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Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force Planning

An Analytic Primer

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Prepared for the United States Air Force

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Summary

Introduction

The USAF has a long history of working with allies and partner countries in a variety of security cooperation contexts, including building the defense capacity of those nations, maintaining and acquiring access to foreign territories for operational purposes, and strengthening overall relationships with partner air forces for the promotion of mutual security-related benefits. The Air Force and other DoD entities conduct a host of activities with partner air forces, including training, equipping, conducting field exercises, staff talks, and conferences.

The USAF has its own niche capabilities for working with partner countries. In this capacity, it focuses mainly on aviation-related activities, including air, space, and cyberspace. Many programs (or “tools”) are available to work with partner countries. Some of those programs are directly managed by the USAF, meaning that the USAF determines the overall objectives and controls the resource allocations. Some programs are managed by other entities, such as the Combatant Commands and other Military Services. Still other programs are managed by non-DoD entities, including the Departments of State, Energy, Homeland Security, and Transportation.

It is important to point out, however, that no process, single organization, database, or office systematically tracks all these programs and activities. The result is a massive information jumble, making USAF planning for security cooperation quite challenging.

This report is intended to give Air Force planners a clearer understanding of the programs available for working with partner countries around the world. The report provides Air Force planners with a better understanding of aviation resources for security cooperation, the rules governing use of those resources, and their application methods. It does so via a construct, tied to U.S. strategic objectives, that illustrates how these resources can be employed in varying situations with different types of partner countries. Specifically, the report identifies programs available to USAF planners, including their purpose, authorities, resources, regional focus, and key points of contact. It also provides a construct for employing those programs, taking into account the partner’s relationship with the United States, and considers in detail the most appropriate types of assistance, given a partner’s willingness and capacity to work both with the United States and in a regional context.
Elements of the Security Cooperation Process

The report broadly covers four key elements in the security cooperation process: planning, resourcing, assessing, and training. Below, we discuss each briefly; we present more detail in Chapters Two, Three, and Four.

Planning

Integrating the full range of security cooperation programs into security cooperating planning requires planners to gather such program details as objectives, purposes, activities, tasks, resources, timing, participants, and so forth. Officials must then integrate those details into plans that responsible military and civilian can actually execute. Except under exceptional circumstances, security cooperation planners must operate within the framework and constraints of combatant commanders’ theater security cooperation plans and ambassadors’ Mission Strategic Resource Plans (MSRPs). Moreover, planners seldom begin with a blank slate. Rather than initiating plans, more frequently they will modify and augment existing plans. And planning is inherently difficult. Typically, the planner does not have all the necessary resources at his or her disposal to implement a plan. But that is only part of the dilemma. Knowing which resources are available, and how to obtain them, can prove equally challenging.

Along with the rest of the U.S. military, the Air Force has well-established heuristics and processes to guide its planning efforts. Such planning frameworks ensure that planners consider most relevant factors and minimize the chance that they will overlook some important consideration. We do not intend to add another such framework, nor is it necessary for us to prescribe which of the existing planning frameworks security cooperation planners should employ in their particular situations. Rather, this report describes how to integrate consideration of security cooperation programs’ capabilities into existing planning frameworks.

USAF security cooperation planners have many sources they can consult for theater and country plan information. These plans originate within DoD (e.g., combatant commands (COCOMs), components, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, other Services, National Guard), the Department of State (DoS), and other U.S. government entities, such as the Department of Transportation/FAA. Figure S.1 depicts the relationships among these plans, focusing on how the Air Force and the air component commands support the COCOM. This direct support is shown in the center of the figure, with both the institutional Air Force’s campaign plan and the air component’s country plans supporting the COCOM’s plan. The importance of both the air component and USAF plans interfacing with other organizations’ plans is illustrated by the surrounding boxes.

One of the most important and practical aspects of effective planning is knowing one’s community and counterparts well, as suggested by the interfacing plans in Figure S.1, and ensuring the interchange of information relevant to ongoing planning efforts. Moreover, the importance of this network increases exponentially because security cooperation resources are

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1 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), describes the conceptual framework for planning joint operations and campaigns, a category into which security cooperation planning arguably fits. At the Air Force level, Chapter 6, “Planning for Operations” of Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1, Operations and Organization (2007) outlines the important elements of planning Air Force operations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Manual 3122, The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, describes the practical measures necessary to translate the concepts in JP 5-0 into executable plans, and Air Force Instruction 10-401, Air Force Operations Planning and Execution (2010), translates these particulars into Air Force processes and systems.
so dispersed. The most successful security cooperation planners across the U.S. government tend to be those who have built and are able to sustain a solid network of colleagues and contacts.

**Resourcing**

Resourcing, the second key element, focuses on the money and manpower available for the security cooperation mission. Resources for security cooperation are dispersed broadly throughout DoD and the U.S. government. Virtually every U.S. government agency manages resources for working with partner countries; some, like DoD and DoS, manage numerous resources. As mentioned in the prior section, part of a USAF security cooperation planner’s responsibility is to have a clear view of his/her planning network, both within and outside the USAF. The same holds true for understanding the resources, where they come from, who owns them, and what authorities govern their use.

It is important to note that resourcing for security cooperation programs and activities requires more than funding. Although funding is certainly a key enabler, from a planning perspective, a broader resourcing context must be considered. There are many different forms of resources, including doctrine, funding, personnel, organizations, materiel, training, and so forth.

**Assessment**

Assessment, the third key element, can be defined as research or analysis to inform decisionmaking. Our assessment discussion draws heavily upon recently published RAND research for the USAF and OSD on security cooperation assessment frameworks.² Within the action-oriented/

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decision support role, assessments can vary widely. Assessments can support decisions to adjust, expand, contract, or terminate a program. Assessments can support decisions regarding what services a program should deliver and to whom. Assessments can support decisions about how to manage and execute a security cooperation program.

RAND’s assessment framework contains five key elements:

- strategic guidance
- programs
- authorities (including directives and instructions)
- stakeholders
- five levels of assessment that are linked with a discussion of assessment indicators (inputs, outputs, and outcomes).

The five levels of assessment, as depicted in Figure S.2, represent the five types of security cooperation program assessments. They are nested, that is, each level is predicated on success at a lower level. For example, positive assessments of cost-effectiveness (the highest level) are only possible if supported by positive assessments at all other levels.

A critical step in the security cooperation process that is often omitted is an assessment of the effectiveness of its programs. Typically, assessments are considered complete following the submission of a post-activity after-action report. However, thorough and meaningful assessments require time and effort. Outcomes are almost never apparent immediately after an activity concludes. Considering feedback from partner countries following an activity is essential for implementing real change, as is staying in touch with the partner military in order to track further progress.

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**Figure S.2**

**The Hierarchy of Evaluation**

Level 5

- Assessment of cost-effectiveness

Level 4

- Assessment of outcome/impact

Level 3

- Assessment of process and implementation

Level 2

- Assessment of design and theory

Level 1

- Assessment of need for program

**SOURCE:** Adapted from Exhibit 3-C in Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman, 2004. Used with permission.

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Training

Training, the fourth key element, is essential to the long-term sustainment of the security cooperation process described in this section. We refer frequently to USAF “security cooperation planners” in this report; in practice, these are airmen of various backgrounds often placed into “security cooperation planner” positions without any preparation or training. The USAF does develop some airmen through the International Affairs Specialist (IAS) program, including Regional Affairs Specialists and Policy Affairs Specialists.\(^3\)

There is no comprehensive course for these airmen; the expectation is that a broad range of training and education over the course of a career will be sufficient. Language training, advanced degrees in international studies, area studies and related fields, and practical experience working with partner nations are all part of the background that an IAS airman might bring to his or her position as a security cooperation planner. These airmen thus may have many, but not all, of the skills needed by security cooperation planners. Other important skills might include military planning, programming and budgeting, acquisition, security assistance processes, cultural awareness, and program assessment.\(^4\) But not all airmen with responsibilities for planning or conducting security cooperation are even part of this program, meaning that previous experience or skills related to security cooperation are not a requirement for these jobs, and are often only incidental.

Adopting a more comprehensive and structured approach to training that addresses these skills will better equip airmen to conduct security cooperation planning and lead security cooperation programs and activities. As such, training is a key force development factor for the Air Force’s security cooperation efforts. This report serves as a starting point for such training.

Implementing This Primer: Using the Program Pages

This report is aimed at helping the USAF security cooperation planner determine the key components of security cooperation plans. Specifically, these components include the partner countries to be addressed by the plan, the programs to be used, and the types of activities to be conducted through those programs. Figure S.3 illustrates the eight-step process described in Chapter Two. These steps are as follows: (1) Identify the purpose, (2) identify relevant security cooperation programs, (3) conduct an analysis of potential partners’ operational and technical utility in order to (4) identify the most relevant partners, (5) conduct an analysis of potential partners’ political-military characteristics in order to (6) select the most relevant and appropriate partners, (7) match partners with appropriate security cooperation activities and programs, resulting in (8) the key components of the security cooperation plan. The steps are summarized in the following discussion.

The first step, as pointed out earlier, is to identify the purpose of the plan (1). Purposes are essentially broad mission areas, such as counternarcotics or humanitarian assistance, and are linked directly to the objectives found in strategic guidance. With an understanding of the purpose, the planner can next consult the program pages for relevant programs (2), and can

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\(^4\) These skills are, however, recognized by the USAF as important. While they are not a formal part of the IAS program, they are included in the Education and Training Plan for the civilian equivalent of the IAS, the “International Affairs Career Field (IACF),” which suggests specific courses and skills.
also begin considering potential partner nations based on their operational and technical utility in relation to the purpose (3). After the potential partners have been identified (4), a “second look” is conducted as a means of selecting the most appropriate partners, an evaluation based largely on an analysis of various geopolitical factors (5). Once the partner nations are finalized (6), the planner can then select the most appropriate types of activities for working with them. For example, basic training or equipment transfer may be appropriate for countries with which the USAF has a nascent relationship, whereas more-advanced activities, such as personnel exchange or research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) might be better suited for high-end allies (7). After completing this process for each partner, the planner will be armed with the key components to provide a solid foundation for the security cooperation plan (8).

**Recommendations**

Our recommendations are presented in accordance with the four key elements of the construct discussed above: planning, resourcing, assessing, and training.

**Planning**

- Consider using this primer, particularly Appendix A of this report, as a data source to inform planning and to guide the contributions of subject matter experts.
- Utilize the analytic construct outlined in this report to help ensure that programs are employed in an effective way.
- Ensure that subject matter experts are included in any discussion of planning, using this construct.
• Update program information (see Appendix A, Program Pages) on an annual basis, if possible, to ensure that the programs included are current and relevant to Air Force security cooperation planners and programmers.

Resourcing
• Consult this primer on the types of programs available, and update Appendix A to include program element information and program funding information.
• Use this primer to inform resource decisionmaking, and consult Appendix A for funding source information.
• Consider the sustainability of the particular programs in question, ensuring that those programs are sufficiently resourced to fulfill the security planner’s objective.
• Consider security cooperation resourcing in a broad context, beyond the programs the USAF directly manages.

Assessing
• Seek to implement and utilize the assessment framework described to informing decisionmaking.
• Ensure that any assessments conducted are designed to directly inform decisions that need to be made.
• Use the assessment hierarchy and the related questions to help guide assessment discussions with subject matter experts in the field.
• Consider assigning assessment stakeholder responsibilities (e.g., data collector, assessor, integrator, reviewer) in the plan, and discuss implications and responsibilities with each stakeholder affected.

Training
• Consider using this primer as a textbook in select USAF and Joint schoolhouses for those training as security cooperation planners and resource managers.
• Consider providing this primer as a reference document for USAF planners and program- mers already on the job at the headquarters level (Headquarters, U.S. Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force), operational level (major commands and numbered Air Forces), and at the unit level.
• Consider developing a stand-alone security cooperation planner’s overview course, using this primer as a foundational document, along with other related USAF security cooperation guidance and planning documents and reports, as a way to acquaint new security cooperation planners with their duties.
• Consider publishing this report, or select parts of it, as an Air Force handbook or manual to reach a wide audience.