Climate Change and Conflict

Having identified expected climate changes in the region and their likely first-order effects, the project team identified a six-step process in which climate hazards interact with other variables to produce both intrastate and interstate conflict (i.e., "causal pathways"). They then use these theoretical pathways to explore real-life ways in which environmental impacts have already contributed to conflict in the Middle East and Central/South Asia. In none of the examined cases is climate change the sole cause of the resulting conflict; rather, environmental factors—which may be exacerbated by climate change—interact with governance and socio-economic factors to contribute to conflict. This is consistent with the idea that climate impacts can serve as a threat multiplier when other conditions make an area ripe for conflict.

Next, the project team turned to the relationship between climate change and the frequency of conflict, incorporating anticipated changes in temperature and precipitation into a machine learning-trained forecasting model. Although there is suggestive evidence that worse climate outcomes will correlate with greater incidence of conflict between 2040 and 2060, higher temperatures and decreased precipitation are not the major drivers of the future security environment. Rather, these hazards increase conflict risk by interacting with stronger predictors of conflict, including governance (which is partly based on economic performance) and recent conflict in a neighboring area. Importantly, the forecasts may be undercounting the impact climate variables have on conflict, given the model was trained on historical data, and climate change may contribute to conditions that shape conflict risk in a manner fundamentally different from those that characterized the recent past.

The project team used scenarios and expert elicitation to consider how China, Russia, and Iran may attempt to exploit climate change to advance their own security interests. Climate-related conflicts in the region may serve as entry points for adversaries to gain advantage, exacerbate tensions, undermine U.S. interests, and challenge U.S. influence. Regional experts noted that China and Russia have a new and increasingly important set of climate-related tools—green energy capabilities and new trade routes, respectively—to leverage in relationships with regional countries. China in particular has increased its operations in the humanitarian assistance and disaster response in the region, potentially competing with the United States in this space.

The RAND team generated nine scenarios set in 2035 that varied across several dimensions, including type of climate hazard, type of conflict, and CENTCOM subregion. These scenarios were considered by experts who were knowledgeable about the overall global strategy, interests, and capabilities of China, Russia, and Iran.

The final report of the series examines how CENTCOM could use operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) in the coming decades to help prevent—or mitigate the intensity of—conflict related to climate hazards. Building on the analysis conducted in the second report, the team identified potential "off-ramps" along the climate-to-conflict pathways. The OAIs to address these off-ramps serve a dual purpose. First, they reduce the risk of climate-related conflict or reduce the intensity if conflict does occur. Second, they provide an opportunity to increase partnerships within the CENTCOM Coalition, and to build upon regional innovation efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build climate resilience.