

WORKING P A P E R

Wage and Benefit Changes in Response to Rising Health Insurance Costs

DANA GOLDMAN
NEERAJ SOOD
ARLEEN LEIBOWITZ

WR-252

January 2005

This Working Paper is the technical appendix to an article published in a scientific journal. It has been subject to the journal's usual peer review process. **RAND®** is a registered trademark.

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

WAGE AND BENEFIT CHANGES IN RESPONSE
TO RISING HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS

Dana Goldman
Neeraj Sood
Arleen Leibowitz

Working Paper 11063
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w11063>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
January 2005

An earlier version of this paper appeared as NBER working paper No. 9540. Forthcoming in *Frontiers in Health Policy Research*, NBER, 2005. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

© 2005 by Dana Goldman, Neeraj Sood, and Arleen Leibowitz. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Wage and Benefit Changes in Response to Rising Health Insurance Costs
Dana Goldman, Neeraj Sood, and Arleen Leibowitz
NBER Working Paper No. 11063
January 2005
JEL No. J33

ABSTRACT

Many companies have defined-contribution benefit plans requiring employees to pay the full cost (before taxes) of more generous health insurance choices. Research has shown that employee decisions are quite responsive to these arrangements. What is less clear is how the total compensation package changes when health insurance premiums rise. This paper examines employee compensation decisions during a three-year period when health insurance premiums were rising rapidly. The data come from a single large firm with a flexible benefits plan wherein employees explicitly choose how to allocate compensation between cash wages and other benefits. Under such an arrangement, higher health insurance premiums must induce changes in the composition of total compensation—either in lower after-tax wages or in decreased contributions to other benefits. The results suggest that about two-thirds of the premium increase is financed out of cash wages and the remaining one-thirds is financed by a reduction in benefits.

Dana Goldman
RAND Graduate School
1700 Main Street
P.O. Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
and NBER
dgoldman@rand.org

Neeraj Sood
RAND
1776 Main Street
PO Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90407
neeraj_sood@rand.org

Arleen Leibowitz
UCLA School of Public Policy
and Social Research
Box 951656
6345 Public Policy Building
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1656
arleen@ucla.edu

INTRODUCTION

Many companies have redesigned their benefits plans to require employees to pay the full marginal cost (pre-tax) of more expensive plans. Such ‘fixed subsidy’ schemes have been discussed for over two decades (Enthoven 1978), but have gotten more attention recently as health insurance premiums escalate. These schemes are more efficient if workers have different tastes for health insurance, and research has shown that employee insurance choices are quite responsive to these arrangements (Buchmueller and Feldstein 1996; Cutler and Reber 1998).

What is less clear is how the total compensation package changes when health insurance premiums rise. If the premium elasticity of demand for health insurance is less than one—and the evidence suggests it is (Cutler, 2002)—then workers will increase expenditures on health insurance as their share of premiums rises. But if labor supply and demand remain fixed, then total compensation should not change, just its composition into health insurance, wages, and other benefits (Smith and Ehrenberg 1983). This paper examines whether employees finance increased health insurance expenditures by reducing current income (essentially wages) or other benefits (life insurance, disability insurance, and other benefits) in the short-term.

We know of no other work looking at the effects of rising health insurance premiums on the structure of compensation, although there is evidence on the tradeoff between wages and fringe benefits. Some of this research tries to estimate the substitution between benefits and wages using data aggregated at the firm or industry level (Woodbury 1983). These estimates are somewhat limited because the fringes are often allocated as part of a collective bargaining agreement or a less explicit process based on worker preferences that calls into question the underlying assumptions of flexible wages and costless mobility (Freeman 1981; Goldstein and Pauly 1976). Others have tried to estimate the relationship with employee-level data from

multiple firms. The implausible result that wages and benefits do not tradeoff—holding productivity fixed—are best explained as bias due to unobserved heterogeneity (Smith & Ehrenberg 1983). Other work exploits natural experiments or time-series variation. Gruber and Krueger (1990) find that firms facing higher worker's compensation premiums passed on approximately 85% of the costs to employees in the form of lower wages. Gruber (1994) finds that all of the cost increases associated with state and federal mandated maternity benefits in the late 1970's and early 1980's were passed on to the female population in the form of lower wages. A similar type of cost shifting appears to occur with employee Social Security payroll taxes, which could be interpreted as reducing wages to finance retirement benefits (Brittain 1971; Vroman 1974; Hamermesh 1979).

In this paper, we examine employee compensation decisions during a three-year period when health insurance premiums were rising rapidly. The data come from a single large firm with a flexible benefits plan wherein employees explicitly choose how to allocate compensation between cash wages and other benefits, such as health insurance, retirement, life insurance, and dental benefits, and these decisions are recorded for each employee. Such cafeteria-style plans cover 13% of workers in medium and large firms, and the proportion is growing, so they are also interesting to study in their own right (BLS 1999). Under such an arrangement, higher health insurance premiums must induce changes in the composition of total compensation—either in lower after-tax wages or in decreased contributions to other benefits—and we observe these tradeoffs. The results suggest that about two-thirds of the premium increase is financed out of cash wages and the remaining one-thirds is financed by a reduction in benefits.

Our focus is on responses to premium increases because we are interested in the allocation of compensation to the actual costs faced by the employee. However, there is a

distinction that should be made between the price of insurance and the premium paid. Most importantly for our purposes, premiums reflect not only the price, but also the expected benefits. This is a point we will come back to later when we interpret our findings. In the subsequent section, we describe our data, methods and results. We then discuss their implications for policy.

DATA

The original data set consists of three years (1989-1991) of earnings and benefit information for employees under age 65 at a single U.S. company.¹ We use data from the three-year period of 1989-1991—a period characterized by large premium increases well above the rate of inflation similar to the rapid premium growth situation in 2000-2001—as shown in Figure 1. Our study focuses on a sample of single employees who signed up for a health insurance plan². Families are excluded because we have no information on the health insurance opportunity sets of spouses, and how those might change over time. These employees are geographically dispersed across 47 states. The data also include a limited set of demographic controls such as age and sex. Since we analyze changes in employees' allocation decisions relative to the previous years, we restrict our attention to employees with at least two years of data – resulting in an analysis sample of 7,896 employee-year observations.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Total compensation averaged \$27,412. Approximately 2.3% of compensation (\$623) went towards the purchase of health insurance, 1.1% (\$286) went towards purchase of other benefits within the cafeteria plan and the remaining compensation was taken as wages. Employees in this firm were given a menu of

¹These data were obtained from a benefits consulting firm. The terms of the data release preclude us from providing detail about the company.

²We excluded a small number of single employees (222) who did not enroll in the employers health plan despite a free catastrophic health plan option.

benefit options. To finance these benefits each employee was also given a completely fungible credit allocation that depends on salary and job tenure. However, the credit allocation does not determine expenses on benefits as employees can make additional pre-tax deductions from their salaries or wages to finance benefits. In addition, employees can also choose to cash –out most of their credit allocation.

Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviation and probability of contributing, for each benefit component of total compensation in 1990. Employees spend their total compensation on wages, health insurance, dental insurance, life insurance, disability insurance, health care savings account,³ retirement plan, accident insurance, survivor insurance, and life insurance to cover dependents. Some of these components are rarely used, and the contributions are small. Rather than estimate models for all of them, we aggregate these into three broad categories – wage, health insurance and other benefits. Although the benefits in the “other benefits” category are diverse, they are conceptually related. Most of them are insurance products that involve forgoing current consumption (in terms of premiums) for future and uncertain payouts.

Table 3 shows the enrollment in each year for the different health insurance plans offered by the firm. The company offers two types of health insurance plans: fee-for-service (FFS) plans and HMOs. Table 3 shows that within the FFS class, there are three types of plans: a catastrophic plan with a deductible of 5% of salary, a low option plan with deductibles of \$300 for individuals, and a high option with deductibles of \$150. The other plans consist of 43 HMOs nationwide, with each employee’s available options depending on state of residence and year.

As with most employers, this company contributes towards the purchase of these plans. Unlike many employers, however, the amount does not vary by plan choice, but depends only on

³An employee can deposit funds free of income taxes in a health care savings account to reimburse qualifying health care expenses. Unused funds left in the account at the end of the year are forfeited.

the number of beneficiaries. By not contributing more generously to more expensive plans, the employer makes employees face the full marginal cost of more generous coverage (on a pre-tax basis). The employer's subsidy—also known as a defined contribution—is equal to the premium for the catastrophic plan.

Table 4 shows the variation in the copremiums—the amount of total premium paid by the employee—across plans. HMO copremiums rose faster in absolute and percentage terms from 1989 to 1990. From 1990 to 1991, the premiums in the low-deductible FFS plan rose faster than the HMO premiums, but the HMO premiums still increased substantially. The drop in enrollment in both types of plans (shown in Table 3) during that period may reflect these premium increases. Table 4 also shows that HMO premiums vary considerably over this period, sometimes falling as much as 26% or increasing by 34% year-to-year. We exploit this considerable variation to identify our models.

METHODS

We model how the allocation of total compensation varies with an increase in costs of health insurance for employees. That is, we want to know the responsiveness of each component of total compensation (wages, health insurance expenditures, other benefits) to changes in health insurance costs for employees. The key challenge is to measure changes in the cost of health insurance for employees.

Ideally, a measure of increase in the cost of health insurance would show the difference in the costs of obtaining a reference level of utility due to a new vector of health insurance copremiums. However, the problem with constructing this “true cost index” is that utility is not measurable. To circumvent this problem, alternative estimates of cost changes calculate the difference in costs of obtaining a fixed basket of goods at a new vector of prices. Two well-

known indices are the Laspeyres price index, which measures the difference in costs of purchasing the base year basket of goods, and the Paasche price index, which measures the difference in costs of purchasing the current year basket of goods. Although these fixed weight indices are easy to calculate they induce some bias in the measurement of cost changes. Most importantly, these indices ignore the possibility of substitution among goods due to changes in relative prices. For example, employees might switch to cheaper health plans in response to changes in the relative cost of health plans (This is true in our data as shown in Tables 3 and 4). Thus using base year enrollment in different health plans as weights for the cost index will overstate the true increase in the cost of health insurance. Fisher (1922) proposed an index that is the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche price index. The Fisher price index has much lower substitution bias and other desirable properties compared to other fixed weight price indices (Diewert 1976). In particular it closely approximates the true cost index if preferences are homothetic. Most statistical agencies use the Fisher index to measure changes in prices and quantities (Boskin et al. 1998), and this is the index we use to measure change in costs. Since HMO plan options and copremiums vary with the state we create separate indices for each state in our data. Details of these calculations are available in the technical appendix.

We estimate separate employee fixed-effects models for each component of total compensation. Essentially, an employee fixed-effects model controls for employee-specific time invariant unobservables (such as preferences for insurance) and primarily uses variation in employee choices and costs over time to identify parameter estimates. Models that ignore these fixed effects will produce biased estimates if the employee-specific unobservables are correlated with our explanatory variables. More detail can be found in the technical appendix. To better illustrate our results we also compute the expenditure elasticity of each benefit category k with

respect to the health insurance cost at the mean benefit allocations in 1989. These elasticities can be interpreted as the percentage change in wages, health insurance expenditures, or other benefit expenditures due to a one percent change in the cost of health insurance.

Our model assumes that cost increases are exogenous—essentially, that premium changes reflect shocks to insurance supply for this firm. Thus, we would be suspicious if the premiums were going up at rates much faster than at other firms, perhaps due to experience-rating. Fortunately, the premium increases we see at this firm mirror economy-wide trends. According to Congressional Budget Office testimony, 1990 and 1991 witnessed double-digit rates of premium growth in two of the largest purchasing groups—the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program, and the California Public Employees Retirement System—as well as for all employers based on surveys by Hay/Huggins, Foster Higgins, KPMG Peat Marwick, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Antos 1997).

RESULTS

The estimates for the models for wages, other benefits, and health insurance expenditures are shown in Table 5. The results show that a \$1 increase in the price of health insurance leads to a 52 cents increase in health insurance expenditures. This 52 cent increase in health insurance expenditures is financed by a 37 cent reduction in take home wages and a 15 cent reduction in other benefits. Thus approximately 70% of the increase in health insurance expenditures due to increase in premiums is financed by wage reductions. Put in elasticity terms (Table 6), each 100% increase in the price of health insurance leads to a 50% increase in health insurance expenditures, a 1% decrease in take home wages, and a 28% decrease in other benefits.

DISCUSSION

To help interpret our results, it is useful to first consider what would happen if an individual did not change health plan choices when faced with fixed compensation. To make this more concrete, we suppose there is an employee who makes \$30,000 a year and is currently paying \$600 annually for health insurance. The individual also allocates \$400 to other benefits, leaving \$29,000 for cash wages. We now suppose the cost of that insurance rises 50% to \$900. Since total compensation remains fixed, if this employee continues to purchase insurance, he will have to reduce either wages or other benefits by \$300. If he chooses to split the increase so that wages decline by \$200 and other benefits by \$100, then wages will fall by only 0.7% (from \$29,000 to \$28,800) whereas spending on other benefits falls by 50% (from \$400 to \$200). Thus, the elasticities—which are computed as the percentage increase in expenditures on each component of compensation divided by the 50% premium increase in our example—would be 1.0 for health insurance expenditures, -0.014 for wages, and 1.0 for other benefits. On the other hand, if the employee dropped coverage, the corresponding elasticity would -1.0 for health insurance expenditures. The savings of \$600 from not buying health insurance any more could be allocated to both wages and other benefits, resulting in positive elasticities for those components of compensation.

We estimate an elasticity for health insurance expenditures of 0.5, indicating that employees facing an increase in the price of health insurance respond by lowering their level of insurance coverage. However, employees do not completely substitute away from health insurance—in fact, increases in prices lead to increases in health insurance expenditures.

These increases in expenditures on health insurance are accommodated by reducing both the take-home income and other benefits such as life insurance, disability insurance, dental

insurance and retirement benefits. Thus, our results suggest that rising health insurance prices not only reduce resources for current consumption but also lower insurance purchases against a variety of risks. If health insurance prices continue to rise and individuals continue to reduce their purchase of health insurance and other insurance products that might leave them vulnerable to health, mortality, disability and other significant risks in the long run.

How do employees reduce their expenditures on health insurance in the face of rising premiums? There are essentially two options. An employee can drop health insurance completely, or they could switch to a less-generous plan. As an example of the latter, one could imagine an employer offers two plans: a generous plan that costs \$500 annually; and a less generous plan that costs \$375. If both premiums rise 100% in the subsequent year, an employee who switches from the more generous plan to the less generous one would see their health insurance expenditures rise from \$500 to \$750. (This would imply an elasticity of 0.5, as we observe in our data.) In fact, single employees in this company did leave their health plans for less costly options. HMO premiums rose 25% between 1989 and 1991, and the premium on the most generous FFS plan rose by 29% (Table 4). At the same time, enrollment in the most generous FFS plan fell 9 percentage points (from 43% to 34%), and enrollment in HMOs fell 6 percentage points (from 43% to 37%). Enrollment rates in the catastrophic plan more than doubled (from 6% to 15%); and enrollment in the high-deductible FFS plan increased from 9% to 14%. More detailed analysis by Goldman, Leibowitz, and Robalino (2004) using multivariate analysis tells a similar story.

To understand the implications for policy, we need to recognize why premiums are rising. If premiums rise because administrative costs rise—thereby leaving the underlying value of the health insurance unchanged—then we would expect fewer people to take up coverage.

However, if premiums rise because of an increase in medical care costs (such as new but expensive treatments), the story becomes more complicated. On the one hand, insurance may actually become more valuable if these treatments are very efficacious. However, if these treatments are not very effective—and only serve to drive up costs—then we would expect people to switch to less generous plans that might not cover or use these treatments. At the extreme, people might drop expensive private coverage altogether and rely on ‘safety-net’ options (Cutler, 2002). (In our data, the safety-net is a catastrophic plan that is offered free to single employees.) Thus—whatever the cause of premium increases—our findings suggest that single employees do not seem to value them very highly and therefore switch to less generous plans. This also suggests that as health insurance premiums continue to rise, we will see fewer employees taking up generous health insurance, including HMOs. One important caveat is worth noting. In our data, the premiums on the HMO plans were, on average, more than the fee-for-service alternative. Nationwide this is not the case. In any event, plans that encourage consumers to reduce waste—such as catastrophic plans or otherwise consumer-driven—would seem to have the upper hand.

REFERENCES

- Antos, Joseph R. 1997. Congressional Budget Office Statement, *Premium Increases in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program*, Subcommittee on Civil Service, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives, October 8, 1997.
- Boskin, Michael J., Ellen R. Dulberger, Robert J. Gordon, Zvi Griliches, and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1998. "Consumer Prices, the Consumer Price Index, and the Cost of Living." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 3-26.
- Brittain, John A. 1971. "The incidence of social security payroll taxes." *American Economic Review*, Vol. 61, pp. 110-25.
- Buchmueller, Thomas C., and Paul J. Feldstein. 1996. "Consumer's Sensitivity to Health Plan Premiums: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in California." *Health Affairs*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 143-51.
- Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1999. Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private Establishments. News Release, January 7, 1999.
- Cutler, David M. 2002. "Employee Costs and the Decline in Health Insurance Coverage." *Frontiers in Health Policy Research*, Volume 6, pp. 27-54.
- Cutler, David M., and Sarah J. Reber. 1998. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-off Between Competition and Adverse Selection." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 113, No. 2, pp. 433-66.

- Diewert, W. Erwin. 1976. "Exact and Superlative Index Numbers." *Journal of Econometrics*, Vol. 4 (May), pp. 115-45.
- Enthoven Alain C. 1978. "Consumer-Choice Health plan (second of two parts). A national-health-insurance proposal based on regulated competition in the private sector." *New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 298, No. 13, pp. 709-20.
- Fisher, Irving. 1922. *The Making of Index Numbers*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Freeman, Richard B. 1981. "The Effect of Unionism on Fringe Benefits." *Industrial & Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 489-509.
- Goldstein, Gerald S., and Mark V. Pauly. 1976. "Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Good." In Robert Rosset, ed., *The Role of Health Insurance in the Health Services Sector*. New York, NY: National Bureau of Economic Research, pp. 73-110.
- Gruber, Jonathan. 1994. "The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits." *American Economic Review*, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 622-41.
- Gruber Jonathan, and Alan B. Krueger. 1990. "The Incidence of Mandated Employer-provided Insurance: Lessons From Workers' Compensation Insurance. National Bureau of Economic Research." Working paper 3557, Cambridge, Mass. *Industrial Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 46, pp. 22-37.
- Hamermesh, Daniel. 1979. "New estimates of the incidence of the payroll tax." *Southern Economic Journal*, Vol. 45, pp. 1208-19.

Smith, Robert S., and Ronald G. Ehrenberg. 1983. "Estimating Wage-Fringe Trade-Offs: Some Data Problems." In Jack E. Triplett, ed., *The Measurement of Labor Cost*. NBER Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 48. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, pp. 347-69.

Vroman, Wayne. 1974. "Employer payroll tax incidence: empirical tests with cross-country data." *Public Finance*, Vol. 24, pp. 184-99.

Woodbury, Stephen A. 1983. "Substitution Between Wage and Nonwage Benefits." *American Economic Review*, Vol. 73, pp. 166-82.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

(N=7,896 employee-years)

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Minimum | Maximum |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Age | 35.1 | 10.8 | 18 | 64 |
| Tenure (years) | 6.1 | 6.5 | 0 | 44 |
| Female | 0.70 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| Health Insurance Benefit ^a | \$623 | \$236 | 0 | \$1,428 |
| Other Fringe Benefits ^a | \$286 | \$280 | 0 | \$5,335 |
| Net Wages ^a | \$26,504 | \$11,582 | \$6,593 | \$109,303 |
| Total Compensation ^{a,b} | \$27,412 | \$11,733 | \$7,277 | \$110,994 |

Notes:

^aAll amounts are in 1989 constant dollars.

^bTotal compensation includes wages, health insurance and other benefits.

Table 2. Employee Expenditures on Benefits in 1990

(N=2,934)

| Benefit | | | % Making |
|---|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
| Category | Mean | Std Dev | Contribution |
| <i>Components of Total Compensation</i> | | | |
| Health Insurance | 633 | 221 | 100 |
| Other Benefits | 289 | 267 | 94 |
| Life Insurance | 38 | 116 | 34 |
| Long-Term Disability | 70 | 66 | 72 |
| Accident Insurance | 13 | 21 | 50 |
| Dependent Life Insurance | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Survivor Insurance | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Retirement | 11 | 58 | 6 |
| Health Care Expense Acct | 33 | 165 | 7 |
| Dental Insurance | 123 | 71 | 76 |
| Wages | 26,289 | 11,451 | 100 |

Notes: All amounts are in 1989 constant dollars. Total compensation includes wages, health insurance and other benefits.

Table 3. Employee Insurance Choices, 1989 to 1991

| Plan Type | Deductible | Percent Choosing Plan: | | |
|---------------------|--------------|------------------------|-------|-------|
| | | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 |
| FFS | | | | |
| Catastrophic | 5% of salary | 6.1 | 8.8 | 15.0 |
| High Deductible | \$300 | 8.5 | 10.0 | 13.6 |
| Low Deductible | \$150 | 42.6 | 39.3 | 34.0 |
| HMO* | | 42.8 | 41.9 | 37.4 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| Number of Employees | | 2,545 | 2,934 | 2,417 |

Notes:

* There are 43 different HMOs offered—we do not break out enrollment by each plan as we do for FFS.

Table 4. Variation in Employee Copremiums

| Type of Plan | Number of Plans | Co-Premium, 1989 | Co-Premium, 1990 (% Increase 89-90) | Co-Premium, 1991 (% Increase 90-91) |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|--|--|
| FFS/5% of Salary | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| FFS/\$300 | 1 | \$490 | \$521 (6.3%) | \$525 (0.8%) |
| FFS/\$150 | 1 | \$630 | \$705 (11.91%) | \$812 (15.1%) |
| HMO ^a | 43 | \$661 | \$750 (13.5%) | \$825 (10.0%) |
| HMO Co-Premium Range ^b | | \$489 to \$946 | \$455 to \$1,110 (-26% to 34%) | \$549 to \$1,428 (-6% to 29%) |

Notes

^a The HMO copremium for each employee-year observation is calculated as the average copremium for enrolling in an HMO in that year for the employees state of residence. The HMO copremium reported is average copremium across all employees.

^b This row shows the range of copremium and percent increase from previous years for the HMO plans.


Table 5. Employee Fixed-Effect Model of Increase in Health Insurance Price on Allocation of
Total Compensation

| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Wages</i> | | <i>Other Benefits</i> | | <i>Health Insurance Expenditures</i> | |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|
| | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>t-statistic</i> | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>t-statistic</i> | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>t-statistic</i> |
| Price | -0.37 | -3.04 | -0.15 | -1.86 | 0.52 | 6.25 |
| Age | -16.97 | -0.56 | 108.83 | 5.33 | -91.86 | -4.43 |
| Age Square | 0.06 | 0.36 | -0.95 | -8.73 | 0.89 | 8.09 |
| Tenure | 49.07 | 1.84 | -64.49 | -3.57 | 15.43 | 0.84 |
| Total Compensation | 0.99 | 413.22 | 0.01 | 4.61 | 0.01 | 3.36 |
| Intercept | -97.66 | -0.12 | -1,963.97 | -3.64 | 2061.63 | 3.76 |

Table 6. Expenditure Elasticity of Wages, Other Benefits and Health Insurance

| | Expenditure Elasticity | | |
|------------------|------------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| | <i>Estimate</i> | <i>Std Error</i> | <i>t-statistic</i> |
| Wages | -0.0083 | 0.0027 | -3.04 |
| Other Benefits | -0.2870 | 0.1543 | -1.86 |
| Health Insurance | 0.5136 | 0.0821 | 6.25 |

Figure 1. Increases in Employer Health Insurance Premiums Compared to Increases in Overall Inflation and Workers' Earnings, 1989-2001



Source: Exhibit 3.3 from “Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care Marketplace: 2002 – Chartbook,” http://www.kff.org/content/2002/3161/marketplace2002_finalc.pdf, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2002.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

We create separate indices for each state in our data. If the vector

$P_{s,t} = (P_{1,s,t}, P_{2,s,t}, \dots, P_{j,s,t}, \dots, P_{J,s,t})$ represent the insurance copremiums for each of the J health plans offered in each state s in year t and the vector

$Q_{s,t} = (Q_{1,s,t}, Q_{2,s,t}, \dots, Q_{j,s,t}, \dots, Q_{J,s,t})$ represents the percentage of employees enrolled in each of the J health plans in state s in year t , then the Fisher index for state s in year t is defined as⁴:

$$Fisher_{s,t} = \sqrt{\left(\frac{P_{s,t} \cdot Q_{s,89}}{P_{s,89} \cdot Q_{s,89}} \right) \left(\frac{P_{s,t} \cdot Q_{s,91}}{P_{s,89} \cdot Q_{s,91}} \right)}$$

Finally we create a price of insurance variable for each state s in year t ($Price_{s,t}$) by multiplying the Fisher index for each state-year with the average copremiums in that state in 1989. This essentially rescales the unit-less Fisher index to 1989 copremium dollars in each state and thus makes our regressions results easy to interpret.

$$Price_{s,t} = Fisher_{s,t} * (P_{s,89} \cdot Q_{s,89})$$

We estimate separate employee fixed-effects models for each component of total compensation. Essentially, an employee fixed-effects model controls for employee-specific time invariant unobservables (such as preferences for insurance) and primarily uses variation in employee choices and prices overtime to identify parameter estimates. Models that ignore these fixed effects will produce biased estimates if the employee-specific unobservables are correlated with our explanatory variables. If i and t subscript the employee and year then our empirical model can be summarized by the following equations:

$$Wage_{i,t} = \alpha_i^{wage} + \delta^{wage} Price_{i,t} + \beta^{wage} X_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}^{wage}$$

⁴The base year is 1989 and 1991 is the current year

$$Benefit_{i,t} = \alpha_i^{benefit} + \delta^{benefit} Price_{i,t} + \beta^{benefit} X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{benefit}$$

$$Health\ Insurance_{i,t} = \alpha_i^{health} + \delta^{health} Price_{i,t} + \beta^{health} X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{health}$$

$$Total\ Compensation_{i,t} = Wage_{i,t} + Benefit_{i,t} + Health\ Insurance_{i,t} \quad \forall i,t$$

Where, α^k represents the employee fixed effects for benefit k , δ^k measures the increase in expenditures on wage or benefit k due to a one dollar increase in the price of health insurance, and similarly the vector β^k measures the changes in benefit k due to changes in other covariates X in our model. The last equation is an accounting identity and states that expenditures on wages, health insurance and other benefits add up to the total compensation of the employee. It, along with the three previous behavioral equations, also implies that $\sum_k \delta^k = 0$. That is, given that total compensation is fixed, any change in health insurance expenditures due to rising health insurance prices must be financed entirely by changes in benefits or wages.

We also compute the expenditure elasticity of each benefit category k with respect to the health insurance price at the mean benefit allocations in 1989 as follows:

$$\xi^k = \frac{\delta^k * \bar{P}_{89}}{\bar{E}_{89}^k}$$

Here ξ^k measures the percentage change in expenditures on benefit k due to a one percent change in the price of health insurance, δ^k is the parameter estimate from the wage, benefit, and health insurance equations, \bar{P}_{89} is the mean health insurance price in 1989 and \bar{E}_{89}^k is the mean expenditure on benefit k in 1989.