If the additional troops President Obama has ordered sent to Afghanistan are intended to pursue a "population-centric counterinsurgency" campaign, as described in news reports about General McChrystal's thinking, then this decision is regrettable, writes Celeste Ward Gventer.
The discussion of American troop numbers misunderstands the subtle nuances of fighting a war in areas inhabited by fiercely independent Pashtun tribes, whose culture and traditions are under severe threat from the Taliban, writes Seth Jones.
When Defense Secretary Gates announced that he was dismissing Gen. McKiernan as the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan and replacing him with Lt. Gen. McChrystal, he signaled his support for an intellectual movement that in a few short years has come to dominate military thinking in Washington, writes Celeste Ward.
Afghanistan has a reputation as a graveyard of empires, based as much on lore as on reality.... Yes, the situation is serious, but it's far from doomed. We can still turn things around if we strive for a better understanding of the Afghan insurgency and work to exploit its many weaknesses, writes Seth G. Jones.
Analysis of alternative statistical models that assess the causal factors involved in insurgent control in Central Luzon and comparison of several models that incorporate the operations of insurgent organization and socioeconomic variables.
Adjunct Political Scientist; Affiliate Faculty, Pardee RAND Graduate School
Education B.A. in communications, Loyola College; M.S. in international relations, New York University; Ph.D. in international security policy, University of Pittsburgh
Assistant Policy Researcher; Ph.D. Candidate, Pardee RAND Graduate School
Education M.A. in international relations, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; B.S. in industrial engineering, Republic of Korea Air Force Academy