Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback196 pages $35.00 $28.00 20% Web Discount

The fifth study in a series concerned with the value of participation in a non-atomic game, a special kind of infinite-person game in which no individual player can significantly influence the outcome. The results of Parts I through IV are applied to a certain class of basic economic models, interpretable either as exchange economies with money or as productive economies. The general conclusion is that under a wide variety of conditions the value of the game derived from this class of model exists and coincides with the unique payoff distribution in the core of the game, as well as with the unique payoff distribution associated with the competitive equilibrium or equilibria of the underlying model. This exact agreement of several solutions, in an infinite-person setting, may be compared with known results on the convergence of these solutions in the limit, in similar models with large but finite numbers of participants. (See also RM-5468, RM-5842, RM-6216, RM-6260.)

This report is part of the RAND Corporation report series. The report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1993 that represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.

This research in the public interest was supported by RAND, using discretionary funds made possible by the generosity of RAND's donors, the fees earned on client-funded research, and independent research and development (IR&D) funds provided by the Department of Defense.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.