Corporations and Counterinsurgency

William Rosenau, Peter Chalk, Renny McPherson, Michelle Parker, Austin Long

ResearchPublished Aug 3, 2009

Like nongovernmental organizations and private military companies, large multinational corporations (MNCs) can play significant roles in zones of violent conflict. Any comprehensive conflict analysis needs to understand these roles, especially as they relate to counterinsurgency. Using a set of three case studies, the authors explore MNC operations in Liberia, Papua New Guinea, and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The case studies highlight the activities of the MNCs that were intended to shape their violent environment and protect their infrastructure and personnel. Policymakers may be tempted to leverage corporate activities. However, corporate actions, no matter how well intentioned, can have less-than-benign consequences. Moreover, any potential “subcontracting” to MNCs would raise questions about accountability, legitimacy, and state responsibilities.

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  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2009
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 55
  • Paperback Price: $23.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-4751-9
  • Document Number: OP-259

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RAND Style Manual
Rosenau, William, Peter Chalk, Renny McPherson, Michelle Parker, and Austin Long, Corporations and Counterinsurgency, RAND Corporation, OP-259, 2009. As of October 11, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP259.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Rosenau, William, Peter Chalk, Renny McPherson, Michelle Parker, and Austin Long, Corporations and Counterinsurgency. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP259.html. Also available in print form.
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