Sitting on bayonets : the Soviet defense burden and the slowdown of Soviet defense spending
ResearchPublished 1985
In order to understand the slowdown in Soviet military expenditures in recent years, this report examines Soviet official figures and various independent Western estimates of the level and trend of Soviet military outlays and their share in national output, and it explores in part the sharp disagreements among the Western estimates on the true levels and rates of change of these expenditures. The author discusses various explanations for the slowdown--technical problems, economic bottlenecks, policy decisions--and concludes that economic issues were at stake, with or without accompanying revision of doctrine. He suggests that in the near future, Moscow is likely to continue to avoid the strains of intensified military spending by constraining the security threat through political and diplomatic action.
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Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Available
- Year: 1985
- Print Format: Paperback
- Paperback Pages: 44
- Paperback Price: $20.00
- Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-0698-1
- Document Number: JRS-01
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Becker, Abraham S., Sitting on bayonets : the Soviet defense burden and the slowdown of Soviet defense spending, RAND Corporation, JRS-01, 1985. As of October 11, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/joint_reports-soviet/JRS01.html
Becker, Abraham S., Sitting on bayonets : the Soviet defense burden and the slowdown of Soviet defense spending. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1985. https://www.rand.org/pubs/joint_reports-soviet/JRS01.html. Also available in print form.
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