This report assesses U.S. efforts in defense institution building (DIB) in Africa and suggests possible improvements to planning and execution. It defines DIB and reviews some best practices from DIB and security sector reform experiences. It also highlights how DIB activities serve U.S. official strategic guidance for Africa.

Defense Institution Building in Africa

An Assessment

Michael J. McNerney, Stuart Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, David Stebbins, Renanah Miles Joyce, Angela O'Mahony, Chaoling Feng, Tim Oliver

ResearchPublished Jan 4, 2016

This report assesses U.S. efforts in defense institution building (DIB) in Africa and suggests possible improvements to planning and execution. It first defines DIB and reviews some best practices from DIB and security sector reform experiences. It also highlights how DIB activities serve U.S. official strategic guidance for Africa. The report then examines how DIB is currently planned and executed in Africa and describes the range of programs that are available to U.S. planners for that purpose. It also provides a structured approach to aid in the prioritization of such programs. The report then analyzes DIB efforts in two African nations — Liberia and Libya. Finally, it examines how other institutions and countries undertake DIB by taking a closer look at the DIB activities of DoD's regional centers, as well as the relatively extensive experience of two key U.S. allies — the United Kingdom and France — in this domain.

Key Findings

  • Understanding how to tailor programs to specific conditions of partner nations, gaining buy-in from partner leadership, incorporating civil society considerations, and establishing monitoring and evaluation techniques should greatly improve DIB effectiveness. We found little evidence these best practices were being systematically documented to support DIB planners.
  • Formal guidance is insufficient and communication is overly ad hoc, given the complexity of DIB and how it relates to security cooperation more generally.
  • DIB is a stepping stone to other U.S. defense objectives in Africa. Planners often fail to understand the important linkages between DIB objectives and other U.S. objectives.
  • Significant resource and legislative constraints inhibit the United States from effectively applying security sector reform and DIB lessons.
  • OSD and AFRICOM officials disagreed on DIB priorities and even the definition of DIB. In part because of different understandings of DIB and in part because DoD planners did not consistently document activities, monitoring of activities was uneven. Coordination challenges among OSD, AFRICOM, and others led to ineffective articulation of requirements, poor communication of DIB opportunities to African partners, poor understanding of partner interests, and insufficient substantive or regional expertise.
  • There are more DIB-related programs (47) than is generally thought. DIB can be implemented through a variety of activities, including sending of advisors, needs assessments, education, information exchanges, and personnel exchanges. Such variety provides options for implementing DIB even with sensitive partners. Strengthening DIB efforts in Africa does not require creating new programs but rather focusing existing programs in this direction.

Recommendations

  • DoD should develop a DIB best practices briefing tailored to Africa. This briefing could address strategic guidance and best practices.
  • DoD leaders should work with Congress to address the need for additional DIB-related resources and to facilitate whole-of-government, long-term DIB efforts.
  • DoD should develop a security cooperation playbook with a prominent section on DIB, written in simple language describing how DIB supports other U.S. objectives and how it can be used with African partners. The playbook would help planners coordinate activities and communicate with African partners.
  • AFRICOM should develop guidance for country desk officers to consistently coordinate DIB planning efforts across the command and country teams. This would help harmonize DIB-related objectives in country-level plans.
  • AFRICOM should strengthen its DIB coordinator office and institutionalize an annual DIB conference.
  • DoD should set up a DIB enterprise liaison at AFRICOM as part of AFRICOM's DIB coordinator office.
  • DoD should include a DIB familiarization module in its Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Course and by having AFRICOM institutionalize in-house DIB training. Such training should improve understanding of how these many different programs can be employed toward DIB and how to integrate them with other security cooperation activities.
  • DoD should organize a pilot effort in a single African country to serve as a model for future DIB activities, including a five-year DIB plan developed by U.S. and partner stakeholders. The plan would be based on a comprehensive baseline assessment conducted jointly with partner nation and international officials.

Order a Print Copy

Format
Paperback
Page count
196 pages
List Price
$28.50
Buy link
Add to Cart

Topics

Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2016
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 196
  • Paperback Price: $28.50
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-9240-3
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1232
  • Document Number: RR-1232-OSD

Citation

RAND Style Manual
McNerney, Michael J., Stuart Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, David Stebbins, Renanah Miles Joyce, Angela O'Mahony, Chaoling Feng, and Tim Oliver, Defense Institution Building in Africa: An Assessment, RAND Corporation, RR-1232-OSD, 2016. As of September 17, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1232.html
Chicago Manual of Style
McNerney, Michael J., Stuart Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, David Stebbins, Renanah Miles Joyce, Angela O'Mahony, Chaoling Feng, and Tim Oliver, Defense Institution Building in Africa: An Assessment. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1232.html. Also available in print form.
BibTeX RIS

Research conducted by

This research was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute.

This publication is part of the RAND research report series. Research reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND research reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.