

WORKING P A P E R

Reducing Violence in Hayward, California

Learning from Homicides

JEREMY M. WILSON, JOHN M. MACDONALD,
CLIFFORD GRAMMICH, K. JACK RILEY

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INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT

Preface

This working paper is a descriptive analysis of homicides from 1998 to 2002 in Hayward, California. It complements earlier analyses of violence in several other California jurisdictions, including Oakland (Wilson and Riley, 2004), Los Angeles (Tita et al., 2004), and San Diego (Wilson et al., 2004). These analyses are part of a series that RAND Corporation researchers have conducted on behalf of Project Safe Neighborhoods, which is a national initiative funded by the U.S. Department of Justice (grant # 2003-GP-CX-0001). Project Safe Neighborhoods, coordinated through U.S. Attorney's offices, is a strategic, coordinated approach to reducing gun violence in America. The role of RAND researchers in the Hayward project is to provide research and support for the strategic planning components of the initiative. The goals of this program are to (1) increase the capacity of Project Safe Neighborhood task forces to design data-driven strategies that produce measurable decreases in firearms-related crime and (2) improve the long-term ability of federal, state, and local agencies to work together to understand, prosecute, and prevent firearms-related violent crime within their jurisdictions.

The purpose of this working paper is to describe homicide violence in Hayward. The analysis described here should be of use to Project Safe Neighborhoods task forces in the San Francisco Bay Area and elsewhere as well as to others interested in crime and safety issues. Readers should understand that this document is a synopsis of analysis done to date and is not a final product prepared for either the funding source or the U.S. Attorney. All opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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Debra Knopman, Director
RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment
1200 South Hayes Street
Arlington, VA 22202-5050

Introduction

The decrease in homicide rates that the nation enjoyed through much of the 1990s has recently slowed and, in some places, reversed itself. One such place is the Oakland metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Homicide rates in Oakland MSA in 2002 were about a third higher than they were in 1999, and have been consistently higher than the national homicide rate (see Figure 1). Within large U.S. cities and metropolitan statistical areas homicide rates vary greatly by geographic location. There are a number of potential explanations for why homicides vary greatly by geography. For example, research in Chicago found that homicide rates varied according to the level of poverty and social cohesion between neighborhoods (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001).




Figure 1. Homicide rates, 1980-2002

Homicide rates may also change more in some geographic areas than in others. The city of Hayward, California, for example, typically had homicide rates lower than the national average and the Oakland MSA for the 1980s and much of the 1990s. Since 1999, however, Hayward's homicide rate has been higher than the national average and close to those of the MSA.

One response to community violence has been the U.S. Department of Justice's Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN). The objective of PSN is to develop, implement, and evaluate data-driven violence reduction strategies. The RAND Corporation has been charged with analyzing relevant data and suggesting possible policy directions for local PSN working groups in the San Francisco Bay Area, Los Angeles, and San Diego.

Methods

In an effort to understand the nature of violence in Hayward and how it has changed over time, we analyzed 39 homicide cases that occurred in the city between 1998 and 2002. Homicide data were missing for seven cases that occurred during this four-year period.¹ We extracted data from Hayward Police Department files on the time, location, motive, method of homicide, and the characteristics of victims and, where known, offenders. This working paper presents these data, provides limited homicide rate tabulations for specific demographic groups, and highlights some of the differences in homicide between Hayward and other areas. To complement these analyses we coupled with the homicide data information from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

We chose to analyze homicides as the measure of violence for several reasons. The detailed incident descriptions available in homicide reports help in partially understanding the broader nature of violence in a given area. The difference between a homicide and an attempted homicide or an aggravated assault, for example, frequently does not depend on the intent of the offender but on the location of the wound and the speed of medical attention. As a result, the nature of homicide incidents may indicate other issues of violence occurring in a city. For example, a city or neighborhood with a large percentage of gang-related homicides is a strong indicator of a more prevalent problem with gang violence in general. The rigor and consistency of homicide reporting is also greater than other forms of violent crime. For example, because of differences in interpretation of criminal statutes some municipal police departments will classify aggravated assaults or robberies differently than other agencies. The interpretation of a homicide is unlikely to vary by jurisdiction, because all involve the discovery of a dead body not likely to go unnoticed. Moreover, the great attention and resources afforded to homicide cases helps yield richer detail and information on them.

Results

Demographic Characteristics

Like that for all California, the population of Hayward has grown in recent decades—from 94,342 in 1980 to approximately 144,000 in 2002. The overall trend in number of homicides in Hayward has roughly kept pace with change in the total population, though homicides vary in number year-to-year. As a result, the homicide rate has remained relatively stable in the city over the past 20 years. By contrast, the national homicide rate has shown a consistent downward trend (Figure 2). In the following sections we explore the demographic characteristics of homicide incidents to partially explain Hayward's homicide rate.

¹ We did not receive police files for two homicides in 1998, three in 1999, and two in 2000.




Figure 2. Hayward homicide rate trend, 1980-2002

Age

Much of the difference in homicide rates between Hayward and the national average can be attributed to differences in the age structure of the population. Homicide victims and offenders are typically concentrated among younger persons. For example, research consistently indicates that homicide victimization and offending rates peak during early adulthood and decline substantially thereafter. This statistical fact has been referred to as the age crime curve (Farrington, 1986). Across both the nation and Hayward, most victims and offenders are less than 30 years of age, while most of the total population is older. The concentration of victims and offenders is particularly high among persons 18 to 29 years of age (see Table 1).

While the populations of Hayward and the nation have aged in recent decades, that in Hayward has aged more slowly (see Table 2). In 1980, for example, about half the population in both Hayward and the United States was at least 30 years old. By 2000, 58 percent of the nation's population was over the age of 30, but only 53 percent of Hayward's population was. The recent higher rate of homicide in Hayward may therefore be explained in part by a higher proportion of young persons at risk for both homicide offending and victimization.

Table 1. Distribution of Total Population and Homicide Victims and Offenders by Age, 2000

	<u>Total Population</u>	<u>Homicide Victims</u>	<u>Homicide Offenders</u>
<u>Hayward</u>			
0-17	27%	19%	5%
18-29	20%	41%	58%
30+	53%	41%	37%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>
<u>U.S.</u>			
0-17	26%	11%	8%
18-29	17%	41%	52%
30+	58%	48%	40%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

Table 2. Population by Age, 1980 to 2000

	<u>Hayward</u>	<u>U.S.</u>
<u>1980</u>		
0-17	26%	28%
18-29	25%	22%
30+	49%	50%
<u>1990</u>		
0-17	25%	26%
18-29	22%	19%
30+	53%	55%
<u>2000</u>		
0-17	27%	26%
18-29	20%	17%
30+	53%	58%

Table 3 displays homicide victimization rates by age. Homicide rates for persons in each age group for Hayward are roughly equal to the national average, indicating that Hayward's relatively high homicide rate has to do with the fact that a larger portion of its population are young adults.

Table 3. Homicide Rates by Age, 1998-2002*

<u>Age</u>	<u>Hayward</u>	<u>U.S.</u>
0-17	3.73	3.92
18-29	10.80	11.79
30+	4.01	4.00
<i>Total</i>	<i>5.28</i>	<i>4.78</i>

* Rates are per 100,000 residents.

Sex

As it is elsewhere in the nation, homicide is a predominantly a male crime in Hayward. Eight-five percent of homicide victims in Hayward between 1998 and 2002 were male compared to 76 percent nationwide. Similarly, 89 percent of known homicide offenders in Hayward were male compared to 90 percent nationwide.

Race and Hispanic Origin

The distribution of homicide victims by race and ethnicity roughly reflects that of the population for whites and Hispanics (see Table 4). In contrast, blacks are twice as prevalent among homicide victims as they are in the population.²

Table 4. Population and Homicide Victims by Race and Hispanic Origin

<u>Race/Hispanic Origin*</u>	Percent Distribution	
	<u>Population, 2000</u>	<u>Homicide Victims, 1998-2002</u>
Hispanic	34%	37%
White	29%	26%
Black	11%	24%
Other	26%	13%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

*Mutually exclusive categories. "White" and "Black" are single-race, non-Hispanic categories. "Other" includes single-race persons of other races and persons of more than one race.

² Comparable nationwide information on homicide victims by race and Hispanic origin is not available.

The racial and ethnic composition of Hayward has changed in recent decades. The Hispanic population increased from 24 percent in 1990 to 34 percent in 2000. The non-Hispanic white population was 51 percent in 1990 compared to 29 percent in 2000.³ The non-Hispanic black population was 9 percent in 1990 and 11 percent in 2000.

While such change could lead to inter-ethnic tensions that result in violence, homicide incidents are relatively rare events in Hayward, so it is difficult to discern any relationship between homicides and possible ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, of the 24 homicides that occurred in Hayward between 1998 and 2002 where victim and offender information is known, 15 (62 percent) were inter-ethnic. This pattern is significantly different from that in other areas where homicides are more likely to be intra-ethnic. Data on homicides in Oakland and San Diego, for example, indicate that offenders and victims most often come from the same race and ethnic backgrounds (Wilson and Riley, 2004; Wilson et al., 2004). National estimates for 1976 through 2000 indicate black offenders killed 94 percent of black murder victims (Fox and Zawitz, 2003).

Incident Characteristics

Scene

Most Hayward homicides (22 of 39, or 56 percent) occurred on streets or street corners. Twelve (31 percent) homicides occurred inside a residence, 2 (5 percent) occurred in businesses, 1 (3 percent) occurred in a park, and two (5 percent) occurred in other locations. Seven (18 percent) homicides were known to be “drive-by,” “walk-by,” or “pedal-by” incidents. Information on possible gang involvement or relationship for offender and victim was not available for nearly all cases, as was information on motive or other relationship between offender and victim.

Month, Day, and Time

Consistent with our PSN analysis for Oakland, CA (Wilson and Riley, 2004), homicides appear to peak during the summer months in Hayward. Nearly half (19 of 39, 49 percent) occurred in June, July, or August (see Table 5).

Homicides also occur on some days more than others. Homicides occurred most frequently on Saturdays, Sundays, and Mondays (eight, or 21 percent, each). This pattern is consistent with that found in other California PSN sites (Wilson et al., 2004; Wilson and Riley, 2004). Fewer homicides occurred on Wednesdays (two, 5 percent) and Thursdays (three, 8 percent) than any other day.

The late afternoon and early evening hours, particularly from 4 to 8 p.m., were the peak time for homicides (see Table 6). Further analysis indicates that homicides are evenly spread during this peak time period. These findings contrast with homicides in Oakland and San Diego, where most occur between 8pm and midnight (Wilson et al., 2004; Wilson and Riley, 2004).

³ Although these two statistics are not strictly comparable, it is very likely that, regardless how non-Hispanic “white” persons are defined their proportion of the total population has decreased. The total number of non-Hispanic white persons in Hayward, single-race and multi-race, in 2000 was 44,984, or 32 percent of the total population. These statistics also indicate how change in composition of the population can be associated with changes in its age structure. While the median age in 2000 of Hispanics in Hayward was 25.8 years, the median age of non-Hispanic whites was 43.5 years.

Table 5. Homicides by Month

<u>Month</u>	<u>Percent</u>
January	5%
February	8%
March	10%
April	8%
May	8%
June	15%
July	8%
August	26%
September	0%
November	8%
December	3%

Table 6. Homicides by Time of Day

<u>Time</u>	<u>Percent</u>
12 midnight-3:59 am	18%
4:00 am-7:59 am	18%
8:00 am - 11:59 am	10%
12 noon - 3:59 pm	5%
4:00 pm - 7:59 pm	41%
8:00 pm - 11:59 pm	8%

Weapon

Firearms of some type were used in 24 of 39 (62 percent) of Hayward homicides. This pattern is consistent with national estimates that indicate 67 percent of homicides in 2002 were committed with a firearm. Detailed firearm information was unavailable for most Hayward homicides. Knives or cutting instruments were used in five (13 percent) homicides. Other weapons (e.g., poison, personal means) were used in four (10 percent) homicides, and the weapon was unknown in six (15 percent) homicides.

Number of Victims and Offenders per Incident

All but one homicide incident that occurred in Hayward between 1998 and 2002 had a single victim. Five homicides, however, involved injury to at least one other person involved in the event. Of the 30 incidents for which information on the number of offenders was available, 18 (60 percent) involved a single offender. A sizeable proportion of incidents (12, 40 percent), then, are perpetrated in groups.

Summary of Key Findings

There are several key findings that emerge from this study. First, the analysis of homicides suggests that violence is predominately a problem among young adults and involves the use of firearms and killings in public places. Second, homicides are more common during summer months, early evening hours, and through the Saturday to Monday period of the week. This pattern is important to note because it suggests how law enforcement resources could be targeted. Third, a larger proportion of homicides in Hayward than elsewhere involved a victim and offender of different ethnic backgrounds. This finding is important because it suggests the potential role changing demographics may have on future violence in the city.

Potential Interventions

Several types of interventions have been implemented or suggested for Project Safe Neighborhoods jurisdictions. We review some of these and discuss how they might be applied to Hayward. We first describe these potential interventions and then suggest a possible strategy for action in Hayward.

Directed Patrol and “Crackdowns”

Directed patrol involves increasing police patrol to reduce gun violence in a targeted area. There are two variations of this strategy: general deterrence and specific deterrence. General deterrence involves saturating a geographic area with police presence, including stops of as many persons as possible for all (primarily traffic) offenses. Specific deterrence focuses police patrol on certain behavior, individuals, and/or places. Under both strategies, perceptions of the certainty of punishment for crime will increase, thereby deterring more individuals (at least temporarily) from illegally carrying guns and reducing the likelihood of lethal violence in the streets.

Directed patrol has been demonstrated to be effective in many cities, including Los Angeles (Tita et al., 2003; Tita, Riley, and Greenwood, 2003; Tita et al., 2004), Indianapolis (McGarrell et al., 2001; McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss, 2002), and Kansas City (Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan, 1995). In addition to reducing homicide like general deterrence, specific deterrence reduced overall gun violence and used fewer resources in Indianapolis. Directed patrol also has the advantage of requiring little coordination with other agencies, and could be implemented swiftly. Within Hayward, patterns of homicide suggest that directed patrol could focus on particular days and times. For example, Hayward police could focus on increasing patrol efforts during early evening hours and on weekends, especially in August, which may at least limit violence in those public spaces. When a series of violent incidents has occurred in a given area (e.g., armed robberies), police could also temporarily saturate an area with officers to “crackdown” on offenders in the area and reduce violent crime opportunities. Such an approach has proven to be effective in other cities for temporarily reducing crime (Sherman, 1990).

There may be limits to the effectiveness of directed patrol if the broader community perceives inconvenience resulting from increased police presence and stricter enforcement of traffic laws. Gaining community trust and acceptance to make directed patrol effective may take a significant public relations effort. Directed patrol also does not provide the prevention services that can divert younger persons from violence. Finally, the costs of directed patrol would be incurred primarily by

Hayward police, and therefore may be only as effective as department resources allow. Nevertheless, the benefits of directed patrol for deterring potential young adults from carrying guns during peak times of violence and homicide suggests that it may be a worthy investment of resources.

Offender List

An offender list can help police and prosecutors focus resources even more directly on the most dangerous individuals in an area and removing them from the community. These could be individuals with a long, violent criminal history or those who are particularly troublesome but do not have a long criminal history. Atlanta is experimenting with such a list (Meredith, 2004). Such intervention can help incapacitate the most troublesome offenders and thereby immediately reduce community violence. Research indicates that focusing efforts on specific repeat offenders can be a successful strategy for incapacitating the most serious repeat offenders (Martin and Sherman, 1986). It is not clear from this analysis that Hayward suffers from the endemic violence typical of communities where offender lists may be the most appropriate means of conserving patrol and investigative resources to curb violence. Offender lists can also be difficult to construct without consensus among different agencies regarding whom such lists should include. Nevertheless, Hayward is a relatively small community compared to other locations where offender lists are being used, which may make such lists easier to compile and to be of greater help in reducing crime. This strategy may be promising but its utility unclear without further analyses.

Witness Incentives

Some programs can be implemented to better identify perpetrators of homicides and other violent crimes. Witness incentives could include adequate rewards and relocation for persons who provide critical information to police about violence and those who commit it. Effective witness cooperation can be used by law enforcement to convince suspects that it is in their best interest to confess to the homicide they committed. Such a program might be particularly useful in Hayward, where records indicate additional information would be helpful in most cases. Confessions or arrests have been made in only 9 homicides, or 23 percent, between 1998 and 2002. By contrast, for all homicides nationwide in 2002, the most recent year for which completed data are available, 64 percent of homicide cases had been “cleared” by an arrest. The potential difficulty of such initiatives is their cost, which would be borne primarily by local police.

Firearms Law Enforcement

Given the high proportion of homicides that are committed by firearms, authorities may wish to consider greater enforcement of firearms laws. Vigorous federal prosecution of prohibited possessors of firearms is one method to deter violent offenders from committing gun crimes. Such a strategy also entails prior and concurrent “retailing the message,” in which those engaging in violent activity and unlawful firearm possession are made aware that such activities will no longer be tolerated and will result in stiff penalties. Presumably, this will deter individuals from committing violent acts and incapacitate those who do. Prosecution of firearms cases was a key component of violence reduction strategies in Boston (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996; Kennedy, 1997, 1998; Kennedy and Braga, 1998; Braga et al., 2001), Indianapolis (McGarrell, Chermak, and Wilson, 2004), and Minneapolis (Kennedy, 1998, Kennedy and Braga, 1998).

“Sweeps” are a related means for seizing illegal weapons and stopping violence. Such a tactic appears to have helped reduce violence in Indianapolis (Horty and Hutchens, 2004). Sweeps entail focusing probation, parole, and law enforcement on a select group of persons in a short amount of time. This could include conducting visits and searches of probationers, parolees, and those with outstanding warrants known to engage in violence. Presumably, seizing illegal weapons from such persons and removing them from the street would reduce violence in the area by incapacitating those perpetrating violence and deterring those considering it.

The benefit of such strategies is that, once planned, they can be carried out swiftly and yield immediate results. Duties can also be spread among several agencies, not unduly burdening any. The drawback is that involving more agencies—e.g., coordinating efforts with parole and probation officers and gun law prosecutors—requires time for planning and coordination. It is also not clear, given the somewhat limited number of gun-related homicides in Hayward compared to larger cities, that such an approach would be effective. Finally, this strategy alone does not provide social services that may help prevent individuals, particularly youths, from engaging in violence.

Enforcing Collective Responsibility

In some areas, holding gangs collectively responsible for the activities of individual members could help reduce crime. This intervention entails compiling a list of “vulnerabilities” for each gang member. These serve as “levers” that are “pulled” for each individual when any member commits a violent act. Levers may include serving of outstanding warrants, seizure of assets, or stringent enforcement of regulations regarding parole and probation, public housing residency, vehicle licensure, child support, or truancy. In addition to these “sticks,” gang members are also offered “carrots” in the form of social service incentives for desisting from crime, including job referrals and education. This strategy, too, entails “retailing the message” to violent offenders that further violence will not be tolerated and that services are available to help them lead law-abiding lives. In addition to curbing homicides, this strategy could help curb other offenses leading to homicide.

Elements of this strategy have proven effective in Boston (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996; Kennedy, 1997, 1998; Kennedy and Braga, 1998; Braga et al., 2001; McDevitt et al., 2003), Indianapolis (McGarrell, Chermak, and Wilson, 2004), Los Angeles (Tita et al., 2003; Tita, Riley, and Greenwood, 2003), and Minneapolis (Kennedy, 1998; Kennedy and Braga, 1998). The strategy offers the advantages of simultaneously encompassing both enforcement and prevention and of costs that could be shared among participating agencies. The multi-agency group needed for its implementation is also already in place for Project Safe Neighborhoods, although additional agencies may need to be represented.

Possible drawbacks to this approach include the challenges in coordinating agencies participating in the intervention. The time needed for this coordination proved to be a particularly difficult problem in Los Angeles (Tita et al., 2003). Time is also needed to gather the required information about offenders and their vulnerabilities. It is not clear that Bay Area gangs have the structure or size of gangs in other areas where this intervention has succeeded (Wilson and Riley, 2004). The very limited information on gang involvement in the Hayward homicide files also does not offer much evidence on how helpful this intervention would be there. Yet, the fact that multiple offenders perpetrated 40 percent of the examined homicides provides an indication of some form of group involvement in many homicides.

Jobs

As recognized in the “pulling levers” model of “sticks” and “carrots,” long-term investments may be needed to sustain crime reductions. One way to provide long-term investments is through jobs paying a living wage (Tita et al., 2003; Tita, Riley, and Greenwood, 2003). The primary advantage of providing an individual with a good job is that it is an alternative to street crime.

The most recent U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicate unemployment rates in Hayward (6.3 percent in July 2004) are roughly comparable to those in the United States (5.7 percent). As elsewhere, however, Hayward youths have an unemployment rate that is about twice as high as that of adults. Given the higher proportion of youths in Hayward and the concentration of homicides among young adults, providing good job opportunities could help reduce overall rates of violence in the city. How to attract good jobs for disadvantaged youth and young adult populations that have low wage skills, low educational attainment, and some cultural resistance to the requirements of legal wage jobs (Anderson, 1998) is a large challenge that Hayward and other cities will have difficulty confronting. This is compounded by the lack of evidence for specific job programs that effectively reduce crime and violence among delinquent youth (Sherman et al., 1998).

Education and Treatment

In addition to jobs programs, education, skills training, and substance abuse treatment can be critical components of violence-prevention strategies. In such interventions, individuals at risk for committing crimes (e.g., probationers, parolees, marginal students, and the unemployed) can learn to lead lawful lives free of violence and substance abuse. Los Angeles has employed these programs in violence prevention strategies (Tita et al., 2003; Tita, Riley, and Greenwood, 2003).

Such programs have the same benefit as employment: they assist individuals with daily life and help prepare them for the future. Skills training can also produce results in a short time. There are several difficulties for assessing the potential benefits of this option in Hayward. First, such programs can be very costly and beyond the means of local jurisdictions. Second, the benefits from some such investments can take years to realize. Research, for example, indicates that training for parents and therapy for families with young school-age children who have shown aggressive behavior can be an effective method of preventing future violence in adolescence and adulthood (Greenwood et al., 1998). This type of program, however, takes years for its violence reduction benefits to manifest.

Intervention Caveats and Promising Approaches

Many of these interventions are deterrence-based. For example, targeting high crime times and places with directed patrol or crackdowns assumes that violent offenders are rational decision makers and will choose not to commit a crime once they determine the certainty and severity of punishment have increased to a point that they outweigh its potential benefit. Research on law enforcement efforts to target high-crime areas, high-risk repeat offenders, and guns does provide promise that deterrence based strategies can work. Research also indicates that there is a number of promising prevention-based violence prevention programs. There are, for example, several model community-based programs that target the areas of life skills, substance abuse treatment, mentoring, and family therapy. The Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence at the University of

Colorado has identified several of these model programs and provides training and technical assistance for communities to choose and implement a set of these programs including: Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, Functional Family Therapy, Life Skills Training, and others (Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, 2004).

There is likely no single intervention guaranteed to reduce violence in Hayward, just as there is not likely any way to determine with certainty beforehand the likely success of a given intervention. Interventions may need to be revised after initial attempts. Their successful implementation also depends on good relations between the police and the community.

Potential Strategy for Reducing Violence

Based on findings from our analysis of homicide incidents and a review of the research literature the PSN task force and Hayward community could consider a three-tiered intervention strategy to reduce violence in Hayward.

Tier 1: Directed Patrol

Hayward police could focus extra patrol and policing on public spaces in high-crime areas during the early evening hours (4pm to 8pm), and throughout Saturday to Monday. During these hours and places police could focus their efforts on enforcing all offenses and searching vehicles and persons for illegal possession of firearms. Such a strategy could send a message to offenders that there is a “zero tolerance” policy for crime and carrying guns. Hayward police must take care to ensure the community supports their approach.

Tier 2: Community-Based Violence Prevention

The PSN task force could work with the Hayward community to select specific model violence prevention programs that target at-risk youth and their families. The programs selected should strictly follow research guidance on effective prevention programs. At least one model program could be selected and implemented upon review of those outlined by the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence. These programs have a proven track record for long-term success when successfully implemented in the community.

Tier 3: Select Prosecution of Serious Repeat Violence

Local law enforcement and prosecution offices could target gun-related crimes for enhanced investigation and prosecution. Coupled with this could be a public relations campaign that “retails” the message to criminals in the community that violence and gun possession are going to be the focus of a new and enhanced effort at detection and prosecution. This could complement the national PSN media campaign.

Further Directions

This analysis of homicide files is a first step in a data-driven intervention. Engaging community leaders would be an effective next step to help construct violence-reduction strategies that recognize

community sensitivities. Interviews with line officers and detectives would also be needed for a complete perspective of the efficacy of directed patrol in Hayward and how problems resulting from it might be addressed. Once mutually agreeable strategies have been adopted, future research should assess their effectiveness at reducing violence in Hayward and identify any potential areas for modification or improvement.

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