New Challenges for Defense Planning
Rethinking How Much Is Enough
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Prefatory Material, Part One and Part Two
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Part Three
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Part Five
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This book is a collection of essays by senior defense analysts at RAND, all of whom have been deeply involved in post-Cold War defense planning studies for the Department of Defense. The essays cover a wide spectrum of issues, including alternative strategies and structures for defense planning, conventional deterrence of Third World opponents, modernizing weapon systems and force structures, and planning under uncertainty (a major theme of the book as a whole). Some of the essays are sympathetic to current U.S. methods and policies, whereas others are critical, arguing that radical changes are needed. Taken as a whole, the book provides a provocative cross section of work by experts who understand both the theoretical issues and the practical considerations that the Department of Defense must address. The book will be of interest to policymakers, students of defense planning, and other readers seeking to understand the challenges and choices confronting defense planners as we approach the end of the century.
Table of Contents
Part One
Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction
Part Two
Principles for Defense Planning
Chapter 2
Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging
Chapter 3
Objective-Based Planning
Chapter 4
Institutionalizing Planning for Adaptiveness
Chapter 5
The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning
Part Three
Planning at the Strategic Level
Chapter 6
Protecting the Great Transition
Chapter 7
Nonstandard Contingencies for Defense Planning
Chapter 8
Improving Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Era: Some Theory and Implications for Defense Planning
Chapter 9
Operations Other Than War
Chapter 10
Priorities for Ballistic Missile Defense
Chapter 11
Future U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces: Applying Traditional Analysis Methods in an Era of Cooperation
Part Four
Planning at the Operational or Campaign Level
Chapter 12
Conventional Campaign Analysis of Major Regional Conflicts
Chapter 13
The Use of Long-Range Bombers in a Changing World: a Classical Exercise in Systems Analysis
Chapter 14
A First Look at Defense Options for Poland
Chapter 15
Not Merely Planning for the Last War
Chapter 16
Extended Counterforce Options for Coping with Tactical Ballistic Missiles
Chapter 17
Military Issues in Multinational Operations
Part Five
Building the Defense Program
Chapter 18
Assessing the Affordability of Fighter Aircraft Force Modernization
Chapter 19
Modernizing Airpower Projection Capabilities: Looking to Get More out of Less
Chapter 20
Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Army Forces
Chapter 21
Strategic Mobility in the Post-Cold War Era
Chapter 22
Reinventing the DOD Logistics System for the Post-Cold War Era
Chapter 23
Defining a Balanced Investment Program for Coping with Tactical Ballistic Missiles
Most of the research underlying the papers in this book was accomplished in RAND's three national-security federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs): Project AIR FORCE, the Arroyo Center, and the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), which are sponsored by the Air Force, the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, respectively. The book itself was organized in RAND's Defense and Technology Planning Department and was made possible with substantial corporate funds and through the auspices of the RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies. RAND's national-security divisions also contributed research-support funds to cover some of the administrative expenses.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Monograph report series. The monograph/report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1993 to 2003. RAND monograph/reports presented major research findings that addressed the challenges facing the public and private sectors. They included executive summaries, technical documentation, and synthesis pieces.
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