This paper, part of the author's Ph.D. dissertation in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California, employs formal thematic content analysis of statements and texts by Soviet Politburo leaders, the Minister of Defense, and the Commander in Chief of the Navy, in an effort to determine the Soviet Union's declaratory policy for the use of naval or other military forces in oceanic theaters in the event of a nuclear war. Multiple themes are traced to cross-check findings. The author uses both manifest evidence and latent historical evidence to substantiate findings.
This report is part of the RAND paper series. The paper was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
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