Examines contracting alternatives for the full deployment phase of the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services system, intended to give the U.S. Navy a common set of key command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence networks.
To design a new naval submarine domestically, Australia's industry and Government will need about 1,000 skilled draftsmen and engineers. Cultivating this workforce could take 15-20 years; partnering with foreign designers could expedite the process.
The Royal Australian Navy intends to acquire 12 new submarines to replace its Collins-class vessels. RAND assessed the domestic engineering and design skills that Australian industry and government will need to design the new submarine, identified the skills they currently possess, and evaluated how to fill any gaps between the two.
A RAND study of previously successful submarine programs reveals that future programs must focus on stability, roles and responsibilities of the government and private organizations, and the need for experienced managers and a strategic view of the submarine force and industrial base.
An examination of five submarine programs in the three countries—the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program—identifies lessons that could help inform future program managers.
Congressional concern with cost overruns in some major defense acquisition programs led to an investigation of root causes by examining program reviews, analyzing data, participating in contractor briefings, and holding meetings with stakeholders.
The policies and procedures established by the Department of Defense for program management and oversight can be tailored to meet the unique needs of ship acquisition programs without compromising oversight.
Some recent shipbuilding programs have had multiple shipyards construct major modules of each ship. Opting for a shared-build strategy makes it necessary to monitor and manage the program to ensure that it delivers all the required outcomes.
The Secretary of Defense's plans to shift Navy aircraft carrier acquisition to every five years should have little impact on force structure and the industrial base in the next decade—but after that, the force structure shrinks, as does the chance of meeting goals for the number of deployed aircraft carriers.
Presented at the Submarine Institute of Australia's 2010 Conference in Perth, Australia, this paper draws on RAND's international submarine experience to highlight policies that Australia may wish to consider in planning for its new submarine.
Washington would be wise to work closely with Britain and France to ensure that their budget cuts do not threaten how the allies will, together, address common threats and security challenges, write F. Stephen Larrabee and Peter A. Wilson.
Develops a framework for measuring the dependability of naval networks and describes a software tool for modeling the impact that individual network components have on overall mission operational availability.
An assessment of the proposed MPF(F) Sea Basing squadron found alternative configurations with fewer ships and different air components that could still meet mission support counterinsurgency, special operations, and major combat operations.
Looking across a set of completed C4I upgrades to U.S. Navy ships, the authors uncovered mixed evidence of cost improvement, a high level of variability in costs, and a trend toward overestimating the installation-labor costs of certain upgrades.