Alternative approaches to the international organization of disarmament
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A discussion of alternative principles upon which an international instrument might be organized for verifying compliance with disarmament measures adopted by the major powers. The report indicates that an arrangement by which each party is permitted to satisfy himself that the others are complying with the agreement may often be preferable to verification by an international organization. In addition, the study examines the problems of organizing enforcement and peacekeeping machinery in a disarmed world, and relates these problems to the U.S. disarmament proposal of September 1961.
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