The War on Terrorism
Phase II: Home and Abroad

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Congressional Resource Package
(Far left cover photo) A New York City firefighter looks up at what remains of the World Trade Center Sept. 13, 2001, after its collapse following the Sept. 11 terrorist attack. (U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Jim Watson) -Photo provided courtesy of DoD

(Far right cover photo) A Light Armored Reconnaissance scout section leader stands fast as U.S. Marines dismount to check the area after a fire fight at Kandahar International Airport, Afghanistan. (Photo by Sgt. Thomas Michael Corcoran, USMC) -Photo provided courtesy of DoD.
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Introduction

In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush put in place a new organizational structure for ensuring the security of the American homeland. By executive order, he created within the White House an Office of Homeland Security, to be headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The President also established a new interagency coordinating body, the Homeland Security Council. The importance the President accords this new organization is evident in his placing it in the Executive Office of the President and in his giving cabinet rank to its director. He also chose a personal friend, Pennsylvania’s Governor Tom Ridge, to head the office. Governor Ridge will have a deputy and some 120 staff members, drawn primarily from the agencies currently involved in homeland security.

Coordinating the executive branch’s many largely autonomous departments and agencies has historically been an enormous challenge, and the integration of domestic and national security policies has been particularly problematic. Thus, designing an organizational structure to coordinate homeland security activities is not only a difficult intellectual task, it also calls for many hard choices, since more than 40 national security and domestic departments and agencies are involved. The experiences of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) attest to these difficulties, as do the divergent recommendations of the various commissions that have called for reforms in the governmental processes for countering terrorism and providing homeland security.¹

¹Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction [known as the Gilmore Commission], Second Annual Report, Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, December 15, 2000; The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century [known as the
President Bush chose to model the new organization after the National Security Council (NSC), although he opted to constitute the staff as a new office and to give it enhanced budget responsibilities. The mandate of the new organization is carefully circumscribed to involve only coordination, leaving unaltered the existing authorities of the operating departments and agencies.

This issue paper discusses the critical issues involved in designing the homeland security organization and in achieving its goals. It first compares existing coordinating organizations responsible for national security, economics, intelligence, and drug control. Next, it presents the restructuring recommendations of three commissions and a nongovernmental group. Each of these recognized the need to integrate foreign and domestic counterterrorism activities, but they disagreed on whether to rely on the current NSC organization or create a new coordinating process. They assigned different priorities to changing current budgetary practices, and they also disagreed on the need for consolidating some of the operating homeland security agencies and offices.

This issue paper then describes in some detail the responsibilities of the new homeland security organization. Particularly striking is the minimalist character of the responsibilities defined in the executive order, in view of the extraordinary challenge ahead. Congressional views on the appropriate structure of a homeland security organization are also emerging, and these too are described. Not surprisingly, the focus of Congress has largely been on assuring its own statutory and budget prerogatives. The paper concludes by offering suggestions about how the new homeland security organization should proceed on some of the most critical issues that it will confront.

**Historical Coordinating Models**

A variety of coordinating models have developed within the White House staff. They tend to differ in the characteristics of their processes, the nature of their budgetary authorities, and their statutory foundation. President Bush clearly drew on the following three models in designing his new homeland security organization.

**The NSC and NEC**

The NSC was originally created as part of the 1947 National Security Act to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and to facilitate interagency cooperation. The act created an Executive Secretary and a small permanent staff. During the Eisenhower administration, the Executive Secretary position evolved into that of National Security Advisor, more formally titled the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

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Security Affairs. Over time, the coordinating and advising functions have shifted from the National Security Advisor to the NSC staff, which has grown to more than 100 members. While forsaking any operational roles, the National Security Advisor has in practice regularly undertaken such tasks, including highly sensitive diplomatic negotiations. As a matter of tradition and principle, the National Security Advisor is the President’s personal adviser and does not receive Senate confirmation. The incumbents have regularly met privately with members of Congress, but they do not testify publicly.

Each new administration defines its own NSC structure of interagency groups. For example, a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure, and Counterterrorism was established in the late 1990s to give priority to these transnational issues. Among other responsibilities, the Coordinator was to develop counterterrorism initiatives through an interagency process and, with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to ensure that the counterterrorism programs and budgets in the federal departments and agencies meet the President’s overall counterterrorism objectives.

Presidents have found particularly challenging the task of coordinating and integrating policies involving national security, international economics, and domestic economics. While closely related, these areas have traditionally been the purview of separate White House staffs with different coordinating mandates and overlapping responsibilities. Recognizing the need for a more structured interagency process, President Clinton in 1993 established by executive order the National Economic Council (NEC), along with a new Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs. He modeled the processes on those of the NSC and charged the NEC with coordinating domestic and international economic policies. Integration with national security policies was to be achieved by overlapping membership in the NEC and NSC, as well as by the sharing of the international economics staffs. The Bush administration took the further integrating steps of making the Secretary of the Treasury a full member of the NSC and appointing a single person to be the Deputy to both the National Security Advisor and the NEC Director.

The Director of Central Intelligence

The 1947 National Security Act gave the DCI responsibility for “coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security.” The DCI was also made Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Concurrently, the President designated the DCI as his principal foreign-intelligence adviser. The responsibilities of the DCI have expanded over time, most importantly in 1992, when Congress for the first time defined the “intelligence community” in law and codified many of the DCI’s specific authorities. These responsibilities included creating a centralized process for establishing requirements and priorities for intelligence collection and analysis; developing and presenting to the President and Congress an annual budget for national foreign-intelligence activities; concurring in any reprogramming of agency budgets; and consulting on appointments of the

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defense intelligence agencies. The DCI’s Community Management Staff assists him in managing intelligence-community resources and collection requirements. The history of the DCI demonstrates the difficulties of trying to coordinate intelligence activities without direct control over the operations and budgets of the other intelligence agencies, especially those of DoD, which consumes some 85 percent of the intelligence budget. There is a constant tension between the DCI, who is responsible for producing independent and objective national intelligence, setting intelligence requirements, and producing an overall national intelligence budget, and the departments and agencies that are required to cooperate in this effort.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy

Congress created the ONDCP as part of the Executive Office of the President in 1988. That legislation and subsequent amendments gave the ONDCP Director broad responsibility for directing and coordinating the nation’s drug policy. The ONDCP Director, who is confirmed by the Senate, is required to set priorities and objectives annually for accomplishing the President’s antidrug goals. The central vehicle for carrying out this responsibility is the National Drug Control Strategy. Each year, the ONDCP must prepare this strategy for submission by the President to Congress. The ONDCP must also define in a federal drug-control budget the necessary resources to implement the strategy. Toward that end, all federal departments and agencies must submit their drug budget requests to the ONDCP at the same time they submit them to their superiors and before transmitting them to OMB. The Director must certify in writing as to the adequacy of the requests and can direct an agency or department to add resources or programs to its OMB budget submission. The ONDCP must approve any reprogramming request of more than $5 million and can request reprogramming itself.

The National Drug Control Strategy provides the ONDCP Director with a platform for highlighting priorities and the interrelationships among various antidrug programs, but it is not a vehicle for actually coordinating the various antidrug activities. The ONDCP Director has relatively limited authority to carry out his budgetary responsibilities: The ONDCP issues budget guidance, repeating the priorities outlined in the strategy, but does not specify what funds will be available. That is the responsibility of OMB. Although the legislation requires review of the drug-control budget at three stages—program, agency, and department—the ONDCP has historically not required the program-level submission, waiting instead until later in the process to review the agency budgets. Following agency review, the ONDCP Director certifies the adequacy of the budget submissions for carrying out the strategy objectives. However, in more than ten years, the Director has decertified a submission only once, the DoD’s submission in 1997. DoD and the ONDCP subsequently negotiated changes to the request. The ONDCP

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3 Preparing for the 21st Century, Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, March 1, 1996, pp. 48–49. Within the purview of the DCI today are the intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Departments of State, Energy, and Treasury; and the multiple elements of the Department of Defense (DoD).

4 For a discussion of the organizational dynamics, see Preparing for the 21st Century, pp. 49–51.
participates in the final OMB budget review, but at this stage, it is too late for the Director to do more than raise a few issues with the President.\(^5\)

**Summary of Historical Coordinating Models**

The three models differ in their organizational characteristics. See Table 1 for a summary of the coordinating models. The NSC and NEC involve a formal interagency process under the leadership of a personal adviser to the President. The DCI is also a presidential adviser, but his coordinating role is less formal. The ONDCP Director directs a White House office but not a formal interagency process. Both the DCI and the ONDCP Director have statutorily based budget authorities, although their actual influence is seriously constrained by the budget powers that reside in OMB and various other departments and agencies.

History demonstrates how difficult it is to coordinate the activities of the many executive branch departments and agencies. There is constant tension between the coordinator’s enumerated responsibilities and limited means. Neither presidents nor department heads have been willing to cede any real authority. It is also clear that the organizational characteristics are only one factor determining whether the coordinator is successful. Policy and bureaucratic imperatives play a critical role, as do personalities and leadership skills. Perhaps most important is the degree of personal presidential engagement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>White House Coordinating Organization</th>
<th>Budget Responsibility</th>
<th>Basis of Authorities</th>
<th>Senate Confirmation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSC Assistant to President; Council</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC Assistant to President; Council</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Executive Order</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI “Principal Foreign Intelligence Adviser”; Community Management Staff</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONDCP Director</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 = baseline budget authority; + = slightly enhanced budget authority; ++ = greater budget authority.

\(^5\) For a discussion of the ONDCP’s statutory and budget authorities, see Patrick Murphy, Lynn E. Davis, Timothy Liston, David Thaler, and Kathi Webb, Improving Anti-Drug Budgeting, RAND, 2000, pp. 5–15. See also, United States General Accounting Office, Drug Control ONDCP Efforts to Manage the National Drug Control Budget, May 1999.
Commission Recommendations

A variety of nongovernmental groups have addressed the issue of reorganizing the executive branch to provide for homeland security. They all see the need for better coordination among the multiple departments and agencies and for integrating foreign and domestic activities. But they have presented very different recommendations for organizational reform.

A table summarizing the commission recommendations, homeland security organization, and congressional views is given in the Appendix.

The Gilmore Commission

The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known as the Gilmore Commission, found that the “United States has no coherent, functional national strategy for combating terrorism . . . [and] that the organization of the Federal government’s programs is fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically unaccountable.”6 The commission called for “establishment of a senior level coordination entity in the Executive Office of the President, [to be] entitled the ‘National Office for Combating Terrorism,’ with responsibility for developing domestic and international policy and for coordinating the program and budget of the Federal government’s activities for combating terrorism.” The “foremost” responsibility of the office would be the development of a comprehensive national strategy. The office would also coordinate both foreign and domestic terrorism–related intelligence activities, assuming “many” of the NSC interagency coordinating functions. The commission recommended that to achieve political accountability and responsibility, the Senate should confirm the director of the new office, who would serve in a cabinet-level position.7

To ensure that the new office would have sufficient resources to carry out the national strategy, the commission recommended that it be given “specific limited program and budget control over activities for combating terrorism within the relevant Federal departments and agencies.” The responsibilities and authorities would include the conduct of a “full review of Federal agency programs and budgets to ensure compliance with the programmatic and funding priorities established in the approved national strategy and to eliminate conflicts and unnecessary duplication among agencies.” The commission also recommended that the new office be given responsibility to provide Congress with comprehensive information, along with a complete description and justification of each program, coupled with current and proposed out-year expenditures. Finally, according to the commission, the resource allocation process should “include a structured certification/decertification process to formally ‘decertify’ all or part of an

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7 See Gilmore Commission (2000), pp. 7–14, for the strategic and organizational recommendations. The Gilmore Commission did not include critical infrastructure protection within “the purview of direct responsibilities in the National Office for Combating Terrorism. The nature of the threats to our critical infrastructure and the processes required to defend against and mitigate attacks are much broader than terrorism” (p. 42).
agency’s budget as noncompliant with the national strategy.” The decertified agency would then have the choice of revising its budget or appealing the decision to the President.8

These budgetary proposals clearly grow out of an appreciation of the difficulties experienced in past efforts to coordinate executive branch activities in the absence of budgetary authority. The commission, however, also limited the power of the new office: It would “not have a ‘veto’ over all or part of any agency’s budget, or the authority to redirect funds within an agency or among agencies.”9 In addition, the commission stated that the office’s authorities “are not intended to supplant or usurp the authorities of OMB.”10

The Hart-Rudman Commission

The Commission on National Security/21st Century, known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, shared the view that the government’s structures and strategies for preventing and protecting against attacks on the American homeland are “fragmented and inadequate,” and it called upon the President to develop a “comprehensive strategy.” Such a strategy would include counterterrorism and nonproliferation activities, intelligence and law-enforcement activities, and critical-infrastructure protection, as well as domestic preparedness and consequence management.11 The commission concluded that the NSC “would still play a strategic role in planning and coordinating all homeland security activities.”12 The Clinton administration’s initiative to include the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services in NSC discussions, along with the designation of an NSC National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure, and Counterterrorism, provided a point of departure.

The commission, concerned that homeland security activities are spread across many agencies, called for the establishment of an independent National Homeland Security Agency “with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should be a key building block in this effort.” According to the commission, “someone needs to be responsible and accountable to the President not only to coordinate the making of policy, but also to oversee its detailed implementation. . . . To give this agency sufficient stature within the government, its director would be a member of the Cabinet and a statutory advisor to the National Security Council. The position would require Senate confirmation.”13

The agency would include the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard, while “preserving them as distinct entities.”14 At present, the Coast Guard is part of the Department of

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8 The budget proposals are found in Gilmore Commission (2000), pp. 8–9, 12.
9 Ibid., p. 12.
10 Ibid., p. 15.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
Transportation, the Customs Service is located in the Department of the Treasury, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service oversees the Border Patrol in the Department of Justice. In the commission’s view, the agendas of these services currently tend to receive only limited attention within the departments, and little effort is made to integrate their activities.\(^{15}\) The commission also proposed creating a Directorate for Critical Infrastructure Protection as an integral part of its recommended new National Homeland Security Agency, which would consolidate certain FBI and Department of Commerce offices.\(^{16}\) Finally, the new agency, working with state officials, the emergency-management community, and the law-enforcement community, would be responsible for rationalizing and refining the nation’s incident-response system, to include both crisis and consequence management.\(^{17}\)

**The National Commission on Terrorism**

The National Commission on Terrorism focused primarily on defining the elements of a successful national counterterrorism strategy and the need to coordinate the activities of the intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. It also made some suggestions for governmental reform. It was particularly concerned that no specific counterterrorism budget existed and that the person on the NSC staff responsible for coordinating counterterrorism programs had no role in the “critical step when the Office of Management and Budget . . . decides what agencies’ programs will be funded at what levels.” The commission recommended that the President require the OMB Director and the NSC Coordinator to “agree on all budget guidance to the agencies, including the response to initial budget submissions, and both officials should be involved in presenting agencies’ counterterrorism budget appeals to the President.”\(^{18}\)

**CSIS Working Groups**

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a series of working groups to assess the nature of the terrorist threats to the American homeland. These working groups described the need for a national plan “to cover all details of the nation’s defense against terrorists, as well as plans for critical infrastructure protection.”\(^{19}\) In a brief discussion of the government’s organization, they recommended that “the President make the Vice President responsible for most aspects of homeland defense.” The Vice President would chair a new National Emergency Planning Council that would include representatives from all federal departments and agencies as well as the states and private corporations. He would be assisted by an “Emergency Planning Staff” headed by the NSC National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure, and Counterterrorism, who would also remain a member of the NSC staff. The

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15 Ibid. In contrast, and following the September 11 attacks, the Gilmore Commission called for the “Office of Homeland Security to create an intergovernmental border advisory group with representatives from the responsible Federal agencies and with State, local, and private sector representatives from jurisdictions with significant ports of entry.” Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction [the Gilmore Commission], III. For Ray Downey, December 15, 2001, p. 36.
16 Hart-Rudman Commission, pp. 18–19.
17 Ibid., p. 19.
18 National Commission on Terrorism, p. 34.
19 CSIS Working Groups, pp. 9, 13.
FEMA Director would report through the NSC Coordinator to the Vice President. Both the FEMA Director and the NSC Coordinator would be confirmable by the U.S. Senate.\textsuperscript{20}

The CSIS working groups recommended that the NSC Coordinator, “in conjunction with OMB, should assess the budgetary programs of federal agencies for homeland defense,” in order to create annual budgets that would support the major objectives of the national homeland defense plans. No changes would be made in the principal department responsibilities, in counterterrorism or counterintelligence operations, or in the FBI and Department of Commerce infrastructure offices. FEMA would, however, be augmented with additional personnel as well as administrative support and would be given responsibility for some Department of Justice training and preparedness activities.\textsuperscript{21}

**Summary of Commission Recommendations**

The Hart-Rudman Commission and the National Commission on Terrorism left overall White House coordinating responsibility with the NSC and the NSC staff. The Gilmore Commission supported the need for a new office in the White House. It did not include in its recommendations a formal counterterrorism interagency coordinating process involving all the federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities. The CSIS working groups recommended a hybrid approach in which the Vice President, assisted by a new council and new staff, would be given coordinating responsibility. State governors and private corporations would be members of the council.

All the commissions recommended that the White House coordinating entity be given responsibility for integrating both international and domestic activities.

The Hart-Rudman Commission and the CSIS working groups were generally comfortable with the current NSC and OMB budgetary processes, while the National Terrorism Commission focused on enhancing the NSC role somewhat. The Gilmore Commission recommended an expanded budget role for the new office, with authorities similar to those of the ONDCP Director. Both the Hart-Rudman Commission and the CSIS working groups recommended steps to consolidate some homeland security operations within an expanded FEMA.

**Roles and Responsibilities of the Homeland Security Organization\textsuperscript{22}**

**The Homeland Security Office**

The mandate of the new Office of Homeland Security created by executive order in October 2001 covers “efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 13–14.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., pp. 14–15.
\textsuperscript{22} See White House, Executive Order 13228, “Establishing Office of Homeland Security,” October 8, 2001, for a description of the functions and responsibilities of the three parts of the homeland security organization.
terrorist attacks within the United States” (emphasis added). The responsibilities involve coordination of “Executive branch efforts” across a wide range of federal activities. The executive order, however, is somewhat ambiguous concerning whether the office’s coordinating responsibilities extend to the activities of state and local government agencies. The order first states that in carrying out its functions, the office is to “encourage and invite the participation of State and local governments and private entities.” Later it requires the office to coordinate “national” efforts to mitigate the consequences of terrorist threats or attacks within the United States by “working with Federal, State, and local agencies and private entities.”

The office’s domestic antiterrorist activities are divided into these functions:

- Identification of priorities for collection and analysis of information on terrorist threats.
- Preparation for and mitigation of the consequences of terrorist threats or attacks.
- Protection of the critical U.S. infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks.
- Prevention of terrorist attacks.
- Response to and promotion of recovery from terrorist threats or attacks.
- Review of legal authorities and development of legislative proposals to carry out antiterrorism goals.

But even as the office’s functions are delineated, it is mandated to share responsibility with others. To ensure the adequacy of a comprehensive national strategy, the office is to work with the executive departments and agencies, state and local governments, and private entities; it must then periodically “review and coordinate” revisions. The office is to work with the National Security Advisor to identify priorities for intelligence collection outside the United States, improve security of U.S. borders, territorial waters, and airspace, and provide ready federal response teams. Working with the NEC, it is to coordinate efforts to stabilize financial markets after a terrorist attack.

The executive order gives the responsibility for coordinating “efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks.” Its mandate is broad, including energy production, telecommunications, information systems, food and water supply, and transportation systems. Since President Bush separately issued an executive order creating a new President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, it is unclear how this will be achieved in practice. In cooperation with the private sector and state and local governments, the board will “coordinate programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure” (emphasis added)\(^{23}\). It will consist of representatives of all the departments and White House offices involved in counterterrorism activities and will be chaired by a Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security. This new adviser will report to both the Assistant to the President for National Security and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and will have a separate staff within the White House office.

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The executive order setting up the Critical Infrastructure Protection Board defines its responsibilities to include those functions that “were assigned to the Office of Homeland Security” relating to “the protection of and recovery from attacks against information systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications.” It then states that the Assistants to the President for Homeland Security and National Security Affairs shall together define the board’s responsibilities for protecting the physical assets that support the information systems. No mention is made of where responsibilities for protecting the physical infrastructure itself will reside. By implication, this function remains with the Homeland Security Office, and the Homeland Security Council has in fact set up policy coordinating committees for key asset, border, territorial waters, and airspace security and domestic transportation security.

The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security

The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security has individual responsibilities that are generally shared with others. He is “primarily” responsible for coordinating the domestic response to terrorist attacks within the United States and is to be the “principal point of contact for and to the President” with respect to coordination of such efforts, while coordinating with the National Security Advisor “as appropriate.” This language appears to reflect the important roles that others, including FEMA and the state and local governments, will play. Most critically, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security is to consult with the OMB Director and the heads of executive departments and agencies in the development of the President’s budget. His actual budget responsibilities are carefully delimited to include only:

- Identifying programs that contribute to the administration’s homeland security strategy.
- Advising the heads of departments and agencies on such programs.
- Providing advice to the OMB Director on the level and use of funding in the executive branch for homeland-security–related activities.
- Certifying to the OMB Director the funding levels “necessary and appropriate for homeland-security-related activities,” prior to the transmission of the proposed annual budget to the President.

The Homeland Security Council

The Homeland Security Council is responsible for “advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security” and is to serve as the “mechanism” for ensuring coordination of these activities among the executive departments and agencies, as well as for effectively developing and implementing homeland security policies. The executive order also specifies different categories of council participants. Like the National Security Advisor, the

24 The Assistants for National Security Affairs and Homeland Security are also to coordinate efforts to ensure the continuity of the federal government in the event of terrorist attack.
25 The council will have eleven “members,” including the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. Also “invited to attend any Council meeting” are the chiefs of staff of the President and Vice President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Counsel to the President, and the OMB Director. Others “shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities,” with the Secretary of State included in this category, along with nine persons from the domestic agencies and White House staff.
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security will have responsibility for determining the agenda, ensuring the preparation of the necessary papers, and recording council actions and presidential decisions. The Homeland Security Council has also put in place interagency coordinating committees at different levels in the government. The executive order concludes by directing that the departments and agencies assist the Homeland Security Council and the Assistant to the President, while it clearly states that “this order does not alter the existing authorities of the United States Government departments and agencies.”

Summary of Roles and Responsibilities of the Homeland Security Organization

The mandate of the Office of Homeland Security covers only terrorism in the United States, far narrower than what its title might suggest. The office is not responsible for other potential threats to the security of Americans at home, such as drug smuggling. While called upon to improve the security of U.S. borders, territorial waters, and airspace, the office appears to have no role in missile or other kinds of active defenses. For activities with multiple purposes, such as emergency planning and response, a strict reading of the executive order would give the office responsibility for only those that involve terrorism. The office has no role in the international aspects of combating terrorism, despite their inextricable connection to terrorism within the United States. Its functions are further delimited by multiple and complex requirements for coordinating with other White House staff.

The President diluted the responsibilities of the Homeland Security Council for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure by creating a separate coordinating entity for a critical component—information systems—and dispersing responsibilities among three White House staffs. The budget authorities of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security are somewhat greater than those of the National Security Advisor, but they are far less than those of the ONDCP Director. The President was also careful not to diminish the authority of the OMB Director.

Nevertheless, Governor Ridge brings to his task what may be his most important assets: strong presidential support and the American public’s appreciation of the seriousness of the terrorist threat. This could well make up for the lack of the historical foundation enjoyed by the NSC or the statutory foundation of the DCI and the ONDCP Director.

Congressional Views and Issues

26 See Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, October 29, 2001, for the organization and operation of the Homeland Security Council. It will include a Homeland Security Council Principals Committee as well as eleven Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination Committees covering these functional areas: detection, surveillance, and intelligence; plans, training, exercises, and evaluation; law enforcement and investigation; weapons of mass destruction consequence management; key asset, border, territorial waters, and airspace security; domestic transportation security; research and development; medical and public health preparedness; domestic threat response and incident management; economic consequences; and public affairs.

27 The language of the executive order leaves some ambiguity when it makes the Homeland Security Council “responsible for advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security,” without any further qualification. It would, however, make little sense to have different mandates for the office and the council.
Since the September terrorist attacks, congressional attention has focused largely on the organization of the executive branch and on ensuring its own prerogatives. Congress has given very little attention to its own structure for providing oversight of homeland security activities.

**Organization of the Executive Branch**

Bills to reorganize the executive branch have been introduced in both the Senate and the House. Following the Gilmore Commission’s recommendations, a number of senators and congressmen have called for the establishment, by statute, of an office in the Executive Office of the President, with a director to be confirmed by the Senate. Still another group of legislators seeks the establishment of a new department or agency, along the lines recommended by the Hart-Rudman Commission. But by adopting these recommendations rather than crafting proposals in response to President Bush’s new homeland security organization, Congress has created confusion as to what is at issue. The choice is not between a White House homeland security office and a homeland security agency. Those who support a new office believe that responsibility for “coordinating” homeland security activities should not reside with the NSC. So one choice is that of where to locate coordinating responsibility within the White House. Another choice is whether some homeland security “operations” should be consolidated into a new agency. It is possible to support both a new homeland security office and a homeland security agency, one but not the other, or neither.

These congressional bills raise some other issues as well. One is the issue of whether the head of the homeland security office should receive Senate confirmation, as the ONDCP and OMB directors do. With Senate confirmation comes congressional testimony and public accountability. President Bush chose instead the model of the National Security Advisor, whereby the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security will be a private presidential confidant. Members of Congress can be expected to question why the American people should not hold publicly accountable a figure as important as this or why he should be available to answer the questions of the media but not those of Congress.

Those in Congress favoring the creation of a dedicated White House counterterrorism or homeland security office are also interested in giving it a statutory foundation. Whether such a step would enhance the influence of the office is a matter of debate. What is really at stake is the nature of its responsibilities. The congressional bills could be interpreted as expanding their offices’ responsibilities beyond those given to the Office of Homeland Security, possibly including foreign as well as domestic activities. For example, H.R. 3026 calls for the new office

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30 This confusion results in part from the broad language in the bill establishing a new homeland security agency, which calls upon the director to “plan, coordinate, and integrate those United States government activities relating to homeland security, including border security and emergency preparedness” (H.R. 1158). Similar language appears in S. 1534.
to coordinate the “planning and implementation of all Federal homeland security activities.” The responsibilities proposed in S. 1449 cover “the prevention of and response to terrorism.”

Perhaps the most critical issue to Congress is what budget authorities should reside in the new White House office. Presently, the individual departments and agencies have extraordinary powers. The President, through the OMB staff, can provide overall direction by setting fiscal guidance and singling out priority programs. He becomes personally involved in only a few disputed issues. Although counterterrorism activities now have high priority, the President has decided that the traditional budgetary process is adequate and will not be changed in any significant way. This is not surprising—presidents have historically been very reluctant to reduce the OMB role or to establish duplicate White House budgetary staffs. But in this case, the more important consideration was probably that of avoiding the separation of the foreign and domestic counterterrorism budgets, even though interagency coordinating responsibilities are split.

The congressional bills give their new White House offices broad budgetary responsibilities, but the language leaves many uncertainties as to what those responsibilities would actually amount to in practice. H.R. 1158 has the office “developing, reviewing, and approving, in collaboration with the OMB Director, a national budget for homeland security.” S. 1534 gives the office responsibility to “coordinate the development of a comprehensive annual budget for the programs and activities under the [National Terrorism Prevention and Response] Strategy, including the budgets of the military departments and agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program relating to international terrorism.”

What would enable the Office of Homeland Security to play a more significant role in the budget process? The experiences of the DCI and ONDCP directors suggest that the relationship between the homeland security director and OMB will be most critical, not whether the authorities are established in statute. Governor Ridge would need to be responsible for defining a baseline budget for domestic counterterrorism, signing off on the methodologies agencies use to define the programs to be included in their budget submissions, and establishing overall fiscal guidance for the programs and budgets in each of the relevant federal departments and agencies. He would be involved in the early phases of their budgetary processes, rather than waiting until fall. He would be able to suggest alternative departmental programs and expenditures and to take any disputes directly to the President. The homeland security director would also need to be able to reprogram funds within the departments and agencies over the course of the year and would therefore need a staff of budget examiners and programmers along with substantive experts. He would, in effect, replace OMB for the domestic counterterrorism budget and would carry out a parallel but similar budget process. The President, then, would be required to institute an entirely new White House process for integrating the foreign and domestic counterterrorism budgets.

Congress has also addressed whether steps should be taken to consolidate homeland security operations, as it did in the 1970s, when it established the Drug Enforcement Administration. This act consolidated within the Justice Department all federal domestic and international anti–drug-
trafficking and enforcement activities. A variety of homeland security operations are potential candidates for consolidation; Congress has so far focused on two of them—border security and critical infrastructure protection.

One organizational issue raised by border security is where to draw the line, if consolidation is to be pursued, since enforcement activities exist in a variety of departments, including Transportation, Treasury, Justice, Defense, and Agriculture. Another issue is whether to create an entirely new agency or transfer these operations to FEMA. Congressional bills S. 1534 and H.R. 1158 transfer to FEMA as distinct entities only the Border Patrol, Customs Service, and Coast Guard. So far, the Bush administration has not taken a position on these issues.

Protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure raises perhaps the most difficult organizational challenge. The central issue is how to define the respective responsibilities of the White House coordinating staffs and the operating agencies in the federal government. Because of the potential vulnerabilities of the supporting information systems and their largely private ownership, pressures have mounted to centralize activities in the White House. President Bush’s approach, including the establishment of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, suggests that such centralization will continue. The congressional bills establishing a new homeland security department or agency favor a more decentralized approach, whereby an operating agency would be responsible for many of the coordinating activities.

Congressional Oversight

After the September terrorist attacks, the House transformed the Speaker’s Working Group on Terrorism into a regular subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. A bill (S.R. 165) has been introduced in the Senate to create a Select Committee on Homeland Security and Terrorism. Otherwise, Congress has been noticeably silent with respect to reform of its own homeland security organization, which today involves some two dozen congressional committees, many with overlapping jurisdictions. This is perhaps not surprising, given the inherent nature of power in Congress and the failure of many past efforts at reform. Since there is no consensus as to what should be done either in or outside of Congress, this issue remains very much on the agenda.

Issues Facing the New Homeland Security Organization

31 For a brief history of the Drug Enforcement Administration, see http://www.mninter.net/~publish/deahist.htm.
32 This pattern of increasing centralization began in 1997 when the NSC took responsibility for implementing the recommendations of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
33 The Gilmore Commission called for the establishment of a Special Committee for Combating Terrorism, “either a joint committee between the Houses or separate committees in each House” (2000, p. 17). The Hart-Rudman Commission recommended the establishment of a “special body to deal with homeland security issues,” but this body “would have neither a legislative nor an oversight mandate, and it would not eclipse the authority of any standing committee” (pp. 27–28). The National Commission on Terrorism urged “Congress to consider holding joint hearings of two or more committees on counterterrorism matters” (p. 35). The objective of Congressional reform for the CSIS working groups was “for each legislative body to have only one authorization and one appropriations committee for cyber threats, [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives] terrorism, and critical infrastructure protection” (pp. 14–15).
Now that the Homeland Security Council and Office are in place, it is time to consider the most critical issues they will face. Some issues will arise as a result of the organizational model that was chosen; others will emerge as the council and office seek to carry out their substantive responsibilities. Historical experience and the insights of past commissions may prove useful in dealing with all of these issues.

**Coordinating Responsibilities**

The Office of Homeland Security can succeed in carrying out its functions only if it finds ways to translate its various coordinating responsibilities into practice. It will not be enough for the Homeland Security Council to meet or for the agencies simply to report on their plans and activities. A process needs to be introduced whereby the individual agencies share information prior to their decisions and take the advice of others. This in turn will require the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General, among others, to yield some of their existing power and independence.

The history of the NSC and the NEC suggests that this will not be easy. It took years for the NSC to succeed in coordinating DoD activities with other NSC members, and even today it has little role in DoD planning or budgeting. The NEC has had even less success in coordinating financial and trade policies where the Treasury Department and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative have the lead. The lesson of these experiences is that coordination can be achieved only when the President becomes personally involved or when a department recognizes that its own interests will otherwise be put in jeopardy. The organizational structure recently implemented to prevent terrorists from entering the United States is unfortunate in this respect. Instead of turning to the Office of Homeland Security to coordinate the various federal efforts, as stipulated in its executive order, the President asked the Attorney General to create a new Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force whose director would report to the Deputy Attorney General and “serve as a Senior Advisor to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.”

**Homeland Security Operations**

By its constant repetition of the word “coordinate,” the executive order leaves no doubt as to the mandate of the Office of Homeland Security. But there is often a very fine line between coordination and operations, and strong pressures will develop—indeed they are already evident—for the office to take on operational responsibilities. This will especially be the case when departments and agencies are perceived to be acting either independently or ineffectively and also during crises and military engagements, when the political stakes are high. The Bush administration, in making the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security its public spokesman during the anthrax scare, took a major step toward an operational role. The more Governor Ridge accedes to these pressures, the more difficult it will become for him to play the

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role of honest broker in the decisionmaking process and thereby fulfill his coordinating responsibilities.

**Foreign and Domestic Counterterrorism Activities**

The challenge of integrating foreign and domestic counterterrorism activities is made even more difficult by the decision to divide responsibilities into two separate interagency coordinating processes. The nature of the terrorist threat gives rise to operational imperatives that are now at cross-purposes with the organizational incentives. Indeed, the commissions that studied this issue were unanimous in the view that the traditional foreign and domestic barriers needed to be broken down, not reinforced.

The Bush administration’s approach is to introduce overlapping membership in the NSC and the Homeland Security Council. The new National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism has also been given a global terrorism mandate. He will report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and “to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security with respect to matters relating to global terrorism inside the United States.” However, such mechanisms may not be sufficient, as evidenced by the confusion and lack of coordination between the NSC and the NEC, particularly in the latter’s early years.

**State and Local Government Cooperation**

Perhaps the most difficult organizational challenge will be that of finding ways to ensure cooperation among federal, state, and local officials. The executive order specifies such cooperation as a function of the Office of Homeland Security and includes “working with” state and local governments as an element in the performance of almost all of its other functions. Yet the order offers no guidance as to how this is to be accomplished. Equally silent is the directive setting up the Homeland Security Council’s day-to-day interagency Policy Coordination Committees, which are enjoined only to coordinate federal homeland security policies with state and local governments. The CSIS working groups recommended state participation in their National Emergency Planning Council but simply called for biannual meetings. The Gilmore Commission recommended that a national Advisory Board for Domestic Programs be established that would include, among others, “one or more sitting State governors [and] mayors of several U.S. cities.”

The Office of Homeland Security will need to address these threshold issues: Will informal or formal processes be established? Will the processes aim simply to share information or will they produce decisions? Where will attention be focused, on federal programs and activities or on those of the states? Obviously, the more formal, directive, and intrusive the processes are, the more difficult the office’s challenge will be, but also the more likely it will be to succeed in carrying out its mission.

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Organizing for Homeland Security
Lynn E. Davis

National Strategy

Every commission has exhorted the government to develop a national strategy. The Gilmore and Hart-Rudman commissions detailed the critical elements of such a strategy, and the Gilmore Commission went further to provide examples of the kinds of priorities that such a strategy would need to establish. But is this a reasonable and realistic goal?

The history of executive branch strategic planning efforts is not encouraging. Setting priorities and translating overall goals into specific implementing guidance is intellectually difficult, even with the best of intentions. Moreover, departments and agencies strongly resist defining such a strategy for fear of undermining their own prerogatives and budgets. Left to staffs charged with protecting departmental equities, the result of such efforts tends to be a listing of broad and multiple goals. Only department heads are empowered to make the serious choices and tradeoffs, and they tend not to have the time—or, more often, the inclination—to participate. The National Security Strategy defines only the most general goals, despite the statutory requirement and the National Security Advisor’s steady accretion of power. Even where the ONDCP Director has the statutory authority to prepare a National Drug Control Strategy, the result is disappointing.

What kind of process would offer the prospect of producing a credible and useful national homeland security strategy? First, and most important, the President would have to play a personal role in defining the overall strategic goals and priorities. The full members of the Homeland Security Council would then buy into these through a process of framing, drafting, and finalizing a strategy document. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security would discipline the process, so that the goals would be operationalized, priorities would be established, and controversial issues would be resolved. The document produced by this process would remain a private planning document, to encourage candor and specificity. It would at the same time become the basis for enunciating a public strategy as well as for ensuring that the President’s goals and priorities were being carried out in day-to-day department policies, programs, and budgets. OMB would then translate this strategy into its fiscal and programmatic guidance.

Domestic Counterterrorism Budget

A related issue concerns how the Office of Homeland Security can use its limited powers to importantly affect the domestic counterterrorism budget. The critical first step would be for the President to instruct the OMB Director, along with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, to identify the specific programs that should constitute such a budget. This itself is a highly political process, for department budgets can be expected to rise or fall in the near term as a function of the departments’ antiterrorism contributions. The initial goal of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security should then be to make sure that in the ensuing budget process the critical programs receive sufficient priority. This could be done in one of two ways. He could

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focus initially on only a few areas, relying on the President to back him up, both with the departments and with OMB. Or he could focus instead on establishing the fiscal guidance for the domestic counterterrorism budget in each agency, leaving the programmatic and budgetary details to others. The President would have to give him the authority to overrule OMB proposals. For either approach, the Office of Homeland Security would need to have a sizeable and dedicated budgetary staff.

**Intelligence and Law-Enforcement Activities**

Past counterterrorism operations have been hindered by the failure of the intelligence and law-enforcement communities to share information. This arises from the different cultures and responsibilities of these communities. Neither the DCI nor the FBI Director has been prepared to alter current practices in the absence of a clear Presidential directive. President Bush’s executive order could be interpreted as providing such a directive, since it gives the Office of Homeland Security responsibility for ensuring that “all appropriate and necessary intelligence and law-enforcement information relating to homeland security is disseminated and exchanged.” Making the DCI and Attorney General members of the Homeland Security Council would provide a mechanism for enforcing such a requirement. The problem is that homeland security is defined in the executive order as involving only terrorist activities within the United States. The Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism has a broader global mandate, but he is dual-hatted and as a deputy lacks the necessary stature. Thus, the White House coordinating processes still do not ensure the sharing of all the necessary intelligence and law-enforcement information.

**The Military’s Role in Homeland Security**

Putting the Secretary of Defense on the Homeland Security Council is a welcome signal that coordinating the military’s role in counterterrorist activities within the United States will be on the agenda. Each of the commissions pointed to the current lack of such planning but then divided as to the appropriate DoD role in responding to terrorist attacks. The Gilmore Commission was clear: The President should “always designate a Federal civilian agency other than the Department of Defense as the Lead Federal Agency.”\(^{40}\) The National Commission on Terrorism called for the development of detailed contingency plans to “transfer lead federal agency authority to the Department of Defense if necessary during a catastrophic terrorist attack or prior to an imminent attack.”\(^{41}\)

The executive order itself focuses on the role of the Office of Homeland Security in coordinating efforts to improve the security of U.S. borders, territorial waters, and airspace. It provides no guidance on the many other potential military roles, although a number of issues need to be addressed (e.g., the respective civilian and military contributions to emergency preparedness and response measures for mass-casualty attacks, the integration of military and law-enforcement counterterrorism activities, and the potential role of the military in providing security for the

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\(^{40}\) Ibid., p. 28.
\(^{41}\) National Commission on Terrorism, p. 40.
nation’s transportation systems and critical infrastructure). Each of these issues in turn raises the politically sensitive question of the National Guard’s future role. The Office of Homeland Security clearly has the mandate to take up this issue—indeed, it is uniquely positioned, given its links with state and local governments. But strong resistance can be expected from each of the interested parties (i.e., the National Guard, the Army, and the state governors). This could well be one of the first litmus tests of the seriousness and clout of the new office.

Looking Ahead

Given the dangers and the immediacy of the terrorist threat to the American homeland, it is understandable that President Bush would adopt a high-profile organizational response, creating a new office and new interagency coordinating process. And the complexity and highly sensitive political character of the war on terrorism made locating the new office in the White House attractive. The President could have given this role to the National Security Advisor, but the most compelling challenge is obviously domestic, not foreign. The NSC has only recently begun to coordinate policies involving the national security and domestic agencies. What is surprising is the limited focus and authorities of the new Office of Homeland Security. Countering terrorism within the United States is unquestionably an enormous task, but it is only a small part of the overall war on terrorism. Dividing coordinating responsibility between two presidential assistants—one for domestic and one for foreign counterterrorism activities—is of particular concern because intelligence, law-enforcement, and military operations at home and abroad need more integration, not less.

The prerogatives, including those for programs and budgets, of the federal departments and agencies have not changed, nor have those of state and local governments. President Bush’s newly created organization is actually more decentralized than the one it replaces. The White House coordinating processes are extremely complicated, and the parallel establishment of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Board and the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force has diminished the role of the Office of Homeland Security.

Nevertheless, the Homeland Security Council and Office are now in place. It is time to move on to the urgent task of coordinating domestic counterterrorism activities. Even with its limited authorities, the new organization will be able to improve upon the current situation. With effort and creativity, these authorities can be used to accomplish even more, especially if the President is prepared to intervene personally. It is now necessary to turn to the substantive functions of the organization, while appreciating that the processes will necessarily evolve over time.

Congress must give priority first to addressing its own processes for providing oversight of homeland security programs and budgets. It is appropriate that Congress consider as well whether the authorities of the new Homeland Security Council and Office are sufficient for the task ahead. But it should focus on the organization that President Bush has put in place, rather than simply supporting the recommendations of past commissions. In considering its relationship to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Congress should appreciate that while he is not directly accountable to the legislative body, his high public profile has made him accountable to the American public.
This does not mean that government reform should be entirely off the agenda. Experience over the coming months may suggest the need for further organizational refinements, particularly in the budget process, border security operations, and critical-infrastructure protection. A more basic restructuring may also be required, depending on whether the current organization can succeed in integrating foreign and domestic counterterrorism activities and in coordinating those federal, state, and local authorities responsible for responding to terrorist attacks. Congress may also insist on more public accountability on the part of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. But for now, it is time to get on with the task of providing homeland security for the American people.
## Appendix

### Summary of Commission Recommendations, Homeland Security Organization, and Congressional Views

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| HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATION   | White House; New Office; New Assistant to President New Council | No | + | Domestic; Terrorism & Other Activities; Critical Infrastructure | Executive Order | No |

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10 = baseline budget authority; + = slightly enhanced budget authority; ++ = greater budget authority.

2Includes such other homeland security activities as border security and missile defense.

3A separate board, not the Homeland Security Council, coordinates programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure.
OVERVIEW OF CONFERENCE

On December 9–11, 2001, a conference was held in New York City that brought together individuals with experience in responding to acts of terrorism. The conference was sponsored by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which also arranged for RAND to organize and conduct the conference and prepare this report. This report presents a synthesis of the discussions held at the December meeting.

This Report presents a syntheses of discussion held at the December meeting. The report is intended to help federal managers and decision makers

- Understand the unique working and safety environment associated with terrorist incidents
- Develop a comprehensive personal protective technology research agenda
- Improve federal education and training programs and activities directed at the health and safety of emergency responders.

The report should also help state and municipal officials, trade union leaders, Industry executives, and researchers obtain a better understand of equipment and training needs for protecting emergency workers.
OBSERVATIONS AND OPINIONS OF RESCUE WORKERS

The full report includes observations and opinions of the participants in the conference - these are men and woman who were at the Ground Zero and know first hands of the challenges faced. We felt it was important to pull some of these quotes and add them to this summary. The authors accept the responsibility for ways those views are expressed in these pages.

One of the things that you’ve got to remember is that when you are actually engaged, that is not the time to pull somebody aside and give them a training course. In the middle of battle you don’t have time to be pulling people and saying, “Let’s get the slides out and go over the procedures.

You can’t wear the fire helmets we have for more than an hour...your neck? I used to be 5’10”; I’m 5’8” now! I tried to wear it for three hours. I noticed that throughout (the response) people were in danger zones holding up their hats with their arm.

Most of the equipment we have is designed for one hazard, not multiple hazards.

Twice that I know of, they were going to shut down the World Trade Center site completely because of environmental and health issues. They were really pushing for this. Calmer heads prevailed, because, can you imagine the political and social impact of just shutting down the World Trade center at that period of time early on?

An industrial hygienist showed me her work boots, and the soles were dissolved off. So you don’t really know what you’re going to step into sometimes. It had just eaten through the bottom of the soles.
The problem that I saw from being there...was people would bring in respirators but they would only bring in half of it. They wouldn’t bring in the cartridges, or they’d bring in just what they had on scene. And these would get distributed in certain ways, but we were having a real tough time just matching everything up.

The only way you could theoretically keep anybody from getting a pulmonary exposure in these event is to keep them on an SCBA 24 hours a day for the duration of the event, which is absolutely impossible. So you’re going to get exposed, no matter what. It’s just a matter of how much of an exposure you’re going to take on.

We’ve changed the roles of special-ops groups over the years to include hazmat, confined space, high angle, and we’ve outfitted them. But now we’re looking at regular front-line firefighters having a different role or responsibility or response and we may have to provide them with the proper PPE for that type of work.

In a collapse like this, you have so many unusual situations. We had jet fuel, we had battery acid, asbestos, productions of combustion, lead paint, silica, biological—things that are all okay individually when you run into them. When you throw them into a collapse environment where you really don’t know how much, what’s broken open, what’s not, what’s mixed, what it’s touched, what hasn’t—all those things aren’t that simple to just sort out...
- EXCERPT -

SUMMARY

Just as it has for the nation as a whole, the world in which emergency responders work has changed in fundamental ways since September 11, 2001. Members of professions already defined by their high levels of risk now face new, often unknown, threats on the job. At a basic level, the September 11 terrorist events have forced emergency responders to see the incidents they are asked to respond to in a new light. At the World Trade Center, 450 emergency responders perished while responding to the terrorist attacks—about one-sixth of the total number of victims. Hundreds more were seriously injured. In this light, the terrorist events are also forcing emergency responders to reconsider the equipment and practices they use to protect themselves in the line of duty.

Preparation is key to protecting the health and safety of emergency responders, and valuable lessons can be learned from previous responses. To this end, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) sponsored and asked the RAND Science and Technology Policy Institute to organize a conference of individuals with firsthand knowledge of emergency response to terrorist attacks. The purpose of the conference was to review the adequacy of personal protective equipment (PPE) and practices, such as training, and to make recommendations on how the equipment and practices worked and how they might be improved. Attendees included persons who responded to the 1995 attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the anthrax incidents that occurred during autumn 2001. They represented a wide range of occupations and skills: firefighters, police, emergency medical technicians, construction workers, union officials, and government representatives from local, state, and federal agencies. The conference was held December 9–11, 2001, in New York City, and this report synthesizes the discussions that took place there.

NEW RISKS, NEW ROLES FOR EMERGENCY RESPONDERS

Although the terrorist incidents shared some characteristics with large natural disasters, the NIOSH/RAND conference participants highlighted ways in which those incidents posed unique challenges. They were large in scale, long in duration, and complex in terms of the range of hazards presented. As a result of these characteristics, these events thrust responders into new roles for which they may not have been properly prepared or equipped. The themes of scale, duration, and range of hazards were repeated frequently during the discussions at the conference because they were seen as having critical implications for protecting the health and safety of emergency responders—during both the immediate, urgent phase and the sustained campaign phase of the responses.
The September 11 terrorist incidents were notable for their large scale—in terms of both the damage incurred and the human and material resources needed to respond. Conference participants spoke extensively about the difficulty of conducting search and rescue, fire suppression, and shoring and stabilization operations, as well as hazard monitoring. Responses were hampered by collateral developments, in particular the grounding of commercial air transport, which slowed the implementation of command and logistical support infrastructures.

The responses to the terrorist attacks involved days and weeks of constant work. At the World Trade Center, an initial urgent phase persisted for several days and then gradually transitioned into a sustained campaign that lasted for several months. An important message of the conference was that PPE generally worked well for its designed purpose in the initial response. However, such equipment typically was not designed for the continuous use associated with a sustained response campaign. Firefighter turnout gear, for example, is constructed to be worn for, at most, hours. Accordingly, responders spoke of being hampered by basic problems such as wet garments and blistered feet.

Furthermore, at major terrorist-attack sites, emergency workers face a staggering range of hazards. Not only do they confront the usual hazards associated with building fires—flames, heat, combustion by-products, smoke—they also must be prepared to deal with rubble and debris, air choked with fine particles, human remains, hazardous materials (anhydrous ammonia, freon, battery acids), and the potential risk of secondary devices or a follow-on attack. Conference participants indicated that many currently available PPE ensembles and training practices were not designed to protect responders from this range of hazards or were not supplied in sufficient quantity at the attack sites to meet the scale of the problem.

The scale of the terrorist events, their duration, and the range of hazards required that many emergency responders take on atypical tasks for which they were insufficiently equipped and trained. The nature of the destruction at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon reduced opportunities for primary reconnaissance and rescue—important tasks for firefighters in large structural fires. Conversely, firefighters became engaged in activities they usually do not do: “busting up and hauling concrete,” scrambling over a rubble pile, and removing victims and decayed bodies and body parts.

Construction workers were also deployed at the scenes and placed in hazardous environments early on. In all of the terrorist-incident responses, emergency medical personnel were on-scene, performing rescue operations, for example, in the rubble pile at the World Trade Center. Complicating activity at these already chaotic, hazardous, and demanding attack sites was the fact that the sites are also crime scenes. In addition, there were massive influxes of skilled and unskilled volunteers that created a significant challenge in managing the incident sites and assuring that all were properly protected.
In sum, the definition and roles of an emergency responder expanded greatly in the wake of the terrorist attacks, but few of the responders had adequate PPE, training, or information for such circumstances.

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND AVAILABILITY

From the experiences at these attack sites, it is clear that there were significant shortfalls in the way responders were protected. Many responders suggested that the PPE even impeded their ability to accomplish their missions.

Within the overall PPE ensemble used by responders at these sites, some equipment performed better than others. While head protection and high-visibility vests functioned relatively well for most responders, protective clothing and respirators exhibited serious shortcomings. Conference participants reported that the available garments did not provide sufficient protection against biological and infectious disease hazards, the heat of fires at the sites, and the demanding physical environment of unstable rubble piles, nor were they light and flexible enough to allow workers to move debris and enter confined spaces. Attendees also indicated that the available eye protection, while protecting well against direct impact injury, provided almost no protection against the persistent dust at the World Trade Center site.

Of all personal protective equipment, respiratory protection elicited the most extended discussion across all of the professional panels. Attendees indicated that under most circumstances, the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) was grossly limited by both the weight of the systems and the short lengths of time (about 15 to 30 minutes) they can be used before their air bottles must be refilled. Most participants complained that respirators reduced their field of vision at best, and their facepieces fogged up at worst. Filters for air-purifying respirators (APRs) often did not match available facepieces, and many responders questioned the level of protection they provided, especially during anthrax responses.

For almost all protective technologies, responders indicated serious problems with equipment not being comfortable enough to allow extended wear during demanding physical labor. It was frequently observed that current technologies require a tradeoff between the amount of protection they provide and the extent to which they are light enough, practical enough, and wearable enough to allow responders to do their jobs. While conference attendees were concerned about having adequate protection, many were even more concerned about equipment hindering them from accomplishing their rescue and recovery missions in an arduous and sustained campaign. Respirators available at the sites were uncomfortable, causing many wearers to use them only intermittently (one participant dubbed them “neck protectors”) or to discard them after a short period.
For many firefighters at the conference, PPE availability was as important a concern as PPE performance. Some health-and-safety panelists expressed a similar view. There was an acute shortage of respirators early in the response at the World Trade Center, for example. Subsequently, providing appropriate equipment to the large numbers of workers at these sites was made even more difficult because of the many types and brands of equipment that were being used by the various responder organizations or were being supplied from various sources. The problem was further exacerbated by a lack of interoperability among different types of equipment. These issues, coupled with the very large volume of equipment sent to the World Trade Center site, in particular, made it very difficult to match responders with appropriate equipment and supplies.

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT TRAINING AND INFORMATION

The responses to the terrorist attacks uncovered a range of PPE training and information needs. Before an incident occurs, those who are likely to be involved in a response should be trained on the proper selection and operation of personal protective equipment. Emergency medical technicians who were themselves treating casualties in the heart of the disaster site should have been wearing PPE but frequently were not, in large part because this equipment was not part of their standard training regimen.

The experiences in these incidents also showed that there is a need for significant on-site training to protect the health and safety of workers. The attack sites involved large numbers of workers, particularly construction workers and volunteers, many of whom were not familiar with most PPE. They needed to be trained in the proper selection and fitting of respirators, how to maintain them, and when to change filters. The situation with anthrax was more severe. Health and safety panel members felt that training support during the anthrax attacks was inadequate on all fronts: The response protocols were being developed during the actual responses.

Emergency responders repeatedly stressed the importance of having timely and reliable health and safety information. “What kills rescue responders is the unknown,” commented an emergency medical services (EMS) panel member. Several shortcomings were noted by conference participants. Special-operations and law-enforcement responders reported problems caused by different information sources telling them different things. Such information conflicts were often attributed to differences in risk assessment and PPE standards among reporting parties. Especially in the case of the anthrax incidents, keeping up with changing information being provided by numerous agencies was a serious challenge for front-line responder organizations. For many conference participants, the problem was not a lack of information on hazards. Rather, they spoke of difficulties trying to manage and make sense of a surplus of information. Finally, conference attendees suggested that better and
more consistent information provision could motivate responders to wear PPE and could decrease the tendency to modify it or take it off when it becomes uncomfortable.

SITE MANAGEMENT

One message that emerged clearly from virtually all panel discussions is that proper site management had a decisive effect on whether personal protective equipment was available, appropriately prescribed, used, and maintained.

The most critical need for site management is a coherent command authority. An effective command structure is essential to begin solving three critical issues affecting PPE: information provision, equipment logistics, and enforcement. Due to logistical problems early in the response, for example, supplies of PPE were misplaced, the stocks of equipment that were available were largely unknown, and responders often did not receive or could not find the equipment they needed.

Conference attendees also emphasized the need for immediate and effective perimeter or scene control. Initially, this entailed responders personally “holding people back” and isolating the scene. As the response evolved, it was necessary to erect a “hard perimeter,” such as a chain-link fence, to make sure only essential personnel operating under the direction of the scene commander were on-site.

Conference attendees also indicated that enforcement of PPE use is very important. Although panelists acknowledged that there is a period early in a chaotic response when it is not practical to rigorously enforce the use of protective equipment, they indicated that strict enforcement must eventually begin in order to protect the health of the responders. Other factors that complicated enforcement of PPE use were the large number of organizations (with different PPE standards) operating on-site, the lack of a unified command, and shortcomings in scene control. Because of the difficulty of defining when it is appropriate to begin enforcing PPE use—and removing workers from the site if they do not comply with use requirements—attendees indicated that this role might be best played by an organization not directly involved in or affected by the incident.

RECOMMENDATIONS

After having discussed PPE performance, information and training, and site-management issues, NIOSH/RAND conference participants were asked to put forward concrete recommendations about technologies and procedures that could help protect the health and safety of emergency workers as they respond to acts of terrorism. The following points represent a brief sample of the themes that emerged and the solutions put forth by conference discussants.
Personal Protective Equipment Performance

• Develop guidelines for the appropriate PPE ensembles for long-duration disaster responses involving rubble, human remains, and a range of respiratory threats. If appropriate equipment is not currently available, address any roadblocks to its development. Such equipment could be applicable to other major disasters, such as earthquakes or tornadoes, as well as to terrorist attacks.

• Define the appropriate ensembles of PPE needed to safely and efficiently respond to biological incidents, threats, and false alarms. Key considerations include providing comparable levels of protection for all responders and addressing the logistical and decontamination issues associated with large numbers of responses in short time periods.

Personal Protective Equipment Availability

• Explore mechanisms to effectively outfit all responders at large incident sites with appropriate personal protective equipment as rapidly as possible.

• Examine any barriers to equipment standardization or interoperability among emergency-responder organizations. Strategies could include coordination of equipment procurement among organizations or work with equipment manufacturers to promote broader interoperability within classes of equipment.

Training and Information

• Define mechanisms to rapidly and effectively provide responders at incident sites with useful information about the hazards they face and the equipment they need for protection. Approaches could include more effective coordination among relevant organizations and development of technologies that provide responders with individual, real-time information about their environment.

• Explore ways to ensure that responders at large-scale disaster sites are appropriately trained to use the protective equipment they are provided. All types of responders must be addressed, and mechanisms that provide training and experience with the equipment before a disaster occurs should be investigated.

• Consider logistical requirements of extended response activities during disaster drills and training. Such activities provide response commanders with information on the logistical constraints that could restrict response capabilities.
Management

- Provide guidelines and define organizational responsibilities for enforcing protective-equipment use at major disaster sites. While such guidelines must address the risks responders are willing to take when the potential exists to save lives, they must also consider that during long-term responses, the health and safety of responders should be a principal concern.

- Develop mechanisms to allow rapid and efficient scene control at disaster sites as early as possible during a response.
The threat of an individual or a terrorist group acquiring deadly biological materials from a lab in California and using it to terrorize and kill indiscriminately is a low probability. However, the probability is not zero. Furthermore, the tremendous media attention and governmental mismanagement of the response to and investigation of the anthrax attacks in 2001 may have drawn undesirable attention to comparatively open civilian facilities that handle these materials. Already, many cases of biocriminality, where an individual or individuals use biological materials to kill others, result from materials obtained from hospital or laboratory sources.¹ Thus, there will likely be an increase in the probability that individuals or terrorists will seek biological materials from hospital and laboratory sources for weapons purposes in the future. The stakes are potentially high for

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California, a state that is home to numerous industries and universities with access to these biomaterials.

As the anthrax exposures in Florida, New York, and Washington, DC, underscored, state and local authorities are the first responders in the evolving crisis stemming from a clandestine biological terrorist attack. Federal government mistakes in the initial phases of the anthrax attacks in Florida and Washington, DC, created considerable problems that local officials needed to contend with long after the federal officials turned their attention to other parts of the problem. When federal authorities become involved in the consequence management of biological terrorist incidents, local and state authorities remain a significant, if not the primary, authority citizens looked to for guidance and reassurance. The challenge for state and local authorities is to make sure they are not totally dependent on federal authorities for guidance and assistance and that state and local capabilities can effectively complement and augment the efforts of federal authorities.

One of the many lessons learned from these incidents is that state and local authorities can improve their effectiveness by having a more comprehensive view of the deadly materials located in their jurisdictions. State and local authorities need to have a much more detailed understanding of the potential weapons materials in their jurisdictions.

Knowing the potentially dangerous materials located in a jurisdiction is a critical component for a comprehensive bioterrorism threat assessment. Part of the challenge of preempting attacks before they occur, or mitigating the consequences if terrorists do strike, is to understand the range of weapons materials available to terrorists. While terrorists have employed disease and poison on comparatively few occasions, trends in the 1990s involving mass and indiscriminate casualties and greater attention to unconventional weapons make it critical for state and local authorities to know what materials are located in their jurisdictions and who has access to them.

The inability of federal authorities to define the potential sources of the anthrax material used in the fall 2001 attacks highlights the challenge of addressing this part of the terrorism challenge. On November 12, 2001, the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information convened a hearing entitled “Germs, Toxins and Terror: The New Threat to America,” chaired by Senator Dianne Feinstein, which explored the issue of the location of deadly
biological materials and who might have access to them. Senator Feinstein questioned witnesses from the FBI about the number of laboratories and laboratory personnel that have access to deadly biological agents referred to by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as “select agents.” The FBI indicated that it did not know how many facilities handle select agents, nor did it know how many people have access to such agents at the facilities that possess them.

This section summarizes the current and proposed regulations covering dangerous biological materials, presents findings on the locations and personnel in the state who handle select agents, and recommends some activities state legislative officials might undertake to increase the state’s ability to prevent and respond to a biological terrorist attack.

Federal Regulations Controlling Select Biological Agents

In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to regulate the transfer of select agents. Congress crafted this piece of legislation in part because of an incident where a former member of a number of right-wing groups fraudulently ordered a culture of plague (yersina pestis) via letter on homemade stationery for purposes still unknown. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 designates the Secretary of DHHS or an entity he or she designates as the implementing agent of the act.

The federal government, with the CDC component of DHHS as its agent, is charged with the responsibility of overseeing all aspects of the safe use and transfer of deadly biological agents. The CDC may share information with state

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2For a list of witness statements see http://judiciary.senate.gov/hr110601st.htm, accessed February 26, 2002.


and local law enforcement authorities if they request it. Otherwise, information the CDC receives on the location of agents or their transfer is not provided to state and local law enforcement or health authorities. According to the CDC External Affairs Program of the Office of Health and Safety, CDC officials have provided information to state law enforcement officials regarding select agents.7

During the period of comment on the regulations implementing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, some commentators suggested requiring laboratories to file parallel documents with state authorities or for the CDC to routinely inform state authorities. Following the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the final regulations state that the “Secretary may provide the forms to state law enforcement authorities under appropriate circumstances.” The CDC determined that it would “not provide state health departments with the transfer forms on a routine basis,” nor would parties transferring a select agent need to “provide a copy of the form to state health departments.”

Current legislative amendments pending before Congress require all facilities that possess select agents to register with the CDC.8 While establishing a national database on the possession of select materials is a valuable first step, verification will be an important part of ensuring the integrity of this process. Adequate inspection resources will be needed to ensure compliance.

A list of the select agents is provided in Appendix A to Part 72 of the law. On the list are approximately 40 different microorganisms (viruses, bacteria, fungi, and rickettsiae) and toxins. The law provides the means to periodically review this list to add new agents and remove existing agents that over time may prove not to pose a high danger to public health. A laboratory using any of these agents or seeking to acquire any of these agents must be registered with the CDC and notify the CDC when it transfers these agents.

Exempt Laboratories

At the November 2001 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information hearing, chair Senator Feinstein questioned witnesses about a category of laboratory that is exempt from the

7Interview with CDC official, January 18, 2002.

8Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001, S. 1765, Section 351A, Enhanced Control of Biological Agents and Toxins. See also H.R. 3338, Section 351 A, Enhanced Control of Biological Agents and Toxins.
requirements regarding deadly biological materials. The rule “specifically exempts clinical laboratories certified under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) (42 USC 263a) that utilize select agents for diagnostic, reference, verification, or proficiency testing purposes.” Laboratories that handle human clinical samples are included in this category. These laboratories are the most prevalent and are exempt from the registration and reporting requirements as long as they transfer the samples to appropriate diagnostic facilities within 36 hours.

Several of the legislative amendments currently before the U.S. Congress are designed to eliminate the CLIA exemption. The concern is that a select agent contained in a clinical sample could be diverted for terrorist purposes.

Natural disease outbreaks involving select agents occur periodically in California. For example, anthrax was recently detected in cattle in Santa Clara County. Personnel who examined the diseased animals and personnel who examined the clinical samples were all placed on antibiotics. While all accounts suggest that local and state authorities handled this outbreak and the custody of the clinical samples with appropriate care, it is possible to imagine someone exploiting this natural outbreak. The first major biological terrorist incident in the United States entailed the pernicious use of a clinical sample. The agent used in the 1984 intentionally caused outbreak of salmonella in The Dalles, Oregon, came from a sample ordered for calibrating instruments in a privately run clinical laboratory.

Gaps in the System

One gap of unknown proportions concerns all the select agents acquired prior to 1997. New rules put in place after passage of the Antiterrorism and

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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 governed any shipments of select agents, but did not require disclosure of existing agents. Hence, as noted above, facilities and researchers working with select agents prior to 1997 did not need to declare their possession of select agents. The CDC could discover who possessed such agents only if they transfer them to other facilities.

Another potential imperfection in the existing federal regulations pertains to facility inspection. The CDC is required to inspect a facility slated to obtain a select agent within three years of the facility registering that it plans to receive select agents. But the inspection is not required to occur before the facility acquires the agent. Therefore, a facility can register with the CDC without being inspected prior to receipt of select agent material. At the time of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the CDC estimated that approximately 1,000 facilities would file registration papers, implying that 1,000 inspections would need to be conducted. When asked about the number of registration inspections and the number of inspectors available to undertake these inspections, a CDC official indicated that she thought the original estimates were high; however, she would not reveal how many inspections were conducted, the number of inspectors available to conduct them or the amount of money the CDC budgeted for such inspections.12

In the current investigation of the anthrax letters mailed in 2001, the CDC has discovered that it was not aware of some federal facilities that had possession of anthrax. The CIA, which was not on the CDC’s list of facilities possessing anthrax, recently revealed that it possesses Ames-strain anthrax spores.13 CIA possession may have eluded CDC notice because it acquired the material prior to 1997. Alternatively, for security reasons, the CIA may not have informed the CDC that it possessed anthrax for the purpose of highly classified defense research. Only within the last few years has the number of CDC officials with security clearances been increased to cover positions in a variety of offices relevant to the prevention of biological terrorism.

Locations of Select Biological Agents in California

After the 2001 discovery of an anthrax exposure in Florida, Governor Gray Davis issued Executive Order D-47-01, which calls upon the State Strategic

12Interview with CDC official, January 18, 2002.

Committee on Terrorism to set up a series of subcommittees including one entitled “Protection of the Public Health.” The subcommittee—chaired by Dr. Diana Bonta, director of the California Department of Health Services, and Dr. Michael Drake, vice president of Health Affairs, University of California—submitted a confidential report to the governor on October 25, 2001. The Executive Order also called upon Dallas Jones, director of the governor’s Office of Emergency Services and chair of the State Strategic Committee on Terrorism, to report the committee’s initial recommendations by October 30, 2001. Among the topics Governor Davis requested the committee to examine were the “facilities and systems for manufacturing, processing, transporting, disposing of and storing potential dangerous substances.” Legislative officials should examine this report as a first step in assessing the threat of biological materials located in the state.

Federal, state, and university officials were all very guarded when discussing the issues of facilities and personnel that handled select agents in California. Without a doubt, part of this reluctance stems from heightened security since the fall 2001 anthrax incidents. However, federal and state officials interviewed agreed that it is not possible at this time to come up with a comprehensive and complete accounting of the laboratories and personnel in California that handle select agents.

Several explanations account for this lack of a complete and comprehensive view. First, prior to 1997, facilities were not required to notify the CDC of their possession or transfer of dangerous biological materials, described in the federal regulations as “select agents.” After implementation of the 1997 regulations, facilities needed to notify the CDC only when they transferred agents. It is possible that there are a number of facilities and researchers who have agents from before the law went into effect. Second, the diversity of laboratories makes it very difficult to get a single comprehensive assessment of those that are in the state.

Additionally, the State of California is home to a variety of federal, state, county, and university health and research facilities. There are also commercial and veterinary laboratories. Any of these different types of laboratories may from time to time work with select agents. Different regulatory bodies supervise these different types of laboratories. Similarly, among those involved in each of these

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14 Governor of the State of California, Executive Department, Executive Order D-47-01, October 10, 2001.

15 Ibid.
different types of facilities, no single individual or association has a complete and comprehensive view.

**Public Health Laboratories**

The overwhelming majority of the laboratories in the State of California do not handle select agents. However, state authorities interviewed do not know the precise number of facilities or personnel who have access to these agents. In the state, there are over 4,000 laboratories capable of moderate- to high-complexity testing.\(^{16}\) Approximately 1,900 of these laboratories are licensed in some fashion. There are approximately 650 hospital laboratories and another 600 large laboratories. One state health official indicated to me that there are 47 public health laboratories in the state.\(^{17}\) Another state health official indicated to me that there are only five biological safety level-2 (BSL-2) facilities and two BSL-3 facilities in California.\(^{18}\) Select agents are known to be handled safely in BSL-3 or BSL-4 facilities.

**University, National, and Veterinary Laboratories**

The University of California operates three national laboratories, two of which are in the state; five teaching hospitals; and a number of other relevant laboratories on its current nine and soon to be ten campuses.\(^{19}\) A university research official whom I interviewed thought that each one of these locations could have at least one facility that handled select agents. After September 11, the university’s inspector general prepared a report on the security at university facilities. This report has not been made public.

California is home to a number of other private universities—such as Stanford University, the University of Southern California, and the California Institute of Technology—with advanced laboratory facilities. Laboratories and hospitals at these private universities undoubtedly also host facilities and personnel that handle select agents.

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\(^{16}\) Interview with official from the California Department of Health Service, Division of Laboratory Services, December 5, 2001.

\(^{17}\) Interview with California Department of Health Services official, January 17, 2001.

\(^{18}\) Interview with California Department of Health Services official, December 5, 2001.

\(^{19}\) Interview with University of California research lab official, January 17, 2001.
Educational authorities always underscore the quality of their security programs, while at the same time guarding against additional regulation of laboratory facilities. In fact, universities have led the fight against additional regulation of such facilities and personnel. In addition, seeking to minimize regulatory burden and protect as much research freedom as possible, university research leaders have actively contributed to the regulatory process. For example, Michael V. Drake, MD, the vice president for Health Affairs of the University of California, testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Hearing on Germs and Toxins as Domestic Terrorist Threats on November 6, 2001; conspicuous by its absence was any mention of facilities handling select agents at university facilities. Universities generally do not perceive themselves as sources for weapons materials. This is a benign view of a potential danger, given the inadequate security precautions at certain facilities.

The California Animal Health & Food Safety Laboratory System is administered by the School of Veterinary Medicine, University of California, Davis. Laboratories are located in Davis, Fresno, San Bernardino, Tulare, and Turlock. San Diego County is the one county that still maintains its own veterinary laboratory, while the other counties plug into a statewide system administered from the U.C. Davis School of Veterinary Medicine. Based on an interview with a senior official in the California Animal Health & Food Safety Laboratory System, the U.C. Davis School of Veterinary Medicine maintains a robust security system for select agents in its possession. The official was the only person interviewed throughout the state who, without in any way compromising security, provided a transparent and convincing description of safety and control measures covering select agents.

The Biotechnology Industry

The State of California hosts a large and diverse biotechnology industry. The companies that manufacture vaccines are the private companies that are most likely to work with select agents, but even these companies generally conduct research with attenuated strains or surrogate agents. Furthermore, according to one state health official, biotechnology companies probably do not work with virulent agents because the liability of such work would cause them to need to spend a considerable amount on insurance coverage. Thus, while it is possible to imagine that some companies may take great risks, the available alternatives make such risks unnecessary in most cases.
If state or federal authorities sought to determine with precision the safety practices of the biotechnology sector’s handling of dangerous biological material, they would face a formidable task. According to a 1998 report on California’s biomedical research and development industry sponsored by the California Health Care Institute, there are over 210,000 biotechnology companies in the state. The task of assessing commercial access to select agents is formidable because of the number of small companies. In Northern California alone, more than 60 percent of the 500 bioscience companies employ fewer than 49 people.\(^\text{20}\)

In addition, the Biotechnology Industry Organization surveyed its membership shortly after the September 2001 attacks. The survey, conducted with the condition that it remained confidential, covered a wide range of issues relevant to the industry’s work and countering terrorism. While most of the Biotechnology Industry Organization’s membership is in California, representatives of the organization did not know the number of commercial laboratories or personnel who handle select agents, nor did they know where to obtain this information.\(^\text{21}\)

**Recommendations for State Assembly Activities**

While the federal government has primary responsibility for regulating dangerous biological agents, state and local authorities will likely be the first line of response after a malicious use of such agents. State authorities should develop their own understanding of the facilities, personnel, and security procedures for handling select agents in the state. Recent developments in the ongoing anthrax investigation suggest that federal authorities are facing serious charges of poor security, inept investigation practices, and lack of knowledge about activities at federal facilities.\(^\text{22}\)

State legislative authorities should examine the confidential report of the State Strategic Committee on Terrorism’s Subcommittee on the Protection of the Public Health if they have not already done so. The Executive Order charged the subcommittee to consult with “representatives from the University of California, medical and health associations, public health organizations, law enforcement, and


\(^{21}\)Interview with a representative of the Biotechnology Industry Organization, December 6, 2001.

state agencies and departments,” as well as “leaders of private industry who have knowledge and experience in security practices.” Given the wide range of Californians involved in this process, it seem appropriate for state legislative authorities to also be informed of the results of this effort.

Oversight hearings in both public and executive session with federal officials and the appropriate state law enforcement and health authorities will help ensure that the protocols for information sharing are in place and that potential gaps in information are identified and closed. While much of the responsibility for oversight lies in federal hands, the state of California should also be involved in the process, providing federal authorities with as much assistance as possible.

It is noteworthy that my recent attempt to reach the CDC office charged to handle irregularities in the transfer of select agents revealed that the phone number on its web page directed callers to a security office that had no knowledge about select agents and suggested calling back the next day. When asked about this experience, a CDC official explained that if the caller had identified himself as a law enforcement official or explained that there was an emergency, the security office would have known what to do. The official suggested that the security office must have viewed the call as an information request.23 While the CDC official’s explanation may be correct, the security office’s apparent failure to understand the term “select agents” raises questions about the adequacy of standard operating procedures.

State legislators can also contribute to the integrity of the security of these select agents by making sure that state law enforcement and health authorities are exercising the state’s right to information when appropriate. As many training exercises have revealed, law enforcement and health authorities often meet one another for the first time during a mock crisis. Oversight hearings will also force coordination in advance of a real crisis.

Finally, thus far, congressional action to bolster current law on the control of select agent material seems well intended and constructive. However, given California’s sizeable number of clinical and research laboratories, the state should make sure that proposed federal legislative action enhances security without unduly and unnecessarily burdening legitimate scientific and commercial work. State legislators can valuably serve the state’s interests by making sure that federal

23Interview with CDC official, January 18, 2002.
efforts strike the right balance. Regulations made in the midst of a crisis often overcompensate for the problem of the moment.
Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements

Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, David Brannan

- Excerpt -
Chapter 6
Assessing the Impact of External Support
TRENDS IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENT MOVEMENTS
Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, David Brannan

- EXCERPT -
CHAPTER 6
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Insurgents may receive many forms of support, but the impact of this assistance varies. Some forms of support allow insurgencies to survive ferocious government onslaught or to weather a decrease in popular support. Other types, while useful, contribute far less to the overall success of the movement.

Although the impact of external support must be measured against the particular needs of and conditions facing the insurgency in question, broader generalizations can be drawn about which forms of assistance are usually the most important to insurgent movements. Chapter Six provides a brief overview of guerrilla movement requirements and notes how outside powers can help meet these needs. It divides these contributions into those that, in our judgment, are critical, those that are valuable, and those that are minor. This chapter also discusses the political, organizational, and operational costs associated with a group’s acceptance of outside support.

INSURGENT REQUIREMENTS

To be successful, insurgent movements have a variety of requirements, most of which can be grouped in two categories—human and material. In general, insurgents most need outside support of all kinds when they cannot obtain this support domestically. Insurgent requirements are summarized in Table 6.1. Each requirement is discussed in more detail below.

In some instances, a dependency on state sponsors can have devastating consequences. A regime’s goals and priorities are likely to change over time, and in some cases, a state will abandon an insurgency to take advantage of new strategic opportunities. Iran, for example, has both supported and reined in Iraq’s SAIRI, varying its backing according to its geopolitical needs. Thus, Iran pushed SAIRI to undertake often-ruinous operations during its eight-year war with Iraq but provided, at best, tepid backing in 1991 when Saddam’s regime was reeling following the Gulf War. Despite Saddam’s weakness, Tehran wanted to avoid even an appearance of meddling in order to deprive the U.S.-led coalition of a pretext for continued intervention in Iraq, or even in Iran itself. As important as external support can be to a guerrilla movement, it can also impose damaging and unacceptable burdens on an underground organization. In ideological, religious, and nationalist insurgencies, militants are risking their lives, and possibly those of their friends and families, to further a set of beliefs. Thus, self-reliance, dedication to the struggle, and self-denial are extremely useful qualities in rebel groups. Excessive reliance on foreign assistance can undercut these virtues and diminish the martial capabilities of a guerrilla movement, as demonstrated by the PLO’s poor performance against the Israeli military after years of comfortable sanctuary in Syrian-controlled Lebanon. As insurgency analyst Gerard Chaliand (1987, p. 58) has cautioned, “every seriously organized guerrilla movement is well advised to rely mainly on its own resources.” In general, dependence on refugees, diasporas, and other non-state supporters carries fewer risks for insurgencies, even though the type of support these actors can provide is limited. Diasporas and refugees tend to follow the lead of rebel movements rather than view them as temporary allies or proxies to be controlled. As a result, sudden changes in funding or political support are far less likely.
Table 6.1
Insurgent Requirements

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Human</th>
<th>Material</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ability to mobilize local and</td>
<td>Safe haven and transit</td>
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<tr>
<td>international support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capable leadership, including</td>
<td>Financial resources</td>
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<td>effective command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Direct military support</td>
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<td>Intelligence concerning the</td>
<td>Arms and materiel, including</td>
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<tr>
<td>adversary</td>
<td>ammunition, food, and fuel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspiration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational aid</td>
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CRITICAL FORMS OF SUPPORT

Safe Haven and Transit
Safe havens, whether inside the country where the insurgents operate or across international boundaries, are essential to the success of any guerrilla movement. Sanctuaries protect the group’s leadership and members; provide a place where insurgents can rest, recuperate, and plan future operations; serve as a staging area from which to mount attacks; and, in some cases, function as an additional base for recruitment, training, dissemination of propaganda, and contact with the outside world. Such sanctuary allows guerrillas and their commanders to organize, train, recruit, plan, recuperate, and otherwise conduct essential operations outside the reach of the targeted state. Without a safe haven, insurgencies are constantly vulnerable to government forces. Iraqi Shi’ites, for example, have been able to organize themselves and receive essential military training in Iran—activities that would have been impossible in Iraq given Saddam Husayn’s tight controls. Safe havens also allow insurgents to dictate the pace of operations, prevent target governments from following up tactical victories when they are denied the right of “hot pursuit,” and otherwise help rebel movements retain their initiative. Kashmiri militants, for instance, often reside in Pakistan until the weather, local political conditions, and other factors are conducive to launching cross-border initiatives and attacks.

During a number of recent conflicts, cross-border sanctuaries appear to have been a major contributor to insurgent effectiveness, particularly when counterinsurgent forces are highly capable. For example, part of the success of the ANC relative to the Pan-African Congress (PAC) can be explained because the ANC had access to safe havens in Mozambique, where militants could train, rest, and plan future operations. The PAC, on the other hand, had no external sanctuaries, and thus was forced to confront highly competent and aggressive South African security forces without being able to recuperate in the comparative safety of a frontline state. The PKK’s access to sanctuaries in Syria and the Syrian-controlled Bekaa’s Valley in Lebanon during the 1980s and early 1990s permitted the movement to thrive; the withdrawal of Syrian support a decade later consequently played a major role in the PKK’s collapse (Radu, 2001, p. 52). In South Asia, Nepalese Maoist insurgents routinely use India as a sanctuary, which also serves as a base for political, logistical, and financial support of the movement (IISS Strategic Comments, 2000, p. 2; Santina, 2001, pp. 34–37). Relative geography, of course, is important; international safe havens are most useful when they are across contiguous borders. Sometimes neighboring states provide insurgents with a haven simply because they are incapable of ousting the rebels themselves. Thus, the IMU has a de facto haven in Tajikistan.
because Dushanbe does not control its borders. Similarly, Lebanon for many years hosted a variety of Palestinian groups that targeted Israel mostly because the central government in Beirut was too weak to defeat them militarily (Hiro, 1992, pp. 81–110).

Some insurgencies may also be able to create a safe haven within the boundaries of the state in which they are fighting. Groups that enjoyed strong support in particular regions, such as the Chinese communist guerrillas led by Mao, are often able to have tremendous freedom of action, and even create alternative government institutions, in part of a country. Geography, again, also plays a role: Sendero Luminoso, for example, took advantage of Peru’s mountains and jungles, creating a liberated zone in parts of Peru. Refugee camps also function as a form of safe haven—one that usually requires the support, or at least acquiescence, of the host state. Insurgent movements use these sites to organize, train, recruit, acquire arms, and otherwise advance their cause. As noted above, this most often occurs when the host government favors the refugee cause or is otherwise too weak to control the activities of the displaced populations on its territory (or when the international community creates a sanctuary).

Refugee camps may also serve as safe havens, particularly if international organizations help create them, making it difficult politically for government forces to attack there. In such cases, refugee camps are liable to become safe places for the combatants’ dependents, a base for organizing, and a source of food and shelter for fighters.

The existence of a contiguous guerrilla safe haven often leads a civil war to escalate into a larger interstate conflict. Government troops cross borders to attack insurgent camps and bases. In so doing, they often confront border forces, air defense assets, and other state security units protecting or providing insurgents with assistance. Escalation may also occur when government forces have punished the sponsoring state directly. Israel regularly held sovereign backers of Palestinian groups responsible for insurgents’ cross-border attacks, using this to justify raids against a wide range of targets in the host country. The Israeli defense forces attacked targets in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan—and on occasion as far afield as Tunisia. This reciprocal pattern of insurgent support and Israeli response greatly contributed to overall Arab-Israeli tension and helped spark the 1956 Suez Crisis and 1967 Six-Day War (Morris, 1994, pp. 340–418, 429–431).

The right to transit relates to the possession of a safe haven. When rebels can transit neighboring states (either through the connivance of an allied government or because of its weakness) it becomes far harder for their adversaries to defeat them. In some instances, a state may also permit insurgents to transit a country or receive support from another backer indirectly. Syria has allowed Iran to send soldiers to Lebanon and funnel weapons to Hezbollah through its territory, while the Zagreb government permitted Bosnian Croats and Muslims to receive arms that were destined for insurgent forces via Croatia. Such support is often a low-cost form of assistance, allowing the transiting state to control the aid flow and even sometimes to divert it, while still maintaining some distance from the insurgent cause.

**Financial Resources**

Money has a powerful effect on insurgent movements: It can be used to buy weapons, bribe local officials, pay operatives, write propaganda, provide a social network that builds a popular base, and otherwise fulfill myriad purposes. Insurgents are often able to acquire some of what they need via theft or from local supporters. However, they also require cash to acquire safe houses, procure weapons and ammunition, pay bribes, meet legal expenses and, in some cases, to pay stipends to militants. As J. Bowyer Bell (1998, p. 138) has noted, “money is a real and persistent problem. The movement commanders must pay their way, pay for the prisoners’ families, pay for newsprint. . . . There seldom seems enough money.”

Some of these funds can be generated internally, through bank robberies, kidnappings, and in the case of Sendero Luminoso in Peru and Colombia’s FARC, through “革命ary taxes” imposed
on drug traffickers. But given that most insurgencies take place in impoverished areas, guerrilla movements often are forced to look abroad for funds they need to support their armed struggle. States can supply money, but in the post–Cold War era, diasporas and foreign sympathizers have also proven to be important sources of cash. In some instances, insurgent movements have become self-financing, at least in part. Such financing can take the form of legitimate business enterprises abroad, such as small-scale “mom and pop” shops selling items such as T-shirts and jewelry. A number of insurgencies, such as the RUF in Sierra Leone, Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, and the Turkish PKK, also have engaged in highly profitable illicit activities, including arms trafficking, gem smuggling, and the transportation of illegal immigrants.

States often play a critical role in funding insurgencies. Hezbollah is an excellent example. The group has used Iranian financial support, conservatively estimated at $100 million a year, both to maintain its fighting strength and to create a vast socioeconomic network for its supporters, a combination of which has greatly enhanced its prestige and influence (Ranstorp, 1997, pp. 33–48, 78–86).

In contrast to safe havens, which are primarily offered by states, diasporas often can provide considerable financial assistance while creative insurgent groups can at times finance themselves. Funds given by diasporas, both voluntarily and through extortion, and wealthy individuals have been vital to the success of the LTTE, the PIRA, Sikh militants, and the mujahedeen, to cite a few examples. Through a combination of fundraising, legitimate businesses, and illicit enterprises, the organizations have been able to generate staggering sums sufficient to bankroll their armed struggles almost indefinitely. LTTE revenues are estimated at $48–72 million a year, while UNITA is estimated to generate $80–150 million per year, largely from diamond smuggling and other illegal ventures. These figures were dwarfed by those for the PKK, which during the height of its power in the mid-1990s was generating an estimated $200–500 million annually (Radu, 2001, p. 55). Such sums are even more impressive considering they will be spent primarily in economically underdeveloped areas of the world, where U.S. dollars, British pounds, German deutschmarks, and other hard currencies have a powerful impact.

**Political Support and Propaganda**

State patrons often provide important political support for insurgent movements. Cataloguing the entire range of this type of backing is beyond the scope of this study. However, this span includes everything from giving insurgents access to the state’s diplomatic apparatus and pushing for recognition in international fora, to encouraging aid agencies to provide assistance to the group directly, to otherwise underwriting insurgent causes by portraying and lobbying for them as a legitimate voice of a particular people or ideology. Moreover, political support often involves denying assistance to the government the insurgents oppose. Diasporas at times indirectly contribute to state political support, using their electoral or financial clout to encourage their host governments to back an insurgency or oppose government counterinsurgency campaigns.

Political support often has important consequences both seen and unseen. Arab and Muslim countries have long backed the Palestinian cause, using their influence to gain aid dollars for displaced persons and refugees; to press other countries to boycott Israel; to encourage recognition of the PLO as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people; and otherwise to place Palestinian grievances on the international agenda. In this way, the Palestinian cause engaged the superpowers during the Cold War, remaining a staple feature of regional politics even though the Palestinian movement itself was relatively weak militarily. In contrast, although the Taliban’s military successes have led it to dominate over 90 percent of Afghanistan, the combined opposition of Russia, the United States, Iran, China, and other adversaries of the movement have

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1 During the mid-1990s, the LTTE reportedly was banking an estimated $650,000 a month in Switzerland alone (Davis, 1996a).
continually deprived it of recognition as Afghanistan’s legitimate government and blunted Taliban efforts to obtain seats in international organizations.

Of course, the level of political support depends on both the state’s commitment to the insurgent movement and the power it generally wields. The backing of a major power can, for example, hamstring UN attempts to contain or defeat a rebel movement. Russian support of the Serb cause in the Balkans is an especially notorious recent case. Pakistan, by contrast, has so far failed to gain wide recognition or support for either the Taliban or the various Kashmiri insurgent groups its sponsors largely because Islamabad lacks Moscow’s diplomatic clout.

In our judgment, political support is particularly critical once an insurgency is established. Weak rebel groups rarely receive more than token political support. Outside governments or diaspora groups, however, may champion more successful insurgent causes. This may involve recognizing the insurgents as a legitimate government, pressuring the regime they are battling and denying them access to weapons of money, or otherwise trying to give the insurgency access to the benefits of being a legitimate political entity while denying the same to their adversary. Such support assists the insurgents in material terms (more aid, a weaker adversary) and politically, by demonstrating to their followers that resistance is succeeding while undermining support for the state.

Propaganda is a critical instrument for generating political support and fundraising for every contemporary insurgent movement, both within its theater of operations and among a broader international audience. Effective propaganda can help legitimize insurgent goals, aid in fundraising and recruitment activities, discredit opposing governments, and internationalize the armed struggle by bringing a movement’s message to a broader audience.

States often assist insurgents in generating propaganda, helping rebel groups portray themselves as innocent victims who deserve assistance, as pious Muslims worthy of financial support, as devoted socialists, etc. Outside support can help make insurgent propaganda more potent in at least two ways. First, external actors can provide the technical expertise and resources that underground groups lack. States may provide insurgents with useful access to radio, television, the Internet and other media through which they can effectively spread their message. Second, and more important, sympathetic states, front groups, ideological sympathizers, and diaspora members can serve as transmission belts for insurgent propaganda. Governments battling insurgencies are likely to find it far more difficult to control the propaganda activities carried out by proxies, supporters, and state sponsors across international borders.²

Although states continue to support their proxies with propaganda, non-state actors have become much more significant sources of this type of assistance in recent years. Across the world, front groups and ideological sympathizers publish newspapers, books and magazines, and maintain web sites aimed at promoting insurgent causes.³ In some cases, as with the PKK, sympathizers

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² During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States frequently aided insurgencies by helping them develop and transmit propaganda. Statements by important foreign leaders expressing support for an insurgency or its goals played an important part of superpower propaganda campaigns on behalf of their guerrilla proxies, and such support was strongly associated with the success of insurgent campaigns during the Cold War (Defense Systems, Inc., 1986, p. 36). The study analyzed 132 campaigns drawn from 15 insurgencies during 1945–1981. Fourteen types of assistance, ranging from cadre training to heavy military equipment, were identified. Of these 14 forms of assistance, propaganda, international recognition, and financial aid were determined to be “very strongly associated with campaign success” (pp. 35–36).

³ Most insurgencies of any consequence, such as the FARC, the LTTE, and the Kurdish underground movements, aggressively use the Internet to promote their cause, particularly internationally. For typical examples of insurgent web sites, see www.ozgurluk.org; www.contrast.org/mirrors/farc; and www.eelam.com.
have operated radio and television stations designed to further their respective movements. The precise impact of positive publicity and propaganda is difficult to gauge; however, it does appear that such assistance remains a vital element in the success of many of post–Cold War insurgencies, not least by legitimating a group and its cause and augmenting its general ability to fundraise abroad.

**Direct Military Support**
States at times provide direct military support, using their own armies to fight alongside insurgents. Not surprisingly, such direct assistance is rare, but when it occurs it usually has a tremendous impact on the fighting. The Taliban, the Bosnian Croats, the Abkhaz, the forces of Laurent Kabila, pro-CIS forces in Tajikistan, and several other insurgent movements have all gained an outright victory over their rivals—a relatively rare phenomenon in the annals of insurgency—largely because of the backing of neighboring state military forces. Without this support, it is likely that these movements would have been completely defeated or, at best, would have clung to survival in the face of superior state forces.

Outside military forces fundamentally change the nature of an insurgency’s struggle. No longer is it a battle of guerrillas against armies while rival institutions compete for the loyalty and cooperation of the populace. When states step in, the confrontation becomes more comparable to interstate war than civil conflict. Armies fight directly in conventional clashes, while guerrilla conflict often assumes secondary importance. The level of weaponry increases tremendously, from small arms to advanced air and land systems. The insurgents also are far more likely to be able to conduct massive and coordinated conventional attacks, enabling them to occupy territory, outgun and outmaneuver rival forces, and otherwise conduct operations that were previously beyond their capabilities.

In general, state forces are better armed, organized, and led, and typically more able to conduct sophisticated operations. As a result, the scope and scale of insurgent capabilities can increase exponentially, allowing previous weak groups that simply sought to survive to develop into a genuine security threat. The Congo experience illustrates how potent direct intervention can be. Before Kabila obtained Rwandan and Ugandan backing, he was an obscure guerrilla leader who posed little danger to the Zairian regime. With the support of troops from Kigali and Kampala, however, Kabila quickly began to pose a direct threat to the Mobutu regime, eventually overthrowing it and installing himself as president of the newly constituted Democratic Republic of the Congo. When Kabila became less responsive to the needs of Rwanda and Uganda, the two countries acted to remove their former puppet—and would have succeeded had it not been for the timely intervention of other states, including Zimbabwe and Angola.

**VALUABLE FORMS OF SUPPORT**

**Training**

To become effective on the battlefield, militants must be given weapons training and instruction in small-unit tactics. Although this is often provided by the militants themselves, the relevant training skills are not always available in-house. On some occasions, insurgents must turn to outsiders for support. Particularly in the early days of a conflict, the group may lack a cadre of skilled, experienced fighters who can pass on their knowledge to new recruits. In addition, training is often required in the case of more-specialized techniques, such as terrorist tradecraft, small-unit tactics, and the use of more-exotic weapons—such as man-portable air defense systems or, as has been alleged in the case of training camps operated in Afghanistan, chemical weapons (Miller, 2000, p. 1). As is the case with external manpower support, such assistance can help bolster the legitimacy and credibility of an insurgent movement by demonstrating the commitment of outsiders.
Pakistan stands out as a country particularly active in training insurgent groups. Islamabad’s assistance, provided through the ISI, is rudimentary, according to public accounts, and consists primarily of training recruits in the use of explosives and small arms such as the AK-47 (Kanwal, 1999, pp. 55–83). However, Indian sources claim that supplemental training is far more advanced and includes instruction in advanced explosive skills, forced entry attacks, intelligence tradecraft, and other difficult skills. Similarly, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps units helped transform Hezbollah from a rag-tag group of poorly armed terrorists to one of the world’s most formidable insurgent movements. Tehran’s forces instructed Hezbollah guerrillas on a variety of weapons systems, intelligence gathering, and conducting small-unit attacks. Given that many insurgent movements face state militaries that are often poorly equipped and unmotivated, even limited increases in armed effectiveness can have an impressive payoff vis-à-vis enemy government forces.

Non-state groups have also supplied training assistance. Hezbollah, often acting as Iran’s surrogate, has trained Islamic insurgents and terrorists who are active throughout the Muslim world. Indian Maoists, for example, reportedly have provided military training to communist insurgents operating in Nepal (IISS Strategic Comments, 2000, p. 2).

It appears, however, that the most effective insurgent groups are self-taught. As a movement develops, it is able to create cadres who in turn train new recruits. In certain parts of the world, such as Latin America, insurgencies in their formative stages also have included former soldiers who have been able to impart their military skills to fellow combatants. Once a group has mastered the fundamentals of waging an insurgency, it becomes a candidate for training in more advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures. In Afghanistan, members of Usama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda (“The Base”) organization reportedly have trained Islamist militants in specialized techniques such as counterintelligence, kidnapping, and urban guerrilla operations.4

**Weapons and Materiel**

Small arms are any insurgency’s defining technology. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union often helped their proxies meet logistical requirements by supplying weapons and equipment. Many smaller states also provided weapons to underground movements during the Cold War. In the mid-1980s, for example, Libya supplied hundreds of rifles and handguns and more than 2,500 kg of Semtex explosive to the PIRA, which gave the organization the ability to sustain its terrorist campaign on a virtually indefinite basis.5 But even in the periods of the most sustained super-power assistance, insurgents were sometimes compelled to obtain arms with little or no assistance from their patrons. In El Salvador, for example, insurgents used weapons captured from the army, bought on the black market, or obtained through sophisticated bartering with East European or African countries (Radu and Tismaneanu, 1990, p. 192).

In some respect, the end of the Cold War has created a worldwide surplus of small arms that made such weaponry both more plentiful and cheaper (see Rana, 1995). Guerrillas usually are also able to acquire some of what they need through theft; raids on police, paramilitary, and army outposts; from corrupt members of the security forces or sympathizers within their ranks; or from adversaries who simply leave their weapons behind after an attack. Materiel, including ammunition, food, and fuel, usually is readily available, either by theft, purchase, or from supporters.

Fortunately for insurgents with financial resources, international arms markets are brimming with small arms, and governments often have, at best, limited control over their borders, particularly if

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4 Engelberg (2001), p. 13. According to one published account, 50,000 to 70,000 militants from 55 countries have been trained by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (Miller, 2000).

5 Horgan and Taylor (1999), p. 5; O’Callaghan (2000). O’Callaghan was a former commanding officer in the PIRA’s Southern Command.
they are facing a strong insurgency.\textsuperscript{6} Gunaratna (2000a) has described one important source of weapons for Asian-Pacific militant organizations:

The economic decline in former Soviet bloc countries meant that financial rather than security considerations determined the sale of weapons. As a result, some [groups] gained access to automatic weapons and explosives at competitive prices. Similarly, access to dual technologies—GPS [global positioning systems], satellite imagery, radar, secure communication, computers, sea scooters, speed boat[s], microlights and drones—enabled terrorist groups to challenge previously formidable land and naval forces.

The illicit international market for small arms such as assault rifles, machine guns, and shoulder-fired missiles is worth $2–10 billion a year, according to a 1998 estimate (\textit{IISS Strategic Comments}, 1998, p. 1). This vast armaments bazaar has become an option for those insurgents whose local sources are inadequate. While some groups continue to receive weapons and equipment from state and non-state sponsors, the existence of such markets means that insurgents are not necessarily compelled to turn to outside patrons for arms and other supplies.

In some circumstances, however, external provision of arms and materiel is quite valuable. Certainly, when local dealers do not have access to the full range of hardware and equipment sought by guerrillas, outside assistance is valuable. In addition, weapons provided by outsiders free rebel groups to spend their scarce funds on other needs. Moreover, in campaigns against capable counterinsurgent forces, it may be difficult for insurgents to acquire weapons without outside support. Security services may monitor borders and local markets and closely scrutinize local military forces to avoid illicit weapons diversions. At times, the police and army may be less willing to sell their weapons. In these cases, insurgents may turn to state or non-state sponsors, or may seek to buy weapons on international markets that are beyond the reach of the adversary’s security forces.

**MINOR FORMS OF SUPPORT**

**Fighters**

Skilled, dedicated, and experienced fighters are the fundamental requirement of any successful rebel movement. By definition, insurgencies are protracted political-military campaigns involving the use of irregular forces. To achieve their objectives, insurgent movements need sufficient numbers of motivated combatants capable of performing credibly against government security forces and in some cases, anti-insurgent paramilitary entities. Recruiting suitable manpower will be a concern at each stage of the insurgency. If government forces are proficient, they will inflict casualties. Counterintelligence operations, psychological operations, civic action, and other components of a well-crafted and well-executed counterinsurgency effort are also likely to deplete guerrilla ranks. Even when counterinsurgency efforts are poor, arrests, defections, simple exhaustion and, in some cases, diminished commitment to the cause will also serve to reduce the number of combatants.

Foreigners often directly aid insurgents by providing additional manpower to supplement native insurgents. Conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kashmir, and Kosovo, have all seen an influx of guest Islamic militants, many of whom have acted as a crucial anchor for fighting that occurs on the ground (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 2000). The participation of foreign combatants contributes to the insurgents’ goal of internationalizing their armed struggle and provides additional manpower to the native insurgents (see Engelberg, 2001, p. 1). The involvement of guest militants offers concrete evidence that these insurgencies are more than mere local conflicts, but were part of a regional or global campaign on behalf of Islam. Sometimes

\textsuperscript{6} For a review, see Boutwell and Klare (1999).
personnel with particularly rare skills (e.g., computer programming, demolitions) may be lacking from the local manpower pool.

In general, rebel groups seldom rely on outsiders for manpower, and those that do risk disaster. If an insurgency cannot attract fighters, it is often a sign that the movement is poorly led or does not have a message that appeals to enough people. In addition, local combatants are often far more adept at providing intelligence, gaining access to materiel, or otherwise helping sustain the movement. Seldom are large numbers of outside fighters available to most insurgencies; they represent at best a limited manpower pool. Finally, outside volunteers may be fickle and move on to another insurgency if it suits their goals and needs. Even when the outsiders are refugees or from a diaspora, they may be out of touch with local conditions and attitudes. The PLO, for example, was long criticized for its perceived aloofness from the struggle in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

For many insurgencies, however, the costs of extensive participation from outside militants may sometimes outweigh their benefits. For example, a large influx of foreign combatants can erode the credibility of a nationalist or separatist movement. Outsiders may also bring with them attitudes and behavior that harm the insurgent cause. Indian sources claim that early mujahedin militants participating in the Kashmir conflict were undisciplined; they alienated local population through acts of extortion and other forms of abuse (Grau and Jalali, 1999, pp. 66–71). Such abuses, like any human rights violations involving insurgent forces, carry the additional possibility of undermining the movement’s legitimacy in the eyes of current and potential supporters abroad. In addition, foreign combatants often have different goals than local fighters (e.g., spreading Islam versus self-determination), which can create internal dissension or dispute.

**Intelligence**

To be effective, it is essential for any insurgent movement to understand the nature, objectives, and capabilities of its adversaries. This understanding includes the size and composition of security forces, the strengths and weaknesses of the opposition’s leadership and strategy, and the level of the population’s support for the underground movement as well as the government. In some instances, insurgents may turn to outsiders to provide intelligence that is difficult or costly to acquire themselves. The RUF, for example, received intelligence from the NPFL that helped in its struggle with Freetown.

Outside provision of intelligence, however, is seldom decisive and often of only limited value. With most movements, the insurgents themselves have better information on local conditions than any outside sponsors or supporters could provide. In any clandestine movement, members are also part-time intelligence agents, operating among the population, gathering information, and conveying it to higher authorities. Insurgents typically are able to draw on a large network of informants and local sympathizers who can provide information useful to the cause. Many movements, according to Bell (1999, p. 159), have been able to rely on “a spy in the castle, a policeman with a rebel heart, a clerk with access to the needed files. . . . The facts are there for those who will invest time and take a risk. The shoeshine boy outside the presidential palace sooner or later will find out something useful.”

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7 This characterization excludes direct intervention by a state’s military forces on behalf of an insurgency (e.g., Rwanda’s intervention in the Congo or Russia’s intervention in Tajikistan). In such cases, foreign support replaces the insurgency itself rather than augmenting it.

8 This generalization does not always hold. For some insurgencies, intelligence support provided by outside actors has been a contributor to the effectiveness of political-military campaigns. In Kashmir, for example, direct tactical intelligence supplied by Pakistan’s ISI reportedly has given Islamist militant groups an increased capability that has helped drive the conflict with India to a near stalemate (Evans, 2000, p.78).
In short, insurgent groups are able to acquire much of the intelligence they need on their own. Insurgents, because of their access to sources in the area of conflict, are most likely suppliers of information to external supporters rather than recipients of intelligence from outside actors.9

Organizational Aid
When outsiders help an insurgency organize, the group is often better able to attract recruits, sustain operations, or otherwise perform basic functions essential to long-term success. Such assistance is particularly important in the early days of an insurgency. Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah, as previously noted, are an example of such a case. With somewhat less success though, Iran also pushed various Afghan Shi’i factors to unite into the Hezb-e Wahdat organization, increasing their overall clout and effectiveness. Islamist groups helped HAMAS organize, and various Arab states assisted in the creation of the PLO.

Governments often provide insurgent groups with organizational aid that takes many forms: attempts to broker deals among different organizational factions, assistance with recruitment, provision of financial incentives to encourage cooperation among opposition rivals, dissemination of lessons learned from previous insurgencies, and facilitation of propaganda. The United States, for example, has helped Iraqi groups unite under the banner of the Iraqi National Congress, lending at least a nominal coherence to their anti-Saddam efforts (Byman, 1999, pp. 23–37). Iran has also assisted Hezbollah in setting up a vast support network that provides recruits, intelligence, funds, and influence in Lebanese politics. Equally, the backers of various highly fractious Afghan movements helped them form the NA in 1996, solidifying and integrating opposition to the Taliban. Strong insurgencies, however, must soon organize themselves or face serious risks. The Lebanese Hezbollah, for example, retained close ties to Iran but has steadily begun to manage its own affairs and operations. As a result, it has become a far more effective actor on the local political scene, able to tailor its operations—and at times rein them in—to improve the group’s local popularity. Similarly, both HAMAS and the PLO became effective actors in part because they distanced themselves from the organizations that initially backed them, ensuring that local officials managed their affairs.

Inspiration
Inspiration from abroad often helps get an insurgent movement off the ground, but seldom sustains it for long. Marxism, Islamic radicalism, and other transnational credos have often inspired insurgents, encouraging them to resist government and transform society. In addition, the success of an ethnic group in advancing its cause in one country can convince other organizations in the same country or in neighboring areas that they can change their status in society and that violence can be an effective tool (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, pp. 25–27).

Sometimes a state’s rhetoric or experience will inspire insurgents even when other forms of aid are limited. Such indirect support can demonstrate the viability of armed resistance, offer a particular organizing model, or illustrate the force of ideas. The Iranian revolution, for instance, inspired Muslim militants worldwide. Even though many Sunni militants opposed Iran’s Shi’a government and distinct Islamic credo, the example of religion as a potent means to overthrowing a despotic authoritarian regime led a host of Sunni Muslim organizations to try to emulate Iran’s revolution as a useful model.

Even when it does not materialize, the hope of outside backing can make rebellion more likely. A state’s rhetorical support, for example, may inspire rebels to take a stand, believing that assistance is forthcoming. In such circumstances, potential insurgents may believe that the costs

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9 In the northeastern Indian state of Assam, for example, the separatist United Liberation Front of Assam has reportedly provided its ISI sponsors with information on Indian troop movements from the northeast to the western and northern borders with Pakistan (Bedi, 2000, p. 32).
of resistance will be few and the promise of success more real (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, pp. 26–27). This type of inspiration is often deadly. Although outside promises may lead insurgents to remain firm in the face of government pressure, they can also cause them to avoid compromise and engage in costly provocations, even when facing probable defeat.

Over time, insurgents must develop an ideology and message that has local appeal. A blind commitment to a transnational ideology may inspire fighters for a time, but will inhibit indigenous recruitment and prevent a movement from capitalizing on local opportunities. Although a successful revolution or other heady success can increase the attraction of a particular ideology, its popular appeal almost invariably fades with time. A failure to go beyond foreign inspiration therefore equals disaster for any insurgent movement’s potential longevity.

As the above review makes clear, insurgents’ requirements vary tremendously. The assistance insurgents receive thus varies in value according to the needs of the particular group and its struggle. Almost all groups can benefit from a safe haven and diplomatic assistance. Some groups, however, do not need foreign assistance to buy arms because they can be obtained locally. Others may require training, while some can train themselves. In gauging the effects of outside assistance, it is critical to recognize that its value is directly related to what insurgents can and cannot acquire by themselves.

THE COSTS OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

For insurgents, assistance from external sponsors entails costs as well as benefits. As noted above, foreign manpower, while helping to fill depleted guerrilla ranks, can also lead to a loss of nationalist credibility and, if human rights abuses occur, an erosion of local and international support. A large influx of cash to insurgents can contribute to corruption, feuding, and internal discord, as with the Afghan and Nicaraguan resistance forces during the 1980s (Bonner, 1987, p. 342). Foreign assistance in the form of international sanctuaries, while often extremely useful to guerrillas, can also have a negative impact. In moving abroad, insurgents risk cutting themselves off from their base of popular support. Resting and recuperating across a border, while providing obvious benefits, also carries the danger of operational isolation from potentially lucrative political and military targets (Laqueur, 1998, p. 393). Other forms of assistance, such as the provision of weapons, can have a distorting and negative effect on an insurgency’s military tactics.

An alliance with a foreign power can also lead to more-violent government crackdowns on the insurgents or their perceived civilian supporters. The government and its domestic supporters are more likely to view the insurgents not simply as rebels, but as traitors. This is especially true if the government fighting the insurgency is also battling an international war with state supporters of the insurgents. Such associations contributed to mass killings of Kurds in Iraq, who had worked with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Previously in history, Turkish fear of Armenian collusion with Russia during World War I was a major impetus behind the Armenian genocide.

More broadly, external aid can lead to a decrease in an insurgency’s freedom of action. Outside patrons typically seek some measure of control in exchange for their political, financial, and

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10 For a discussion of this phenomenon with regard to radical Islam, perhaps the most potent transnational ideology today with the exception of liberal democracy, see Roy (1994).

11 During the 1980s, for example, the Afghan resistance had ready access to foreign supplied longer-range weapons, such as 82-mm mortars and 107-mm rockets. As a result, resistance forces were able to minimize their own casualties by conducting frequent long-range barrages. However, such barrages were often ineffective against Soviet forces, and came at the expense of more potentially fruitful operations designed to take ground or defeat adversary units (Isby, 1992, p. 207).
logistical investments (Bell, 1999, p. 166). However, insurgents—particularly those driven by strong nationalist sensibilities—generally are reluctant to allow their movement to fall under foreign domination.\textsuperscript{12} Movements and their patrons often find themselves at odds over questions of strategy and tactics, political objectives, and the tempo and nature of political-military operations.

External support can also be fickle. Typically, second-generation members of diasporas are less enthusiastic about armed struggles than are their elders, and so fundraising by insurgents within those communities may prove to be more difficult over time. The LTTE, for example, is beginning to experience increased difficulty raising funds among younger members of the overseas Tamil community, many of whom have been absorbed into their host societies and retain little, if any, affinity for the Eelam cause (Ranetunge, n.d.).

In some instances, a dependency on state sponsors can have devastating consequences. A regime’s goals and priorities are likely to change over time, and in some cases, a state will abandon an insurgency to take advantage of new strategic opportunities. Iran, for example, has both supported and reined in Iraq’s SAIRI, varying its backing according to its geopolitical needs. Thus, Iran pushed SAIRI to undertake often-ruinous operations during its eight-year war with Iraq but provided, at best, tepid backing in 1991 when Saddam’s regime was reeling following the Gulf War. Despite Saddam’s weakness, Tehran wanted to avoid even an appearance of meddling in order to deprive the U.S.-led coalition of a pretext for continued intervention in Iraq, or even in Iran itself.

As important as external support can be to a guerrilla movement, it can also impose damaging and unacceptable burdens on an underground organization. In ideological, religious, and nationalist insurgencies, militants are risking their lives, and possibly those of their friends and families, to further a set of beliefs. Thus, self-reliance, dedication to the struggle, and self-denial are extremely useful qualities in rebel groups. Excessive reliance on foreign assistance can undercut these virtues and diminish the martial capabilities of a guerrilla movement, as demonstrated by the PLO’s poor performance against the Israeli military after years of comfortable sanctuary in Syrian-controlled Lebanon. As insurgency analyst Gerard Chaliand (1987, p. 58) has cautioned, “every seriously organized guerrilla movement is well advised to rely mainly on its own resources.”

In general, dependence on refugees, diasporas, and other non-state supporters carries fewer risks for insurgencies, even though the type of support these actors can provide is limited. Diasporas and refugees tend to follow the lead of rebel movements rather than view them as temporary allies or proxies to be controlled. As a result, sudden changes in funding or political support are far less likely.

\textsuperscript{12} Rice (1988), p. 78. However, it should be noted that in some cases, such as Kashmir, the state sponsor has found it extremely difficult to exercise authority over its client (Bose, 1999, p. 163).
Confronting Iraq: US Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War

Dan Byman and Matthew Waxman

- Excerpt - Summary
Successful coercion, a cornerstone of an effective foreign policy, depends on the proper application of military force. Despite its overwhelming military power, however, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. To help understand this problem, this study assesses attempts to coerce Iraq since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. Although Iraq remains hostile to the United States and its allies, Baghdad has also repeatedly compromised, and at times even caved, in response to U.S. and allied pressure. The story behind this mixed record illustrates Baghdad’s strengths and weaknesses and highlights general lessons about limits on the U.S. ability to bring its full power to bear when coercing foes.

AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
Coercion is the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would. Coercion is typically broken down into two categories: deterrence (stopping an undesired action from occurring) and compellence (reversing an undesired action). In practice, however, distinguishing between these two is difficult. This report draws on both these categories to inform its overall conclusions about coercion.

Coercion is a dynamic process. Just as the United States or another coercer tries to shape Iraq’s or another adversary’s behavior, so too does Iraq try to reduce the pressure imposed on it. Adversaries typically try to counter-coerce the United States, inflicting military, political, or diplomatic costs to force the United States to drop its threats. Any assessment of the U.S.-Iraq confrontation must focus equally on the U.S. capacity to apply pressure and on Iraq’s capacity to neutralize or reverse it.

Coercive success is often difficult to measure. The same action can have both positive and negative effects, particularly when long-term ramifications are taken into account. Many past studies of coercion have paid inadequate attention to the range of goals pursued by the coercing power. With the same action, the United States can succeed in forcing Iraqi troops off the Kuwaiti border even as it fails to stop Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) programs. Any study of U.S. attempts to coerce Iraq must recognize the many, often competing, U.S. goals in the region—both short-term and long-term.

Taken together, these points suggest that successful coercion has as much to do with constraints on the coercer as with vulnerabilities of the adversary and that the balance of constraints and vulnerabilities can change over time. Coercing Iraq is not just about threatening it with air strikes and sanctions but about the interaction of two political systems within a broader international context.

IRAQ AS AN ADVERSARY
To understand why coercion succeeds or fails in a given case, it is necessary to understand what drives an adversary’s decisionmaking. Iraq is thoroughly dominated by Saddam Husayn and his
henchmen: their vulnerabilities and aspirations are, for the purpose of coercion, Iraq’s vulnerabilities and aspirations.

Saddam ruthlessly maintains his hold on power, and keeping power is the dominant concern that drives his regime’s decisionmaking. All positions of importance are in the hands of carefully selected individuals, who are usually from trusted Sunni Arab tribes or families. Using his numerous and overlapping security services and select military units, the Iraqi dictator has eliminated any potential rivals. These services and units suppress popular unrest and guard against a coup or assassination attempt.

In addition to fear and repression, Saddam uses political measures to solidify his rule. He tries to curry favor with core Arab nationalist supporters by pursuing Iraqi hegemony in the region and Sunni Arab domination within Iraq, objectives that Saddam believes in but also supports for instrumental reasons. Saddam also uses financial rewards to co-opt leading tribal figures and employs the media to trumpet his identity as a powerful leader to impress supporters.

Iraq’s strategic objectives reflect both Saddam’s personal ambitions and the desires of his core supporters. Four related goals drive Iraq’s strategy today: maintaining the current regime’s hold on power, ending UN sanctions, achieving regional hegemony, and building an NBC weapons capability. These goals reflect Saddam’s desire to end pressures that highlight Iraq’s current weakness and his ambition to lead the Arab world.

THE HISTORICAL RECORD
The United States has pursued several, often-competing objectives with regard to Iraq. First, the United States has tried to prevent any Iraqi aggression by keeping Iraq weak and maintaining a strong regional presence. Second, it has sought to reverse Iraq’s NBC programs. Third, it has pressed to change the Iraqi regime. A fourth, negative objective has also shaped U.S. policy: preventing instability among its allies that might result from U.S. actions. These four objectives underlie U.S. attempts to coerce Iraq since the Gulf War.

The United States, however, does not have a free hand in its Iraq policy. Washington has long feared that the sudden collapse of Saddam’s regime would lead to chaos in Iraq and provide an opening for Iran to increase its influence. Washington seeks to keep its regional and international allies behind its policies, and they often differ on the correct way to confront Saddam. The United States also is ambivalent about its commitment to Iraq’s Kurds and Shi’a. Although Washington feels a humanitarian interest in their well being, it does not want its regional policies tied to these communities. Similar ambivalence can be found in U.S. attitudes toward sanctions. Sanctions are viewed as an effective tool for squeezing Baghdad, but the United States has tried to reduce their impact on the Iraqi populace. Finally, domestic politics shape U.S. actions: no administration can afford charges that it is “soft” on Iraq. Political pressures provide U.S. decisionmakers with military flexibility, but they also limit policy options during crises and when planning for future dangers.

With these objectives and constraints in mind, a close look at the following eight attempts to coerce Iraq or to deter hostile Iraqi actions, sometimes in response to coercion, reveals a mixed U.S. track record:

- Saddam’s acceptance of the initial UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspections at the end of Desert Storm in 1991.
- The imposition of a protectorate over Kurdish-populated areas of northern Iraq in 1991.
- The creation of a no-fly zone over southern Iraq in 1992.
- Saddam’s 1992–1993 defiance of both the no-fly zone and UNSCOM.
- The U.S. response to the 1994 Iraqi buildup near Kuwait.
Among the positive results, Saddam accepted intrusive UNSCOM inspections for many years after the Gulf War, a safe haven in northern Iraq, and no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. More broadly, Iraq has generally refrained from aggression against its neighbors. But despite these concessions, Saddam at times defied the no-fly zones, invaded the northern safe haven, and systematically deceived inspectors.

Coercive threats have contributed to the successful containment of Iraq. Iraq’s regional influence, while increased from 1991, remains limited. A robust U.S. regional presence, a rapid surge capacity, and a willingness to use limited force probably have convinced Saddam that regional aggression will not produce results. Coercive threats contributed to containment by maintaining no-fly and no-drive zones and demonstrating regional unity in the face of Iraq’s attempts to intimidate its neighbors.

Stopping Iraq’s NBC programs has proven far more difficult, but coercive threats have achieved some success. Iraq probably has not attained a nuclear weapons capability, and progress on its biological and chemical programs has probably halted—making this effort at least a partial success when we recognize that, without UNSCOM inspections, sanctions, and other measures, Iraq would probably have a nuclear weapon and a range of biological weapons. Nevertheless, the broader U.S. goals of discovering the extent of Iraq’s programs, destroying them, and preventing Iraq from reconstituting them in the future have not been met. Inspectors never discovered the true scope of Iraq’s programs, much less destroyed them. Effective inspections ended early in 1998, and even the pretense of arms control has now been abandoned. Although information is scarce, Saddam is probably trying to continue some programs already and certainly will do so once sanctions and isolation end. While threats of force have persuaded Saddam at various times to accept inspections and instances of force have knocked out some of his NBC program resources, the various U.S. actions have not substantially induced a change in Saddam’s long-term policies towards acquiring such an arsenal.

Maximal U.S. goals regarding regime change were not met, but Washington’s efforts did not destabilize U.S. regional allies as some policymakers feared. Efforts to change the regime—by encouraging Iraqi elites to support a coup or the Iraqi populace to overthrow Saddam—probably are farther from success than at any time this decade. Saddam’s position at home appears stronger than in the past, and the Iraqi opposition is fragmented. Coercive threats nevertheless made this goal more realistic. The protected zone in the north, and the humiliations of air strikes, contributed to disgruntlement among Saddam’s followers, though not enough to induce a regime change. The United States avoided instability among its regional allies while making the limited progress described above. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, while hardly tranquil, remain loyal U.S. allies. They have supported several U.S. operations in the region without suffering domestic unrest.

U.S. domestic support has been strong with regard to the use of force against Iraq. In general, both the Bush and Clinton administrations enjoyed considerable support from Congress and the U.S. public for their efforts to punish Iraqi aggression and end Iraq’s NBC programs. In addition to supporting a large U.S. military presence in the region, the American people have strongly backed policymakers’ calls to combat proliferation among rogue regimes. If anything, the American people and U.S. Congress are often more hawkish than the administration leadership. As a result, the President at times has been criticized for not threatening or using enough force.
Allied and international support proved far less consistent than U.S. domestic support and posed a major challenge for U.S. policy. Although U.S. allies in Europe and other major powers initially strongly supported attempts to coerce Iraq, over time France, Russia, and China became increasingly critical of U.S. policy in the region and sought to end or curtail sanctions and inspections. Regional allies often did not support U.S. strikes on Iraq or sought to limit their extent to avoid criticism at home. Lack of consistent regional or allied support undermined the credibility of U.S. threats, encourage Saddam to defy U.S. ultimatums, and restricted U.S. military options.

IRAQ’S VULNERABILITIES AND COUNTERMOVES
The various U.S. attempts to coerce Iraq reveal that Saddam is most vulnerable, and therefore most likely to give in, when his power base is effectively threatened. Maintaining the support and loyalty of key tribes, Baath party officials, military officers, and other elites is Saddam’s overriding concern. When Saddam’s power base can be effectively targeted, he is more likely to limit his foreign policy provocations, unless restraint would jeopardize his position at home. After Operation Desert Storm, Saddam’s domestic position was weak, and he feared that another blow from the anti-Iraq coalition would shatter it. His response to subsequent threats and weak air and missile strikes in the following years exposed his fear that coalition military strikes might discredit his regime. U.S. military strikes and other forms of pressure that risked humiliating Saddam, demonstrating his inability to respond to U.S. pressure and threatening his control over his power base, proved effective at forcing concessions from the Iraqi regime.

Fear of elite dissatisfaction also helps explain instances when Saddam has issued provocations or refused to back down in the face of U.S. pressure: Saddam was most intransigent when acceding to U.S. demands would decrease support among his power base. In 1996, for example, Saddam saw an opportunity to regain stature in the eyes of core supporters by ordering incursions into northern Iraq against Kurdish and other resistance forces. Perhaps the most important issue related to elite dissatisfaction is Saddam’s commitment to Iraq’s NBC programs. Although Saddam’s initial defiance on this score may be explained by his belief that deception would triumph over UNSCOM and that sanctions would soon be lifted in any event, eventually the possession of NBC became a source of Saddam’s prestige in the eyes of his core supporters.

Saddam is somewhat sensitive to the threat of popular unrest. This sensitivity is largely indirect, though, and arises mostly when unrest risks discrediting him with his power base. Saddam is committed to firm control over Iraq, with his Sunni Arab nationalist brand of chauvinism dominant. The predecessors to the Baath government fell, in part, because they failed to achieve peace at home. Moreover, as Saddam has portrayed himself as the defender of Iraq’s integrity (and Sunni Arab hegemony), continued Shi’a, Kurdish, and tribal unrest undercut this source of strength.

The prospect of defeat on the battlefield shapes Saddam’s tactics and the nature of his provocations—sensitivity reflected in what Saddam does not do rather than in observable Iraqi behavior. Saddam has not threatened his neighbors with military forces since the October 1994 buildup, which the United States countered with Operation Vigilant Warrior. The rapidity of the U.S. buildup, the strong ongoing U.S. regional presence, and the continuing weakness of Iraq’s conventional forces probably led Saddam to conclude that another buildup would at best result in an Iraqi withdrawal and at worst in the attrition of his forces. The prospect of military defeat also heightens the chances of both elite dissatisfaction and popular unrest, making Saddam even less likely to issue challenges that could be met on the battlefield. Strikes on military forces could lead officers to become dissatisfied with Saddam, seeing his continued rule as a threat to their lives and prestige.

Saddam does not respond passively to U.S. attempts to target his vulnerabilities and press his regime. Rather, he tries to tailor his response to exploit U.S. weaknesses whenever possible and he takes countermeasures to minimize U.S. pressure. These countermeasures include exploiting
domestic suffering, complying incompletely with demands, trying to fracture coalitions, and repressing dissent. These countermeasures (most notably attempts to fracture coalitions) have at times failed or even backfired, but in general the Iraqi leader has managed to offset U.S. coercive pressure.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COERCION
The Iraqi experience is rich with general lessons for coercing major regional powers in critical regions. When designing coercive strategies, policymakers must pay particular attention to the following issues:

• **Recognizing adversary “centers of gravity.”** When planning a coercive strategy, policymakers should strive to identify the target’s “center of gravity”—that which, if destroyed, would cause the enemy’s resistance to collapse. For Iraq, this appears to be Saddam’s relationship with his power base. When coercive threats placed pressure on Iraq’s center, they proved far more likely to move the regime. A center of gravity, however, will vary by regime and must be assessed and understood accordingly.

• **Recognizing the dynamic nature of coercion.** Coercion is a process, not an event. Planning must acknowledge that just as the United States is (or should be) performing a “center of gravity” analysis on the adversary, the adversary is likely doing the same on the United States or the coalition aligned against it. Because of overwhelming U.S. military capacity, many adversaries may try to undermine public support or fracture U.S.-led coalitions to offset coercive pressure.

• **Understanding what cannot be affected.** The United States can affect only the level of pain it inflicts, not an adversary’s willingness to accept it. Adversary regimes are particularly loath to give up power, and coercing populations to revolt or elites to carry out a coup is extremely difficult.

• **Improving long-term planning.** Policymakers and analysts did not anticipate Saddam’s survival, and U.S. policy suffered as a result. In future confrontations, the United States should conduct more low-probability, high-impact analysis and “red team” measures to explore the range of possible outcomes and make U.S. policy more robust.

• **Recognizing self-imposed limits.** The attempts to coerce Iraq reveal the degree to which self-imposed constraints, especially those generated by political and diplomatic concerns, limit the quantity and type of force the United States can threaten or use. These self-imposed limits often are far more effective in undermining coercion than are any measures taken by an adversary.

Adopting this framework when confronting adversaries in the future will make coercive threats more sustainable, more robust, and ultimately more effective. Equally important, it will help decisionmakers recognize limits on the use of force and avoid situations where coercive threats will fail in the short-term and undermine U.S. credibility in the long-term.

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Fighting the 'Attack on All' Alone

Only Britain has stepped up. We need more help for phase two.

By Robert E. Hunter

Last September, President Bush called the war on terrorism "civilization's fight." However, the United States has mounted the overwhelming bulk of the outside world's effort in Afghanistan.

Among close allies, only Britain has been substantially engaged. Even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which for the first time invoked its formal provision that recognizes "an attack on one is an attack on all," has essentially watched from the sidelines.

But for the ongoing campaign, the United States will need major support from other nations. Before the Afghan phase of the war concludes, the United States should create a global anti-terrorism coordinating committee to marshal efforts on the many individual steps needed to undercut terrorism's reach. There has been a consensus about the search for Osama bin Laden, the elimination of the Al Qaeda network and the punishment of the Taliban regime that harbored members of it. But beyond that, there's little agreement, not even on the definition of "terrorism with a global reach," much less on what to do about it.

Many Europeans especially worry that the Bush administration has Iraq in its sights, and they are fearful both about the military costs and the diplomatic consequences throughout the region and with Russia.

They also argue for a primary focus on Middle East terrorism's political support structure, which they believe to be a combination of economic and social backwardness, unreformed regimes, and--in particular--the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict.

Differences with the allies might not matter if the U.S. could continue largely to go it alone. But except for the use of military power in backward places such as Somalia and Sudan, the active support of friends and allies will now become critical, especially to trammel the ability of terrorists to operate around the world.

From the beginning, Bush understood this: "We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services and banking systems around the world."

Many countries responded, including those in the European Union, which committed its members to act in areas of transport security, police and judicial cooperation, denial of financing of terrorism, border controls and export controls related to nonproliferation. Under U.S. leadership, a good deal has been achieved, but support has been far from uniform or consistent.

Ideally, we need a systematic means whereby the U.S. and its key allies can agree on an overall political strategy for the war on terrorism: definitions, sources and quality of threats, means for opposing them and the contributions to be made by different countries under different circumstances--what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has called "multiple coalitions."

Realistically, however, differences of viewpoint will make reaching such an agreement difficult if not impossible. That is why another approach is needed, and is likely to be more successful.
What we need is an agreement, a process and a bureaucracy to coordinate efforts in intelligence, finance, police, extradition, border controls and other bread-and-butter matters of stifling the capacity of terrorists to act.

There is useful precedent. During the Cold War, the NATO allies saw the need to keep the Soviet Union and its allies from gaining access to sensitive exports that could be diverted to military uses, but each nation had its own criteria and procedures.

Thus, from 1950 to 1994, 17 allied countries, including Japan and Australia, banded together in a Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Security Controls, or COCOM, to set the necessary rules.

Operating out of public view, by and large it worked, mainly because the group took the politics out of each individual decision, created a bureaucracy to apply the rules and made the whole process routine.

Today, we need a COCOM for anti-terrorism.

This would not replace efforts by individual institutions but would help ensure that they all work together and are consistent in their judgments and actions. The anti-terrorism COCOM should begin with U.S.-EU cooperation and then be extended, progressively, to other countries.

With such a structure, governments would not have to analyze in advance the precise nature of each terrorist movement and its purposes. They would not have to be faced continually with making difficult political decisions or have to decide how much leadership and control to cede to the U.S.

This anti-terrorism COCOM should be created now, before the first phase of the war on terrorism winds down and it becomes harder to mobilize support among allies that do not share all of the U.S. perspective on global terrorism. It could become a core feature of the long-term struggle to outlaw terrorism.

Robert E. Hunter, a senior advisor at the RAND Corp., was U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998.
Limited Conflict
Under the
Nuclear
Umbrella:
Indian and
Pakistani Lessons
from the Kargil
Crisis
Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair,
Jamison Jo Medby

- Excerpt -
SUMMARY
In spring 1999, details of the “Kargil conflict”—the latest chapter in the long-standing India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir—emerged publicly. For these two largest South Asian states, this conflict represents a watershed, in part because it demonstrated that even the presence of nuclear weapons might not appreciably dampen the India-Pakistan security competition.

The goal of this analysis was to assess both combatants’ perceptions of the Kargil crisis with a view to evaluating the possibilities for future Kargil-like events. Kargil represented a departure from the low intensity combat (LIC) operations that have most recently typified the military dimension of the Kashmir dispute. Whereas these types of operations typically pit insurgents against Indian police and paramilitary forces, Kargil saw both sides engage with regular military forces across a de facto border in the face of Pakistani attempts to seize and hold territory. The lessons both belligerents took from the crisis and their respective judgments of whether their actions were successful could suggest the prospects for future military actions of greater intensity.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KARGIL CRISIS
The crisis is significant at several levels for both Pakistan and India. For Pakistan, it reconfirmed LIC as a legitimate tool for attaining political goals, but it probably also caused the Pakistani leadership to conclude that Kargil-like operations are not legitimate in the current international environment. Moreover, Kargil stands as yet another symbol of the failure of Pakistan’s grand strategy and illustrates Islamabad’s inability to anticipate the international opprobrium and isolation that ensued from its actions in Kargil. In addition, the crisis posed real concerns about the possibility of the conflict widening to conventional warfare and subsequently escalating to nuclear use.

For India, Kargil confirmed its belief that Pakistan is a reckless, adventuristic, and untrustworthy state. Kargil motivated India to reconsider whether to engage Pakistan diplomatically on the Kashmir issue. In addition, the crisis strengthened the widespread perception that India’s intelligence infrastructure has endemic deficiencies. It also led India to realize that international attention to Kashmir is not altogether undesirable, particularly when the attention focuses on Pakistani misadventures.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE KARGIL CRISIS
The most important lesson Pakistan took from the crisis was that Kargil-like operations have high political costs, especially for Pakistan’s international reputation. That said, the Kargil fiasco does not appear to have extinguished Pakistan’s belief that violence, especially as represented by LIC, remains the best policy for pressuring India on Kashmir and other outstanding disputes. While vocal criticisms of the Kargil misadventure are plentiful, there are many stakeholders in Pakistan who view Kargil as some sort of a victory lost. If such beliefs of Kargil—despite being fundamentally false in their details—represent the considered assessments of Pakistan’s security managers, future policies could emerge that call for Kargil-like operations. A reemergence of such policies could have disastrous consequences for stability in South Asia.

The most important lesson learned by India was that it must be prepared to counter a wide range of Pakistani threats that may be mounted by what is essentially a reckless but tenacious adversary. India must therefore develop the robust capabilities it needs to thwart surprise and to win even if surprised by Pakistan.
Another lesson is that if India is obliged to respond forcefully in future episodes, covert rather than overt action may be preferable.

**OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE**
The Kargil conflict has shaped Pakistan's and India's conceptions of their future choices. Pakistan has slowly come to appreciate the costs it has endured as a result of Kargil: Pakistan is economically vulnerable, politically unstable, and internationally isolated; and it is widely viewed as a precarious, decaying, and increasingly Islamist state. As a result, many in the political classes have come to recognize that they must decide among themselves what kind of a state they want to become: Jinnah's Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami's Pakistan, or the Lashkar-e-Taiba's Pakistan.

For its part, India is not likely to give Pakistan a chance to flirt with Kargil-like scenarios again. New Delhi will watch the border in Kashmir and elsewhere carefully and redouble its efforts to prevent infiltration of the sort that occurred at Kargil. India understands that the most likely strategy for Pakistan will be increasing its support for insurgency and for terrorist attacks throughout India. New Delhi also appreciates that this strategy is to Pakistan’s own disadvantage and further confirms Islamabad as a sponsor of Islamist terrorism. Despite the episodic temptation to bloody the Pakistani nose, India will continue to exhibit restraint.

**CONCLUSIONS**
"Ugly stability"—the persistence of unconventional conflicts—will probably endure in the region. State-sponsored terrorism will remain an attractive mode of operation in large part because conventional conflicts remain risky.

Pakistan's evaluation of Kargil's consequences is still ambiguous. In some circles, Kargil may be rationalized into an attractive mode of LIC. However, there are those within Pakistan who have increasingly come to question the costs that Pakistan’s LIC strategy has imposed upon the state’s economic, social, and political development. Nevertheless, Islamabad remains passionately focused on "resolving" Kashmir, and its support for the insurgency is unlikely to dissipate any time soon.

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India's Emerging Nuclear Posture

After a hiatus of almost 24 years, India startled the international community by resuming nuclear testing in May 1998. Pakistan responded later the same month with nuclear tests of its own. In the aftermath of these events, many Indian strategic analysts and commentators asserted that New Delhi had been transformed into a consequential "nuclear weapons power," while the United States and others in the international community increased pressure on India to renounce its nuclear weapons program. An understanding of India's emerging nuclear posture is crucial to both the United States' global antiproliferation efforts and its interests in South Asia. According to a new book by RAND senior policy analyst Ashley J. Tellis, the truth about India's strategic environment, nuclear capabilities, and evolving doctrinal preferences, as well as the technological and organizational tasks facing New Delhi, is far more complex than is commonly acknowledged.

In India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal, Tellis demonstrates that, in contrast to the views held by many within and outside India, New Delhi does not currently possess or seek to build a ready nuclear arsenal. Instead, India's objective is to create what Tellis calls a "force-in-being." This term refers to a nuclear deterrent that consists of available, but dispersed, components: unassembled nuclear warheads, with their components stored separately under strict civilian control, and dedicated delivery systems kept either in storage or in readiness away from their operational areas--all of which can be brought together as rapidly as required to create a usable deterrent force during a supreme emergency. The implications of such a force for U.S. policy are many. The study concludes that an effective U.S. policy in South Asia must first acknowledge that nuclear rollback is currently not a viable option for India. However, a regional restraint regime of some sort could be sustained if the United States were committed to a deepened engagement with New Delhi and willing to live with a degree of ambiguity about India's strategic capabilities.

INDIA'S COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING A NUCLEAR DETERRENT

The Indian government's decision to resume nuclear testing in 1998 resulted from growing pressures for a strategic deterrent in the aftermath of the Cold War. The roots of this decision extend back to the country's first nuclear test in 1974 which, despite the claims made by India's scientific establishment then and now,
India's Emerging Nuclear Posture

actually produced an insufficient yield, thus ensuring that New Delhi would someday need to resume testing if it sought to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. This need became more pressing after a series of events in the late 1980s, including the demise of India's most important protector, the Soviet Union; the newly acquired nuclear capabilities of its traditional antagonist, Pakistan; and the new growing economic and military capabilities of its prospective competitor, China. In addition, the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and the successful conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1997 increased--from New Delhi's perspective--the costs accruing to its traditional posture of ambiguity ("keeping its options open") with regard to nuclear weaponry. Ultimately, a new, more risk-acceptant government in India used the opportunity afforded by Pakistan's test firing of the Ghauri--a new missile acquired from North Korea--to resume nuclear testing.

According to the RAND study, the 1998 tests did not signify a dramatic change in New Delhi's strategic capabilities nor did they signal India's emergence as a potent nuclear weapons power. However, they did symbolize a critical shift in India's strategic direction by committing the country to the active development of a nuclear deterrent force of some kind, a course that is unlikely to be reversed in the future by any succeeding government.

THE FORCE-IN-BEING: BETWEEN "READY ARSENAL" AND "RECESSED DETERRENT"

The study analyzed the viability of five specific nuclear "end-states" that India has debated since its independence in 1947. The two options shown on the left of Figure 1 call for India's denuclearization, either through a renunciation of the nuclear option or the development of regional arms control arrangements with Pakistan and China. The middle position is India's traditional stance of keeping the nuclear option open--neither publicly endorsing nor rejecting the creation of nuclear weaponry. India's 1998 decision to pursue a nuclear posture in the form of a force-in-being is a compromise between the two options on the right end of the spectrum: a ready arsenal and a recessed deterrent. A ready arsenal would involve creating a nuclear force consisting of a sizable inventory of weapons that are maintained in military custody in peacetime and ready for immediate use. In contrast, a recessed deterrent would involve developing various elements needed for an effective deterrent without actually producing a standing nuclear force.

Figure 1. The Spectrum of India's Nuclear Options and Its Emerging Nuclear Posture
The force-in-being implies that India's nuclear capabilities will be strategically active, but operationally dormant, giving New Delhi the capability to execute retaliatory actions within a matter of hours to weeks. Such a capability will allow India to gain in security, status, and prestige, while simultaneously exhibiting restraint. India will acquire a nominal deterrence capability against Pakistan and China, while avoiding both the high costs of a ready arsenal and any weakening of its long tradition of strict civilian control over the military.

**INDIA'S DECLARATORY AND OPERATIONAL POLICIES: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS POLITICAL TOOLS OF DETERRENCE**

The decision to adopt a force-in-being grew out of a very specific Indian doctrinal conception of the value of nuclear weapons as political tools useful mainly for deterrence rather than defense. This idea is reflected in the main components of India's strategic policy, as delineated in the RAND study.

**India will adhere to a policy of "no nuclear use" against nonnuclear powers and "no first use" against nuclear adversaries.** In effect, this policy implies that Indian nuclear weapons will be used only in response to a nuclear attack on India. India's commitment to this policy is not likely to change as long as India maintains conventional superiority over Pakistan and China (in the theater) and does not acquire any extended deterrence obligations in Asia (which it presently does not have and is unlikely to acquire in the future).

**In the remote contingency that nuclear use is necessary, Indian nuclear weapons would be most effective in attacks against economic and industrial assets, infra-structure nodes, and population centers (countervalue targets).** India's relatively small number of low-yield weapons are not optimized for effective direct attacks on opposing nuclear forces (counterforce targets), although they could be used successfully against many military facilities, bases, and field formations in Pakistan and, potentially, against Chinese forces in the Himalayan region (countermilitary targets).

**The retaliatory use of nuclear weapons--if necessary in the event of nuclear attacks on India--will be delayed, but is "assured."** By definition, a "force-in-being" is not structured for prompt operations. Because Indian security managers feel confident that the possibility of nuclear weapons use in South Asia is remote, they believe that their ability to retaliate with certainty is more important that their ability to retaliate with speed. As India's strategic capabilities evolve, however, New Delhi will be able to retaliate with both certainty and speed.

**THE FORCE-IN-BEING: SMALL, DISPERSED, CENTRALLY CONTROLLED**

India's emerging force-in-being will not reach its desired form before the end of this decade, but is likely to be characterized by three specific traits.

**Modest in size.** The future nuclear stockpile could consist of about 150 warheads, depending on the rate at which plutonium and other special materials are produced during the current decade and whether a Fissile Material Control
India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture

Treaty is successfully concluded during this time. If India resumes nuclear testing with greater success than that exhibited during the May 1998 series, its nuclear arsenal could eventually incorporate both boosted fission and thermonuclear weaponry, although the true reliability and maximum yield of both India’s simple fission weapons and its advanced nuclear designs are uncertain.

The number and configuration of delivery systems incorporated into the force-in-being are also unclear. Over the next two decades, India’s current tactical strike aircraft will be supplemented by an as-yet-undefined number of new rail-, and possibly road-mobile, solid-fueled missile systems or possibly some kind of sea-based systems over the very long term. Improvements and modifications will also be made to supporting infrastructure; procedural; and command, control, and communication systems.

**Separated in disposition and centralized in control.** The nuclear force will be routinely maintained in the form of separated components, with the responsibilities for the command, custody, integration, and use of the weapons distributed among civilians and the military, as shown in Figure 2. The command over the use of nuclear weapons will lie solely with civilians in the persons of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, while civilians and the military will share custody of the strategic assets jointly. In the remote contingency that deterrence breakdown occurs and nuclear release orders are issued by the Prime Minister (or his designated successors), the nuclear components would be integrated into a usable weapon system, with custody to be gradually transferred to the military, which would retain sole responsibility for executing nuclear use options. Other variations of this command system, which are likely to be used in different strategic circumstances, are investigated at length in the RAND study.

![Figure 2. Distribution of Responsibilities for Command, Custody, and Use of Nuclear Weapons](image)

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORCE-IN-BEING

Although the force-in-being offers many advantages to India, it will not enable New Delhi to cope with all potential regional threats, such as a more aggressive China. Beijing’s current nuclear force is both technologically and
numerically superior to that of India. Extensive Chinese attacks could devastate India's ability to reconstitute its dispersed components, leaving New Delhi with only a ragged retaliatory capability of perhaps little political consequence. Indian security managers are aware of these challenges but not overwhelmed by them, believing that India's emerging capabilities will allow them to ward off all but the worst contingencies imaginable. Moreover, Chinese nuclear weapon use against India is believed to be neither likely nor imminent. In the event of a serious prospective Chinese threat, Indian policymakers recognize that their country would not have to face such a contingency alone because an aggressive China would also become a source of concern to great powers like the United States, Japan, and Russia. Finally, India's current nuclear posture does not prevent the country from continuing to improve its strategic capabilities.

**One likely result of India's continuing nuclearization will be a weak arms race with Pakistan.** The concurrent development of nuclear forces typically leads to such competition, which could be all the more pronounced because of the historical rivalry between the two countries. Many in the Pakistani elite, including the military, believe that New Delhi's strategic capabilities are highly sophisticated and that India is committed to Pakistan's destruction. Such beliefs imply that Pakistan is likely to respond to continued Indian nuclearization with even more intense efforts of its own, which could in turn precipitate Indian counter-reactions. Fortunately, relatively strong economic constraints suggest that the nuclear build-up on both sides will be generally slow.

**While India's nuclearization does present complications, it does not represent a failure of the nonproliferation regime.** To the contrary, the nonproliferation regime has been a resounding success. It has prevented the worst nuclear threats to international, and particularly to American, security by ensuring that Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea remain bound by international obligations to renounce nuclear weapons. The American architects of the nonproliferation regime recognized from the beginning that India, Pakistan, and Israel would be unlikely to renounce nuclear weapons because all these states are located in areas of high systemic insecurity and, further, because the United States could offer no adequate substitutes for the nuclear option. Other than these three countries, every state in the international system has agreed to accept specific obligations with respect to the acquisition or use of nuclear weaponry.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

India's development of a force-in-being represents one stage in the country's slow maturation into a true nuclear weapon power. Coping with such an India remains an important task for U.S. foreign policy. The RAND study makes the following recommendations for U.S. policymakers:

- **Shift U.S. regional strategy from the prevention of proliferation to the prevention of war.** Although Indian policymakers acknowledge that a ready nuclear arsenal is not desirable from the viewpoint of Indian
interests, they are strongly committed to continued nuclear weaponization and missile development. Attempts by the United States to stop this process have little chance of success, but the United States can use its influence to prevent a deterrence breakdown that results in nuclear use.

- **Work to prevent the diffusion of strategic technologies.** The deliberate or inadvertent diffusion of Indian strategic technology to other potential proliferants represents a real threat to U.S. interests that needs to be addressed jointly by Washington and New Delhi.

- **Shape the character of India's nuclear deterrent by deepened political engagement with New Delhi.** The United States cannot provide India with technical assistance to develop its force-in-being, nor should it do so. It can, however, work with India (as well as Pakistan) to ensure that its evolving deterrent remains modest in size, surreptitious in nature, and slow to be used. Toward that end, the United States should prepare to play three additional roles: First, it should serve as a helpful critic—in private and with due sensitivity to India's security concerns. Second, it should share its own assessments about the character of the strategic environment facing India. Third, it should translate its stated preference for Indo-Pakistani reconciliation over Kashmir into a clear and articulated tenet of its regional policy.

- **Work with India to develop an overarching strategic vision to guide bilateral U.S.-Indian relations and reconcile the interests of both countries.** Such a vision would provide a means for the United States to engage India in a way that supports larger American strategic interests, such as stability in Asia, freedom of navigation in the northern Indian Ocean, coalition arrangements in support of peace operations, and the prevention of further diffusion of weapons of mass destruction.
Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions

Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson, and F. Stephen Larrabee

- Excerpt -
Summary
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- EXCERPT -

SUMMARY

The United States remains the prime guarantor of Western security, especially in protecting common interests outside Europe. In the future, however, the task of sustaining this burden single-handedly is likely to become increasingly difficult for the United States for both economic and domestic political reasons. Political and military imperatives exist for having allies that are capable of bearing greater responsibility for defending common Western interests both within and outside Europe.

During the U.S. Senate’s consideration of NATO enlargement, serious bipartisan concerns were raised about the growing imbalance between the security commitments and military capabilities of the United States and those of its NATO allies. In ratifying enlargement, the Senate expressed its clear sense that the United States can no longer tolerate a situation in which its European allies are incapable of responding to common threats that originate beyond Europe, such as rogue-state aggression, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the disruption of vital resources. In addition, there may be future circumstances in which the United States finds itself heavily engaged in another conflict during a military emergency in the Persian Gulf and will thus need an important military contribution from its European partners. In such a situation, political imperatives will dictate that the United States act in concert with its allies regardless of considerations of military expediency.

Simply put, unless America’s European allies take up more of the burden of defending common security interests outside Europe, NATO’s future and America’s continuing engagement in Europe could be placed in jeopardy. The challenge facing the United States therefore lies in developing and implementing a vision for the Alliance that, more than just offering the prospect of U.S. and NATO involvement in European peacekeeping operations, calls for America’s European allies to contribute substantively to military operations outside Europe when common Western interests are threatened. Accordingly, this study addresses three key questions: Will America’s European allies be able to marshal the political will and build the military capabilities to project significant military power to help defend the Persian Gulf? How much military power can our NATO allies project today and in the future? And finally, can Europe become a more equal partner in defending common interests that go beyond peacekeeping in Europe?

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, NATO has taken great strides in adapting its missions, organization, doctrine, and forces to the new security challenges of the post–Cold War environment. In addition to maintaining the capabilities to carry out its central mission of collective defense, the Alliance has affirmed its commitment to a new purpose that is much more relevant to the challenges the United States and its allies face today: extending security and stability in and around the Euro-Atlantic region. The Alliance has created more mobile and flexible forces and new organizations and procedures to carry out a broader range of missions to enhance European security. Several allies are making improvements in their ability to project power outside Alliance territory.
Taken together, the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept and the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) approved at the April 1999 NATO Summit in Washington have laid the groundwork for more closely aligning NATO’s power with its purposes.

Nonetheless, much work remains to be done to complete the Alliance’s strategic transformation. Currently, for example, there is no consensus within NATO regarding the use of military force outside Europe to defend common Western security interests. On the contrary, most European allies eschew responsibilities beyond Europe, especially in the Persian Gulf—preferring to focus instead on improving European military capabilities for peace operations in Europe. While some progress has been made in improving power projection capabilities, such progress has been uneven at best, and prospects for future progress remain uncertain in the face of budgetary constraints and flagging political will.

At the same time, several factors will make the security of the Persian Gulf an increasingly vital issue over the coming decade. First, Europe will continue to import vast amounts of oil from the Persian Gulf to meet its energy needs. Second, Gulf oil supplies will remain vulnerable to a host of internal and external threats. Third, the U.S. military will come under increasing strain in meeting its global security commitments at a time when it is bearing most of the burden for defending common Western interests in the Gulf. America’s European allies thus run the risk that a military crisis in the Gulf could create serious tensions in U.S.–European relations.

THE GULF IS THE PROBLEM
The Persian Gulf will remain the main source of Western energy supplies over the next decade. Over the next 15 years, the portion of Western Europe’s total oil consumption imported from the Gulf will increase to 35 percent, compared to 14 percent for the United States. By 2010, Gulf exports will meet roughly half of all global oil consumption needs and will become the predominant source to which the Asia-Pacific region will turn to fill its burgeoning energy demands. Consequently, the perception is likely to arise that a serious interruption of Gulf oil supplies would cause severe economic and financial dislocation as well as political and social instability in the developing world, and this in turn could generate pressure for Western military action.

By contrast, the energy resources of the Caspian Basin will make a negligible contribution to global and Western energy supplies for at least the next 10 to 15 years. The Caspian region contains no more than 2–3 percent of proven world oil reserves, and bringing Caspian oil to market poses formidable challenges. As a result, by 2010 the Caspian will account for only about 3 percent of global oil consumption—or even less if the region fails to reach its full export potential. For the foreseeable future, then, a serious disruption in Caspian oil supplies would have minimal economic and security consequences and is thus unlikely to prompt Western military intervention, particularly in light of Russian opposition.

European security perspectives—especially those of NATO’s southern members—are increasingly influenced by the growing importance of natural gas exports from North Africa. Gas supplies from that region, which continues to be buffeted by political, economic, and social challenges, play a growing role in European Union (EU) economic development and modernization plans. France, Spain, and Italy import a large portion of their energy needs from the Maghreb, and the governments and security establishments in all three of these countries have become increasingly concerned about the possibility that turmoil and conflict in the area might disrupt gas supplies. Such concerns are reflected in increased military planning and preparation on the part of these countries to cope with a potential interruption of North African energy supplies. Indeed, if nonmilitary means were not available or effective, it is conceivable that such a disruption could prompt some southern members of the Alliance to assemble a European-led force and to request NATO support for an emergency response. In such a contingency, the United States might be asked to provide logistics, intelligence, and command-and-control support if not to commit combat forces.
OLD AND NEW THREATS
The security of the Persian Gulf will remain a vital Western interest for the foreseeable future. Therefore, planning for a major theater war (MTW) in the Gulf—particularly the ability to halt a large-scale invasion with short warning—will remain a cornerstone of U.S. defense planning. That said, winning big wars in the Gulf will present more difficult challenges in the future. The United States’ most likely adversaries, for example, could threaten or resort to the early use of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons. They may also employ other asymmetrical threats (e.g., terrorism or information warfare) to interfere with a Western military response.

Under these circumstances, the infrastructure on which the United States relies to conduct military operations could be damaged, hampering the introduction and buildup of U.S. forces. In addition, the United States and its European allies could face political restrictions on their access to regional bases. In this situation, it would be up to rapidly deployable air power to blunt the invasion before strategic targets in Kuwait and northern Saudi Arabia were seized.

Accordingly, U.S. preparations to defeat large-scale aggression will be essential to sustaining deterrence, demonstrating U.S. security commitment to the Gulf states, and maintaining U.S. predominance in a vital region.

At the same time, however, the United States and its allies must be prepared to cope with a broader range of threats in the Gulf. Because of the economic and military weaknesses of both Iraq and Iran, the danger of large-scale Iraqi or Iranian military attacks against the Arab states in the Gulf remains remote for at least the next five to ten years. Indeed, during this period both countries are likely to use other means to pursue regional hegemony and to end U.S. dominance of the Gulf. The two most likely options are (1) use of NBC weapons, terrorism, and subversion; and (2) limited air and missile attacks or small-scale ground incursions to achieve limited objectives (e.g., seizure of limited territory or assets).

In other words, Iraqi and Iranian nonconventional warfare and small-scale aggression—as opposed to the “big war” scenarios that continue to dominate U.S. force planning—represent the most plausible threats to Western security interests in the Gulf. Consequently, the United States and its European allies should be prepared to deal not only with the “canonical” MTW threat but also with a broader range of more plausible Iraqi and Iranian challenges.

THE GULF IN THE GULF
A wide gap currently separates U.S. and European perspectives and policies toward the Persian Gulf, notwithstanding their shared interest in secure oil supplies. NATO faces severe institutional limitations on a formal role in Gulf defense, reflecting widespread apprehension on the part of European governments and publics about becoming entangled in security commitments and military operations outside Europe. Likewise, individual allied governments—with the exception of the U.K. and France—generally have little stomach for engaging in such operations outside the Alliance framework.

The reasons for these attitudes are not difficult to understand: many European governments do not share the United States’ view on the nature of Western interests in the region, the nature of the threats to those interests, and the most effective means of responding to such threats. In particular, many allied governments, believing that the United States has exaggerated the Iraqi and Iranian military threat, prefer strategies of constructive “engagement” rather than “containment” to cope with the broader security challenges posed by these states. In addition, there is still a lingering fear in Europe that the United States will embroil European countries in conflicts that do not involve threats to their vital interests.
These reservations are reinforced by political and economic constraints. European governments face strong domestic pressure to reduce spending. Thus, the use of force in the Gulf would be highly unpopular in many European countries except in cases involving clear-cut, unprovoked aggression, decisive U.S. leadership, a perception that vital Western interests are at stake, an endorsement of Western military intervention by the U.N. Security Council, and widespread international support for the deployment of Western military force. In the absence of these conditions, the United States cannot count on a large number of like-minded allies to help shoulder the burden of defending Gulf security.

The situation the United States confronts in the Gulf is therefore rich with irony: In the most challenging though unlikely scenario—large-scale Iraqi and Iranian conventional attacks—some allies will probably be willing to contribute to military operations to defend important Western interests. In the more likely but less serious contingencies, however, the United States will probably bear most or all of the military burden alone. Participation in the defense of the Gulf will be a matter of choice rather than obligation for America’s European allies—and most are likely either to opt out or to commit only token forces.

EUROPEAN FORCES: ASSET OR LIABILITY?
The prevailing view among U.S. defense planners and military commanders is that while there may be sound political reasons for the allies to fight with the United States in the Gulf, America does not need European military assistance to achieve victory. Indeed, a widespread if often unstated view within American military circles is that the allies will simply get in the way and that the United States is better off going it alone. These perceptions, however, represent only half-truths—and the half that is missing is potentially significant.

According to the results of RAND computer modeling done as part of this project, if the USAF promptly deploys a large force (i.e., four or more Aerospace Expeditionary Forces [AEFs]) to a Gulf contingency, allied air contributions would be of marginal importance. If, however, the USAF is heavily engaged in an MTW elsewhere and the Gulf is the second MTW, a prompt allied deployment of one to three AEFs could prove critical in halting an Iraqi armored invasion. Moreover, NATO allies can contribute meaningfully even if they are not engaged in killing Iraqi armor. In many possible contingencies, America's European allies have specialized capabilities that could contribute significantly to Western military operations, especially in areas where U.S. forces face shortfalls or heavy demands—such as tactical reconnaissance and electronic warfare as well as airborne early warning. Because there are limits to what the allies can contribute to an MTW, the United States should encourage its allies to maintain and improve these “niche” capabilities.

More fundamentally, skeptics questioning the value of allied involvement in Gulf military operations miss a larger point: that there are strategic and political imperatives for America’s European partners to fight alongside U.S. forces in defending the security of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, in the real world—as opposed to the world of modelers and planners—some allies will provide help in a Gulf war. As long as they do, they should, at a minimum, hew to the Hippocratic oath of “do no harm.” Whether they will be able to fare better than that is a key issue that this report examines.

European allies face daunting obstacles to developing robust power projection capabilities. Moving significant allied forces, especially support elements, to the Gulf is a difficult problem, although it could be ameliorated with adequate access to forward basing and prepositioning of heavy stocks in the theater of operations. Equally problematic is what the allies can do once they arrive.

Some allies—notably the U.K. and France—are making progress in developing the capability to deploy sizable forces over a long distance and to sustain these units in high-intensity combat for
extended periods. But even the British and the French face serious shortcomings, and the rest of
the allies are in far worse shape in developing serious expeditionary capabilities. The most
glaring weaknesses are shortages of precision munitions, especially with all-weather capabilities;
insufficient command-and-control systems that can be deployed in remote areas; and limited
protection for forward-deployed forces against NBC attacks. Together, these limitations cast
serious doubt on the military utility of European AEF operations in the Gulf.

Rectifying these deficiencies will require difficult choices that many allies may be loath to make. In
some instances, increases in defense spending—or at least a halt to defense budget cuts—will
be required. In other areas, European governments will need to reallocate defense resources and
to restructure forces, both of which will be politically difficult in the current environment. Even
more significant, most European governments and military establishments confront
organizational, doctrinal, cultural, and philosophical obstacles to change.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
For the foreseeable future, it is likely that the United States will for the most part have to deal on
its own with key threats to common interests outside Europe. NATO as an alliance will continue to
have a strong aversion to any serious military role in the Persian Gulf. Similarly, the EU, with or
without a common foreign and security policy, will continue to be wary of placing its imprimatur on
European military participation in missions outside Europe—and European governments, with the
notable exception of the U.K. and possibly France, will be reluctant to participate heavily in
military operations in the Gulf. Most European militaries, moreover, will lack the capacity to
project power in any significant way and will find it difficult to participate in coalition operations far
from their borders.

Taken together, the expense of improving European power projection forces, the unpopularity of
security commitments outside Europe, and deeply ingrained misgivings on the part of European
governments toward the use of force in the Gulf will conspire to limit Europe’s focus to peace
operations in and around Europe. For these reasons, contingencies in the Persian Gulf are likely
to involve “coalitions of the willing” rather than NATO as an alliance. For all but the most serious
threats, moreover, the number of willing allies and their ability to conduct effective military
operations will be limited.

Consequently, the United States—and in particular the U.S. Air Force—must be realistic about its
expectations of allied military support in the Gulf and must tailor its operational plans accordingly
to fit political and military realities. At the same time, the forecast for augmenting allied
contributions to Gulf security is not completely gloomy. The United States and its European
allies could take several steps to help ensure that Europe shoulders a larger share of the
responsibility for defending common Western security interests in the Gulf. These measures
include:

• **Improvements in allied force planning.** The United States and its European allies must adapt
the NATO force-planning process to the needs of power projection and coalition operations. In
particular, they should institutionalize a dialogue, preferably within the NATO framework but
outside it, if necessary, to formulate coordinated plans for developing power projection
capabilities and conducting coalition operations in the Gulf. The key tasks involved are (1) to
establish new force goals that are better suited to these requirements; (2) to reach a shared
understanding of the operational demands imposed by power projection missions and agreement
on contingency plans for these missions; and (3) to create a mechanism for the allied forces to
execute these plans. If these steps are taken, commanders will have confidence in the size, mix,
and operational requirements of forces the allies are likely to make available in the full spectrum
of Gulf contingencies.
• **Improvements in allied forces.** The United States should encourage allies to focus on the most serious shortcomings in their power projection postures—i.e., inadequate precision-guided munitions, command-and-control capabilities, force protection, and logistics support. Redressing some of these shortfalls—particularly improved munitions—will require an increase of less than 0.5 percent in planned procurement spending, while other deficiencies can be addressed through more efficient use of existing resources. Given the special political, military, fiscal, and geographic circumstances each country faces, however, not every ally needs to make all these changes; instead, the United States and its European allies could seek a division of labor based on task specialization and complementarity. The NATO DCI provides a good planning framework to guide this process. Based on such a strategy, some allies would concentrate on developing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)–type power projection capabilities, while others would focus on maintaining and improving “niche” capabilities or on providing timely and reliable access to facilities and overflight rights. In short, the United States would concentrate on what it does best, and willing allies would perform tasks at which they in turn are proficient. This would minimize the possibility of inefficient use of resources while exploiting the comparative advantages of each country.

• **Increased allied pre-positioning and presence.** If America’s European allies are to make a significant contribution to Gulf defense, they must be able to deploy forces to the region promptly and must operate out of a well-developed infrastructure. The most cost-effective means to improve allied rapid deployment capabilities is to pre-position heavy logistics support (e.g., ordnance and fuel) in theater that would otherwise require a large amount of lift to move. In addition, facilities in the Gulf states are oriented to supporting the operational requirements of U.S. rather than allied AEFs. The United States should encourage the U.K. and France to substantially expand their forward prepositioning of munitions stocks and to work with appropriate Gulf states to ensure that their facilities can provide the necessary support for deploying allied AEFs. In addition to the operational benefits that would result, an increased allied presence in the region would strengthen deterrence, sustain domestic support for U.S. deployments in the Gulf, and perhaps allow the United States to draw down its own presence, thereby reducing the exposure of U.S. forces to acts of terrorism and political violence.

• **Increased military-to-military dialogue.** The USAF should use its military contacts with NATO members to develop and enforce common operational practices, standards, concepts, and terminology related to coalition warfare. Such discussions could also facilitate solutions to affordability issues while addressing other barriers to improving interoperability, including differing perspectives on doctrine, objectives, and operational tradeoffs.

• **Instituting changes in military exercises.** New exercises should be designed to identify and train for commonly executed functions, especially those related to allied power projection operations. One possibility would be to conduct regular continental United States (CONUS)-based exercises in which the United States moves European ground forces or supports the deployment of an allied AEF. If necessary, the cost of such exercises could be funded out of additional European contributions to the NATO infrastructure account. Improving coalition operations in contingencies outside Europe also dictates that major allies should conduct exercises outside the NATO framework.

• **Enhancing interoperability of air forces.** The USAF will need to pay more attention to the requirements of interoperability with allied air forces. Reducing demands on interoperability will be a key element of this effort. Such measures include avoiding mixed air squadrons; having the USAF perform time-urgent and/or data-rich tasks; having allies attack only fixed or area targets and performing close air support only for their own ground forces; and scrubbing information exchange requirements. In addition, the USAF will need to work the supply side of the interoperability equation—for example, by developing allied-friendly standards for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and compatible secure communications.
Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, and security regimes. Equally important, the USAF will need to collaborate more closely with allied air forces in the planning of air tasking orders.

The above measures will facilitate an augmented allied air contribution to Gulf military operations and will improve the ability of allied and U.S. forces to conduct effective coalition operations. While some measures will face resistance on both sides of the Atlantic, they are for the most part politically sustainable, militarily feasible, and affordable. In the final analysis, however, there is no substitute for strong U.S. leadership. Unless American leaders convince their European allies that their failure to assume greater security responsibilities in the Gulf risks serious damage to the transatlantic relationship, most are unlikely to make the force improvements necessary to defend vital Western interests in the Gulf and other critical regions of the world.

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