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National Security Up Front
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New Insights from the RAND National Security Research Division
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Escalation in the War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Future Risks
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by Bryan Frederick, Mark Cozad, and Alexandra Stark
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A woman who survived a Russian missile strike prays at the site where a residential building was heavily damaged in Dnipro, Ukraine on January 14, 2023, photo by Mykola Synelnykov/Reuters |
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Russian President Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has imposed devastating losses on the Russian military and on Ukraine's military and civilian populations, but both sides have avoided certain escalatory options. President Putin, assuming that the war would be over quickly, had no escalation strategy. When forced to acknowledge battlefield reversals, Russia did escalate—attacking Ukraine's civilian population and critical infrastructure—but this escalation merely hardened Ukrainian resolve and consolidated NATO support. Putin has not pursued further escalation for several reasons, including fear of NATO's military response; an information flow that filters out negative facts, promoting the view that Russia can still win a protracted war; and incremental NATO support for Ukraine. The fact that Putin has avoided certain escalatory options to date does not mean that he will continue to avoid them in the future. The Kremlin's control of Russia itself has become brittle, potentially encouraging Putin to consider options to shorten the war. Withdrawal from Ukraine is one such option. Greater escalation is another, including attacking NATO directly, widespread air/missile attacks against Ukraine, and using chemical weapons. Putin could also use nuclear weapons inside Ukraine. The risks to the Kremlin would be enormous, but a sudden deterioration of Russian forces or increased threats to internal stability could lead the Kremlin to view using nuclear weapons as the best among a set of bad options. Should Putin decide to use nuclear weapons inside Ukraine, he may decide to use several weapons, including of different types or yields, to achieve his objectives, rather than being limited to a small number of low-yield devices. This assessment highlights implications for U.S. and NATO policymakers. Maintaining NATO alliance cohesion is critical to sustaining support for Ukraine and deterring Russian escalation against NATO. An incremental approach to providing support could limit escalation risks but also could work against Ukraine if Russia fields new forces quickly and Ukrainian losses increase. Putin may be politically unable to reduce his war aims, giving him less room to maneuver. More-destructive attacks against Ukraine's civilian population could initiate an escalatory spiral if Ukraine retaliates with attacks inside Russia. Internal instability in Russia is likely to influence Putin's calculations, but the direction of its effects is not yet clear. The ability of the United States to control future escalation may diminish. U.S. and allied policymakers should plan to respond to further Russian escalation while striving to maintain political and military communication channels with Russia that could arrest an escalatory spiral.
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What did Putin get wrong? Putin overestimated the quality and prospects for success of his invasion plan and underestimated both Ukrainian will and Western cohesiveness. These misperceptions led him to conclude that he did not need to plan for escalation. When battlefield reversals could not be denied, Russia attacked Ukraine's civilian population and critical infrastructure, again showing a misperception of Ukrainian resolve. Putin failed to recognize that Russia's brutal conduct in the war would enhance Western unity. What did the West get wrong? The West underestimated Russia's fear of NATO and accompanying hesitance to confront NATO directly, overestimated the effectiveness of Russian escalatory tools and options, and failed to appreciate the extreme insularity of Russia's decisionmaking. Why has Russia not escalated more? Russia's fear of NATO encourages the Kremlin to behave cautiously rather than risk direct conflict. The information flow in the Russian system filters out negative facts, promoting the view that Russia's prospects for winning a protracted war are still high. Russian incentives to escalate may also have been diminished because support to Ukraine has increased gradually. No single change in assistance was sufficiently dramatic to risk war with NATO to prevent it. What could change the escalation calculus? Both Russia and Ukraine have additional escalation options. These figures illustrate how the risk of different options may vary depending on the trajectory of the war. The horizontal axes of the figures show the challenges that Russia or Ukraine would face in executing each option, with more-executable options to the left and less-executable options to the right. The vertical axes show the likely degree of Russian or Ukrainian hesitancy to attempt the option given both motivations and restraining factors.
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While illustrative, these two figures show how a dramatic shift in battlefield conditions—in this case an imminent Russian military collapse that threatens the survival of the current Russian regime—could alter the likelihood of different escalation options. In the event of such collapse, we assess that several highly destructive escalation options, including nuclear use inside Ukraine, would become more likely.
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What does this risk assessment imply for U.S. and NATO policymakers?
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- Alliance cohesion is critical to sustaining support for Ukraine and deterring Russian escalation against NATO.
- The incremental approach to supporting Ukraine may have helped limit Russian escalation, but the strategy could work against Ukraine if Russia fields new forces and Ukrainian losses increase.
- Putin may be politically unable to reduce his war aims, giving him fewer options.
- Putin could unleash more-destructive attacks against Ukraine's civilian population, touching off an escalatory spiral if Ukraine retaliates with attacks inside Russia.
- Internal instability in Russia is likely to influence Putin's escalation calculations, although the direction of its effects is not yet clear.
- The U.S. ability to control future escalation may diminish. U.S. and allied policymakers need to develop plans for responding to potential Russian escalation and maintain political and military communication channels with Russia that could arrest an escalatory spiral.
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This summary is derived from Escalation in the War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Risks for the Future by Bryan Frederick, Mark Cozad, and Alexandra Stark (forthcoming). For more information about this study, reply to this message and we'll connect you to the authors. Want to stop receiving these messages? Reply to this message with "Unsubscribe" in the subject line.
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