An examination of the critical factors in strategic-base selection and an application of this analysis to the basing of the 1956-1961 bombing force. The principal factors considered are the distances from bases to targets, to favorable entry points into enemy defenses, to the source of base supply, and to the points from which the enemy can attack these bases. In addition, the study discusses the joint effects of these factors on the costs of extending bomber radius, the enemy deployment of defenses, the numbers of our bombers lost to enemy fighters, logistics costs, base vulnerability, and our probable bomber loss on the ground.
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