DIEP), which, while updated annually, works on a five-year time horizon. The International Policy Division within Defence’s Strategy Executive develops the DIEP in collaboration with the groups and services in defense.

The DIEP provides a prioritized list of international engagement objectives and subobjectives by country, performance measures, and proposed activities. The guidance in the DIEP is derived from the defence white paper and the Defence Planning Guidance.\(^ {21}\)

Each military service also has an international engagement plan. The Army International Engagement Plan, Navy International Engagement Plan, and Air Force International Engagement Strategy define their individual service’s international engagement priorities and objectives as linked to the DIEP.

Another key document is the Program of Major Service Activities, managed by the Joint Operational Command Headquarters and used to schedule and coordinate exercises and engagement activities among the services. Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between the various documents.

A key forum for the coordination of activities, objectives, and security cooperation programs is the Defence International Engagement Group. It includes representatives at the two-star level. The group meets quarterly to discuss issues, review activity, and ensure coordination.

**Lessons Learned and Assessments**

As of summer 2010, there are no formal ADF-wide lessons learned or assessment processes for security cooperation activities. The services often compose after-action reports on activities, but there are no formal guidelines stating what these reports should contain, and no process for collecting and integrating the information. Some officials we spoke with offered that a more-formal lessons-learned and assessments process would be useful, and that this may be explored in the future as officials endeavor to make Australia’s international engagement activities increasingly strategic and more closely linked to guidance.\(^ {22}\)

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21 Australian DoD, 2009c, and the Defence Planning Guidance amplify the guidance in the white paper and are updated annually. It provides strategic guidance on military strategy, force structure planning and capability development, international engagement, resource planning, etc.

22 RAND interview with senior Australian DoD officials, Canberra, July 2010.
Funding

Australia’s security cooperation activities are funded under a few different program lines. The largest of these is DCP. The services have funding for international engagement that is not set out in publicly available documents.

DCP is focused on capability development among Australia’s immediate neighbors in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. A number of separate programs fall under DCP; the budget estimate for 2010 and 2011 is about A$96 million for activities in Papua New Guinea, the South Pacific region, Southeast Asia, and other countries. Table 2.2 breaks down the spending by country.

DCP grew out of an effort in the early 1980s to assist the Pacific Island nations in Australia’s immediate region in enforcing the newly agreed-to United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea. The convention introduced a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone around coastal States, but few of the Pacific Island countries had the capacity to meet the regulatory, surveillance, and patrol requirements the convention implied.

At the request of these governments, Australia established DCP, whose main object was producing patrol boats suitable for these nations to use in surveillance and maritime patrol. The Pacific Patrol Boat Program was started in 1984 and continues today. This program is described in greater detail later.

DCP has grown since its inception and now assists regional security forces in a wide range of areas, including defense reform and governance, planning, analysis, command and control, counterterrorism, maritime security, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

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23 There is also a funding line for activities beyond this region, referred to as multilateral general assistance, which is the largest line item.
communications, logistic support, education and training, and counter–improvised explosive device training. This assistance is provided through a range of activities, including ADF advisors, training events and exercises, and equipment and infrastructure projects.24

### Australia’s Defense Relationships and Partner Selection Process

Australia’s strategic posture includes a host of networks and relationships. In the past decade, Australia has increased its efforts to develop productive and substantive relations with countries around the world, and defence cooperation and engagement are key tools in that effort.

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Partners are selected primarily by the International Policy Division of the Strategy Executive in the Australian DoD (see Figure 2.3), with input from the services and groups in the department. The Strategy Executive, in turn, is located in the Office of the Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force Group. Figure 2.4 charts the overall DoD; the position of this office is shaded in gray.

A number of considerations govern the selection of partners, and several, sometimes competing, priorities may factor into the analysis. A particular country may offer a specific training value to Australian forces, which the services would tend to value highly. For example, the Australian Army has a long-standing relationship with Malaysia, which offers the ADF unique training environments and defence engagement value. Another country may be important primarily for its relationship with Australia, rather than its training advantages. These considerations are weighed and adjudicated by the Strategic Policy and International Policy Divisions.

Ultimately, Australia’s defence engagement and cooperation activities—including the selection of partners—are intended to flow from the nation’s strategic priorities. As noted earlier, the DoD white paper describes the framework for Australia’s interests as a series of concentric circles, with the security of the Australian homeland at its center. The document describes Australia’s relationships in a similar fashion. At the heart of Australia’s relationships lies its alliance with the United States; other relationships flow out from that center.

Both frameworks play roles in the process of partner selection and in defining the objectives for defence engagement and defence cooperation activities. Figure 2.5 illustrates these two frameworks. In the left-hand circle are Australia’s strategic interests as defined in the white paper, with a secure Australia at the center and other interests emanating out from that funda-

**Figure 2.3**

*Strategy Executive, Australian Department of Defence*

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RAND interview with senior Australian DoD officials, Canberra, July 2010.
Figure 2.4
Department of Defence

![Department of Defence diagram]

RAND TR972-2.4

Figure 2.5
Australia’s Strategic Interests and Australia’s Defense Relationships

![Australia’s strategic interests and defense relationships diagram]

SOURCE: Australian DoD, 2009, Chs. 5 and 11. The “Wider Asia Pacific Region” in the latter chapter includes China, Japan, Korea, and India.
RAND TR972-2.5
mental imperative. In the right-hand circle are Australia’s defense relationships, with the U.S. alliance at its center and the relations in other regions emanating out from that core.

The remainder of this section will review Australia’s key defense relationships in the sequence they appear in the white paper and hence the Figure 2.5 right-hand diagram.

**United States.** The first decade of the 21st century has seen a substantial deepening of the already close defense relationship between Australia and the United States, which is ultimately enshrined in the Australia–New Zealand–U.S. Security Treaty of 1951. The bond was further reinforced in the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Initiative of 2007. The U.S.-Australia defense relationship operates on numerous dimensions, including technology sharing, joint exercises, technical collaboration, combined operational planning, interoperability, regional engagement cooperation, and joint facilities in Australia. For Australia, there is no more important relationship, and certainly no more important defense relationship, than the one it shares with the United States.

**The Wider Asia-Pacific Region (Japan, China, Korea, and India).** Australia has also developed cooperative partnerships and defence engagement relationships with a number of East and South Asian nations.

Given its military capabilities and its shared alliance with the United States, Japan is an increasingly important strategic partner to Australia. Australian and Japanese forces operated together in Iraq, and are engaging in growing defence cooperation, both bilaterally and through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with the United States. In 2008, Australia and Japan signed a memorandum on defence cooperation that expanded engagement between the two militaries from dialogue to practical activity, including counterterrorism, disaster relief, peacekeeping, maritime security, and regular bilateral defense minister’s meetings.

Australia has also been developing its defense relationship with China, as Chinese military power grows in Asia. In 2008, Australia upgraded its Defence Strategic Dialogue with China to the level of the Chief of Defence Force and Secretary of Defence. There are also a number of educational and professional exchanges with China.

The Australian DoD is seeking to expand its cooperative activities and exchanges with both South Korea and India, for example, in maritime security. In 2006, Australia signed a memorandum of understanding with India on defence cooperation, that focused on joint training, maritime security, and defense research and development, as well as a potential joint working group on defense between the two nations.

**Southeast Asia.** Indonesia features very prominently in Australian strategic thinking and is arguably the most important country in Australia’s immediate region. The bilateral relationship between the two nations has a long, and sometimes complicated, history. In recent years, the defense relationship in particular has grown stronger; in 2008, Australia and Indonesia signed the Lombok Treaty on Security Cooperation, which provides a framework for cooperation on matters of mutual interest. The Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation, signed in January 2009 by the two chiefs of the respective defense forces, was intended to further deepen the defense relationship. Australia plans to expand its cooperative activity with the Indonesian military through exercises, exchanges, dialogue, and capacity-building activities.


The Five-Power Defence Arrangement between Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Singapore, and Malaysia facilitates cooperation among these countries and provides one of the major frameworks for Australian defence cooperation with both Singapore and Malaysia. Both countries have strong defense ties to Australia; Singapore maintains training facilities on Australian soil, and Australia operates forces out of RMAF Base Butterworth.

Australia is also increasing its cooperation with Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand on such issues as counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, and the professionalization of the countries’ armed forces. In September 2009, Australia and Vietnam signed the Vietnam-Australia Comprehensive Partnership to improve cooperation between the two countries in combating terrorism and human smuggling, and a Joint Transnational Crime Center has been established in Ho Chi Minh City. Australia offers around 100 spots in training courses in its own territory to officers from Vietnam, and remains committed to assisting in the modernization and reform of the Cambodian Armed Forces.

**New Zealand, South Pacific, and East Timor.** The relationship between Australia and New Zealand on security matters remains extremely close. The tradition of the ANZAC—the Australia New Zealand Army Corps that fought together in Gallipoli in World War I—continues through joint deployments, technology sharing, joint planning, interoperability, and joint capability development and procurement activities. The Australian DoD white paper envisions pushing integration between the two militaries even further, including combined air transport logistics or even a combined task force ready for deployment.²⁸

Australia maintains strong interests in and ties to the nations in its immediate region (shown in Figure 2.6) and leads efforts to promote their economic security, governance, and stability. These nations include East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Tonga, and Samoa. Examples of these efforts include the 400 members of the ADF who continue to serve as the lead element of the International Stabilisation Force in East Timor and the work the Australian government has been investing in development of a professional military and police force for Papua New Guinea.

**South Asia.** Australia has also been increasing its defence engagement and capacity-building activities in Pakistan, and is now the second-largest contributor to such activities in that country (after the United States).²⁹ Despite a shared history as part of the British Commonwealth and long-standing relations, Australia had suspended their bilateral defense relationship after Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear test. After September 11, 2001, in recognition of Pakistan’s importance in combating international terrorism, Australia reestablished relations and has been increasing and expanding them ever since.³⁰ To a degree, then, Australia’s assistance to Pakistan is part of Australia’s support to the U.S. alliance.

In June 2010, Pakistan and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding to increase bilateral defence cooperation. This document offers a framework for increased cooperation, including further counterinsurgency training; visits by Australian officials, senior officers, and ships; and greater educational exchange between the two countries. Australia raised the number of Australia-based training positions for Pakistani officers to 140 in 2010.

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²⁸ Australian DoD, 2009c, p. 98.
²⁹ RAND interview with senior Australian DoD officials, Canberra, July 2010.
In Afghanistan, Australia remains committed to training the Afghan Security Forces and participating in multinational operations to bring stability and security to that country. Australia participates actively not only in defense relationships but also in training Afghan police (the AFP has a training mission in Afghanistan) and providing development and reconstruction aid.

The Middle East and Africa. Australian forces have been involved in the Middle East for many decades. Since 1956, Australia has participated in the UN Truce Supervision Organisation, established in 1948 to monitor the truce of the first Arab-Israeli war. Staff officers and observers continue to contribute to this operation. Until the change of government in late 2007, Australian forces were active in promoting stability and security in Iraq, and a small staff continues to support the UN Assistance Mission in that country. RAN ships continue to patrol and conduct operations in the region.

In keeping with Australia’s desire to be an active “middle power, and a growing recognition of shared interests, Australia has recently increased its activities in Africa. When it came to power in late 2007, the Labor government (then led by Kevin Rudd) announced it would increase its focus on and activities in Africa. In 2009, then–Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon attended a conference in Addis Ababa on African peace and security and announced a number of initiatives for enhancing Australia’s engagement with Africa. These initiatives included establishing a defense attaché to the African Union (AU), inviting AU personnel to peacekeep-

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31 Australian DoD, “Minister for Defence Returns from Visit to Ethiopia and Poland,” February 23, 2009b.
ing courses in Australia, and cosponsoring a peacekeeping symposium with the AU in Ethiopia in March 2010.

Additionally, Australia currently deploys about 17 military observers and personnel to the UN Mission in Sudan. The personnel specialize in air movements, aviation safety, and logistic support, and are providing assistance to the UN's peacekeeping operation. Australia has also provided headquarters training to the East Brigade of the AU in Kenya.

**United Kingdom.** Australia's history as a British colony and its status as a continuing member of the British Commonwealth ensure close and continuing ties between Australia and the UK. British military personnel are able to “laterally transfer” into the ADF with comparative ease, and the two militaries share not only a culture but many of the same policies, procedures, and approaches. There is strong cooperation in intelligence and technology sharing, personnel exchanges, exercises, dialogue, and the Five-Power Defence Arrangement, among other activities.

**Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).** Australia has relationships with a variety of countries in Europe, but notable among these are its strong and growing ties to France, in part because of that country’s role in the Pacific region. In July 2009, the Australia-France Defence Cooperation Agreement entered into force (originally signed in 2006), providing a detailed legal and policy framework for existing military cooperation between the two nations and potential future expansion of such activities. Because a number of islands in the South Pacific are part of French colonial history (some remain part of French Polynesia), France frequently works in cooperation with Australia and New Zealand on maritime surveillance, humanitarian and disaster relief, and support to regional defense and police forces.

Cooperation between Australia and NATO has also increased over the past decade; Australia is one of NATO's contact countries, nations with shared interests and that conduct a range of cooperative efforts with the organization. Australia contributed to NATO-led stabilization missions in the Balkans in the 1990s and is now a member of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Australia also cooperates with NATO on such issues as counterterrorism and nonproliferation.

**Multilateral Institutions.** Finally, Australia engages with multilateral security institutions, including NATO and, importantly, the UN. In 2008, then–newly elected Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that Australia must further develop its relations with countries around the world and with international institutions. He planned to usher in, he said, “a new period of active, creative Australian middle-power diplomacy.” Rudd later announced that Australia would seek one of the ten nonpermanent seats on the UN Security Council in 2013–2014. While the middle power concept was not new (and is not well defined in the literature), Rudd implied that Australia must actively engage the international community and develop deeper relations with countries around the globe.

To a large degree, this effort has been successful. Rudd is no longer the prime minister, but is in fact the foreign minister in the recently elected Labor government, offering him fur-

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32 Australia is a federal constitutional monarchy under a parliamentary democracy; the Queen of England is the executive of Australia's government, and that executive power can be represented by the governor-general, the prime minister, the ministers, and executive departments.


ther opportunity to fulfill this vision. Australia continues to pursue a seat on the UN Security Council, and is a major contributor to multinational operations in Afghanistan.

Because of Australia’s experience in stabilization operations and peacekeeping, it views this area as a competitive advantage for training others (it has participated in 13 African peacekeeping missions since 1960 alone, and Australia’s DoD has four personnel seconded to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It is also a way for Australia to contribute to UN interests, a key asset to the Labor government’s renewed multilateralism and desire to join the Security Council.

Defence engagement and defence cooperation are mechanisms Australia uses to engage nations around the world and build its middle-power influence. Building that influence is also a means of shoring up existing relationships and establishing Australia as a country that deserves a seat at the international table.

**Australian Security Cooperation Activities**

Australia conducts a full range of capacity-building activities, from PME in Australia to mobile training teams (MTTs), joint exercises, and, in limited cases, the provision of materiel to partners. The list of these activities is long, with some programs involving only a few personnel or countries well outside of Australia’s region. Of perhaps greatest significance are the exchanges and activities with the United States, Australia’s most important ally, and the many activities Australia undertakes to help enhance the stability of its immediate region.

**Professional Military Education and Australia-Based Training (Defence Cooperation)**

The Australian Defence College, located in the Weston Creek suburb of Canberra, offers both Intermediate Level Education to O-4/O-5 level officers at the Australian Command and Staff College and War College–level training to colonel-level officers at its Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies. At both institutions, foreign exchange officers study alongside their Australian counterparts.

The college’s 2010 class included 45 foreign students from 23 countries (out of a total class of 177). The center’s class was smaller, with 45 total students and 22 foreign officers from 17 countries. Both courses conduct overseas tours to nations in Australia’s larger region, including Pakistan, China, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, New Zealand, New Caledonia, Philippines, and others.35

The ADF offers other courses to partner countries in Australia, such as English language training, flight instructor training, and air traffic control.36 DITC provides training to Southeast Asian and South Pacific defense forces.37 The focus at DITC is on English language training, some of which is preparatory to other training (e.g., flying instructor training), while, in other cases, the purpose is to promote cultural exchange and familiarity. Some of DITC’s courses are train-the-trainer initiatives designed to allow students to return to their home countries to train their colleagues in the English language.

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35 RAND query to Australian Defence College, Canberra, Australia, July 2010.
36 RAND interview with RAAF, Canberra, Australia, July 2010.
37 For further information, see the Defence International Training Centre website.
In general, as the services assemble courses, they often hold spaces for international attendees. These spaces are funded either through DCP or through Service International Engagement funds.

Australia also hosts a number of partner country units and facilities. At RAAF Base Pearce, north of Perth in Western Australia, the Republic of Singapore Air Force maintains a number of aircraft, including the S-211 fighter trainer and the PC-21. Due to the severely restricted airspace in Singapore, the country maintains about a third of its aircraft abroad, in the United States, France, and in Australia (at RAAF Pearce, and at Oakey Army Aviation Centre, near Queensland, where it has a helicopter squadron).38

Australia has long hosted a joint U.S.-Australian communications facility at Pine Gap, near Alice Springs, and a naval communications station at North West Cape in Western Australia. Some reports suggest that Australia will also be home to a new joint communications facility at Geraldton, north of Perth.39

Additionally, the AFP offers Australia-based training to personnel from partner countries. The Law Enforcement Cooperation Program has funded international students at AFP training institutes and courses, such as the Australian Institute of Police Management, Management of Serious Crime programs, Australian Crime Commission, and Transnational Crime Prevention Program at the University of Wollongong.40

**Staff Talks, Visits, Seminars, Workshops, Conferences (Defence Engagement)**

Australia also has a small budget (about A$3 million) for defence engagement activities, such as visits, conference attendance, and workshops with partner nations. Outside DCP, this funding covers engagement with the United States, Europe, Africa, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the UN, and the majority of the Middle East.41

**Joint Training and Exercises**

Australia conducts a number of joint training and exercise activities with partner countries. Its most vigorous partnership in this area is with the United States; Australia participates in Rim of the Pacific, Pacific Partnership, Talisman Saber, Cooperative Spirit, Red Flag, and a number of other bilateral and multilateral exercises with the United States.42

Australia conducts a biennial air exercise, known as Pitch Black, with its regional partners. The 2010 Pitch Black exercise was held over northern Australia (out of Darwin and Tindal RAAF bases) July 16 through August 6, 2010, and involved the Australian Army and participants from the air forces of Singapore, New Zealand, and Thailand. The exercise focused on the tasking, planning, and execution of offensive counterair and offensive air support operations in a coalition context.43

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41 As Australia’s most important ally, the United States receives considerable attention in this area. RAND interview with Australian DoD officials, Canberra, July 2010.
43 Australian DoD, “Pitch Black 2010 Draws to a Close,” August 6, 2010d.
Australia also hosts the annual two-week Kakadu exercise off Darwin. Kakadu is led by the RAN and focuses on maritime cooperation in the areas of humanitarian assistance, security, and disaster relief. The participants can vary, but the recent 2010 exercise involved Australia, Japan, Thailand, Singapore, and New Zealand. In March 2011, the RAAF put theory into practice by providing airlift support to Japan after its massive earthquake and tsunami.

To enhance its defense relationship with Indonesia, Australia conducts regular bilateral exercises with that country as part of the Ausindo series. The exercises have involved a number of mainly air force activities, focusing on issues ranging from air combat to airlift in disaster response, and maritime surveillance from the air.

Advisors In Country and Mobile Training Teams (Defence Cooperation)

Australia provides expert personnel to capacity-building activities around the world. Some of these missions may be on the scale of a few people, while others number in the hundreds. The following is not an exhaustive catalog, but rather a representative sample of the activities and countries with which the ADF is involved in on-the-ground capacity building.

**Afghanistan.** Australia’s largest in-country training initiative at the moment is Afghanistan. The First Mentoring Task Force at Camp Holland, in Tarin Kowt, is engaged in training and mentoring the Afghan security forces, reconstruction, and security operations in Oruzgan Province. The task force includes five Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams structured to provide assistance in the development of the 4th Brigade of the Afghan National Army.

**East Timor.** Australia leads the International Stabilisation Force in East Timor, which includes about 400 members of the ADF. As the security situation in East Timor has gradually improved, ADF’s mission has shifted its focus to training and mentoring the indigenous Timorese military forces. The International Stabilisation Force is supporting DCP by providing Timorese personnel with training in basic military skills, communications, planning, and engineering and construction.

**Malaysia RMAF Butterworth.** Australia maintains a small detachment at RMAF Base Butterworth in Penang (Australia’s link to Butterworth has a long history, both before the transfer of Butterworth from the British Royal Air Force [RAF] to the Malaysian government in 1970 and since). The Australian personnel at Butterworth conduct some joint exercises and activities with the Malaysians, and support ADF personnel around Southeast Asia.

**Pacific Islands.** Australia has been involved in a number of Pacific Island States over the last decade (some for much longer), including Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Fiji, and Nauru. In 2006, about 50 members of the ADF deployed to Tonga to help restore order after a riot in the Tongan capital. Tonga is also part of DCP and the Pacific Patrol Boat Program. Australia has provided extensive support to Papua New Guinea in the areas of military and police reform and professionalization, as well and customs and border enforcement. Papua New Guinea is also a key member of the Pacific Patrol Boat Program.

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Australia also leads RAMSI, whose mission is to assist the Solomon Islands in restoring law and order, economic stability, and good governance. The military component of RAMSI includes troops from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga. The ADF currently contributes about 80 troops to this mission.

**Kenya.** As part of the Australian DoD’s increasing engagement with Africa, the ADF recently provided some modest training assistance in Kenya to the AU’s Eastern Africa Standby Brigade. This is one of five regional units being established as a peacekeeping capability for the AU.

**Non-ADF Advisors Abroad: Australian Federal Police.** The AFP has a number of significant capacity-building efforts abroad. These include around 15 police officers stationed in advisory positions in Papua New Guinea through the Police Partnership program; officers serving in Afghanistan as police mentors and in counternarcotics; officers assigned to the UN missions in Sudan and Cyprus; police advisors in Tonga, Nauru, and Vanuatu; and officers and initiatives in many more locations in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and globally.

**Military Sales and Training (Defence Cooperation)**

In general, Australia does not conduct significant sales or transfers of armaments and materiel abroad. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Australia’s sales of items costing more than US$500,000 in 2008 and 2009 were only to the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the UK.⁴⁸ Still, Australia does periodically donate equipment to partner countries, and some capacity-building efforts are focused on providing training on this equipment. This is, however, the exception rather than the rule.

One of the most notable transfers of equipment Australia has made is through the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, which was the original foundation of DCP and forms the basis of some ongoing cooperation with countries in the region. Twenty-two boats were eventually delivered to 12 countries (Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, Western Samoa, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu).⁴⁹

The Pacific Patrol Boat Program reached well beyond equipment transfer. Recipient nations also received training on tactics, maintenance, and management. Australia also assigns RAN officers and senior sailors as technical and maritime surveillance advisors to serve in each country operating Pacific patrol boats.⁵⁰ A recent life-extension program on the boats will ensure their continued operation until at least 2027.⁵¹

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⁵⁰ Nautilus Institute, 2009.

⁵¹ Nautilus Institute, 2009.
Conclusions

With a population of fewer than 23 million (about one-third the size of the UK),\textsuperscript{52} Australia is a small country that has sought to maximize its influence through defence engagement and defence cooperation, which leverage Australia’s superior military and security force training, technology, and experience. Some of these activities may involve just a few personnel, but according to officials, the country has found that these initiatives offer access, influence, and a means of shoring up stability in its region.

Australia continues to expand its activities in this area in keeping with its desired status as an active middle power that must build relationships not just in the region, but around the world. Moreover, as the DoD white paper explains, possible changes in the Asia-Pacific power balance during the coming decades imply that Australia must adapt its military forces and its relationships to a strategic context that may change in potentially unpredictable ways. Security cooperation is a key tool for accomplishing these and other important strategic objectives.

Australia has defined processes for selecting countries, specifying objectives, and planning security cooperation activities, and these processes are becoming increasingly linked to strategic guidance. To a larger degree than in the United States, these processes are centralized, specifically in the Strategy Executive in the DoD. The bulk of these activities’ funding (over 90 percent) is determined by this organization, which also owns the DIEP, the critical foundational guidance document. Thus, the organization that provides the guidance also provides the bulk of the funding, a critical distinction from U.S. business processes.

That said, there is more work to be done to better align the ADF’s activities with strategy and to more closely integrate civilian and military planning and budgeting. Enhanced joint planning with other agencies, such as the AFP, could also be beneficial. Finally, a formal lessons-learned process remains to be created.

USAF may benefit from collaborating with the RAAF to produce formal lessons-learned processes that link back to strategic objectives, as specified in the DIEP and the U.S. Guidance for Employment of the Force, respectively. Measuring outcomes of security cooperation activities is notoriously difficult, but Australian interlocutors may have considered innovative ways to capture results based on years of experience in their region. USAF may also find it advantageous to explore collaboration with Australia and its regional partners in maritime patrol and surveillance, an area in which Australia has substantial experience and which, in an increasingly crowded Pacific maritime environment, could become a significant issue.

Australian and United States military forces have a close and ever-deepening relationship. The United States and USAF are likely to benefit from developing a better understanding of this trusted ally’s approach to the planning and execution of defence engagement and cooperation activities. As security cooperation grows increasingly significant in U.S. strategy, Australian experience can bring a fresh perspective and opportunities for collaboration to an already vibrant alliance.

\textsuperscript{52} Australian Bureau of Statistics, website, 2010.
CHAPTER THREE

France’s Approach to Security Cooperation

Introduction

France has historically pursued an active policy of security and defence cooperation, focused on its former colonies and, more specifically, on Africa. Defense cooperation programs allow France to maintain strong links with countries in which it still has large numbers of expatriates and strong economic interests. The processes and resources underpinning security cooperation have undergone important changes in France over the past 15 years, even more since the accession of Nicolas Sarkozy to the French presidency in 2007. In an effort to make foreign policy more transparent, the president has undertaken to revise the defense agreements that had been binding France to several of its former African colonies since the 1960s. The 2008 white paper on defense and national security, which articulates the French national security strategy for the years to come,\(^1\) underscores the main mission of France’s security cooperation activities: supporting the military personnel of partner countries as they develop their capacity to respond to crises and taking part in peacekeeping missions led by regional or subregional organizations.\(^2\) The French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs [ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, MAEE] concurs that ensuring the stability of partner countries is crucial, as is expanding France’s influence worldwide.\(^3\)

This chapter examines the new principles guiding French security cooperation, and their implications for other security cooperation providers, such as the United States. It identifies the main actors of security cooperation and the processes through which programs are proposed, adopted, implemented, and assessed. The military divides security cooperation into two large categories—structural and operational cooperation—and this chapter examines the types of activities covered by each, with a special focus on flagship programs, such as the Region-Focused National Schools [Écoles nationales à vocation régionale (ENVR)] and the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP and its European Union [EU]–funded component EURORECAMP) projects.

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\(^1\) Commission du Livre blanc, 2008. The previous white paper on defense was published in 1994.


\(^3\) MAEE, “La Direction de la Coopération de Sécurité et de Défense,” briefing, April 8, 2009a.
Strategic Outlook

The French approach to security cooperation has undergone drastic changes over the past few years. Its revised guiding principles offer new opportunities for partnership with the United States. France’s future cooperation activities, however, will take place under tighter personnel and budgetary constraints, as the 2008 white paper announced major changes in defense spending allocation.

France’s View of Itself

Contrary to the United States, France’s national security strategy is not summarized in a public document. It can however be inferred from a number of sources, including a white paper on defense,4 and the president’s speeches, especially his annual speech to the ambassadors. Other speeches are of particular relevance, such as the president’s 2008 Cape Town speech on cooperation with African countries.5

The 2008 white paper is a particularly important document, as it states the priorities of France’s defense and security policy for the next 15 years. In the words of one of its authors,

For 2025, the White paper foresees a world still largely dominated by the US but where Asian powers will have grown in importance and where regional conflicts might occur without much warning and might be difficult to control.6

The paper underlines the depth of the changes that have occurred since the publication of the previous white paper in 1994,7 such as the effects of globalization and the higher vulnerability of France and Europe to terrorism, ballistic missiles developed by hostile nations, cyberattacks, health crises, and ecological disasters. For the first time, the white paper covers both internal and external threats: It focuses on national security rather than strictly on defense.8 This shift is evidenced by a change in titles: While the main title in 1994 was simply Defense, in 2008 it was Defense and National Security.

France’s national security strategy emphasizes five core functions; these are, in order of importance,

• knowledge and anticipation (with a focus on intelligence, satellite technology, and drones)
• prevention of crises, in particular along the “arc of crisis” from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and covering northern Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf
• renewed commitment to nuclear dissuasion
• protection of the French population and territory, by promoting surveillance and resilience and by improving reaction capabilities
• intervention (including a 30,000-strong projection force deployable in six months).9

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5 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.
9 These five principles replaced “deterrence, prevention, projection, and protection,” which had prevailed since 1996 (Tertrais, 2008, p. 2).
The white paper also announced that France would fully reintegrate NATO’s integrated military command, which it had left in 1966. A logical sequel to France’s increasing operational involvement with NATO since the mid-1990s, this reintegration suggested President Sarkozy’s implicit recognition that full participation in NATO could facilitate the development of an EU defense policy.\(^{10}\) The white paper emphasizes the complementarity between NATO and the EU as international security actors, and commits to promoting the EU as a major security actor through developing its intervention capabilities and the European defense industry.\(^{11}\)

The white paper announced a drastic cut in the number of armed forces personnel, from 320,000 to 266,000, and the closure of numerous military installations in France and abroad, from 300 to fewer than 100.\(^{12}\) Overall, France reoriented its military toward a smaller, but better-equipped, force.

A number of observers criticized this reallocation of resources (overall, the defense budget should remain at approximately 2 percent of France’s gross domestic product). A group of French generals denounced the white paper’s “incoherences, including its focus on space even though low-intensity conflicts require more capability on the ground, or on cutting African bases even though they represent a French comparative advantage on a continent that is likely to experience more crises in the years to come (crises that may require, in some instances, the evacuation of French nationals).\(^{13}\) President Sarkozy’s decision to reintegrate NATO’s integrated military command has raised some critics on both sides of the political spectrum, but this decision has generally been well accepted.\(^{14}\)

**Identifying Shortcomings in the French Approach to Security Cooperation**

The 2008 white paper identifies several shortcomings in France’s approach to security cooperation: Efforts are too dispersed and not adequately distributed; partnerships are often based on outdated defense agreements; and military and police security cooperation activities are insufficiently integrated.\(^{15}\)

The white paper’s conclusions were echoed and reinforced by President Sarkozy’s speech of February 28, 2008, in Cape Town, South Africa, which directly addressed these issues and initiated a reorientation of France’s security cooperation activities along several guiding principles:

- promoting transparency
- reassessing existing defense agreements
- improving the geographic distribution of French forces
- focusing on regions instead of countries


\(^{14}\) A survey published in March 2009 found that 58 percent of respondents were in favor of this reintegration, while 37 percent were against (IfoP/Paris Match survey cited in “58% des Français Favorables à un Retour dans l’Otan,” *L’Express*, March 10, 2009).

\(^{15}\) Commission du Livre blanc, 2008, p. 152.
• preferring multilateral over individual action
• integrating the internal and external dimensions of security.\textsuperscript{16}

Previous cooperation relationships tended to be opaque. In many instances, decisions on how defense agreements should be interpreted and implemented were left to the discretion of the president’s inner circle (and, more specifically, the Elysée Palace’s Bureau Afrique). President Sarkozy committed to making French defense agreements public and their list was published in the 2008 white paper. The 2009–2014 Military Planning Law [loi de programmation militaire] reaffirmed this commitment to transparency.\textsuperscript{17}

Another major change outlined in the 2008 white paper is the geographical shift of France’s defense and security engagement. The paper identifies four main areas of strategic interest: the arc of crisis, sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and Asia.\textsuperscript{18} President Sarkozy committed to a pragmatic approach based more on France’s strategic interests than on its historical legacy with former colonies, most of which are located in Francophone Africa. The focus on regions that do not belong to France’s traditional area of influence is not entirely new. In Uganda, for instance, French forces have trained more than 7,600 military personnel since 2006 in preparation for their deployment in Somalia with the AU Mission in Somalia.\textsuperscript{19} President Sarkozy’s inauguration of a new military base in the UAE, however, represents an interesting development, especially at a time when France is planning on closing its base in Senegal. The Abu Dhabi base is the first permanent French base in the region, and the first French base in a country that never was a French colony.\textsuperscript{20} The new base was inaugurated on May 26, 2009, and illustrates France’s focus on the entire arc of crisis,\textsuperscript{21} as well as the white paper’s statement that defense and security cooperation with the Middle East and countries bordering the Indian Ocean will gain “particular importance,” due to “their strategic interest and the perspectives that a [French] presence in these regions can open other major geographic areas in Asia.”\textsuperscript{22}

France has also increasingly focused on the regional, rather than national, level, especially in Africa, which remains France’s main area of activity for security cooperation. France supports the AU’s Africa Standby Force and its regional subforces.\textsuperscript{23} This emphasis on action at the regional level is not entirely new. An early example of France opting for a regional level of

\textsuperscript{17} French National Assembly, “La Déclaration de Guerre et les Interventions Armées à L’Étranger,” November 2009.
\textsuperscript{18} Commission du Livre blanc, 2008, pp. 43–49.
\textsuperscript{20} Major, 2008, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{21} Laurent Bastide, “La France Inaugure une Base Interarmées dans le Golfe Persique,” French MOD website, undated. This installation consists of an air base, a naval and logistical base, and an Army training facility. Their purpose is, according to its commander, to support French forces deployed over the Indian Ocean and to develop bilateral military cooperation (Eric Feferberg, “Sarkozy Inaugure la Nouvelle Base Militaire Française à Abu Dhabi,” \textit{L’Express}, May 26, 2009; Colonel Hervé Chere quoted in Feferberg, 2009).
\textsuperscript{22} Commission du Livre blanc, 2008, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{23} Focused discussion with French MOD official, Paris, April 28, 2010.
engagement is its support to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group mission to Guinea-Bissau in 1999.24

Cooperation activities have also evolved from mainly bilateral relationships (often based on personal relationships between political leaders) toward a multilateral approach. This approach not only allows France to intervene at a lesser cost, but also reduces the likelihood that its actions will be perceived as a resurgence of colonialism. France teamed up with South Africa, for instance, to reorganize the Central African Republic’s armed forces at the country’s request.25 Multilateral organizations, including the UN, EU, and AU, have also been called on to take part in some of France’s partnership building activities. The EU, in particular, is a partner of choice, because it provides France the ability to tap into a much larger pool of resources with a partner that largely shares its strategic, political, and economic interests.26 In Africa, for instance, France and the EU pursue the same objectives of ensuring the safety of their southern border and countering trafficking.27 This orientation has been particularly marked since the December 2007 EU Lisbon Summit, which saw the adoption of an Africa-EU strategic partnership. France has consistently supported EU missions abroad, especially in Africa, and has integrated Europeans among the French headquarters’ staff in such places as Dakar or Djibouti.28 In 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy declared that he wanted Europe to be “a major partner of Africa in terms of peace and security.”29

A last important change in the French approach is its integration of the military and police sides of cooperation. In the past, the French military and police often worked on parallel tracks when it came to building capacity in partner countries. Since 2009, the Directorate for Security and Defense Cooperation [Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense, DCSD] of MAEE, whose authority was previously limited to cooperation activities undertaken by the armed services (army, air force, navy, and the gendarmerie), now oversees the police and civil defense [sécurité civile] components as well.30 The effort to integrate defense and internal security issues in the DCSD reflects the evolution of France’s strategic priorities: Combating drug trafficking, terrorism, illegal migration, and financial crime is now considered as important as establishing lasting defense relations, if not more so. It is, however, too early to assess whether this integration of external and internal security issues, which reflects the white paper’s orientations, can be deemed a success.

29 Sarkozy, 2008.
30 General Emmanuel Beth, Director of DCSD, Interview, MAEE website, April 7, 2009a.
France as a Strategic Partner to the United States

France and the United States share a large number of objectives with regard to their security cooperation activities. Fragile and failed States are an important concern for both countries, and, as such, stability and peace operations figure prominently on their defense agendas. Both have made a priority of assisting African countries in building the capacity to prevent and manage crises at the continental level, through such programs as RECAMP, for France, or Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (and its predecessor, the Africa Crisis Response Initiative), for the United States. France is a key U.S. ally with a deep knowledge of countries where the United States historically had a reduced presence. Over the years, France has also developed an extensive network among the defense and security communities of these countries, many members of which were trained in France. In this context, future reductions in the personnel and budget devoted to security cooperation, will open an opportunity for the United States, as France evolves toward pooling more of its educational and training facilities with its allies, thereby developing more combined programs with them in an effort to cut costs and increase interoperability.31 Such cooperation could also open further opportunities for the United States to collaborate with the regional organizations of which France is a member, such as the EU. Cooperation between the United States and France in the field of security cooperation has already improved with the creation of U.S. Africa Command on the African continent, which enhances the U.S. ability to create a dialogue with the French Joint Staff (État-major des armées, EMA), which is in charge of the military side of French security cooperation.

Upcoming Developments in the French Air Force

Of all the services, France’s Air Force is expected to undergo the most drastic cuts in personnel. The white paper announced that it would reach a force of no more than 50,000 by 2014–2015, which represents a 25 percent loss.32 Nine air bases are due to close in 2011 or 2012. The remaining air force bases outside continental France are

- Al-Dhafra, Abu Dhabi, UAE
- Ambouli, Djibouti
- Cayenne, French Guyana
- Dakar, Senegal
- Libreville, Gabon
- N’djamena, Chad
- Noumea-Tontouta, New Caledonia.33

This list is not final. In February 2010, the Senegalese government announced that France would close its base in Dakar. The current French contingent of 1,200 will eventually be replaced with a residual force of 300.34 This decision is in line with the 2008 white paper state-

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31 The white paper calls for a significant reduction in manpower of the French Military, from 271,000 in 2008 to 225,000 in 2014–2015. It also focuses on increasing cooperation and pooling resources with European allies, but also emphasizes complementarity between the EU and NATO (Commission du Livre blanc, 2008, pp. 90–92, 101). The United States already contributes to some French-led initiatives, such as the Bamako Peacekeeping School in Mali.


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France has generally adopted a ground-centric approach for its security cooperation activities. This is largely because of its focus on African countries, where air infrastructures typically require significant upgrades.

France’s security cooperation activities have a sizable air component. France launched, for instance, an aviation-focused regional school in the framework of the RECAMP program: the Region-Oriented National Aeronautics Center [Pôle aéronautique national à vocation régionale] in Garoua, Cameroon. The white paper also emphasizes the importance of air and maritime monitoring of strategic areas, as part of the “knowledge and anticipation” function of its security forces.36 The ability to conduct such monitoring is one of the key reasons France opened an air base in Abu Dhabi in 2009. Additionally, France, as a producer of aircraft, is eager to establish relationships with potential consumers of equipment and training. This is another consideration that led to the opening of the UAE air base, where three Mirage 2000-5s are permanently posted.37 More generally, France emphasizes the concept of air diplomacy, which refers to the use of the air force as a tool of influence to serve France’s strategic interests. A French academic has defined air diplomacy as “the use of armed forces for foreign policy purposes outside of a war context.”38 Air diplomacy includes all security cooperation activities involving the air force, from personnel exchange to air shows, but also encompasses coercion measures that call on the air force to implement French foreign policy priorities more forcefully—albeit still in a context of peace.39

Organization

Three ministries share some degree of authority over French security cooperation activities: MAEE, the MOD, and the Ministry of Interior (see Figure 3.1).

Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs

At MAEE, security cooperation activities fall under DCSD, which was known until March 2009 as the Directorate for Military and Defense Cooperation. Its staff includes foreign service, military, and police personnel.

French security cooperation activities fall into two broad categories: structural and operational. These two categories encompass more or less the same types of activities, but their time horizons differ. Long-term projects, such as the building and running of a military school, are part of structural cooperation. Short- to medium-term projects, such as preparing a partner country’s battalion prior to deployment in a peacekeeping mission, are considered operational cooperation.

cooperation. This distinction is important, because structural and operational cooperation involve different actors and are organized along distinct bureaucratic processes. DCSD is in charge of French structural cooperation, while the ministries of Defense and Interior are in charge of operational cooperation. DCSD’s activities include

- education and training
- expertise missions for diverse French civil and military authorities
- consultancy and audit missions for partner countries that request it
- direct provision of aid or equipment to build capacity (e.g., human resources, budget management, logistics) and support reconstruction; such aid includes material as diverse as information systems, demining equipment, and law enforcement equipment.

Structural cooperation relies on coopérants, who are detached from their military service of origin to act as embedded trainers and advisors. Military coopérants are tasked with building the capacity of a host nation’s military units through training, advising, and joint operations. Coopérants can also come from the gendarmerie: In 2009, approximately 50 gendarmes

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40 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.


42 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010. There are also civil coopérants, who are detached from civilian administrations to perform cooperation activities. The faculty and management personnel of French schools abroad, for instance, are coopérants.
coopérants were assisting countries as diverse as Jordan, Colombia, Argentina, Cambodia, and Ukraine. The overwhelming majority, however, are deployed in Africa.43

**Ministry of Defense**

At the MOD, security cooperation activities fall under EMA’s International Relations Subdirectororate Sous-Chefferie Relations Internationales de l’Etat Major des Armées; the different services (army, air force, navy); and, to a lesser extent, the gendarmerie. The joint staff is in charge of military operational cooperation, which includes operational training and direct cooperation with partner countries’ interior security services.

Operational instructional detachments [détachements d’instruction opérationnelle, DIOs] and technical instructional detachments [détachements d’instruction technique, DITs] consist of teams that deploy to partner countries to provide assistance for periods ranging from a few weeks to a few months. In March 2010, for instance, a detachment of Special Forces from the Dakar (Senegal) air force base trained 36 Mauritanian military personnel in securing the country’s international airport.44 Some of these missions take place on a regular basis: In January and February 2010, a detachment from the Foreign Legion based in Djibouti comprising 35 officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) offered predeployment training to the Fifth Ugandan contingent before its deployment with the AU Mission in Somalia.45

EMA’s budget for operational cooperation is divided between the different joint commands [commandements interarmées, COMIAs]. COMIAs fall into two categories: sovereignty forces, based on French territory, and presence forces, based on foreign territory (see Table 3.1).46 Each COMIA engages in operational cooperation in its area of operation, where it deploys the DIO or DIT needed according to the cooperation plan it developed with the relevant defense attaches, and after EMA has validated that plan.47 COMIAs, as a general rule, execute in their areas of operation the policies EMA sets. EMA has the operational responsibility for all French forces deployed abroad.48

Reflecting France’s emphasis on regional organizations, the four COMIAs based in Africa have zones of operation that correspond broadly to the four main sub-Saharan regional organizations, with which they liaise regularly: ECOWAS for the French Forces in Cape Verde, Economic Community of Central Africa States for the French Forces in Gabon, Intergovernmental Authority of Development for the French Forces in Djibouti, and Southern African

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45 France had already trained the four previous AU Missions in Somalia Ugandan contingents, beginning in 2006 (Embassy of France in Uganda, 2010).
46 COMIAs do not include French military operations (such as Operation Licorne in Ivory Coast or Operation Épervier in Chad) or French forces operating under an international mandate (focused discussion with senior member of EMA, October 6, 2010).
47 Security cooperation is a COMIA’s main mission. COMIAs are also involved in preparing, conducting, and/or supporting French military operations (including the evacuation of French residents). They are also used as training platforms for the French units based in the region or traveling to the region (focused discussion with senior member of EMA, October 6, 2010).
48 Phone discussions with senior official of French MOD’s Directorate for Strategic Affairs [Délégation aux affaires stratégiques, DAS], July 6, 2010; phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.
Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries

The annual budget for operational cooperation in Africa only is approximately €4 million (US$5.2 million).50

The army, air force, and navy usually intervene directly in regions that are not adequately covered by a COMIA, or when no COMIA has the specific competence required. This is the case, for instance, for training associated with foreign military sales when the equipment sold is technologically advanced and the relevant COMIA does not have the relevant experts or technicians. Every year, each service lists all the requests it has received (through defense attachés) for training during a coordination meeting. EMA subsequently decides which projects the services should accept and pursue.51

The status of the gendarmerie in security cooperation activities is complex. Although gendarmes retain a military status, they have been placed since 2009 under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. Gendarmes can take part in DCSD-led technical cooperation activities, in which case they are paid by DCSD with funds from the Interior Ministry.52 Also, if they take part in operational cooperation, they fall under the responsibility of the MOD. In 2008 alone, 154 gendarmes deployed abroad for 82 short-term training missions.53 Gendarmes who are deployed for long-term missions (one year and longer) are part of the Foreign Operations Group [Groupement des opérations extérieures], which was created in 1998 to undertake foreign assignments, including auditing, reorganizing, and training local police forces. As of 2010, the group consisted of 26 officers and 36 NCOs selected because of their international professional experience and their language skills.54

Table 3.1
French Joint Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sovereignty Forces</th>
<th>Presence Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces in the south Indian Ocean area (FASZOI)</td>
<td>Reunion Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces in the West Indies (FAA)</td>
<td>Martinique and Guadeloupe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces in French Guiana (FAG)</td>
<td>French Guiana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces in New Caledonia (FANC)</td>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces in French Polynesia (FAPF)</td>
<td>French Polynesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: French MOD website.

a Starting in fall 2010.

Development Community (SADC) for the Armed Forces in the south Indian Ocean area.49

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49 Beth, 2009b.
50 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
51 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
52 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
Ministry of Interior

At the Interior Ministry, the International Police Technical Cooperation Service [Service de coopération technique internationale de police, SCTIP] has been in charge of operational cooperation for the police since 1961. It currently has a budget of €10 million. As of 2009, SCTIP was overseeing a network of 243 policemen and gendarmes in 100 countries worldwide. The personnel deployed are under the authority, in each country, of an internal security attaché [attaché de sécurité intérieure].

SCTIP is involved in three types of cooperation activities:

- **operational:** gather and analyze information that could be of interest to the French police and gendarmerie on such issues as terrorism and organized crime
- **technical:** provide all training activities and police equipment, and invite foreign police and gendarmerie (or similar corps) personnel to France
- **institutional:** provide expertise to the EU, and select the police and gendarmerie personnel who will deploy with the UN or the EU in peacekeeping missions.

As of mid-2010, however, SCTIP personnel were expected to be dispersed to other organizations as part of the general effort to integrate more closely military and police cooperation. Some of the organization’s assets will join DCSD, with others going to a new Directorate for International Cooperation [Direction de la coopération internationale] at the Ministry of Interior.

Coordination Between Ministries

At the interagency level, coordination on security cooperation issues takes place in a strategic orientation committee, which periodically gathers the EMA, DCSD, the MOD’s DAS, and a representative of the Ministry of Interior. The purpose of these meetings is to review ongoing and prospective projects, and to decide how to prioritize them. These committees meet every two years in theory, but as of mid-2010, the most recent one had taken place in 2007. They also meet too infrequently to provide anything more than very broad orientations.

Pilot committees with EMA and DCSD relevant members gather in Paris every six months for closer monitoring. These committees occasionally involve other actors, including the relevant bureaus of MAEE (such as the Africa bureau) or the Interior Ministry (if the gendarmerie or police are involved). These meetings ensure that the actions of all the actors are

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58 Focused discussions with senior French military official, Washington, D.C., August 19 and October 6, 2010.
59 The role of the DAS in these meetings is to provide strategic information that may have an impact on this prioritization process.
60 Phone discussion with senior DAS official, July 6, 2010.
61 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
consistent, at both the regional and the country level. High-level meetings gather the various ministers (Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior) or their representatives once a year.

At the country level, coordination among the different agencies and ministries is facilitated by the fact that defense attachés are the point persons for both structural and operational cooperation, while internal security attachés oversee police cooperation. Internal security attachés are the equivalent of defense attachés for police and, when relevant, gendarmerie issues. They have diplomatic status and advise the French ambassador on internal security issues. They represent the main point of contact for France with the local police and gendarmerie forces.

The security cooperation process benefits from a high level of interagency communication. The division in bureaus at the EMA, MAEE, and the DAS is roughly similar, making it clear for each person who is his or her counterpart in other agencies. These bureaus are small relative to, for instance, the U.S. system, which makes this communication even easier. Ultimately, however, even with an organizational structure geared toward efficient interagency communication, the quality of coordination depends on the individuals in charge and their willingness to work well with their counterparts.

**Partner Selection: Strategy and Process Considerations**

**General Approach**

In his Cape Town speech of December 2008, President Sarkozy redefined France’s security cooperation principles and emphasized the importance of ownership by partner countries. Referring to France’s activities in Africa, he proposed “that the French military presence be primarily used to support Africans in building a collective security architecture in their own way.” A related key concept of France’s security cooperation is partnership. DCSD deems it “essential,” and intends it to “develop projects defined in a dialogue with each recipient country on the basis of a partnership, in order to reach a goal that was agreed upon jointly . . . .” At the root of this notion of partnership is the idea that the relationship between France and the countries it engages should be based on equality. Such an approach is particularly crucial—and challenging—in countries where France used to be the colonial power.

As a result, France approaches security cooperation both from the bottom up and from the top down. It is a bottom-up approach to the extent that it responds to demands from potential or existing partner countries. Countries seeking to cooperate with France make requests

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62 Phone discussion with senior DAS official, July 6, 2010.
63 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
64 French Ministry of the Interior, 2009. As of 2008, the gendarmerie was filling 16 internal security attaché positions and 11 deputy internal defense attaché positions (Vanderheyden, 2009, p. 9).
65 Phone discussion with senior DAS official, July 6, 2010, and focused discussion with senior member of EMA, October 6, 2010.
66 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, October 8, 2010.
67 Sarkozy, 2008.
68 MAEE, 2009b.
69 MAEE, 2009b.
to the French ambassador present on their territory; this political channel is often complemented with a military one, with the chief of staff of the partner country’s army approaching the French defense attaché. In Paris, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and EMA are the ending points of these two channels. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs decides whether the requested assistance is politically desirable, while EMA decides whether it is militarily possible. Both conditions need to be fulfilled for a security assistance program to be accepted.\(^\text{71}\) Hence, cooperation still flows from the top down to some degree as well, in the sense that France will mostly respond to queries that correspond to its own priorities. Overall, the choice of partner countries takes place where French strategic interests and requests for assistance overlap.\(^\text{72}\)

Strategic decisions regarding which countries correspond to France’s strategic interests are set by a defense council chaired by the president and comprising the relevant ministries. Such councils are generally called when policy needs to be readjusted, with the last one on security cooperation taking place in 2005.

France distinguishes between three levels of partners corresponding to different building partnerships (BP) activities\(^\text{73}\):

- **Level-one partners** are those with which France wants to increase interoperability; activities with such partners tend to focus on exercises and simulation training. These currently include the UK, the United States, Germany, The Netherlands, and Belgium.
- **Level-two partners** are those with which France aims to promote the development of the European defense industry and are thus generally confined to EU members.
- **Level-three partners** are those that require more significant levels of assistance and with which France focuses on building capabilities. These currently include Singapore and Indonesia in Asia; Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf; and francophone Africa.

For level-three partners, France prioritizes its engagement by assisting the countries with which it has defense agreements and countries that are recovering from crises, are facing terrorist threats, want to participate in peacekeeping operations, or are key to maritime security.\(^\text{74}\)

The defense white paper identifies France’s geographic areas of priority for the succeeding 15 years. For level-three partners, Africa comes first, with issues including the risk of conflict, growing terrorism threats in the Sahel, risk of states failing, increased trafficking of various “goods” (drugs, migrants) bound for Europe, and the strategic importance of natural resources.\(^\text{75}\) In Africa, France aims to protect its national interests, which include protecting trade and the many French nationals living on the continent. As of 2010, 80 percent of DCSD’s budget was devoted to cooperation projects in Africa.\(^\text{76}\) The Middle East and the Indian Ocean come next because of their strategic value and position as bridges to other areas

\(^{71}\) Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.

\(^{72}\) Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.


\(^{76}\) Focused discussion with a DCSD official, Paris, April 29, 2010.
in Asia. French cooperation activities are more limited in the rest of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.77

**Resourcing**

Resourcing modalities differ sharply according to whether programs are part of operational or structural cooperation. Operational cooperation projects are planned on an annual basis, while structural cooperation projects are set up on a five-year basis. Both types of cooperation projects are mainly funded by France, but an effort is made to have the partner country fund part of the project to give it some degree of ownership.78

With regard to operational cooperation, COMIA commanders draft a regional cooperation plan every year underlining the security cooperation needs for their areas of operation. The plans are based on the input received from defense attachés after they consulted their local partners. COMIAs make a first selection among the requests from the defense attachés before sending the resulting regional cooperation plans to EMA in Paris. EMA subsequently accepts the plans or requests amendments.79 COMIAs are in charge of the implementation of these plans. EMA makes decisions in the event of contingencies.80

The budget for structural cooperation activities comes from DCSD. DCSD has an annual budget of €80 million to 90 million, approximately 50 percent of which goes to paying the salaries of coopérants and military advisors, with the remainder funding equipment and infrastructures.81 Funds for gendarmes coopérants are given to the DCSD annually by the Interior Ministry.82

Every year, defense attachés propose a number of structural cooperation projects to DCSD. Requests may also come directly from the partner country’s officials during high-level meetings with their French counterparts. Each partner country hosts approximately three to five structural cooperation projects. These projects are undertaken on a parity basis, meaning that the project director, who is a French coopérant (under the authority of the defense attaché), works with a local partner who has an equally important position in the project. This creates a sense of ownership for the country involved.83

Each country has an annual budget for structural cooperation. As of 2010, the two largest country budgets went to Cameroon and Senegal, which are key French partners in sub-Saharan Africa. Country budgets are reassessed every year. Defense attachés submit budgeting proposals, which are examined by DCSD. If DCSD’s available funds are not sufficient to cover all the defense attachés’ requests, the directorate either cuts each request by a similar percentage or grants some requests while fulfilling only part of others.84

78 Phone discussion with a French MOD official, July 6, 2010. France does not, however, make burden-sharing a condition to its cooperation projects; some countries contribute nothing, while others contribute the largest share of the project’s budget (focused discussion with senior French military official, Washington, D.C., August 19, 2010).
79 Phone discussion with French MOD official, July 6, 2010.
80 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.
82 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
83 Phone discussion with French MOD official, July 6, 2010.
84 Phone discussion with French MOD official, July 6, 2010.
Agreements for Partnering

France has different types of agreements that cover a wide range of modalities for cooperation. As of January 2008, France held defense and cooperation agreements with 11 countries (see Table 3.2). It is currently revising the defense agreements signed in the 1960s. These agreements stated that France should intervene militarily if the partner country was invaded—a commitment France does not wish to pursue.85

France has different types of cooperative agreements. Cooperation agreements are all-encompassing, each covering a specific area, such as security, and are permanent unless explicitly revoked. Limited cooperation agreements are limited in time or in the activities they cover. Both types of agreements can be signed by the president, a minister, or an ambassador. Technical arrangements are specific agreements between two administrations to conduct a cooperation activity; they can be signed by a general officer (for instance, commanders of French forces deployed abroad).86 In Africa, for instance, France has cooperation agreements with Mali, Guinea, Burkina-Faso, Niger, Benin, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Democratic Republic

Table 3.2
France’s Bilateral Defense Agreements as of January 1, 2008, and Their Status as of July 1, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Country</th>
<th>Signature Date</th>
<th>Type of Bilateral Agreement</th>
<th>Status as of July 1, 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Defense agreement</td>
<td>New agreement has been signed but not yet ratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Defense agreement</td>
<td>New agreement has been signed but not yet ratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comores</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Defense cooperation agreement</td>
<td>Ongoing renegotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Defense agreement</td>
<td>Renegotiation not yet initiated due to unstable political situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Agreement relative to the stationing of French forces in Djibouti and military cooperation</td>
<td>Ongoing renegotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Agreement relative to airspace monitoring</td>
<td>Not under consideration for revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Defense cooperation agreement</td>
<td>Not under consideration for revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Defense agreement</td>
<td>New agreement has been signed but not yet ratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Defense cooperation agreement</td>
<td>Not under consideration for revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Defense cooperation agreement</td>
<td>Not under consideration for revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Technical agreement relative to defence cooperation’s implementation</td>
<td>Not under consideration for revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Defense cooperation agreement</td>
<td>Ongoing renegotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Defense agreement</td>
<td>New agreement has been signed but not yet ratified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


86 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, South Africa, and Madagascar; limited cooperation agreements with Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Seychelles, and Mauritius; and technical arrangements with Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Sao Tome.87

Assessments and Lessons Learned
Assessments are carried out regularly and involve all participants in the program being evaluated. Lessons learned are rarely formalized, but are typically passed from coopérant to coopérant as postings change.

Operational cooperation activities are assessed at several levels. At the force level, DIOs gather feedback from trainees at the end of their training program. There is, however, no quantitative assessment. This is because training output is particularly difficult to measure in countries where inadequate personnel management makes it impossible to track trainees over time to assess whether their performance has improved. The head of the DIO also sends a report to the COMIA on the activity his team performed. He or she mentions, in particular, any shortcoming he or she may have come across, such as insufficient or inappropriate trainee skills or language issues.

At the embassy level, the defense attaché provides a second assessment channel by meeting with the head of DIO at the beginning and the end of the training. If serious difficulties arose during the training and can be imputed to the host country, the defense attaché can engage the partner country’s military chiefs directly or indirectly to attempt to resolve the issues.88

Assessment processes are different for structural cooperation. Pilot committees in the field assess structural cooperation projects every six months. These committees include the director of the ongoing project, the defense attaché, and the military officials involved. They assess progress, delays, and the reasons for such delays. After five years, projects are either ended or renewed for another five years.89

Coopérants can do more than one mission. While they can volunteer for the mission of their choice, they must also be selected for it. If they have shown competence in a certain domain—for instance, managing educational institutions—they are likely to be asked to perform a similar duty in another country.90 Because general lessons learned are also not formalized, coopérants must rely mainly on their own experience.

Decisions to suspend or terminate cooperation with a given country are made collegially by all ministries and agencies involved, including the presidency (through the president’s diplomatic advisor). In the case of a political crisis, EMA’s role is to identify which activities can be stopped relatively easily, and which are of the highest priority for France. The French Agency for Development performs a similar task by identifying which activities could harm the population if they were stopped. The president himself would be involved in such decisions only if they related to a major crisis or to an important French ally, in which case the issue would be discussed before a defense council.91

88 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
89 Phone discussion with French MOD official, July 6, 2010.
90 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
91 Phone discussions with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010 and October 8, 2010.
Security Cooperation Activities

France conducts a wide range of security cooperation activities. They are very similar to the U.S. activities in this domain and count some additional ones. For instance, French military personnel can be detached to serve temporarily in partner countries’ armies, under that country’s army uniform, in the framework of structural cooperation projects, as just discussed. France particularly emphasizes PME and training of foreign forces. It has explored, through the RECAMP program and ENVR, new modalities for providing this education and training in more multilateral and cost-effective ways. France also has a dense network of in-country advisors who are the backbone of its cooperation activities.

Professional Military Education

Bringing foreign students to French military schools has long been important for partnership building. Educational exchange offers opportunities to develop lasting relationships with promising officers who might later rise to prominent positions in their home countries. All French military schools of sufficient size, both officer and technical, welcome foreign students and trainees. In the technical category, for instance, the Army’s Logistics School had hosted nine foreign students as of 2007. In the naval domain, France trains approximately 20 engineering students from Saudi Arabia a year. France has competitors for PME among its allies (including the United States, the UK, Germany) and emergent countries (China, India, Pakistan), but remains a destination of choice for francophone countries because of the common language and the training that France provided in the past. Countries tend to keep the same partner over time to train their military elites to avoid creating a “patchwork” army, in which officers have different training backgrounds.

Educational opportunities in French schools are distributed in a bottom-up manner: Each partner country identifies its needs and makes requests. DCSD examines the requests from all countries and bases decisions on the annual budget for this purpose and on the number of slots that each school’s budget can cover. DCSD then informs the partner countries, through the defense attachés, of the number of slots it can give each country for each school.

In general, French officer schools open their doors to foreign students. For the Army, the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr hosted 77 foreign students in 2009, including 53 from sub-Saharan Africa. The French Naval School in Brest has a special course for non-francophone foreign officer students. The French Air School hosts foreign students (a Tunisian and a German cadet graduated in 2009) and has cadet exchange programs with the U.S., Canadian, German, and Spanish air force academies. It also has a special course for students from francophone Africa. This special course’s duration (three years) and academic content are almost exactly the same as for regular air school cadets. Each year, CSEA hosts approximately

92 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
95 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, October 8, 2010.
15 students who have been recommended by the governments of their home countries and have successfully completed the entrance exam for the course. The National Gendarmerie Officer School hosts foreign students coming from their home countries’ army, police force, or gendarmerie. Finally, at the joint level, the 2009–2010 graduation class of the French EMA College [Collège Interarmées de Défense] in Paris included 110 international trainees out of a total of 355. These trainees belonged to 78 different countries from every region of the world, with the largest contingents coming from the EU (29 trainees), sub-Saharan Africa (21 trainees), Asia (18 trainees), and the Middle East (14 trainees). Over the past two decades, demand for such educational opportunities has increased, while the supply has decreased because of France’s shrinking defense budget. Consequently, France has attempted to promote education in student’s and trainees’ home countries rather than in France. France therefore supports a number of individual foreign schools, such as the Officer Basic Training School for the Cambodian Army, the Officer and NCO Basic Training School for the Cambodian Gendarmerie force, and the Baltic Defence College in Estonia.

The French presidency of the EU in the second half of 2008 also promoted the development of a military education exchange program for EU cadets, with the purpose of increasing the ability of European armies to work together. This project was modeled after the successful European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS) program and was in its starting phase as of 2010.

Region-Focused National Schools

France began developing the ENVR concept in 1997. This concept involves creating training centers in partner countries for students and trainees who come from the surrounding region. The purpose of ENVR is to provide the host nation and its neighbors with high-quality military and police academies and specialty schools offering technical skills that are in high demand in the context of peacekeeping operations. As of 2010, there were a total of 17 ENVR in 11 countries, with more planned for the near future (see Table 3.3). One school for gendarmerie officers opened in Eastern Europe (Romania) in 2002, but all 16 other schools are located in sub-Saharan Africa.

ENVR are part of a strategy of regional integration. For instance, the Gendarmerie School at Rosu in Romania teaches an International Superior Course, which, between 2003 and 2008, hosted policemen, gendarmes, and carabinieri from Albania, Croatia, France, Georgia, Italy, Macedonia, Moldavia, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine. As a result of this regional approach, teaching in these schools tends to be multilingual.

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99 Excluding the Middle East.
DCSD and the host country both contribute to building the school, and DCSD sends coopérants, who will teach.\footnote{MAEE, 2010.} France has been trying to make these schools multinational by getting other countries to take part in their management. Le Centre de perfectionnement aux actions post-conflictuelles de déminage et de dépollution, the humanitarian demining school, for instance, has instructors from Europe, Canada, Brazil, Ukraine, and Japan.\footnote{Beth, 2009b.} The Bamako

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Region-Focused National Schools as of January 1, 2010}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Region & School Name & Specialty & Location \\
\hline
ECOWAS & Centre de perfectionnement aux actions post-conflictuelles de déminage et de dépollution, CPADD & Demining & Ouidah, Benin \\
& Centre de perfectionnement de la police judiciaire, CPPJ & Judiciary police & Porto-Novo, Benin \\
& École d'application de l'infanterie, EAI & Infantry & Thiès, Senegal \\
& École militaire d'administration, EMA & Administration & Koulikoro, Mali \\
& École d'État-major, EEM & Staff college & Koulikoro, Mali \\
& École de maintien de la paix, EMP & Peacekeeping & Bamako, Mali \\
& École militaire technique, EMTO & Technical military academy & Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso \\
& Cours d'application des officiers de Gendarmerie, CAOG & Gendarmerie officer school & Ouakam, Senegal \\
& École des personnels paramédicaux des armées, EPPAN & Health & Niamey, Niger \\
& École du service de santé des armées, ESSAL & Health & Lomé, Togo \\
& Centre d'instruction maritime, CIM & Maritime security & Bata, Equatorial Guinea \\
\hline
ECCAS & Cours supérieur interarmées de défense, CSID & Joint Defense Staff College & Yaoundé, Cameroon \\
& Centre de perfectionnement aux techniques de maintien de l'ordre, CPTMO & Law and order & Awaé, Cameroon \\
& Pôle aéronautique national à vocation régionale, PANVR & Aeronautics & Garoua, Cameroon \\
& École d'application du service de santé militaire, EAS & Health & Melen, Gabon \\
& École d'État-Major, EEM & Staff college & Libreville, Gabon \\
& École de génie-travaux, EGT & Engineering & Brazzaville, Congo \\
& École internationale des forces de sécurité, EIFORCES & International school for security forces & Awaé, Cameroun \\
\hline
Eastern Europe & École d'application pour les officiers de la Gendarmerie, EAOOG & Gendarmerie officer school & Rosu, Romania \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
Peacekeeping Academy counts nine countries (in addition to France and Mali) and one organization on its board of directors.108

The only aviation-focused ENVR is the Regional-Focused Aeronautical National Center in Cameroon, which has been operational since 2001. The main purpose of this training center is to select future military pilots from Africa to take the entrance exam for the French flight school (CSEA). In addition to this six-month course, other (shorter) training modules include:

- a beginner flying course for students who were not able to enter the CSEA
- an instructor course for confirmed pilots
- two courses on aerial reconnaissance and navigation
- a three-week course for light aircraft technicians.109

As with other ENVR, this school is a joint project (between France and Cameroon) and aims at serving the needs of the broader region. The school’s director is from Cameroon, while the director of studies is French. Between 2001 and 2008, the school trained 335 students from 16 different African countries.110 It still trains 40 to 50 students (pilots and mechanics) a year following a “train the trainer” model.111 Students come mainly—but not exclusively—from the ECOWAS region.112 The air base at Garoua, Cameroon, was originally chosen because of its existing airport facilities; its meteorological conditions, which are similar to those of many Africa countries; and the fact that there were already French coopérants on this base.113

More ENVR will open in the years to come to cover additional fields of expertise and to respond to increasing requests for training. An international school for security forces is planned to open in 2011.114 A Maritime Security Training Center is under construction in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.115 This center will train maritime specialists in the Gulf of Guinea.116

Increasingly, France is trying to involve other partners in ENVR projects to reduce the cost of its own participation. As a result, the skills taught in ENVR have evolved from the typically military (e.g., aviation mechanics in Garoua) to more human-security themes (peacekeeping, humanitarian demining) that are more likely to attract funding from the EU and other donors.117

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108 These are Argentina, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, the United States, and ECOWAS. Beth, 2009b.


110 These countries are Benin (16 students), Burkina Faso (7), Burundi (1), Cameroon (128), Central African Republic (4), Republic of the Congo (10), Ivory Coast (6), Gabon (15), Mauritius (1), Madagascar (14), Mali (39), Niger (28), Democratic Republic of the Congo (9), Senegal (11), Chad (25), and Togo (21) (MAEE, 2008a, p. 24).


113 MAEE, 2008a.


117 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, October 8, 2010.
Staff Talks, Visits, Seminars, Workshops, and Conferences

The Institute of Higher National Defense Studies (IHEDN) and the Center of Higher Armament Studies organize seminars with various formats (from year-long part-time training programs to one-week intensive courses) on defense and armament issues. IHEDN’s one-week international sessions, in particular, aim to promote the exchange of ideas between military and civilian officials, members of the business community, and prominent civil society actors. IHEDN Forum on the African Continent gathers about 60 participants every year from Africa, the Indian Ocean region, Europe, the United States, Canada, and Japan; it also involves officials from the EU, the AU, and African regional organizations. Other, smaller international sessions involve 30 to 40 participants each year from the Euro-Mediterranean region, Asia, and Latin America.

French military officials also take part in regional forums organized by France’s partner countries. For instance, ECOWAS regularly invites the commander of the French forces based in Dakar to attend its high-level forums.

Training and Exercises

France conducts numerous training activities with its partners, under the category of either structural or operational cooperation. French forces based abroad routinely engage in partner country training. The French forces in Djibouti, for instance, provided logistical support to exercise Amani Carana, carried out by the Eastern Brigade of the Africa Standby Force in November and December 2009 with 1,600 troops from Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Since 2009, the French forces in Djibouti have also participated in the EU’s training mission for Somali security forces in Uganda. Increasingly, however, training in Africa is undertaken by regional organizations, with France playing only a supporting role—an evolution that France has been calling for over the past decade.

France conducts regular bilateral training exercises with partner air forces. In 2006, it was involved in the Air Warfare Center Exercise on the Al Dhafra air base and trained UAE squadrons to undertake complex air defense missions and improve interoperability. In October 2009, it conducted the Green Shield exercise with the Royal Saudi Air Forces. France

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118 L’Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale and Le Centre des Hautes Études de l’Armement are located in Paris. Since January 2010, the institute and center have merged into a single administrative entity. The new entity has also gotten closer to the Higher Security and Justice Studies Institute [Institut National des Hautes Études de la Sécurité et de la Justice], which organizes seminars that are also open to foreigners.


123 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.


125 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, October 8, 2010.

126 Moroney, Cragin, et al., 2009, p. 82.

also conducts multilateral exercises, such as Salitre II in October 2009 with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States, and the U.S.-led Operation Brimstone in July 2008.\footnote{“France—Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, November 23, 2009.}

Other French Air Force initiatives include the Franco-German school for helicopter pilots (École franco-allemande “TIGRE”), which trains French and German crews on the “TIGRE” armament system.\footnote{French MOD, “École Franco-Allemande TIGRE: Mission Générale,” undated.} The school was created in 2003 and plans to eventually train up to 70 trainees from each nation a year. It will likely extend training to additional countries besides France and Germany.\footnote{French MOD, “École Franco-Allemande TIGRE: Personnel,” website, undated.} An advanced European jet pilot training program, which could possibly enroll non-European trainees in the future, was still in development as of mid-2010.\footnote{European Defence Agency, “Advanced European Jet Pilot Training System,” May 3, 2007.}

In-Country Advisors

Beyond coopérants and DIOs, other actors performing in-country advising and training are liaison officers, military advisors, and police technical assistants.

France has different types of liaison officers. Some are detached to regional organizations, while others work on cross-agency themes, such as counternarcotics.\footnote{Général Maurice Vanderheyden, “L’Engagement International de la Gendarmerie,” Frères d’Armes, No. 261, p. 9.} In some instances, liaison officers fulfill the role of the defense attaché in countries where there are none.\footnote{Even in this function, liaison officers are still considered coopérants and, accordingly, do not have diplomatic status.} For instance, the defense liaison officer in Ghana is under the authority of the French defense attaché based in Togo, but is in charge of military cooperation between France and Ghana. He also manages the French language program for the Ghanaian military.\footnote{French Embassy in Ghana website, “Attaché de Liaison Défense,” undated.}

Military advisors, like liaison officers, are part of structural cooperation. They are detached from their military units to serve as advisors in a partner country’s army, usually under that army’s uniform. They provide high-level advice to military officials including EMA chiefs. They can also provide strategic advice at the ministerial level, or to a regional organization.\footnote{Focused discussion with senior French military official, Washington, D.C., August 19, 2010.} Military advisors generally adopt the uniform of the country they are working with to show their integration to their temporary adopted army. It is also a way to distinguish them from other French personnel (those belonging to DIO or DIT, or to the relevant COMIA). Military advisors are required to follow the regulations of the army they work with and the orders of its hierarchy. They remain, however, under the authority of the cooperation mission chief (usually the defense attaché) for issues related to discipline, daily life, and salary. Cooperation agreements regulate the potential areas of conflict that may arise between the local army’s rules and the advisor’s security cooperation mission.\footnote{Focused discussion with senior member of EMA, October 6, 2010.}

Police technical assistants, like gendarmes coopérants, work under the authority of the internal security attaché. They advise the police forces of the partner country on how best to organize and manage their force, with a major focus on respecting the rule of law.
Military Sales

France is a major exporter of military equipment. In 2009, it was the second largest European arms exporter after the UK, with €8.13 billion worth of military equipment sold abroad.137 From 2003 to 2007, France was the fourth largest defense exporter globally, behind Russia, the UK, and the United States.138 France’s General Delegation for Ordnance interfaces between, on one side, French and foreign services willing to purchase ordnance and, on the other, French public and private armament producing companies.139

Some of these export contracts include training. Starting in 2006, for instance, France trained pilots and mechanics from the Brazilian Air Force on Mirage 2000s after Brazil purchased 12 French aircraft.140 Such training can be done in France, with French schools hosting foreign engineers, technicians, and pilots. Training can also take place in the partner country. If the skills required are relatively simple, the training is usually subcontracted to private defense companies. If the requirements are more complex, or if the training takes place in a politically sensitive partner country, a state entity—such as Défense Conseil International, which is part of the General Delegation for Ordnance and routinely provides foreign military sales–associated training—is more likely to be in charge.141 Since 2009, for instance, Défense Conseil International has been training Libyan pilots and technicians for Mirage F1 planes in both France and Libya. That same year, it also trained helicopter pilots from Malaysia.142 The training can also be done by the relevant French services, in which case it falls under the operational or institutional cooperation activities.143

Integrating the Different Elements of Security Cooperation: The RECAMP and EURORECAM Programs

France launched the RECAMP concept in 1997, as a result of a joint process from the MOD and MAEE. Its purpose is to build African capacity to respond to crises on the continent. The RECAMP program incorporates many of France’s security cooperation activities, such as the ENVR or the sending of advisors. RECAMP activities include

- training officers and NCOs, especially in technical areas, in the ENVR built for this purpose in Africa
- training units and joint staffs
- providing logistical support, transportation, and equipment (including individual gear, vehicles, communication material, strategic transport, and medical supplies) to African

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139Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.
140Moroney, Cragin, et al., 2009, 82.
141Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010. DCI has four operational branches, corresponding to the ground forces (including the gendarmerie), the navy, the air force, and arms procurement.
143Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.
armies for deployment in peacekeeping missions; RECAMP has three depots (in Senegal, Gabon, and Djibouti) to store this equipment.144

Both DCSD and the EMA are involved in leading and funding RECAMP. RECAMP activities cover three domains of support: individual education, collective training, and operational support, which it combines with three levels of action (leadership, operational, and tactical) (see Figure 3.2).

RECAMP also includes exercises, which are organized in a series of two-year cycles. Each cycle comprises three phases: a political-military seminar on a crisis situation, a staff exercise simulating decisionmaking processes and responses to the crisis defined in Phase 1, and a large-scale field exercise designed to implement and test the decisions made during Phase 2.145 RECAMP works in coordination with the AU and focuses on subregions: ECOWAS for RECAMP I (1996–1998) and RECAMP IV (2003–2005); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) for RECAMP II (1998–2000) and RECAMP V (2005–2007); and SADC for RECAMP III (2000–2002).146

Over the past few years, France has attempted to reduce its unilateral military commitment in Africa and to increase the involvement of the EU and, other partners, in the evolution of the RECAMP program. Since 2008, the EU funds and manages the training at the strategic level of the AU crisis management cell in Addis Ababa under the name Amani Africa (EURORECAMP),147 while France remains in charge of operational and tactical training under the original RECAMP name (see Figure 3.2). Amani Africa’s role is to assist the AU in setting up its specific contribution to the building of the African Standby Force, which will engage in peacekeeping all over the continent. Amani Africa encompasses police and civilian

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146UN, undated.
147“Amani Africa” means “Peace in Africa” in Swahili.
capabilities in the field of crisis management. A major objective of the recent cycle has been to set up a crisis management cell within the AU’s Peace and Security Council.

Like RECAM, Amani Africa is designed as a training cycle ended in 2010 with a large-scale map exercise consisting in the deployment, within 30 days, of an African force under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. An international project team led by France and an African team under AU’s authority are tasked with jointly implementing the training cycle.

The future of this project is to be defined jointly by the EU and the AU. Further discussions will be needed to decide whether there will be another cycle after Amani Africa and how this program should evolve. Over the past decade, African regional organizations have developed their own large-scale multinational exercises, making RECAM training cycles less relevant. It is likely that, in the future, RECAM will focus more on its individual education and operational support components, leaving collective training to regional organizations.

Conclusions

Over the past 15 years, France has gradually reoriented its security cooperation activities in directions that make it more likely to cooperate with its Western partners, including the United States. France’s reintegration of NATO’s integrated command also represents a strong signal that it is eager to restore a stronger relationship with the United States. In the field of security cooperation, France is gradually deemphasizing its historical legacy and bilateral relationships with its former colonies to focus on the areas that are most relevant to its strategic interests—even though Africa still remains, by far, the main focus of French security cooperation activities. These interests are, to a large extent, similar to those of the United States and include preventing crises; combating terrorism, piracy, and trafficking (of drugs, migrants, or weapons); promoting democracy and the rule of law; and building states’ capacity to prevent and manage crises. Additionally, France’s foray into countries beyond its historical sphere of influence makes overlaps and redundancies between its actions and those of other countries more likely, suggesting that coordination on security cooperation activities is desirable.

Avenues for such cooperation are numerous. ENVR schools represent a major one, as they combine regional outreach with a multinational, and often multilingual, teaching and managerial staff. The United States could contribute instructors and equipment to these schools, which focus on building the capacity of local military and law enforcement forces (whether at the officer, NCO, or technician level) to prevent and manage crises on the continent. The aviation ENVR in Cameroon is a first step toward making security cooperation in Africa less ground-centric, and has been welcome in a region where drug trafficking, especially by air, is an increasing threat. For France, such coordination is very much needed if it wants to sustain its flagship cooperation activities in spite of the upcoming downsizing of its defense

149 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 19, 2010.
150 EURORECAMP, 2008.
151 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, October 8, 2010.
installations and personnel. With smaller cooperation budgets and fewer personnel, France will increasingly need to pool resources and engage in multilateral, rather than bilateral, initiatives. Its engagement of the EU and other countries in the RECAMP project suggests that this process is already largely under way.

In addition to opportunities for resource sharing and collaboration, the French model offers several lessons of interest with regard to the actors and processes involved in security cooperation. First, the work done by coopérants and the length of their stay allow them to develop personal relationships with the militaries of partner countries and to develop networks that facilitate future operations between France and the host nations. Staying three years in a country also gives individuals a chance to better know their operational environments and be more culturally sensitive—an asset they will carry to their next assignments.153 Similarly, a general principle for French forces based abroad is to interact as much as possible with the local population.

Second, French security cooperation activities benefit from a well-coordinated inter-agency process. EMA’s different bureaus are in constant communication with their counterparts at MAEE.154 The MOD’s DAS, which makes strategic and political assessments of the countries where France intervenes, is part of the process as well.155 Such a structure is arguably easier to put into place when the agencies themselves are small—fewer than ten persons work at the DCSD’s Africa Bureau, and a similar number at the Africa Bureau of the DAS.156 Besides, most military decisions are made by a small group of officers who work as advisors in the different agencies, often after having served together. On Africa, for instance, almost 75 percent of the senior military advisors are from the Troupes de marine (an arm of the army dedicated to serving overseas). This results in easier communication and coordination, with the associated risk that this common cultural background may reduce the occurrence of original analysis or dissenting opinions.157

Third, the military and police components of cooperation are better integrated than before. DCSD’s recent name change reflects this evolution. At the embassy level, defense and internal security attachés work together to cover the whole spectrum of security issues.

Fourth, the ENVR concept gives a large degree of ownership to the host country, giving it a direct role in the management (as well as the financing) of the school. The concept also promotes a regional approach by bringing together students and trainees from countries that often face similar security issues and can only benefit from pursuing their collaboration in the future. ENVR are particularly illustrative of France’s efforts toward addressing regions rather than individual countries, and launching multilateral projects that can be supported by a wide range of donors and contributors. The aviation ENVR in Garoua, whose outreach goes beyond the West African region in which it is located, could benefit from additional contributions in personnel and equipment from other countries, including the United States.


154 Focused discussion with senior member of EMA, October 6, 2010.

155 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.

156 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, July 16, 2010.

157 Phone discussion with senior member of EMA, October 8, 2010.
The orientations outlined in the 2008 defense white paper should provide the basis for France's security cooperation policy for at least two to three more years. Major changes are unlikely to take place before the end of President Sarkozy's mandate in 2012. In the meantime, efforts to reduce engagement in Africa and to share the burden of cooperation security with bilateral and multinational partners will remain one of France's strategic priorities.

CHAPTER FOUR

The United Kingdom’s Approach to Security Cooperation

Introduction

The UK is in a period of change. After 13 years of government by the Labour Party, a coalition was formed in May 2010 by the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrat Party. This is the first coalition government since the end of World War II. There is an excitement in UK political circles and the media at the novelty of the coalition arrangement, and some in the UK bureaucracy have commented that this is a new way of doing business.

Almost immediately after the formation of the coalition government, the UK initiated an SDSR, the UK’s first defense review since 1998, announcing its intentions via a green paper. That review was finalized and published in October 2010 alongside a national security strategy document: Both contributed to the UK’s comprehensive spending review budgetary process.

The defense budget is under pressure because currently planned equipment programs are unaffordable and because there is to be no budget increase for at least the next four years. As discussed later, the government has, however, set out new policies that emphasize the importance of security cooperation, and it is possible that this area will benefit in the review.

This chapter considers the UK approach to military soft power over the past ten years and how it might develop following the current defense review. The SDSR initiated an implementation process that has involved an extensive series of internal working groups. The work of these groups was under way as we were writing this report, and the details and implications of their work were not yet clear. This chapter is therefore necessarily a snapshot of the intentions of the SDSR and the expectations of officials closely involved with soft power activities. It does not draw on the confidential work of those involved in the working groups.

1 Labour has traditionally been described as “left of center” but, when in power, was described as following a centrist agenda. Liberals are thought of as left leaning, and Conservatives are normally described as “right of center.” In U.S. political terms, the main UK parties might all be grouped as more Democrat than Republican.

2 UK MOD, Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defense Review, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, February 2010. In the UK, green papers are consultative documents that announce the government’s intention to consider a policy and set out the scope, intentions, and possible options to guide those wishing to contribute. White papers tend to follow green papers and are the formal announcement of policy or the intention to introduce new legislative processes or laws.


4 In addition, funding for the nuclear deterrent is to come from the MOD budget instead of directly from the Treasury. Although the decision on whether to proceed with a replacement for the current deterrent has been postponed until the next review, in 2015, the MOD will be facing even greater and significant funding problems as it begins to reshape its acquisition programs to pay for feasibility analysis, long-lead items, and the possibility of going ahead with the replacement program.
As the UK defines them, the terms security cooperation, defence diplomacy, and soft power are not interchangeable. For the MOD, prior to the publication of the SDSR, soft power incorporated defence diplomacy. Later sections describe the latter in more detail, but in general, it comprises the contributions of the UK armed forces to building partner capacity and some elements of security cooperation. Baroness Taylor, then Minister for International Defence and Security, described an emerging view of soft power (to be called smart power) as encompassing activities that prevent conflict, support operations, promote international military friendships, build capacity, reform security sectors, and aid stabilization. The meaning of defence diplomacy has evolved in the MOD since its inception in 1998 to the definition in use for the current defense review, as explained in the following sections. Surprisingly, defence diplomacy is not used in the SDSR, which instead uses the phrase defence engagement to describe the “[u]se of Armed Forces expertise overseas such as in training and exercising with partners.” It remains to be seen whether this new term will be developed further during the implementation phase. It does not appear to be as inclusive of military soft power activities as defence diplomacy. Even so, MOD is not expected to deviate from the general thinking about soft power and the approach to the supporting activities described in this chapter; the phrase defence diplomacy is retained here, however, to make it clear that this report captures official thinking prior to any announcements about the implementation of SDSR decisions.

Strategic Outlook

The new UK government is establishing its international priorities against the backdrop of significant budgetary constraints and policies in place for more than ten years. The SDSR is the process for aligning the UK’s armed forces and their activities to support the new policies and priorities. The first half of this section describes how the UK sees itself and examines the U.S.-UK relationship. It then briefly considers the force development process that leads to the size and shape of the UK’s armed forces before describing the RAF in more detail. The second half of this section focuses on the UK’s military contribution to soft power and discusses the rationale for the activity, how it is managed, and the resources available for it.

The UK’s View of Itself

History and geography have left the UK in a unique position in the world. It is one of the major trading nations (member of the G8), a key economy not just in Europe but across worldwide financial markets, a leading member of NATO, a strong supporter of the EU military force and administrative structures, a leading nation in the Commonwealth of Nations, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and responsible for 13 Overseas Territories across the

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5 In this context, note the full meaning of security cooperation: It occurs between nations in combined operations when the intention is to improve operational effect, rather than to advance particular relationships with the involved nations (although this might occur too). As we will describe later, MOD disaggregated defence diplomacy to two versions of security cooperation in the early part of 2010 without defining the meaning of security cooperation openly. This step was quickly overtaken by the change of government and the start of a defense review in which the term defence diplomacy will return to the fore.


7 Her Majesty’s Government, 2010a, p. 74 (glossary).
world.\(^8\) This status and the various allegiances have shaped UK foreign policy and also, because in the UK system defense is subordinate, significantly influenced defense policy and activity.

Since its formation, NATO has been the cornerstone of the UK’s defense, and almost all its defensive capability, including its nuclear deterrent, can be placed at the disposal of the NATO military command structure. Both within the alliance and superimposed on it, the UK has aligned its wider defense and security interests to those of the United States. The 1998 SDR determined that the UK would not be expected to undertake large-scale combat operations except in conjunction with the United States.\(^9\) This further emphasized the U.S.-UK relationship that Winston Churchill coined the “special relationship” in 1946. Consequently, for example, the UK has played a leading role in Afghanistan (NATO Article V operation) and alongside the United States in the coalition that formed for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Successive UK governments have attempted to reconcile these responsibilities, and the necessary armed forces to provide the ability to act when needed, with the available resources. Many times, this balance has not been achieved, and the government of the day has often found its defense intentions confounded by the requirements of real-world events.\(^10\) The then-new Labour government attempted to avoid this mistake in SDR(98). This pattern has continued since SDR(98), however, and the UK armed forces have been involved in more than 100 operations since that report.\(^11\) The current coalition government intends the new SDSR to balance military commitments against the available defense budget. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review states the government’s view of what it is to be British and how this involves the UK’s armed forces:

> Our country has always had global responsibilities and global ambitions. We have a proud history of standing up for the values we believe in and we should have no less ambition for our country in the decades to come.\(^12\)

The UK formalized its approach to military soft power in SDR(98) and coined the phrase *defence diplomacy* to capture the activities of MOD and the armed forces that contributed to a full range of “soft” objectives outside of those directly related to operational capability. The aim of the new activity was to provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the MOD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.\(^13\)

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\(^8\) The Commonwealth of Nations comprises 53 now-independent nations that almost wholly were once part of the British Empire. There are 13 overseas territories: Anguilla, British Antarctic Territory, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, St. Helena and Dependencies (Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha), (sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia), and Turk and Caicos Islands. The sovereign base areas in Cyprus are classified as overseas territories but not always referred to as such.

\(^9\) UK MOD, 1998, which is also referred to as SDR(98).

\(^10\) For a fuller discussion, see “Defense Reviews and Reality,” in Johnson et al., 2009, pp. 125–130.


\(^12\) UK MOD, 1998.

It did not include all possible military soft power activities, however, and the remainder are described in relation to supporting wider British interests.

MOD saw a worldwide requirement for military soft power activities that would either specifically promote stability and prevent conflict or be considered as the appropriate military contribution to the government’s wish for the UK to be a “force for good” in the world. The breadth of the UK’s relationships meant that demand would quickly exceed available discretionary resources. This was anticipated, and a system for determining support priority and the level of activity was developed: MOD soft power activities were either to support defence diplomacy, dispel hostility, or prevent conflict, or to support wider UK interests. The former was seen as most important and was allocated a support fund. Very quickly, however, postconflict activities, such as those after Operation Iraqi Freedom, noncombat support to Afghanistan, and support to Sierra Leone, added considerably to the demand for defence diplomacy funds and support. The strain of combat operations would, in any event, have reduced the available single-service spare capacity to undertake soft power activities, defence diplomacy, or any others, and pressure on the defense budget to reduce costs continued.

However, critics inside and outside the UK describe its view of itself and its relationship with the United States as out of step with current realities. Some argue that the UK cannot afford to meet the obligations of these responsibilities, least of all to attempt to be a leading nation in each arena. Indeed, the size of the UK armed forces has continued to decline, although UK defense spending remains among the highest of western nations, at about 2.5 percent of gross domestic product. Others describe these responsibilities as accidents of history with no modern relevance. More recently, the current UK prime minister has attempted to explain what the U.S. relationship means to the UK. In an article in the Wall Street Journal, to mark his first formal visit to the United States as prime minister, David Cameron described the relationship in this way:

The U.S.-U.K. relationship is simple: It’s strong because it delivers for both of us. The alliance is not sustained by our historical ties or blind loyalty. This is a partnership of choice that serves our national interests.

Why the UK Matters to the United States

Above all, our alliance thrives because it advances our common interests. Whether it’s preventing the spread of nuclear weapons or securing vulnerable nuclear materials, thwarting terrorist attacks, or confronting climate change, or promoting global economic growth and development, when the United States and the United Kingdom stand together, our people—and people around the world—are more secure and they are more prosperous.

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14 For comparison, France’s defense spending is 2.3 percent of its gross domestic product (2008); Germany’s defense spending is 1.3 percent of its gross domestic product (2008). Figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure database, as of October 2010.


16 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the UK in Joint Press Availability, July 20, 2010.
These remarks, spoken by President Obama during Prime Minister Cameron’s visit to the United States in July 2010, mirror some of the motivating factors for the UK to seek partnership with United States. The UK's position in the world, historically, geographically, and politically, complements the enduring global interests of the United States. The intelligence sharing between the nations alone would be sufficient to justify U.S. government and DoD interest in the UK.

The depth and breadth of defence cooperation is much greater: U.S. and UK armed forces have stood side by side in two World Wars, the Cold War, and numerous recent combat and stabilization operations, including in Iraq and Afghanistan; the UK provides extensive basing facilities for most branches of the U.S. armed forces, but particularly USAF, both in the UK and in its Overseas Territories, such as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Ascension Island in the South Atlantic; and the UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. U.S. and UK air forces, and the other services, have trained, exercised, exchanged officers, and operated together using NATO military procedures from the earliest days of USAF. This has provided USAF a thorough understanding of the RAF. Discussing the wider U.S.-UK defense relationship, a RAND report concludes that “the coincidence of common interests and priorities [of the U.S. and UK] is demonstrated clearly by the depth of commitment of both countries to the same operations.”17

Given the UK's commitment to continue to be a strong partner with the United States and the reciprocal nature of this relationship for historical, geographic, political, and military reasons, it appears that USAF has much to gain from a greater understanding of the UK’s approach to military soft power in general and defence diplomacy (and any successor concepts, such as defence engagement) specifically. The UK's history and enduring national interest have given it links and friendships with many nations, as described at the beginning of this section, which lie in regions of strategic interest to the United States. The UK has a wide network of international relationships, with particularly close relations with nations in Europe, the Caribbean, Anglophone Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf, South Asia and Australasia. Some of these duplicate existing U.S. bilateral relationships, and the UK links may be complementary or competitive, or may indeed far exceed any U.S. relationships in a region or country. Other UK links may, with agreement, provide a conduit for U.S. engagement.

The UK’s Armed Forces
The purpose of the UK's armed forces is a subject of the SDSR. Such analysis, followed by scenario modeling at different scales of effort, is the MOD's foundation for determining what forces the UK wishes to prepare and the readiness levels they need for potential operations. The resulting “force elements at readiness” profiles underpin the funding of the individual services responsible for manning and training personnel with the provided equipment. A force element is a ship; a battalion; an aircraft; a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset; or a logistical element that provides operational support. The equipment requirements—ships, tanks, and aircraft—are determined during the modeling and lead to the acquisition process, which is the largest expenditure after salaries and pensions in the MOD budget. Prior to the current review, the MOD was only funded for the force elements at readiness needed for the contingency operations in the agreed scenarios.

17 Johnson et al., 2009, p. 137.
Other activities, such as defence diplomacy, were achieved by using the irreducible spare capacity of individual services as they met their remits to provide force elements at readiness.

The UK’s individual services, the Royal Navy, Army, and RAF, focus on delivering operational capabilities within a highly joint administrative and operational structure. The military contribution to soft power is considered a joint function, with policy and discretionary resources coordinated by a joint military and civilian central staff in the MOD. This staff liaises with other governments and other government departments before directing joint military soft power activities or guiding individual service support.

**The Royal Air Force**

Past and current operations and the need to reduce costs have shaped the RAF in the years since the SDR(98) was implemented. This subsection describes the RAF’s size, shape, and roles in 2010, before the changes called for in the SDSR.

The RAF consisted of about 41,000 personnel, as of April 2010. There are about 7,000 reservists, of whom 140 were on active duty as of April 2010. The majority of the active personnel are employed directly in the RAF but some, particularly senior officers, are employed in joint organizations, such as the Permanent Joint Headquarters, or in MOD’s central staff. The single RAF command and top-level budget holder is Air Command, located at RAF High Wycombe. This four-star headquarters is responsible for all aspects of administration, preparation, and training of RAF aircraft, aircrews, and maintainers. Aircraft and personnel are divided between three groups: 1 Group, which is responsible for combat air force elements at readiness; 2 Group, which is responsible for projection, protection, and support of air force elements at readiness; and 22 Group, which is responsible for recruiting and training of air force personnel (including some specialists for the other services).

In 2006, the RAF reintroduced expeditionary air wings to increase flexibility and provide an identifiable structure to support expeditionary operations. There are nine such wings, and these draw on the main air base command and support structures that provide the bulk of operational combat and support force elements at readiness.

The RAF operates the significant majority of UK aircraft. As of December 2009, there were 327 combat air aircraft, of which 74 were Harriers, 54 were Tornado F3s (air defense), 137 were Tornado GR4s (ground attack), and 62 were Typhoons (originally air defense [F2] with later multirole variants [FGR4]). At the same date, there were 44 transport aircraft (six C-17s, 14 C-130Ks, and 20 C-130Js); 11 Nimrod Maritime Patrol Aircraft; 24 tankers (nine Tristars and 15 VC-10s); and 12 command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft. The RAF also operates the majority of support helicopters, with 119 in service at the end of 2009.

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18 For comparison, the Royal Navy has about 36,000, the Army about 103,000. We obtained these statistics from the UK’s Defence Analytical Services and Advice organization’s website.

19 Defence Analytical Services and Advice website.


The SDSR announced reductions in the personnel and force structure of the RAF. By 2020, the service is to have only 31,500 active personnel, have withdrawn its Harrier and Nimrod aircraft from service, and reduced the number of air bases.

Although clearly much smaller than USAF, the RAF is a peer in terms of professionalism and operational effectiveness and is the second largest air force in NATO. It was the first organization formed as an air force (in April 1918) and has extensive military-to-military affiliations, many of which originated during World War II, when the RAF hosted many of the displaced European aircrews that had escaped the control of Nazi Germany.

RAF flying and maintenance training is considered among the best, and the courses attract fee-paying students from around the globe. The UK also funds students from high-priority countries to attend some of these courses when it is in the defense interest to do so, for example to build the capacity of less-well-off partners and allies.

The RAF undertakes operations, exercises, and training worldwide. It is most heavily engaged operationally in Afghanistan and in support of the air bridge that supports this deployment. Its exercise and training priorities lie with NATO and Partnership for Peace nations and the Middle East.

Recent Evolution of UK Military Soft Power

This section considers how military soft power might evolve as the new coalition government moves from the outlines of policies in the SDSR and implements the changes. The new National Security Strategy was published to coincide with the announcement of the SDSR. The SDSR incorporated the requirements of this strategy in outlining the changes to the size, shape, and role of the UK’s armed forces. The implications of this new strategy and the SDSR are the main focus of the working groups that are planning how to implement the SDSR. In the meantime, the new strategy, the SDSR, and recent foreign policy announcements are likely good indicators of the direction for the future of MOD’s soft power work. The highest risks to UK security are considered to be international terrorism, including chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack; hostile attacks on UK cyberspace; major accidents or natural disasters; or an international military crisis drawing in the UK and its allies.

The government has reexamined the UK’s international priorities, and the foreign secretary has outlined a focus for overseas activities on “enlightened national interest.” The three objectives are to

1. safeguard Britain’s national security by countering terrorism and weapon proliferation, and working to reduce conflict
2. build Britain’s prosperity by increasing exports and investment, opening markets, ensuring access to resources, and promoting sustainable global growth
3. support British citizens around the world through modern and efficient consular services.

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22 Her Majesty’s Government, 2010a, and Her Majesty’s Government, 2010b, respectively.
23 Her Majesty’s Government, 2010b, p. 27.
The first of these most obviously bears on the work of the MOD. The second is also relevant because defense exports, *defence sales* in UK terminology, are seen as an important and valid objective of foreign policy and diplomacy. Indeed, our research discussions lead us to assess that defence sales are likely to become a leading priority of defence diplomacy or a successor concept.26 It will also increase the priority of defence engagement with emerging powers, such as Brazil, China, and India. SDSR’s purpose was to build on these foreign policies and decide how they, and such other factors as budget and perceived threats, will affect the size and shape of the UK’s armed forces.

Missing from these objectives and the new government’s announcements is the declaration to be a “force for good” in the world. Acting as a force for good was coined in SDR(98) and influenced much of the UK’s overseas activity across the FCO, MOD, and the Department for International Development (DFID). To be sure, the UK still intends to act for the common good, but all activities overseas should first and foremost support UK interests. The phrase “enlightened national interests” is intended to emphasize this concept of acting in the interests of the UK, in supporting a rules-based structure, and certainly not against international rules or standards or globally accepted norms.27

Although the green paper was released by the outgoing government, the document suggests some significant changes for the defence diplomacy mission of the UK’s armed forces when viewed in the context of the changed foreign policy of the new government. This was confirmed during our research discussions with MOD officials,28 but we were not given the details of likely policy or strategy changes because the SDSR was ongoing at the time. These will start to become clear with the announcements of the outcomes of the post-SDSR working groups in the latter half of 2011. The green paper assesses that “[defence diplomacy] . . . , though modest, . . . has made a significant contribution to conflict prevention and a stable rules-based international order disproportionate to the resources . . . invested.”29

The next section describes how the MOD develops its policies and strategies in light of foreign policy and discusses the contribution of defence diplomacy in more detail.

**Development of Defence Diplomacy as a Military Task**

The Defence Board issues classified defense strategic guidance, usually every two years, for interpreting foreign policy, other government direction, and the key events affecting defense business.30 In a parallel process that informs the Defence Board, MOD policymakers and planners use the foreign policy and MOD’s own forward-looking document, on strategic trends,

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27 Discussions with defence diplomacy subject-matter experts in the MOD and RAF, London, July 2010. We assess that these changes in foreign policy will influence the soft power activities of the MOD and DFID. It is possible that these two government departments will now find more common ground than before. For example, it has been announced that DFID will be required to use much more of its funding to support stability operations in Afghanistan. DFID had previously resisted this because it gave stability operations a lower priority than other programs that, for example, reduced poverty, and other countries, therefore, were assessed as needing assistance ahead of Afghanistan.


29 UK MOD, 2010, para 3.22.

30 The Defence Board is formed by the two most senior MOD civil servants, the two senior most MOD central staff military officers, the heads of the individual services, the senior MOD scientist, the senior MOD financial officer, the most senior procurement officer, and three nonexecutive directors (usually from industry).
to produce the defense planning assumptions.\textsuperscript{31} These are approved by the Defence Board and are the cornerstone for describing what the MOD and the UK’s armed forces are expected to do or be prepared to do. The defense planning assumptions have two components: descriptions of the expected activities, in the form of military tasks, and a description of the scale of effort expected of the armed forces in carrying out each task. These military tasks are more strategic than those of the mission task list and cover standing and contingent commitments at home (in and around the UK) and abroad.\textsuperscript{32}

MOD officials working on the SDSR are developing a series of options, which are in line with the intent of the new government, to establish defence diplomacy as a funded military task within the planning assumption framework. If implemented, this would have far-reaching effects on the MOD policy and planning system and would affect the individual services. Since at present force elements at readiness are funded only for specific military tasks, current military soft power activities are conducted using spare capacity that is considered irreducible in the delivery of the required, funded capabilities. So, for example, the RAF cannot run a training course tailored to the needs of overseas air forces, even if they are prepared to pay, because it can only run the courses it needs to train its own personnel who contribute to force elements at readiness generation. Spare spaces in these courses can be made available (at full cost recovery).

Establishing defence diplomacy or a successor as a funded military task will not only raise its profile as a mission (when it was a military task before, it was unfunded), but could allow spending, using the example above, on additional training staff to run courses for soft power reasons. Further, in the current unfunded regime, defence diplomacy has no ability to establish priorities for activities against the requirements of the other funded military tasks: Emerging requirements that support funded military tasks, of whatever priority, will take precedence over any military soft power activity. These requirements can range from the vital, such as support to current operations, to the less important. Currently, defence diplomacy activities can rarely be planned with confidence more than 12 months in advance because they are vulnerable to cancellation—sometimes at extremely short notice. This places defence diplomacy planners in a difficult position: Should they, for example, offer an exercise or training event with a partner more than a year ahead, with the chance that it might be canceled, and so cause offense? Or should they wait to see if the assets are available and then plan, perhaps not being able to make the necessary arrangements in time? Unfortunately, most military activities require early planning by both MOD and the partner nation and the risk was often taken that the assets would remain available.

It is recognized in the MOD that soft power is a long-term activity that relies on extended commitment and that short-notice changes can be extremely damaging.\textsuperscript{33} Establishing defence diplomacy or its successor as a military task will hopefully provide more-secure funding and permit longer-term planning. This will also reduce the risk of causing offense by canceling activities on short notice for reasons that partner nations may not find easy to understand.


\textsuperscript{32} High-level operational analysis is conducted using these assumptions and the military judgment and scenarios determined by the Strategic Analysis Group (stakeholders from the planning and policy staffs in MOD). The output of this process is the force elements at readiness profiles.

\textsuperscript{33} Discussions held with UK MOD officials, London, July 2010.
Finally, and in keeping with the comments of coalition ministers, MOD officials are optimistic that military soft power funding will be increased to reflect levels of activity prior to recent cuts. For example the Defence Secretary has related the role of the MOD to that of the new foreign policy that is going to focus on enlightened national interest, leading to

[T]he enhancement of diplomatic relations with key partners, using Britain’s unique network of friendships, bonds and alliances, working bilaterally as well as multilaterally.  

That is why a broad programme of Defence Diplomacy is required, as is stepping up bilateral defence co-operation, particularly with nations who share our interests and are prepared to both pay and fight, such as France.

We intend to treat, and consequently fund, a Defence Diplomacy programme separately within the SDSR.

**Defence Diplomacy Concepts**

The MOD currently describes its defence diplomacy activities in two steps: activities in the first group are additional, sometimes critical, enablers; activities in the second group more directly support other military tasks or higher government priorities. The two enablers are

- *strategic insight*—a combination of information or intelligence and sufficient knowledge and understanding of the partner nation, its leaders, and people to inform key decisions on how to interact and react to the nation and the events that affect it
- *influence*—the ability to shape thinking and decisions by the leadership of the partner nation.

The second group consists of activities that pursue the following objectives:

- **Influencing international contributions to operations**—The UK endeavors to persuade others to join combined operations, for example, to lessen its burden or to enhance the operations’ legitimacy in the eyes of others.
- **Transforming peace support operations capabilities**—This objective is similar to the previous one but is linked to lower-intensity operations that are, in theory, more accessible to a wider range of international forces.
- **Securing operational access**—The UK sees its forces as expeditionary and recognizes the need for broad access around the world if it is to have the fullest flexibility for operational

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34 Speech delivered by Liam Fox, Secretary of State for Defence, Royal United Services Institute, London, June 14, 2010.
35 Fox, 2010.
37 Described by MOD in 2003 as the objectives of defence diplomacy and modified here to reflect current MOD thinking following the revisions announced in 2009.
planning. This objective covers, for example, overflight, host-nation support, and basing options.

• Securing training areas—This objective has two motivations: First, the UK does not possess the full range of environmental conditions that the armed forces may have to contend with as an expeditionary force; second, training ranges in the UK are generally limited in physical size or have other users that conflict with military training.

• Developing and sustaining interoperability—The UK wishes to help others work with its armed forces in the event of combined operations. The focus is described as “NATO and other key partners.”

• Maintaining overseas recruiting—All the services, but especially the army, recruit personnel from countries with strong ties to the UK. Gurkhas from Nepal are a good example.

• Transforming counterterrorist capacity—Since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the UK has developed an overt, although classified, program specifically to assist the abilities of partner nations to deal with terrorism.

• Developing and sustaining alliances—This would include formal alliances, such as NATO and other long-standing arrangements.

• Stabilizing conflict and instability—This consists of assisting in the creation and maintenance of the security conditions required to allow all levers of power to address the underlying causes of conflict.

• Reforming the security sector—Implementation of good governance to encourage democratically accountable armed forces.

These enablers and objectives and our earlier description of the likely changes to defence diplomacy indicate a need to revamp the details of these enablers and objectives and how their implementation supports announced policies of the new government. Its focus on national interest and defense exports, away from the requirement to be a force for good, will not only alter the priorities of the countries and regions in which MOD will undertake defence diplomacy activities. It will also affect what it does or attempts to do there. This revamp is likely part of the work of the post-SDSR implementation teams.

During the research, we sensed recognition that MOD’s contribution to, and use of, soft power was problematic. In part, this was because of the paucity of resources. It also seems that there were difficulties delivering the objectives of defence diplomacy, with little connection between activities and what they were achieving in some instances. In saying this, we do not want to leave the impression that the extensive UK program is ineffective—more that this points to a perennial difficulty with soft power: measures of effectiveness. It is clear from the examples discussed in the next section that a great deal was and is being achieved for many countries around the world, much of which can be associated with one or more of the defence diplomacy objectives. Perhaps this snapshot shows UK military soft power in flux: a program that should measure effects over years having undergone recent changes in mission and objectives, continuing some commitments in the absence of decisions to stop, and having to take drastic savings with little opportunity to revise policies or plans.

The next section considers in more detail the execution processes in the MOD and the RAF and the regional and country priorities. The final section describes some illustrative activities to show the breadth and depth of the UK’s approach to defence diplomacy.
Partner Selection

Three main factors influence partner selection: the priorities of foreign policy, the requirements of defense and security, and the need to align military soft power activities with the work of other government departments. This section looks at each of these briefly before discussing the processes the MOD and the RAF use to prioritize and implement defence diplomacy activities.

Foreign Policy
Foreign secretary's speeches have concentrated on the importance of the emerging large economies of Brazil, China, and India. All these are a shift away from the regions of Africa and the Middle and Near East that have received the most attention in the recent past. Although clear, but less specific, these speeches and those of the Defence Secretary have described the importance of alliances, such as NATO; old friends, such as those in the Commonwealth of Nations; and a specific commitment to the Five-Power Defence Arrangements. The importance of countering terrorism abroad is likely to give such countries as Pakistan and, probably less so, Indonesia, a high priority. Similarly, these ministers have spoken about the need for the UK to be involved in the maintenance of global order that can affect national interests; piracy, for example, is likely to give weight to failed or failing coastal States near chokepoints.

Defense
MOD’s requirements are those related to defense and security of the UK and the overseas territories, as well as support to current operations. Afghanistan is going to be the main effort of the UK for the foreseeable future; the MOD will want to ensure that it can continue to operate there effectively by taking advantage of operational access to countries in the region or along the logistic supply route. This might give an importance to the Middle and Near East that is lacking from statements made so far. The only overseas territories considered in need of dedicated defense are those in the South Atlantic, the Falkland Islands, and the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. Defense of these raises the importance of South America. The Caribbean also includes many countries that are part of the Commonwealth of Nations. MOD will continue to work within NATO to aid new members. Less clear is whether other central and eastern European countries will feature as highly as before.

Other Government Departments
The FCO and DFID are perhaps going to be most affected by the new direction of foreign policy. This may limit the bias over MOD priorities at the more detailed level these departments exerted previously. Of more significance will be the enhanced importance of defense exports and the higher priority that MOD will have to place on supporting the UK Trade and Industry Defence and Security Group. Although the UK adheres to international restrictions on arms sales, it has become the second largest defense exporter in the world by being very effective in promoting UK equipment and training. Maintaining or enhancing this achievement will affect MOD defence diplomacy priorities and activities. For example, attachés are unlikely to be removed from key export targets.

Central Staff Processes
Drawing on the factors we described above, MOD uses a top-down process for determining regional and country priorities. These priorities are going to change as a result of the SDSR,
The United Kingdom’s Approach to Security Cooperation

notably because national interest will be the paramount priority. Since MOD serves only the national interest, and during operations it is the supported arm of government, there is the opportunity for greater coherence in cross-government international activities. The occasionally divisive requirement to balance force for good with force for defense and security has been removed. Where friction may occur, and careful management has the ability to overcome any problems, will be from the requirement to place more emphasis on supporting defense exports.

MOD generates its own diplomacy requirements, e.g., the need for operational access, and priorities are assessed and reconciled by the three-star level Security Cooperation Operations Group (SCOG). MOD central directorates prepare country priority lists for validation by the SCOG by

- following Defence Strategic Guidance that in turn adheres to foreign policy priorities
- taking inputs from the single services and joint operational commanders, allowing consideration of overseas support and access requirements, which might be a joint need or unique to one service,
- liaising with other government departments, principally the FCO and DFID, to ensure that the detail of their policies is understood properly and that no unnecessary friction will arise out of emerging defense priority proposals; this liaison includes the UK Trade and Industry Defence and Security Group, which is responsible for promoting defense exports.

This process is expected to lead to an informed country priority list. This list, the SCOG approved International Security Cooperation (ISC) Priorities, will be expected to balance available MOD resources with government policy and any competing requirements. At the time of writing, the MOD and the individual services are entering a period of change as they absorb the implications of the SDSR and take the necessary actions to change priorities. The implications for the successor program to defence diplomacy are not clear. An updated country priority list is not available and may remain a UK classified document. Even so, the study team was able to highlight some of the possible post-SDSR priority regions and countries.38

Presently, MOD’s lead soft power directorates are NATO and Europe Policy and International Policy and Planning, with the latter assuming almost all policy responsibility for defense attachés (with the approval of the SCOG or other senior officer groups in MOD). Both implement defence diplomacy and are the main interface between MOD and other parts of government. Internally, they are the link to the small individual service staffs that, in turn, provide guidance, sometimes direction, to the individual service headquarters. The individual service staffs are responsible for coordinating service-specific soft power activities, such as bilateral staff talks and senior officer visits; in the case of the RAF, this is a three-person team.39

38 We exclude the United States from this discussion (the UK’s most important relationship) and the older NATO member countries, such as France and Germany (greater defence cooperation with the former has been specifically raised).

39 Each service staff draws its authority from the professional head and chief of its service, for example the Chief of the Air Staff. Their offices are in the MOD in London. Although of the same rank, the commanders-in-chief of the individual services are subordinate and run them from separate headquarters. Operations are run by a three-star permanent joint headquarters that is supported with force elements at readiness by the individual services. The joint headquarters is under the direction of the four-star Chief of Defence Staff supported by the central staff.
RAF-Specific Processes

The RAF staff has developed a series of tools to assist it in managing its service-specific soft power responsibilities and in communicating guidance or support requirements to the RAF. The first tool is the RAF ISC Country Prioritisation matrix. It mirrors the main ISC priority list approved by the SCOG and weights each alliance, international organization, and country in the world. It shows the importance attached to the defence diplomacy objectives for each and adds air force—relevant detail. The second tool is the RAF ISC Air Regional Engagement Plan (AREP), an appendix to the RAF ISC matrix that shows the SCOG priorities and a RAF importance category for every international organization and country. The available types of defence diplomacy activities and the planned RAF contribution for that year are listed for each of these. Detailed remarks complete the AREP. The AREP is discussed throughout the year within the RAF at a series of meetings involving Air Command and RAF resource providers, such as the groups, as well as the next tier of support, for example, the Central Flying School. The factors that influence construction of the AREP include some of those already mentioned, the SCOG priorities, and those that are air force specific:

- Chief of Air Staff intent—This higher-level guidance generally seeks to use air force defence diplomacy activities to aid RAF vision, insight, and influence.
- Current operations—While the international security assistance force in Afghanistan presently dominates, the priority on current operations also allows soft power activities that will provide specific support to operations.
- Multilateral agreements—The priority on such agreements maintains visibility of enduring alliances, such as NATO and Five-Power Defence Arrangements
- Future equipment programs—This is either to support defense exports or in recognition of RAF interest in new equipment, such as the Joint Strike Fighter.

The next step in construction of the AREP addresses which of the countries need to be influenced to affect the air force factors. These countries are categorized as one of the following:

1. major countries
2. important regional influence or overflight countries
3. signatories to alliances not in item 1
4. as required activity to assist global or regional influence.

The detail in these documents would likely be of interest to USAF security cooperation power policymakers and activity planners.

Resources

Total MOD spending on defence diplomacy (before its demise) was about US$240 million (£160 million at US$1.5 = £1.0), roughly 0.5 percent of the UK defense budget. This figure includes discretionary funds, such as MOD spent in Africa, Afghanistan, and elsewhere; the capitation costs of all MOD officials (service and civilian) involved in delivering defence diplo-
macy; MOD support to foreign personnel sponsored at UK PME or on technical training courses; all soft power–related seminars and conferences; soft power–related exercises; and the costs associated with training and maintaining attaché, liaison, and exchange posts.

Assessments and Lessons Learned
MOD does not have a formal assessment and lessons learned process to inform its defence diplomacy activities. Attachés and training teams, whether short or long term, produce annual reports, and such activities as ship visits, senior officer visits, and exercises generate any number of reports. These inform the regional desk officers in joint staff directorates, who are expected to pass this information on to the individual services. In turn, the individual service staffs assimilate this emerging information and adjust their planning and descriptors of future intentions.

The UK is interested in methods of measuring the effect of its defence diplomacy activities. At present there is only a very limited process of feedback, whether from those undertaking the activity, those who sponsored it, or from in-country representatives. The UK has tended to use the term lessons identified rather than lessons learned to differentiate between reporting a lesson and acting on it. The most complete feedback process for UK military soft power activities appears to be that for the Exchange and Liaison Officer programs. Midtour reports from the posted officers and senior enlisted are used to guide decisions on the next posting: the desired skills of the incumbents, whether the post is still delivering the expected benefits, and whether an alternative post might offer better value. Our research indicates that this process has been fragile during the recent period of MOD expenditure reductions.

MOD officials expect that more formal processes will be required after SDSR to better inform defence diplomacy planning and activities. Budgetary pressures will lead to a requirement to identify the most cost-effective activities. MOD central staff aspires to plan and coordinate single service and center activity more carefully after the SDSR. It is believed that greater efficiency and effect can be achieved by closer planning of, for example, exercises and ministerial and senior officer visits. At present, it does not appear that there is much coordination of the activities described in the AREP either with similar plans used by the other services or with those of the center. Those we spoke with intimated that increased resources for defence diplomacy would allow better management of greater activity.

The next section examines in more detail the types of activities the UK undertakes with partner nations. These activities are likely to have been approved using the process described in this section.

Security Cooperation Activities
While the UK uses military soft power levers similar to those available to DoD and USAF, there are some important differences in emphasis. This section considers these initially before discussing, with illustrative examples, the defence diplomacy activities MOD and RAF undertook prior to SDSR. It also discusses the potential effects of improvements to defence diplomacy or a successor program that may follow SDSR implementation.

MOD priorities and the soft power activities undertaken with partner nations are considered classified information. The general principle is that more-important regions or countries are given a higher priority for all defence diplomacy activities. A higher priority might trigger MOD funding for soft power activities when the country is unable to pay itself. A high priority
will also give access to the most sought after PME courses, such as senior staff courses, ahead of countries with lower priorities. In a similar way, all other activities are allocated according to the current ranking. The MOD central staff prioritizes activities according to emerging requirements and to ensure that, for example, low priority countries are not permanently excluded from high-demand activities. As discussed below, the individual services use the MOD center priority as the starting point for allocating their resources. The post-SDSR priority countries are expected to be Brazil, India, and China, as well as those offering specific military support to UK forces, such as basing or overflight rights. The coalition’s desire, as stated in the SDSR, is:

        focusing, within our overall approach to defence engagement, on supporting current operations and standing commitments, including by prioritizing key allies, countries that provide us with access, basing and overflight privileges; and on where defence activity can add most value, for example in countries where the military plays a prominent role in national policy-making.42

**Professional Military Education**

MOD considers certain staff courses to be “flagship” courses: These are in high demand and seen as effective soft power tools. The Royal College of Defence Studies course is premier among these flagship courses. Each course lasts for one academic year and consists generally of 80 members, 50 from overseas.43 UK personnel selected for the college are considered capable of reaching the highest ranks of their service—all are colonel or one-star or equivalents. The 2009 courses were conducted from January to December with 79 members, 51 of whom came from overseas, with 16 of these funded by the UK.44

Command and staff training for the UK armed forces is conducted at a joint staff college with individual service modules. These courses are important for field-grade officers and those selected are expected to command and achieve higher rank. The 2008–2009 course had 330 places, 100 of which were assigned to overseas students, with 24 of these paid for by the UK. Foreign language training is generally only provided to UK personnel who are about to be posted as attachés or in other long-term positions overseas in non–English speaking countries. English language training is usually provided to those about to attend another UK course.

International defense training can be delivered in the UK or abroad. The individual services manage the training based in the UK. The RAF’s aircrew, technical maintenance, and nontechnical maintenance courses are highly sought after. As described in the previous section, spaces in the courses are offered to foreigners when there is spare capacity. Although classified courses are offered only to personnel from appropriate countries, students come from almost every country in the world.45 Initial officer training at the RAF College Cranwell is open to foreign officers: One-third (about 40) of all places are made available each year.

Overseas training is delivered either by teams deployed for many years or by those deployed for short term, perhaps a few weeks, for specific courses. The higher-profile methods involve long-term, deployed teams that work within the host nation’s training structure to deliver a

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43 More information is available at UK MOD, “Royal College,” website, undated.
45 Extensive information is available on the RAF International Defence Training website.
wide range of courses. These probably achieve the greatest effect in terms of interoperability and increased capability in the forces of a partner nation. Short-term teams are usually used for the forces of smaller countries, in which the demand tends to be lower. A good example of the UK approach to overseas training is that of the British Military Advisory Training Team in the Czech Republic (BMATT). This team has been in place since 2000 and undertakes training for the Czech armed forces. This BMATT also deploys short-term teams to other nearby nations, such as Slovakia and in the Balkans. The team delivers military training courses, training assistance, and advice to partner nations to further develop their professional armed forces and their capabilities to participate in multinational Peace Support Operations. The BMATT in the Czech Republic trained around 550 instructors at its facilities in Vyskov and through in-country training teams. It also provided predeployment training for Czech units heading for Afghanistan and peace support operations training for a Kazakhstan battalion.

Staff Talks, Visits, Seminars, Workshops, and Conferences
Although all these are transitory activities, MOD officials remarked that visits from ministers and senior officers (Chief and Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Chiefs of Staff of the individual services) are of great importance. MOD officials also remarked that, post-SDSR, they intend to ensure that future activities of this type are in line with the new country and policy priorities. Ministerial or senior officer visits to any one country might occur once every three years; defense staff talks (that is, MOD to DoD or MOD) might occur with the same regularity, if at all; and special advisors are mostly for specific operations.

Bilateral service-to-service staff talks are held, in the RAF’s case, about 12 times a year. Each partner country meets with the RAF on roughly an 18-month cycle. In 2010, talks were held with Greece, Turkey, Australia, Pakistan, India, and Japan and were anticipated with Germany, Italy, and South Africa. The UK uses the term loan service personnel to describe those it deploys overseas to serve in complement posts in a foreign nation’s armed forces. Loan service personnel wear the uniforms of the host nation and, within the boundaries of the initiating agreement, obey the commands of that nation’s senior officers. For example the Omani armed forces are supported by about 90 UK personnel. The receiving nation pays a fixed fee per person in-country and the personnel deployment costs. Exchange or liaison posts, on the other hand, are coordinated by the relevant individual service staff in the MOD and do not involve payments from the hosting nation. The RAF has 148 exchange posts with 60 in the United States. The remainder tend to be within NATO countries, and the posts are thought of as a continuation of pre–Cold War priorities. Exchange programs are considered to be effective and of good value because they incur only the incidental costs of deployment and in-country

46 This team was established as part of the UK’s contribution to NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative to prepare former Warsaw Pact countries for NATO membership. More information is available at the team’s comprehensive pages on the MOD website.
47 UK MOD, 2009, Ch. 7.
48 The RAF describes talks with USAF differently, suggesting that they are more intimate and focused on practical aspects of an air force relationship rather than on diplomacy.
49 Loan service personnel serve in countries with which the UK has had long and friendly relations, e.g., Oman and Brunei. Personnel are covered by status of forces–type agreements that balance the requirements to follow local national laws with the protections of those of the UK. Generally, these operate on the understanding that the UK will allow personnel to be subject to local laws and authorities except when there is serious disagreement or criminal activity, at which point UK laws and procedures are used.
support; capitation is not paid because the partner nation pays the salary of its personnel. The RAF program costs about US$3 million per year.50

Training and Exercises
In recent years, MOD has struggled to maintain its international exercise program while meeting its significant commitments to combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the UK, these exercises tend to be joint and require significant logistic support. The army has been overcommitted to combat operations, and the RAF has had difficulties generating certain specialist force elements at readiness. In addition, the UK logistics system has been focused on operations with little spare capacity. Consequently, the MOD has been able to program few, if any, joint exercises since 2000, and few exercises with foreign nations are able to take place at present.

In-Country Advisors
The UK sees defense attachés as the most effective critical enablers. Attachés coordinate most MOD contact and defence diplomacy activity. Some posts are small, with a single officer, while others include representatives from each service. Attachés also provide strategic insight, reporting back to the central staff in MOD. Defense advisory teams are another example of in-country advisors. Although these are less common and are not considered enablers, they are expected to provide strategic insight as they undertake their missions. One example is British Defence Advisory Team Nigeria, which aims to support the development of professional Nigerian armed forces, capable of fulfilling their role as a national defense force and as a significant provider of peacekeeping forces. Efforts also include support to the refurbishment and further development of the Nigerian Peacekeeping Training Wing in Jaji.51

Military Sales
The UK is one of the largest arms exporting countries in the world and competes with France to be the largest in Europe. The Defence and Security Organisation within the government’s UK Trade and Investment department is responsible for all aspects of advising and assisting UK government and UK industry export of defense and security equipment. The specific responsibilities and relationships with other government departments, particularly the MOD, may evolve as the new foreign policy and SDSR are implemented. In 2009, the UK achieved defense and security exports valued at US$11 billion, with the largest customers identified as Saudi Arabia and the United States.52 The Defence and Security Organisation relies in part on military soft power to achieve its sales success.

Differences Between U.S. and UK Security Cooperation Activities
The UK does not use the combatant command structure the United States employs and has no regional military commanders. Operational commanders are deployed from the UK under the command of the three-star commander of the permanent joint headquarters. In combined

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50 Discussions held with UK MOD officials, London, July 2010.
operations, these officers become the national component commander and may also have combined functional responsibilities. They return to the UK on completion of the operation.

This means that the UK has a different entry point for regional and military soft power activities. The regional perspective is retained solely in MOD and, to a very limited extent, within the individual services. For example, International Policy and Planning divides its global responsibilities across the regions of Asia Pacific, South Asia, Middle and Near East, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Regional bids for available activity resources will be championed by the relevant sections and resolved in MOD according to the SCOG ISC priorities. When appropriate, such decisions will guide the individual services, and so the RAF will amend its AREP. These regional sections in International Policy and Planning are expected to liaise with their relevant colleagues in the FCO and DFID.

UK defense attachés in the respective countries are the entry point to the country for any activity, including those related to operations. In theory, the more important countries will have larger defense sections, with two or more attachés; this reflects both the amount of representative work expected of the posts and the amount of defence diplomacy activity in or from the country. Consequently, MOD views attachés and defense sections as the most important starting point for defence diplomacy. Interestingly, MOD central staff policymakers have little interaction with foreign attachés in London. The attachés in London are ministered to by a section within the central staffs, and much more credence is attached to the UK staff in the defence section overseas.

The intention to establish defence diplomacy or a successor program as a funded military task is likely to lead MOD to review the career structure and employment of attachés. At present, most are end-of-career officers, leading to two main problems: They may have varying degrees of experience and interest in military soft power, and they are rarely able to be employed in defence diplomacy staff positions in MOD or individual services on their return because they are leaving the service.

Conclusions

The new UK government intends to change its armed forces dramatically. Although financial constraints will limit what the country can afford, the incoming ministers have agreed to alter defense priorities to better reflect their view of modern requirements, rather than those of the Cold War.

The UK has used the concept of defence diplomacy for most of the 21st century to describe its military contribution to soft power, and this or a successor program is to be given a much higher priority in a number of ways. First, it will be funded as one of the main military tasks that underpin MOD policy and strategic planning. This should allow more effective long-term planning with a more-secure financial footing. Second, despite the financial pressures, it is possible that additional resources will be spent on delivering military soft power. MOD assesses its current commitment at about US$240 million; this could increase. Third, UK foreign policy

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53 For NATO countries the situation is less clear cut because there are appropriate command and control structures in place to resolve operational requirements. Representative activities between the UK and NATO countries will fall to the attaché. Service-to-service engagement between NATO countries can occur without direct attaché involvement, but the practice will be to keep the attachés informed and usually to ask them to broker the process.
has been changed to focus on its enlightened national interest. MOD will likely find it easier to prioritize its activities, both for its armed forces and with other government departments. Fourth, as part of this foreign policy change, the UK is reviewing and realigning its country priorities. Consequently, Brazil, China, and India are likely to emerge with higher defence diplomacy requirements to support the new national priorities. Regionally, the Persian Gulf region, South Asia, and Latin America will remain important to MOD. Finally, in response to these changes and others forecast in the SDSR, MOD’s processes are likely to change, with those who manage and deliver defence diplomacy undergoing regular review.

Despite the weaknesses in the previous UK approach to military soft power, defence diplomacy was heralded as an effective contributor to defense and national interest. We have identified a number of important lessons:

- The time frame for measuring the effect of soft power is years. Long-term planning is key to being able to plan and complete activities that deliver worthwhile effects.
- MOD retains only a limited capacity to plan, coordinate, and execute defence diplomacy activities. The management of these activities was made more difficult with the disbandment of the defence diplomacy military task to split its activities across other military tasks. In an administrative system built around a strong central staff with individual-service support to joint organizations, the limited capacity of central staff management has led the individual services to develop their own management systems.
- The officials we spoke with stressed the importance of flagship PME courses as a soft power tool. In addition to the benefits already seen, student alumni tracking, of both foreign and UK attendees, is seen as a vital step to deriving further value from foreign participation.
- MOD staff explained they are not always getting the right personnel as attachés, although plans are in place to review the necessary skill sets. Despite the need for experience, officers earlier in their careers and with different career profiles could also provide a strong contribution as defense attachés.
- Linked to the last point, MOD staff also remarked that defence diplomacy could usefully become a more important career path.

There appear to be a number of opportunities for DoD and USAF staff responsible for planning military soft power activities to engage with their UK counterparts as changes are made to the MOD approach to defence diplomacy. The adjustments to UK regional and country priorities could affect U.S. interests. It may be possible and desirable to engage UK policymakers to establish common interests and agreed boundaries. When U.S. and UK priorities coincide, it may be possible and desirable to agree on a combined approach or to operate in concert with a third nation. Each nation may be able to help the other when one has an advantageous relationship with a third nation. There could always be the risk that competitive military soft power activities, which may be inadvertent, could allow some third nations to play the U.S. and UK against the other.

The UK approach to military soft power, whether the assessment of effect or the way in which some activities are executed, may offer templates for a different DoD or USAF approach. Conversely, there may be U.S. military soft power practices that the UK would be interested in learning more about from DoD or USAF, for example the steps that are being taken to assess the effects of security cooperation activities. USAF staff talks with the RAF, possibly
OET, could set aside time to explore defence diplomacy changes in more detail to gain a better understanding of the UK and RAF approach. This is likely to be more valuable after the SDSR and may warrant specific effort outside the normal cycle of talks. Chapter Five draws on the case studies of Australia, France, and the UK to identify overarching comparisons and indicate future opportunities.
CHAPTER FIVE
Comparing the Case Studies

This report has attempted to highlight the positive aspects of and the challenges to the approaches of three key U.S. allies to working with third countries. This chapter compares these approaches in an effort to inform current USAF thinking on security cooperation. The chapter compares similarities and common challenges of each ally’s approach to security cooperation, specifically in terms of strategic outlook, partner country selection and planning, geographic focus, types of activities conducted, resourcing processes, and assessments and lessons learned.

Similarities and Common Challenges

Table 5.1 summarizes some of the major aspects of each ally’s approach to security cooperation with third countries, based on the data and analysis provided in Chapter Two, Three, and Four. The discussion below provides an explanation, analysis, and some examples of each aspect in a comparative way.

Strategic Outlook

All three allies either have been through recent (since 2008) strategic reviews, or in the UK’s case, are in the process of a full-scale defense and security review. In the case of Australia, its strategic outlook seems to be driven by a desire to maintain its “middle power” status, with a desire to obtain a seat on the UN Security Council. To reiterate a key point made in Chapter Two, the Australian defense engagement and defense cooperation are mechanisms that Australia uses to engage nations around the world and build its middle power influence, and to secure a seat at influential international tables, such as the UN Security Council. The perception that U.S. power and influence are on the decline factors heavily into the Australian defense white paper, and subsequent security cooperation planning documents that are influenced by the white paper.1 Over the past several years, Australia’s interests have expanded somewhat beyond its immediate region in Southeast Asia, which has long been Australia’s primary focus. Developing closer ties with China and Japan, for example, has factored more prominently into Australia’s security cooperation activities at the senior official level. Australia also has growing interests in Africa.

France’s security cooperation efforts were criticized in the 2008 white paper for being too dispersed, being based on outdated defense agreements, and insufficiently integrating military

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1 Australian DoD, 2009c.
and police security cooperation activities.\textsuperscript{2} As a result, France’s strategic outlook has focused on the countries and regions most relevant to its strategic interests (i.e., preventing crises, and combating terrorism, piracy, and trafficking).

Similar to France, the UK, through its SDSR, is refocusing its defence diplomacy efforts, moving beyond a focus on sub-Saharan Africa to include other regions of renewed strategic

\textsuperscript{2} Commission du Livre blanc, 2008.

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\textsuperscript{a} Australian DoD, 2009c.  
\textsuperscript{b} Commission du Livre blanc, 2008.  
\textsuperscript{c} Her Majesty’s Government, 2010a.
interest. The UK’s approach to working with third countries and, indeed, its foreign policy more generally, are no longer thought of as simply a “force for good, but rather are considered in the context of what is and is not important to the UK’s national interests. Constrained resources in a tight fiscal environment are the main driver of this refined approach. What is interesting, however, is that, according to officials the team spoke with, in the context of the SDSR and the subsequent budget review, resources devoted to defence diplomacy are expected to increase as other major acquisition programs, for example, are likely to decrease.3

Partner Selection and Planning
In terms of partner selection and prioritization, both Australia and the UK use a top-down approach, similar to that of the United States, which publishes national strategic guidance first, followed closely by the drafting of subsequent strategic planning documents. Resources are then allocated to support the plans. More often than not, resources tend to come from within approved operational budgets, rather than from a separate security cooperation funding source. Again in Australia and the UK, the military departments prioritize partners in their defence engagement plans. However, these priorities have been predetermined by higher-level security cooperation coordination groups. The military departments, therefore, do not have a great deal of flexibility in making their own decisions about activities to conduct in specific partner countries.

France, on the other hand, has more of a bottom-up approach to partner selection and planning, based on the core principle of equality. According to the 2008 white paper, France will engage partner countries on equal terms to the extent possible, and encourage them to take ownership of any capacity-building training or equipment that France provides. This is exemplified in the ENVR concept of African-owned and operated training centers, where France and its allies mainly provide only the instructors. Even in the French case, however, some degree of top-down approach remains, as partner countries’ requests for assistance are assessed and answered based on how well they fit France’s strategic interests.

Geographic Focus
To varying degrees, all three allies studied have global interests, Australia less so than the UK or France. These are reflected in their white papers and other national-level documents and in the security cooperation approaches and activities they conduct with selected partner countries.

Australia has been anchored to its immediate region of Southeast Asia and maintains that focus; yet, at the same time, it is expanding its interests in Northeast Asia (e.g., Japan and China) and is showing a greater interest in Africa. France is in the process of rethinking its national interest as it pertains to security cooperation investments and is thus beginning to reach out in a more deliberate way to countries that lie outside of its postcolonial relationships. The UK is moving away from a global “force for good” approach and focusing on its “enlightened national interest.” The new foreign policy is to engage with emerging powers and traditional friends and to maintain existing alliances. Military soft power activities are likely to be given a higher priority in the UK MOD and will follow the foreign policy lead to these countries and regions.

Each ally reviewed tends to prioritize specific countries, rather than taking a regional approach to building capacity. This approach could be more a reflection of resource limitations than an actual decision not to build regional capacity.

Types of Activities Conducted
Australia, France, and the UK all use their armed forces for soft power in similar ways. The types of activities conducted generally include joint PME, bilateral exercises, small training teams, seminars and conferences, exchange officers, and staff talks.

Australia emphasizes PME; small, focused training teams; and bilateral exercises. It distinguishes between defence engagement, which includes staff talks and conferences, for example, and defence cooperation, which is viewed as consisting more of hands-on activities designed to build or increase capacity by providing training and equipment. According to the officials we spoke with, the small training team concept works particularly well for Australia. Small teams of experts are deployed for relatively short periods, often at very little notice, to assist partner countries with specific issues. For example, the Vietnamese government recently asked the RAN to provide personnel with training to handle shipboard emergencies. Australia responded by sending a small team to provide this training.

France tends to focus largely, but not exclusively, on training and advisory types of activities, which have been concentrated on Francophone Africa in the past. Similar to Australia, France also distinguishes its activities in two categories but, unlike Australia, focuses more on time lines than types of activities. France emphasizes structural cooperation projects, which last roughly five years, and operational cooperation projects, which last only about a year. France is tending more and more to work its security cooperation projects through international and regional organizations, such as the EU and AU. The approach to its larger training and assistance programs, such as RECAMP and EURORECAMP, is joint, rather than single-service efforts.

The UK also distinguishes two categories of activities, but the criteria are different from those of Australia and France. Strategic insight activities rely on gathering data to better understand the country’s situation, political dynamics, economic outlook, and any threats to its security. The second type, influence, is the ability to help shape the decisions of the leadership of a country. Importantly, the UK considers its defense attachés to be primary contributors to military soft power activities. By comparison, the United States considers its defense attachés and security cooperation office personnel to be resources that enable security cooperation, not an activity in and of themselves.

Each ally we studied appears similar to the United States in terms of the types of activities conducted. Therefore, to the extent national interests align, it is certainly possible to identify partnering opportunities with the United States to achieve the same or similar security cooperation ends, and to leverage available resources.

Resourcing Approach
For officially designated security cooperation activities (i.e., resourced activities programmed in the budgets), the UK and Australia have a more centralized approach to funding. In the UK, a portion of the funds from several government departments are pooled, and responsibility for determining which projects are supported is shared among the MOD, the FCO, and DFID. Moreover, a large portion of Australia’s security cooperation programs are centralized and are funded under a single source—the Defence Cooperation Program. Similarly, France
appears to be moving more in the direction of pooled funding, similar to the approaches of the UK and Australia. The United States, by contrast, has a more decentralized approach to resourcing security cooperation activities, although in mid-2011, DoD is exploring options for pooling limited security cooperation resources, including those of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, based on the UK model, when management and oversight would be shared.4

Assessment and Lessons Learned
Interestingly, none of the allies surveyed claimed to have established any kind of process for systematically analyzing the performance or effectiveness of their defense security cooperation efforts with partner countries. At best, ad-hoc assessments are conducted by way of after-action reports immediately after the event, more as a matter of keeping some kind of record of what happened and documenting any issues that occurred.

The closest the team came to identifying a lessons learned process is in France, which has a process for assessing its structural (i.e., longer-term institution-building) projects. In-country pilot committees, consisting of the project’s director, the relevant defense attaché, and the military personnel involved, informally assess progress every six months. The UK has similar assessment processes operating within the individual services; however, evidence of these and how they work was not uncovered during our discussions in the MOD.

Officials from all three allies, especially UK and Australian defense officials, expressed a strong desire from senior leadership to do a better job assessing the results and cost-effectiveness of their security cooperation activities with third countries. All are under budgetary pressures to identify the activities and efforts that provide the best tangible benefits to the partner and to the source country. We recommended to these officials that they consider consulting several recent RAND and other key publications on assessing the effectiveness and performance of security cooperation programs and activities.5

As to lessons identified and lessons learned,6 all three allies have processes in place at the service and joint levels for collecting, analyzing, validating, and disseminating lessons from the field. However, these processes pertain to military operations only and are not geared toward identifying lessons from security cooperation activities. Security cooperation assessment processes are closely tied to and, in many cases, dependent on the data from lessons learned. For example, lessons identified regarding coalition operation effectiveness can in many cases be tied directly back to predeployment security cooperation training or exercises conducted by allies with the partners to help them prepare. It may be appropriate to tie these processes together for practical considerations. The lessons learned offices in the respective countries have the necessary resources and trained personnel who are capable not only of collecting data,

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6 British officials distinguish between lessons identified and lessons learned. Basically, a lesson is simply “identified” until the issue is fixed in practice, when it becomes a lesson “learned.”
but also of assessing them and, moreover, validating and disseminating the insights back to the operational units or to the training communities. However, security cooperation program managers and those executing the specific events do not have the same level of training, so security cooperation assessments remain mostly at a basic level of information (i.e., reporting mainly on what happened, not what the implications are).

Conclusion

All three allies surveyed are clearly undergoing changes to their security cooperation approaches, and not all of the implications of these changes were apparent at the time of writing. Thus, the previous case study chapters have attempted to identify trends to the extent possible. The following chapter attempts to relate the issues discussed in this chapter to the security cooperation approach of USAF and DoD more broadly, to provide a first cut at actionable recommendations.
The premise behind our research was that DoD and specifically USAF officials do not have great insight on the security cooperation activities key allies conduct around the world; how they plan for, resource, and assess these activities; what their overall goals and objectives are; and what allied lessons might be applicable to the United States. Without such knowledge, it is virtually impossible to identify security cooperation partnering opportunities with U.S. allies in a comprehensive way when strategic interests align.

The research for this report focused on three key U.S. allies—Australia, France, and the UK—each with global interests and a diversified toolbox of activities that in many ways resemble those of the United States, albeit on a smaller scale in terms of mission manpower and funding. These three allies were selected from the pool of current OET countries, at the request of the USAF sponsor. The interests of the allies surveyed in this report largely overlap those of the United States, which include, for example, building the capacities of weak and failing States to prevent and manage crises; combating terrorism, piracy, and trafficking; and promoting democracy and the rule of law.

This report has argued that USAF and, indeed, DoD more broadly should increase their awareness of the kinds of approaches, resources expended, and specific security cooperation activities of key U.S. allies. It has also argued that these may offer lessons about how U.S. allies approach working with partner countries that may be beneficial to USAF, for example, in the way in which they economize limited resources and plan directly with interagency civilian counterparts.

This chapter consolidates our findings and analysis and provides several conclusions, best practices, and recommendations for USAF consideration. We have grouped the conclusions and best practices under headings that link directly to the insights in Chapter Five.

Our approach did not easily lend itself to producing a host of specific, actionable recommendations for USAF, since most of the research effort focused on gathering the data needed to characterize how, overall, each ally approached working with third countries. Nevertheless, we were able to identify several recommendations that USAF may wish to explore in greater detail. We have further offered recommendations below in the spirit of improving partnering opportunities with Australia, France, and the UK in security cooperation with third countries, and of learning lessons from each other’s approaches.

The chapter concludes with a brief synopsis that considers prospects for future research, particularly as this research was a first cut at understanding best practices and learning lessons from the security cooperation approaches of key U.S. allies.
Conclusions and Best Practices

This section consolidates our conclusions and identifies a few areas of possible best practices for DoD and USAF consideration. These areas focus on improving joint and interagency partnering and planning, combining resources, and partnering with allies when national interests align. It is important to note that this section draws on completed and published RAND work on security cooperation, specifically USAF security cooperation approaches for working with partners.1

Improving Joint and Interagency Partnering and Planning

A comparison of the approaches of U.S. allies to security cooperation with those of DoD or USAF immediately highlights one point: The United States devotes a much higher level of resources to this mission than the others do. Therefore, while the allies may have been able to overcome coordination problems at the joint and interagency levels through political will, far fewer stakeholders have been involved in the coordination process. By sheer numbers, the processes are thus inherently less complicated.

The security cooperation activities of all three allies are tied to national-level interagency-approved foreign-policy objectives. The processes are such that it is unlikely that an event would be planned and subsequently funded in a country that was not mentioned or deemed important within the context of national-level foreign policy goals.

Overall, our research indicates that Australia, the UK, and France all have tight planning processes at the joint level, and military personnel have civilian counterparts in place for security cooperation. One reason for this, as mentioned previously, has to do with the smaller numbers of personnel and stakeholder organizations in comparison with the United States. Typically, one or perhaps two individuals may be in charge of “air force security cooperation, for example, at the headquarters planning level. That same task in USAF, by comparison, generally includes a host of planners each of the Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA), Headquarters Air Force Operations, Plans and Requirements (AF/A3/5), and at the respective geographic major commands and numbered air forces, and even more if the functional major commands are included.

Additionally, in our examination of the allies, the defense headquarters staff members tend to be located in the same building, or very nearby, making regular face-to-face meetings more likely. Compare this to USAF, where the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (SAF) and Headquarters USAF (HAF) are in the same city, but not the same location, and the geographic major commands and numbered air forces can be many time zones away. Add in the other military services; the U.S. Joint Staff; the Office of Secretary of Defense; the combatant commands; interagency actors, such as the departments of State, Energy, and Transportation; and others with a role in security cooperation, and suddenly the stakeholder picture is extremely complicated, convoluted, and widely dispersed.

Even without the large number of stakeholders, the coordination and deconfliction process is still broken in the United States. Conversely, the allies we looked at have only one plan

for each service, and this plan is often simply a matrix of objectives and activities. Regular planning meetings ensure a large degree of visibility over security cooperation activities currently taking place or planned. Having top-level direction to coordinate means that these interagency actors tend to work together from the same plan, to coordinate, deconflict, address key gaps in assistance, and leverage scarce resources.

By comparison, both SAF and HAF issue strategic planning guidance—the Global Partnership Strategy and CSP, respectively—to USAF. Both SAF and HAF manage a handful of security cooperation programs to set the objectives and manage the resources. Within USAF’s component commands, SAF/IA integrates security cooperation activities in its country pages, which are short of country plans and do not incorporate the activities of the other military services (such as Army and Navy aviation), the National Guard (such as the State Partnership Program), U.S. government actors (such as the Federal Aviation Administration), or key allies (such as the UK, France, and Australia).

One possible best practice from the allies is to develop synergies across the various organizations and stakeholders mentioned previously, perhaps by creating small planning teams focused by country. The development of and illustrative country air, space, and cyberspace plan for the affected U.S. government agencies and departments, especially the departments of Defense, State, and Transportation, and a few others, might be one way to socialize and test a possible new joint and interagency planning process. Such a plan might consist of interagency objectives, security cooperation programs and activities, identified resources, and metrics for assessing the plan’s effectiveness.

Combining Resources

Each ally we surveyed distinguishes between security cooperation activities, which include shorter-term operational activities, and longer-term institution-building and professionalization activities. This distinction is not as apparent in the U.S. system, which is more closely tied to authorities (e.g., training and nontraining; equipping, advising, and assisting; and engaging nonmilitary security forces). A considerable amount of the allies’ resources are pooled under a single authority to plan and execute.

The allies surveyed employ a concept of combining or pooling their government’s resources for security cooperation. These pools are overseen by senior officials from defense and foreign affairs, and, in the case of the UK, the development community.

Security cooperation resourcing pooling has some potential benefits, specifically in the context of USAF-managed security cooperation resources. Resource pooling could help ensure that program managers are not competing against one another for sustained or additional resources. This pooling approach would remove some of the control from the program managers, which could be a positive move because coordination and deconfliction among programs has been a challenge. Moreover, USAF’s new 2010 CSP was drafted in part to address this issue. Pooling resources could be one way to ensure that visibility would no longer be an acute issue. The pools of resources should be overseen at the headquarters level, ideally by the manager of CSP, is which currently the Air Staff, A3/5.

Of course, resource pooling has its drawbacks. For example, it is quite probable that the defense, foreign policy, and development communities might all agree to undertake a specific

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2 These include defence engagement and defence cooperation for Australia, structural and operational for France, and strategic insight and influence for the UK.
Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries

project in a partner country from a strategic planning perspective, but from an execution perspective, the methods of engagement could differ considerably. This was the case in the UK, where pooled resources for defence diplomacy involve the MOD, FCO, and DFID, which often disagree over the means of execution.

With pooling as a possible best practice and these considerations in mind, our analysis led us to believe that the pooling concept has some real benefits, both from a planning and an economizing resources perspective, that USAF could consider, particularly in the context of the security cooperation programs that it manages directly.

Partnering with U.S. Allies

We have identified three key areas for partnering with U.S. allies: staff talks, exercises, and training followed by exercises.3

Staff talks are a key area for collaboration with U.S. allies. U.S. allies all conduct staff talks, and USAF is no exception. USAF conducts a variety of staff talks at various levels, from chiefs of staff to operators, with allies and partner countries around the world. Working groups on specific topics (such as space and other areas of technical cooperation) also exist with key allies and partners. Many of these working groups have resulted from more-formal staff talk discussions. USAF staff talks focus primarily on bilateral relationships. For example, as mentioned in Chapter One, the Air Staff A3/5 holds bilateral OET with 14 countries. Multilateral staff talks are a logical next step, perhaps focused on a specific issue, such as security cooperation. The process might start with a request to one ally for focused discussions during the OET on the topic of security cooperation, defence diplomacy, etc., and then invitations to other allies to join as the discussion takes shape.

Exercises are another key area that could be ripe for partnering with key allies. USAF hosts a number of bilateral and multilateral field and tabletop exercises with partner countries of varying capabilities and capacities. It is conceivable that allies might cohost a few of these exercises, starting perhaps with the tabletop exercise concept, using the AF/A5X-managed BP seminars as the vehicle. Real-world experiences in Afghanistan, for example, could be discussed. The content of these exercises could be discussed and coordinated during USAF staff talks with the individual allies.

Training followed with exercises to test skills and readiness is another area in which USAF might partner with an ally. Australia, France, the UK, and the United States frequently deploy military training teams around the world. However, unless an exercise is part of the original training package, these skills are often not tested in a realistic context in the field. It would be useful to coordinate training events with planned exercises, and to ensure that the skills employed in a bilateral or multilateral exercise take advantage of the recent training. Here again, such events could be coordinated during the staff talks.

While this report has focused mainly on identifying best practices with regard to our allies’ approaches, it is important to note that shortcomings also exist that the United States should not emulate. First, in the UK’s pooled resources approach, an interagency committee decides which projects to undertake. Guidance is not clear on how projects should be executed.

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3 We were not able to identify every country where U.S. and allied interests overlap; this was not one of our goals. These data simply were not available to the study team from the allies due to the sensitivities. Therefore, in an effort to identify partnering opportunities, it is more useful to focus on the different types of activities rather than the opportunities for partnering in specific countries.
This becomes apparent when both the development and defense communities have a role in project execution. Generally speaking, the development community tends to have a longer-term whole-government focus, while the military takes the short-term approach of fixing the immediate problem and working with a single defense agency to do so. The pooled resources concept would have to be done with foresight not only about joint planning and resourcing, but also for executing the projects.

Second, none of the allies surveyed have developed and implemented an assessment framework for their security cooperation activities. This presents a potential opportunity for the United States to share its security cooperation assessment lessons and approaches with these allies, rather than the United States learning from them in this area.

Third, new strategic directions coupled with resource constraints have led certain allies to decrease their overall level of activity, and, in the more extreme specific cases, pull out of certain countries. French budgetary limitations have been the impetus of a policy to work directly through other donors and international organizations (i.e., the EU in particular) at the expense of a robust bilateral approach. While working with, by, and through others can be a useful option for the United States in some instances, it should not be the only option. Working through others entails combining objectives with these organizations, which may be the best way to further U.S. national objectives.

This section has identified areas of best practices for DoD and USAF consideration, and a few areas in which the United States should not necessarily emulate the allies’ approaches. The next section provides the team’s more-specific recommendations, based on the conclusions and best practices identified and insights from Chapter Five.

**Recommendations**

**Planning**

The case study analysis revealed several areas for possible action in this area. First, USAF should discuss security cooperation formally with key allies during routine USAF-managed staff discussions, at the senior and working levels, including consultative talks, the Air Senior National Representative (ASNR) Talks, and OET, to identify areas of potential partnering and to learn lessons from each other’s approaches.

Second, USAF should consider developing air, space, and cyberspace country plans that capture allies’ security cooperation activities. The key would be to identify allies’ activities in each respective country to improve their visibility to the U.S. planning community. U.S. planners, however, should not rely on these completely, in the event an ally decides to cancel some plans. The inclusion of the allies’ activities does not imply cooperation in every instance; bilateral activities may be more appropriate at some times than at others.

In the short term, however, allies’ security cooperation activities should be included in each of the SAF/IA-managed country pages, which are currently housed on the Knowledgebase system. This information would be a good way to identify possible partnering opportunities, such as combined seminars, workshops, and staff talks, or capacity-building events, such as training and exercises.

Third, together with the U.S. Joint Staff, USAF should consider discussing joint and interagency planning processes with Australia and France, in particular, to learn possible lessons. The intensive engagement of the AFP and France’s integration of the gendarmerie and
police are examples of success. In France, DCSD’s recent name change reflects this evolution. At the embassy level, defense and internal security attachés work together to cover the whole spectrum of security issues. In addition, working together with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and coordinating with the U.S. Navy, USAF may also see advantage in exploring potential areas of collaboration with Australia and its regional partners in maritime patrol and surveillance in the Pacific. This issue could be discussed during the ASNRs, for example, or employed as a scenario in the bilateral or multilateral BP seminars held with Australia and other partners in the region.

Finally, USAF should consider how its security cooperation activities contribute to soft power. Such research and analysis may provide a framework for aligning the various activities of the United States and its allies described as, for example, security cooperation, security assistance, defence engagement, defence cooperation, structural and operational, and strategic insight and influence. Such an alignment, alongside USAF hard-power activities, may suggest better ways for working with the other services, and other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of State, and for engaging with allies.

**Resourcing**

USAF should explore collaboration opportunities to leverage shrinking budgetary resources devoted to security cooperation. For example, relatively small budgets in Australia and France provide an opportunity for increasing collaboration. In particular, smaller cooperation budgets and fewer personnel mean that France will increasingly pool resources and engage in multilateral, rather than bilateral, initiatives. French engagement of the EU and other countries in the RECAMP project suggests that this process is already largely under way.

Second, in coordination with OSD and the Department of State, USAF should engage the UK directly and at multiple levels on changes in defence diplomacy and budget increases that will result from the UK’s comprehensive SDSR, as the recommendations and decisions are being implemented in October 2010. Although UK resources (US$240 million) are modest by U.S. standards, it is still worth exploring possibilities, perhaps during the bilateral consultative talks or OET, or various working groups.

Third, USAF should consider ways to combine resources within the programs and activities it manages, perhaps using the concept for pooling resourcing that the UK and Australia use. For example, USAF should consider using this concept, starting with the Title 10 security cooperation programs that it directly manages, such as the consultative talks, OET, BP seminars, and international armaments cooperation. This concept might be useful for testing in future versions of USAF CSP. The idea would be to start with a few similar programs that conduct the same kinds of activities (conferences, staff talks, exercises, etc.) and consider the implications of requiring the planning and the programming and resourcing communities to work together to come up with a common security cooperation approach, perhaps by country or by region.

Fourth, USAF should consider several new modalities that some of the allies we studied employ. U.S. national security interests and DoD guidance require consideration first, then partnering opportunities, when our interests align with those of our allies. For example, the French ENVR concept could be a very useful way to explore avenues of multilateral coopera-

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4 For example, defence engagement and defence cooperation, structural and operational assistance, strategic insight and influence.
tion, in which U.S. instructors might work on a rotational basis in a PME or technical schoolhouse in Africa. Specifically, provided security interests align, USAF could commit instructors and possibly equipment to the aviation ENVR in Senegal, in a region where drug trafficking, especially by air, is increasing. Such an approach would help build ties with France and the host nation, and help leverage resources (manpower and funding). Another example would be to consider new modalities for engaging partners and resourcing activities, such as providing long-term training teams, short-term training teams, embedded advisors, and loan-service personnel, based on the UK model. The French model also offers some interesting insights. The work done by coopérants and the three-year length of their stay allow them to develop personal relationships with the military of partner countries and to develop needed networks to facilitate future operations and interact extensively with the local population.

Yet another example would be to consider new modalities for resourcing security cooperation activities, when partner countries that can afford to do so provide a greater share of the funding. This approach would encourage the host nation to take greater ownership of the activity, and is based on the French model. The ENVR concept gives a large degree of ownership to the host country by giving it a direct role in the management and the financing of the school.

Assessing
USAF should offer to discuss security cooperation assessments (processes, approaches, techniques, results of recent program, and activity and country assessments) with allies during routine staff talks, or perhaps in a dedicated bilateral session or workshop that would include the United States and its allies. We found that all allies surveyed have indicated a strong desire to discuss this topic with their U.S. counterparts, with the hope of learning from them. USAF may benefit from collaborating with the RAAF and the RAF to produce formal lessons learned processes that link back to strategic objectives.

Second, USAF should consider offering to share security cooperation country needs and capability assessments with allies to identify potential areas of coordination and leverage U.S. or allies’ comparative advantages. Across USAF, needs and capability assessments are done regularly, most of them being unclassified but sensitive. When USAF “owns” an assessment, meaning that it was conducted by the United States, not as a combined effort with the partner nation, these data are typically releasable to key U.S. allies. These assessments could be discussed with allies in a broader context of security cooperation collaboration possibilities.

Next Steps
We can identify three possible areas for further exploration. The first would be conducting an in-depth analysis of the lessons and best practices from our allies and applying them to help improve USAF’s approach to security cooperation. Most of our research focused on collecting and analyzing the primary data from the three allies and comparing their security cooperation approaches with one another. Future work should consider the extent to which allies’ lessons are applicable to helping optimize USAF planning and resourcing processes internally, with other DoD organizations, and interagency within the U.S. government.

Second, a deeper level of analysis of lessons from these three case studies may help to identify opportunities for partnering in specific countries. Our research identified opportuni-
ties for partnering in terms of various types of activities (i.e., staff talks, training, exercises), but identifying specific opportunities at the country level would require more-detailed data from the allies.

Third, there is room for additional work on other U.S. allies in the same context, perhaps focusing on other OET partners, such as Brazil, India, Japan, and South Africa, which are also quite active in security cooperation with third countries.
APPENDIX A

Royal Australian Air Force Activities with Foreign Partners

Celeste Ward Gventer and Jennifer D. P. Moroney

Strategic Outlook

ADF comprises the Australian Army, RAAF, and RAN. With a total permanent force of about 56,000 (and about 20,000 reserves), Australia maintains an active presence abroad and conducts a range of capacity-building activities with regional and international partner nations. For its part, the RAAF provides niche training in aviation safety and flight instructor training, MTTs to partner nations, provides personnel to joint schools (e.g., English language training), and participates in a number of exercises.

Partner Selection

Because of its geography and the strategic imperative to defend the Australian homeland and help maintain a stable region, Australia works closely with partners in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Laos, Brunei, Philippines, and Singapore. It has a special relationship with developing countries in its immediate region, including Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, East Timor, Fiji, and Vanuatu. But Australia’s activities are not limited to its region, because it sees itself as a middle power that should maintain relationships around the globe. Thus, Australia also conducts defence engagement and cooperation activities with a wide range of other partners globally and with multinational organizations, such as the UN and the AU.

1 This appendix and those that follow concisely discuss the security cooperation activities of each of the 14 OET partners with third countries. These should serve as useful references and as starting points for further in-depth research. The authors originally prepared these as papers for submission to Maj Gen Kip Self (ASX) one month in advance of planned OETs and to provide planners with some ideas for discussion topics and to identify opportunities for future partnering. These appendices compile and summarize information from Jane’s Information Group, the Military Periscope website, RAND publications, national air force websites, RAND interviews with foreign defense officials, and articles from major newspapers, as well as defense-related news sources.

2 Major ADF operations include Afghanistan (about 1,500 personnel), East Timor (about 400 personnel), assistance to the Solomon Islands (about 80 personnel), and a handful of personnel in multinational operations in Darfur, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere.
Types of Activities

The RAAF participates in

- capacity-building activities, including providing Australia-based training in aviation safety and flight instructor courses, and MTTs dispatched to train personnel on safety, maintenance, and best practices.
- exercises, including the Pitch Black series with Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, and the biannual Ausindo Series with Indonesia.
- training, including providing instructors for the Australian Defence College in Canberra and the Defence International Training Centre (which provides English language training to overseas personnel) at RAAF Williams, Victoria.
- supporting the DCP in Pacific island nations, which includes law enforcement, border, and maritime security assistance.
- antipiracy activities, by rotating a P3 detachment into Malaysia at RAAF Butterworth to conduct joint patrols in the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

Other Australian government agencies focus on building the capacities of partner security forces, which includes AFP and Attorney-General’s Department initiatives to assist foreign partners in cyberdefense.

Future Prospects

The ADF, the AFP, and other Australian government agencies see capacity building as one of Australia’s key contributions to regional and global stability. During the upcoming ASNR talks, USAF might ask the RAAF to cohost a BP seminar to include some of the developing countries in the region, perhaps on counterpiracy or cyberdefense, or on the development of lessons-learned processes in capacity-building efforts.
Strategic Outlook

The Brazilian Air Force [Força Aérea Brasileira, FAB] is the largest in South America. The FAB fighter-bomber fleet is being modernized with improved avionics while awaiting the acquisition of a new generation of fighter-bombers, the F-X2 program. Recent funding shortages have negatively affected procurement, training, and operational flight hours. The 2008 National Strategy of Defense prioritizes the ability to monitor and control Brazil’s airspace, territory, and jurisdictional waters, with emphasis on the areas that Brazilian strategists call the “Green Amazon” (the Amazon region) and the “Blue Amazon” (the territorial waters and exclusive zones where large new oil deposits have been found). The FAB is responsible for defense of national airspace; tactical and logistical support of both the army and navy; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for counterdrug missions and humanitarian missions. A high-priority program is the modernization of the Brazilian Aerospace Defense System, which consists of a mixture of air- and land-based radar that will be expanded through the deployment of a new generation of space-based surveillance vehicles. Brazil is also developing an indigenous space launch vehicle capability. Brazil operates one of the most extensive surveillance systems in the world—the Amazon Surveillance System, which has become a regional model for international and internal security.

Partner Selection

The FAB’s international partnerships are largely shared with, but not limited to, key regional allies. Recent exercises have been held with Colombia, Chile, and Argentina. Brazil also shares an emerging partnership with Russia. To meet near-term attack helicopter needs, the air force plans to acquire 12 Russian Mi-35 Hind-class attack aircraft. The plan will likely include exchanges of Russian and Brazilian Air Force delegations and military-technical cooperation. Brazil’s desire to remain flexible and not entirely dependent on U.S. arms suppliers has also led to its development of a strategic partnership with France.1

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1 Brazil acquired 12 second-hand Mirage 2000 fighters from France in 2005.
Types of Activities

Brazil participates in combined exercises:

- Operation Cruzeiro do Sul IV (CRUZEX IV), the largest air-combat exercise in South America, took place in November 2009. Operating in conjunction with the FAB were air force elements from Argentina, France, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela.\(^2\)
- Salitre II was held in northern Chile in October 2009. More than 50 combat and support aircraft and 2,000 personnel from the air forces of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, and the United States took part in the exercise, which focused on planning and coordinating ground attack and interdiction operations.

On the training front, Brazil has made a commitment to military cooperation with certain African nations. In August 2010, Brazil announced an expanded military cooperation with Angola (as both nations share a colonial history), but the details of this new “strategic partnership” are not yet evident.

Finally, the country is a member of the System of Cooperation Among the Air Forces of America (SICOFAA), which strives to strengthen and promote ties of mutual support among its 18 member and six observer nations.\(^3\)

Future Prospects

Future engagement between USAF and FAB might focus on the development of air capabilities to support combined interdiction operations; this appears to be an issue of interest in the region. As a regional leader, FAB could function as a bridge to developing more substantial relationships with South American air forces. To these ends, A5X might consider offering to host a combined BP seminar with Brazil and inviting Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay, at a minimum, and perhaps other SICOFAA members to discuss surveillance and/or interdiction operations. The possibilities could be discussed during the upcoming OETs.

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\(^2\) CRUZEX IV “objectives” were to “train members of the Air Operations Command of the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) in planning joint operations with the Air Forces of friendly countries” and also included “training the participants in the structure of the NATO Command and Control of Air Operations in planning, mounting, and conducting operations in a crisis and low-intensity conflicts.”

\(^3\) SICOFAA grew out of the annual Conference of American Air Chiefs, which originated in 1961. The 18 members of SICOFAA consist of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The six observer nations consist of Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Haiti, and Mexico.
Strategic Outlook

The Chilean Air Force [Fuerza Aérea de Chile, FACH] was established in 1930, making it the fourth-oldest independent air force in the world. It currently has about 7,760 active personnel, including 460 conscripts. In recent years, the FACH has been modernizing its force, with the purchase of F-16s, EMB-314 Super Tucano for training, and B-412EP helicopters. In February 2010, it received the first of three U.S.-purchased KC-135E tanker airplanes. Chilean authorities presented the new planes as part of an effort to “enhance airlift capability for peacekeeping operations as well as for humanitarian assistance or medical evacuations.” Chile itself was the first to benefit from this new capacity, with the FACH delivering massive aid in the aftermath of the February 2010 earthquake.

Partner Selection

The FACH’s international engagement focuses mostly on its immediate South American neighbors (mainly Argentina and Brazil), and on the United States and France.

Types of Activities

The FACH does not provide training to other nations, but does take part in peace operations, usually under the auspices of the UN. The force currently participates in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistani Kashmir (with one military observer) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (with the deployment of four UH-1Hs).

Recent multinational air exercises include

- Exercise Salitre: in 2004 with Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and the United States; in 2009 with the same, plus France
- Exercise Ceibo: in 2005 with Chile, Argentina, and Brazil
- Exercise Cruzex: in 2002 with Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and France; in 2006 with the addition of Uruguay and Venezuela; in 2008 with Chile, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela
- Exercise Ñandú: in November 2007 with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, with the United States and France as military observers
• Exercise Search and Rescue Andino: since the 1990s; aims to improve coordination between Chile and its neighbors (and the United States) for search and rescue activities.

Following its purchases of F-16s from the United States and the Netherlands, the FACh initially received training from these two countries. In April 2004, it signed an agreement with Turkey to receive F-16 pilot training at a lower cost.

Future Prospects

New medium helicopters and, improvement of the country’s air defense system, will be the next steps in Chile’s modernization program. USAF might offer to cooperate with Chile to support these modernization efforts, perhaps by conducting multilateral BP seminars (including the United States, Chile, France, Brazil, and maybe Argentina), or, in the future, organizing multilateral working groups under the auspices of OET, including other OET partners, such as France, Brazil, and perhaps Colombia. The discussion could focus broadly on modernization of air defense systems, but could also include the role of air forces responding to natural disasters. Yet another possibility is to encourage a Pacific Rim version of the Air and Space Interoperability Council, and include Chile.
Strategic Outlook

Optimized for counterinsurgency, the ability of the Colombian Air Force [Fuerza Aerea Colombiana, FAC] to provide air defense against external, conventional threats is limited. FAC is heavily committed to aerial interdiction to support its counterdrug mission, and benefits from long-standing support from the United States in the context of Plan Colombia and a forward-based team of USAF trainers and advisors. As a result of these efforts, FAC currently fields the largest rotary-wing force in South America. Prompted by a dramatic deterioration in relations with Venezuela during the Uribe administration, recent acquisitions of Israeli upgrades to the FAC Kfir fleet of fixed-wing fighter aircraft have supplemented Colombia’s air defense capabilities and have provided a more-balanced force. While Colombia has long benefited from U.S. security cooperation efforts, it has now reached a sufficient level of indigenous capability to develop key relationships with other air forces in the region.

Partner Selection

Colombia’s international activities have mainly included engagement with regional allies, especially Brazil and Peru. FAC also engages with the 18 members of SICOFAA.1

Types of Activities

Colombia participates in combined exercises and training:

- Colombia participated in combined antinarcotic interdiction exercise “PERCOL-II,” designed to promote enhanced border operations with Peru in June 2009.
- Colombia is providing training in the use of night vision goggles at its Medical Center for Aerospace Medicine to students from Peru, Chile, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic.

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1. SICOFAA consists of five committees whose areas of research are personnel, information, operations, logistics, and communications. SICOFAA is currently planning its first joint, multinational exercise.
Colombia is a member of the SICOFAA, an international organization that aims to strengthen and promote ties of mutual support among its 18-nation membership and six observer nations. SICOFAA fosters partnerships and cooperation among air forces in the Americas by sharing experiences, training, and education, and by developing procedures and plans to improve interoperability and combined operations. Colombia hosted the most recent SICOFAA meeting in May 2010.

The country relies on foreign military acquisitions for its military aircraft:

- Colombia acquired upgraded Kfir jets from Israel in June 2009. This and Israel’s recent conversion of a B-767 into a tanker-ailifter for FAC have provided the basis for a budding partnership between the two countries.
- The Super Tucano, Colombia’s major fixed-wing counterinsurgency platform, is an aircraft acquired from Brazil in 2006.
- Colombia plans to buy the Brazilian KC-390 tanker-ailifter to be developed by about 2015.

**Future Prospects**

FAC’s demonstrated capability in counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations offers many potential avenues for sharing lessons relevant to current USAF operations, and, perhaps, could be addressed during the first OET meeting. Moreover, Colombia’s extensive regional operations offer the opportunity to enhance regional cooperation. The expanding agenda of counternarcotics cooperation between Colombia and Brazil concerning their common border is noteworthy. To these ends, A5X might consider offering to host a combined BP seminar with Colombia and inviting Peru, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and perhaps other SICOFAA members to discuss counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and/or interdiction operations. These possibilities could be discussed during the upcoming OETs.
Strategic Outlook

France’s strategic outlook resembles that of the United States in many respects. Fragile and failed States represent an important concern. Accordingly, stability and peace operations figure prominently on France's defense agenda, along with the projection of national power through international engagement. Train, advise, and assist activities are viewed as key components of this engagement, which has historically focused on France’s former colonies—especially in Africa—but has broadened its geographical scope in the past few years. The new French air force installation at the Dhafra Air Base in the UAE is the first permanent overseas air installation outside French territory or France’s former colonies in Africa in 50 years.

Partner Selection

France distinguishes its relationships and activities with foreign partners on three levels, each with its own goals:

• level one: increase interoperability, focusing on exercises and simulation training; partners include the UK, the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium
• level two: promote development of the European defense industry; partners are generally limited to EU members
• level three: focus on building capabilities in countries that require more significant assistance (partners include Singapore and Indonesia in Asia; Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf; and francophone Africa).

To select level-three partners, France prioritizes its engagement by choosing to assist countries with which it has defense agreements, and countries that are recovering from a crisis, are facing a terrorist threat, want to participate in peacekeeping operations, or are key to maritime security.
Types of Activities

The French military establishment takes great care when selecting trainers and advisors for overseas missions, and those selected are rewarded in their military careers with command positions when they return. Examples of activities with partner air forces include

- training, including training pilots and mechanics from the FAB, starting in 2006, on the Mirage 2000 after Brazil purchased 12 French aircraft
- bilateral exercises, such as the October 2009 Green Shield exercise with the Royal Saudi Air Force
- multilateral exercises, such as Salitre II in October 2009 with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States, and the U.S.-led Operation Brimstone in July 2008
- educational exchanges, such as the Franco-German school for helicopter pilots; the Advanced European Jet Pilot Training program, whose schools also enroll non-European trainees; and a Region-Focused National School (ENVR) in Cameroon devoted to aviation training of students from the West Africa region
- military sales, such as a recent sale of 24 Eurocopter EC-635 light transport and reconnaissance helicopters to Iraq, with the accompanying training
- institutional support, such as a January 2006 audit of the Ghanian Air Force.

Future Prospects

In the context of the general reduction in forces announced in the June 2008 white paper on defense,¹ the air force will lose a quarter of its personnel by 2014 or 2015. This will, in all likelihood, reinforce the orientation France has developed, over the past few years, toward pooling educational and training facilities with its allies in an effort to cut costs, increase interoperability, and pursue its key mission of air diplomacy.

Strategic Outlook

The Indian Air Force is the world’s fourth-largest air force and has over 170,000 airmen. The air force’s strategic posture is largely geared to counter Pakistan’s military, but recently emphasis on China has increased. While previously focused on ground support, its declared core competencies today are conventional precision attack, air defense, force projection, humanitarian and disaster-relief operations, and nuclear deterrence and retaliation. The Indian Air Force currently fields 632 fixed-wing combat aircraft, mostly of Russian or Soviet origin. Seeking to replace aging fighters and possibly diversify its suppliers, the air force is currently deciding on a supplier for 126 modern multirole aircraft. Current contenders are the Rafale and the Eurofighter. It is only considering acquiring aerial tankers. India has purchased C-130J and C-17 strategic airlifters.

Partner Selection

India’s air force actively seeks to exercise with top-notch modern air forces such as USAF and the UK’s RAF and is willing to travel. To this end, the air force has demonstrated limited expeditionary capability by sending aerial refueling and airlift aircraft to support its deployed fighter aircraft. The Indian Air Force has focused less on security cooperation with third countries, although it has trained air forces in countries of strategic regional significance in both Central and Southeast Asia to gain greater regional influence, combat terrorism, and secure energy routes.

Types of Activities

India has participated in a number of multilateral and bilateral exercises. The multilateral exercises include the U.S.-hosted Red Flag Nellis in 2008 and Cooperative Cope Thunder in 2005. Bilateral exercises have included the annual U.S.-India Cope India series, since 2002; the regular France-India Garuda series, since 2003; the regular Singapore-India exercises (SINDEX), since 2004; and the regular UK-India Indra Dhanush series, since 2006. Smaller, one-off exercises have been held with Tajikistan and South Africa. Israel-India air exercises have been announced, but not executed to date. India plans to conduct a joint exercise with China in
2012. Because of substantial resource constraints, it is important to note that the air force’s ability to participate in exercises far from home is somewhat limited.

India regularly trains air force personnel from a large number of developing countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Botswana, Burma, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Lebanon, Nepal, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zambia. The Indian Air Force also provides high-end training to the Malaysian Air Force (which also flies the Su-30MK).

The Indian Air Force regularly provides humanitarian assistance in response to domestic disasters within India and in response to regional contingencies (e.g., the 2004 tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir earthquake), as well as to evacuate Indian nationals (most notably the airlift of 117,000 Indian nationals prior to the first Gulf War).


Foreign deployment is centered on a small IAF contingent stationed at the Farkhar Air Base in Tajikistan although a number of pilots and technicians are also located at the Gong Kedak airbase in Malaysia for training purposes.

**Future Prospects**

The Indian Air Force is evolving into one of the world’s most capable and, notably, one with increasing rather than decreasing budgets. It will continue to train and exercise with other world-class air forces and simultaneously build partnership capacities in developing countries, with a specific focus on enhancing India’s influence in its extended neighborhood.
APPENDIX G

Israeli Air and Space Force Activities with Foreign Partners

Aidan Kirby Winn and Jennifer D. P. Moroney

Strategic Outlook

The combat capabilities of the Israeli Air and Space Force are considered unrivaled in the region. The total strength of 36,000 includes some 20,000 conscripts, most of whom serve in the air defense brigades, and 55,000 reserves. Israel’s far-reaching modernization program has enhanced the capabilities of the air force, but some weaknesses remain. One such weakness, among its long-range strike capabilities, is its aging fleet of aerial refueling aircraft, as unmanned aerial vehicles have taken a more prominent role in operations in recent years. The air force’s international engagements are limited and highly strategic. For political reasons, many countries in the region are not candidates for security cooperation, so the Israeli Air and Space Force instead pursues strategic partnerships as a means of securing adequate air space to meet its training requirements.

Partner Selection

In recent years, existing partnerships have been strained due to ongoing Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Israel has shared a military cooperation agreement with Turkey since 1996, which has allowed the Israeli Air and Space Force to use Turkey’s airspace for training. However, since the 2006 conflict in Gaza, relations between the two nations have soured, and Turkey has downgraded its cooperation with Israel and increased its ties with Syria. Israel is now exploring prospects for deepening existing partnerships with Greece, Romania, and Azerbaijan to gain access to training air space. The air force has also established a strong and growing relationship with India. The two nations share important strategic interests. Moreover, India is currently Israel’s largest arms export market.

Types of Activities

To date, Israel’s partnership activities have consisted mainly of combined training and exercises, such as
• Anatolian Eagle is a joint military exercise involving the United States, Turkey, and Israel; the first took place over southern Turkey in June 2001; it has since taken place annually.\(^1\)
• MINOAS 2010, a combined Israeli and Greek air force exercise, was scheduled for May 25 through June 3, 2010. The event was supposed to consist of simulated aerial battles, long-range missions, and midair refueling. The exercise was abruptly suspended midway through, on May 31, following the May 30 raid by Israeli forces of a Gaza-bound civilian aid flotilla.
• Glorious Spartan 08, another exercise with the Greek Air Force, took place in May and June 2008 and consisted of aerial maneuvers, including simulated aerial combat, attacks on terrestrial targets, aerial refueling, search and rescue missions, and knowledge exchange.\(^2\)

The Israeli Defense Ministry is hoping to renew an agreement it originally signed in 2006 that allows for the stationing of select air force units in Romania. The air force deployed fighter jets to Romania for training in 2007. Additionally, Israel has been courting Azerbaijan for use of its airspace for training, particularly since relations with Turkey have been strained.

**Future Prospects**

Because of its politically unpopular activities in Gaza over the last several years, Israel is unlikely to be in a position to significantly advance its partnerships with third countries. In fact, many partnerships are currently backsliding. The emergence of prospects for cooperation between the United States, Israel, and third nations will continue to depend on the status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel will continue to rely on partners willing to offer training air space, but it remains unclear whether the partnerships with Turkey and Greece will be mended, or how many new partners will be sought. In future years, it will be important for USAF to explore options within OET or other USAF-managed forums for multilateral cooperation, perhaps with Romania and Azerbaijan, in which both the United States and Israel have strategic and operational interests, particularly in the area of combined training and exercises.

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1 In October 2009, Israel was excluded by Turkey from Anatolian Eagle due to lingering tensions following the IAF counterterrorism Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in December 2008 to January 2009 and the exercise was subsequently canceled.

2 Greece and Israel began joint maneuvers in 1994, although to date, these had been principally concerned with natural disaster response. The 2008 event was the first time combat equipment had been used in their exercises.
Strategic Outlook

The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) is responsible for defending Japanese territory and air space from an attack from the air. The constitutional constraints that limit military forces, but not offensive actions, have led to restrictions on the types of equipment JASDF can procure and how it can deploy what it does procure. The air force is well equipped with aircraft, missiles, and command and control systems. However, it relies on the United States for nuclear deterrence and offensive strike capabilities. In addition to its air defense mission, it also is responsible for domestic emergency response during disasters. More recently, international peace cooperation has been added as a third important mission.

Partner Selection

Since the end of WWII, Japan has had only one strategic partner, the United States. Prohibitions on collective security outside of the UN have limited the numbers and types of Japanese Self-Defense Forces. As these restrictions have been relaxed in recent years and as engagements have increased, Japan has focused on the middle powers of Asia, especially those that share an alliance or strategic relationship with the United States; these include Australia, South Korea, India, and Thailand. Japan has also reached out in a more limited way to China and Russia. The most politically palatable partners are those in which the intent of the interaction is diplomatic (confidence building with China or South Korea) or aimed at improving nonmilitary capability such as search and rescue exercises with Thailand and Indonesia.

Types of Activities

For years, Japan’s primary method of engaging foreign military partners was through educational exchange. Since 2000, the nation has expanded its participation in and hosting of multilateral exercises, especially in the Asia-Pacific. Some examples include

- Rim of the Pacific, which was a multilateral exercise focused on refugee rescue
- Cobra Gold with the United States and Thailand, which focused on peacekeeping operations and disaster relief
• Malabar 09, a multilateral joint marine exercise near Okinawa.

Future Prospects

Over the first decade of the 21st century, successive Liberal Democratic governments allowed the JASDF to increase the countries it engaged with and the activities in which it engaged. By early 2010, the Japanese government, under the Democratic Party of Japan, appeared focused on peacekeeping activities under the UN mandate and those that excluded the use of force. To these ends, the government is considering adding education and training to the types of international engagement the military can participate in. The types of training that will likely be approved include medical, transportation, and civil engineering. Japan does not yet conduct training as part of its peacekeeping missions, but is building a Peacekeeping Training Center and will soon have the capacity to do this. While training opportunities for the JASDF will likely continue to be more limited than those available to the other services, there is a new openness to this that is worth exploring in the OET, and other USAF-led forums with Japan, including possibly a bilateral or multilateral BP seminar.
APPENDIX I

Pakistan Air Force Activities with Foreign Partners

Jeffrey Engstrom and Jennifer D. P. Moroney

Strategic Outlook

The primary mission of the 45,000 airmen of the Pakistan Air Force is to defend Pakistan’s airspace. Following that, they provide close air support for the Pakistani Army and delivering nuclear weapons. Although this air force has sought, often unsuccessfully, to acquire modern multirole U.S. fighters, its fleet of 383 combat-capable aircraft is a patchwork of aging airframes from multiple sources.

Recently, the Pakistan Air Force’s operational focus has been on counterinsurgency operations against militants along its border in the Federally Administered Tribal Area/Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPk) region. Current acquisition of a handful of (out of a total order of 18) U.S. F-16 C/D Block 52 airframes has improved this air force’s all-weather capabilities.

Partner Selection

In 2010, the Pakistan Air Force participated in two large-scale multilateral exercises with the United States for the first time. In fact, until then, the Pakistan Air Force had conducted only small-scale bilateral exercises with Turkey and Iran. Islamabad’s long-standing relationship with Beijing and a recurring need for military equipment have resulted in significant military cooperation with China. Not surprisingly, Chinese airframes currently account for nearly 50 percent of the combat aircraft inventory, including a small but growing number of the coproduced JF-17 fighter. The Pakistan Air Force does not engage in extensive partner training, capacity building, or assistance, although has recently provided support to Sri Lanka in conjunction with China.

Types of Activities

The Pakistan Air Force participated in the following exercises: Red Flag Nellis and Green Flag Nellis, both in 2010; Indus Vipers 2008 and Saffron Bandit, both in 2009 with the Turkish Air Force; and an unnamed Pakistani-Iranian exercise in 1994. Of note, there have been no known bilateral Pakistan Air Force exercises with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force, even though both countries maintain extensive political and military ties.
Training of foreign partners is minimal but includes open billets at both the Pakistan Air Force Academy and the College of Aeronautical Engineering. These two institutions have trained cadets from 17 nations, including Kenya and Tanzania.

The most recent military assistance was to the Sri Lankan military to fight Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam forces. The Pakistan Air Force was also a part of the substantial Pakistani military deployment to Saudi Arabia during the latter half of the Cold War and participated in the defense of the kingdom from a 1969 incursion by South Yemen and helped bolster the country’s security during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.

Pakistan has sold indigenously built trainer aircraft to Bangladesh, Iran, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan and China are also marketing the codeveloped JF-17 abroad.

The Pakistan Air Force has responded to various earthquakes in China, India, and Afghanistan. It also delivered relief supplies to Lebanon in the wake of the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Although the Pakistan Army plays a major role in UN peacekeeping operations, the air force is not a substantial contributor.

Future Prospects

Constrained resources and current counterinsurgency focus may potentially limit the ability of the Pakistan Air Force to engage in more extensive security cooperation activities. Given its tenuous security situation, both internally and externally, Pakistan has shown an exceptional willingness to participate in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These issues and the service’s interest in modernization could be topics of discussion for bilateral OET, although past U.S. unwillingness to sell Pakistan modern airframes may prove to be an area of sensitivity.
Strategic Outlook

The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) is a highly competent force focused on defending against North Korean threats. According to its 2005 Defense Reform Plan 2020, ROK is engaged in a large-scale modernization process that will make a larger share of the military and joint staff positions available to the ROKAF. At present, ROK engages in only a modest level of partnership activities, and these involve partners in the immediate region.

Partner Selection

The country’s primary partner is the United States. Others include regional powers that share the ROK’s objective of containing North Korea. The ROK maintains close relations with nations that participated in the multinational UN force that sent troops to Korea during the 1950–1953 war, such as the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and Turkey. Also, the country shares a military cooperation agreement with Russia, which provided Seoul with defense equipment, including helicopters, as repayment of its financial debt. In 1999, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency offered to jointly develop and launch telecommunication and observation satellites. Two ROK satellites were subsequently launched aboard Russian launchers in 2003 and 2006. Since 2004, the two countries have had a space-related technology cooperation agreement. In 1994, the ROK established an MoU on logistics and defense industry cooperation with the Philippines, and, in 2009, provided its air force 15 T-41B trainers.

Types of Activities

Currently, the ROKAF conducts joint exercises and training solely with the United States. However, the Korea Air Force Academy welcomes a small number of foreign cadets from Thailand (since 1994) and Japan (since 2002). Also, the academy plans to develop a student exchange program with Turkey beginning in 2011, and to host officers in training from the Philippines and Australia. The Air Force University also welcomes foreign officer students.

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In 2008, the ROKAF’s Chief of Staff discussed space development cooperation with his Chinese counterpart. In 2009, the ROK Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force discussed increasing bilateral exchanges, especially in the management of air-refueling tankers. These talks have not yet resulted in any program or agreement.

The ROK holds an annual air symposium, regularly inviting officials from the United States, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel.

The ROK is increasingly willing to take part in multilateral peacekeeping activities, especially since former Foreign Minister, Ban Ki-Moon, became UN Secretary General in January 2007. ROKAF’s cargo planes have been involved in operations in Angola, Afghanistan, and East Timor.

**Future Prospects**

Overall, the ROKAF is focused more on developing its own modern operational capabilities, and on receiving the appropriate training for them than it is on providing such training to third countries. Recently, the ROK’s currency lost almost one-third of its value, forcing the country to reassess the timeline for the modernization objectives set forth in its *Defense Reform Plan 2020*. These financial pressures may constrain the ROK’s willingness and ability to expand its involvement in partnership building activities in the near future. Activities that build ties without diverting major resources or manpower from the ROKAF, such as promoting academic or informational exchanges and providing decommissioned equipment to third countries, are likely to remain activities of choice for South Korean partnership building. During the upcoming OET, USAF might consider giving briefings on the BP seminars, and possibly the International Standardization Organization Air and Space Interoperability Council framework. ROK officials may be interested in taking part in a regional BP seminar with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and/or Thailand, in such areas as regional response to humanitarian assistance or cooperation on space issues.
Strategic Outlook

The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) is the most capable air force in Southeast Asia. Singapore’s air power planning is based on maintaining a technological edge over potential opponents by using force multipliers, including airborne early warning platforms, in-flight refueling tankers, and precision-guided munitions. Due to Singapore’s restricted airspace, 50 percent of all flight training is conducted overseas. Thus, RSAF depends on international collaboration with other air forces to develop its own capabilities. Singapore has used this reliance on foreign partners to develop new international relationships and increase interoperability with these countries. Singapore views its role as a small air force as one that it can make most effective through international collaboration with like-minded partners.

Partner Selection

RSAF seeks to engage partners with which it anticipates operating in the future. Singapore currently has training agreements with Australia, France, and Canada. This overseas presence—which Singapore refers to as a policy of “constant engagement”—has provided RSAF with a vehicle for developing close international relationships with key allies. It has enhanced the air force’s understanding of how other air forces operate.

Singapore has established a close relationship with India aimed at mutual capacity building. The RSAF-IAF joint exercises and training provide opportunities for increased interoperability and relationship building between the two air forces. Operationally, this program provides Singapore with a valuable opportunity to operate in India’s airspace and learn from the IAF’s experience.

Types of Activities

RSAF regularly engages in bilateral and multilateral exercises with a variety of partners, including

- Pitch Black in Australia, involving air forces of Australia, Thailand, and the United States
• Red Flag and Maple Flag in the United States and Canada, respectively, involving air forces from countries such as Canada, France, Italy, the UK, and the United States
• Cope Tiger in Thailand, involving the United States and Thailand.
• SINDEX in India, an annual bilateral exercise with Singapore held since 2004.

**Future Prospects**

Since Singapore is not a significant force provider in terms of building partnerships with third countries, the most promising opportunities for USAF lie in Singapore’s relationship with India. The unique relationship that exists between these two countries presents a possible mechanism for USAF to explore opportunities for trilateral engagement and thus to further expand USAF engagement with both. Both India and Singapore are engaged in the BP seminar series, currently bilaterally with USAF. Singapore is an OET partner and India is on the verge. These HAF-managed institutional programs offer two possibilities through which trilateral engagement might be pursued, provided it is consistent with OSD policy and U.S. Pacific Air Force concurs.
Strategic Outlook

The South African Air Force (SAAF) is the most effective air force in sub-Saharan Africa, but it lacks skilled personnel and research and development funds. Budget cuts have led qualified personnel (pilots, technicians, and air traffic controllers) to leave the country. The SAAF reportedly lost approximately 60 qualified pilots a year between 2000 and 2005; deficits reached critical levels in mid-2008, depriving SAAF of an operational fighter force until early 2009. Insufficient research and development has also threatened the leading technological edge that the country’s chief defense industries have built up, including Aerotek, Mattek, and Mikomtek. As a result of these constraints, SAAF has had to reduce some of its security cooperation activities with third countries and refocus internally. That said, the South African Defense Force (SADF) remains committed to fostering collective external regional security, which has remained a core strategic priority of the government since the end of apartheid.

Partner Selection

South Africa is particularly active with other SADC countries. With an air capability that includes utility helicopters, Hawk trainer aircraft, and Gripen fighter jets, it is the natural lead for the SADC Brigade of the AU Standby Force.

Types of Activities

South Africa trains military personnel from Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Since the mid-1990s, South Africa has offered flying safety courses for air force officers from several countries in the region. In 2008, South Africa signed an accord to train the Angolan Armed Forces on internal auditing and inspection. SAAF also has exchange programs with Botswana and Zimbabwe.

South Africa has participated in the following exercises:

1 Members of the SADC include Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
• Good Hope IV, with the German Navy and Air Force, in 2010
• Golfinho, with 12 SADC countries, in September 2009; this was aimed at preparing the SADC Brigade of the African Standby Force to undertake multinational peace support operations
• Pegasus, with the air component of the Lesotho Defence Force, in February and March 2008.

Since the early 1990s, SAAF’s fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft have taken part in numerous humanitarian operations (e.g., Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Somalia, Tanzania, DRC, Zambia, Iran, Uganda, Algeria, and Madagascar). The service also deployed in support of elections in Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Comoros. SADF has joint ventures with Malaysia, the UK, France, Sweden, Germany, and the United States. The biggest contracts are with British Aerospace and Saab.

Future Prospects

While collective regional security remains a core SADF objective, SAAF’s own lack of qualified personnel has forced it to reassess its priorities and focus on its internal defense obligations at the expense of international engagement. Reversing this situation will take time. In the interim, USAF might consider supporting South African arms exports to augment SADF’s income and sponsoring a regional BP seminar to discuss interoperability, multinational operations, and peacekeeping, perhaps inviting Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland.
Strategic Outlook

With approximately 4,000 personnel, the UAE Air Force and Air Defence is a small but professional air force actively engaged in modernizing its fleet. The seven emirates of the UAE merged their militaries in 1976, but only Abu Dhabi and Dubai ever had sizable air forces (Dubai also hosts one of the largest air shows in the world). Individual emirates do, however, still make some decisions regarding procurement and training. UAE sees its air force as an important strategic asset that compensates for a small (albeit well-equipped) army. The UAE Air Force’s primary purpose is to defend the emirates in case of attack, but it also aims to project power in the region and beyond, in particular in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. UAE is intent on building strong relationships with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and on furthering partnerships with its Western allies. It has held a Defense Cooperation Agreement since 1994 with the United States, and hosts approximately 2,000 U.S. troops. It also provides logistical support to USAF operations through the Al Dhafra Air Base, and plans to purchase US$15 billion worth of defense equipment from the United States over the next few years.

Partner Selection

The UAE Air Force has two main categories of partners: regional partners, with which it pools some elements of training and defense, and Western allies, which provide the UAE with modern equipment and/or the associated training. UAE has close ties with its GCC neighbors—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—with whom it shares a joint air defense system. The UAE’s other main partners include the United States, France,1 and the UK. UAE pilots have received F-16 training from the United States and Turkey.

1 France opened a military base in Abu Dhabi in May 2009.
Types of Activities

In the training arena, the UAE established the Gulf Air Warfare Centre in 2003 at Al Dhafra, using NATO’s Tactical Leadership Program as a model. This center trains fighter pilots from the Persian Gulf to improve interoperability, including with the United States. As of 2010, the UAE was also training pilots from the Afghan National Army Air Corps.

The UAE has participated in the following exercises:

- Iron Falcon, a combat exercise and leadership course that took place in December 2009 with the United States, the UK, France, Pakistan, and Jordan
- Gulf Spears, a joint GCC military exercise, in late 2009
- Red Flag, a U.S.-led exercise; first participated in 2009
- Eagle Resolve, with GCC and U.S. Central Command, an annual exercise to further the ability to cooperate in air defense.

The UAE has been involved in humanitarian deployments in Lebanon, Iraq, and Somalia, and in NATO-led peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Albania. The UAE has also been involved in coalition operations in Afghanistan since 2003.

Future Prospects

USAF should consider activities that support the UAE in a regional (GCC) framework—in operating their new equipment, and in activities that promote interoperability. Other areas of cooperation to consider include coastal defense and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, especially since UAE has a protracted territorial dispute with Iran, which occupies three islands (Abu Mussa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb) claimed by UAE. UAE announced in 2007 that it would purchase Patriot missiles from the United States, and as such is likely to want to further improve its early warning detection capabilities on threats coming from Iran. BP seminars and the Military Personnel Exchange Program could be useful tools in furthering the ability of the U.S. and UAE air forces to work together on these different threats and opportunities.
Strategic Outlook

The UK is a strong supporter of the UN, NATO, and the emerging EU military structure and has numerous bilateral agreements. Commitments to international bodies and responsibility for its overseas territories, as well as far-reaching strategic interests, give it a global outlook. MOD manages spare capacity of its available operational forces to support international partnering activities called “defence diplomacy.” Until recently the guiding principle was for the UK to act as a force for good in the world; this emphasis is under review. As one of three services in the UK armed forces, the RAF (with a trained strength of 40,000) works in a highly joint framework while retaining a strong air force identity.

Partner Selection

FCO leads the UK’s international policy, while DFID holds the majority of UK overseas discretionary funding. Currently, defence diplomacy is biased toward Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Partnership for Peace) and Africa, with notable partners in the Middle East (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Oman) and South East Asia (e.g., Brunei, Indonesia). Defense sales, future potential operational requirements, emerging events and disasters, and postconflict commitments govern the criteria for partner selection. The RAF ISC strategy refines joint Defence Strategic Guidance and informs its resource planners on prioritization of air force assets. To improve coordination, a new air international team has been established to better align foreign exercise participation with the ISC strategy. RAF uses a weighted matrix called AREP for prioritizing partners, which is closely tied to MOD guidance.

Types of Activities

RAF facilities offer a very extensive range of air training courses (aircrew, technical and non-technical ground crew) to international students. Places are also available to international air force candidates at its joint staff college, higher warfare colleges, and initial entry establishments. One-third (40) of officer spaces at the air force initial officer college at Cranwell are assigned to overseas students.
Recent staff talks have been held with Greece, Turkey, Australia, Pakistan, India, and Japan. Talks with Germany, Italy, and South Africa are expected in the near future.

The UK participates in a variety of partner capacity-building exercises each year with the newest NATO members and Partnership for Peace nations. In 2009, exercises outside Europe occurred with Malaysia, Australia, Belize, India, UAE, and Egypt.

UK “defence sales” are governed by the willingness of a foreign country to pay for the equipment. RAF training is often used (on a payment basis) as an inducement to such sales.

**Future Prospects**

An SDSR, the first defense review in 12 years, was under way while our research was in progress, and the report was completed in October 2010. While significant overall cuts to the defense budget are likely, including to the manpower and equipment of the RAF, defence diplomacy is likely to be given higher priority with dedicated funding (opportunity activity was calculated as US$240 million in 2009 but may double), and characterized as a fully fledged military task. The UK is likely to increase emphasis on building relationships with emerging powers in Latin America (Brazil) and renew emphasis on regional powers in Asia (India). RAF staff in the MOD expects the increase in defence diplomacy activities to lead to opportunities for better coordination with foreign partners. Given this, it is appropriate to discuss possible opportunities for partnering vis-à-vis Brazil and India at the upcoming OETs and consider other ways to improve partnering opportunities, perhaps hosting a combined BP seminar with the RAF, inviting partner countries of mutual interest. At a minimum, defence diplomacy and partnership building probably deserves several hours of discussion on the upcoming OET agenda.

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