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Poverty and Time Preference

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LABOR AND POPULATION

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Abstract

This paper estimates the time preference of poor households in rural Mexico. I use data from a program that randomly assigned communities to treatment and control and paid transfers to poor households in treatment communities. The randomization implies that differences in consumption between control and treatment households are due to the program. A buffer-stock model predicts how the response of consumption to transfers depends on the discount factor. I estimate this parameter by matching simulated to sample treatment effects on consumption. My estimates being very low, I conclude that poor households are very impatient or a richer model is needed.

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1 Introduction

Empirical evidence shows that the poor and the non-poor behave differently when it comes to choices involving intertemporal trade-offs. The poor have lower saving rates (Attanasio and Szekely 2000; Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004), invest less in their children's education (Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely 1998) and have more children (Schultz 2005). Economists have long debated the underlying reasons for these differences (Duflo 2006) and have suggested numerous explanations: (1) the poor might face lower returns to their investments (Rosenzweig 1995, van de Walle 2003); (2) some investment opportunities might not be available to the poor due to inefficiencies in credit markets or insurance markets (Banerjee 2001) and (3) the poor and the non-poor might have different preferences (Lawrance 1991; Atkeson and Ogaki 1996; Ogaki and Atkeson 1997). In particular, the poor might be more impatient than the non-poor.

The last explanation suggests that time preferences might be a mechanism that transmits poverty across generations. Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that parents can increase their children's discount factors by investing in education. Moreover, theory predicts that impatient parents invest less in their children's human capital (Lang and Ruud 1986). These children, in turn, will develop time preferences that are more present-oriented. When they reach adulthood, they will be less educated and more impatient parents. To investigate whether this hypothesis has any merit, it is necessary to know whether the poor and the non-poor – as adults – have different time preferences.

Previous studies (Hausman 1979; Lawrance 1991; Atkeson and Ogaki 1997; Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Cagetti 2003; Harisson, Lau and Williams 2002; Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen 2006; Stephens and Krupka 2006) have investigated differences in time preferences between poor and non-poor by comparing estimates for the two groups. These studies have produced mixed results.¹ However, one limitation of this research is that it is difficult to distinguish between differences in time preferences, and differences in the economic environ-

¹Hausman (1979), Lawrance (1991), Harisson, Lau and Williams (2002) and Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2006) find that the poor have higher discount rates. Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003) and Stephens and Krupka (2006) yield inconclusive results while Ogaki and Atkeson (1997) find no differences in time preferences.

ments in which the poor and the non-poor live. For example, differences in intertemporal choices of the two groups might be partly explained by the fact that the poor are more likely to be liquidity constrained.²

In this paper, I estimate the discount factor of poor Mexican households living in rural communities. I explicitly model liquidity constraints and I present estimates for a wide range of interest rates and risk aversion parameters to address concerns that particular assumptions about the economic environment might drive my results. I also compare my estimates of the discount factor with existing estimates for non-poor households from studies that use similar methods. I use data from PROGRESA, a program that randomly assigned communities to “treatment” and “control” groups, and extended conditional cash transfers to poor households in the treatment communities 18 months before those in the control communities. The random assignment implies that, in the absence of the program, there would not be any differences in the consumption behavior of control and treatment households. A model gives predictions on how treatment households would spend the experimental variation in wealth over time as a function of households’ time preference. Specifically, I use the canonical buffer-stock model of consumption to simulate the effects of PROGRESA transfers on consumption at different discount factors. I estimate the discount factor using the method of simulated minimum distance by matching simulated and sample treatment effects on log consumption.

My empirical approach bridges two methods that have been used to measure time preferences.³ The first approach elicits discount rates from subjects by asking them to make intertemporal choices over hypothetical or real outcomes (Coller and Williams 1999; Harrison, Lau and Williams 2002; Andersen et al 2008). The most common experimental procedure asks respondents to choose between a smaller, more immediate reward and a larger, more delayed reward. A benefit of this method is the researcher’s ability to control the terms of the experiment. However, there are concerns about the external validity of these estimates.

²Alternatively, Carroll (1997) argued that Lawrance’s(1991) results might be partly explained by the faster labor income growth of more educated households.

³See Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) for a review of the literature on estimating time preferences.

The second method uses observational data on individuals' intertemporal choices. For example, macroeconomists have estimated structural life-cycle consumption models using data on consumption and wealth (Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Cagetti 2003).⁴ This approach entails simulating the consumption-age or wealth-age profiles as a function of the parameters of the model, which are estimated by matching the simulated and sample profiles. The limitation of this method is that it assumes changes in consumption or wealth over the life cycle are entirely due to optimizing behavior as predicted by the model. The approach I take – using observational data that embeds experimental variation in wealth – addresses concerns about confounding factors that arise in observational studies but avoids the concerns about external validity that arise in many experimental studies.

My results indicate that poor rural households in Mexico are very impatient. My benchmark estimates for the annual discount factor range from 0.08 to 0.70. These estimates are much lower than what is found for the much wealthier households in the United States. Three recent articles (Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Cagetti 2003; Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman 2007) use data from large U.S. household surveys to estimate the parameters of a stochastic life-cycle consumption model using the method of simulated moments. Their estimates of annual discount factors range from 0.92 to 0.99 and concentrate around 0.95. I take these estimates for the U.S. as reflecting the time preference of non-poor households and formally test whether households in my sample have an annual discount factor above 0.90. For almost all model specifications, I am able to rule out at a 1% significance level any annual discount factor above 0.90.

The intuition for my result is as follows. PROGRESA transfers increased over the first few semesters of the program. If households faced no liquidity constraints, they would have smoothed consumption either by drawing down their own assets when the program started, or by borrowing against future transfers. This behavior would have produced treatment effects in consumption that declined over time, with larger increases in consumption in the earlier periods of the program. However, the data do not show such a pattern. Instead,

⁴One strand of the literature estimates discount rates using data on the purchase of durable goods (e.g., Hausman 1979). Other studies estimate discount rates from wage-risk tradeoffs (Viscusi and Moore 1989).

the treatment effects on log consumption increased over time, implying an absence of consumption smoothing. The observed pattern of treatment effects is consistent with borrowing constraints working in concert with impatience. A key point is that patience governs the stock of assets that households can use for consumption smoothing. Patient households hold larger stocks of assets before the program, on average, and so can use their own assets to smooth consumption even in the presence of borrowing constraints. Impatient households, who hold smaller stocks of assets, cannot. A high degree of impatience – implying lower initial assets – is necessary to reconcile the model with the rising treatment effects in consumption observed in the data.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives some background on PROGRESA. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 discusses the identification strategy and the method of simulated minimum distance. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and section 6 presents robustness checks. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of alternative models that could be consistent with the data.

2 Background on PROGRESA

PROGRESA is a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico that pays cash transfers to households which comply with the program requirements. To evaluate the program, a randomized social experiment was conducted in its initial phase: 506 rural communities were randomly assigned to either participate in the program or serve as controls. A census was conducted in 1997 – before the start of the program – in control and treatment communities to identify eligible families.⁵ Eligible households in treatment communities started receiving transfers 18 months before eligible households in control communities.

PROGRESA’s cash transfers have two major components: a scholarship conditional on 85% or higher attendance of school-age children, and a cash transfer for food that is conditional on mandatory visits of household members to health clinics.⁶ The payments are made

⁵Households were classified as eligible/poor based on a measure of household’s permanent income rather than income reported at the baseline survey. For more details, see Skoufias, Davis and Behrman (1999).

⁶Households also get twice a year support for school supplies. Households are not required to spend the transfer on food or

every two months. Hoddinott, Skoufias and Washburn (2000) report that average transfers corresponded to roughly 20% of average expenditures of eligible households in control communities. I do not model the program conditionalities and the household’s participation decision. A majority (approximately 90%) of eligible households in treatment communities enrolled in the program (Gertler, Martinez and Rubio-Codina 2006).

Treatment households started receiving transfers in May 1998.⁷ Households in control communities were not incorporated into the program until November 1999 and started receiving transfers in December 1999. Control households were not notified about the program until two months before incorporation and surveyors were told to conceal that the survey was related to PROGRESA.⁸

3 The Model

3.1 Theoretical Model

The framework is a standard discrete-time intertemporal allocation problem (Deaton 1991a). Infinitely-lived households maximize their lifetime utility:⁹

$$\max_{\{C_{i,t+k}\}_{k=0}^{\infty}} E_t \left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^k u(C_{i,t+k}) \right], \quad (1)$$

where u is instantaneous utility, β is the discount factor, C is consumption, t indexes time and i indexes the household. Every period, households receive stochastic labor income $Y_{i,t}$ – which is the only source of uncertainty – and some of them receive a positive cash transfer $B_{i,t}$. There is a single asset in the economy with a constant gross real interest return R , and

school-related expenses. See Skoufias (2005) for more details.

⁷They were told that benefits would be paid for three years and that their status would not change irrespective of changes in household income. The existence of the program could not be guaranteed beyond 2000 because of the 2000 general election.

⁸There is some controversy on whether control households anticipated participation in the program. See Attanasio et al (2004), Skoufias (2005) and Todd and Wolpin (2006).

⁹The majority of households in the sample are young couples with school-age children and are mostly saving for precautionary reasons rather than for retirement. Carroll (1997) shows that, for the U.S., the infinite-horizon model is a good approximation to the finite horizon model up to age 50.

the evolution of assets is given by

$$A_{i,t+1} = R(A_{i,t} + Y_{i,t} + B_{i,t} - C_{i,t}). \quad (2)$$

The consumer is subject to a borrowing constraint¹⁰

$$A_{i,t} \geq 0. \quad (3)$$

The instantaneous utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form with coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ :

$$u(C) = \frac{C^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho}. \quad (4)$$

I assume that transitory shocks to income are lognormally distributed:

$$\ln Y_{i,t} = \ln \omega_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (5)$$

where ω_i is the household-specific permanent component of income and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ represents transitory shocks to income.¹¹

3.2 Modeling the Program

I explain how the introduction of a cash transfer such as PROGRESA affects consumption decisions within the framework of the canonical buffer-stock model. I use the superscript 0 to denote control households and 1 to denote treatment households. To simplify the exposition, I present the case in which transitory shocks are i.i.d.¹² I observe consumption every 6 months, and my analysis uses data from three 6-months “semesters.” To match

¹⁰I follow Zeldes (1989) and Deaton (1991a) in imposing a liquidity constraint. The assumptions that income is lognormally distributed and that the utility function is isoelastic imply that the borrowing constraint might bind (Rabault 2002). An alternative approach (Carroll 1997, Gourinchas and Parker 2002) is to set up the model such that the consumer chooses never to borrow by assuming that there is a positive probability that income will be equal to zero. Deaton (1991b) questions this assumption.

¹¹The literature for the U.S. (Zeldes 1989; Carroll 1997; Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Cagetti 2003) models income as a nonstationary serially correlated process. Here, I assume that the income process is stationary because the available data are not sufficient to estimate the parameters of a nonstationary process.

¹²If transitory shocks follow an AR(1), then the state vector is formed by cash on hand and current income. If transitory shocks follow a MA(1), the state vector is formed by cash on hand and the current innovation to income.

the frequency of the data, I assume that households solve their intertemporal problem on a semi-annual basis. Henceforth, all discount factors presented are semi-annual discount factors unless noted otherwise.

I assume that control households did not anticipate their participation in the program, in which case their intertemporal allocation problem is the standard one. (I will relax this assumption in section 6.) The value function of a control household is:

$$V^0(X_{i,t}; \omega_i) = \max_{\{C_{i,t+k}\}_{k=0}^{\infty}} u(C_{i,t}) + \beta E_t [V^0(X_{i,t+1}; \omega_i)], \quad (6)$$

subject to constraints (2) and (3) and where $X_{i,t} = A_{i,t} + Y_{i,t} + B_{i,t}$ is cash on hand, the sum of assets, income and transfers.

It is also initially assumed that treatment households did not expect the introduction of the program but that, once the program was announced, households had no uncertainty about the levels of transfers in future periods. Treatment households perfectly forecast transfers two semesters ahead and expect transfers to remain constant from there into the future. I model the seasonality in transfers – transfers are smaller in one semester because households are not entitled to scholarships during the school holiday period – by letting households have different expectations for each semester.¹³

Treatment households expect the program to last for 6 semesters, after which they expect to stop receiving cash transfers. The value function of treatment households who have τ periods remaining until the end of the program is:

$$V^{1,\tau}(X_{i,t}, B_{i,t+1}, B_{i,t+2}; \omega_i) = \max_{\{C_{i,t+k}\}_{k=0}^{\infty}} u(C_{i,t}) + \beta E_t [V^{1,\tau-1}(X_{i,t+1}, B_{i,t+2}, B_{i,t+3}; \omega_i)], \quad (7)$$

subject to constraints (2) and (3), where $\tau = \max\{7 - t, 0\}$. At the end of the six semesters – i.e, when $\tau = 1$ – the value function of a treatment household is equal to the value function

¹³Define the “summer” semester as the six-months period from May to October and the “winter” semester as the period from November to April of the following year. Let $t = 1$ denote the first semester of the program, from May to October of 1998, so odd periods denote summer semesters and even periods denote winter semesters. Thus, in the summer semester of 1998, treatment household i expects to receive in future winter semesters $B_{i,2}$ (the winter semester of 1998 actual transfers) and in future summer semesters $B_{i,3}$ (the summer semester of 1999 actual transfers). Similarly, in the winter semester of 1998 ($t = 2$), household i expects to receive in future summer semesters $B_{i,3}$ (the summer semester of 1999 actual transfers) and in future winter semesters $B_{i,4}$ (the winter semester of 2000 actual transfers).

of a control household:

$$V^{1,\tau}(X_{i,t}, \cdot; \omega_i) = V^0(X_{i,t+1}; \omega_i) \quad \text{for } \tau \leq 1. \quad (8)$$

The isoelastic utility function makes the problem homogeneous of degree 1 in the permanent component of income ω . I write the optimal consumption rule as a function of the state variables and transfers, all normalized by ω :

$$c_{i,t} = \frac{C_{i,t}}{\omega_i}, x_{i,t} = \frac{X_{i,t}}{\omega_i} \quad \text{and} \quad b_{it} = \frac{B_{i,t}}{\omega_i}. \quad (9)$$

The policy function of a control household is given by $c_{it} = c^0(x_{i,t} | \Omega)$, where Ω is the vector containing the key parameters – β, ρ, R and σ_ν^2 , where σ_ν^2 is the variance of transitory shocks to income – and c^0 is the control policy function. The policy function of a treatment household is given by:

$$c_{i,t} = c^{1,\tau}(x_{i,t}, b_{i,t+1}, b_{i,t+2} | \Omega) \quad \text{for } \tau \geq 2, \quad (10)$$

$$c_{i,t} = c^{1,\tau}(x_{i,t} | \Omega) = c^0(x_{i,t} | \Omega) \quad \text{for } \tau \leq 1, \quad (11)$$

where $c^{1,\tau}$ is the policy function of a treatment household with τ periods remaining until the end of the program.

The general consumption rule can be written as:

$$c(s_{i,t}, D_i | \Omega) = c^0(x_{i,t} | \Omega) (1 - D_i) + c^{1,\tau}(s_{i,t} | \Omega) D_i, \quad (12)$$

where $s_{i,t} = (x_{i,t}, b_{i,t+1}, b_{i,t+2})$ and D_i is a treatment status dummy. The consumption of household i in period t is then given by $C_{i,t} = c(s_{i,t}, D_i | \Omega) \omega_i$.

The consumption problems of control and treatment households are solved respectively by policy function iteration and backward recursion. The first step is to solve an infinite horizon dynamic program to find the policy and the value functions for control households. The second step involves solving a finite horizon dynamic program to find the policy function

for treatment households, where the horizon is equal to six semesters, the expected duration of the program. The terminal value of the treatment household problem is given by the value function of control households.

3.3 The Income Process

The data generating process for observed household income is assumed to be:

$$\ln Y_{i,t}^* = \ln Y_{i,t} + \xi_{i,t} = \ln \omega_i + \varepsilon_{i,t} + \xi_{i,t}, \quad (13)$$

where $Y_{i,t}^*$ is observed household income, $Y_{i,t}$ is actual household income, ω_i is household permanent income, $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ captures transitory shocks to income and $\xi_{i,t}$ is measurement error.

I decompose permanent income into household size and per capita permanent income – $\ln \omega_i = \ln hsize_i + \ln \mu_i$ – and assume that $\ln \mu_{i,t}$ is normally distributed with mean $\overline{\ln \mu}$ and variance $\sigma_{\ln \mu}^2$. The program identified eligible households by choosing the ones more likely to be poor based on a proxy for per capita permanent income. Thus, I assume that $\ln \mu$ is distributed among eligible households as a truncated normal with mean $\overline{\ln \mu}$ and variance $\sigma_{\ln \mu}^2$ bounded above by some threshold level b .

Transitory shocks and measurement error are independent of permanent income. Measurement error is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ_{ξ}^2 . The distribution of the transitory shock $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ depends on the income process.¹⁴

¹⁴More precisely,

$$\begin{aligned} iid & : \varepsilon_{i,t} = \nu_{i,t}, \\ AR(1) & : \varepsilon_{i,t} = \eta \varepsilon_{i,t-1} + \nu_{i,t}, \\ MA(1) & : \varepsilon_{i,t} = \eta \nu_{i,t-1} + \nu_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\nu_{i,t} \sim iid N(0, \sigma_{\nu}^2)$.

4 Methodology

4.1 Identification Strategy

The data-generating process for observed consumption C^* for a family i in period t can be generally described by:

$$\ln C_{it}^* = \ln C_{it} + \epsilon_{it} = \ln (c(s_{it}, D_i | \Omega) \omega_i) + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (14)$$

where the first term on the right hand side is optimal consumption predicted by the model and ϵ is an error term that captures deviations of observed consumption from optimal consumption. The error term can be thought of as measurement error in consumption levels.

The goal is to estimate β by minimizing the distance between theoretical moments and sample moments. The equation above states that the mapping of s and D to consumption is a function of Ω , so it would be natural to match on moments that summarize co-movements between the right-hand-side variables and consumption. Let z be a vector including some of the right-hand-side variables. One possible set of matching moments would be the coefficient vector $\hat{\gamma}_1$ from an OLS regression of log consumption on z . The probability limit of these coefficients is:

$$p \lim \hat{\gamma}_1 = Var(z)^{-1} Cov(\ln C, z) + Var(z)^{-1} Cov(\epsilon, z). \quad (15)$$

The model predicts the first term on the right hand side of the equation above. However, the equation makes it clear that the sample moments are not consistent estimators of the theoretical moments if the second term on the right hand side is different from zero. In other words, the theoretical moments differ from the observed moments at the true parameter vector if the variables that provide the source of variation used to identify Ω are correlated with the error term.

Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate the parameters of the intertemporal allocation problem by matching the theoretical consumption-age profile to its empirical counterpart,

which is equivalent to having as z a vector of age dummies. Their identifying assumption is that the error term is uncorrelated with age. But if there are other explanations for why observed consumption evolves over the life cycle, the second term on the right hand side of (15) will differ from zero. For example, the error term will be correlated with age if there is time-varying measurement error in consumption or if omitted factors that determine consumption vary over the life cycle.

In this article, I exploit the fact that the consumption behavior of control and treatment households would have been the same in the absence of the program. In other words, any treatment-control differences in consumption must be due to the program. I use the model to predict program treatment effects on log consumption and match these to sample treatment effects. In this case, z is a vector of time-treatment dummies.

I estimate the time preference of sample households from the following moment conditions:

$$E^1 [\ln C_{i,t}^*] - E^0 [\ln C_{i,t}^*] = E^1 [\ln c(s_{i,t}, D_i | \Omega_0) \omega_i] - E^0 [\ln c(s_{i,t}, D_i | \Omega_0) \omega_i], \quad (16)$$

where $E^d [\cdot] = E[\cdot | D = d]$. The expression on the left hand side is the sample treatment effect on log consumption at period t while the expression on the right hand side is the treatment effect predicted by the model. The identifying assumption is that the error term ϵ is orthogonal to treatment status – i.e., $E[\epsilon_{i,t} | D_i] = E[\epsilon_{i,t}]$.

The discussion above clarifies the advantage of using experimental variation to estimate time preferences. When using changes in consumption over the life cycle to identify the parameters of interest, the assumption is that the changes are entirely due to the optimizing consumption behavior described by the model. This rules out any unobservables that are correlated with age and with consumption. When using treatment-control differences in consumption, the nature of the experiment implies that differences in the consumption profiles of control and treatment households are due to the program. The model is used to describe how treatment households' consumption responds to the injection of PROGRESA transfers, relative to the consumption of control households. The identifying assumption is that the mean deviation of log observed consumption from log optimal consumption (as predicted by

the model) is the same for control and treatment households.

4.2 Simulated Minimum Distance

This section justifies the use of simulation methods and explains the simulation procedure. The model presented in section 3 can be used to predict households' consumption and to calculate the theoretical moments (the treatment effects on log consumption predicted by the model). The dataset, however, does not contain reliable data on households' permanent incomes nor on their wealth such that $s_{i,t}$ in equation (12) is unobservable. Thus, s must be integrated out of the moment conditions:

$$E^d [\ln c(s_{i,t}, D_i | \Omega)] = \int \ln c(s, D | \Omega) dF_t(s; \Omega | D = d), \quad (17)$$

where F_t is the cumulative distribution of s at date t conditional on treatment status D .

The consumption function does not have a closed form, so that (17) cannot be calculated analytically. I follow Gourinchas and Parker (2002) in using a simulation method to overcome this difficulty. The idea of these methods is to draw many realizations of s from $dF_t(\cdot)$, compute $\ln c$ for each s , and calculate the mean of $\ln c$ across the simulated draws.

The simulation procedure involves three steps. First, for each household i and simulation draw h , I generate a history of income shocks and draw per capita permanent income μ_i^h from the appropriate distribution. Second, I use the policy function of control households and the history of income shocks to simulate the asset distribution at the eve of the program.¹⁵ Finally, I simulate consumption after the program was introduced using different policy functions for control and treatment households. The data on transfers and household size required to simulate consumption come from the actual household-level data and are not simulated. Average log consumption for the control (treatment) group is calculated as simulated log consumption averaged over control (treatment) households and simulation draws. For any parameter Ω , the theoretical moment can be replaced by its simulated counterpart.

¹⁵The randomization implies that the asset distribution for control and treatment households should have been the same before the start of the program. The asset distribution is stationary and it can be simulated using the control policy function.

The simulation procedure is explained in greater detail in the appendix.

In estimating the model presented above, two complications emerge. First, the data available are not rich enough to identify all the parameters of the model. In particular, there is not enough variation in the data to estimate the risk aversion parameter and the interest rate. Thus, I choose to present results for different values of the interest rate and the risk aversion. Second, I follow Gourinchas and Parker (2002) in employing a two-stage estimation procedure to estimate the parameters of interest. In the first stage, I use income data to estimate the variance of log permanent income and the variance of transitory shocks. In the second stage, I use the treatment effects on log consumption to estimate the discount factor and the mean of permanent income.

More formally, let us define $\psi = (\sigma_\nu^2, \sigma_{\ln \mu}^2)$ and $\theta = (\overline{\ln \mu}, \beta)$. The parameter vector ψ is estimated in the first stage while θ is estimated in the second stage. Notice that $\hat{\theta}$ is a function of $\hat{\psi}$ as well as ρ and R since $\hat{\theta}$ will be estimated conditional on particular values for the interest rate and the risk aversion parameter.¹⁶

I proceed by defining g_t , the difference between simulated treatment effects and sample treatment effects on log consumption:

$$g_t(\theta, \hat{\kappa}) = (E^1[\ln C_{it}^*] - E^0[\ln C_{it}^*]) - (\tilde{E}^1[\ln C_{it}(\theta, \hat{\kappa})] - \tilde{E}^0[\ln C_{it}(\theta, \hat{\kappa})]), \quad (18)$$

where $\hat{\kappa} = (\hat{\psi}, \rho, R)$.

The Simulated Minimum Distance estimator is given by:

$$\hat{\theta}_{SMD} = \arg \min_{\theta} g(\theta, \hat{\kappa})' W^* g(\theta, \hat{\kappa}), \quad (19)$$

where $g(\theta, \hat{\kappa}) = [g_1(\theta, \hat{\kappa}) \ g_2(\theta, \hat{\kappa}) \ g_3(\theta, \hat{\kappa})]'$ – the three periods referring to the three semesters during which the program was randomized – and the optimal weighting matrix W^* is calculated from survey data. The variance-covariance estimator and its derivation is contained in Appendix D.

¹⁶The standard errors presented in section 5 do not correct for the first stage estimation.

5 Empirical Analysis

5.1 Data

The empirical exercise involves three steps. First, I use survey data on household consumption and treatment status to estimate the sample treatment effects on log consumption. Second, I use survey data on household per capita wage income to estimate parameters of the income process. Finally, I simulate consumption in the model taking the estimated parameters of the income process as given, and find the discount factor that best matches the model to the data. To simulate the consumption of a household, one needs data on transfers, household size, assets, income and permanent income. I use household-level data on transfers and household size in the simulation exercise. Income – including permanent income – and assets are simulated as explained in Section 4.

The PROGRESA survey data consists of longitudinal data on approximately 24,000 households from 506 communities (320 selected into the treatment group) that were interviewed in the November 1997 baseline survey. PROGRESA conducted follow-up surveys approximately every six months between May 1998 and November 2000. I restrict my sample to households in control and treatment communities who were classified by the program as poor/eligible. These households correspond to 52% of the original sample.¹⁷ Data on consumption, household size and income come from PROGRESA surveys. I use consumption data collected in the three survey rounds that were conducted after the introduction of the program but before controls started receiving transfers.¹⁸ The appendix contains more details about how I construct the measure of household consumption. The data on transfers come from administrative data compiled by PROGRESA.^{19 20}

¹⁷In an initial stage, PROGRESA's beneficiary selection method classified 52% of households in the sample as eligible. By July 1999, PROGRESA revised its method and extended eligibility to 54% of households that were initially classified as ineligible. However, about 60% of households living in treatment communities with a status revised from noneligible to eligible were not incorporated into the program until late 2000. It is unclear what were the expectations and the behavior of these households so I use the more stringent eligibility criterion and drop families with revised eligibility status from my eligible sample.

¹⁸November 1998, May 1999 and November 1999.

¹⁹The dataset shows the amount of transfers each household was entitled to receive for each two-months period in which it participated in the program. The dataset does not have information on the dates of transfer payments. I assume that transfers corresponding to participation during months m and $m + 1$ were paid sometime during months $m + 4$ and $m + 5$, a rule that PROGRESA has followed since 2000. I also estimated the discount factor under alternative assumptions about the timing of the transfers and obtained qualitatively similar results (available upon request).

²⁰I adjust transfer values to September-October 1998 figures using the monthly national CPI calculated by Banco de Mexico

5.2 Estimating the parameters of the Income Process

The income process presented in section 3 implies the following theoretical moments:²¹

$$\begin{aligned} Var_E \left(\ln \frac{Y_{it}^*}{hhsiz_e_i} \right) &= Var_E (\ln \mu) + \varphi_0 \sigma_\nu^2 + \sigma_\xi^2, \\ Cov_E \left(\ln \frac{Y_{it}^*}{hhsiz_e_i}, \ln \frac{Y_{it-1}^*}{hhsiz_e_i} \right) &= Var_E (\ln \mu) + \varphi_1 \sigma_\nu^2, \end{aligned}$$

where the subscript E indicates that the moments are calculated for the eligible population and φ_0 and φ_1 depend on the process of transitory shocks.²² The parameters of the income process can be estimated by minimizing the distance between the theoretical and empirical moments.

In practice, I restrict the sample to eligible households and compute the sample variance and autocovariance of order 1, calculating separate moments for control and treatment households.²³ The variance of transitory shocks to income and the (cross-sectional) variance of log permanent income are estimated using minimum distance estimation.²⁴ The estimates

and for each household summed the values received in a given semester.

²¹In Section 2, I discussed how households were classified as eligible or non-eligible based on a proxy for their permanent income. Thus, the log permanent income is assumed to be distributed among the eligible population as a truncated normal. The variance of the unconditional distribution is given by:

$$\sigma_{\ln \mu}^2 = Var (\ln \mu_i) = \frac{Var_E (\ln \mu_i)}{[1 - \alpha \gamma (\alpha) - [\gamma (\alpha)]^2]}, \quad (20)$$

where $\alpha = \Phi^{-1}(.52)$, .52 is the fraction of households who were deemed eligible, Φ is the standard normal cdf and γ is the Mills ratio.

²²More precisely,

$$\begin{aligned} i.i.d. &: \varphi_0 = 1; \varphi_1 = 0, \\ AR(1) &: \varphi_0 = \frac{1}{1 - \eta^2}; \varphi_1 = \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta^2}, \\ MA(1) &: \varphi_0 = 1 + \eta^2; \varphi_1 = \eta. \end{aligned}$$

²³The U.S. literature (Carroll and Samwick 1997, Gourinchas and Parker 2002) has estimated income uncertainty from within-household changes in income over time. Data limitations prevent me from using the same strategy here. First, there is an intrinsic difficulty in measuring income of rural households in a developing country given that a large fraction of these households is engaged in subsistence agriculture or self-employment. Second, the survey instrument used to collect income data changed during the period of analysis. In particular, data on farming and livestock income were collected in only 2 survey rounds. Finally, in each survey round, a large fraction of households reports no income. Given these limitations, I use data from five survey rounds on household (per capita) wage income, whose survey instrument was not modified across surveys. The goal is to provide a ballpark estimate of the uncertainty faced by the households in the sample. Nevertheless, it is a real concern that the variability in wage income data might not accurately reflect the income uncertainty they face. Therefore, in the robustness section, I vary the parameters of the income process drastically and show how the results are affected.

²⁴The mean of log permanent income is estimated jointly with the discount factor in the second stage. Estimating the mean of permanent income is important because in many household surveys in developing countries income seems to be underreported relative to expenditures.

of the parameters of the income process are presented in Table 2 in the Appendix.²⁵ The variance of measurement error is estimated by assuming a reliability ratio λ of 0.7.²⁶

5.3 Simulated Treatment Effects

Before moving on to the empirical analysis, I present results from simulations of the model. These results provide intuition on the economics behind the empirical results, which I present in the next section.

In a buffer-stock model, risk-averse households accumulate assets to use as a buffer against income shocks. However, accumulating assets is costly because it reduces current consumption. The more impatient households are, the more willing they are to substitute current consumption for future consumption, and the less assets they will hold.

Treatment households had to decide how to change their consumption in response to the exogenous increase in wealth. As shown in Appendix Table 1, transfers increased over the first few semesters of the program. They increased roughly 150% between the first and second semesters and 18% between the second and third semesters. If treatment households anticipated rising transfers, they would have tried to smooth consumption. In particular, impatience would have led them to run down their assets in the first semesters of the program and let consumption fall over time. As a consequence, treatment effects in consumption would have declined over time.

The previous intuition relies – given the borrowing constraints – on households having enough assets to smooth consumption. But in a buffer-stock model, households’ asset holdings are a function of their time preferences. The more impatient households are, the less willing they are to forego current consumption to accumulate buffer wealth, and hence the lower their assets will be on the eve of the program. Figure 1 in the Appendix presents the simulated pre-program asset distribution for three different discount factors: 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9.²⁷ Patient households hold, on average, more assets. The relationship of asset holdings

²⁵In the AR(1) and MA(1) cases, I estimate $Var_E(\ln \mu)$ and σ_ν^2 conditional on particular values of η : .25 and .5.

²⁶The reliability ratio is defined as $\lambda = Var_E\left(\ln \frac{Y_{it}}{hhsize_i}\right) / Var_E\left(\ln \frac{Y_{it}^*}{hhsize_i}\right)$. Bound and Krueger (1991) find that the reliability ratio in US cross-sectional data is 0.82 for men and 0.92 for women.

²⁷For more details on how the asset distribution is simulated, see Appendix.

to time preferences has important implications. When the program is introduced, treatment households want to smooth consumption in anticipation of higher future transfers. However, because households cannot borrow, they must use their own assets to finance any increase in first-semester consumption that exceeds the first-semester transfer. A high degree of impatience implies that households cannot easily do so because they have a small stock of initial assets; in this case, treatment households' consumption will track transfers over time.

Figure 1 plots simulated treatment effects on log consumption against the (semi-annual) discount factor for the first three semesters of the program.²⁸ The distances between the curves tell how the windfall is distributed over time. The graph shows that the increase in treatment households' consumption is roughly evenly distributed over time if households have a high discount factor, but not if households are less patient.²⁹

Finally, I present the time profile of treatment effects. Figure 2 plots the simulated treatment effects against the program semester for three different discount factors: 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9. The profile is positively sloped. Because of borrowing constraints, treatment households' consumption – and the treatment effects – grow over time following the growth in transfers. Moreover, patient households have larger initial assets and are more able to smooth consumption over time. As a consequence, the time profile of simulated treatment effects is flatter for higher discount factors.

Figure 2 also shows the program treatment effects on log consumption estimated from survey data, which give rise to a steep profile. The comparison of the sample treatment effects with the simulated treatment effects suggests that the two can be matched only if households have a low discount factor.

²⁸The simulation uses household-level data on actual transfers.

²⁹In the second and third semesters, the treatment effect is decreasing in the discount factor because more patient households have a lower marginal propensity to consume out of transfers. The treatment effect is non-monotonic in the first semester because households want to increase consumption by more than the transfers in anticipation of higher future transfers. Households have to finance an increase in consumption which exceeds the first semester transfers using their pre-program asset holdings – which is an increasing function of the discount factor – given that they cannot borrow against future transfers.

5.4 Results

5.4.1 Sample Treatment Effects

Table 1 presents the program treatment effects on log consumption estimated from the survey data. I will estimate the discount factor by matching simulated treatment effects to these sample treatment effects. The top panel of Table 1 reports the estimates of a regression of household log consumption on treatment status, by program semester.³⁰ The treatment effects rise over time, from 8.5% for the first semester of the program, to 14.4% in the second semester, to 16.4% for the third semester.³¹

The second panel of Table 1 reports average PROGRESA transfers for the treatment group and average consumption in levels for the control group. The last row of the panel shows the ratio of average transfers to control average consumption, which can be compared to the treatment effects. If the treatment effect is higher than the ratio of transfers to control consumption, this suggests that treatment households increased their consumption by more than the transfer. The treatment effect was higher than the ratio of transfers to control consumption in the first semester, but lower in the second and third semesters.

5.4.2 Estimates of the Discount Factor

Table 2 presents my benchmark estimates of the discount factor.³² All estimates of the discount factor are conditional on the interest rate and the risk aversion.³³ They assume that transitory shocks to income are independently identically distributed.³⁴ The table displays results for nine possible combinations of the interest rate and the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The interest rate varies across columns while the risk aversion varies across rows.

I follow Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2007) and show results for three different risk

³⁰The sample contains 9,397 observations with non-missing consumption data in all three survey rounds. In the simulation, I choose the missing observations to be exactly the same as in the observed data.

³¹These findings are consistent with other work (Stephens 2003; Shapiro 2004; Mastrobuoni and Weinberg 2009) which find that recipients of government transfers such as Social Security checks and food stamps in the U.S. do not smooth consumption between payment dates.

³²Estimates of $\ln \mu$ range from 7.29 to 7.33, which corresponds to an average ratio of transfers to income of about .2. Hoddinott, Skoufias and Washburn (2000) estimate that the ratio of average transfers to average expenditures of the control group is 20%.

³³As discussed in Section 4, I do not estimate the risk aversion parameter because I cannot separately identify the discount factor from the risk aversion parameter.

³⁴I also present results in Appendix Table 3 assuming that transitory shocks follow an AR(1) or MA(1) process.

aversion coefficients – 1, 2 and 3 – that are commonly used in lifecycle consumption models.³⁵ I vary the interest rate over a wide range, from -15% to 10%. Annual inflation for the period was approximately 15% and the real interest rate was 5%. The real interest rate would have been -15% if households received no interest on their savings. For each combination of risk aversion and interest rate, four figures are shown: the semi-annual discount factor, its standard error, the p-value from a hypothesis test that the semi-annual discount factor is equal to $\sqrt{0.9}$ (corresponding to an annual discount factor of .9) and the p-value from a test of overidentifying restrictions.

The point estimates of the semi-annual discount factor in Table 2 suggest that households are very impatient. The figures in the table have to be squared to obtain annual discount factors. The highest semi-annual discount factor is 0.84, which corresponds to an annual discount factor of 0.7 and to an annual discount rate of 43%. The lowest semi-annual discount factor is 0.28, which corresponds to an annual discount factor of 0.08 and to an annual discount rate of 1156%. Although the estimates vary according to the values of the risk aversion parameter and the interest rate, all the estimates imply a high degree of impatience and are well below the discount factors typically estimated for the U.S. For comparison, Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003) and Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2007) apply similar methods to U.S. data and obtain estimates of the annual discount factor ranging from 0.921 to 0.989.

Overall, it is hard to reconcile the behavior of poor rural households in my sample with discount factors which have been estimated for the wealthier households in the U.S. Table 2 reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the semi-annual discount factor is $\sqrt{.9}$ against a one-sided alternative. I can reject the null at 5% for all combinations of risk aversion and interest rate except one: the case with a negative interest rate of 15% and a risk aversion of 1. Despite the large standard errors, I can generally bound the estimates away from annual discount factors above 0.9.³⁶

³⁵See Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2007) for a discussion on the values of the risk aversion parameter.

³⁶I get similar results – in terms of being able to bound the estimates away from an annual discount factor above 0.9 – if I compute 95% confidence regions based on the distribution of the objective function. More precisely, let $\hat{\theta}$ be the parameter vector that minimizes the objective function g/W^*g as defined in equation (19) – for simplicity, I drop $\hat{\kappa}$ from the notation.

The estimates are sensitive to the risk aversion parameter but change little with the interest rate. As explained in Section 5.3, households decide how much to consume by striking a balance between their impatience and their precautionary motives. When households are more risk averse, the precautionary motives for savings are stronger. If, for example, households were risk neutral, they would have no assets at the eve of the program and treatment households' consumption would track transfers over time. This intuition explains why there is a negative relationship between the discount factor that the data imply and the risk aversion parameter. Similarly, households have more incentives to save when the interest rates are higher, giving rise to a negative relation between the estimated discount factor and the interest rate.

Finally, Table 2 reports a measure of model fit. I estimate two parameters using three moments so there is one overidentifying restriction, which can be tested using a chi-squared test. Table 2 reports the p-value from this test; I cannot reject the overidentifying restriction at any conventional significance level.

6 Robustness Checks

Table 3 examines how sensitive the results are to some of the assumptions of the benchmark model.³⁷ It presents robustness checks assuming an annual interest rate of 5% and a coefficient of relative risk aversion parameter of 2.³⁸ The first row, labeled row 0, repeats the results for the benchmark case.³⁹ The other rows present results for alternative assumptions. The first column says which assumption is varied. The remaining columns present the semi-annual discount factor estimate, its standard error and the p-value from a one-sided test of the null hypothesis that the semi-annual discount factor is $\sqrt{0.9}$.

Define

$$\vartheta(\beta) = \min_{\frac{\ln \mu}{\beta}} g' \left(\frac{\overline{\ln \mu}}{\beta} \right) W^* g \left(\frac{\overline{\ln \mu}}{\beta} \right) - g(\hat{\theta}) / W^* g(\hat{\theta}).$$

The limiting distribution of the statistic $\vartheta(\beta)$ is chi-squared with one degree of freedom. The 95% confidence region is the set of β 's for which $\vartheta(\beta)$ is smaller than 3.84.

³⁷Additional robustness checks are presented in Appendix Table 3.

³⁸I have also conducted robustness checks for other combinations of the interest rate (-15%, 0%, 5% and 10%) and the risk aversion parameter (1, 2 and 3). These results are available upon request.

³⁹The benchmark assumes that transitory shocks are i.i.d. with standard deviation of .36, that the standard deviation of log permanent income is .46 and that control and treatment households have the same income process.

The first three rows of Table 3 show results under alternative assumptions about the income process. Row 1 reduces the standard deviation of transitory shocks from .36 to .2, which is the estimate of Gourinchas and Parker (2002) from U.S. data.⁴⁰ The estimate of the discount factor is higher, but it remains low.⁴¹ Row 2 relaxes the assumption that control and treatment households continued to have the same income process after the program was introduced. It assumes that treatment households' permanent incomes were on average 5% lower than control households' permanent incomes.⁴² The estimate for the semi-annual discount factor raises to 0.66 and the annual discount factor to 0.43 so that the annual discount rate falls to 130%. Row 3 investigates whether macro shocks can explain the growth of treatment effects over time. I estimate the discount factor assuming that there was an unexpected aggregate shock of -5% to income of control and treatment households in the second and third semesters of the program.⁴³ The estimate of the annual discount factor rises to 0.41 and the annual discount rate falls to 145%.

The remaining rows of Table 3 show how results change when alternative assumptions are made concerning households' expectations about the program. As explained in section 5.3, the results are driven by the growth in treatment effects over time. We would expect to observe a similar pattern if households did not anticipate the growth in transfers but instead revised their consumption plans upward as they received higher-than-expected transfers.⁴⁴ Row 4 shows results for when treatment households have myopic expectations and expect transfers to remain constant at the current level. The estimate is higher than for the benchmark case, but I can still reject an annual discount factor above 0.9 at the 5% level.⁴⁵ Row 5

⁴⁰I take their estimate as a lower bound for the income risk rural households in Mexico face.

⁴¹Row 1 of Appendix Table 3 reduces the standard deviation of log permanent income from .35 to .15, which is the variance of log permanent income estimated by Gourinchas and Parker (2002). In my model, the variance of log permanent income refers to the time-invariant cross-section variance of log permanent income. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate a within-household time variance of log permanent income, which I take to be a lower bound of the cross-sectional variance of my model.

⁴²It is possible that PROGRESA reduced the income (excluding PROGRESA transfers) of treatment households because of a reduction in child labor or because households enrolled in PROGRESA were not entitled to receive government transfers from other programs. The evidence suggests that control and treatment households did not have different income processes (Parker and Skoufias 2000; Gertler, Martinez and Rubio-Codina 2006; Angelucci and De Giorgi 2006; Albarran and Attanasio 2002; Gertler, Martinez and Rubio-Codina 2006).

⁴³When hit by a negative income shock, treatment households use the transfers to buffer the shock. As a consequence, the consumption of treatment households changes less than the consumption of control households. Thus, treatment effects are expected to be larger in semesters with negative aggregate shocks.

⁴⁴Row 2 of Appendix Table 3 assumes that treatment households were pessimistic about the continuation of the program and expected to receive zero transfers in the future.

⁴⁵For myopic and pessimistic expectations, I cannot identify the discount factor separately from the mean log permanent income. Hoddinott, Skoufias and Washburn (2000) estimate that the ratio of average transfers to average expenditures of the

assumes treatment households anticipated participation in the program one semester before they started receiving transfers.⁴⁶ The estimates increase to an annual discount factor of 0.62, corresponding to an annual discount rate of 61%.

7 Conclusion

My benchmark results indicate that poor households in rural Mexico have very low discount factors, much lower than those found in U.S. data using similar methods. My result is robust to a wide variety of alternative assumptions about households' expectations and the economic environment they face. To obtain discount factors similar to those in the U.S., I would need to assume either that households have an unusually low degree of risk aversion or that the households had mistaken beliefs about future transfers – which seems unlikely because, government officials visited each community and explained the program at a public meeting.

There are three possible interpretations of the results. The first is that the poor are very impatient, which has implications both for policy design and for future research. First, poverty reduction programs that try to increase poor households' investments in human capital will be more effective when part of the returns to these investments accrues in the short run. Second, future research should investigate the underlying reasons for differences in time preferences of poor and non-poor households.

The second interpretation is that the model does not contain a sufficiently rich description of households' information and the assets they can hold. In particular, the model abstracts from uncertainty about future transfers and does not allow for the possibility that households hold illiquid assets. When there is uncertainty about future transfers, households are reluctant to deplete their assets to increase consumption in anticipation of higher future

control group correspond to 20%. The results I present are estimated conditional on $\overline{\ln \mu} = 7.3$, which corresponds to an average ratio of transfers to income of .2. Higher values of $\overline{\ln \mu}$ correspond to higher estimates of the discount factor but imply implausible low values of average income given that expenditures provide a lower bound for income. Both of these models fit the data worse than the benchmark model. I cannot reject the overidentifying restriction for myopic expectations, but I can reject it at 5% for pessimistic expectations.

⁴⁶In this case, treatment households would have increased consumption at the time of the announcement by reducing their buffer wealth. Treatment households' consumption would have tracked transfers more closely during the first three semesters of the program, implying a higher estimate of the discount factor.

transfers: they might not receive any transfers in the future and they would have no buffer wealth to shield future consumption from income shocks. Another explanation is that households failed to smooth because they hold mostly illiquid assets, which they could not use to substitute current consumption for future consumption.⁴⁷ Households would choose to hold few liquid assets if the returns to available liquid assets were sufficiently lower than the returns to illiquid assets.

The third interpretation is that the very low estimated discount factors suggest that a different model may be needed to describe the consumption behavior of poor households in developing countries. The co-movement between treatment effects in consumption and transfers observed in the data is, for example, consistent with sophisticated hyperbolic preferences, which induce households to keep most of their savings in illiquid assets to cope with their self-control problems (Laibson 1997).

⁴⁷Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) note that most of the assets held by farmers are inputs to production but also serve as buffer against income shocks. They propose a model in which investment assets are used both for production and to smooth consumption.

Appendix

A Construction of Consumption Measure

I use the November of 1998, May of 1999 and November of 1999 survey rounds which collected data on consumption. The module included questions on 36 food items and households reported for each of these items expenditures, quantity consumed and quantity purchased in the last 7 days. The respondent was given an option to report quantities in 3 units of measure: Kilos, Liter or Units. I exclude data on consumption of alcohol, for which the data seems unreliable.

Household-specific prices were calculated by dividing expenditures by quantity purchased. I trimmed prices which were below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile. If a household reported consuming a give food item but the price was missing – either because of trimming, no quantity had been purchased or because the measure unit of purchase was different from the measure unit of consumption – then the household-specific price was set equal to the local price. Median prices at the village, municipality, state and national level were calculated for each measurement unit and the local price was set equal to the lowest level of aggregation with at least 20 household-specific price observations. The value of consumption for each item was calculated as the product of prices times quantity consumed, where prices and quantities were quoted in the same unit of measure. Household food consumption was calculated as the total value of consumption over the 35 items and converted to a semi-annual figure.

Households were also asked to report their expenditures with 24 non-food items. I exclude data on expenditures with weddings, funerals and ceremonies. The length of the reporting period was different for different items: transportation costs (last 7 days); personal and house hygiene, drugs and prescriptions, doctor visits, heating (i.e., wood, gas, oil), electricity (last month); clothing and shoes, school related expenses (last 6 months). I converted the expenditures to semi-annual figures and summed over all expenditures to calculate consumption of other goods.

Household total consumption is calculated as the sum of food consumption and consumption of other goods. Finally, I trimmed the total consumption distribution in each survey round in 1%.

B Policy Function

I first solve the consumption problem for control households by using policy function iteration. I create a grid for cash on hand x with 250 points. For each value of cash on hand on the grid I find the level of consumption c which maximizes lifetime utility. The expected value of the value function one period ahead is

calculated by discretizing the shock and using a three-node Gaussian quadrature scheme. I use cubic spline interpolation to approximate the policy function for levels of cash on hand between grid points.

The second step is to solve the consumption problem for treatment households using backward recursion. Again, I create a grid for cash on hand identical to the one created for control households. For treatment households, there is heterogeneity in the amount of transfers households receive. Thus, I proceed to create a 7 by 7 grid corresponding to different levels of summer semesters and winter semesters transfers – b_1 and b_2 . Starting at period $T - 1$, for each value of cash on hand on the x grid and for each value of transfers on the (b_1, b_2) grid I find the optimal consumption level – where period T is the last period in which households expect to receive transfers. The terminal value function is given by the value function of control households. The optimal consumption for periods before $T - 1$ are found recursively. I use cubic spline interpolation to approximate the policy function.

C Simulation

In the simulation exercise, each household i is characterized by its treatment status D_i , its history of transfers $\{B_{i,t}\}_{t=1}^5$ and its household size $hsize_i$ – all of which come from household-level data. I generate for each household 50 fictitious histories of income shocks $\nu_{i,t}^h$ and permanent (per capita) income μ_i^h – where h indexes the simulation draw. Notice that both of these variables are assumed to be independent of household size, treatment status or transfers. Using the first 100 periods of each history and the control policy function, I simulate for each household i and simulation draw h its initial asset level – i.e., the household’s financial wealth at the beginning of the first semester of the program: $a_{i,t=1}^h$. I set $a_{i,-99}^h = 0 \forall i, h$ and run history for 100 periods:

$$\begin{aligned} a_{i,t+1}^h &= R(a_{i,t}^h + y_{i,t}^h - c_{i,t}^h), \\ c_{i,t}^h &= c^0(a_{i,t}^h + y_{i,t}^h | \Omega), \end{aligned}$$

where $t \in \{-99, \dots, 0\}$.

In the post-program period, control and treatment households have different policy functions. Consumption for a control household i is simulated as:

$$C_{i,t}^h = c^0(a_{i,t}^h + y_{i,t}^h | \Omega) * \omega_i^h$$

while consumption for a treatment household i is simulated as:

$$C_{i,t}^h = c^{1,\tau} (a_{i,t}^h + y_{i,t}^h, b_{i,t+1}^h, b_{i,t+2}^h | \Omega) * \omega_i^h,$$

where:

$$\tau = 7 - t \text{ for } t \in \{1, 2, 3\}, b_{i,t}^h = \frac{B_{i,t}}{\omega_i^h} \text{ and } \omega_i^h = hsize_i * \mu_i^h.$$

The household size and the history of transfers $\{B_{i,t}\}_{t=1}^5$ are kept constant for a given household i across simulation draws h . I then average log consumption across simulation draws h and households i for each group. The treatment effect is the difference between the simulated average log consumption of treatment and control households.

D Variance

The Simulated Minimum Distance Estimator is defined by:

$$\hat{\theta}_{SMD} = \arg \min_{\theta} g'(\theta, \hat{\kappa}) W^* g(\theta, \hat{\kappa}).$$

The first-order condition for the second stage estimator is:

$$\frac{\partial g'}{\partial \theta}(\hat{\theta}, \hat{\kappa}) W^* g(\hat{\theta}, \hat{\kappa}) = 0.$$

Expanding $g(\hat{\theta}, \hat{\kappa})$ around θ_0 and solving for $\hat{\theta} - \theta_0$ yields:

$$\hat{\theta} - \theta_0 = - \left[\frac{\partial g'}{\partial \theta}(\tilde{\theta}, \hat{\kappa}) W^* \frac{\partial g}{\partial \theta'}(\tilde{\theta}, \hat{\kappa}) \right]^{-1} \frac{\partial g'}{\partial \theta}(\hat{\theta}, \hat{\kappa}) W^* g(\theta_0, \hat{\kappa}).$$

For simplicity, I assume that the uncertainty of the first stage does not affect the uncertainty of the second stage – i.e., $\frac{\partial g'}{\partial \kappa}(\theta, \hat{\kappa}) \approx 0$. I employ the optimal weighting matrix $W^* = (Var[\Phi(\theta_0)])^{-1}$, in which case the Slutsky and central limit theories imply that $\hat{\theta} - \theta_0$ converges in distribution to a mean zero normal distribution with asymptotic variance:

$$Var(\hat{\theta}) = \left[\frac{\partial \Phi'}{\partial \theta}(\theta_0) Var[g(\theta_0)] \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial \theta'}(\theta_0) \right]^{-1}, \quad (21)$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ are the theoretical moments corresponding to the sample moments $g(\cdot)$. The simulation inflates the variance of the minimum distance estimator such that $Var[g(\theta_0)] = (1 + \frac{1}{H}) Var[\Phi(\theta_0)]$. To construct

an estimate of (21), I replace $\frac{\partial \Phi'}{\partial \theta}$ by its empirical counterpart while an estimate of $Var[\Phi(\theta_0)]$ is given by the estimated variance of the sample treatment effects.

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Table 1. TREATMENT EFFECTS

Variable	Log Consumption		
	May-Oct98	Nov98-Apr99	May-Oct99
Treatment Effect	0.085 (0.011)***	0.144 (0.011)***	0.164 (0.010)***
Control	8.565 (0.009)***	8.532 (0.009)***	8.584 (0.008)***

Variable	May-Oct98	Nov98-Apr99	May-Oct99
Mean Consumption of Controls	6,024	5,870	6,059
Mean Transfer	386	1,056	1,305
Mean Transfer / Mean. Consumption of Controls	0.06	0.18	0.22

Note: The first panel reports treatment effects on log household consumption. Each column presents results from a separate regression by semester. The number in parentheses are robust standard errors. The sample, which includes 9,397 observations, is restricted to eligible households surveyed at the baseline survey with nonmissing consumption data in all three survey rounds. The second panel reports average PROGRESA transfers among treatment households, average consumption of control households and the ratio of average transfers to average consumption. All figures are nominal values in pesos. *** Significant at 1% level

Table 2. MAIN RESULTS

Risk Aversion		Annual Interest Rate			
		-15%	0%	5%	10%
1	Semi-annual Disc. Factor	0.84	0.77	0.75	0.74
	Standard Error	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.08
	p-value Ho: $\beta = \sqrt{.9}$	0.12	0.02	0.01	0.01
	p-value O.R. test	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.94
2	Semi-annual Disc. Factor	0.56	0.52	0.50	0.49
	Standard Error	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.14
	p-value Ho: $\beta = \sqrt{.9}$	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	p-value O.R. test	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.94
3	Semi-annual Disc. Factor	0.32	0.30	0.29	0.28
	Standard Error	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.12
	p-value Ho: $\beta = \sqrt{.9}$	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	p-value O.R. test	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.94


Note: The table presents estimates of the semi-annual discount factor for different combinations of annual real interest rate and risk aversion parameter. The mean of permanent income is estimated jointly with the discount factor and the estimates range from 7.29 to 7.33. The exercise assumes that families perfectly foresee transfers for the next year. The sample containing transfers and family size is the balanced sample of 9,397 eligible households and I draw 50 simulation draws for each household. The income process is assumed to be i.i.d. with the standard deviation of shocks being equal to .46 and the standard deviation of log permanent income equal to .35. The first p-value reported refers to the one-sided test that the semi-annual discount factor is $\sqrt{.9}$. The second p-value refers to the overidentifying restrictions test.

Table 3. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

	Semi-annual Discount Factor	Standard Error	p-value Ho: $\beta = \sqrt{.9}$
(0) Benchmark: i.i.d. shocks, $r = 5\%$, $\rho = 2$, $\sigma_v = .46$, $\sigma_{\ln \mu} = .35$ and $\eta = 0$ Agents perfectly forecast transfers for next year and expect to remain constant Control and treatment do not anticipate the program	0.50	0.14	0.00
(1) Std. Deviation of Transitory Shocks $\sigma_v = .2$	0.61	0.08	0.00
(2) Income Differences Assume aver. income treatment 5% lower than aver. income control	0.66	0.07	0.00
(3) Macro Shocks Assume aver. income 5% lower in 2nd and 3rd semesters	0.64	0.03	0.00
(4) Myopic Agents expect future transfers to remain constant at current levels	0.81	0.06	0.01
(5) Anticipation Treatment Treatment anticipates participation one semester before receive transfers	0.79	0.06	0.00


Note: The table presents estimates of the semi-annual discount factor for an annual interest rate of 5% and risk aversion of 2. For all estimates except (4), the mean of permanent income is estimated jointly with the discount factor. For estimate (4), the mean of log permanent income is assumed to be 7.3, which corresponds to an average ratio of transfers to income of .2. The exercise assumes that families perfectly foresee transfers for the next year. The sample containing transfers and family size is the balanced sample of 9,397 eligible households and I draw 50 simulation draws for each household. The p-value reported refers to the one-sided test that the semi-annual discount factor is $\sqrt{.9}$.

Figure 1: Simulated Treatment Effects by Discount Factor



Note: The figure plots the simulated treatment effects on log consumption for each semester as a function of the semi-annual discount factor assuming an interest rate of 5%, a risk aversion parameter of 2 and mean log permanent income of 7.3. The simulation uses data on the actual transfers and simulates the initial asset distribution as a function of the parameters of the model.

Figure 2: Treatment Effects Over Time



Note: The figure plots the simulated treatment effects on log consumption as a function of the semester of the program for different semi-annual discount factors (β) assuming an interest rate of 5%, a risk aversion parameter of 2 and mean log permanent income of 7.3. The simulation uses data of the actual transfers and simulates the initial asset distribution as a function of the parameters of the model.

Appendix Table 1. TRANSFERS

Panel A. Average Transfers				
	Unadjusted		Adjusted	
	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment
May98-Oct98	-	386	-	392
Nov98-Apr99	-	1,056	-	970
May99-Oct99	-	1,305	-	1,147
Nov99-Apr00	716	1,495	592	1,244
May00-Oct00	1,415	1,682	1,140	1,355
Nov00-Apr01	1,555	1,586	1,202	1,226
May01-Oct01	1,820	1,870	1,381	1,419

Panel B. Average Positive Transfers				
	Unadjusted		Adjusted	
	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment
May98-Oct98	-	428	-	434
Nov98-Apr99	-	1,147	-	1,054
May99-Oct99	-	1,436	-	1,261
Nov99-Apr00	718	1,605	593	1,335
May00-Oct00	1,532	1,834	1,234	1,478
Nov00-Apr01	1,719	1,793	1,329	1,386
May01-Oct01	2,042	2,159	1,550	1,638

Note: The Unadjusted column shows average nominal transfers per household in pesos. The Adjusted column shows average real transfers per household deflated bimonthly to Sep/Oct 98 prices using national CPI. Panel A shows average transfers for the entire sample. Panel B shows average transfers for households that received transfers.

Appendix Table 2. PARAMETERS of INCOME PROCESS

Variable	Income Process				
	i.i.d.	AR(1) $\eta = .25$	AR(1) $\eta = .5$	MA(1) $\eta = .25$	MA(1) $\eta = .5$
Std. Deviation of Transitory Shocks	0.4594	0.5086	0.5509	0.5047	0.5253
Std. Deviation of Permanent Component	0.3494	0.2822	0	0.2880	0.1929


Note: The table shows the estimated parameters of the income process for the cases in which transitory shocks are either i.i.d., autoregressive of order 1 or follow a moving average of order 1. For AR(1) and MA(1), the parameters are estimated conditional on the value of η , the parameter that governs the serial correlation.

Appendix Table 3. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

	Semi-annual Discount Factor	Standard Error	p-value Ho: $\beta = \sqrt{.9}$
(0) Benchmark:			
i.i.d. shocks, $r = 5\%$, $\rho = 2$, $\sigma_v = .46$, $\sigma_{\ln\mu} = .35$ and $\eta = 0$			
Forward-looking expectations regarding transfers Control and treatment do not anticipate the program Treatment expects to receive transfers for 3 years	0.50	0.14	0.00
(1) Std. Deviation of Permanent Income			
$\sigma_{\ln\mu} = .15$	0.50	0.14	0.00
(2) Pessimistic			
Agents expect to receive no future transfers	0.39	0.10	0.00
(3) Anticipation Control			
Control anticipates participation as treatment is enrolled	0.49	0.12	0.00
(4) Duration			
Treatment expects to receive transfers for 2 years	0.48	0.12	0.00
(5) AR(1)			
AR(1) shocks, $\sigma_v = .51$, $\sigma_{\ln\mu} = .28$ and $\eta = .25$	0.48	0.12	0.00
(6) AR(1)			
AR(1) shocks, $\sigma_v = .46$, $\sigma_{\ln\mu} = 0$ and $\eta = .5$	0.47	0.11	0.00
(7) MA(1)			
MA(1) shocks, $\sigma_v = .50$, $\sigma_{\ln\mu} = .29$ and $\eta = .25$	0.47	0.11	0.00
(8) MA(1)			
MA(1) shocks, $\sigma_v = .52$, $\sigma_{\ln\mu} = .19$ and $\eta = .5$	0.44	0.12	0.00

Note: The table presents estimates of the semi-annual discount factor for an annual interest rate of 5% and risk aversion of 2. For all estimates except (2), the mean of permanent income is estimated jointly with the discount factor. For estimate (2), the mean of log permanent income is assumed to be 7.3, which permanent component equal to .35. The sample containing transfers and family size is the balanced sample of 9,397 eligible corresponds to an average ratio of transfers to income of .2. The income process is assumed to be i.i.d with the standard deviation of shocks being equal to .46 and the standard deviation of the permanent component equal to .35. The sample containing transfers and family size is the balanced sample of 9,397 eligible households and I draw 50 simulation draws for each household. The p-value reported refers to the one-sided test that the semi-annual discount factor is $\sqrt{.9}$.

Appendix Figure 1: Simulated Initial Asset Distribution



Note: The figure plots the simulated initial asset distribution for different semi-annual discount factors (β) assuming an interest rate of 5% and a risk aversion parameter of 2.