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  <title>RAND Research Topic: Pay for Performance in Education</title>
  <link rel="self" href="https://www.rand.org/topics/pay-for-performance-in-education.xml"/>
  <updated>2021-04-05T21:15:34Z</updated>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" hreflang="en" href="https://www.rand.org/topics/pay-for-performance-in-education.html" />
  <rights>Copyright (c) 2021, The RAND Corporation</rights>
  <author>
    <name>RAND Corporation</name>
  </author>
  <id>https://www.rand.org/topics/pay-for-performance-in-education.html</id>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Retirement Benefits and Teacher Retention</title>
  <author>
   	<name>David Knapp; Kristine M. Brown; James Hosek; Michael G. Mattock; Beth J. Asch</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1448.html</id>
  <published>2016-05-02T08:45:00Z</published>
  <updated>2016-05-02T08:45:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">The authors develop and estimate a stochastic dynamic programming model to analyze the relationship between compensation, including retirement benefits, and retention over the career of Chicago public school teachers.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1448.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Results from the Intensive Partnerships for Effective Teaching Initiative</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Brian M. Stecher; Deborah J. Holtzman; Michael S. Garet; Laura S. Hamilton; John Engberg; Elizabeth D. Steiner; Abby Robyn; Matthew D. Baird; Italo A. Gutierrez; Evan D. Peet; Iliana  Brodziak de los Reyes; Kaitlin Fronberg; Gabriel Weinberger; Gerald P. Hunter; Jay Chambers</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10009-1.html</id>
  <published>2019-02-11T13:47:00Z</published>
  <updated>2019-02-11T13:47:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">A multiyear effort aimed at increasing students&apos; access to effective teaching failed to achieve its goals for improved student achievement and graduation. However, the participating school districts and charter management organizations did implement better measures of teaching effectiveness.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10009-1.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Impacts of the Intensive Partnerships Initiative</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Brian M. Stecher; Deborah J. Holtzman; Michael S. Garet; Laura S. Hamilton; John Engberg; Elizabeth D. Steiner; Abby Robyn; Matthew D. Baird; Italo A. Gutierrez; Evan D. Peet; Iliana  Brodziak de los Reyes; Kaitlin Fronberg; Gabriel Weinberger; Gerald P. Hunter; Jay Chambers</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2242.html</id>
  <published>2018-06-21T03:01:00Z</published>
  <updated>2018-06-21T03:01:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">The Intensive Partnerships for Effective Teaching initiative enhanced how teachers are evaluated and improved teacher staffing policies. But it did not lead to gains in student achievement or graduation rates.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2242.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">&apos;Motivating teachers with incentivised pay and coaching&apos; randomised control trial (ICR trial)</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Alex Sutherland; Rob Prideaux; Julie Belanger; Miriam Broeks; Yulia Shenderovich; Simon Van Der Staaij</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2145.html</id>
  <published>2018-02-05T09:30:00Z</published>
  <updated>2018-02-05T09:30:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">After recruitment issues had led to the cancellation of a randomised controlled trial on the impact of incentivised pay on teaching in the UK, RAND Europe conducted a follow-up investigation exploring the reasons behind the recruitment difficulties.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2145.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">How Different Pension Policies Can Impact Teacher Retention</title>
  <author>
   	<name>David Knapp; Kristine M. Brown; James Hosek; Michael G. Mattock; Beth J. Asch</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9898.html</id>
  <published>2016-05-02T17:32:00Z</published>
  <updated>2016-05-02T17:32:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">A dynamic retention model can help policymakers concerned with mounting pension costs estimate and analyze the relationship between different retirement benefit policies and retention over the career of Chicago public school teachers.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9898.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Retirement Benefits and Teacher Retention</title>
  <author>
   	<name>David Knapp; Kristine M. Brown; James Hosek; Michael G. Mattock; Beth J. Asch</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1448.html</id>
  <published>2016-05-02T11:37:00Z</published>
  <updated>2016-05-02T11:37:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">There is little capacity to predict how recent pension reforms and changes to teacher compensation will affect teacher turnover and teacher experience mix&amp;mdash;and in turn&amp;mdash;potentially impact the cost and efficacy of the public education system. Research using a structural modeling approach may begin to fill that gap. </summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1448.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Three Essays on Education Reform in the United States</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Ethan Scherer</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD335.html</id>
  <published>2014-09-29T13:00:00Z</published>
  <updated>2014-09-29T13:00:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">Examines California&apos;s state education accountability reform and comprehensive reform to improve teacher and principal talent in high-poverty, low-performing schools.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD335.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Addressing Challenges in Evaluating School Principal Improvement Efforts</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Susan Burkhauser; Ashley Pierson; Susan M. Gates; Laura S. Hamilton</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP392.html</id>
  <published>2012-10-04T08:45:00Z</published>
  <updated>2012-10-04T08:45:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">This report describes challenges that states, districts, and other entities can expect to encounter as they evaluate efforts targeting school leadership as a way to improve student outcomes and offers suggestions for dealing with those challenges.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP392.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Evaluating Efforts to Improve School Leadership</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Susan Burkhauser; Ashley Pierson; Susan M. Gates; Laura S. Hamilton</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9686.html</id>
  <published>2012-10-04T08:45:00Z</published>
  <updated>2012-10-04T08:45:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">Efforts to improve school leadership may improve student outcomes. Evaluators and policymakers should allow time for improvements to show, use multiple evaluation measures, and interpret findings carefully before applying them to others.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9686.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Focus on K-12 Education handout</title>
  <author>
   	<name>RAND Corporation</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP613-2012-08.html</id>
  <published>2012-09-04T09:30:00Z</published>
  <updated>2012-09-04T09:30:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">This document describes recent RAND work related to K-12 education, including teacher pay for performance, measuring teacher effectiveness, school leadership, school systems and reform, and out-of-school time.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP613-2012-08.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Can Team Pay for Performance Improve Teacher Practices and Student Outcomes?</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Matthew G. Springer; John F. Pane; Vi-Nhuan Le; Daniel F. McCaffrey; Susan Freeman Burns; Laura S. Hamilton; Brian M. Stecher</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201200111.html</id>
  <published>2012-08-10T00:00:00Z</published>
  <updated>2012-08-10T00:00:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">Policymakers have shown increased interest in incentive programs for teachers based on the outcomes of their students. However, evidence shows no significant effects from team-level bonuses on student achievement or teacher practices in the short term.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201200111.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Improving School Leadership Through the Pittsburgh Principal Incentive Program</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Laura S. Hamilton; John Engberg; Elizabeth D. Steiner; Catherine Awsumb Nelson; Kun Yuan</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9666.html</id>
  <published>2012-07-02T10:15:00Z</published>
  <updated>2012-07-02T10:15:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">A RAND Corporation report examines the Pittsburgh Principal Incentive Program&apos;s implementation, how principals have responded to the reforms, and what outcomes followed program implementation.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9666.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Improving School Leadership Through Support, Evaluation, and Incentives</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Laura S. Hamilton; John Engberg; Elizabeth D. Steiner; Catherine Awsumb Nelson; Kun Yuan</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1223.html</id>
  <published>2012-06-25T12:45:00Z</published>
  <updated>2012-06-25T12:45:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">This report examines the Pittsburgh Principal Incentive Program&apos;s implementation, how principals and other school staff have responded to the reforms, and what outcomes accompanied program implementation.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1223.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">No Evidence That Incentive Pay for Teacher Teams Improves Student Outcomes</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Matthew G. Springer; John F. Pane; Vi-Nhuan Le; Daniel F. McCaffrey; Susan Freeman Burns; Laura S. Hamilton; Brian M. Stecher</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9649.html</id>
  <published>2012-05-30T10:15:00Z</published>
  <updated>2012-05-30T10:15:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">Analysis of an incentive program that paid teachers bonuses based on their students&apos; growth in achievement in mathematics, English language arts, science, and social studies showed no effect on student test scores in any of the subject areas.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9649.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Incentive Pay Programs Do Not Affect Teacher Motivation or Report Practices</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Kun Yuan; Vi-Nhuan Le; Daniel F. McCaffrey; Julie A. Marsh; Laura S. Hamilton; Brian M. Stecher; Matthew G. Springer</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP51138.html</id>
  <published>2012-01-01T12:00:00Z</published>
  <updated>2012-01-01T12:00:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">The goal of this study is to examine whether three recently implemented pay-for-performance programs had similar effects on teachers&apos; motivation and reported practices.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP51138.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">New York City School-Based Financial Incentives Program Did Not Improve Student Achievement or Affect Reported Teaching Practices</title>
  <author>
   	<name>RAND Corporation</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/07/18.html</id>
  <published>2011-07-18T00:02:00Z</published>
  <updated>2011-07-18T00:02:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">A New York City program designed to improve student performance through school-based financial incentives for teachers did not improve student achievement, most likely because it did not change teacher behavior and the conditions needed to motivate staff were not achieved.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/07/18.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">A Big Apple for Educators: New York City&apos;s Experiment with Schoolwide Performance Bonuses</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Julie A. Marsh; Matthew G. Springer; Daniel F. McCaffrey; Kun Yuan; Scott Epstein; Julia Koppich; Nidhi Kalra; Catherine DiMartino; Art (Xiao) Peng</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1114.html</id>
  <published>2011-07-18T00:01:00Z</published>
  <updated>2011-07-18T00:01:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">New York&apos;s Schoolwide Performance Bonus Program, whose broad objective was to improve student performance through school-based financial incentives, did not in fact do so, perhaps because it did not motivate change in educator behavior.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1114.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">What New York City&apos;s Experiment with Schoolwide Performance Bonuses Tells Us About Pay for Performance</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Julie A. Marsh; Matthew G. Springer; Daniel F. McCaffrey; Kun Yuan; Scott Epstein; Julia Koppich; Nidhi Kalra; Catherine DiMartino; Art (Xiao) Peng</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9596.html</id>
  <published>2011-07-18T00:01:00Z</published>
  <updated>2011-07-18T00:01:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">New York City&apos;s Schoolwide Performance Bonus Program did not improve student achievement at any grade level, perhaps in part because it provided no significant additional motivation beyond other accountability incentives.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9596.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Experimental Evidence on Teacher Incentives</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Matthew G. Springer; Dale Ballou; Laura S. Hamilton; Vi-Nhuan Le; J. R. Lockwood; Daniel F. McCaffrey; Matthew Pepper; Brian M. Stecher</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1416.html</id>
  <published>2010-10-13T14:00:00Z</published>
  <updated>2010-10-13T14:00:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">By and large, students of teachers randomly given eligibility for bonuses did not outperform students whose teachers were not eligible for bonuses. This and other findings have significant implications for education policy.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1416.html" />
  </entry>
 <entry>
  <title type="html">Performance-Based Accountability Systems for Public Services</title>
  <author>
   	<name>Brian M. Stecher; Frank Camm; Cheryl L. Damberg; Laura S. Hamilton; Kathleen J. Mullen; Christopher Nelson; Paul Sorensen; Martin Wachs; Allison Yoh; Gail L. Zellman; Kristin J. Leuschner</name>
  </author>  
  <id>https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1019z1.html</id>
  <published>2010-07-21T15:28:00Z</published>
  <updated>2010-07-21T15:28:00Z</updated>
  <summary type="html">Evidence supports continued experimentation with and adoption of performance-based accountability systems (PBAS) in various sectors: child care, education, health care, public health emergency preparedness, and transportation. However, PBAS design and its prospects for success depend on the context in which it will operate.</summary>
  <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1019z1.html" />
  </entry>
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