• News Release

    Local Communities in Afghanistan Can Play Crucial Role in Improving Security

    The Afghan government and NATO can improve security in Afghanistan by leveraging traditional policing institutions in rural villages and mobilizing the population against insurgents.

    Jul 26, 2010

  • Commentary

    Why U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Are So Frustrated

    President Obama's declaration last week that a change in personnel will not mean a change in policy suggests that the administration took only some of the lessons contained in Michael Hastings' Rolling Stone article, writes Celeste Ward Gventer.

    Jun 30, 2010

  • Commentary

    Ends, Ways, and Means—The Debate We Still Need on Afghanistan

    When President Obama explained his decision to send 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan to support General Stanley McChrystal's new counterinsurgency campaign, he left a key question unanswered: Will this be enough to achieve U.S. strategic ends in Afghanistan? writes David E. Johnson.

    Dec 9, 2009

  • Commentary

    Take the War to Pakistan

    The United States and Pakistan must target Taliban leaders in Baluchistan. There are several ways to do it, and none requires military forces, writes Seth G. Jones.

    Dec 4, 2009

  • Commentary

    A False Promise of 'Counterinsurgency'

    If the additional troops President Obama has ordered sent to Afghanistan are intended to pursue a "population-centric counterinsurgency" campaign, as described in news reports about General McChrystal's thinking, then this decision is regrettable, writes Celeste Ward Gventer.

    Dec 1, 2009

  • Commentary

    Path to a Pashtun Rebellion in Afghanistan

    The discussion of American troop numbers misunderstands the subtle nuances of fighting a war in areas inhabited by fiercely independent Pashtun tribes, whose culture and traditions are under severe threat from the Taliban, writes Seth Jones.

    Oct 2, 2009

  • Commentary

    Countering the Military's Latest Fad: Counterinsurgency

    When Defense Secretary Gates announced that he was dismissing Gen. McKiernan as the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan and replacing him with Lt. Gen. McChrystal, he signaled his support for an intellectual movement that in a few short years has come to dominate military thinking in Washington, writes Celeste Ward.

    May 17, 2009

  • Commentary

    Going the Distance

    Afghanistan has a reputation as a graveyard of empires, based as much on lore as on reality.... Yes, the situation is serious, but it's far from doomed. We can still turn things around if we strive for a better understanding of the Afghan insurgency and work to exploit its many weaknesses, writes Seth G. Jones.

    Feb 15, 2009

  • News Release

    Taliban's Sanctuary Bases in Pakistan Must Be Eliminated

    If Taliban sanctuary bases in Pakistan are not eliminated, the United States and its NATO allies will face crippling long-term consequences in their effort to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan.

    Jun 9, 2008

  • Journal Article

    US Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency

    Counterinsurgency has re-emerged as an urgent priority for the U.S. armed forces.

    Jan 1, 2004

  • Research Brief

    The New Face of Insurgency

    What are the external sources of support for insurgencies today? What motivates the different sources of support? How do different sources of support contribute to insurgent movements?

    Jan 1, 2002

  • Report

    Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements

    Outside supporters, including state and non-state sponsors, of insurgent movements offer various forms of assistance to insurgents based on a wide range of motivations.

    Nov 20, 2001

  • Research Brief

    Drugs and Insurgents in Colombia: A Regional Conundrum

    The study concludes by examining possible scenarios for Colombia's future, assessing their implications for the security of neighboring states and suggesting how U.S. policy toward the region might best be redefined.

    Jan 1, 2001

  • Report

    Explaining Dissident Success: The Huks in Central Luzon

    Analysis of alternative statistical models that assess the causal factors involved in insurgent control in Central Luzon and comparison of several models that incorporate the operations of insurgent organization and socioeconomic variables.

    Jan 1, 1972

  • Report

    The Huk Rebellion in the Philippines: Quantitative Approaches

    A statistical study of conditions related to control of barrios in Central Luzon by Huk rebels.

    Jan 1, 1970

  • Report

    Insurgent Organization and Operations: A Case Study of the Viet Cong in the Delta, 1964-1966

    Analyzes the decisionmaking and operating procedures of the Viet Cong in Dinh Tuong province, 1964-1966.

    Aug 1, 1967

  • Content

    Sebastian Joon Bae

    Defense Analyst
    Education BA in peace & conflict studies, UC Berkeley; MA in security studies, Georgetown University

  • Content

    Elizabeth M. Bartels

    Associate Policy Researcher
    Education PhD in policy analysis, Pardee RAND Graduate School; M.S. in political science, MIT; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago

  • Content

    Hannah Jane Byrne

    Defense Analyst
    Education M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University; B.A. in political science, Johns Hopkins University

  • Content

    Jason H. Campbell

    Policy Researcher
    Education M.A. in international affairs, Catholic University; B.A. in political science, Amherst College