Cover: The Rise and Fall of Detente

The Rise and Fall of Detente

Causes and Consequences

Published 1985

by Harry Gelman

Download

Download eBook for Free

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 2.4 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 Format Price
Add to Cart Paperback41 pages $23.00

This paper considers four issues surrounding the decline in U.S.-Soviet relations over the past decade: (1) whether the decline was inevitable given opposing assumptions held about the goals of the relationship from the outset; (2) to what extent the changes introduced into the relationship since the end of the 1970s represent a sharp break with what went before; (3) what, if anything, remains of detente; and (4) what might be considered "normal" for the U.S.-USSR relationship. Among his conclusions, the author suggests that the relationship between the two nations is essentially adversarial, and this reality is probably not subject to change by U.S. policy; given the certainty of continued intense competition between the superpowers, much will depend upon whether Soviet leaders emerge who are willing to modify the past Soviet view of acceptable geopolitical compromise; and the political viability of any nuclear negotiations between the two powers will remain vulnerable to the political consequences of an advance by one party at the expense of the other in the world arena.

This report is part of the RAND occasional paper (Soviet) series. The occasional paper series was a product of RAND from 1985 to 1992. It included the occasional paper education (OPE) and occasional paper Soviet (OPS), which was issued jointly by the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies (CSS) to facilitate the exchange of ideas among those who shared the research interests of the Center and of scholars participating in its research and seminar programs.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.