An Assessment of the Army's Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning Program
ResearchPublished Jun 19, 2013
U.S. Army Special Operations Command asked RAND Arroyo Center to determine whether its Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning (THOR3) program is effectively utilizing the resources provided and to identify opportunities for improvement in the program's planning and implementation, staffing, leader development and education, facility and equipment requirements, and ability to support participating personnel.
ResearchPublished Jun 19, 2013
In 2009, U.S. Special Operations Command provided U.S. Army Special Operations Command with funds to establish the Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning (THOR3) program, an investment reflecting "truth number 1" of special operations forces: "Humans are more important than hardware." The goals of THOR3 are to increase the physical and mental capabilities of Army special forces, help these soldiers recover more rapidly from injuries sustained in combat or training, and help them stay healthy and able to contribute longer. The program differs from other Army fitness programs in several important ways, including its holistic approach to improving physical and mental performance, its focus on individual and unit needs, and its reliance on a professional staff of program coordinators, strength and conditioning coaches, physical therapists, dietitians, and cognitive enhancement specialists to deliver training and rehabilitation services that are on par with those provided to professional sports teams. U.S. Army Special Operations Command asked RAND Arroyo Center to determine whether THOR3 is effectively utilizing the resources provided and to identify opportunities for improvement in the program's planning and implementation, staffing (including hiring and retention), leader development and education, facility and equipment requirements, and ability to support participating personnel.
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.
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