WORKING PAPER

IN SEARCH OF HOW SOCIETIES WORK

Tribes—The First and Forever Form

DAVID RONFELDT

RAND PARDEE CENTER

PREFACE

This paper is the latest in a string of efforts to develop a theoretical framework about social evolution, based on how people and their societies use four major forms of organization: tribes, hierarchical institutions, markets, and networks. The effort began over ten years ago, when it first struck me that there may be only three or four major forms of organization (Ronfeldt, 1993, 1996). It has proceeded on a part-time basis since then. The eventual goal is a book-length elaboration of the framework.

This installment focuses on the tribal form. It also provides a lead-off chapter that sketches the entire framework, plus a "rethinking" chapter that shows why I think social evolution revolves around four forms of organization. I expect these to be the opening chapters of the eventual book-length study. An appendix reprints three op-ed pieces that sprang from my efforts to understand the tribal form and its continuing relevance.

Since this installment nearly completes my work on the tribal form, it could make sense to proceed next to writing installments on the later forms: hierarchies, markets, and networks. However, studying a form in depth, as I have done with the tribal form, has involved so much time and effort that I am concerned I may not generate future installments in a timely manner if I proceed in such a linear fashion. Therefore, I plan to jump next to producing the concluding chapters. The next installment will show what the framework looks like once it is fully assembled, and will elucidate its dynamics and implications.

This paper was written on my own time, while on leave from regular RAND Corporation work. It reflects only my own ideas and observations, not those of RAND or any of its sponsors. Comments may be emailed to ronfeldt@rand.org.

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CONTENTS

1. HOW SOCIETIES PROGRESS: THE BASIC STORY

Four forms of organization—and evidently only four—lie behind the governance and evolution of all societies across the ages:

- The *tribal* form was the first to emerge and mature, beginning thousands of years ago. Its main dynamic is kinship, which gives people a distinct sense of identity and belonging—the basic elements of culture, as manifested still today in matters ranging from nationalism to fan clubs.
- The *institutional* form was the second to emerge. Emphasizing hierarchy, it led to the development of the state and the military, as epitomized initially by the Roman Empire, not to mention the Catholic papacy and other corporate enterprises.
- The *market* form, the third form of organization to take hold, enables people to excel at openly competitive, free, and fair economic exchanges. Although present in ancient times, it did not gain sway until the 19th century, at first mainly in England.
- The *network* form, the fourth to mature, serves to connect dispersed groups and individuals so that they may coordinate and act conjointly. Enabled by the digital information-technology revolution, this form is only now coming into its own, so far strengthening civil society more than other realms.

Each of the four forms, writ large, embodies a distinctive set of structures, beliefs, and dynamics (with bright and dark sides) about how a society should be organized—about who gets to achieve what, why, and how. Each involves different standards about how people should treat each other. Each enables people to do something—to address some social problem—better than they could by using another form. Each energizes different kinds of actors and adherents. Each has different ideational and material bases.

The development of each form has a long history. Early versions of all four were present in ancient times. But as deliberate, formal systems with philosophical portent, each has gained strength at a different rate and matured in a different epoch over the past 10,000 years. Tribes developed first (in the Neolithic era), hierarchical institutions next (notably, with the Roman Empire and then the absolutist states of the 16th

century), and competitive markets later (as in England and the United States in the 18th century). Now, collaborative networks are on the rise as the next great form. This form's cutting edge evidently lies among activist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) associated with civil society. See Figure 1.

Figure 1. Master Forms Underlying the Organization of All Societies

There are many reasons for this long progression, partly because each form requires a different set of conditions before it can take hold, including a revolution in the information and communications technologies of the time. Yet, the progression occurs mainly because the attractiveness of each form lies in its capacity to enable people to address a core problem that a society is bound to face as it develops. In brief, the tribal form excelled—and continues to excel today—at addressing the early problem of social identity and belonging; the hierarchical institutional form, the problem of power and administration; and the market form, the problem of complex exchanges. The paradigmatic strength of the collaborative network form is still unclear; however, it seems best suited to addressing the still-far-from-resolved problem of social equity.

When a new form arises, it has subversive effects on the old order, before it has additive effects that lead to a new order. As each form takes hold, energizing a distinct set of values and norms for actors operating in that form, it generates a new realm of

activity—for example, the state, the market. As a new realm gains legitimacy and expands the space it occupies within a social system, it puts new limits on the scope of existing realms. At the same time, through feedback and other interactions, the rise of a new form/realm also modifies the nature of the existing ones. An example is the evolution of European absolutist regimes into liberal democratic regimes, which occurred as old hierarchical state institutions gave up on mercantilism and were remolded by the rise of the market system and the collateral spread of marketlike electoral politics. If the addition of a new form occurs properly, the older forms end up being strengthened, not weakened, even as their scope is newly limited.

The main story, then, is that societies advance by learning to use and combine all four forms, in a preferred progression. What ultimately matters is how the forms are added and how well they function together. They are not substitutes for each other; they are complements. Historically, a society's advance—its progress—depends on its ability to use all four forms and combine them (and their realms) into a coherent, well-balanced, well-functioning whole.

To put it notationally, over the ages monoform societies organized in tribal (T) terms—many of which still exist today—are eventually surpassed by societies that also develop institutional (I) systems to become biform T+I societies, normally with strong, professional states. In turn, these biform societies are superseded by triform societies that allow space for the market (M) form and become T+I+M societies, normally with a propensity for democracy. The network (N) form, which is now on the rise, appears to have civil society as its home realm, the realm that is being strengthened more than any other (but it is possible that a new, yet-to-be-named realm will emerge from it). Thus, a new phase of social evolution is dawning in which quadriform T+I+M+N societies will emerge to take the lead and a vast rebalancing of relations among state, market, and civil-society actors will occur around the world. To do well in the 21st century and beyond, an advanced, democratic, information-age society must incorporate all four forms and make them function well together, despite their inherent contradictions. See Table 1.

Table 1. Patterns of Progress: Evolution from Monoform to Quadriform Societies

Type of Society	TIMN "Formula"	Examples
Monoform	$S_{1st} = T$	Most of the world, most of history; recently, Afghan tribes, Somali clans, L.A. city gangs
Biform	$S_{2nd} = T+I$	Roman Empire; 16th C. European absolutism; recently, Soviet Union, Castro's Cuba
Triform	$S_{3rd} = T+I+M$	England, United States since 18th C.; recently, Chile, China, Mexico
Quadriform	$S_{4th} = T+I+M+N$	North America, Western Europe the likely candidates in 21st C.

NOTE: S = Society, T = Tribe, I = Institution, M = Market, N = Network.

Societies that can elevate the bright over the dark side of each form and achieve a new combination become more powerful and capable of complex tasks than societies that do not. A society's leaders may try to deny or skip a form, as have clannish ethnic groups that fail to form a real state or Marxist-Leninist regimes that opposed the market. But any seeming success at such skipping eventually proves temporary and limited. A society may also constrain its prospects for evolutionary growth by elevating a single form to primacy—even the market form, as appears to be a tendency at times in the United States.

In historical terms, it is often difficult—and it may take decades or longer—for a society to adapt to a new form and relate it to those forms that may have taken root long ago. Success is not inevitable. Every society, every culture, must move at its own pace and develop its own approach to each form and each combination of forms. There are many ways to get a form wrong, but there is no single way to get a form or combination right. What is "right" and "wrong" may vary from culture to culture. Part of the difficulty is that each form has attributes that are contradictory to those of the other forms—for example, hierarchical institutions provide a different setting from atomized markets. Thus, people who prefer one form culturally or philosophically may not be comfortable with another form; they may have to learn how to accept and cope with the coexistence of various TIMN forms in their society.

A people's adaptability to the rise of a new form appears to depend largely on the local nature of the tribal form. It may have profound effects on what happens as the later forms get added. For example, the tribal form has unfolded differently in China and in America. Whereas the former has long revolved around extended family ties, clans, and dynasties, the latter has relied on the nuclear family, heavy immigration, and a fabric of fraternal organizations that provide quasi-kinship ties (e.g., from the open Rotary Club to the closed Ku Klux Klan). These differences at the tribal level have given unique shapes to each nation's institutional and market forms, to their ideas about progress, and, now, to their adaptability to the rise of networked NGOs.

Elsewhere, deeply tribal societies often have great difficulty advancing beyond their traditional ways. Indeed, many of the world's current trouble spots—in the Middle East, South Asia, the Balkans, the Caucuses, and Africa—are in societies so riven by embedded tribal and clan dynamics that the outlook remains terribly uncertain for them to build professional states and competitive businesses that are unencumbered by tribal and clan dynamics. Many so-called failed states are really failed tribes.

A society may get stuck, go astray, or even be torn apart as it tries to adapt to a new form. Thus, the great social revolutions of the 20th century—in Mexico, Russia, China, and Cuba—occurred in mostly agrarian T+I societies in which old clannish and hierarchical structures came under enormous internal and external stresses that stemmed partly from inadequate or flawed infusions of capitalist market practices. Failing to make the +M transition, they reverted to hard-line T+I regimes that, except for Mexico, remolded absolutism into modern totalitarianism. Today, to varying degrees, these societies are trying anew to make the +M transition. Again except for Mexico, none is yet amenable to the presence of networked NGOs, which represent +N dynamics.

The United States, along with countries in Western Europe and Scandinavia, long ago developed triform T+I+M societies and are now on the cutting edge for creating quadriform T+I+M+N societies. This evolutionary shift explains some of the turbulence America has been experiencing at home and abroad.

In the long term, +N dynamics should enable policymakers, business leaders, and civil-society activists to create new mechanisms for joint consultation, coordination, and cooperation spanning all levels of governance. Aging contentions that "government" or "the market" is the solution to particular public-policy issues will eventually give way to new ideas that "the network" is the optimal solution.

Once again in the long history of social evolution, the society that first succeeds at making a new combination stands to gain advantages over competitors and to have a paramount influence over the nature of international conflict and cooperation. But if a major power finds itself stymied by the effort to achieve a new combination, it risks being superseded.

2. RETHINKING SOCIAL EVOLUTION

There is never a bad time—and now seems a fine time—to inquire anew into how societies evolve. The world is in awful flux, and debates keep sharpening across national, cultural, and other divides regarding what *progress* means. There is continual talk that the information age will remake the world and propel societies up the ladder of progress; yet the gaps between the most-developed and least-developed societies are larger than ever. Many people want better lives; but while some aim to advance in a secular, liberal, Western sense, others would rather back up, cleanse, and restart their societies, with a religion as their guide. Meanwhile, much of the world remains mired in ancient tribal dynamics; only a part of the world has succeeded in developing modern, complex societies—or so it seems.

A sound theory of social evolution would be handy to have. Although there are philosophers and social scientists who question whether evolution has brought real progress to humanity,[1] U.S. policymakers and strategists operate on assumptions that societies based on political democracy, market economies, and independent civil societies are better—more advanced, civilized, peaceful, stable, productive, equitable, and responsible—than other societies. And, indeed, many foreign policy problems facing Washington concern one aspect or another of social evolution—such as how to keep former communist countries on democratic paths, how to sustain economic liberalization in Asian and Latin American nations where elites may prefer cronyism to capitalism, how to motivate tribal systems in Africa and the Middle East to modernize, and how to deal with ethnic conflicts in places that lack professional states and may be under the sway of criminal clans. In addition, assumptions about social evolution lie behind both international and U.S. assistance programs, which are supposed to lift people out of poverty, diminish the lures of crime and terrorism, create middle classes, and put all on paths to freedom and prosperity.

But are such assumptions valid? What are the keys to social evolution?

STANDARD APPROACHES TO ANALYZING SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The literature on social evolution is long and varied. For over two centuries, the concept has engaged one grand theorist after another—Herbert Spencer, Ferdinand

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[1] I will address this in a future installment.

Tönnies, Max Weber, Karl Marx, Pitirim Sorokin, Arnold Toynbee, and Talcott Parsons, to name a few. And thoughtful new examinations continue to appear—such as Robert Carneiro's *Evolutionism in Cultural Anthropology: A Critical History* (2003), Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (1997), Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah's *Macrohistory and Macrohistorians: Perspectives on Individual, Social, and Civilizational Change* (1997), John McNeill and William McNeill's *The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History* (2003), Stephen Sanderson's *Social Transformations: A General Theory of Historical Development* (1999), and Robert Wright's *Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny* (2000). Even studies that are as much about policy as theory—arguing, for example, about "the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992), "jihad versus McWorld" (Barber, 1996), and "the clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996)—have gained a grip on long-range thinking about where the world may be headed.

Recent reexaminations of the meaning of progress—such as Robert Nisbet's *History of the Idea of Progress* (1994) and Arthur Herman's *The Idea of Decline in Western History* (1997)—have added to this new round of wondering. So have studies questioning why some societies lag at modernization, including Hernando De Soto's *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (2000) and Bernard Lewis's *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (2002).

Theorists who focus on social evolution normally identify key stages that societies must pass through, along with the demographic, economic, political, military, cultural, and other factors that cause or constrain the movement from one stage to the next. This has long been a standard, sensible practice for theorists. Typically, it revolves around examining a progression from tribes, to chiefdoms, to states and empires; then, from feudalism, to absolutism, to democracy; and, along the way, from mercantilism to capitalism; and from a nascent to a full-fledged civil society. Thus, people have advanced from hunter-gatherer, to agrarian, to industrial, and now post-industrial stages and types of societies—or, in a more simplistic formulation, from primitive, to intermediate, to modern levels of development.

Whatever stages a scholar specifies and whether a scholar's scope is local, regional, or global, this evolution means that societies move from simple to complex designs, as progress leads to ever-larger, more specialized, more productive forms of organization and activity. Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim were the major early champions of the complexity theme, and it permeates theorizing about social evolution

today (as in Wright, 2000; Carneiro, 2003). In this vein, Sanderson (1999) opens and
then ends his sterling review of the field with the following summary observations:

> World history reveals social transformations and directional trends of
> sufficient generality such that typologies of social forms can be fruitfully
> constructed. These directional sequences of change constitute the bulk of
> what is known as social evolution. Social evolutionists concentrate on
> general and repeatable patterns of social evolution, i.e., on parallel and
> convergent evolution. (p. 4)

> Everywhere we have seen the same directional patterns: from smaller and
> simpler societies to larger and more complex ones, from relatively
> egalitarian societies to highly stratified ones, from bands and tribes to
> centrally-coordinated chiefdoms to complex states, from low levels of
> commercialization (or no commercialization at all) to highly
> commercialized, capitalistic societies, and so on. These trends are quite
> striking from the Paleolithic era to the early modern world. Nowhere have
> things run in the opposite direction or even in a different direction. (p. 403)

LOOKING AHEAD: THE RISE OF NETWORK FORMS OF ORGANIZATION

Let me slide into my own formulation by noting a particular idea about the future,
because that is what prompted me to wonder about the past—and then led me into the
literatures just mentioned. The idea is that the world is entering the age of networks.

It seems clear that the information revolution strengthens and favors network
forms of organization. The new information and communications technologies—all
that make up the Net, the Web, the Grid—are enabling dispersed, often small, once-
isolated groups and individuals to connect, coordinate, and act conjointly as never
before. Power and influence are migrating to actors who are skilled at developing
multiorganizational networks and operating in contexts in which such networks are
common, as evidenced by the rise of transnational networks of environmental, human-
rights, and other NGOs that represent civil society—not to mention terrorist and
criminal organizations that represent uncivil society.[2] It is also evident among
businesses that form strategic partnerships, and among interagency mechanisms that
operate at many levels of government. All are pursuing network designs, although

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[2] Of particular significance for my work (notably, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996,
2001) is sociologist Luther Gerlach's (Gerlach and Hine, 1970; Gerlach, 1987) attention to
"segmented, polycentric, ideologically integrated networks" among social movements.

nonstate actors remain generally ahead of state actors at adopting them. These trends, projected into the future, seem to augur major transformations in how the world's advanced societies will be organized—or, if not societies as a whole, then at least key sectors of their governments, economies, and civil societies.[3]

The rise of networks promises to reshape specific sectors by leading to "global civil society," "electronic democracy," "networked corporations," and "network-centric warfare."[4] Globalization is even said to revolve around the growth of global networks and their interconnections with networks at national and local levels of society.[5] Many writings are speculative. But many, particularly in the business world, are often quite practical, because they inquire into exactly what kinds of network structures and processes work well and which do not.[6] More to the point, the rise of networks portends such a vast reshaping that writers herald the coming of "the network age," "the network society," and the redefinition of "nations as networks."[7] This network age and its network societies will amount to a new stage in social evolution, moving the

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[3] Readers who want more detail are directed to Ronfeldt (2005a) and Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001). Greater detail will appear in the chapter on the rise of networks, in a future installment.

[4] The literatures on each of these concepts is now quite large, except for "network-centric warfare," whose main source is Cebrowski and Garstka (1998). Some writers (e.g., Florini, 2000) prefer the term "transnational civil society" to "global civil society."

[5] See Held and McGrew (2000), especially Chapter 2 (excerpted from a 1999 book by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton) and Chapter 11 (from a 1997 paper by Michael Mann). Also, see Rosenau (1990), Nye and Donahue (2000), and Castells (2004). Another source—"Special Issue on Mapping Globalization," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 44, No. 10, June 2001, edited by Eszter Hargittai and Miguel Angel Centeno—was supported in part by the International Networks Archive, which has an interesting Web site at http://www.princeton.edu /~ina. Tarrow (2001) provides a literature review.

[6] The *Harvard Business Review* is a fine source of business-oriented references: for example, Evans and Wurster (1997) and Coyne and Dye (1998) on banking networks; and Jacques (1990) for a classic defense of the importance of hierarchy in corporate structures.

[7] See Kelly (1994) and Lipnack and Stamps (1994) on "the network age," Castells (1996) and Kumon (1992) on "the network society," and Dertouzos (1997) on "networks as nations." See Brin (1998) on a related concept about "the transparent society." Also see Toffler (1970).

world well beyond the historical progression from hunter-gatherer, to agrarian, to industrial, and, lately, to post-industrial stages and societies.

The rise of network forms of organization started attracting attention in the 1970s. Landmark studies of the 1990s—Nitin Nohria and Robert G. Eccles's *Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action* (1992), Jessica Lipnack and Jeffrey Stamps's *The Age of the Network* (1994), Kevin Kelly's *Out of Control: The Rise of Neo-Biological Civilization* (1994), Fritjof Capra's *The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems* (1996), Manuel Castells's *The Rise of the Network Society* (1996), and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (1998)—confirmed the deepening of the trend. Today, early in the 21st century, it is a burgeoning topic for theoretical research and policy analysis. The past few years have brought a spate of new studies, including Howard Rheingold's *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution* (2002), Albert-László Barabási's *Linked: The New Science of Networks* (2002), Mark Buchanan's *Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Science of Networks* (2002), and Peter Monge and Noshir Contractor's *Theories of Communication Networks* (2003), not to mention John Arquilla's and David Ronfeldt's *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (2001).[8] So many advances are under way in the study of complex systems that "In the longer run, network thinking will become essential to all branches of science as we struggle to interpret the data pouring in from neurobiology, genomics, ecology, finance, and the World-Wide Web" (Strogatz, 2001, p. 275).

Some theorists view social networks as the basic organizing principle behind all that goes on in life. Others (including myself) view networks as a distinctive form of organization that is different from other forms, such as hierarchies and markets. As an example of these divergent viewpoints, note the contrasting titles (with my underlining) of two recent books: *Markets <u>from</u> Networks* (White, 2002) and *Networks <u>and</u> Markets* (Rauch and Casella, 2002). Either way, what is being conveyed is a sense that our understanding of network designs and their uses is still at an early stage.

Well, then, if the rise of network forms of organization is so significant—if it truly augurs a new stage in social evolution—should we not also be asking what other forms of organization lie behind the construction of societies? The network trend raises questions not only about the importance of the network form by itself, but also vis-à-vis other forms of organization. But what are those other forms? And could *forms* offer a

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[8] I started calling attention to the rise of networks in Ronfeldt (1992, 1993).

way to rethink social evolution, adding something new to the traditional focus on *stages*?

The term *forms* already figures in theorizing about social evolution, as in these statements by two major figures—the first, an anthropologist; the second, a sociologist:

> The basic ideas of evolution refer to the means by which definable entities change from one form into another. (Cohen, 1987, p. 256)

> World history reveals social transformations and directional changes of sufficient generality such that typologies of social forms can be fruitfully constructed. (Sanderson, 1995, p. 4)

In these usages, every stage in a typology becomes a different form. But, so do many constellations of forces and practices that are not stages—as in forms of ownership, production, technology, culture, religion, and so forth. Much the same can be said about the term *organizational forms*, as used in management studies (e.g., Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; DeSanctis and Fulk, 1999; Monge and Contractor, 2003). Any organization that displays a somewhat different purpose, structure, set of routines, or whatever, may be viewed as a new organizational form—banks, hospitals, gas stations, human-rights groups, and so forth, are all different forms. Thus, in management as well as in social-evolution literatures, the meaning of *forms* broadens, the examples proliferate. I have something more elemental, more reductive in mind.

LOOKING BACK: FORMS OF ORGANIZATION BEHIND SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Societies work because they are organized—not simply in a hands-on sense of "let's get organized and do something," but in a grand sense of abiding by major forms of organization that set standards for who interacts with whom, in what ways, and why. So, just how have people organized societies across the ages? What forms—what basic patterns, arrays, constructs, designs, models—have people repeatedly turned to? What are the major forms that have played paradigmatic, even philosophical, roles in the construction and governance of societies? There is no standard answer, but partial answers abound.

To begin, anthropologists and historians have shown that states and empires arose after ancient tribes and chiefdoms (e.g., Service, 1971), and markets superseded earlier nonmarket relationships (e.g., Polanyi, 1957; Hicks, 1969). Also, social and economic theorists who focus on modern eras draw contrasts between authority and market

systems (Arrow, 1974), politics and markets (Lindblom, 1977), states and markets (Strange, 1988), governments and markets (Wolf, 1993), guardian and commercial syndromes (Jacobs, 1993), and between top-down authority and bottom-up association (Bendix, 1964). All draw instructive distinctions, generally highlighting the importance of tribes, political hierarchies, and markets.

Meanwhile, organizational economics, using transaction-cost analysis, treats hierarchies and markets as the key alternatives (e.g., Williamson, 1975). In addition, the field of organization theory (as portrayed in Shafritz and Ott, 1996, 2001), with its focus on bureaucratic and corporate designs, offers distinctions between "mechanistic" (i.e., hierarchical) and "organic" (networked, but still stratified) management systems (Burns and Stalker, 1961), along with distinctions about divisional, matrix, and networked forms of business organization (Miles and Snow, 1986, 1992). Indeed, in the 1990s, the benefits of reducing hierarchy while increasing networking became a regular theme in business writings (e.g., Malone and Rockart, 1991), despite an occasional reminder "in praise of hierarchy" (Jacques, 1990) or in favor of fostering "internal markets" for ideas, staff, and projects. Moreover, "coordination without hierarchy" was also found to be suitable for managing one complex public transportation system (Chisholm, 1989; also, see Perrow, 1979).

Only a few scholars (notably, Powell, 1990; Thompson et al., 1991; Monge and Fulk, 1999; Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2005) have called for adding networks to the standard identification of hierarchies and markets as the major forms of coordination:

> [T]he familiar market-hierarchy continuum does not do justice to the notion of network forms of organization. . . . [S]uch an arrangement is neither a market transaction nor a hierarchical governance structure, but a separate, different mode of exchange, one with its own logic, a network. (Powell, 1990, pp. 296, 301)

A few management scholars also noted that tribes preceded hierarchies, markets, and networks as a form of organization (Fulk and DeSanctis, 1999, p. 5). Moreover, one business writer (Ouchi, 1980) made a rare effort to add clans—a variant of tribes—as another alternative to hierarchies and markets.

A further view in this vein (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) posits that community, market, and state—characterized respectively by spontaneous solidarity, dispersed competition, and hierarchical control—were the main models of governance, and proposed adding a fourth: association, characterized by what they call "organizational

concertation." Their concept of community overlaps with that of tribe; but their concept of associations has them so tightly tied together, in a corporatist manner, that it overlaps only somewhat with the concept of networks. Other views about the paradigmatic importance of associations (notably, Bendix, 1964) treat associations as having much looser ties and dynamics, more like a mix of market and networks.

Elsewhere, Swedish sociologist Ulf Hannerz (1992, pp. 46–47) posits that "four organizational frameworks encompass most of the cultural process in the world today," and his "form of life, market, state, and movement" frameworks correspond roughly to tribes, markets, hierarchies, and networks, respectively. Anthropologist Mary Douglas (1996) discerns three major cultural contexts—enclaves, hierarchies, and markets—and her notion of "enclaves" corresponds roughly to clans, whose external boundaries are closed and whose internal norms are egalitarian (for discussion, see Almond, Appleby, and Sivan, 2003, pp. 31–33).

In grander literatures, age-old ideas about social life as a "great chain of being" or as a progression of nested hierarchies have given way to newer ideas that networks are the key to understanding all life. Here, theorists argue that hierarchies or networks—or markets—are mankind's most elementary or finest form of organization, and that one or the other design underlies essentially all order in the world. In the social sciences, for example, writings in the 1960s about general systems theory (e.g., Bertalanffy, 1968) and social complexity (e.g., Simon, 1969) stressed the importance of hierarchy. But since the 1970s, and especially the 1990s, new ideas have come to the fore that networks are the elemental design. Thus, "most real systems are mixtures of hierarchies and networks" (Pagels, 1989, p. 51; also, see La Porte, 1975). And, "the web of life consists of networks within networks," not hierarchies (Capra, 1996, p. 35; also, see Kelly, 1994). Right now, a "network science" is emerging that aims to span both the physical and social sciences (Barabási, 2002; Watts, 2004).

Other social scientists have counterpoised heterarchy and hierarchy as alternative forms of organization (e.g., see Monge and Contractor, 2003, pp. 11–16). Heterarchical designs are indeed significant and widespread. But on close examination, heterarchy turns out not to be a singular form. In some writings that use the term, the underlying form is the tribe—as in a study that admires the heterarchical (i.e., nonhierarchical) qualities of early tribes and laments the later rise of hierarchical chiefdoms and states (Ehrenreich, Crumley, and Levy, 1995). Or else it turns out that the nodes in a heterarchy are allowed to be mini-hierarchies, which rather contradicts the basis for claiming a true hierarchy-heterarchy comparison. In many writings, however,

heterarchy is a point made about the nature of markets or networks. For example, there is a set of writings (including Fairtlough, 2003; Iannacci and Mitleton–Kelly, 2005) that contrast hierarchy, heterarchy, and autonomy (or anarchy) as different ways of getting things done. But then these studies correlate heterarchy with networklike behavior, and autonomy with marketlike behavior.

Elsewhere, a somewhat parallel view from anthropology (Boehm, 1999) contrasts egalitarian (i.e., heterarchical) and hierarchical tendencies in primitive tribes as though they were the two major forms that have vied for humanity's favor, even into modern times. And political scientist Robert Dahl (e.g., Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Dahl, 1989) famously contrasted top-down hierarchy and bottom-up "polyarchy" as tendencies that define autocratic and democratic political systems, respectively. His idea of a polyarchy resembles a marketlike heterarchy.

In short, the varied meanings of *heterarchy* and such related terms as *egalitarianism* and *polyarchy*, as well as the new terms *panarchy* and *peer-to-peer networks*,[9] keep walking back to tribes, markets, and/or networks. So why not use those concepts instead?

Cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists are taking their own turns at asking what proclivities for organization may be embedded in the mind's capacity for social thought and behavior (e.g., Jackendoff, 1994; Wright, 1994; Pinker, 2003; Shermer, 2004). One seminal work finds that three cognitive proclivities emerged early in history: kinship relations, group membership (more than kin, but still having strong boundaries), and dominance hierarchies (Jackendoff, 1994, pp. 212–214). A lament that market competition can be mentally more wearing than communal sharing implies that other patterns developed later (Jackendoff, 1994, p. 220).

One psychologist (Fiske, 1993) posits that all social relationships reduce to four forms of interaction: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. People develop their capacities for social interaction in that order, from infancy through early childhood. The sharing, ranking, and pricing forms correspond to the tribal, hierarchical, and market forms, respectively. The equality-matching form, which is mainly about equal-status peer-group behavior, does not correspond to any

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[9] On these two new terms, see the following Web sites: *Paul B. Hartzog: A Cultural Philosophy of Complexity, Networks, Politics, Technology, Society, and Economy* at http://paulbhartzog.org/panarchy and *The Foundation for P2P Alternatives* at http://p2pfoundation.net/.

single form; it has some attributes that fit under network form, but other attributes (e.g., reciprocity, feuding, revenge) fit better under the tribal form.

For the most part, these new, quite Darwinian fields focus on the emergence of kin-oriented altruism and then hierarchy in the evolution of relations among kin and nonkin. This focus tracks with anthropologists who take a neo-Darwinian view of the evolution from primate to human behavior. They too emphasize the emergence of egalitarian sociability, hierarchical domination, and social exchange as mankind's most basic ways of acting together (e.g., Tiger and Fox, 1971; Boehm, 1999). These theorists also recognize that societies must always leave plenty of room for individual and group competition—another pattern—if they are to retain a capacity for further evolution.

FOUR MAJOR FORMS: TRIBES, HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND NETWORKS

What I distill from these and other readings is that societies have repeatedly relied on four major forms of organization: kinship-based tribes, hierarchical institutions, competitive-exchange markets, and collaborative networks.[10] Hierarchies and markets are the easiest, least controversial contenders to identify. Anthropologists' research shows that tribes took shape prior to formal hierarchies and markets (and in many parts of the world, the tribal form is still strong). Information-age networks appear to be emerging as a fourth form that is now coming into its own as a deliberate, distinctive choice.

These four forms are quite different from each other, from various angles. Each has a distinctive topology (the angle I prefer, as a first criterion, as depicted in Figure 1). Each involves different kinds of bonds, transactions, decision rules, and coordination mechanisms. Each has a long, distinctive history of association with different philosophical ideals, codes of conduct, and mentalities. Moreover, each requires an actor to have different kinds of information to perform well in that particular form.

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[10] My first foray into the literatures on organization and evolution yielded three forms: institutions, markets, and networks (Ronfeldt, 1993). After further reading in anthropology, I realized a fourth, earlier form—tribes—had to be added (Ronfeldt, 1996; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996).

Definitional Issues

Some definitional issues should be noted, because each of the terms that are used to characterize a form can lead to long discussions. Two or three of the terms are subject to controversies. Also, alternative terms exist that some readers may prefer.

The term *tribe* is widely used, but it is not in favor among all anthropologists (see Carneiro, 2003, pp. 137–139). Some prefer *ethnic group* or *clan*—or, from a different organizational angle, *hamlet* or *village* (Johnson and Earle, 1987). There is even an argument that tribes rarely preceded states in ancient eras (Fried, 1967, 1975). In this view, primitive, weakly united ethnic groups organized first into agricultural villages, and, perhaps later, evolved into chiefdoms and states, without ever truly being tribes (Otterbein, 2004). Or else these ethnic groups and their villages hardened into boundary-sensitive tribes—they "tribalized"—only after predatory states intruded into their territories (Ferguson and Whitehead, 1992).[11] But these critics still acknowledge that kinship remained a defining principle and that early societies were uncentralized and nonhierarchical, which is in keeping with standard definitions of what tribes were like. I will discuss this controversy further in the next chapter. Terms such as *kinships* or *kindreds*, although rarely used, might be alternatives to *tribes*. *Clans* is too narrow. A *band* is too small to qualify as a full-scale society.

The term *institution* is used here in the tradition of Max Weber, not to mention modern management and organization theorists (e.g., March and Simon, 1958; March and Olsen, 1989). It refers to formal, bounded organizations that are based on hierarchy and have leaders, management structures, and administrative bureaucracies.[12] Since the major manifestation for social evolution is the *state*, some readers might prefer that term—but to adopt that term would ignore the form's generic importance in other contexts: notably, among corporate, military, religious, and business organizations.

A second tradition, exemplified by Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons, not to mention such recent theorists as Douglass North, views any valued, structured, habitual, rule-guided pattern of activity—such as the family, the market, democracy, voting, even popular culture—as an institution, whether or not the activity involves

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[11] Fried (1975) is the original source for most objections to the concept of *tribe*. For counterarguments to Ferguson and Whitehead's (1992) reiteration, see Keeley (1996).

[12] There have been nonhierarchical institutions, but they have never risen to the status of a major form of organization for societies.

hierarchy.[13] Indeed, from this viewpoint, the four forms I focus on—tribes, hierarchical institutions, markets, and networks—are all, in some sense, institutions. This sweeping, second usage does not apply here.[14]

Thus, *hierarchy* could be used instead of *institution*—indeed, much of the literature prefers that term, and I may yet turn to prefer it. But it is not so much the presence of hierarchy, instances of which existed in early tribes and households, as the rise of the formal hierarchical institution—such as the monarchy, the state, the army, the court, the bank, the trading company—that redirects the course of social evolution.

Of the four terms, *market* may be the least controversial and have the fewest alternatives—*exchange* being one. But here is a significant nuance to bear in mind: Some writers use *the market system* almost conterminously with *capitalism* and do not distinguish much between the two. That is not the case with this study. Markets existed long before capitalism took shape. Capitalism is a modern design that market actors develop in combination with (hierarchical) state actors. In some settings, capitalism may even be rigged so that a full, open market system is constrained from developing, thereby making it not unreasonable for a person to be pro-market and anti-capitalist at the same time. The two terms are not interchangeable.

The term *network* is currently subject to diverse usages. Here, it refers primarily to *organizational* networks, such as "all-channel" designs, whereby all nodes are connected to and can communicate with each other. However, most social scientists use the term to refer to *social* networks of people. And many social-network analysts also see networks as lying behind all forms of organization (e.g., Nohria and Eccles, 1992). Moreover, the emerging field of "network science," which is being grandly defined to span both physical and social sciences, is sure to view all TIMN forms as subsets of networks (National Research Council, 2005; Newman, Barabási, and Watts, 2006). In

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[13] This second view draws distinctions between *institutions* and *organizations*, with the latter being viewed as bounded, formal entities, such as bureaucracies, that conform to the first, Weberian view. Hodgson (2006) offers a discussion of the differences—and overlaps—between the two terms, and of how a higher-level term, *structures*, may fit into the terminology. For a discussion of the two views of institutions at the international level, see Keohane (1988). A crucial reading on "the new institutionalism" and its growing influence across the social sciences is DiMaggio and Powell (1991).

[14] However, I may occasionally slip into using the adjective *institutionalized* with this meaning in mind, as in noting that a particular market or network has become institutionalized.

the TIMN framework, however, the term refers to a form of organization that is distinct from a hierarchy or a market (as per Powell, 1990; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Thompson et al., 1991; Thompson, 2003; Monge and Fulk, 1999; Smith-Doerr and Powell, 2005). At times, I wonder about using a *nouveau* information-age term such as *cybernets* to convey my emphasis, but that could obscure the fact that organizational networks played significant roles in early periods of history.

The Four Forms Compared

Table 2 summarizes many points that can be made about each form, based on the literatures mentioned above, as well as on what else I have found during my efforts to build the TIMN framework. The entries indicate the differing strengths, limitations, and other attributes of each form.

Table 2. The Four Forms Compared

	TRIBES	INSTITUTIONS	MARKETS	NETWORKS
ERA OF RISE	Neolithic	agrarian	industrial	post-industrial
KEY PURPOSE	identity	power, authority	trade, investment	social equity?
KEY EFFECT	solidarity	sovereignty	competition	collaboration?
KEY PRODUCT	shared "gifts"?	public goods	private goods	collective goods?
MOTIVATION	family endurance	higher authority	self-interest	grp. empowerm't?
STRENGTH	kinship, culture	state, army, corp.	commerce	civil society?
DARK SIDE	nepotism	corruption/abuse	exploitation	deception?
WEAKNESS	administration	econ. transactions	social equity	info. overload?
STRUCTURE	kinship	hierarchy	exchange	heterarchy?
—SPACE ORIENT.	segmental	vertical	atomized	flat, web-like
—TIME ORIENT.	cyclic (myth)	past (tradition)	present (demand)	future (needs?)
—ACTION ORIENT.	solidarity	command/control	exchange/trade	consult./coord.?
INTERNAL TIES	tightly coupled	< - - - - - - - - - >	< - - - - - - - - - >	loosely coupled
EXTERNAL BOUNDS	solid, closed	< - - - - - - - - - >	< - - - - - - - - - >	fluid, open

DESIGN ANALOGY	labyrinths, circles	pyramids	billiard balls	geodesic domes
BODY ANALOGY	skin/look	skeletal system	circulatory system	sensory system

INFO. TECH. NEEDS	early language	writing, printing	telephony, radio	fax, Internet

PHILOSOPHERS	Khaldun?	Hobbes	Smith	Teilhard?

As an overview, the table conveys that each form, once it is subscribed to by many actors, is more than a mere form: It develops into a realm, even a system, of thought and behavior. Each form embodies a distinct cluster of values, norms, and codes of conduct; and these must be learned and disseminated for a form to take root and a realm to emerge around it. Indeed, the rise of each form spells an ideational and structural revolution. Each is a generator of order, because each defines a set of interactions (or, transactions) that are attractive, powerful, and useful enough to create a distinct realm of activity, or at least its core. Each becomes the basis for a governance system that is self-regulating and, ultimately, self-limiting. And each tends to foster a different kind of worldview, for each orients people differently toward social space, social time, and social action.[15] What is deemed rational—how a "rational actor" should behave—is different for each form; no single "utility function" suits them all.

Thus, each form becomes associated with high ideals as well as with new capabilities. As each develops, it enables people to organize to do more than they could previously. Yet, all the forms are ethically neutral—as neutral as technologies—in that they have both bright and dark sides and can be used for good or ill. The tribal form, which should foster communal solidarity and mutual caring, may also breed a narrow, bitter clannishness that can justify anything from nepotism to murder in order to shield and strengthen a clan and its leaders. The hierarchical institutional form, which should lead to professional rule and regulation, may also be used to uphold corrupt, arbitrary dictators. The market form, which should bring free, fair, open exchanges, may also be distorted and rigged to allow unbridled speculation and profiteering. And the network form, which can empower civil society and its NGOs, may also be used to strengthen "uncivil society"—say, by enabling terrorist groups to engage in far-flung campaigns,

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[15] I think a case can be made that social space, time, and action orientations are the fundamental building blocks of consciousness, from childhood onward. But that is a topic for another set of writings.

and crime syndicates to smuggle drugs. So, it is not just the bright sides of each form that foster new values and actors; their dark sides may do so as well. As Jane Jacobs (1992, esp. p. 151) observes about what she calls the "guardian" (+I) and "commercial" (+M) syndromes, "monstrous moral hybrids" can occur if they are mingled improperly.

Finally, note the suggestive bottom four rows. The first of these points out that each form has a different architecture: Tribes, with their interlaced lineages and marriages, resemble circles and labyrinths. Hierarchical institutions are often portrayed as pyramids or stovepipes; markets are represented as atomized billiard balls moving freely in space. Nowadays, information-age networks are said to resemble geodesic domes and "buckyballs" (after Buckminster Fuller). The next row observes that each form corresponds, in a sense, to a different aspect of anatomy: tribes to a body's skin or look (as in common ethnic parlance); hierarchical institutions to a musculo-skeletal system (as Thomas Hobbes implied); markets to a cardio-pulmonary circulatory system (as Karl Marx noted); and networks to a sensory nerve system (as Herbert Spencer thought, and many writers suppose today). These are only analogies and metaphors, but they help impart the distinctive nature of each form.

The next-to-last row notes that the rise of each TIMN form is associated with a different information and communications technology revolution. I will elaborate on this in a future installment, but it is important enough to sketch a bit here: The rise of the tribal form depended on a symbolic revolution—the emergence of language and early writing (e.g., runes, glyphs)—which enabled the storytelling that is central to tribal cultures. The rise of the institutional form—as in the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, the absolutist states, and their vast administrative structures—involved a mechanical revolution: the development of formal writing and printing, first penned script and later the printing press. Writing was important not only for keeping records and issuing commands but also for inscribing laws that chiefdoms and states wanted to apply to growing populations who were not kin and, generally, not known well to each other. Next, the rise of the market form and its far-flung business enterprises was enabled by the electrical technologies of the 19th century: the telegraph, telephone, and radio. Today's rise of the network form extends from the digital-technology revolution and its technologies, notably the Internet, fax machines, and cellular telephony, which are empowering civil-society actors around the world and across political spectrums.

The Most Questioned Distinction: Tribes and Networks

These distinctions will be revisited in future installments, particularly in chapters that address the rise of each TIMN form separately. For now, I expand briefly only on whether the tribal and network forms are truly different from each other—a question that people who have commented on the framework have raised more than any other about distinctions among the four forms.

The complaint is that tribes are kinship networks—a classic view in social and cultural anthropology, in which the term *network* was used long before it spread into other social sciences. Hence, there are really only three forms: networks, hierarchies, and markets. In this view, ancient tribes and information-age networks are all networks (or all tribes). And this is apart from the grand view of social-network analysts and the new network scientists who would treat all the TIMN forms as subsets of networks.

But this conflation downplays differences in design and dynamics. What is distinctive about tribes, as the first form of societal organization, is the clustering of people according to kinship principles. It is a design aimed not at accomplishing complex tasks but, rather, at affirming a people's sense of identity and belonging for purposes of survival and solidarity. And this applies not only to ancient tribes, whose emphasis is on blood ties, but also to later manifestations, such as nationalism and fan clubs, whose emphasis is on brotherhood and sisterhood.

What is distinctive about information-age networks is that people who are far removed from each other can connect, coordinate, and act conjointly across barriers and distances. Membership may impart a sense of identity and belonging, but that is not the main reason people assemble into such networks. They do so because this form is suited to enabling people to address modern, complex policy issues that may require efforts from many directions at the same time, such as health management and disaster recovery. These networks offer new designs for mutual collaboration that cannot be characterized as tribal, hierarchical, or market in nature. (For preliminary elaboration, see Ronfeldt, 1996, 2005a.)

 In other words, what matters in tribes is bloodline, regardless of a person's ideas, whereas in modern civil-society networks, ideas matter regardless of bloodline. Classic tribes are about kinship identities that are singular and sticky[16]—they cannot be changed or denied—whereas members of modern networks often have fluid, multiple

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[16] I thank Bruce Berkowitz for suggesting *sticky*.

identities. Tribes also tend to be very boundary-sensitive, whereas modern networks are often quite open and have blurred, indefinite boundaries.

For example, consider information sharing. What does it mean to say that it should be conducted along tribal or network lines? In tribal systems, such sharing may proceed after checking a recipient's lineage—and thus his or her loyalty. In modern networks, the decision criteria are not about bloodline but about the professional or ideational nature of the role or person who may receive the information. Moreover, modern organizational networking is often meant to overcome bureaucratic parochialism, which itself is a kind of tribalism. Abundant examples exist in efforts to create government interagency mechanisms for information sharing and joint planning in such areas as counternarcotics and counterterrorism, in which each agency tends to be very guarded about its "turf." Indeed, if tribes and networks were the same, then modern corporations, as well as government interagency mechanisms, might as well be advised to adapt to the digital information revolution by becoming more tribal, instead of more networked. But extolling being more tribal in this context is not sensible, except for particular issues such as employee morale or product branding.

Perhaps the distinction I am trying to make would benefit from harking back to the distinction that Max Weber made long ago between two "types of solidary social relationships": *communal* relationships, and *associative* relationships. The former were "based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together." His examples included families and brotherhoods—exemplars of the tribal form in the TIMN framework. In contrast, the associative form mostly depended on "a rational agreement by mutual consent." Associative relationships included free-market exchange relationships, but also consisted largely of "voluntary associations" based on the members' "self-interest," meaning "the promotion of specific ulterior interests," and/or "motivated by an adherence to a set of absolutist values," such as serving a "cause" (from Weber, [1922] 1947, pp. 136–137; cf. Weber, [1922] 1978, pp. 40–43).

Mancur Olson (1971, p. 6, fn. 6) notes that Weber's associative relationships correspond to what he and other group theorists mean by *economic interest groups*. For the TIMN framework, Weber's concept identifies the kinds of groups that, in his day, generally operated alone, if not apart from each other—long before the network form could take hold in conjunction with the spread of new information and communications technologies. Today, I would say that Weber's associative relationships correspond well to many civil-society actors operating in the network form, and therefore that his

distinction between communal and associative relationships underscores the TIMN distinction between tribes and networks.

These points, along with the entries in Table 2, begin to address the distinctions between tribes and networks. Even so, I realize I have more work and explaining to do on this matter (and I welcome comments). Meanwhile, here are several additional, tentative observations about how the tribal form may relate to the other forms in the TIMN framework.

First, the tribalness of some social-activist networks may derive not from any similarity between the tribal and network forms, but from the fact that all TIMN forms get their initial impulses from the activities of small, kinlike groupings.[17] A case can be made that all the forms start out embodied in small bands — that small bands seed each form. This hypothesis certainly applies to the tribal form, whose progenitors were small bands of extended families. It also applies to the next two forms. The hierarchical form's first manifestation is the chiefdom, which, in a sense, is a clannish band that gets a hold on power, ages before this form matures to depend on professional principles and cadres. Next, the market form received its early impulses from equivalents of bands: merchant and banking families, not to mention smuggling and pirate bands — long before theorists regarded states and markets as alternative systems of governance. In turn, today's NGO networks, not to mention terrorist and criminal networks, may look partly tribal because the network form is still in an early phase — it is still largely the provenance of innovative, nomadic bands of like-minded (though not blood-related) individuals who are attuned to the information age. As this TIMN progression occurs, the binding glue in these progenitor bands may be said to shift from biological genes in tribal times to ideational "memes" in modern network times.[18]

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[17] For this proposition, I take heart from historian Arnold Toynbee's (1947) point that "creative minorities" play key roles in the rise of civilizations, and from anthropologists Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox's (1998, pp. 136–140) point that modern equivalents of small hunting bands are the sources of many innovations in today's business worlds.

[18] The term is from Dawkins (1989), who mused that cultural evolution and biological evolution are based on "self-replicating patterns of information" (p. 329). In this view, cultural information — for example, ideas, fashions — can be communicated genelike in memes: "Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation" (p. 192).

Second, it is not clear yet what the network form, fully emerged, will be like, nor what realm may cluster around it. This was the pattern with the earlier forms—they took ages to mature as systems of thought and action. There is no reason to think that the network form's evolution will be any different. It may take decades, probably much longer. As noted in Chapter One, and as I will elaborate in a future installment, civil society appears to be the home realm for the network form, the realm that is being strengthened more than any other. The deepening of the network age may thus cause an epochal increase in the strength of civil society. But there is also another possibility: the emergence from civil society of a new network-based realm whose name and nature are not yet known. An end result may be the creation of next-generation policy mechanisms for mutual communication, consultation, and collaboration among state, market, and civil-society (or new realm) actors, at home and abroad. Signs of movement in this direction appear in the fact that government and corporate actors are slowly but increasingly turning to collaborate with NGO networks, particularly on environmental issues.

Third, to those readers who persist in thinking tribes and networks are not so different and the framework should be based on three forms—networks, hierarchies, and markets—I would say this possibility would not undo the framework. The framework would have to be altered, but the underlying point—that social evolution revolves around how societies develop and use a limited number of organizational forms—would remain in place. Also, if what I am calling the *network form* is little more than an information-age reiteration of the tribal form, then the framework's dynamics (to be described in a future installment) might mean that the next step in social evolution, far from now, could involve an upgraded reiteration of the hierarchical form, in a kind of spiraling from one form to the next. Such spiraling might be a way to adapt the framework to there being only three paradigmatic forms while recognizing that what's going on now with the network form is substantially different from its classic original.

Finally, aside from the issue of whether there may be only three forms, I would note that another frequent question about the TIMN framework is whether a fifth form may emerge in the far future. An answer lies in the observation that each form's rise has required a new information and communications technology revolution. If there is a fifth form beyond the four TIMN forms, then there must be yet another information revolution centuries from now—an advance so far beyond today's digital revolution, enabling knowledge-gathering processes so rapid and dense, that it may verge on what

today is viewed as mental telepathy. I hesitate, however, to speculate on what such a form of organization would be like, or what it might be named.

Other Forms to Consider: Groups and Classes, -Isms and -Ocracies

What about two other forms of organization that are often used: *classes* and *groups*? For many social scientists, class structure is a key form of organization. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ([1888] 1959, p. 7) even avowed that, "the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles." But significant as it is, class does not qualify as an original form: People don't say, "Let's organize into social classes to make our society work." If they do, they have a kind of hierarchy in mind. Instead, class structures emerge over time as a result of experiences with and interactions among the four TIMN forms in specific settings. (What I expect to argue in a future installment is that monoform T-type societies are one-class societies; biform T+I societies develop two classes (the rulers and the ruled); and triform T+I+M societies give rise to the three classes—upper, middle, and lower—that are common today. The evolution of quadriform T+I+M+N societies should lead to the emergence of a new four-level class system.)

As for groups—such as family groups, interest groups, pressure groups, peer groups, or variants that colleagues have suggested, such as lodges, clubs, and ecumenes—they appear in all societies, and all societies benefit from their presence. Indeed, people have gathered into small groups since primitive times—beginning with what anthropologists call bands and fraternal interest groups, and group theorists call primary (i.e., family) groups. Moreover, there is a vast body of theory about interest groups and their importance in modern life.[19] But while groups may be viewed as

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[19] Early examples include writings by sociologist George Homans, a pioneer in group analysis. But his study on the "elementary forms of social behavior" (Homans, 1974, esp. Ch. 16) offers little for understanding how groups may evolve into societies and what kinds of groups may be needed to develop a society. The study ends by talking more about *institutions* than groups. Another classic, by economist Mancur Olson (1971), observes that all organizations and associations are constructed on groups and subgroups. He also discusses the heyday of American theory in the 1950s through 1970s, when it was thought that the best way to analyze American political, economic, and other structures and processes was by focusing on groups. Again, it is not clear (at least, not to me) how far a theorist can go with overlapping distinctions about *groups*, *associations*, and *organizations*, or with distinctions about the "primary groups" (i.e., families) found in primitive societies and the "secondary" groups (e.g., labor unions)

constituent elements of a society, they are not a distinctive, overarching form of organization. What matters are the relationships among groups. If groups are atomized, acting as free-floating, scattered, autonomous entities that have little or no interaction, then not much organization exists—not enough to say that this amounts to a major form for the construction of a society. And when groups are dense, interrelated, and acting as a set, they usually fit the four forms. For example, if they resemble bands of brotherhoods, this makes them tribal. Or if they are pushing and pulling, with and against each other, to make a government or other body heed their interests, then they are acting more in accord with the market or the network form. If they are ecstatic in nature—as in some charismatic religious groups—their dynamics may suffice to form small gatherings, but not to constitute a major role in the functioning of a full-scale society.

And, finally, what about the various *-isms* and *-ocracies* that are scattered across the history of social evolution? From a TIMN perspective, none qualifies as a paradigmatic form; all *-isms* and *-ocracies* amount to particular expressions of one or more of the TIMN forms. For example, many writers treat capitalism as a modern stage of evolution. Yet, capitalism reduces to a particular configuration that market actors develop in combination with (hierarchical) state and other actors. Or consider fascism. It is not, by itself, a distilled form; rather, it blends hyper-tribalism and hyper-hierarchy. And as for liberal democracy—the kind that arises only in triform T+I+M societies—it is the result of the spread of the market form into (and alongside) the institutional form in the political realm.

THE CHAPTERS AHEAD

In short, I shall persist for now with these terms: *tribes*, (hierarchical) *institutions*, *markets*, and *networks*. While I stress their importance as forms of organization, they are, of course, more than that. They are paradigmatic ways that people have developed for relating to each other, constructing their societies, and philosophizing about social life. They are both material and ideational in nature. And they both push and pull people to think and act.

If this were a full exposition of the TIMN framework, the rise and consolidation of each form would be discussed in separate chapters next. Subsequent chapters would

that characterize modern industrial societies and their large voluntary associations. I see no way to get from there to a theory of social evolution.

show how to assemble the forms into an all-encompassing model about the long-range evolution of societies—all societies everywhere, across the ages, as sketched in Chapter One. A full exposition would then identify the evolutionary dynamics that reside in the model, specify diagnostic criteria for assessing specific societies, and end by identifying policy implications. A full exposition would also discuss, as colleagues have remarked, that the framework has Darwinian, Hegelian, Marxian, and Parsonian aspects. It would also be made clear that the framework is not based on mainly economic, political, social, cultural, or technological explanations. Nor does it favor materialist over ideational explanations. It contains bits of all of the above. Indications of all this appear in earlier, partial expositions (Ronfeldt, 1996, 2005a, 2005b).

Ultimately, the TIMN framework is about how societies work—and why some evidently work better than others. The framework is also about looking far ahead into the future as well as back into the past. Anthropologists have examined the evolution from tribes (T) to states and other hierarchical institutions (+I). Other social scientists have analyzed the later evolution from societies based on hierarchies to those based also on markets (+M). And there are many current discussions about moving onward to new network designs (+N). The TIMN framework endeavors to encompass all four—in a sense, treating TIMN as the DNA of social evolution.

However, a full exposition remains a work in progress. This paper provides only an interim installment. In addition to laying out this chapter's rationale for focusing on these four forms, the paper is mainly aimed at laying out the ancient rise and modern endurance of the tribal form, in the next two chapters.

3. EVOLUTION OF TRIBES AND CLANS

As people banded together to constitute primitive societies in Neolithic eras over 10,000 years ago, the first major form of social organization to arise was the tribe. Its organizing principle was kinship, as expressed through nuclear and extended family ties, lineage segments (notably, clans) that spanned various families and villages, and claims of descent from a common, often mythologized, even godlike ancestor. Its key purpose (or function) was to render a sense of social identity and belonging, thereby strengthening a people's ability to bond and survive. Some of the better-studied tribes of recent eras include the Nuer (Africa), the Trobrianders (Melanesia), the Yanomama (Brazil), and the !Kung (Africa), not to mention old tribal and clan societies in Europe, Asia, and North America (notably, the Iroquois Confederacy).

The tribe is the founding form; what happens with this form—with the sense of "blood" and "brotherhood" it engenders—remains at the foundation of every society. Over time, the maturation of this form in particular places ends up defining a society's basic culture, including its ethnic, linguistic, religious, and civic traditions. In modern eras, it is expressed in nationalism, as well as in the shaping of smaller kindred glues, such as sports and civic clubs, popular-culture fads, and urban gangs. Modern versions of tribes and clans may seem quite different from primitive ones, but people can be as tribal now as back then. This, the first paradigm for social organization, never loses its significance or its attractiveness; it is not going to go away in the centuries ahead.

This chapter examines the evolution of ancient tribal and clan societies and the subsequent rise of chiefdoms. The next chapter shows how tribal and clan dynamics persist in today's world.

DEFINING TRAITS

Tribes grew from bands. Indeed, a standard progression used by anthropologists, ethnologists, and archeologists since the early 1960s, based mainly on work by Elman Service, holds that social organization evolved from bands, to tribes, to chiefdoms, and then to early states (see Service, 1971).[1] In the TIMN framework, the band is little more

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[1] For discussion, see Carneiro (2003, pp. 137–139). For modifications, see Earle and Johnson (1987). Service's formulation has critics (e.g., Ehrenreich et al., 1995; Otterbein, 2004), partly because the progression correlates progress with the growth of

than a small kinship-based precursor to the tribe—a proto-tribe. But let it be noted that a tribe is "not simply a collection of bands," because "the ties that bind a tribe are more complicated than those of bands" (Service, 1971, p. 100).[2] Tribes qualify as societies; roving bands are too small to do so.[3]

A tribe may be tied to a specific territory and the exploitation of its resources. A tribe may spell an evolution from the hunter-gatherer life of nomadic bands to a more settled, agrarian, village lifestyle. A tribe may span a small number of villages and hamlets, and its size may grow (but be limited) to a few thousand people. A tribe may harden its identity as a tribe, as a result of conflicts with nearby societies. And it may lack the formal hierarchies that characterize chiefdoms and states—the two types of societies that come next in evolutionary theory. Yet, even if these or other observations made by scholars are added to the definition of the tribe, kinship remains its essence.

A quick aside: A handful of anthropologists reject the very concept of tribes (as noted in Chapter Two: Fried, 1975; Ferguson and Whitehead, 1992; Otterbein, 2004; Ferguson, 2006b). In their view, few well-defined, "pristine" tribes ever existed in the ancient past; and fewer still evolved into chiefdoms, much less states. Local ethnic peoples that did congregate into distinct tribes mostly did so only after states arose nearby and intruded into their domains, pressing them to resist by organizing into tribes as "secondary" creations. This is tantamount to saying that the tribe is not a prevalent form, and that states—hierarchical institutions—formed before most tribes. This view, if accurate, would undermine the TIMN framework, for it would mean that the tribes-chiefdoms-states progression rarely occurs. Yet, in the details of their analyses, these critics acknowledge that pre-chiefdom/pre-state societies, even though they did not call themselves tribes, still consisted of kinship-oriented settlements, usually hamlets and villages, whose people exhibited a full range of tribelike attributes: They developed around lineages and clans, and had egalitarian, segmental, uncentralized structures. So even if such communities do not meet these critics'

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hierarchy, to the distaste of some scholars. A good example of a sociologist who relies on Service's typology is Sanderson (1999, pp. 52–58).

[2] For discussion of the important roles bands may play, particularly small hunting bands, see Tiger and Fox ([1971] 1998).

[3] There are a few old "societies" (if that is the correct term), such as the Aborigines in Australia, that are considered composite bands, not tribes. Contact with civilization is evidently what drives the bands together.

standards to be termed *tribes*, they are still softly tribal in nature, likely to harden their identities, boundaries, and behaviors as a distinct tribe if pressed from outside to do so.[4]

Back to the main story: Kinship considerations permeate everything—all thought and action—in a tribe and its constituent lineages, families, and clans. One's identity is less about one's self than about one's lineage—lineage determines most of one's identity as an individual and submerges it in the tribal whole—and applies particularly to one of the most important activities in a tribe—arranged marriage—which, too, is about the linking of families, not individuals. From our distant remove, varied economic, political, and cultural activities may appear to occur in a tribe. But in its own light, a tribe's structure

> lacks an independent economic sector or a separate religious organization, let alone a special political mechanism. In a tribe, these are not so much different institutions as they are different *functions* of the same institutions: different things a lineage, for example, may do. (Sahlins, 1968, p. 15; also see Service, 1971, p. 98)

> Thus, whatever a man does in such a society he does as a kinsman of one kind or another. (Schneider, 1980, p. vii)

Kinship systems can be complicated to depict and analyze—as complicated as administrative and market systems. For the most part, kinship systems are patrilineal, matrilineal, or cognate (whereby individuals may identify with either or both lineages) (see Fox, 1967; Sanderson, 2001, pp. 222–223). And they revolve around consanguinity (lineage) or affinity (marriage). The calculation that may matter most for individual behavior is one's place (proximity, distance) in the vertical line of descent from a key ancestor. But sometimes the deciding factor may be the horizontal alliance through marriage (or designation of a godparent) with another family, clan, or tribe. Indeed, whether descent or alliance—the vertical or the horizontal bond—matters more, when, and why have been issues of grand debate among anthropologists for decades (Fox, 1967; Hann, 2000; C. Harris, 1990; Lévi-Strauss, 1996; and Zonabend, 1996).

As tribes grow, clans often coalesce inside them.[5] *Clans* are essentially clusters of families and individuals who claim a distinct lineage and, because of this lineage, act conjointly in a corporate manner (Fox, 1967, pp. 89–92; Johnson and Earle, 1987):[6]

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[4] For additional discussion of the defining traits of tribes, clans, and band societies, see the entries for those terms in the online *Wikipedia* encyclopedia (en.wikipedia.org).

> Clans and lineages are kin-based corporate units; they own land and other resources together and restrict outsiders' access to their estate. (Johnson and Earle, 1987, p. 201)

> The lineage or clan is more than a group of relatives united by privileged ties; it is also a corporate group, whose members support each other, act together in all circumstances, whether ritual or everyday, jointly own and exploit assets and carry out, from generation to generation, the same political, religious, or military functions. (Zonabend, 1996, p. 48)

Typically, a clan has its own legends, totems, rituals, and ceremonies about its ancestry, its own lands and other properties, perhaps a "Big Man" or at least an elder to represent (but not rule) it, and perhaps a particular function in a tribe, such as progeny who usually serve as priests or warriors. Mutual defense and aid are keenly important in clan systems; indeed, an insult or threat to one member is received as an insult or threat to all—the case also for a tribe as a whole vis-à-vis other tribes and outsiders.

Tribes and their clans depend heavily on rules regarding who may and may not marry whom (see Fox, 1967; Zonabend, 1996). Marriage in such systems is less about the linking of individuals than of groups; thus, it is also about the transmission of status, property, privilege, and responsibility. Monogamous nuclear families are not the norm; polygyny often is—and to a small extent, polyandry (whereby the woman has more than one husband). Strict rules often govern the extent to which a man or woman should marry outside a lineage (exogamy) or within it (endogamy). Prescribed and arranged marriages, often between distant cousins or in exchanges of women with other clans or tribes, tend to be the norm. Practices of brideprice (whereby the man pays the

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[5] Which developed first, tribes or clans? I have yet to encounter a discussion of this question. Yet those anthropologists who raise doubts about the concept of "tribes" (see footnote 7 and related text in Chapter Two) and those who prefer such terms as *hamlets* and *villages* (e.g., Johnson and Earle, 1987; Carneiro, 2003), all seem to be saying that clans took shape regardless.

[6] Anthropologists who study tribal systems consider the constituent elements to consist of not only clans but also *gens*, *phratries*, and *moieties*. But I do not see that my elaborating on these elements would help the development of the TIMN framework at this point.

woman's family) and dowry (whereby the woman brings money and property to the marriage) are common as well (for an overview, see Sanderson, 2001).[7]

Explanations for these marriage patterns vary, but often entail beliefs about how best to safeguard family honor and property, maximize mutual trust and obligation, limit prospects of betrayal, ensure long-term reciprocity, avoid contact with strangers, and foster long-term alliances, including between tribal elements that may have been antagonistic (see Burguière et al., 1996). An extremely traditional expression of this protectiveness is found among Bedouin Arabs, for whom the family becomes a "fortress"—so much so that "It is quite possible for a woman to meet no one but blood relatives in her entire life" (Fargues, 1996, p. 35). Generally speaking, what such dynamics aim to ensure, even in modern Western societies, is "enduring diffuse solidarity" (Schneider, 1980).

In a sense, then, kinship is both ideology and strategy. A tribe's internal cohesion and its relations with other tribes revolve around a *realpolitik* not of physical resources but of lineages and marriages—what anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss once called "the great game of marriage," cognitive scientist Stephen Pinker (1994, pp. 436–440) terms "strategic matchmaking," and I would venture to call *kinpolitik*. Arranged marriage is a key instrument for deliberately structuring society. Indeed, kinship matters are so crucial at this stage that "Part of [humanity's] enormous success in the evolutionary struggle lies in [its] ability to manipulate these relationships to advantage" (Fox, 1967, p. 30). In tribal systems,

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[7] There are many interesting variations. One that catches my eye concerns the Ngombe in Africa, about which Wolfe (2005, p. 112) writes:

> A result of this system of marriage is that every lineage relates to a number of other lineages in two ways—either it is obligated to give goods to that other lineage because one of its males married a woman from that lineage, or it has the right to demand goods from that lineage because one of its "daughters" married a man from that lineage. . . . The consequence of these rules is a very highly connected network of bridewealth obligations over a broad area of Ngombe territory. This is terribly important, because there is among these people no tradition of market exchange. This bridewealth system was the primary method of not only distributing useful capital goods but also of generating a stock of capital goods that was thus available for use when needed.

> Cultural relationships of kinship determine rights and obligations that represent power over people, and political individuals manipulate these relationships (by strategic marriages, adoptions, godfathering, and the like) to centralize and extend power. (Earle, 1997, p. 5)

This pattern is evident even in a tribe that developed the beginnings of a revered, centralized chiefdom, the Trobrianders in New Guinea:

> Despite such displays of reverence, a chief's actual power was limited. It rested ultimately upon his ability to play the role of "great provider," which depended on ties of kinship and marriage rather than on the control of weapons and resources. (M. Harris, 1977, p. 109)

But while lineage and marriage ties might hold small bands and tribes together, they alone do not suffice to keep large tribes integrated. To do so eventually requires the rise of a variant on the kinship principle: fraternal associations and corporate orders that are more about brotherhood than blood—what anthropologists variously refer to as sodalities, pan-tribal associations, fraternal interest groups, or fictive kinship.[8] Such associations usually combine individuals from various families and villages for a specific corporate purpose (Service, 1971, p. 13). Examples include secret brotherhoods and age-grade, warrior, healing, ceremonial, and religious associations. Whereas some may have derived directly from lineage (e.g., the clan), others did not—yet all emulated kinlike relations. The larger and more complex a tribe becomes, and the more varied the activities in it, the more important such brotherhoods become. (In modern times, these associations are also called clubs, gangs, fraternal orders, and secret societies.)

In serving cross-cutting, integrative functions, such associations laid groundwork for the eventual rise of status distinctions and for the differentiation and specialization that are bound to occur as a tribe developed into a chiefdom or a civilization centered around a state (Service, 1971, pp. 102, 105, 156). Conflict and competition vis-à-vis other tribes (or states) also played roles in strengthening such internal bonds, but were still secondary to the roles of lineages, marriages, and brotherhoods.

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[8] The important point—that kinship may be about brotherhood as well as about blood—is discussed by Service (1971, 1975) under the concept of *sodalities* and by Johnson and Earle (1987, pp. 6–7) under the concept of *fictive kinship*. Sahlins (1968, p. 23) prefers "pan-tribal institutions." Otterbein (2004) prefers "fraternal interest groups"—but his concept has all the men (e.g., warriors) related by blood.

GOVERNANCE, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE

Individual identities and possibilities in tribal/clan societies are fixed and fluid at the same time. Lineage means that they are fixed by virtue of to whom an individual is born, and when. Moreover, as a rule, tribe trumps clan, trumps family, trumps the individual—binding all into a nested social (but not political) hierarchy. Even so, kin and their associates may operate off lateral as much as vertical ties. For example, an individual may select which relative (say, which distant cousin) to ally with on which issues under what circumstances. This choice can make for flexible social possibilities that resemble not only circles within circles but also circles across circles—possibilities that may offer extensive room for maneuver that can be used for promoting rivalries as well as alliances.

As individuals, families, clans, and whole tribes assert themselves and maneuver for position, maximizing honor—not power or profit—is normally their paramount motivation. This emphasis is often thought to flow from the fact that tribes arose in subsistence times, way too early for power or profit to matter much. But there must be more to the explanation, for the pattern persists in modern types of tribes and clans, too. Wherever people, even powerful rich people, turn tribal and clannish, then honor—as well as respect, pride, and dignity, honor's concomitants—come into serious play in social interactions. Thus, warlords and warriors fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other tribal zones today are renowned for the value they place on upholding codes of honor and avoiding shameful humiliation. All want to gain honor for themselves and their lineage, clan, and tribe. No one can afford to lose face, for that would reflect badly not only on them as individuals but also on all their kin. If the word were in a dictionary, it might be said that tribes and clans are deeply *honoritarian*.[9]

Let us turn next to organizational principles. Reflecting the primacy of kinship bonds, tribes are resolutely egalitarian, segmental, and acephalous—to use the terms favored by anthropologists.[10] These three principles are interlocking.

First, in being egalitarian, a tribe's members are deemed roughly equal to each other. The aim is not so much absolute equality as respect for individual autonomy, especially the autonomy of individual households. In this spirit, members emphasize communal sharing (especially of food), mutual gift-giving, and doing favors for each

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[9] For an interesting history of the concept of honor, see Bowman (2006).

[10] An early classic source is Evans-Pritchard (1940). Harris (1979) and Boehm (1999) cover all three principles in detail. Almost all anthropology works discuss them.

other—activities that obligate recipients to reciprocate, whether immediately or over time, because honorable reciprocity, not economic exchange, is the deep ethic (see Malinowski, [1922] 1984; Mauss ([1950] 1990).[11] A case can be made that "the sharing is driven by cost-benefit analyses and a careful mental ledger for reciprocation" (Pinker, 1997, p. 505). But ideally, "[t]he objective of exchanges between the parties to a kin relationship does not involve the calculation of advantage; it is rather concerned with the maintenance of an egalitarian social relationship" (C. Harris, 1990, p. 60). Indeed, a purposeful result of all this giving and receiving—with giving deemed more valuable than receiving, and reciprocity being more about ethics than economics—is to build far-reaching networks of personal bonds with kin and nonkin, to enhance solidarity by weaving all parties deep into the fabric of tribal life (Mauss, [1950] 1990; Wolfe, 2005). It is a system whereby giving renders prestige and social harmony may depend on exchanges being always in circulation and never being totally in balance or equilibrium (see Maybury-Lewis, 1992, Ch. 3).[12]

In this context, attempts at elitist domination are not tolerated for long. Upstarts, such as alpha-type bullies and despotic self-aggrandizers, are eventually restrained, as are selfish free-riders and odd-ball deviants (Boehm, 1999). Indeed, tribes are so egalitarian that they exhibit no fixed rank or status system.[13] There may be tendencies for elders to receive more respect than the young, men more than the women, and a "Big Man" more than others. Also, family heads may lord it over others inside their own households; and some lineages and clans may compete for standing. But overall,

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[11] I will return to discussing the nature and role of exchange in a future chapter on the rise of the market form of organization. The important point for now is that, at first, exchange is not simply an economic concept or factor.

[12] Cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists analyze these dynamics in Darwinian terms of "kin selection," "reciprocal altruism," and "inclusive fitness" (Jackendoff, 1994; Wright, 1994; Pinker, 1997; Shermer, 2004). Behavioral economics is also adding to the understanding of reciprocity (De Waal, 2005). In addition to Mauss ([1950] 1990), anthropologists Tiger and Fox ([1971] 1998, Ch. 5) offer an extended discussion of the obligations to give and receive in tribal systems. However, there are views that egalitarianism among hunter-gatherers is a myth and that the deep dynamic is either hierarchy (Otterbein, 2004, pp. 77–81) or exchange (Wright, 2000, pp. 71–72).

[13] I prefer the view that emphasizes egalitarianism over hierarchy in early large kin-based groups (à la Boehm, 1999). For a view that dominance and hierarchy are central to animal as well as early human groups, even though coalitions form to assure egalitarian leveling, see Tiger and Fox (1971, esp. Chapter 2).

the egalitarian ethos limits both hierarchical and competitive tendencies. Whoever shows leadership is supposed to be modest, generous, self-effacing, and treat others as peers. And there is constant groupwide vigilance to keep anyone from gaining sway for long. If necessary, coalitions form to ensure leveling.[14] In tribes sundered by feuds and rivalries, egalitarianism becomes more an ideal than a reality—but is still the desired ethos. In short, tribes operate more as balance-of-honor than as balance-of-power systems.

Second, the classic tribe is segmental (term from Durkheim, [1933] 1947), in that every part resembles every other—there is little to no specialization.[15] The tribe has "no central nervous system," and all households and villages are "like each other, largely self-sufficient economically with each enjoying a great deal of autonomy" (Service, 1975, p. xiii; cf. Service, 1971, p. 132). Since tribes are so segmental and undifferentiated, their constituent parts—for example, families, lineages, clans—tend to oscillate between what anthropologists call "fusion" and "fission." *Fusion* occurs, for example, when clan intermarriages foster unity across villages and other segments; when segments, even those that were feuding, ally against an enemy; and when a tribe absorbs an outside band or tribe. *Fission* occurs when shortages or feuds so beset a tribe that a segment (e.g., a few related households, an entire clan) splits off and goes its own way, forming a new tribe that immediately replicates the design of the old.

Meanwhile, whether engaging in fusion or fission, each segment guards its own autonomy. Not even when segments unite—i.e., fuse—for war against a common enemy do they organize under a central command; they still fight as segments (Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc with Register, 2003). Fission likewise serves to maintain the tribal form, for it inhibits the formation of a central hierarchy and other inegalitarian structures (Cohen, 1978, p. 53). Tribes depend on the formation of integrative segments, such as clans and brotherhoods, to inhibit fission as they grow in size to span multiple villages (Carneiro, 2003, p. 184).

Third, the classic tribe is *acephalous* (headless). It is erroneous to posit that the earliest principle of social organization was hierarchical leadership; egalitarian societies

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[14] This paragraph draws on various classic anthropological texts, but Boehm (1999) has become its main source.

[15] Anthropologists often identify this segmentary quality as a trait of tribes. But, it seems to me, all the TIMN forms are segmentary, despite the advance of specialization and differentiation. If a part of a state or a market should go its own way, it too will end up replicating, with provisos, the basic design and dynamics of the system it left.

were the norm "for thousands of generations" before hierarchical systems—chiefdoms, then states—prevailed (Boehm, 1999, p. 5). Hierarchical tendencies existed in bands and tribes, especially in the sorting out of who were the dominant males (Tiger and Fox, [1971] 1998). But classic tribes had no formal central leaders, not even chiefs. Informal status differences that arose (e.g., deference to elders) were kept muted. Political hierarchies, class structures, and other status systems are absent at this stage. Even the title of chief, if there was a chief, meant little; he was a man of influence, an adviser, a broker—but he could not give orders that had to be obeyed:

> Leadership is personal—charismatic—and for special purposes only in tribal society; there are no political offices containing real power, and a "chief" is merely a man of influence, a sort of adviser. . . . [T]he tribe is largely self-regulating, in contrast to higher levels of polity which, though in important measures self-regulating, are also *regulated by* persons institutionalized for that purpose. (Service, 1971, p. 103, italics in orig.; also see Sahlins, 1968, p. 6)

> What is important to appreciate is that such a "tribal" system is a complex network with a hierarchical structure—household level, . . . village lineage level, political lineage level—even though there is not really centralization of power in the hierarchy. A multitude of ties actually exist in such a system because there are as many ties as there are marriages and offspring of marriages, and no two marriages can connect the same two segments. Such a system enables collaboration and communication and cooperation on a fairly broad scale without centralized control. (Wolfe, 2005, p. 113, based on Wolfe, 1961, about the Ngombe tribe in Africa)

Leadership, as in hunting for big game or conducting a ceremony, tended to be transient, episodic, and low-profile, depending more on the situation than the person. One day's Big Man was not necessarily tomorrow's. It was a system in which "leaders can lead, but followers may not follow," since no real power was vested in a leader (Fried, 1967, pp. 83, 133, 141). Headmen did not give orders that had to be obeyed; they acted more as facilitators or mediators than rulers (Boehm, 1999, p. 33; Maybury-Lewis, 1992, Ch. 9). Major decisions, such as whether to go to war or where to migrate, were made in tribal councils open to all, at which anyone (at least all households' heads)

could speak. Indeed, consultative consensus-seeking in tribal councils—majority rule—was the first form that democracy took.[16]

What matters for keeping order in this milieu are not leadership, hierarchy, force, and law—it is too early a form for that—but the morals, customs, and codes of etiquette that flow from revering kinship bonds. Kinship systems place high value on principled, praiseworthy displays of respect, honor, trust, obligation, sharing, reciprocity, and an acceptance of one's place. Rituals and ceremonies—and, later, religion—are designed to reinforce this reverence. And all this can be accomplished in the absence of a formal hierarchy, because people in bands and tribes act as a decidedly "moral community" (Boehm,1999, pp. 86–89). In the event of wrongdoing, sanctions range from public blame, shame, shunning, ostracism, and a withdrawal of reciprocity, to banishment or assassination if a consensus exists (Fried, 1967, p. 73; Johnson and Earle, 1987, p. 315; Boehm, 1999; Shermer, 2004, Ch. 2; Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc, 2004).

Indeed, principles of mutual respect, dignity, pride, and honor are so important in tribal societies that humiliating insults may upset peace and order more than anything else. As noted earlier, an insult to one individual is normally regarded as an insult to all who belong to that lineage. Then there are basically only two ways to relieve the sense of injury: compensation or revenge. And a call for compensation or revenge may apply not just to the offending individual but to his or her entire lineage. Responsibility is collective; and justice is less about inflicting punishment for a crime than about gaining adequate compensation or revenge to restore honor. It is not unusual to find clans and tribes engaged in prolonged cycles of reconciliation and revenge—i.e., fusion and fission—deriving from insults that happened long ago.

BRIGHT AND DARK SIDES OF TRIBALISM

The tribal form, not to mention all the TIMN forms, has both bright and dark sides. Like technology, it is ethically ambivalent or neutral; its dynamics can be used for good or evil, or for both. Scholars of tribal societies have written extensively about one dark aspect in particular—the blood feud; it is not the only dark aspect.

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[16] Tribal democracy is not liberal democracy, for it is about defining and imposing the will of the majority—even a tyranny of the majority. It does not leave room for a dissenting minority to have independent rights, as in a marketlike liberal democracy. I will discuss this concept in a future installment, showing that each of the four TIMN forms is associated with a different kind of democracy.

At its most uplifting, the tribal form imparts a vibrant sense of social identity and togetherness. It fills a person's life with pride, dignity, honor, and respect. It motivates those who belong to protect, welcome, shelter, encourage, and care for each other, as well as to give gifts and hold ceremonies that celebrate their connections to each other and to the ancestors, lands, and the god or gods that define the tribe's identity. This kinship creates a stable, satisfying realm of communal trust and loyalty, in which one knows (and must uphold) one's rights, duties, and obligations. And these do not have to be accepted passively; they can be actively exploited as one maneuvers to thrive in a tribal system. Such maneuvering may even help foster peaceful alliances with outside tribes and clans. As an old maxim states, "They are our enemies; we marry them."[17]

But tribalism can make for a mean-spirited exclusivity and partiality, too. Tribes and clans can be terribly sensitive about boundaries and barriers, about who is in the tribe or clan and who is outside, about the differences between "us" and "them." One's own tribe (assuming it is not riven with feuds and rivalries) may be viewed as a realm of virtue, in which generous reciprocal altruism rules kin relations. But virtuous behavior toward kin does not have to extend, in tribal logic, toward outsiders—they may be treated differently, especially if they are "different." It is not illogical to have one code for one's kin and another for outsiders. Indeed, it may seem sensible—and not at all unethical or illegitimate—to behave in what modern analysts may regard as deceptive, exploitive, and even murderous ways toward outsiders.[18]

The darker aspects of tribal dynamics show up in four patterns in particular. One thread these four have in common is a desire for domination that exceeds the classic desire for an egalitarian equilibrium all across a tribal or clan system. Another thread is that what modern analysts regard as crime and corruption may have entirely different meanings to tribal and clannish peoples.

First, the dark side shows up regularly in fractious blood feuds that may develop within and between tribes and their clans. In extreme (but far from rare) instances, a feud may extend over very long time periods, and the lust for vengeance may lead to efforts to kill all relatives, so that no one is left to retaliate, breed new kin, or even pray

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[17] However, Keeley (1996, p. 125) finds that "[i]ntermarriage is thus no guarantee of peace; like trade, it can be an inducement to war."

[18] Shermer (2004, pp. 25–27, 37–39) shows that the Golden Rule and its variants cropped up in many ancient societies, and that ancient religious texts often advocated benevolent behavior toward kin, yet allowed barbaric behavior toward outsiders. See Furnish (2005) on the rationale for beheading in Islamic societies.

for a dead perpetrator's soul. Yet a feud may be temporarily suspended if a tribe or set of clans feels threatened by outsiders; fractiousness is halted conditionally in order to present a solid, unified face against a common external enemy.

Second, the sense of connection to the land—especially if it is believed that the land was a gift from a deity—may render a sense of entitlement to challenge outsiders crossing into one's territory and to collect tribute and fees from them. Such entitlement can happen with the later TIMN forms as well, but it starts with this one. Road and bridge tolls may be mild expressions; highway robbery, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom may also result. Moreover, such enterprises as smuggling across borders, collecting levees from outlaw groups in an area, requiring kickbacks from legitimate investors and traders, and neglecting to remit taxes and fees to a central government may seem reasonable to the tribal-clan mentality, especially if the outsiders, including government officials, are thought to belong to a rival tribe or clan.

Third, although the tribal form may favor intense, irrevocable loyalties to one's kin and preferred outsiders, another common tendency is that of suddenly shifting alliances and loyalties. In tribal milieus, one day's ally may turn into another day's betrayer, and a group that takes shape one day may not be able to form anew later. Amity may shift abruptly to enmity, and the shifter may change colors like a chameleon on the loose. Alliance-shifting may surface particularly in high-stakes situations, such as wars or feuds, involving rival tribes, clans, or outsiders.[19] Histories of embattled clan systems are replete with such betrayals, as in Japan and Scotland long ago and Afghanistan today. Thus, it is said that, in the wilder parts of Afghanistan, the allegiance of tribesmen to U.S. forces may not be for sale, but it can be for rent.[20]

Fourth, while tribesmen and clansmen are bound to favor kin if an opportunity arises to name someone to a post, nepotism carried to an extreme may amount to a dark-side behavior. This point does not have much bearing on classic tribes, since few if any offices or posts existed in them. But it became significant as tribes developed into chiefdoms in ancient times, and again in modern eras as ethnocentric tribal or clan personages gain control of offices in state and business systems in which they proceed to appoint kin, no matter their qualifications, ahead of qualified others.

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[19] See Keeley (1996) and LeBlanc (2003) on the nature of tribal warfare. See Ferguson and Whitehead (1992) for a view, criticized by Keeley, that ethnic groups do not organize into tribes until after they are pressed and attacked by intruding states. See Ferguson (2006a, b) for rejoinders to Keeley and LeBlanc.

[20] From a *Los Angeles Times* article, November 1, 2004, p. A-8.

This is a tentative list, because it is not clear exactly what should be listed as the bright and dark aspects of the tribal form, or why one or the other may prevail in a particular context. One significant factor appears to be religion (and, earlier, magic). Religion may not determine whether a tribal society tilts toward the bright or dark side, but it may well attend the justification. The way that a religion is layered onto tribalism, or tribalism onto a religion, can deeply affect a people's thinking and behavior. After all, a deity may be seen as the ultimate ancestor, defining a society's sense of identity and belonging, and religions are partly about how people should treat one another with that deity in mind.

Most religions, from ancient totemism onwards, have their deepest roots in tribal societies. Indeed, each of the world's major monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—arose during a tense tribal time in the Middle East. And the oldest texts of each contain passages that, true to traditional tribal ethics, advocate reciprocal altruism toward kin, yet allow for terrible retribution against outside tribes deemed guilty of insult or injury. Today, centuries later, tribal and religious concepts remain fused in much of the world—notably, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.[21]

In general, the more a religion commends the kinship of all peoples, the more it may favor the brighter aspects of communal life. But the more a religion's adherents delineate severely between "us" and "them," demonize the latter, view their every kin (man, woman, child, civilian and military) as innately guilty, revel in codes of revenge for touted wrongs, and crave territorial or spiritual conquests, all the while claiming to act on behalf of a deity, then the more their religious orientation is utterly tribal, prone to violence of the darkest kind. This is as evident in the medieval Christian Crusades as in today's Islamic jihads, to mention only two examples.

All ancient religious hatreds by groups toward groups—be they Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, or Hindu—are sure to speak the language of tribe and clan. And that language is sure to be loaded with sensitivities about respect, honor, pride, and dignity, along with allocutions to the sacred, purifying nature of violence. This is a normal ethic of tribes and clans, no matter the era or the religion. Savagery may worsen when a tribe

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[21] I am not saying that religion is associated only with the tribal form. Each TIMN form is associated with a different phase of religion. In the case of Christianity, the rise of the papacy reflects the hierarchical institutional form, and Protestantism, the market form. The rise of the network form should lead to a long new era of ecumenical outreach and interfaith connections. I will elaborate on this in a future installment on the TIMN framework.

or clan is headed by a sectarian chieftain who is also an ambitious warlord. It may be further exacerbated if outsiders who feel threatened react with a mirrorlike tribalism of their own. While the modern idea of separating state and church is difficult enough, any notion of separating tribe and religion is virtually inconceivable for many a people, especially in wartime.

KEY STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FOR SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The tribal form serves a crucial early role in the evolution of societies because it, more than any other form, excels at inculcating a sense of identity, belonging, and solidarity. At first, this sense boosts a people's abilities to survive and even flourish at a subsistence level. Later, it lays a basis for the rise of ethnic cultures with distinctive languages, traditions, and practices, and still later, for the rise of nationalism.

But although the tribal form excels at addressing problems of social identity, it has an insurmountable limitation: It is not suited to addressing problems of power and administration, neither internally nor vis-à-vis other tribes. In primitive times, this limitation did not matter much. Eventually, however, it becomes a weakness that limits a society's ability to prosper and protect itself. Without occasional leadership, decisionmaking, planning, and coordination, a tribe cannot move beyond the simplest types of activity, such as subsistence agriculture for household consumption. It cannot resist fragmentation through feuds that lead to prolonged cycles of revenge—a pernicious tendency in kin-oriented societies. And it cannot mount a constant defense or offense against an outside enemy; nor can it govern a conquered enemy.

Thus, a society cannot advance far by relying solely on the tribal form, no matter how much a set of people enjoys the sense of solidarity and community that tribal life may provide. Which takes us to the next form to emerge: the hierarchical institution. As I discuss the hierarchical and later forms, the point should be kept ever in mind that tribelike patterns, which initially dominate the organization of societies, forever remain an essential basis of identity and solidarity as societies become more complex and add the other TIMN forms.

THE TRANSITION FROM T TO T+I SOCIETIES

With the rise of the early state, whose leading examples were in Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, Mexico, and Peru,[22] the bases of societal organization and governance shift. Kinship gives way to hierarchy. A central authority begins to emerge that has a coercive capacity. From a TIMN perspective, the way opens for the transition from monoform (T) to biform (T+I) societies. Anthropologists summarize this paradigmatic shift as follows:

> The tribal condition is transcended the moment a state apparatus is differentiated from and imposed upon society at large. (Sahlins, 1968, p. 15)

> A state is not simply a legislature, an executive body, a judiciary system, an administrative bureaucracy, or even a government. . . .   [A] state is better viewed as the complex of institutions by means of which the power of the society is organized on a basis superior to kinship. (Fried, 1967, p. 229)

> The *typical*[23] early state exists where kinship ties are counterbalanced by territorial ones, where competition and appointment to office counterbalance the principle of heredity of office, where non-kin officials and titled holders begin to play a leading role in government administration . . . . (Claessen and Skalník, in Claessen and Skalník, 1978, p. 23)

The key way station in this transition is the chiefdom. It is the next step up the ladder of social complexity—one that "dramatically changes social life, as cultural identification and economic interdependence supersede biological bonding as the fiber of social cohesion" (Johnson and Earle, 1987, p. 313). Compared with tribes, chiefdoms have larger, denser, more varied populations; they preside over a larger set of villages; and they are more productive and better integrated. Whereas in tribes, everyone knew

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[22] Service (1957) and Claessen and Skalník (1978) offer case studies. Wittfogel (1957) analyzes cases of "Oriental despotism" where bureaucratic states ruled "hydraulic societies" based on the "Asiatic mode of production."

[23] Claessen and Skalník (1978a, p. 23; and 1978c, pp. 640-642) distinguish among the inchoate, typical, and transitional early state, and between the early and mature state. Otterbein (2004, pp. 105-120) melds the typology from Claessen and Skalník with one from Robert Carneiro to delineate five stages in the evolution from villages to chiefdoms to states: Stage I, Minimal Chiefdom; Stage II, Typical Chiefdom; Stage III, Maximal Chiefdom or Inchoate Early State; Stage IV, Typical Early State; Stage V, Transitional Early State. Beyond these lies the Mature State.

everybody else, they increasingly do not in chiefdoms. Faced with the challenge of managing larger, more complicated populations and economies, chiefdoms bring the emergence of a "permanent central agency of coordination" (Service, 1971, pp. 134, 142):

> Although chiefdoms are highly variable, characteristically the organization at this scale requires political hierarchy or an overlapping series of hierarchies for coordination and decisionmaking. (Earle, 1997, p. 14)

Clannish hierarchy, patron-client relations, status differences, and early steps toward differentiation and specialization are the chiefdoms' hallmarks, in contrast to the acephalous, egalitarian, segmental nature of the classic tribe.

Many anthropologists view the chiefdom as a distinct type of society that lies between the tribe and the early state. But in the TIMN framework, the chiefdom is a transition in which the tribal form is suffused and combined with the hierarchical form, yet the hierarchical form is still far from taking hold. En route to evolving into chiefdoms, tribes may first experience the Big Man phenomenon—the occasional, irregular appearance of individuals who bring a group of people together from different families and villages to perform some activity that requires momentary leadership and coordination. Next may come the "petty chieftain," who gets to speak for the tribe in a range of matters, yet who still lacks real power and authority and may even be ignored. Then, slowly but finally, a full-fledged chiefdom may develop as a governing institution. Here is how Allen Johnson and Timothy Earle, experts on the evolution of chiefdoms, characterize this development:

> For example, in Polynesia a single local lineage may expand by conquest to form a regional chiefdom. The chiefdom is at first organized by the kinship principles formerly governing the local lineage, but its new regional functions inexorably lead to changes in this mode of organization. Kinship-based forms and institutions gradually give way to novel, more bureaucratic institutions designed to solve problems of integrating society on a much larger scale. (Johnson and Earle, 1987, p. 22)

> The family-level economy, based primarily on bonds of kinship and friendship—that is, reciprocity and trust—gives way first to modest hierarchies based on reputation and publicly demonstrated "prestige," later to official hierarchies still rooted in the language of kinship, and still later to bureaucracies in which the pretense of kinship between ruler and ruled is

finally abandoned, though it remains faintly perceptible in patron-client relationships of various sorts. (Johnson and Earle, 1987, pp. 319–320)

Chiefdoms rested initially on charismatic authority, but they also began to invest authority and legitimacy in the institution itself. Succession rules emerged that made ascension to the post hereditary, with an emphasis on primogeniture—thereby fusing the principles of kinship and hierarchy. Secular and sacred roles also remained fused in this phase. Indeed, many chiefdoms were theocracies devoted to ancestor worship; the chief was both warrior and priest, sanctioned by a divine supernatural authority linked to his lineage.

On the one hand, chiefdoms amplified kinship ranking—some lineages and descent groups were now more important than others. In many, a "conical clan" took shape, in which rank depended on genealogical proximity to a key ancestor. Beneath the chief and his clan were arrayed a cone-shaped (pyramidal) structure of subsidiary chiefs and clans, with ranking reflecting genealogical nearness to the chief. A tribe's villages often fell under a single-clan chiefdom; but in some chiefdoms, leading clans feuded over who would prevail in the emerging, pan-tribal hierarchy (Sahlins, 1968, p. 24; Service, 1971, pp. 79, 142, 145; Johnson and Earle, 1987, pp. 226–227)

On the other hand, lineage is no longer the singular source of power; the central control and coordination of economic, military, and religious resources now matters increasingly (Earle, 1997; Haas, 1982; LeBlanc, 2003; also, North, 1981).[24] Chiefdoms could undertake activities that tribes could not, such as building public works and monuments, making larger weapon systems (e.g., long canoes), storing part of a harvest in a central granary, collecting tributes and taxes, organizing large ceremonies, arranging trade deals with outsiders, forming up for war, and making treaties. And as chiefdoms did so, the tribal propensity for egalitarian reciprocity gave way to a new emphasis on inegalitarian redistribution; indeed, the shift from reciprocity to redistribution is a key theme in the literature on chiefdoms (e.g., Service, 1971, p. 134). Chiefs played lead roles especially in ceremonies that signified a redistribution of resources within the tribe.[25]

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[24] While most scholars emphasize the chiefs' roles in centralizing the collection and redistribution of resources, Haas (1982, p. 10) urges that "the primary role of the chief is to process information and manage interaction between communities."

[25] Mauss ([1950] 1990) provides a fascinating analysis of *potlatch* ceremonies.

By their nature, then, chiefdoms were less segmental than tribes; the parts were no longer identical. To raise economic productivity, chiefdoms allowed specialization in what different villages did, and sometimes required villages to pool their resources. To enable better management, some centers of activity were made more specialized and indispensable than others, and offices resembling proto-bureaucracies started to take shape. Even so, each segment of a chiefdom tended to replicate the offices and functions located at the center (Cohen, 1978, pp. 36, 55).

Thus, partly because chiefdoms were more complex than tribes, they were better able to resist the fission that was the bane of tribes. This resistance is a key diagnostic of the differences among tribes and chiefdoms and states (Cohen, 1978, p. 35; Carneiro, 2003):

> Pre-state polities fission as part of their normal political process. States do not. States emerge therefore in situations in which break-up is impossible or unacceptable. . . . [T]he impossibility of fission means that a quantum increase in political activity must be initiated by the traditional authorities. . . . *The polity centralizes in response to an increased administrative work-load by the leadership*. (Cohen, 1978, p. 57, italics in original)

States and their bureaucracies will be able to fight fission not only by resorting to force, but also by building education and communication systems to absorb and integrate varied ethnic groups. Chiefdoms still lacked such capacities, but they were a step in that direction.

And yet, despite these gleams of hierarchy, stratification, and specialization, chiefdoms are still "examples of kinship society rather than civil society" (Service, 1971, p. 163). They amount to an intermediate phase between the egalitarian tribe and the hierarchical state, rarely turning to nonkin to fill administrative posts and functions. And while authority is becoming centralized and hereditary, it is still not embedded in formal institutions that command a monopoly of force. At most, a chiefdom commands a "majority of force" (Sahlins, 1968, p. xx). Kinship is far from losing its importance; struggles over its formalization may even intensify as a once-egalitarian tribe evolves into a stratified chiefdom (Fried, 1967, pp. 120–121).

DYNAMICS IN THE TRANSITION FROM T TO T+I SOCIETIES

While scholarly debates swirl around efforts to explain the rise of all the TIMN forms, the most vigorous debates I have encountered concern the transition from tribes,

to chiefdoms, to states. The major explanatory factors that scholars repeatedly posit for this transition are increases in population, in economic production, in local and long-distance trade, in warfare and conquest, and in social stratification. All these increases generate impulses and opportunities for central coordination and control, and thus for the emergence of specialized administrative and bureaucratic hierarchies—i.e., for the rise of the +I form. Of these factors, population growth is the one that receives the most agreement (M. Harris, 1977; Johnson and Earle, 1987; Carneiro, 2003). Part of the argument is that this factor, more than any other, impels societies to intensify their capacities for economic production as well as for warfare. As Carneiro (2003, p. 206) notes,

> In the *absence* of concentrations of population, few if any chiefdoms or states ever arose. In its *presence*, many sprang up, responding to the demands that the increasing pressures of human numbers began exerting on existing political structures.

But are such factors mainly causes, or consequences? For example, consider an enduring debate among anthropologists about whether the growth of inegalitarian stratification caused the rise of a hierarchical coordinating center, first in the chiefdom and then in the state. A view influenced by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels[26] (notably, in Fried, 1967) argued that the state developed in order to expand and defend social stratification. An opposing view (notably, in Service, 1971, e.g., p. 140)[27] countered that little stratification and private ownership preceded the rise of the state, whose primary aim was simply to defend its rise as an autonomous institution. In this view, inequality, ranking, and stratification are a consequence rather than a cause of the state's rise. For many observers, truth exists on both sides:

> [T]he development of the state involved the specialization of a governing bureaucracy, as argued by Service, *and* the emergence of stratification based on access to basic resources, as argued by Fried. The two factors are not

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[26] A classic source is Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* ([1891] 1972). Also influential was Jean Jacque Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* ([1754] 1984).

[27] Service (1971, p. 140) states: "But however salient the personal, individual ranking as a social feature of developed chiefdoms, . . . this is a consequence of the development of a coordinating center, not its cause."

mutually exclusive; rather, they must be considered together to adequately explain the origin of the state. (Haas, 1982, p. 151, italics in original)[28]

Political stage and social stratification are clearly very strongly correlated with each other, almost inextricably intertwined. It is difficult to say which is the dependent variable and which the independent variable. It may be best to conclude that these variables are codeterminants—they ratchet each other up in the evolutionary process. (Sanderson, 2001, p. 314)

This coevolution makes sense. Moreover, in reviewing a range of demographic, economic, military, and other causal factors and the scholarly debates about them, Robert Carneiro (2003) makes the deeper point that cause and effect may interact and spiral across *all* stages of social evolution:

Causation may be said to be *spiral* in the sense that factors may react in such a way that something that may be a *cause* at one stage of the process may in turn become an *effect* at a later stage. And then this effect may once more play a causal role in a later stage, and so on. (Carneiro, 2003, p. 190, italics in original)

Clearly, what caused the rise of the state, not to mention other hierarchical institutions, is a difficult area for analysis, and debates continue to simmer among anthropologists. Similar debates have arisen regarding the causes and consequences of the later rise of the market (+M) and network (+N) forms—with technological advances playing an ever-stronger role as an explanatory factor.

While identifying the causes of particular transitions is a major concern for many scholars, I doubt that much is to be gained for the formulation of the TIMN framework by dwelling on specific causal factors at this point. More important for the framework's development is to cull from the literature about tribes, chiefdoms, and early states those propositions that speak not to specific causes but to overarching systemic dynamics that may play a role in all the TIMN transitions. In the literature on tribes, chiefdoms, and early states, I find five notable propositions in particular.

First, evolution does accrue in stages or steps. Each stage matters; none can be skipped. But progress is not inevitable. Societies may get stuck, retreat, or advance

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[28] These debates resound in the papers in the volumes assembled by Claessen and Skalník (1978) and Cohen and Service (1978).

along these steps. Not all tribes develop into chiefdoms, nor all chiefdoms into states.
Moreover, reversions can occur, with tribe and clan being the ultimate fallback form:

> [W]hen dealing with political evolution, we encounter an undeniable
> unilinearity. . . . [T]he common line in the evolution of all states has been one
> of band > autonomous village > chiefdom > state. No known case exists of a
> number of autonomous villages having evolved directly into states without
> first having been chiefdoms. . . . Advanced forms of political organization
> may temporarily revert to simpler forms, before advancing again to even
> higher forms. Or indeed, following a breakdown, a complex polity may
> never advance again. Historical developments, then, are saw-toothed rather
> than straight-lined. (Carneiro, 2003, p. 234)

Second, progress can be viewed as a process in which a society proceeds from one
TIMN form of organization to the next, while passing through an intermediate step that
mixes characteristics of the forms on either side. The tribe-chiefdom-state progression
is like this. The chiefdom is a hybrid of the kinship dynamics that regulate tribes, along
with the nascent hierarchical institutional dynamics that lead to states. Some scholars'
typologies put chiefdoms on a par with tribes and states, but chiefdoms are no more
than an intermediate form of organization in the T+I transition. (This point reemerges
later with mercantilism; it is an intermediate, transitional stage in the evolution from +I
statism to +M capitalism)

Third, as progress occurs, the older forms and practices remain embedded within
the new form for ages to come. This embeddedness is noticeable with the first
evolutions from tribes (or as in the quote that follows, hamlet-level societies) to
chiefdoms to early states:

> [A]t each evolutionary stage existing organizational units are embedded
> within new, higher-order unifying structures. Hamlets are made up of
> families, local groups of hamlets, regional chiefdoms of local groups, and
> states of regional chiefdoms. . . . The earlier levels continue to operate but
> with modified functions. . . . Thus the chiefdom and even the archaic state
> espouse ideologies of reciprocity and redistribution appropriate to the more
> intimate social life of the family and the local community. (Johnson and
> Earle, 1987, p. 322)

Fourth, no matter what specific factors are said to be the causes, once a new form
comes into play, it affects everything around it, altering the nature of adaptation and

causation that previously existed. The rise of a new form generates effects that not only help spread the new form but also help to modify prior forms, causes, and activities, so that they support the new form's growth. Ronald Cohen (1978), in writing about the transitions from tribes to chiefdoms to states, raises this proposition, which may apply equally well to the later TIMN transitions:

> The position taken here leads to the conclusion that once a society starts to change its authority structure towards greater permanency and stable supra-local hierarchy, then the political realm itself becomes an ever-increasingly powerful determinant of change in the economy, society, and culture of the system. The entire process is a large-scale feedback system in which multiple possible sets of causes in the ecology, economy, society, and intersocietal environment may singly or in combination produce more permanent centralized hierarchies of political control. After this initial impulse, the hierarchical structure itself feeds back on all societal factors to make them more closely into an overall system that supports the authority structure. This is why early states so far removed from one another as Inca Peru, ancient China, Egypt, early Europe, or pre-colonial West Africa have so many striking similarities of organization, culture and society. (Cohen 1978, p. 70)

A fifth proposition is that incomplete, flexible adaptation to a form may be optimal for further evolution. Rigid adherence to a form may prove detrimental to the capacity for further evolution. Important as it is to get a form "right," exact adaptation (or adaptedness, or fitness) to an environment may not be best for a society's potential. It may be easier for a new TIMN form to emerge if the prior form is somewhat weak; the more hardened and inflexible an established form, the more it may impede the rise of the next. This proposition reflects Elman Service's "Law of Evolutionary Potential" (Service, 1960, p. 97, as discussed by Carneiro, 2003, p. 246), which, based on his studies of tribes, chiefdoms, states, and early civilizations, maintains that "The more specialized and adapted a form in a given evolutionary stage, the smaller is its potential for passing to the next stage." Furthermore, says Service (1975, pp. 314–322),[29] the "potential for further advance decreases in proportion to adaptive success and maturity," because adaptation may have "self-limiting, unprogressive, conservative" consequences if it puts a leading society totally in tune with its environment. If that environment changes,

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[29] Tainter (1988, pp. 56–60) provides an interesting discussion of Service's Law.

a "newer, less adapted and less stabilized society" may then be better suited to making breakthroughs and bypassing the leading society.

This fifth proposition, like the others, would gain value if it applied as well to the later TIMN forms—if, for example, markets arose more readily when states were less entrenched. That it does apply will be discussed in a future installment.

CODA

This chapter has laid out, in summary fashion and skipping many intricacies, the basic dynamics of classic tribes. These dynamics took shape more than 10,000 years ago, beginning in the Neolithic age. They still characterize the many bands, tribes, and chiefdoms that anthropologists have studied in recent eras, such as the Nuer (Africa), Trobrianders (Melanesia), !Kung (Africa), Iroquois (North America), and Yanomama (Venezuela and Brazil), not to mention other examples.

This can make the tribal form look primitive and backward, like a relic from the past. Yet, one modern manifestation or another still makes media headlines almost ever day, especially for many current events in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Moreover, in modern societies in Europe and North America, the tribal paradigm is constantly reiterated in large ways and small—not only in expressions of nationalism and "national character," but also in the often-clannish organization and behavior of civic clubs, social circles, sports fans, urban gangs, and even "cyber-tribes," to note a few examples. All such expressions reflect the tribal paradigm, for they are more about traditional desires for identity, honor, pride, respect, and solidarity than about modern desires for power and profit. The next chapter discusses these modern manifestations of this most ancient form.

4. MODERN MANIFESTATIONS
OF THE TRIBAL FORM

The tribe, as the first full form of societal organization, initially defines nearly the totality of a society. As the later TIMN forms develop, making societies more complex, this foundational form ceases to be so defining—it ceases to be the driving form. Yet it never goes away; it remains forever significant. No durable society can do without it. Even fully modern societies that lack explicit tribes and clans still have—indeed, must have—tribelike sensibilities at their core; the tribe persists, for example, in nationalism, cultural festivities, and even such seemingly minor matters as sports and fan clubs.

As a society advances in TIMN terms, kinship and other tribal criteria get pushed out of determining its political, military, and economic activities—the other forms, once developed, are better at those activities. And as this exclusion occurs, the tribal form gets concentrated in what becomes the cultural realm. To this day, the tribal form continues to define much of that realm. Culture becomes its home realm. Indeed, the tribal form is essential to culture, because cultures express the kinship of not only people but also ideas and practices.[1] Subcultures become its most clannish expressions.

In short, the tribal form plays larger, more resonant, enduring roles in societies and social evolution than is recognized. Tribalism, for good and ill, is alive everywhere, all the time, in one shape or another, even in complex modern societies.

This chapter—which concludes this installment on the formulation of the TIMN framework—reiterates that, even for modern societies that have advanced far beyond a tribal stage, the tribe remains not only the founding form but also the forever form and the ultimate fallback form. Myriad manifestations of this form are spread throughout all societies, at all stages of evolution—and that will remain the case, forever. This form affects how the other TIMN forms are adopted and developed. It is the natural fallback form if the others fail.

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[1] This is not to claim that the tribal form defines all of culture. Culture is a vaster concept, because it may include, to quote Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington (2000, p. xv), all "the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among a people in a society."

THE ONCE AND FOREVER FORM

I am not alone in being interested in the persistence of tribalism into our times. New studies often show that ancient tribal patterns remain relevant, even instructive, for modern life. Many come from anthropologists and sociologists—such as Lionel Tiger's *The Manufacture of Evil: Ethics, Evolution, and the Industrial System* (1987) and David Maybury-Lewis's *Millennium: Tribal Wisdom and the Modern World* (1992). Some inquire anew into how families have changed over time in different cultures—as in *A History of the Family* by André Burguière et al. (1996). Lately, evolutionary psychologists have added new thinking about the ancient, tribal roots of modern behaviors—as in Michael Shermer's *The Science of Good and Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Care, Share, and Follow the Golden Rule* (2004). Even popular science writers tout the subject at times—as in David Berreby's *Us and Them: Understanding Your Tribal Mind* (2005).

Moreover, in America there is no end to studies about excessive individualism and the erosion of family and community ties—as in Robert Bellah et al.'s *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (1996) and Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (2000). These analyses pertain to the tribal form, although the language is not about tribes and clans but about individuals in relation to the "community." That Americans are not the only ones concerned about such matters is evidenced by a French study, Michel Maffesoli's *The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society* (1996).

Meanwhile, a few scholars have turned to the tribal form as a way to think about global trends in identity. Examples include Joel Kotkin's *Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy* (1993) and Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World* (1996). Recent wars and other conflicts have also led to new examinations of tribal dynamics—as in Robert Kaplan's *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (2000) and James Bowman's *Honor: A History* (2006).

These studies are pertinent and illuminating, yet they rarely reach beyond their specific focus. I have yet to find a sweeping portrayal of how tribal (and clan) forms of organization and behavior have permeated social life across the ages. Political and economic histories often provide such portrayals for the institutional (I) and market (M) forms. But there is nothing comparable for the tribal (T) form, not even in cultural theories and histories.

Even so, there is no dearth of evidence that tribal dynamics still reign in many of the wilder, remoter, more-violent, less-developed parts of the world. The challenge is

to show the tribal form's endurance in complex modern societies. Basic places to look include

- at the family level—including in the nature and roles of the nuclear family, the extended family, clans, and other kith and kin in different societies
- at the associational level[2]—including among formal and informal groups, affiliations, organizations, and other such entities that constitute the bulk of a society's structures and processes beyond the family
- at the ideational level—including in ideas, values, norms, principles, and other such criteria about how people should relate to each other and how a society should treat its members.

At the Family Level

Understanding local variations in the tribal form helps explain why some political and economic systems are more personalistic and clannish than others. Cultures and their effects depend on the significance of extended family ties, not to mention other kinship factors. Their generally greater importance in Eastern than in Western cultures—and in Third World than in First World societies, in the Middle East than in Western Europe, in Italy than in England, in southern than in northern Italy—helps explain why, in each comparison, the former often exhibit more familistic, even nepotistic, approaches to economics and politics than do the latter.

For example, the details of the tribal form at the family level are very different in China and the United States. Chinese society has revolved for ages around extended family ties, clans, and dynasties, as manifested even in the notion of China as *jia* ("one big family"). Moreover, the so-called Asian model of economic development has a distinctive cultural content—and that content is largely about family, clan, and other kinship orientations. In contrast, the "specialness" of the American model reflects how its Anglo-Saxon heritage was more individualistic than other European heritages, and how its national development involved an emphasis on the nuclear family, heavy immigration, access to a vast frontier, and growth of a fabric of fraternal organizations

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[2] I am not sure whether to call this the institutional, the organizational, or the associational level—or something else. Each of these terms has problems. I am open to suggestions. Basically, the term should refer to groupings that lie outside the family.

that provided quasi-kinship ties (e.g., from the open Rotary Club, to the closed Ku Klux Klan).

Such differences in blood and brotherhood relations help explain differences in the nature of the hierarchical (I) and market (M) forms in the two societies, their concepts of progress, their development philosophies, and, lately, their adaptability to the rise of networked NGOs. I am not saying anything new and unusual here. It is just that these matters are usually discussed in terms of "cultural" differences. My point is that many such differences trace back to the tribal form, and that the TIMN framework serves to get at them in a systematic way.

At the Associational Level

Even though the tribal form eventually loses its grip on the overall governance of societies, it persists in suffusing the later TIMN forms. For example, in Europe from the Roman Empire onward, the rise of aristocracies, nobilities, and dynasties who claimed to have special lineages spelled a continuation of kinship principles and their fusion with hierarchical principles at elite levels. At popular levels, notably around the 16th century, tribelike sentiments and distinctions helped to fuel the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, as well as to curb papal ambitions for the Church of Rome to stand above all other institutional hierarchies. In recent eras, tribal dynamics have persisted through the endurance of old-boy networks and patronage systems that stem from school and other experiences, in the clannishness of many civic groups and fan clubs, and in ethno-nationalist movements and transnational diasporas that resemble "global tribes" (Kotkin, 1993).

At present, tribalism of one kind or another makes headlines almost every day. Many concern hot spots in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, where societies still have explicit tribes and clans. And many of the stories are quite dark in tone: the intertwining of security forces, not to mention job opportunities, with tribal and clan structures in places such as Palestine, Iraq, and Somalia; "blood feuds" in the Balkans and the Caucuses; and "honor killings" of Muslim women who defy arranged marriages, or of men and women who leave Islam and convert to another religion.

Modern societies that do not have explicit tribes and clans generate additional evidence. They include Russia, where purloined privatization and crony capitalism have been attributed to the "Yeltsin family" or the "Chubais clan," and, most recently, to "connection politics" around President Vladimir Putin. That economic-liberalization policies may end up being rigged to favor powerful political and business clans has also

been a theme in reports about China, Japan, South Korea, and Mexico, not to mention numerous other nations.

Many of these examples involve patronage. Aspects of the tribal form often creep into notions of who deserves to be appointed to an office, gain a favor, or make a deal. Nepotism and cronyism are valued practices, as are providing kickbacks and trading favors, which reflect ancient customs of reciprocal gift-giving. Sometimes such practices help to ensure a hierarchical relationship or to market an office to the highest bidder—meaning that the practices serve other TIMN forms. But a deeper aim is to bind kith and kin in a clannish affiliation, strengthening their reach and their access to resources.

All this may look like crime and corruption. Indeed, crime and corruption linked to cronyism and nepotism—the banes of meritocratic modernity—evidently emerge as normal practices in tribal systems, especially for dealing with outsiders. This is not to say that crime and corruption derive more from the tribal than the other TIMN forms. But it is to say that the stronger the clannish tendencies in a society, the more the society may be riddled with what will elsewhere be viewed as corrupt, criminal practices.

The United States—presumably the most advanced society of all—is no exception in this regard. But I would rather emphasize other points about how tribal dynamics persist in advanced societies.

In particular, notice that many hot-button issues in the United States—family values, abortion rights, same-sex marriage, illegal immigration, identity politics, affirmative action, just about everything that makes up the "culture war" and distinctions between "red" and "blue" states—involve the tribal form. Add other news about gang rivalries, teenage angst (e.g., the "trench-coat mafia"), and religious cults run as charismatic chiefdoms, and it is easy to see that neo-tribal issues are not only rife in American society, but also that they have risen in prominence relative to issues, such as "big government" or poverty, pertaining to other TIMN forms. Note also that bureaucratic tribalism is what still hampers the U.S. government's inability to build solid interagency mechanisms for intelligence-sharing and joint operations in such areas as counterterrorism and counternarcotics.[3]

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[3] I would note a somewhat-related point made by Fukuyama (2006, p. 61) about the tribal form's penetration of the institutional form: "Bureaucratic tribalism exists in all administrations, but it rose to poisonous levels in [George W.] Bush's first term. Team loyalty trumped open-minded discussion, and was directly responsible for the

Here is another point about how the tribal form resonates across the ages: What do individuals do in modern societies—where do they go—when they feel a need for social belonging, for an identity that brings a welcome sense of togetherness, without having to submit to a hierarchy? There are many answers, but I'll mention only two.

One is the sports world. It offers a marvelous haven for tribal impulses in modern times—especially in the United States, which has larger newspaper sports sections than other countries, and a great variety of innovative youth activities whose members engage in clannish behavior, such as surfing and skateboarding. Indeed, the sports world provides examples of both too much tribalism, as in England's thuggish "soccer hooliganism" (Buford, 1992; Foer, 2004), and too little tribalism, as in America's urban phenomenon of "bowling alone" (Putnam, 2000). Meanwhile, the Internet has become a new place where "cyber tribes" take form in online gaming worlds.

Another is the shopping mall. In today's America, the market form is often bent in tribal directions, to attract consumers and develop brand loyalties. Many advertising strategies do not sell products solely on their economic and technical merits. They market them as symbols—icons, narratives—that appeal to the sense of meaning, belonging, and even mystery that a product can be said to impart. Brand loyalists turn into tribal subcultures, even bickering clans—as in long-ago fans of Chevrolet versus Ford, or Coca Cola versus Pepsi, and recently of Apple versus Microsoft. The appeal of a product is driven not simply by its utility but by how it amplifies personal identity and social cachet. And vice versa: The tribal form is often bent in market directions, as in products such as T-shirts emblazoned with symbols or sayings that proclaim a wearer's identity, affiliation, or cause—his or her tribal fandom or subculture.

Need I offer more examples? Instead, I urge readers to try this: Peruse a major newspaper, such as *The New York Times* or *Los Angeles Times*, for a few days. Ask and see for yourselves where tribal and clan dynamics appear in their stories. Once you start looking for them, you will see that their variety and density are enormous. Most of the examples I have noted make the enduring resonance of the tribal form look negative, but that is mostly because they are drawn from my exposure to news stories. There are plenty of positive examples to be found, as well.

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administration's failure to plan adequately for the period after the end of active combat [in Iraq]."

At the Ideational Level

The tribal form, at its best, embodies high ideals about how a society should be organized and how people should treat each other. Today, as in ancient times, social ideals about egalitarianism, mutual caring, sharing, reciprocity, collective responsibility, group solidarity, family, community, civility, and democracy all hark back to tribal principles. So do high ideals about struggle and sacrifice for the common good; about displaying honor, pride, respect, and dignity on behalf of one's in-group or nation; and about conforming rather than dissenting and insisting on minority rights and personal freedom to do as one wants.

France offers handy examples. Consider the motto from the French Revolution: "*liberté, egalité, fraternité*." Two of those ideals—*egalité* and *fraternité*—stem from the tribal form. Consider also the marvelous motto of novelist Alexander Dumas' three musketeers: "All for one, and one for all." That motto too expresses a brotherly solidarity that is inherently tribal. Japan is another society in which such sentiments and practices run deep, most notably in the business world.

Meanwhile, the ways in which modern institutions are managed have evolved far beyond the ideal of a tribal or clan council. But that ideal persists. It shows up, for example, in the egalitarianism of the United Nations' General Assembly,[4] in the collective, consensus-seeking nature of China's top leadership, and in the design of "affinity groups" and "spokescouncils" by NGO activists who want nonhierarchical forms of organization and coordination

The tribal form started out being about blood kinship. But as societies grew larger and more complex—and thus less about kin, and more about rulers and ruled and about how to oblige kin to get along with nonkin—new principles were needed to hold societies together. Ideas that came to the fore included the social compact, the general will, and civil society.[5] Later came nationalism and citizenship, with their notions about love for the fatherland or motherland, ties to blood and soil, and shifts from an ethnic to a civic identity. Later still came the social-welfare state, with its dedication to shared risk and responsibility, over letting individuals fend for themselves in isolation. All

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[4] Boehm (1999, p. 257) views the United Nations as a combination of egalitarian principles in the General Assembly and oligarchic principles in the Security Council, thus adding up to its resembling both a hunter-gatherer band and a tribe.

[5] The original philosophers behind these concepts sometimes argued that men were born as individuals into an anarchic state of nature and then had to invent ways to get along. Not so, according to the TIMN framework.

these post-tribal ideas express ancient tribal ideals; they were meant to arouse a kinlike solidarity and motivate togetherness. And they are all rooted more in tribal ideals than in ideals associated with the other TIMN forms, such as hierarchical institutional notions about the divine right of kings, feudal fealty, sovereignty, and constitutional law. Along the way, a Marxist idea—economic class—arose that was supposed to render a transnational but still tribelike sense of solidarity among the masses, but it never gained the potency of rival identities, such as race and nation.

Persistence of Both the Bright and Dark Sides of Tribalism

In a positive sense, many people around the world still prefer the tribal form as a way of life. They particularly prefer it to living under hierarchical and market ways, partly because these can be so restrictive and impersonal. In a plea that illustrates this preference, Rigoberto Menchú, the indigenous Guatemalan who won a Nobel Peace prize, objects to the intrusive, disruptive effects that capitalist practices, specifically the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), can have on a people's communal way of life:

> [W]hile NAFTA may create new markets and a better economy, it does not take into consideration the indigenous world view or the way we understand our surroundings—in a word, our cosmology. None of the Western development programs or models understand[s] the difference between the organizing principles of the market—banking, corporations and enterprises—and our organizing principle: community life. We want holistic, integrated development that holds the community sacred. We see the community, not the market, as the building block of a model of self-reliant development based on cooperative village life. (Menchú, 1994, p. 59)[6]

In dark contrast, essayist Amin Maalouf speaks to an ages-old pattern of tribalized religious hatreds, especially in the Middle East, when he says about the present era that

> What we conveniently call "murderous folly" is the propensity of our fellow-creatures to turn into butchers when they suspect that their "tribe" is being threatened. . . . [I]f the men of all countries, of all conditions and faiths

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[6] This tone receives further expression in a call by Evo Morales, the indigenous Bolivian elected president in 2005, for "communal socialism" as a way for his country to resolve its economic troubles. (From a *New York Times* article, January 22, 2006, p. A-10, based on Morales's use of the term in a *New York Times* interview in 2002.)

can so easily be transformed into butchers, if fanatics of all kinds manage so
easily to pass themselves off as defenders of identity, it's because the "tribal"
concept of identity still prevalent all over the world facilitates such a
distortion. (Maalouf, 2001, pp. 28–29)

Indeed, some of the worst ethnic conflicts in recent decades have involved peoples
who have seen the demise of their central institutions and have reverted to ferocious
neo-tribal behaviors (as in the Balkans), or who have fought to retain their traditional
clan systems while resisting the imposition of outside state and market structures (as in
Chechnya, Somalia, among Arab Bedouins, and, to a degree, in Chiapas, Mexico).
Moreover, some dictatorships that seemed to rest on a strong state were grounded on a
murderous clan (e.g., Hafez al-Assad's Syria, Saddam Hussein's Iraq).

Of course, these two disparate, tribe-evoking points of view—Menchú's bright
one, and Maalouf's dark one—are not inconsistent. They may coexist in the same place,
even the same person. Both draw their enduring appeal from ancient fissures, and both
stand a long way from the cosmopolitan, ecumenical ideals that may well inspire the
network form as it takes hold in the decades ahead.

THE ULTIMATE FALLBACK FORM

The tribal form remains not only an essential basis for the functioning of complex
societies but also the natural fallback option if the other TIMN forms falter or fail. Then
it again becomes the primal form of organization and behavior. People revert to it as a
sensible way to regroup and protect themselves under dire conditions—perhaps to start
rebuilding a society, or just to regress into a violent, recidivist rage against outsiders.

This fallback occurs mainly in two circumstances: (1) in social pockets where the
other TIMN forms are not performing well, even though a society as a whole may be
doing well; and (2) across entire societies if they fall into discord and disarray. Positive
and negative examples abound (although I have mainly kept track of negative
examples).

In Social Pockets

For example, gang life in social pockets around the world occurs largely at the
level of tribes and clans. Note the incidence of urban youth gangs among racial and
ethnic minorities in the United States, not to mention elsewhere. Gang recruits often
come from fractured, uneducated, impoverished families. As individuals, they have
little hope of participating in the advanced TIMN systems of society. So they group into

kinlike clans and establish quasi-chiefdoms in their "hoods." Gangs in the Los Angeles area, such as the Bloods and the Crips, as well as the transnational Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), represent a recursion to self-protective, warriorlike brotherhoods by youths who lack strong nuclear family ties and do not see a future for themselves in the state, market, or other TIMN structures around them. Such gangs often reflect the *culture* more than the *economics* of crime: Gang behavior is mainly the result of tribelike rivalries for respect, prestige, and turf (e.g., see Pinker, 1997, pp. 496–498; Tita et al., 2003).[7] Similar clannish behavior is also seen in prison-based gangs, such as the Aryan Brotherhood and the Mexican Mafia, as well as in some motorcycle gangs. Even special police units created to deal with gang violence are known to develop tribal/clan characteristics (e.g., the Los Angeles Police Department's CRASH unit—Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums—that operated in the Ramparts division in the 1990s).[8]

The resort to tribal forms of organization and behavior in social pockets is not always pernicious. It is sometimes positive. An example would be the passing rise of "clown posses" and their festive "krumping" dance culture, as a way to keep youth out of trouble in gang-infested areas of Los Angeles (e.g., see the documentary film *Rize*, 2005). The creation of uplifting church groups is another kind of positive response.

Across Entire Societies

A descent into tribalism, including into clan and chiefdom forms of organization, motivation, and behavior, often spreads across entire societies if they veer into collapse. As a society degenerates and is stripped of the later TIMN forms—the more its state, market, and civil-society systems falter and fall apart—people are sure to revert to the tribal form. It again becomes the driving form. Aspiring leaders may even hype sectarianism or nationalism precisely to put listeners in a tribal frame of mind—inciting their sense of identity, focusing their grievances on outsiders, and energizing them for

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[7] The RAND study by Tita et al. (2003, p. xii) on violence in East Los Angeles says: "Our crime analysis demonstrated, contrary to the perception of some, that little of this violence was related to battles between gangs over control of drug markets. Rather, intergang violence more typically dealt with personal or gang honor or prestige."

[8] Although I do not inquire in this study into family and clan feuds in the United States, Waller (1988) provides an interesting analysis of the legendary feud between the Hatfields and McCoys in the late 1800s.

new sacrifices and struggles. Polarization and tribalism then become of a piece—as polarization tribalizes, so does tribalism further polarize.

Examples from the 1990s include the disintegration of Somalia into rival clans, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia into warring ethnic minorities, and the ferocious bid of Chechens for independence from Russia following the demise of the Soviet Union. In such places, people have fought less to create professional nation-states than to promote deep-rooted clannish cultures—to try to impose what might be called clan-states. Also, in Russia, numerous criminal gangs based on family and ethnic ties surfaced after the collapse of the Soviet state. And across the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, Islamic fundamentalism has exacerbated tribalism (McCallister, 2005; Ronfeldt, 2005b). Indeed, all across history, wounded nations, as they seek to recover lost strength and glory, have shown a propensity for pernicious tribalism (and for fascism).

But again, there can be a bright side. For example, during the 1980s there was an erroneous trend among some U.S. analysts to think that Mexico was probably headed toward a systemic collapse as a result of multiple political, economic, and social crises. Mexico was indeed having great difficulty then. But a key, little-noticed reason it did not collapse was the strength of extended family ties: Many people were able to fall back on their kinship networks to survive hard economic times. Mexico's strong nationalism also played a role as a kind of tribal glue. Such a resistance to collapse has been the case elsewhere, too, including in China and Russia, where the discrediting of communism in the 1990s was followed by a revival of nationalism.

As a Philosophical and Ideological Ideal

Apart from these tendencies for people to revert to the tribal form in hard times, the form often turns up as a philosophical or ideological ideal among intellectuals, even though they may not recognize or present it as such. Sometimes the ideal is extreme, as in a call for a society to back up and start over. A moderate ideal is to make corrections in how people associate with each other, so that a society is better grounded.

Each TIMN form has its particular philosophical and ideological proponents— such as Thomas Hobbes for hierarchies and Adam Smith for markets. However, the tribal form, perhaps because it is so ancient, lacks exemplary early proponents who left writings behind. Of course, the Bible and the Koran contain numerous passages about tribal principles. But if one is looking for a theoretical perspective, then one of the earliest examples is Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), an Arab (Tunisian) who was so concerned about the decline of the Islamic caliphate that he became one of the world's first

historians to analyze the rise and fall of civilizations. For him, the key factor was the loss of *asabiya* (an Arabic word for group feeling, unity, solidarity), which I take to be a tribal impulse. He was particularly critical of the negative effects that the growth of cities had on those ancient, nomadic, especially Bedouin, ways of life that reflected *asabiya* (Galtung and Inayatullah, 1997).

In modern eras, Western intellectuals across the political spectrum have often fielded sweeping critiques of modernity that end up calling for a revival of tribelike modes of belonging. Such critiques typically lament the rise of excessive individualism, the spread of anomie and alienation, the decline of family and community moorings, and the corrupting influences of urbanization, commercialization, capitalism, and even civilization itself.

These are common themes for philosophers on the Left, beginning with Jean Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Peter Kropotkin. Both anarchism and communism tend to idealize ancient tribal ways of life. Similar themes are often reiterated in contemporary bestsellers by Left-leaning authors (e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Christopher Lasch). In the United States, laments about the nature of government, business, society, and culture have often motivated Leftist idealists to create egalitarian communities, communes, collectives, and cooperatives that operate much like semi-autonomous, self-reliant tribes and clans, in isolation from mainstream America. Their ideal is communal solidarity and sharing, expunging individualistic profiteering and exploitation. Meanwhile, the communitarian movement represents an effort to restore the best of tribal values—family and community—to mainstream America.

But this is not only a pattern on the Left. Tracts against modernity are common on the radical Right, too (e.g., by René Guénon, Julius Evola). They typically decry the forsaking of tradition, the loss of the sacred, the spread of rampant individualism, and corruption of the human spirit by modernity and democracy. Some call for the creation of a new spiritual elite and tribelike following to pursue salvation, survive the "end times," and start society anew. Such antimodernity is evident, for example, in an occultist philosophy termed Traditionalism, which stems from some Gnostic, Catholic, and Islamic sects and has reportedly inspired European fascists and terrorists, as well as Islamic jihadists (Sedgwick, 2004). One difference from the Left is that neo-tribalists on the Right may want a strong dose of hierarchy in their solutions.

In a lighter vein that does not fit into a Rightist or Leftist category are New Age philosophizers who disparage modern civilization, claiming it is unsustainable. They too may end up calling for a renewal of tribalism, but without a return to primitivism

(Quinn, 1999, is said to be an example). Further evidence of idealization appears in the annual Rainbow Family and Burning Man gatherings, which mingle old hippie and New Age yearnings in a tribal spirit of camaraderie and celebration.

In sum, the more people do not expect to find fulfilling places in a society's state, market, or civil-society sectors—the more those TIMN realms are broken or void of opportunity, and the more civilization and modernity are deemed dysfunctional—then the more people tend to revert to tribal motivations and behaviors. They may claim to be looking ahead to creating something new, but in fact they are casting back to ancient ideals. They may even forsake hierarchies and markets in favor of longing for a utopian communalism. This is why, in a sense, all social revolutions are inherently reversions.

Ultimately, for a people to turn so tribal and clannish can only prove self-limiting for a society as a whole. A more sustainable, evolutionary aim is to make the tribal form work better, by itself and vis-à-vis the other TIMN forms.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT TRIBES AND THE TIMN FRAMEWORK

In the TIMN framework, a society cannot advance for long without a tribelike basis that fosters trust, sharing, and togetherness—in short, an irrevocable sense of kinship. But having a sound tribal basis is only part of the story, for a society also cannot advance without adding the later TIMN forms. Thus, a society's advance, or lack of it, depends on how the tribal form relates to the other TIMN forms, and vice versa.

The tribal form is different from, even contradictory to, the other forms. As noted in Chapter Two, there is extensive literature on how the forms differ. Anthropologists who specialize in kinship dynamics have as much to say about this difference as other social scientists. Here, for example, is how one anthropologist contrasts kinship (T) with bureaucratic (+I) practices:

> In a society where kinship is supremely important, loyalties to kin supersede
> all other loyalties, and for this reason alone kinship must be the enemy of
> bureaucracy. . . . In the developing countries bureaucratic rationality often
> loses out to kinship loyalties; . . . . What to us is rank nepotism is to him a
> high moral duty. (Fox, [1967] 1983, p. 14)

And here is how another anthropologist contrasts kinship (T) and economic (+M) types of relations:

> Kinship and economic relations constitute polar opposites. . . . antagonistic cultures. . . . This opposition is an old one and belongs to the conservative reaction to the Enlightenment, which views modernity as subverting and destroying the world of interpersonal primary relations, and replacing them with secondary relationships characterized by egotistical calculation. (C. Harris, 1990, pp. 55, 56, 59, using dense Parsonian terminology I omit)

These are significant points. But contrasts and contradictions do not mean the tribal form stands in irremediable opposition to any other TIMN form. All the forms are contradictory, but they are not incompatible. Making their contradictions compatible is essential to social evolution. For a society to advance, it must make the forms work together. This will be a theme in a future installment on the framework, which will also discuss how and why some societies have evidently done better than others at advancing through the TIMN progression. To end this installment, I have just a few final comments on how the tribal form may interact with the other forms. They add a bit to some of the propositions located at the end of the preceding chapter.

My first comment is about causation: The tribal form may assist as well as inhibit the rise of the other TIMN forms. Indeed, one key to progress, in TIMN terms, is how the tribal form, as it manifests itself in a particular society, serves to impede or impel the development of the next forms. What happens with the tribal form may hold a society back, if it infects and distorts a later form. Or it may help propel a society forward, if it energizes that form, particularly in its early stages.

For example, consider the tribal and market forms together. The two represent contradictory approaches to economics. The spread of markets depends on displacing traditional ways.[9] Indeed, one reason the market form still does not work well in many societies today is because of the grip that the tribal form retains on social interactions, determining who should deal with whom. Nonetheless, the relationship between the two forms is not linear. In some respects, tribal dynamics fueled rather than fettered the spread of the market form centuries ago. At a micro level, merchant families, perhaps working through distant kin they trusted, became little engines of capitalist enterprise

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[9] I plan to discuss this in an eventual chapter on the rise and spread of the market form. Until then, I refer readers to Robert Heilbroner's (1967) point that there have been only three grand principles of economic organization: tradition, command, and the market. These three principles overlap neatly with the first three of the TIMN forms.

all across Europe (on Britain, see Grassby, 2000).[10] And at a macro level, competitive nationalism—a grand kind of tribalism—helped motivate the spread of capitalism from nation to nation (see Greenfeld, 2001). Similar patterns may be found in how the tribal form interacted with the rise of the hierarchical institutional form, but I leave that for a future installment.

My second comment is about the separation of realms: In the TIMN framework, each form arises separately, and a result is the creation of a distinct realm of activity in which that form predominates. For the tribal form, that creation evidently means the cultural realm, or at least a large part of it (though so far I have made more a hypothetical than a fully grounded case for this). While a separation of realms is essential, it cannot and should not be total—anymore than culture, politics, and economics can be separated. For one thing, total separation is impossible. Aspects of the tribal form persistently penetrate into activities defined by the other forms. Bureaucratic nepotism and crony capitalism are common examples; and detrimental as they are, it is doubtful that they can ever be eradicated. For another thing, total separation is surely undesirable. Consider the market form again. As an abstract ideal, its principles favor competitive, even anarchic, selfish individualism. But, unleashed to an extreme, these principles are not necessarily good for a society, or even for a market system. Positive tribal impulses can help curb those tendencies, by promoting social trust and tempering how people behave toward each other. Adam Smith himself said as much long ago.

My third point is about balance: It has been easy to find examples of the tribal form persisting in activities ruled by the other TIMN forms. But it is not easy to specify how much is good, or bad. Too much tribalism can restrict and distort the other forms. But too little may hinder the other forms' taking root and functioning as well as they could. An appropriate metaphor is glue. The tribal form resembles a kind of social glue that holds a society together. If that glue is too strong and spread too wide, it can keep the later forms from developing their own cores and dynamics. But if it is too weak and

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[10] I have not read Grassby (2000), but I gather it substantiates my point. According to information posted at Amazon.com, this study "reconstructs the public and private lives of urban business families during the period of England's emergence as a world economic power. . . . [and shows] that familial capitalism, not possessive individualism, was the motor of economic growth." Kotkin (1993) shows how modern-day diasporas and immigrant families have played enterprising roles with great success.

spotty, a society may become so atomized and lacking in social trust that it cannot progress further. Presumably, there is a middle ground where balance is important—where the forms interact, but none dominates. Presumably, too, each society must find its own way on these matters. Indeed, one way such matters get addressed is through epochal debates. Thus, for example, the Enlightenment initiated great discussions about whether and how commercial behaviors were subverting old family and community ways, a discussion that at times rears anew even now. This theme will be explored further in a future installment.

On this note, I must end this installment and turn to preparing the next one. I am tempted to add some ideas here about implications for U.S. policy and strategy abroad. And indeed, I have already begun to do so elsewhere, emphasizing four implications:

- that great powers, as they expand afar, are often ultimately undone by tribal encounters
- that today's world is experiencing a tumult of tribalisms, more than a clash of civilizations
- that Islam, a civilizing force, has fallen under the sway of Islamists who are a tribalizing force
- that fascism, which fuses hyper-tribalism and hyper-hierarchy, is due for a resurgence.

Readers interested in such implications are invited to turn to the three op-eds reprinted in the Appendixes below and to a Postscript added to another paper (Ronfeldt, 2006). I am also tempted to raise some U.S. domestic implications, because tribalism is welling up in the United States more than seems desirable. However, these are near-term implications, whereas the focus of this installment is not the next few years but on how to rethink a vast sweep of past history in a way that may enable us to look far ahead. I shall leave near-term implications for another installment on the TIMN framework.

Americans may comfort themselves by thinking that no other nation will be able to match, much less exceed, their nation's enormous power for decades to come. The United States has built the most advanced triform (T+I+M) society the world has seen, and is headed haltingly toward creating a quadriform (T+I+M+N) society, in an era when America has an unprecedented global presence. Whether it succeeds depends largely on how well it engages the emerging network (+N) form. But success also depends on what happens to the tribal (T) form here at home, and in societies abroad.

Out there, America has friends and allies who are similarly advanced. But a few nations, Russia and China in particular, are in the throes of adapting to the addition of the market (+M) form. And essentially monoform tribal/clan (T) societies and biform (T+I) chiefdoms and clan-states, some dressed in the trappings of nation-states and capitalist economies, remain a ruling reality in vast areas of the world.

Social evolution is thus in for a slog. It behooves analysts and strategists who mostly think about states and markets to gain a better grip on roles the tribal form plays in both national development and national security.

Appendix

A. 21ST CENTURY TRIBES[1]

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is fighting virulent tribalism as much as Islamic fundamentalism. Salafi and Wahhabi teachings calling for jihad against infidels, fatwas from clerics justifying the murder of noncombatants and ultimatums from Sunni insurgents who behead captives all are expressions of extreme tribalism more than Islam.

Professor Lawrence Keeley at Oxford University has shown that classic tribal warfare mostly amounts to raids and skirmishes but can evolve into total warfare in which entire peoples are massacred without mercy. According to journalist/novelist Amin Maalouf, this happens "because the 'tribal' concept of identity still prevalent" in the world facilitates the escalation.

Many religions, from ancient totemism onward, have their deepest roots in tribal societies. The major monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—arose during tense tribal times in the Middle East. Each religion's oldest texts contain passages that, true to traditional tribal ethics, advocate reciprocal altruism toward fellow kin—and allow for terrible retribution against tribes deemed guilty of insult or injury.

The ways religion gets layered onto tribalism, and vice versa, deeply condition a people's thinking and behavior. A tribe may regard a deity as the ultimate ancestor of its identity. Its religion also may instruct tribal members how to uphold their society and treat one another. It does not determine how they may behave toward outsiders, but religion often supplies the justification.

Tribal life can foster a vibrant sense of social solidarity. It fills a people with pride and self-respect. It motivates families to protect, welcome and care for each other and to abide by strict rituals that affirm their connections as tribal members and to their

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[1]Published in the *Los Angeles Times*, December 4, 2004, p. M-5. Sources include Keeley (1996), LeBlanc (2003), Maalouf (2001). Also see John Robb's (2006) blog on networked tribes. Elaborations appear in Ronfeldt (2005b, 2006).

ancestors, land and deity. This kinship creates trust and loyalty in which one knows (and must uphold) one's rights, duties and obligations.

Many people around the world prefer the tribal way of life, most notably in the Middle East and South Asia. Even modern societies that lack well-defined tribes and clans still have tribe-like sensibilities at their core that are variously expressed in nationalism, cultural festivities, civic interest groups, sports and fan clubs.

But tribalism can make for a mean-spirited partiality. Tribes and clans are terribly sensitive to boundaries and barriers, about who is a tribal member and who isn't. As such, a tribe can be a realm of virtue in which reciprocal altruism rules kin relations. But this virtuous behavior, in tribal logic, does not have to extend to outsiders—they can be treated differently, especially if they are "different."

In general, the more a religion calls for kinship among all peoples, the more it may lead to ecumenical caring (as Islam often does). Further, tribes open to more than one faith may be less susceptible to sectarian appeals. For example, Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's tribe contains both Sunnis and Shiites.

But the more a religion's adherents demonize others, revel in codes of revenge for alleged wrongs and crave territorial and spiritual conquests, all the while claiming to act on behalf of their deity, the more their religious orientation is utterly tribal and prone to rationalizing violence of the darkest kind.

All religious hatred—whether Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu or other—speaks the language of tribe and clan. And in true tribal fashion, that language is loaded with sensitivities about respect, honor, pride, and dignity. An insult or injury to any of these is sensed by all tribal members, and the only honorable recourse is full compensation or total revenge. This is an essential ethic of tribes and clans, no matter their religion.

These behaviors may worsen when tribal or clan elements are led by a sectarian chieftain who sees himself as a ruthless warlord or revolutionary. Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar of the Taliban, Muqtada Sadr, Abu Musab Zarqawi or Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev are examples of such leaders. If the people they target react in tribal ways—extreme nationalism is an example—fights over whose religion should win become inseparable from whose tribe should win.

Americans comfort themselves with the thought that no other nation will be able to match our power for decades. But from ancient times to the present, globally expanding great powers often encounter tribes or clans that fiercely resist them, sometimes with dire consequences, as happened to the Roman Empire. The more tribal

or clannish the society, the more resistant it will be to change. Reform then has to come from the outside or from above, as in Meiji Japan.

The United States is not at war with Islam. Its struggle is largely with insurgents who behave in the manner of tribes and clans. Some are members of true tribes; others are patched together by radical clerics or jihadist recruiters operating among alienated migrants. U.S. forces are learning this the hard way—on the ground.

Policymakers and strategists in Washington, meanwhile, lag in catching on. The new Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication recognizes that "the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and Islam." But it barely mentions the role of tribalism in that struggle.

B. TODAY'S WARS ARE LESS ABOUT IDEAS
THAN EXTREME TRIBALISM[1]

Western strategists and policymakers should stop talking about a clash of civilizations and focus on the real problem: extreme tribalism. Recent events—riots in many nations protesting cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, Sunni-Shiite warring in Iraq, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan—confirm that the West is not in a clash with Islam. Instead, Islam, which is a civilizing force, has fallen under the sway of Islamists who are a tribalizing force.

Unfortunately, the tribalism theme has difficulty gaining traction. After the end of the cold war, many American strategists preferred the optimistic "end of history" idea that democracy would triumph around the world, advanced by Francis Fukuyama in 1989. A contrary notion—reversion to tribalism—made better sense to other strategists, such as France's Jacques Attali in 1992. Indeed, the emergence of ethnic warring in the Balkans and elsewhere confirmed that when societies crumble, people revert to tribal and clan behaviors that repudiate liberal ideals.

Perhaps partly because the idea of "tribalism" sounds too anthropological for modern strategists, it has not taken hold. American thinking has shifted to revolve around a more high-minded but less accurate concept: "the clash of civilizations" articulated by Samuel Huntington in 1993.

But what troubles the world is far more a travail of tribalisms than a clash of civilizations. The major clashes are not between civilizations per se, but between antagonistic segments that are fighting across fringe border zones (like Christian Serbs vs. Muslim Kosovars), or feuding within the same civilization, such as Sunnis vs. Shiites in Iraq.

Most antagonists, no matter how high-mindedly they proclaim their ideals, are operating in terribly tribal and clannish ways. Some, such as Al Qaeda terrorists, are extreme tribalists who dream of making the West start over at a razed, tribal level.

This travail is sure to persist, fueling terrorism, ethnonationalism, religious strife, sectarian feuds, and clannish gang violence and crime. Thus, the cartoon protest riots pose an effort to mobilize an Islamic global tribe, not a civilization. Al Qaeda and its

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[1]Published in the *Christian Science Monitor*, March 27, 2006, p. 9. Sources include Fukuyama (1989, 1992), Attali (1992), Lukacs (1993), and Huntington (1993, 1996).

affiliates comprise an information age network, but they, too, operate like a global tribe: decentralized, segmental, lacking in central hierarchy, egalitarian toward kith and kin, ruthless toward others.

What are tribes like? The tribe was the first major form of social organization. The hierarchy, market, and network forms developed ages later. Classic tribes are ruled by kinship principles about blood and brotherhood that fix one's sense of identity and belonging. Tribes are also egalitarian and segmental. Everyone is deemed equal and must share. Each part, such as a clan, is structured similarly, aiming for self-sufficiency. And there is no formal chief, though a "big man" may arise. Democracy may appear in tribal councils, but it is not liberal, since it does not tolerate minority rights and dissident views once a consensus emerges.

What maintains order in a tribe is not hierarchy and law—it is too early a form for that—but kinship principles stressing mutual respect, dignity, pride, and honor. Reciprocal gift giving is essential. Humiliating insults upset peace more than anything else, for an insult to one is seen as an insult to everyone of that lineage. And there are only two ways to restore honor: compensation or revenge. Finally, a tribe may view itself as a realm of virtue, but see outsiders as a different realm that may be treated differently, even brutally, especially if they are "different."

Much of the world is still like this. Of particular concern to strategists, a dense arc of tribal and clan systems runs across North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, up into the "stans" of Central Asia. Even modern societies still have tribal cores and impulses. That shows in their cultures, nationalisms, identity politics, kindred glues like sports clubs and social fads, and in cronyism, nepotism, and gang life. Tribalism, for good and ill, is alive everywhere, all the time. We just don't think about it much, and use other terms.

So let's shift away from the civilization paradigm. The tribalism paradigm is better for illuminating the crucial problem: the tribalization of religion. The more that extremists create divisions between "us" and "them," vainly claim sacredness solely for their own ends, demonize others, revel in codes of revenge, crave territorial and spiritual conquests, and suppress moderates who disagree—all the while claiming to act on behalf of a deity—the more their religious orientation becomes utterly tribal and prone to wreaking violence of the darkest kind. They can only pretend to represent a civilization.

The "war of ideas" should be rethought. Western leaders keep pressing Muslim leaders everywhere to denounce terrorism as uncivilized. But this approach, plus

counterpressures from sectarian Islamists, has put moderate Muslims on the defensive, stymieing them from speaking out. An approach that focuses on questioning extreme tribalism may be more effective at freeing up dialogue and inviting a search for common, ecumenical ground.

Shifting to a travail-of-tribalisms perspective would have to be carefully thought out. The point is not to condemn all tribal ways. Many people around the world appreciate (indeed, prefer) this communal way of life and will defend it from insult. It is not always uncivilized to be tribal. The point is to strike at the awful effects that extreme tribalization can have—to oppose not a terrorist's or insurgent's religion, but the reduction of that religion to raw tribalist tenets.

C. MUSSOLINI'S GHOST[1]

Despite comparisons to Josef Stalin's communist government in Russia, Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime actually had far more in common with the fascist systems of 20th century Europe. And that is why de-Baathification is proving so difficult. People like being liberated from dictatorship, but not necessarily from fascism.

What's the difference? Fascism is no mere dictatorship. Yes, it imposes a centralized and organic—if not totalitarian—structure, enforced by a single party, secret police and paramilitary thugs. But that is not what keeps fascism in power and explains its appeal. Fascism is a total system of existence that willingly engages a broad spectrum, even a majority, of elites and masses. At its core, fascism has a deeply mythic allure; it proposes a quest to overcome dystopian times and achieve a utopian rebirth of a nation's supposed greatness. Thus fascism rules the mind as well as the body—and both mind and body come to idolize it.

In this quest, fascism is fiercely anti-liberal because it values order far more than freedom and brooks no boundaries between public and private, or state and society. Yet fascism is also anti-conservative; it aims to transform the status quo on behalf of all, not preserve it for the sake of a few.

And although fascism is normally secular in its ends and means, it has a messianic quality, for it promises national redemption and progress to break through to an exquisite new millennium. Indeed, fascism vows to create not only a new order but also a new man—one who has a radiant sense of identity and purpose, the better to ensure that the rebirth endures.

All this shines in the iconic fascisms of the mid-20th century: Benito Mussolini's in Italy (the standard for many scholars), Adolf Hitler's in Germany (the racist and totalitarian extreme) and the Falangist movement in Spain (which flowed later into the semi-fascist regime of Francisco Franco). Significant, though eclectic, tendencies also emerged outside Europe, notably in South Africa, Argentina and Japan.

Where and why does fascism take hold? It cannot happen anywhere; some tendencies, perhaps, but not fascism as a system. First, it requires a modernizing nation that has a serious state, a significant private business sector and a complex civil society.

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[1]Published in the *Los Angeles Times*, May 25, 2003, p. M-5. Sources include Payne (1995), Griffin (1996), and Paxton (2004).

The ultranationalism so characteristic of fascism resembles an extreme tribalism, but societies that turn fascist are too advanced to be considered tribal. Moreover, though studies of totalitarianism typically view communism and fascism as quite similar, they have a key difference that often gets overlooked: the role of a private sector and a market system, however weak. Communism must be rid of them, but fascism aims to strengthen them, albeit in a suborned way.

Second, fascism requires that this modernizing society be suffering from deep disturbances and grievances. There should be a widespread sense of disaster, alarm and disarray stemming, say, from a lost war, a severe economic depression, pervasive corruption scandals or humiliating foreign interference. It's a point that applies to the making of terrorists as well as fascists: Whatever the political, economic or social details, people feel that they and their nation are facing an "absolute disaster."

Under these conditions, longing can arise for national rebirth, not to mention a great charismatic leader to show the way. People at large are so fed up, furious, divided and fearful about the condition of their nation that, if fascism's exponents manage to seize office through election or force, it is not that hard to make people succumb to fascism's promises to reunite them, overcome obstacles and organize a strong system. A leadership cult and grandiose assertions of national solidarity, sovereignty and independence spread fascism's mythic appeal as its media, intelligence and coercive apparatuses expand to ensure compliance.

Why be reminded of these basics? Because Americans are not used to thinking about fascism as a system anymore. And because fascism—unlike communism—is far from dead or obsolete. The spread of the market system, pro-democracy pressures and other aspects of globalization are having ambivalent effects around the world. There are new signs of progress in many societies. But not in all.

Some modernizing nations are having wrenching difficulties adapting to globalization and other pressures to build ever more open, competitive, complex systems. Some also face external and internal threats that can be hyped to arouse ultranationalism and distract citizens from domestic problems. Thus the conditions for fascism, which were centered in Europe many decades ago, are likely to recur in new places. Already in this century we have had to wage two wars against fascism: first against Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Serbia and now in Iraq.

We also keep having to tussle with fascism-inspired regimes that have taken hold elsewhere—notably the Hindu-nationalist one in India and Hugo Chavez's in Venezuela. These instances are more harbingers than holdovers from past trends.

It is easier to sound a warning about a new round of fascism in far-off places than to specify where or in what variety and numbers. But some future possibilities—Russia or a new Islamic caliphate?—would prove much riskier for the West than others. It will take more than the superb, innovative military power of the United States to deter and prepare for this future.

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