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National Security Up Front
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New Insights from the RAND National Security Research Division
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Oversight, Agility, and Stability: What the Department of Defense Can Learn from Other Budgeting Systems
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by Megan McKernan, Stephanie Young, Timothy R. Heath, Dara Massicot, Andrew Dowse, Devon Hill, James Black, Ryan Consaul, Michael Simpson, Sarah W. Denton, Anthony Vassalo, Ivana Ke, Mark Stalczynski, Benjamin J. Sacks, Austin Wyatt, Jade Yeung, Nicolas Jouan, Yuliya Shokh, William Shelton, Raphael S. Cohen, John P. Godges, Heidi Peters, and Lauren Skrabala
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Photo by Navy Chief Petty Officer Carlos M. Vazquez II. |
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Is the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) System nimble enough to meet national needs in a time of dynamic threats, increasingly capable adversaries, and rapid technological changes? A congressional commission was tasked with probing the PPBE System's effectiveness, considering alternatives, and recommending ways that the budgeting process could better support national security goals. To establish a baseline for comparison, the commission considered the budgeting processes of nine organizations: the defense establishments of China and Russia—two near-peer defense competitors; the allied defense agencies of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom; and four U.S. federal agencies—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
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How does the PPBE system stack up to the budgeting processes of competitors, allies, and other U.S. federal agencies? Centralized budget decisionmaking in China and Russia facilitates long-term support for military modernization and enables course corrections to meet changing priorities. But the systems in both countries lack sufficient oversight to ensure the quality and efficiency of defense investments. In Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, defense agencies can make major multiyear investments without annual legislative coordination and can move or reallocate funds, effectively linking strategy and available resources. Although they have traditionally prioritized budget predictability and stability over agility, all three are pivoting toward supporting agility and innovation in the face of lengthy acquisition cycles. The four U.S. federal agencies used DoD’s PPBE system as a model in developing their own systems. DHS, HHS, and ODNI focus less on long-term planning relative to DoD, though all four have more flexibility to implement reallocations, in part because Congress employs broader appropriation categories than those used for DoD appropriations.
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What can DoD learn from China and Russia, despite their radically different political cultures, governance structures, and strategic orientations? China and Russia make top-down defense budget decisions, but they face implementation constraints; reaping returns on investments depends on key social and economic factors, including a trained workforce, robust industrial capacity, and adequate oversight. Both countries have mechanisms for changing course to address changing priorities, facilitated by their centralized decisionmaking. Especially in China, political leaders provide stable, long-term support for military modernization. The lack of political opposition, the close alignment between military and political leaders, and the sheer scale of investment over several decades have facilitated the long-term planning needed to reach complex modernization goals. However, both countries have weak systems for fighting corruption and ensuring transparency, efficiency, and oversight of investments. A top-down approach has both benefits and limitations. Despite the public discussion in the United States that oversight delays the U.S. PPBE process, the challenges highlighted by the Chinese and Russian cases show that oversight is critical to successfully deploying military capabilities and should not be haphazardly traded for speed. However, finding ways to maximize the benefits of a top-down approach could be worthwhile: for example, by ensuring sustained, consistent funding for priority projects over many years and by delegating more authority to project and program managers, without compromising their accountability, so they can adapt as technologies and programs evolve.
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What can DoD learn from allied defense agencies? Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom rely on interdependent, co-development efforts and foreign military sales with the U.S. to promote strategic convergence, interoperability, and the shared benefits of innovation. In all three countries, the executive branch has the power of the purse, reducing political friction over appropriations. There is less legislative intervention in defense budgets and no need to operate without regular appropriations. In each country, the defense agencies guarantee payments for projects for years or even decades in advance; the U.S. Congress must vote on DoD’s entire budget every year. Despite a shared emphasis on stability, the three budget systems provide flexibility to address unanticipated changes. The allied agencies can carry over funds, move funds across portfolios, appropriate funds with different expirations, and supplement funds for emerging needs. Strategic planning mechanisms harness defense spending priorities and drive budget execution. All three countries have pivoted toward supporting innovation in the face of lengthy acquisition cycles. Of particular concern for DoD is its yearly vulnerability to political gridlock, continuing resolutions, and government shutdowns. The U.S. system of government deliberately empowers strong voices from both the executive and legislative branches in defense budgeting. However, the United States could learn from the allied budget systems that permit major multiyear investments without an annual reevaluation. Such farsighted investments strengthen the linkage between strategy and resources, reduce the chances for inefficiency, and minimize the risk of obstructed funding from year to year.
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What can DoD learn from other U.S. federal agencies? DHS, HHS, NASA, and ODNI all have more discretion than DoD to redirect appropriated funds without reporting to Congress. Various mechanisms allow these agencies to meet dynamic mission needs, carry over partial funding across years, repurpose expiring unobligated balances, and reallocate funds to capital investments. Congress gives these agencies larger budget categories than it gives DoD, granting them more flexibility to identify and pursue funding priorities. Additional mechanisms—which can include two-year appropriations timelines, early requests for grant proposals, and ten-year entitlement budgets—help the agencies weather continuing resolutions and other sources of budget turbulence. Because the budget systems of these other agencies were modeled after DoD’s PPBE System, there would be no benefit to DoD in adopting any of these systems. However, there would be value in exploring how Congress gives these agencies flexibility so that DoD can seek flexibility to spur innovation; make funding more predictable across years; and find relief from pain points in the PPBE System, such as continuing resolutions, rigid appropriations categories, and appropriations for line items instead of portfolios.
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What overarching observations do these case studies suggest for DoD?
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- Innovation and agility in planning and budgeting need to be balanced with stability and predictability.
- Military modernization requires a strong societal foundation—with a trained and productive workforce, industrial capacity and capability, policies to foster innovation, sustained and focused defense investments, and oversight.
- DoD resource planning policies and decisions have implications for defense industrial base health and interdependent, co-development efforts with allies and partners.
- DoD’s budgeting practices could be improved by sustained funding for priority projects, greater authority for project and program managers to adapt to emerging needs, and less restrictive congressional budget categories.
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This summary is derived from Volumes 1 through 4 (Phase One) of the RAND National Security Research Division series Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution in Comparative Organizations, by Megan McKernan, Stephanie Young, Timothy R. Heath, Dara Massicot, Andrew Dowse, Devon Hill, James Black, Ryan Consaul, Michael Simpson, Sarah W. Denton, Anthony Vassalo, Ivana Ke, Mark Stalczynski, Benjamin J. Sacks, Austin Wyatt, Jade Yeung, Nicolas Jouan, Yuliya Shokh, William Shelton, Raphael S. Cohen, John P. Godges, Heidi Peters, and Lauren Skrabala (forthcoming). Phase Two, which is in progress, involves an examination of five additional international defense organizations and two additional U.S. domestic agencies. The lessons from these additional case studies will be presented in three additional volumes. For more information about this study or for details about the RAND public event on PPBE reform on February 8, 2024, reply to this message and we'll connect you to the authors. Want to stop receiving these messages? Reply to this message with "Unsubscribe" in the subject line.
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