Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has waged a wide-reaching, high-volume, multichannel disinformation campaign that seeks to not only undermine Ukrainian resilience but also gird Russian support for the war and deplete international support of Ukraine. In this report, the authors provide an overview of Ukrainian efforts to counter this disinformation war and identify lessons for the United States and allied militaries.

Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation

Lessons for Future Conflict

Todd C. Helmus, Khrystyna Holynska

ResearchPublished Sep 3, 2024

Russia has disseminated large volumes of false content targeted at Ukrainians, those living in Russia, and global audiences, including those in the United States and Europe. Both Russia's attempts to sow false narratives and the Ukrainian response during the war provide a unique laboratory for considering how nations can counter disinformation and propaganda during conflict. In this report, the authors seek to distill some of those lessons. They offer a broad case study of Ukraine's information and counterdisinformation war and highlight key lessons that can help the U.S. national security establishment prepare for and counter disinformation during U.S. contingency operations.

Key Findings

Ukraine's key initiatives launched before the war, referred to as shaping operations, helped lay the groundwork for successful Ukrainian counterdisinformation initiatives

  • Its intelligence-driven "prebunk" informed Ukrainian and international audiences about a planned Russian operation to falsify a Ukrainian attack on its forces and thereby provide a casus belli for the Russian invasion.

In Ukraine's efforts during the war to counter Russian disinformation in the three theaters of its information war — inside Ukraine, inside Russia, and in the international community — it has largely experienced success in countering it domestically within Ukraine

  • To fight Russia's attempts to undermine Ukrainian unity and sap their will to fight, Ukraine has responded with a diverse campaign that enlisted both government and civil society institutions to debunk Russian disinformation, prebunk emerging narratives, build the capacity of key frontline communities, and promote media literacy education among the populace.

Ukraine has fared the worst in countering Russia's domestically targeted disinformation inside Russia during the war

  • While Ukraine has attempted to undercut Russian support by highlighting the costs of the conflict to both Russian soldiers and Ukrainian citizens, such efforts have largely proved unsuccessful.

Success in the international arena can best be measured in international support for the war, which has slipped over time, maybe particularly so in the United States

  • Ukrainian narratives hailing from the internationally popular President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as well as a band of online Ukrainian influencers helped to enlist early international support.
  • Cracks in the international coalition have emerged of late.

Recommendations

  • The United States should consider innovative ways to reach and communicate with populations residing in totalitarian countries like Russia or China; rally international institutions to more effectively identify, debunk, and prebunk adversary campaigns targeting the rest of the world; and support a broader array of institutions residing in host nations.
  • U.S. and allied governments should look to identify key at-risk countries early. The goal, as in Ukraine, is a civil society and government that have the necessary skills and resources to counter foreign disinformation and the interconnections to coordinate such efforts.
  • The United States will need to assess its own doctrine, training, and wargaming efforts to ensure it is able to counter disinformation during conflict.
  • The U.S. military, as well as the Department of State, should not only invest in building civil society organizations in advance of future conflict but support and be willing to work closely with such institutions when conflict does arise.
  • The U.S. military should develop a mandatory media literacy education campaign that can help both deployed and garrison personnel recognize malign influence attempts and foster safer online behavior.
  • Senior U.S. government leaders must be willing to accept risk and allow communicators to quickly (without obtrusive senior leader approval chains) create unique, humorous, and engaging content.
  • The U.S. Department of State, as well as the U.S. military, will need to ensure that initiatives to debunk (fact checking), prebunk, and promulgate proactive information narratives are effectively resourced, implemented, and integrated in military theaters of operation.

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Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2024
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 96
  • Paperback Price: $21.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1398-6
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA2771-1
  • Document Number: RR-A2771-1

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Helmus, Todd C. and Khrystyna Holynska, Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation: Lessons for Future Conflict, RAND Corporation, RR-A2771-1, 2024. As of September 23, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2771-1.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Helmus, Todd C. and Khrystyna Holynska, Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation: Lessons for Future Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2771-1.html. Also available in print form.
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This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).

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