Retrograde is the movement or return of serviceable and unserviceable materiel back through the distribution system. Planning for such operations requires adequate estimates of the types and amounts of materiel that will need to be retrograded, during both ongoing and redeployment operations. This report describes a repeatable methodology for the U.S. Army to use in developing accurate retrograde planning factors.

Developing a Repeatable Methodology to Calculate Retrograde Planning Factors

Kristan Klinghoffer, Kenneth Girardini, Arthur W Lackey, Cheryl K. Montemayor, Bonnie Magnuson-Skeels

ResearchPublished Aug 12, 2015

Cover: Developing a Repeatable Methodology to Calculate Retrograde Planning Factors
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Retrograde is the movement or return of both serviceable and unserviceable materiel back through the distribution system to a designated ship-to location, repair facility, or point of disposal. To plan for and field a force capable of efficient retrograde operations, the Army must possess accurate planning factors, by class of supply, to estimate the retrograde workload that will occur, both during ongoing theater operations and during redeployment operations. The flow of retrograde during operations over the past decade has been very slow. This has led to an almost continuous backlog in theater of materiel to be retrograded that the Army had difficulty eliminating. It appears that the Army regularly underresourced the theater organizations involved in retrograde operations, in part due to inadequate retrograde planning factors. To address this problem, RAND Arroyo Center developed and demonstrated a repeatable methodology for developing accurate retrograde planning factors, informed by process mapping, empirical data analysis, and discussions with Army supply officers. The methodology determines retrograde planning factors as a percentage of customer issues and is agnostic to theater, theater development, and unit type variances. The output of this report is a series of retrograde planning factors, by class of supply and by phase of operation, expressed as a percentage of forward flows of supplies to units.

Key Takeaways

The Immediate Output of This Effort Was a Series of Retrograde Maps and Planning Factors

  • This report maps the Army's retrograde process, presents an overview of responsible organizations and a listing of relevant doctrine, and relates peer insights regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the current retrograde system.
  • During OEF and OIF, the Army underresourced organizations involved with retrograde operations, in part because of inadequate retrograde planning factors. By expanding the sources of data, planning factors can be developed that more accurately predict retrograde workload.
  • A methodology was developed to generate the improved planning factors included in this report. This methodology can be used to update the planning factors as new data become available.

Recommendation

  • The Army should use RAND's methodology to develop future retrograde planning factors.

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Klinghoffer, Kristan, Kenneth Girardini, Arthur W Lackey, Cheryl K. Montemayor, and Bonnie Magnuson-Skeels, Developing a Repeatable Methodology to Calculate Retrograde Planning Factors. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR993.html.
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This research was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 Army, in close collaboration with the Army’s Combined Arms Support Command. It was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Military Logistics Program.

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