Strategic Distribution Platform Support of CONUS Army Units

by Marc Robbins

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Home station units depend upon a reliable distribution system to deliver the supplies they need to train and prepare for possible deployments. With forces returning home from Iraq, and with a drawdown anticipated to begin in Afghanistan after July 2011, along with repositioning of forces in Europe and Korea to the continental United States (CONUS), support to Army forces in CONUS will be of increasing concern. The Department of Defense — and the Army — will be under increasing pressure to do more with less and will require a distribution system that helps maintain readiness and supports training goals with timely delivery of needed supplies, and does so at the lowest cost possible. A critical part of that support will come from scheduled truck service from the Strategic Distribution Platforms (SDPs) that dominate the volumes going to Army units. Although this system is relatively strong, there are ways it can be made more robust and comprehensive by adding new units and posts to the truck network and taking other steps to reduce "leakage" from the truck network.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Background

  • Chapter Two

    Facing Fill and Scheduled Truck Performance

  • Chapter Three

    Sources of "Leakage" from the Truck Network

  • Chapter Four

    Issues in Scheduled Truck Performance

  • Chapter Five

    Potential Actions for Strengthening/Expanding the Truck System

  • Appendix

    Participation in Scheduled Truck Service, FY10

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The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.

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