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National Security Up Front

New Insights from the RAND National Security Research Division

January 11, 2024

U.S.-China Rivalry in a Neomedieval World: Competition in an Era of Weakening States

Wheelbarrow and shovel in front of destroyed buildings, photo by Aboud Hamam

Photo by Aboud Hamam

 

Although it is comforting to look to history to guide how we understand the present, viewing the U.S. competition with China through the lens of the Cold War—or indeed any of the great-power contests of the past two centuries—distorts our understanding of the current rivalry. Today’s U.S.-China rivalry is unfolding in a moment of epochal transformation, which we call neomedievalism.

Beginning around 2000, the neomedieval era is characterized by a radically different backdrop of ideological, economic, and political conditions: weakening states, fragmenting societies, imbalanced economies, pervasive threats, and the informalization of warfare. The fundamental driver of these interacting trends—the declining relative economic strength of the modern industrial state owing to deindustrialization—is unlikely to be reversed, and the sooner U.S. decisionmakers recognize this shift, the sooner more effective strategies can be developed. Strategic advantage will accrue to the state that adapts more effectively to this new reality.

 

Why do the novel features of the neomedieval era make Cold War–based strategies against China less relevant?

  • Ideologically, the Cold War was a binary contest between two relatively cohesive societies. Today, both the United States and China are fragmented societies, weakened by contests among identity groups and declining political legitimacy.
  • Economically, the United States was at its zenith during the Cold War, generating an astonishing 25% of world gross domestic product. High productivity, rapid growth, and manageable expenses enabled generous military budgets. U.S. and Chinese defense planning continues to favor huge military budgets designed to improve combat capabilities. But acute demand for aid to embattled allies and partners has placed immense strains on diminishing resources. Moreover, the globalization of production has made the U.S. and Chinese economies mutually dependent. Both are growing too slowly to operate without access to global markets.
  • Politically, the contrast is dramatic. The U.S. and Soviet governments mobilized patriotic populaces and carried out extensive propaganda campaigns to generate political opposition to the rival. In the current era, governments have less ability to command the loyalty and trust of their disengaged populations.
 
 

What does neomedievalism suggest for the U.S.-China competition? Severe resource constraints and nearly overwhelming threats will stress both militaries, impairing their ability to compete with each other. The same trends make high-end, conventional war improbable, but conflict cannot be ruled out. Should tensions escalate, the United States and China may have little choice but to carry out their struggle in a more constrained manner. Incapable of mobilizing their societies for total war, both sides are likely to find growing incentives to directly target the rival’s political legitimacy by provoking political discontent and economic disruption primarily through cyber and information operations, as well as economic warfare.

The two sides might also engage in proxy conflicts as another way to weaken the adversary by draining valuable military and other resources. Under such conditions, conventional conflict, if it occurs at all, could consist of sporadic clashes between relatively modest-sized formations. Political goals in such wars are likely to focus on securing minor gains through temporary settlements while leaving broader issues unresolved.

 

What insights can we draw from an understanding of neomedievalism?

  • Defense planning must acknowledge that both the United States and China will be weaker, less cohesive states than they were in the past century. Military operations should be planned with a fragile level of public support in mind. This also could mean that defense spending might not increase significantly in a contingency.
  • Conventional military attacks are not the only threats on the horizon. Pandemics, terrorism, crime, and political violence are just some of the domestic and transnational threats facing states today. Addressing these threats requires adequate resourcing decisions by governments. Failure to cope with these dangers will damage states’ already weakened legitimacy.
  • While major conventional war between the United State and China is unlikely, should tensions escalate to conflict, the two might instead find indirect, proxy conflict more feasible. Directly targeting the vulnerable domestic political situation of the rival is likely to become a more attractive way to impose costs as well.
  • Demand for assistance to embattled allies and partners will stress defense budgets that are already constrained by slowing economies and competing demands for domestic priorities. Avoiding unnecessary combat operations will become essential to national success.
  • Fragile public support will deepen the military’s dependence on contractors, unmanned systems, and coalition partners. As publics disengage, leaders around the world might have more freedom to start and stop conflicts. However, because of fragile public support, the same leaders will likely have little ability to escalate conflict to industrial levels of “total war.”
  • Extremism, corruption, and criminality will become more acute in societies and increasingly corrosive to military discipline. In the United States, diminishing prospects for social mobility will increase the risk of extremism, but relatively strong institutions will make government collusion with criminals less likely. In China, weak institutions raise the likelihood of corruption and collusion between criminals and government officials. In both countries, increasing reliance on contracts for military work will open more opportunities for corruption.

One thing we can learn from history in this fraught geopolitical moment is that the United States has adapted in the past to overcome international challenges. To succeed in this era of neomedievalism, it will need to do so again.

 

This summary is derived from U.S.-China Rivalry in a Neomedieval World: Security in an Age of Weakening States (RR-A1887-1), by Timothy R. Heath, Weilong Kong, and Alexis Dale-Huang (available now on rand.org).

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