There are good reasons for the United States to rethink how it counterbalances Iran, reassures local allies, and projects power with fewer resources. However, tying down large numbers of fighter aircraft in the Gulf is likely only to exacerbate old problems and create new ones.
Age and heavy usage makes equipment renewal an Army imperative. Recent expenditures have been on the order of $10 billion per year. Quantitative analyses are needed to determine how often a vehicle should be renewed. This study assesses the effects of vehicle age, operational tempo, Southwest Asia deployment, and reset on mission-critical failures and maintenance costs.
To reduce costs and take advantage of commercial technology, the U.S. Navy is pursuing open-architecture software and other improvements to its Aegis combat system. This report examines the potential benefits and challenges of this new approach.
Examines contracting alternatives for the full deployment phase of the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services system, intended to give the U.S. Navy a common set of key command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence networks.
To design a new naval submarine domestically, Australia's industry and Government will need about 1,000 skilled draftsmen and engineers. Cultivating this workforce could take 15-20 years; partnering with foreign designers could expedite the process.
The Royal Australian Navy intends to acquire 12 new submarines to replace its Collins-class vessels. RAND assessed the domestic engineering and design skills that Australian industry and government will need to design the new submarine, identified the skills they currently possess, and evaluated how to fill any gaps between the two.
A RAND study of previously successful submarine programs reveals that future programs must focus on stability, roles and responsibilities of the government and private organizations, and the need for experienced managers and a strategic view of the submarine force and industrial base.
An examination of five submarine programs in the three countries—the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program—identifies lessons that could help inform future program managers.
Congressional concern with cost overruns in some major defense acquisition programs led to an investigation of root causes by examining program reviews, analyzing data, participating in contractor briefings, and holding meetings with stakeholders.
The policies and procedures established by the Department of Defense for program management and oversight can be tailored to meet the unique needs of ship acquisition programs without compromising oversight.