Using EPIC to Find Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Gaps in Department of Defense Policies
ResearchPublished Jun 20, 2013
The authors present a framework and methodology to identify the roles and responsibilities of those implementing Department of Defense policies and also potential conflicts, ambiguities, gaps, inconsistencies, and redundancies in those policies. They introduce a new software tool that automates one step of the methodology — EPIC — and demonstrate its use with three case studies to illustrate the technique and also the tool's flexibility.
ResearchPublished Jun 20, 2013
The authors present a framework and methodology to identify the roles and responsibilities (R&R) of those implementing Department of Defense policies and also potential conflicts, ambiguities, gaps, inconsistencies, and redundancies in those policies. They introduce a new software tool that automates one step of the methodology — EPIC — and demonstrate its use with three case studies to illustrate the technique and also the tool's flexibility. EPIC allows analysts to efficiently analyze multiple policy documents to detect potential conflicts in policy early on, thereby allowing policy developers to focus their attention on the need for clarification and, possibly, changes in policy. The authors relate executive positions to R&R and the products that result from their execution. If it can be shown that more than one actor is assigned to take the same action on the same product, then a potential conflict exists in the body of policy. If, on the other hand, no executive is assigned to take action on a product, then there is a potential gap in the body of policy. Use of this new tool will result in better and more consistent defense policy.
The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Navy. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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