A set of “scorecards” assesses the relative capabilities of U.S. and Chinese military forces in diverse types of conflict, at varying distances from the Chinese mainland, and at different points in time.
Although China continues to lag behind the United States in terms of aggregate military hardware and operational skills, it has improved its capabilities relative to those of the U.S. in many critical areas. Moreover, China does not need to catch up fully in order to challenge U.S. ability to conduct effective military operations near the Chinese mainland.
Even if China really sees itself as undertaking legitimate activities to protect its rightful interests, it is not surprising that its rival claimants, as well as the United States and other countries in the region, see Beijing's island building activities as efforts to improve China's abilities to bully its neighbors.
In many cases, the available space on a Marine Expeditionary Unit's ships falls far short of what is needed to transport the full set of required equipment. A RAND-developed software tool was designed to help limit the effects of these shortfalls.
Australia is examining an enterprise-level naval shipbuilding plan. All three options—sustaining a domestic naval shipbuilding industry, buying ships from foreign shipbuilders, or building ships partially in-country and partially overseas—have complex consequences and trade-offs.
This report assesses the economic impacts that a shipbuilder has on its local community and region. The authors utilize a case study methodology to examine two U.S. shipbuilders and the Saab Aeronautics Gripen program in Sweden.
Researchers answer questions regarding ship design and build options available to the Royal Australia Navy; various phases, options, and decisions; and aspects that can contribute to the success of Australia's major ship acquisition program.
Russia and China have been investing in military modernization programs to blunt the U.S. military's technological edge, fielding advanced aircraft, submarines, and both longer range and more accurate missiles. The DoD's Third Offset Strategy is a much-needed initiative to identify and invest in innovative ways to sustain and advance America's military dominance for the 21st century.
The U.S. Navy and the shipbuilding industrial base on which it depends on are approaching a critical juncture. Unless the Navy and U.S. shipbuilders adopt an integrated set of broad management strategies the United States runs the risk of shortchanging its capabilities to design and produce naval warships for several generations.
In what ways, and to what degree are unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) suitable for supporting U.S. Navy missions and functions? This report briefly characterizes the current and emerging USV marketplaces to provide a baseline for near-term capabilities, describes USV concepts of employment to support diverse U.S. Navy missions and functions, and evaluates these concepts of employment to identify specific missions and functions for which they are highly suitable.
There are good reasons for the United States to rethink how it counterbalances Iran, reassures local allies, and projects power with fewer resources. However, tying down large numbers of fighter aircraft in the Gulf is likely only to exacerbate old problems and create new ones.
To reduce costs and take advantage of commercial technology, the U.S. Navy is pursuing open-architecture software and other improvements to its Aegis combat system. This report examines the potential benefits and challenges of this new approach.
Examines contracting alternatives for the full deployment phase of the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services system, intended to give the U.S. Navy a common set of key command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence networks.
To design a new naval submarine domestically, Australia's industry and Government will need about 1,000 skilled draftsmen and engineers. Cultivating this workforce could take 15-20 years; partnering with foreign designers could expedite the process.
The Royal Australian Navy intends to acquire 12 new submarines to replace its Collins-class vessels. RAND assessed the domestic engineering and design skills that Australian industry and government will need to design the new submarine, identified the skills they currently possess, and evaluated how to fill any gaps between the two.