The authors provide an analysis of Russia's theory and practice of objective-setting when using force abroad prior to 2022 and compare this with Moscow’s behavior in the first year of the full-scale invasion. This comparison relies on a qualitative analysis of Russian leaders' key speeches and a quantitative study of an original dataset of Russian official statements in 2022.

Russia's War Aims in Ukraine

Objective-Setting and the Kremlin's Use of Force Abroad

Samuel Charap, Khrystyna Holynska

ResearchPublished Aug 13, 2024

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is by far its largest and most consequential commitment of military forces abroad in recent decades. The stakes for Russia are extremely high. However, despite these stakes, the Kremlin has not provided a clear and consistent public narrative regarding its objectives, maintaining significant ambiguity and even adopting contradictory stances. In this report, the authors analyze Russia's official public narrative regarding its war aims in Ukraine in the first year of its full-scale invasion. They begin by investigating Russian strategic writings and pre-2022 Russian practice of objective-setting when using force abroad. The authors use this analysis to generate expectations about how Russia would have been expected to behave during the full-scale invasion. They then document the reality of Moscow's objective-setting in the first year of the Ukraine war through a qualitative analysis of Russian leaders' key speeches and a quantitative study of an original dataset of official statements on the war. The authors compare this reality with the expectations, noting significant divergences. Finally, they then provide implications of their findings for U.S. and allied policymakers.

Key Findings

  • Russian strategists recognize the importance of clear, publicly articulated objectives when using military force.
  • Russian strategists emphasize the need to adjust political objectives to realities on the ground.
  • Since 2014, Russia's military operations abroad have either been deniable and semi-covert (Crimea and the Donbas) or, when its operations are acknowledged and overt (Syria), such operations are accompanied by a clearly stated objective.
  • Moscow's failure to consistently articulate a coherent objective in the first year of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine deviates from both the postulates of Russian military science and the country's past practice since 2014.
  • Russian military and political leaders have pronounced objectives for the war in Ukraine, but those objectives have been numerous and varied significantly through the first year of the war.

Topics

Document Details

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Charap, Samuel and Khrystyna Holynska, Russia's War Aims in Ukraine: Objective-Setting and the Kremlin's Use of Force Abroad, RAND Corporation, RR-A2061-6, 2024. As of October 10, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2061-6.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Charap, Samuel and Khrystyna Holynska, Russia's War Aims in Ukraine: Objective-Setting and the Kremlin's Use of Force Abroad. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2061-6.html.
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This research was sponsored by the Russia Strategic Initiative, U.S. European Command, and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division.

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