As online platforms have multiplied, cyberstalking has become more prevalent. What are the most common or contrasting characteristics of federal cyberstalking cases? And what are the main challenges to prosecuting such cases?
Social media has a content problem. It's not the content itself, although the list of toxic material is long. The problem is the sheer volume of content. Instead of trusting in self-regulation, the United States could use its regulation of Wall Street after 2008 as a roadmap for regulating tech.
Russia has taken increasingly aggressive actions to restrict access of information about the war in Ukraine. Ensuring that the Russian people know the truth about what their government is doing in Ukraine could bring this war to an end soon rather than later.
The aim of this study was to develop a tool to 'nowcast' migrant stocks by using real-time data from the Facebook Marketing Application Programming Interface (API) and official migration data from EU member states and states in the United States.
By the early 2010s, it was clear that the internet provided white supremacists and other extremists a tool to operationalize their hateful ideas and cause real-world harms. How can the average user understand their risk of exposure to extremist content and make informed decisions about the platforms they use?
Social media systems were incredibly active during disasters. Traditional sources such as the initial FEMA damage estimates can miss areas of heavy impact. This study provides a novel use case in crisis informatics.
Social media users generate massive volumes of content, which then spreads at extraordinary speeds. Yet platforms generally rely on a slow process of human moderation to remove prohibited content. What if moderation could happen before the content is even posted?
The authors identify key Chinese practices and the supporting infrastructure and conditions that successful social media disinformation campaigns require, concluding that China is using Taiwan as a test bed for developing attack vectors.
Disinformation campaigns on social media pose a nuanced threat. But much of the U.S. response remains ad hoc and uncoordinated. It's unclear who has the edge moving forward, because disinformation techniques and countermeasures are evolving simultaneously.
Since the Russian propaganda campaign that targeted the 2016 U.S. presidential election, researchers have penned a trove of reports that offer recommendations for countering such efforts. To help policymakers and others, RAND experts produced a compendium that divides these recommendations into various categories.
This article addresses a gap in the current policy discussion, provides evidence of Chinese military planning for covert manipulation of Taiwanese social media, and explores how its interest in and tactics for social media manipulation have evolved over time.
This article collects a novel dataset of thousands of Chinese-language social media posts on the leading microblog, Sina Weibo, in 2015. Analysis of this dataset reveals four multilayered popular Chinese narratives on North Korea.
A recent poll found that more than a quarter of Americans will not try to get vaccinated. The spread of misinformation and disinformation, which is rampant over social media, is one of the factors fueling vaccine hesitancy. And in turn, it's threatening our ability to end the pandemic for good.
The Chinese military is positioning itself as one of the leading actors for hostile Chinese influence operations on social media. The PLA uses social media for covert hostile political interference operations targeting foreign countries.
As information becomes ever more central for Chinese warfighting, the People's Liberation Army is developing a new concept for psychological warfare in the information era called "cognitive domain operations."