News Release
The End of the Iraq War Offers Lessons for Withdrawal from Afghanistan
Nov 5, 2013
Ending the U.S. war in Iraq required redeploying 100,000 military and civilian personnel; handing off responsibility for 431 activities to the Iraqi government, U.S. embassy, USCENTCOM, or other U.S. government entities; and moving or transferring ownership of over a million pieces of property in accordance with U.S. and Iraqi laws, national policy, and DoD requirements. This book examines the planning and execution of this transition.
The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq
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Over the course of the U.S. engagement in Iraq, the U.S. military managed hundreds of bases and facilities and used millions of pieces of equipment. The military was not only involved with security-related activities but also assisted in political and economic functions the host nation government or other U.S. departments would normally perform. A 2010 assessment identified that responsibility for 431 activities would need to be handed off to the government of Iraq, the U.S. embassy, U.S. Central Command, or other U.S. government departments. Ending the U.S. war in Iraq would also require redeploying over 100,000 military and civilian personnel and moving or transferring ownership of over a million pieces of property, including facilities, in accordance with U.S. and Iraqi laws, national policy, and DoD requirements. This book looks at the planning and execution of this transition, using information gathered from historical documents and interviews with key players. It examines efforts to help Iraq build the capacity necessary to manage its own security absent a U.S. military presence. It also looks at the complications that arose from uncertainty over just how much of a presence the United States would continue to have beyond 2011 and how various posttransition objectives would be advanced. The authors also examine efforts to create an embassy intended to survive in a hostile environment by being entirely self-sufficient, performing missions the military previously performed. The authors draw lessons from these events that can help plan for ending future wars.
Part I
Setting the Stage
Chapter One
Introduction: How Wars End
Chapter Two
The First Six Years
Chapter Three
Multi-National Force – Iraq Transition Planning and Execution, 2009–2010
Part II
Transition Management and Planning
Chapter Four
Transition Management
Chapter Five
The Influence of Washington and Baghdad on the Transition
Part III
Executing the Transition and Retrograde of Forces
Chapter Six
Enduring Security Challenges
Chapter Seven
Enhancing the Security Sector Capacity of the Government of Iraq
Chapter Eight
Enabling an Expeditionary Embassy
Chapter Nine
Reposture the Force
Part IV
Executing the Transition and Retrograde of Forces
Chapter Ten
After the Transition
Chapter Eleven
Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendix A:
Comments of Ambassador James Jeffrey
Appendix B:
Joint Campaign Plan — Base Document
Appendix C:
JCP Annex F — Transition
Appendix D:
USF-I J4 Joint Plans Integration Center Input
Appendix E:
USF-I J4 Department of State Transition Cell RAND History Report
Appendix F:
Joint Logistics Operations Center Input
The research described in this report was prepared for United States Forces–Iraq. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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