Sep 20, 2005
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How can the Air Force and the other services profit from the experience of these two very different development programs? The F/A-18E/F is a new platform, but it incorporates some of the key components of the legacy platform. The F/A-22, on the other hand, is completely new, but the authors believe the divergent histories of the two-the F/A-22 has been delayed 52 months and has experienced cost overruns while the F/A-18E/F was developed on time and on budget-have lessons to teach future acquisition decisionmakers. In this report, the authors present a detailed history of the two programs and conclude that these decisionmakers can take several steps to reduce risk and improve the acquisition process, including setting realistic schedule and cost estimates, establishing a stable and experienced development team, being aware of the risks entailed in concurrent development of new technology, and carefully monitoring airframe weight.
Acquisition Strategies and Industrial Base Issues
Potential Contributors to Cost and Schedule Growth
Use of Cost Performance Data
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
DoD and Congressional Oversight