Congressional concern with cost overruns, or breaches, in several major defense acquisition programs led the authors, in a partnership with the Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to investigate root causes of overruns. Having conducted six analyses, the authors were able to develop a methodology for such analyses.

Methodologies in Analyzing the Root Causes of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches

Irv Blickstein, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian McInnis, Megan McKernan, Charles Nemfakos, Jerry M. Sollinger, Carolyn Wong

ResearchPublished Sep 27, 2012

Congressional concern with cost overruns, or breaches, in several major defense acquisition programs led the authors, in a partnership with the Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to investigate root causes by examining program reviews, analyzing data, participating in contractor briefings, and holding meetings with diverse stakeholders. In two companion studies, the authors analyzed the reasons for six program breaches and developed a methodology for carrying out root cause analyses. This report documents that methodology, whose key components include the following steps: formulate a hypothesis, set up long-lead-time activities, document the unit cost threshold breach, construct a time line of cost growth recent events from the program history, verify cost data and quantify cost growth, create program cost profiles and pinpoint occurrences of cost growth, match the time line with profiles and derive causes of cost growth, reconcile remaining issues, attribute cost growth to root causes, and create postulates. This study represents an important chronicle of the approach to use in performing such analyses — one that others may use in their own analytic efforts. In addition, it gathers extensive documentation on the data sources used to examine the six program breaches investigated.

Key Findings

A Method for Conducting a Root Cause Analysis Has Been Developed

  • Each program is unique but a generic methodology can be applied.
  • Recording bibliographic information for a data source archive is vital.
  • Analysts need to examine each program’s history, to include the military requirement, financial data, technical data, contractual issues, schedules, and the acquisition environment.
  • The methodology will iteratively improve the research focus.

Recommendations

  • Analysts should consult a variety of sources during their investigation of a program breach.
  • They should establish a permanent archive to record sources used, which will assist with future root cause analyses and maintain the sources for future efforts.
  • Analysts will need a way to search data sources, so a searchable database should be created.

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  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2012
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 106
  • Paperback Price: $24.95
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-7630-4
  • Document Number: TR-1248-OSD

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Blickstein, Irv, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian McInnis, Megan McKernan, Charles Nemfakos, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Carolyn Wong, Methodologies in Analyzing the Root Causes of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches, RAND Corporation, TR-1248-OSD, 2012. As of September 8, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1248.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Blickstein, Irv, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian McInnis, Megan McKernan, Charles Nemfakos, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Carolyn Wong, Methodologies in Analyzing the Root Causes of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012. https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1248.html. Also available in print form.
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The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

This publication is part of the RAND technical report series. RAND technical reports, products of RAND from 2003 to 2011, presented research findings on a topic limited in scope or intended for a narrow audience; discussions of the methodology employed in research; literature reviews, survey instruments, modeling exercises, guidelines for practitioners and research professionals, and supporting documentation; and preliminary findings. All RAND technical reports were subject to rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

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