
I am putting the following note of explanation at
the head of each of the accounts of various segments of my recent
trip through the Far and Middle East and Europe:
This is one of a series of impressions gleaned during
a long trip. As will be evident, the series combines a wide variety
of matters: reports on conversations with American or foreign
military or diplomatic officials, meetings with reporters, encounters
with refugees, judgments on personalities and the immediate environment,
half-formed surmises on strategic and political issues, tentative
judgments as to useful topics for research, etc., etc. I have
not attempted to sort these out, since to do this would probably
preclude my getting much of it down. Rather, the impressions
and offhand appraisals are put down nearly raw. I expect to exploit
this near-raw material myself. It might conceivably be of interest
to others, and in this hope I am circulating it. But it is closer
to a diary than the conventional trip report. Hence the title,
"Impressions and Appraisals."
The circumstances of the trip, the rather extensive
preparation for it, and the time at which it occurred, made it
a most stimulating and useful one from my own point of view.
The timing was nearly pure luck. John Dewey remarks somewhere
that "when there is any thinking going in, there is something
definitely wrong." There was a good deal definitely wrong
in Asia and the Middle East this spring, and I found many thoughtful
people pondering the troubles. Trouble was popping all over;
a mass exodus from China into Hong Kong, the movement of American
forces into Thailand, protests against this movement in Japan,
similar protests in Malaya about the movement of British units,
war in South Vietnam, the West Irian madness at its peak in Indonesia,
the worst financial crisis since the early 1950s in Iran, a six-week
cabinet crisis in Turkey, etc., etc.
It was particularly useful to be pursuing several
basic questions sequentially through a succession of countries
affected by these questions. Nonetheless, the things I learned
in various countries are partially separable, and to make it easy
to get these impressions out, they are being published country
by country, though not always in the sequence in which I made
the trip.
One final note: many senior military and foreign
service officers spoke to me with great candor and in confidence.
Their remarks therefore should not be quoted and these reports
are limited in circulation.
Hong Kong, May 19 - May 23.
I arrived in Hong Kong in the late afternoon of Saturday. I
put through several calls to people to whom I had introductions
or to whom letters had been sent. The first to Marshall Green,
the American Consul General. Green suggested that we get together
the first thing Sunday morning for a long talk. We did that.
We met at the American Consulate in his office and talked for
nearly four hours. Green, who was the American Minister in Korea
at the time of the military take-over last spring, seemed to me
to be very intelligent and imaginative, as well as most generous
of his time. After describing to him briefly the Third Area Conflicts
Program and the purposes of my current trip, I suggested that
we might discuss subjects in the following order:
First, the current mass exodus from China into Hong
Kong; the political significance of this -- what it indicated
about the Chicom regime; why the Communists seem to be cooperating,
at least passively, in the exodus; British attitudes; U.S.; Taiwanese,
etc.
Second, I asked whether there had been any re-evaluation
of the political stability of the Chinese Communist regime. I
said that in the past it seemed to me that most of the best informed
and intelligent opinion had pretty much accepted the regime as
unchallengeable -- unlikely to be bothered by any internal dissidence.
I cited, for example, the Conlon Associates report to the Fulbright
Committee done at the end of 1959 as illustrating this. By that
time the myths of enormous economic advance had already been partially
deflated. However, the possibilities of internal discord were
dismissed out of hand. I mentioned the Conlon Associates report
simply because on the whole, I thought it was one of the best
of the Fulbright reports, done by a very able group of men. What
are the current estimates of the political stability of the Chinese
regime? Have there been any changes since the Conlon Associates
report?
Third, I asked about the possible effect of the strains
of engagement in a war in Laos: (a) How well can China handle
such a war, assuming that there is no revolutionary challenge
to the regime? (b) What would be the effect of such a war; how
well could China handle it, given the economic crisis it's in?
(c) What would be the effect of the strain of any large-scale
engagement on the possibilities of revolt against the regime?
(d) What, in turn, might be the effect of such a revolutionary
challenge on the conduct of the war?
Fourth, I asked about the role of Chiang Kai-shek,
and specifically about his program of parachute drops of fairly
large groups of men -- 100 to 200 in number. How much political
preparation had there been for this? What was his estimate of
their effect in the current situation, or given war?
I suggested that these were all useful questions
to discuss, but that he could choose any one of them in any order
he pleased. Green said he thought this was a very logical progression
and that we might very well begin with the exodus to Hong Kong
and follow roughly that order, though we might not stick to it
faithfully.
1. Exodus to Hong Kong
Green said that the British and U.S. views were "pretty
close" on the causes of the exodus. First, it was one more
manifestation of the erosion of political discipline. Historically,
the Kwantung population has fled to Hong Kong. Up to recently
the Chicoms used force to stop them, and they came mostly by way
of Macau rather than directly over the land border. In the last
few weeks the Chicoms haven't tried to hold them back at all.
When the English turn the escapees back to China, the Red guards
in a perfunctory way direct them home -- point where they're supposed
to go, but then allow them to turn right around and make another
attempt. Second, we might ask why. There are two factors: one
the peasant, the other the Chinese Communist government. The
peasant is hungry and disillusioned; the government has been turning
the city people back to the farms. These city people have no
skills for farm work for the most part; they don't help -- they
just mean more mouths to feed. Most important, they are evidence
of the failure of their "Great Leap Forward." The peasants
that are emigrating are not starving. They are lean.
They hear that the Chinese Communist government is conniving in
the emigration, and this is a change. The government forces used
to shoot those trying to escape. Moreover, they hear that some
people are getting through. Green said, in confidence, that the
U.K. has accepted 40 to 60 thousand during the last year and expect
100 thousand this year.
The other factor is the government. The government
at the present time seems to shrink from using force against this
large popular movement. Moreover, they seem to feel that if the
émigrés are accepted by the English, this might
relieve the problem a bit. On the other hand, if the English
turn them back, it will teach people that Hong Kong is no escape.
On both assumptions, however, it's clear that the exodus will
exhibit the deterioration of the regime.
There has been a large deterioration. There has
been a weakening of the resolution of the government in important
points. The middle officials, the matrix of administration at
lower levels, and even some top officials, but the middle officials
especially, when the "Leap" went sour, got blamed by
top officials; the cadres got upset; there was a great deal of
stifled recrimination and widespread demoralization.
In sum, the interplay of (1), the farmers' desire
to get out, which was stimulated most immediately by the back-to-the-farm
movement, together with (2) the weakening of discipline in the
middle and even some higher levels of the government, are a good
part of the explanation of the exodus.
2. British Attitudes and the Stability of the
Chicom Regime
The British tactic is to put the people back and
hope thereby to shift the onus onto Peking. Moreover, they hope
that this very public evidence of the weakening discipline in
the government in China might goad Peking to cooperate in keeping
the barrier between China and Hong Kong intact.
I observed that there were a good many people on
our side who breathed a sigh of relief on August 13 when the Berlin
Wall went up. In this case it seemed that we were building the
wall ourselves and simply hoping to get the other side to cooperate
in keeping it intact. I confessed I found this point of view
uncomfortable.
Green agreed. He said they've been coming through
-- they used to come through at 500 per night and now it's 5,000,
still mostly by way of Macau.
The ones that the Kwantung government officially
condones (and there are some daily with exit permits) are increasingly
younger men, and some are among the better educated. Are they
agents? Some probably are, hoping to get to Taiwan.
Most, on the other hand, are not condoned; enter
illegally. Green said he saw and talked to 80 the other night,
who came through in five junks. It was a very simple method by
way of Macau, they just bribed the guards.
I asked about high-level defectors. Green said not
much. And appeared to me not to want to pursue the matter. Later
Jacobson simply said that there had been none.
I asked about the Peoples' Liberation Army, that
is, the Red Army. He said that its integrity was thin. There
had been no crippling deterioration yet. They were given special
rations and many privileges. They were determined, well-trained,
and in the face of an invasion by Chiang of the mainland in force,
Green doubted that there would be any desertion on a large scale.
In fact, he thought that the PLA would crush the invasion.
While this is true, on the other hand, the PLA was
largely peasant (Jacobson later told me 80 per cent) and were
receiving constantly letters and other news from their families.
Some soldiers send food back to their families. Are these letters
causing them concern enough to affect their military capability?
Perhaps. The government, at any rate, was pouring out torrents
of words to buck them up, which suggested that they were in doubt
themselves.
On the subject of defection, Green mentioned the
fact that Chiang does get feelers all the time, and straight out
of Peking. Peking offers to make him governor of some province,
or whatever.
I commented that his remarks on the exodus had really
answered a good deal of my second question on the stability of
the regime. It seems that there was a serious challenge to it
at the present time. Green agreed.
3. War in Southeast Asia
The Chinese capability to fight, he thought, today
was very circumscribed. They had a great many logistics problems
in Southeast Asia; they would need trucks, convoys, POL, and all
this was very difficult for them to come by. They had coolies,
of course. I commented on the difficulties of using coolies for
very long distant transport, and described a little of the work
of Summerfield and Rainey. He said that this sounded reasonable
to him and was consistent with the point that he was making, which
was that the Chinese for any large-scale combat would be extremely
dependent on Soviet help, especially for POL.
They had built a highway through Yunan, then running
east to Phong Saly in Laos. He said, however, that he didn't
think that there were any Chicoms there in Laos in large numbers
in spite of the claims or the Royal Lao.
He said that the Chinese did not want a big war in
Laos. They want a guerrilla war there. It isn't just that the
Soviet Union is holding them back, if the Soviet Union is doing
that at all. In fact, Hanoi is pressing for an expansion of the
war, more than the Chicoms or the Soviet Union. Ho Chi Minh is
willing to force the pace more than both of them. Green then
made some very excellent succinct comments on our policy in Laos.
He attributes the expansion, the pressing of the war by the Russians,
to our policy. If the U.S. says that it won't fight in Laos,
it's easy for all three, Hanoi, Moscow and Peking to work out
some sort of cooperation. Nam Tha illustrates this. Our policy
meant that the ultimate sanction of U.S. forces was withdrawn.
Expansion seemed less risky. If the Soviet Union ever did want
a "truly neutral Laos," even temporarily, when a Communist
Laos became less risky the Soviet Union ceased to press for "a
truly neutral Laos." Russia is competing with China for
the title "most revolutionary" in the eyes of Hanoi.
Hence Nam Tha. In any case, in Laos the Soviet Union would be
likely to make some concessions, assuming there were differences,
because the Soviet-China relations were worsening very sharply
up to two months ago -- so sharply that they decided consciously
to avoid any further worsening they could. They want to patch
it up. A quarrel in Laos is made somewhat less likely by this.
Green then said that he had heard about the Sigma
1 exercise on Southeast Asia. (Sigma 1 was a Joint War Games
Control Group exercise in which very high level Defense, White
House, and CIA representatives participated on opposing blue and
red policy teams and the chief action officers from State as well
as these other agencies took part on opposing action teams. I
was the game director and several RAND senior staff took part
as consultants or members of the action teams. Bill Sullivan,
Harriman's second in the Geneva negotiations on Laos, was Captain
of the red action team.) In fact, Bill Sullivan had told Green
about it. He stressed that while Bill Sullivan is publicly committed
to the Harriman policy and must defend it, he really doubts it.
In fact, he sent joint cables from Hong Kong with Green when
he was here recently. This was the first of many indications
I received during the trip that our current policy is much more
amenable to criticism and change than would be suggested either
by public statements of principals or by the principals' oral
statements during formal official contacts. Green illustrated
very articulately a common view of senior Foreign Service Officers
in Asia. (But in Washington, too, there are grave doubts. This
became clearest to me at Geneva.) Green went on.
In sum, the Soviet Union doesn't want "a truly
neutral Laos." They simply don't want to fight us. If we
say we're going to fight for Laos, then the Soviet Union might
accept a truly neutral Laos. What was wrong with our policy,
however, is that we seem to have written off Laos. If we write
off Laos, the Soviet Union will move in.
We then discussed the relationship of the defense
of Laos to the defense of South Vietnam, and the Sigma 1 exercise.
Green told me that he had been in 1958 a policy planner for the
Far East. In this job he had had to prepare some six different
scenarios for limited wars in the Far East. One in Korea, one
in Indonesia, one in Thailand, one in Laos, another in the offshore
islands, one on Burma. Green says that he thinks very highly
of this method and of the necessity of trying to work out some
detailed possible contingencies. He said that the scenario for
the offshore islands was hardly finished when the trouble popped
there, and it served as a basis for our actual conduct in the
crisis. Moreover, in getting the scenarios up Green had worked
with a good many of the people who had to play a role in cooperation
in the actual crisis.
4. The Role of Chian Kai-shek, Air Drops, and
the Return to the Mainland
Green said that he'd begin this part of our discussion
by saying that he wishes that Chiang could keep his mouth shut.
Supposedly one of the reasons for the continual pronouncements
that he is just about to go back to the mainland is to bolster
the morale of his troops in Taiwan. Green doubts that this is
really necessary for morale. Chiang wants to get U.S. material
support; he wants to drag us into a battle. And Chiang is a good
bluffer.
We have tried to persuade him that he should wait,
that opportunities will come. But he is getting old. The current
shortages and enormous difficulties in China spur him on. And
then he fears that the Chicoms may get a nuclear capability, and
even if it's nominal, this would mean that Chiang would lose face.
Green doesn't think that the Chicoms are worried
about Chiang Kai-shek. They might even like it if he tried an
invasion. On the other hand, they do fear the U.S. We could
open a huge beachhead in Fukien.
The Soviet Union would stay out if the Chinats and
the Chicoms were engaged, in Green's opinion; but if the U.S.
were involved also, the Soviet Union would move in.
All of this has to do with the kind of mainland attack
that Chiang has been talking about. On Southeast Asia, Green
said, we do tend to take too "British" an attitude.
South China is much less vital than Manchuria. The Korean war
was fought near the industrial heart of China. The uncoordinated
return to the mainland by Chiang Kai-shek would be a disaster.
On the other hand, Southeast Asia must be saved. One of the
troubles with Chiang Kai-shek's continual talk is that it doesn't
strike terror. Another is that it makes it hard for us to use
him in Southeast Asia. If he were quiet, we could use him.
We have to take compensatory moves in Laos. The
Chicoms, on the other hand, can't afford to react too strongly
in Laos. Chiang could be used, if he were more controllable and
intelligent, to deter the spread of war in Laos by the threat
of bigger air drops. Moreover, if the Chicoms did spread the
war in spite of these threats, we could actually increase the
drops.
One of the major problems is that Chiang, while he
has talked a lot, has done no political preparation. In Fukien,
Chekiang, and North Kwantung he may have a little attraction.
But the growing anti-regime feeling is not connected with Chiang.
It's a reaction against the regime rather than for Chiang.
The Great Leap Forward has fizzled. It would take
a generation more than we had expected. And not only we, they.
Some of the Chicoms admit this. China, therefore, won't pose
the threat that we thought it would as a model for Asia.
In the West, when we're in a lot of trouble in a
depression, we tend to unite, but in a family society like China
when you have the sort of trouble they have, it just tends to
disintegrate, to dissolve back into families. China is coming
apart at the seams. It's more likely to erode steadily than to
suddenly give way. It may be that some of the military, or a
group supported by the military, will defect. On the other hand,
the Chinese government might simply accommodate. There might
be a succession of different Chinese Communist regimes. There
will be no over-all rapprochement between the Soviet Union and
China while Mao is alive and in power. When Mao goes, Liu will
succeed for a short time. Then there will be another regime which
is very likely to accommodate to the Soviet Union.
The people are apathetic. They're neither for nor
against Chiang. And the PLA remains strong despite the strains
on it. Chiang should orchestrate his efforts with ours in Southeast
Asia. He should be getting intelligence, cadres into China and
working with the people there.
We have to tread lightly on this whole question of
starting an invasion. In 1959, because we thought that the Chinese
Communists were sure to be successful, and we wanted to oppose
any move they made of an expansion, we said "All wars are
bad." This of course means that a war by us as well as by
them, an invasion by Chiang, is bad.
We have to remember that we have problems, a great
many of them, in the world. Even if there were no communists
at all, we'd have problems of the economic and political development
of the backward areas, and the like. Our successes have been
created by the communists. Unfortunately, they have not been
created by us. This suggests that organic processes inside communist
societies should not be interfered with; rather, we should accelerate
the divisions inside, not mechanically intervene.
In the last ten years our record hasn't been so bad,
simply because they've made a considerable number of failures.
The greatest difficulty in the Far East is not communism, but
apathy on both sides of the curtain about political and economic
self-development.
Nearly four hours had passed by this time, and Mrs.
Green had been waiting below for over three-quarters of an hour.
I suggested that the time was getting late and Green then discussed
my schedule for the rest of Sunday and the next day with me.
He thought that it would be possible to get his deputy, Jacobson,
on the phone, and if he could, he suggested we get together Sunday
night. Jacobson is his acting deputy. His former title was Political
Reporter. Mr. Green suggested some others in the American Embassy
he thought would be good to talk to, and he indicated that he
would set it up. He also discussed some of the foreign correspondents
in Hong Kong who he thought were worth talking to, and people
at some of the other consulates. He indicated that he would like
to talk to me again himself the following day. In particular,
he indicated that he would like to have a chat about Korea, which
had been his last post. I indicated that this would be extremely
interesting to me.
Jacobson
I went back to my hotel, and a short time afterward
was phoned by Mr. Jacobson. I suggested dinner and he picked
me up at 7 o'clock. It was still light and we drove around Kowloon
and the new territories for an hour or two. Jacobson commented
on the various scenes. Hong Kong is extraordinary at the present
time. The new territories are supposed to revert to China by
agreement in 1997. However, current anticipations of people investing
in Hong Kong is that it will last no more than seven years. In
spite of this there is an enormous amount of investment activity,
office buildings, private housing, government housing for the
Hong Kong police, and of course refugee housing, all going up
in huge quantities. Moreover, new new territory is being
built all the time as well. That is, a good deal of the bay is
being filled in, hills are being 'dozed and being pushed into
the bay to extend the territory. More to revert. It suggests
that if we knew the world were coming to an end in six or seven
years, we'd all put up reinforced concrete steel and glass structures.
The standards of the buildings architecturally are
very high. I would surmise that some first-rate British modern
architects or a consortium of Europeans are involved. The office
buildings and multi-story auto parks, the private housing, are
for the most part very clean examples of architecture of the international
school. Esthetically on a level far higher than the run of the
multi-story structures that are going up in Los Angeles today,
for example. This includes the government housing for the Hong
Kong police, and even the enormously densely populated public
housing blocks for the refugees are good examples of their type.
The living standards of refugee housing as distinct
from esthetic standards, of course, are something else again.
One hundred and fifty-four square feet are allotted for a family
of five, where children less than 12 years old are counted only
as a half. One housing block at this rate contains something
like 5,000 people. The continuous strip balconies are loaded
with laundry almost continuously. The families pour out onto
the balconies, into the recreation areas on the roofs, and into
the streets below. The ground level is reserved for stores, which
are hives of activity.
The British, typically, had been proceeding in a
completely empirical manner as far as the refugee problem is concerned.
They thought the problem transient. The refugees would return.
But they were brought up short in 1954 by an enormous fire.
This forced them to take seriously the refugee housing program.
By this time also the British realized that émigrés
were for the most part not going to return. Up to now
some 600,000 refugees have been housed and there are another 400,000
to go, not counting the current exodus. These lives in little
shacks, squatters' huts, up on the hills. We visited these too,
the great squalor contrasting with the verdant hills. Swarms
of children.
The American Consulate conducts a flag count every
October when the Chinats and the Chicoms have their national days
coming in successive weeks. The British are not entirely happy
about this flag count, but they tolerate it. It has yielded very
interesting results. In spite of the fact that the communists
are highly organized and clearly in some cases act under compulsion,
there has been a steady rise in favor of the people showing Chinese
Nationalist flags during the last three years until now, when
the flags are counted by establishment rather than individually.
The ratio is 10-to-one in favor of the Chinats. Jacobson explained
that the job is done by the establishment rather than individually,
since this is the only significant thing. The Chicoms act in
a disciplined fashion and an entire establishment will have its
flags out. Even so, the ratio of 10-to-one undoubtedly understates
the relative popularity of the Chinat-Chicom flags. The ones
displaying the communist flag are especially people who are engaged
in business with the Chinese mainland or unions that are dominated
by the communists and in which the membership tends to show the
flag as a matter of safety and job security.
I suggested that I would like very much to hear Jacobson's
judgment as to what the continuing deterioration of the situation
in China means to the stability of the regime, but first I was
curious about the economic investment in Hong Kong. Jacobson
said that private housing was being amortized in some five years.
This, if the expectation of seven years actual life is accurate,
would give them two years of grace. A short while ago the amortization
was on a three-year basis. Expectations about the life of the
community, in other words, have lengthened a bit. Jacobson believes
that while the enormous construction activity seems hardly rational,
actually it's part of the reason that the communists allow Hong
Kong to continue. So long as investment is pouring in and continuing
to enhance its value when the communists do take over, this is
one argument for their holding off. A nice question of strategy
for both sides, affecting both optimum investment and amortization
rates as well as the best time to end the game.
On the question of the stability of the Chinese communist
regime I remarked that it was unfortunate that some of the right-wing
and even some less extremist statements about Liberating Communist
Satellites, unleashing Chiang Kai-shek, and so on, had been advanced
with so little thought, simply as campaign slogans. Perhaps as
a reaction, it was the tendency for most moderate and informed
people to avoid the subject altogether. Yet it was related to
some very live sorts of questions. From time to time large cracks
appear in the wall and we are sometimes faced with the issue for
policy as to whether and what sort of support we might give to
indigenous rebellion against totalitarian rule. Up to a few years
ago the almost universal opinion of intelligent and informed writers
on China was that the communist regime in china was unchallengeable.
I knew that the Hong Kong consulate was our major listening post
for China and was continually engaged in evaluation of the political
conditions of the Chinese Communist regime. I wondered whether
they had had a chance to stand back and observe how their evaluations
of the stability of the regime may have changed in the course
of the last few years.
Jacobson said that these evaluations had changed
a good deal. He believed that if the very serious deterioration
that had been going on for several years continued, there was
quite likely to be a shake-up, either a palace revolution, or
an expulsion of the critics. Expulsion of the critics, he said,
was quite likely, especially if the critics were right. Peng
Te Huai came into disfavor in 1959 because he had been right.
If this year's harvest is as bad as last year's,
a shake-up is quite likely. If the Peoples' Liberation Army,
which is still 80 per cent peasant, continues to receive news
of their own families' suffering, there might be increasing disaffection.
Elements of the PLA might join with critics of the current policy.
I asked whether all this would be within the palace, so to speak.
And Jacobson said he thought it would.
Jacobson said he didn't believe that we could exclude
from our policy some support for indigenous revolt where such
support could actually help it.
The current exodus is without question a protest.
Three thousand were leaving per day, and this has come up to
five thousand. Taiwan offered the previous day to accept one
thousand per year. A local newspaper writer observed that this
would handle the May exodus by the end of the century. The British
fear that millions would come out if the British let them come
into Hong Kong. Disaffection is extremely widespread.
The opinions that I referred to about the unchallengeability
of the Chinese communists were formed when everyone was impressed
by the peoples' militia in China. So many millions were in the
militia. However, it's hard to say whether this was a sign that
the regime could not be challenged, or whether it was itself something
that might be used as a challenge. In fact, the militia were
never given arms, precisely because of the possibility of widespread
disaffection with arms conveniently at hand.
Jacobson stressed that nonetheless insurgency was
extremely difficult under a totalitarian regime. He discussed
the confession meetings which used to be held several times a
week, but which are now tapering off a little. In these confession
meetings the participants are supposed to list the things that
they did wrong or that they know others of their neighborhood
did wrong. If a provocateur suggested to some peasant that he
join forces in a protest movement under cover, the peasant is
then faced with a dilemma at the next confession meeting. If
he denounces the man, this of course puts an end to the possibility
of that specific protest. On the other hand, if he doesn't denounce
the man who proposed the resistance to him, he might just turn
out to be a provocateur who would then denounce him for not having
mentioned this at the meeting.
Nonetheless, there is a breakdown of discipline very
generally, and the exodus is one sign of this. The government
seems to have permitted this as a safety valve. There are other
signs of relaxation. Beggars are reappearing for the first time.
It was proudly boasted that there was no stealing or tipping
before. Therefore in hotels people never asked for keys. Now
people are asking for keys because they need them. There is a
lot of stealing. Moreover, they are giving tips and the tips
are being accepted. And there is a lot of beefing when the tip
isn't large enough. Prostitution is reappearing. Kids are writing
anti-Mao slogans on walls. These are just a few of the signs
of the spreading demoralization.
Some of this may be being allowed by the government
as a kind of safety valve. On the other hand, it's a very delicate
matter to judge. It may be a safety valve; on the other hand,
it may have the opposite effect, it might be self re-enforcing.
I asked, "Why did the Chinese communist government
cooperate in the exodus of Chinese to Hong Kong?" Jacobson
said, "Well, there are several hypotheses." If the
cooperation was just passive, then it might be in order to get
the United Kingdom to build a Berlin wall. Or, a second hypothesis
the people were talking about was that it might get people bounced
back over the line. A third hypothesis that had been advanced
rested on the assumption that the cooperation of the Chinese government
was active. This had it that the idea was to provoke widespread
U.S. sympathy and offer some grain to the Chinese government without
the government having to lose face. Jacobson expressed no opinion
as to which, if any, of these hypotheses he thought was plausible.
The following day, Monday, I met with Rothenberg
(now acting Political Reporter while Jacobson is acting as Deputy
Chief of the Mission, ordinarily a Soviet specialist who works
on Chinese-Soviet relations), T. S. Sun (who evidently performs
a function at the consulate of reading very widely in the Chinese
literature and spotting the articles worth translation or worth
close reading by some of the other language officers), Seasword,
and Starbird (who has been handling Chinese-African relationships).
Starbird seemed in particular a very bright and able young research
man. He did undergraduate work at Yale in Chinese and graduate
work at Columbia.
After a general discussion with these men in which
I went over some of the same ground as I had with Green and Jacobson,
I spent some time with Rothenberg. I raised the question of Chinese
attitudes towards arms control as one of the issues I was looking
for research problems on, and seeking stimulation on, during my
trip. I told Rothenberg about Tom Schelling's observations at
the Pugwash conference in December, 1960, on the Chinese attitude
towards the test ban agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union (they regarded a test ban as an anti-Chinese move by the
U.S. and SU). Rothenberg thought that Schelling's observations
were quite sound. He believes that a nuclear capability for China
is one of the key issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. I asked
about whether there had been any statements on the so-called nth
country problem. He said that in fact there had, quite recently.
That Chen Yi, in talking with Welton Cole, the Reuters correspondent,
and Chou En-lai, in talking with Montgomery recently, both commented
on the nth country problem and indicated that increasing n is
good, the more the merrier. In short, they took much the same
position as General Gallois. I asked where I could find these
statements and he said that the Chou En-lai statement was quoted
by Monty when he was in China in the fall of 1961, very possibly
during September in Peking. Chen Yi's meeting with Welton Cole
was on October 5 and could probably be dug up in Reuters dispatches
in the following few days. He gave me a reference to a government
publication which is probably at RAND, Joint Week 42, October
19, 1961.
On the disarmament negotiations, Rothenberg says
the Chinese think that nothing whatsoever will come of them.
The Russians probably don't think anything will come of them either,
yet curiously, Sino-Soviet polemics act as if the Soviet Union
did expect something to come of it. However, in such polemics,
disarmament and expectations about it are purely symbolic. I
commented that in any case it seemed unlikely that disagreement
between the Russians and the Chinese was over whether a workable
mutual disarmament of the East and West was in the offing, but
rather as to whether the disarmament negotiations were worthwhile
as a tactic for inducing unilateral disarmament to some extent
on the part of the West.
I steered the conversation back to the demoralization
in Red China and the implications for Laos. I mentioned the recent
and predictable Chinese reactions to the President's movement
of troops to Thailand: "Mr. Kennedy is playing with fire."
etc., etc. How serious are the Chinese? Hoe likely is it that
they'll get deeply involved in Laos? Rothenberg said that he
thought that China was bluffing. Five days before this they had
said, "There are Chinese Nationalists in Laos and we cannot
be indifferent to that." This was a rather modest basis
for objection to the U.S. moves: They needed the cooperation
of some hypothetical Chinats. Then the Chinese stepped it up
a notch and based their objection not merely on the presence of
some hypothetical Chinats, but on the presence of U.S. forces
themselves.
In any case, if China actually did get involved in
the war, this might be relatively disadvantageous to it. The
situation is very different from Korea. Here Rothenberg, Jacobson
and Green all seemed to agree that Korea was much more critical
for the Chinese, and it came at a better time for Chinese intervention.
Korea was near the industrial heart of China. Rothenberg said
that it got them a lot of aid from Russia and helped complete
the unification of the country. Now, coming after a period of
disillusionment, an intense involvement in Laos would have a disruptive
effect.
At this point, I had word that Marshall Green would
like to continue the discussion, which we did. I asked about
Korea. He said that Korea could not be self-sufficient and independent.
For this reason it was extremely important to reconcile Japan
and Korea. They were natural complements. Japan could help a
great deal in Korea's development. If it didn't, North Korea
might catch up with South Korea. Japan was dragging its feet.
South Korea was asking much too much in war reparations. If
a stalemate continues, Japan may eventually become quite as disinterested
in North Korea as in South Korea, and this would be extremely
bad for us.
There was a tremendous population problem in Korea.
They can't make it without extensive help from us or Japan, or
both. Part of the problem was that South Korea and most of the
other small countries were fighting for prestige issues rather
than genuine foreign policy issues.
I remarked that this was true, unfortunately, not
only in the Pacific and in the newly independent countries, but,
for example, in such countries as France. Green discussed the
problem of democracy. Parliamentary democracy was probably not
appropriate and wouldn't be for a long time to come. On the other
hand, the students had fought for democracy as we taught it to
them, and the military government was just not doing enough.
It will be toppled unless we do something. Park Chung Hee must
broaden his base. He has to take in civilians in a government
of national unity. If he doesn't, a counter coup is possible,
and a very much bloodier one.
Park needs at least some of the outer trappings of
democracy, even though something more centralized than parliamentary
democracy is required. They obviously don't need two houses --
one house will do. Green then referred to his own role last year,
at the time of the coup, which of course made headlines at the
time. Green opposed the coup, and opposed it for a full month.
Green is convinced that he did the right thing, that by playing
it tough with the strong man, he was just exploiting the fact
that the military needed the United States. While there were
limits to what could be done, he felt that by threatening the
withdrawal of U.S. aid, we forced the military to give back the
command to Magruder and forced them to stop parading "criminals"
through the streets like the communists. Green feels that in
general we don't have the guts to restrain our own creatures in
these countries.
The military in Korea is enormous. There are 600,000
Koreans in the armed forces. The forces are large enough to be
more than just a force for national unity. They are large enough
to involve a great deal of factional strife. Green felt that
the armed forces didn't have to be that large -- 400,000 would
be enough, for example.
I raised a theme which I had been hoping to explore
with several people on the trip. In preparing for the trip and
during my talks in Honolulu and Japan, I had become more and more
conscious of the fact that, viewing the United States and its
allies broadly, thinking of the Pacific and the Middle East as
a whole, it seemed we had a great many of our own forces, and
there were a great many indigenous forces fixed rigidly in place.
While we were members and constructors of a number of regional
alliances, these seemed, on analysis, only nominally regional.
They boiled down to a series of excuses for bilateral arrangements
between the united States and various members of the alliances.
And of course there were overtly bilateral pacts with other Asian
and Middle Eastern countries. I found, during other parts of
my trip, a great ambivalence about our alliances among American
officials. Doubts were re-enforced by the inertia of the Western
non-regional members such as France and U.K. or the hostility
of the neutrals. On the other hand, it seemed to me that we are
neglecting many forms of regional military cooperation which might
be very useful in the kinds of conflicts likely to arise in third
areas. The role of regional collaboration and mutual support
in these remote areas in a central war was very likely
to be insignificant. Some of the areas, like Southeast Asia,
have almost no importance themselves in a central war. However,
the use of neighboring or intermediate countries for logistic
support in local conventional wars was something that appears
not to have been exploited in any systematic fashion; nor had
cooperation of combat forces -- either for local conventional
wars or guerrilla warfare. The Filipinos, for example, have a
good deal to contribute to an ally in fighting guerrillas. The
Turks, the Paks and the Koreans, on the usual estimate, have something
to contribute in conventional war as well. A sober analysis of
what was feasible and useful here might have gross implications
for our foreign policy, our contingency plans, and our military
and economic aid programs.
This speculation suggested a set of questions that
I pursued in various stages of my travel. I dealt with one aspect
in conversation with Green. I asked about the possibility of
the use of Koreans in Indochina, and in general about the transferability
of the various Far Eastern native forces which are all tied down
locally at the present time. I suggested that this might have
a number of advantages, including the political advantage of involving
Orientals in defense of oriental allies.
Green said that he was all for this. He suggested
that it would be extremely useful to have a number of "construction"
battalions from Korea at work in Indochina. These would be of
course construction battalions that would not only be able to
do engineering work, but would be able to defend themselves, able
to fight. We could provide the logistics support for it. A couple
of Korean battalions, he thought, could make a real difference.
He felt that the political advantages were very real.
I asked what the objections were, who would oppose
it. He said that some might oppose it, but they would oppose
it mostly out of inertia, perhaps some of the military, and specifically
the army, on the spot. General Molloy in Korea might claim they
were needed there, that you couldn't strip Korea of the engineers
they needed.
Green said that it is true that you couldn't strip
Korea of the engineers, but on the other hand you could reduce
them and could train new forces. Green felt that it was the Army
especially that would be in opposition, that the Air Force and
Navy might actually support it.
I suggested that far from being a weakening of the
Korea self-defense, in the long run combat training of Korean
forces would be useful in Korean self-defense. The alternative
use of engineering battalions did not affect economic development
in Korea.
I suggested that it was not just a question, of course,
of the Korean forces, but also of the Chinats. How do we get
so that we can treat the indigenous forces in the Asian theater
flexibly, as transferable resources, at least in part?
Green felt that this was the way to look at it.
I asked him what political arguments there might be against such
a development of flexibility. He said that the Japanese would
be skittish about any involvement of the Korean or of Chiang's
forces. He thought that flexibility could be argued against plausibly,
but that the arguments were specious, that flexibility could be
developed gradually in a way that would overcome these problems.
We could have military exchanges, like student exchanges, to
make these transfers seem normal and politically palatable. Chiang
is particularly hard to use because of his reputation for aggressiveness.
He has talked so much about invasion that any modest use of his
forces always looks like a much bigger threat.
We then discussed the relationship of the military
to political and economic development. Green said one of the
things we had to do was to indoctrinate the military in political
matters much more. Two, the military could be used to help the
economy of these underdeveloped countries. They had to understand
that the battle in the rice paddy is not just on a thin front
line. Third, military surplus hardware -- jeeps, etc. -- could
be used. Four, we could give the military skills that would be
useful in civilian life. Five, he thought that we had to re-evaluate
the whole MAP program in such terms. He then referred to Charlie
Wolf's work, and said that he thought that Charlie had done a
splendid job in Korea, and that he was a great admirer of Charlie's
in general.
The French Consul General
That night, Monday night, I had dinner with Andre
Saint Mleux, the French Consul General, and his wife at the Repulse
Bay Hotel. Saint Mleux is one of Alain Enthoven's many strategically
placed cousins, who are distributed not only over Europe and England,
as I had known, but also in the Far East. Saint Mleux had been
in the Far East in an earlier stage of his career, had just come
to Hong Kong to become Consul General. His preceding job had
been Chef de Cabinet for Henri Spaak when Spaak was Secretary
General of NATO. Saint Mleux has an extremely lively mind and
a very strong interest in NATO strategy. He has quite a wide
acquaintance, therefore, among the English and Americans who have
been concerned with NATO, some of whom are presently in the Pacific,
such as Bill Trueheart, Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon, and
Fritz Nolting, the Ambassador in Saigon. Saint Mleux himself,
it quickly became clear, is a strong supporter of De Gaulle's
"Europe de patries." Our talk, cordial and animated,
ranged over many topics, touching only lightly on the Far East
and Southeast Asia, focusing mostly on Europe and American policy.
Our dinner took place precisely at the time of the
De Gaulle press conference and the retaliatory press conference
comments of Mr. Kennedy. French-American relations on the subject
of nuclear strategy in short were at a new low point. We discussed
French nuclear policy after we had rung the familiar changes.
I remarked that the only country I knew where there was an even
sharper cleavage than in France between opinions privately
expressed and those formally uttered was Japan. In Japan double
speak seemed to apply to all parties, including those out of power,
whereas in France it was largely, though not exclusively, confined
to officials. But France, in its officialdom, seemed a rather
close second. Saint Mleux said that he didn't think the French
position on the deterrent was really that difficult to defend.
He said it with zest, speaking as a man who regarded such defense
as vigorous intellectual exercise for which he was feeling entirely
fit. I mentioned some of the proceedings at the de Bilderberg
conference where each of the French participants, after formal
statements reiterating the French position, told either Denis
Healey or myself that in fact they didn't really hold the views
they were expressing, but that they really agreed with us and
almost all the rest of the members of the conference.
Saint Mleux's comments indicated that he didn't actually
believe the Gaullist position; in fact, his strong support of
Spaak suggested the opposite to me at the very outset (though
it was the following week before Spaak's public opposition to
De Gaulle on the European community was voiced prominently in
the press). Saint Mleux's views amounted essentially to saying
that while there might be some basic errors in the French position,
the American position was not a very good one, and therefore the
French position was defensible as a response to the American one.
He specifically mentioned the continuing special treatment of
the United Kingdom which, he said, was obviously intolerable to
De Gaulle. He thought that the use of Christmas Island by Mr.
Kennedy was a very fundamental and foolish mistake. He was sure
there were other spots in the Pacific that would have served as
well without rubbing De Gaulle's nose in the dirt. I confessed
I didn't think Christmas Island a very good choice. In fact,
the special relationship was a mistake all right, but it was a
mistake that had been made by the preceding administration from
which the present administration had found no graceful means of
withdrawal. On the other hand, the benefits of this special relationship
should be looked at in perspective: They were largely fictitious;
the British were given information and help in spending an enormous
amount of money on a capability which they themselves had more
and more realized was practically useless. We discussed the Blue
Streak program. Saint Mleux agreed it had been a fiasco. He
said that nonetheless there was a very large issue of prestige
involved. I indicated that I thought that while prestige issues
were of course of real importance, nonetheless it was important
to distinguish them from issues of substance, particularly where
billions of dollars and national security were involved. I felt
that the French in particular had the sophistication not to confuse
issues of prestige with issues of substance. In fact, the fiasco
of the Blue Streak had lowered rather than raised British prestige,
and this was likely to be the case with other prestige forces.
Saint Mleux said that on substance he felt that while
neither he nor most of the people he knew were very impressed
by Gallois' sort of argument (it was "rather evidently shallow"),
there was something to be said for a country such as France seeking
a capability to defend itself. I stated that this depended on
just how difficult that job was, whether it was feasible in fact,
and what alternatives France had. Alliances had been used before
to substitute for an ability to defend oneself. We went through
some of the familiar questions on the problems of deterring a
major antagonist such as Russia, and keeping it deterred over
the years in the face of changes in technology and in the development
of countermeasures. And we discussed the irrelevance of such
nuclear deterrence for attacks below a threshold that made a nuclear
response at all plausible. Saint Mleux was extremely agile throughout
this discussion but brought it near a close by saying that really
Europe was not a place that one had to worry about -- the focus
of attack was right in the regions that I was going to be traveling
in. There was no real threat in Europe. This was precisely the
line of argument I had gone through many times with Frenchmen
in Europe, and so I found myself once more saying to a very able
Frenchman that if there were really no threat to defend against,
as he said, he could not feel very strongly about the need on
the part of the French to develop their own defenses against a
non-existent threat. Wasn't the premise for the non-existence
of a threat really the covert assumption that no matter what is
done by the French or our allies, the American guarantee would
discourage Russian attack? What concerned me about Gaullist policy
was precisely that it might call the American guarantee into question.
There have always been some Americans who would prefer to be
rid of the burden of defending Europe. They had been very much
in the minority. They had been joined recently by a lot of people
newly concerned about the balance of payments. Many of these
would be all too eager to take literally the Gaullist claim that
France could defend itself. If so, why, then, should the United
States, with obligations elsewhere, spend its resources redundantly?
Then there were others, a good deal more serious than these,
who would not take lightly the threat by an ally to use its force
specifically to trigger American nuclear power against the will
of the President. Many who were not impressed by the balance
of payments would be concerned about cooperation on such terms.
This could mean American withdrawal. And an urgent attempt to
disengage from identification with the French nuclear button.
And with it the destruction of the American guarantee which,
it would then be apparent, had been implicit all along in the
notion that there was no serious Russian threat.
Saint Mleux, at this point, abandoned any pretense
of defending the current Gaullist views. He expressed his own
very serious concern that the greatest danger of De Gaulle's use
of a nuclear policy as a bargaining device in the alliance is
that it might destroy the alliance itself, and specifically, force
a beginning of U.S. withdrawal. He then described Spaak's views
on the subject with which I had been in general familiar. He
anticipated the statement that Spaak actually issued about a week
later in Brussels.
We concluded by a discussion of recent changes in
American policy and their significance. He expressed considerable
enthusiasm about recent American attempts to broaden the information
available to our allies on basic strategic issues and praised
the Athens speech of McNamara in particular. (The Ann Arbor published
version of it[1] was not available to
either of us.) He was particularly
eager for me to include several of his friends in the French Foreign
Service and Ministry of Defense, but especially to include Spaak
in Belgium on my itinerary, and wrote out letters to Ambassador
Clarac in Bangkok and to the French ambassador in Djakarta without
further delay. He said he would write Spaak and DeRose. (The
ambassador in Djakarta was on leave, unfortunately, while I was
there, and in my brief stay in Paris DeRose and I tried to make
connections. Harry Rowen and Bob Bowie had seen him the day before
and had as high a regard for him as Saint Mleux.) I never made
it to Brussels, but I did see Clarac in Bangkok and benefited
from a very wise and experienced discussion of the problems of
the area.
Visit to the Border and Talk with Takashi Oka
On my last day in Hong Kong I spent about 8 hours
with Takashi Oka, the Christian Science Monitor correspondent
for East Asia; went up to the border to witness some of the sites
of the exodus and to talk with refugees; and after several long
telephone conversations with Stanley Karnow of Time, who
had been recommended by both Dick Moorsteen and Marshall Green,
gave up plans for visiting with Karnow at his home in order to
snatch a few hours of sleep before emplaning for Djakarta.
Takashi Oka is a Japanese who went to a small Quaker
college in Missouri and is now a naturalized American. Dick Moorsteen
is a good friend of his and had written to Oka by way of introducing
me. I found Oka a very modest and able newspaperman with none
of the flamboyance of an Alsop, but extremely well informed about
Southeast Asia, which he visits frequently, as well as North Asia.
It turned out that he is also a good friend of Kei Wakaizumi
of the Japanese National Defense College, who had been my host
a good deal of the time while I was in Tokyo. As a result, we
began talking of various Japanese personalities and the Japanese
intellectual climate. Oka has great respect for Wakaizumi's integrity.
He feels that, with his brilliant record of study, he has surrendered
an assured career in a first-rate university or in industry in
order to pursue problems of defense policy. He felt this itself
is a commentary on the Japanese intellectual scene. His comments
on Matsumoto, the Director of International House, were interesting.
He said that in the 1930's Matsumoto was widely considered a
future Prime Minister. He is, however, a perennial dilettante
as far as political action is concerned. Yet he remains enormously
influential among the intellectuals of Japan. He is an idealist,
a strong admirer of the British parliamentary system, toyed a
bit with the Socialist Party as a possible vehicle for his political
goals, but became very disillusioned with it. The Democratic
Socialists are the next best thing for him. Like Reischauer,
Oka remarked on Matsumoto's ambiguities and lack of commitment.
However, Oka felt this was at least better than the familiar
Japanese intellectual, whose commitments are clear, but stereotyped
and fashionable.
On the Chinese crisis Oka said that he didn't dare
conclude that the political deterioration had gone so far as to
challenge the regime. However, the exodus is a symptom of the
worst crisis in its history. The refugees flooded out (a) because
of the food shortage and the shutting of industrial plants; (b)
because they feared it would get worse; and (c) the news had spread
that they could get out, that the Communists had left the border
open or penetrable. There were rumors of several thousands migrating
from the north, not just Kwangtung.
I listed a variety of hypotheses that I had heard
or read about in the local papers. These had been offered to
explain the cooperation, passive or active, of the Red Chinese
guards in the exodus: (1) the Chinese Communists wanted to teach
their discontented subjects that 'There is No Exit,' that they
would be bounced back by the British; (2) that they were going
to force the British to erect barriers and tighten the control
of entry into Hong Kong and get British help in controlling their
refugee problem (and specifically, make it harder for some future
defectors of a possibly high level); (3) that the Chinese Communists
wanted to "sink" Hong Kong; (4) that the Chinese Communists
wanted to provoke sympathy for their economic plight and help
from the West -- the United States specifically -- in the form
of grain; and to get it without asking us for it formally, etc.,
etc.
I indicated that I hadn't found any of these very
convincing. Oka said he thought they weren't persuasive, that
they all attributed an excessive degree of foresight and deliberation
to the Communists. His own theory was by far the most plausible
one to me. He suggested that aside from everything else, it seemed
likely to him that it was one of the more perfect examples of
the bureaucratic rigidity of the communists. Peking, in its campaign
to cut back on manufacturing -- the Great Leap Backward -- has
assigned quotas to each of the cities: Number of people to be
sent out of the city and back to the farm. Canton had had a quota
assigned to it. (I heard Canton's quota cited variously as 300,000
and 700,000.) In any case, Canton was out to meet its quota.
It was going to get the required number of people out of the
city, and it didn't care particularly where they went -- to the
farm, where they weren't going to help any, or to Hong Kong.
This explanation has the ring of truth to me. It
fits in well with Green's analysis of loss of control and demoralization.
Breakdown in communications between the national government and
the provinces, on the subject of quotas, escapes to Hong Kong,
etc. help fill out the picture connecting the loss of control
with the exodus.
Hong Kong observers, he said, tended to be conservative
and rather cautious in their evaluations of Chinese trends. The
English in Hong Kong, in particular. The English look at China
and at the Soviet Union not as missionaries of communism but as
nation states with traditionally limited interests. Some of these
interests conflict with those of the West; some conflict with
each other. They are less worried about Chinese expansion and
less concerned to see the Chinese government collapse.
So far as the implications of the present crisis
for China's attitudes in Laos, Oka felt that it would limit the
Chinese severely in any deep involvement in a sizable war there.
He too made the point that Laos doesn't threaten the industrial
center of Red China and Manchuria as Korea did, and so they have
less incentive for involvement. He was aware from General Taylor's
speech of the spring, as well as from talks with our military
people, that Laos was a difficult problem for the Chinese logistically.
But the Royal Lao were not much of an obstacle for
any non-Laotians. They would collapse if the North Vietnamese
came in, and especially if the Chinese came in. He mentioned
something I was to hear many times on the trip: the superstition
of the Lao that they can't fight outsiders like the Viet Minh,
and that the Chinese in particular were deadly for them. This
superstition, Oka said, made a boomerang of the Royal Lao statements
denouncing Chinese participation on the side of the Pathet Lao.
A good many of the Royal Lao's own supporters took it seriously
and ran.
As far as Souvanna Phouma is concerned, a great many
Lao of a genuinely neutralist persuasion have some doubts about
his neutralism. Oka reported that this included a member of Souvanna's
Geneva negotiating team, who was also a brother of Keo, the Pathet
Lao Commissar for Rural Affairs.
Oka talked a little of the war in South Vietnam and
its political as well as military aspects. He described Lt. Col.
Pham Ngoc Thao, Chief of the Kien Hoa Province. The latter is
one of the current heroes of the war. He is a former communist
guerrilla, now very much a convert. But very critical of the
limping efforts of the government towards winning popular support.
He urged me to see Pham when I was in Saigon, and I promised
to make the attempt.
I had been eager to go up to the border and Oka offered
himself as guide. He had been up there several times in the course
of his work and knew, as of a couple of days before, the status
of the efforts of the refugees to get through, where they were
making them, and where the Hong Kong government's countermeasures
were successful. I rented a car with a young driver who had himself
come from Kwangtung a few years before and spoke English as well
as Cantonese.
The exodus was near its maximum at the time Oka and
I went up to the border. They had been coming over at the rate
of 5,000 a night, and the British were using all their ingenuity
on the problem of outwitting the protesting relatives in Hong
Kong, and shunting the immigrants back. The Hong Kong Tiger
Standard and other local newspapers were full of news photos
of the chaotic scenes, of truckloads of refugees on their way
back to the border blockaded by local villagers and relatives
from Hong Kong, with some refugees escaping from trucks. On the
very day that Oka and I went up there the British laid on a successful
countermeasure for this: They sent 5,000 refugees back in a shuttered
railroad train. The British were stringing new barbed wire on
their side of the border in Hong Kong as frantically as I observed
the East Germans doing the same in East Berlin. I found the circumstances
and sight deeply disturbing, and, in fact, the meeting with the
refugees was a very emotional experience. Oka and I visited various
spots where the refugees had been coming through, and points on
the route of their return by the British: Fanling, a police training
center, where the refugees were taken in trucks, fed a meal (or,
if they were caught during the night, two meals) of rice and salted
fish; and several areas where refugees were hiding and hunted.
Some of these areas were swarming incredibly with activity.
We went through the little market town of Sheung
Shui, which several of the refugees had reached, so to speak,
"home free;" from there they had been concealed until
relatives took them out. On a hill in the outskirts of the town
are the grounds of the Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club. We stood
there and looked out from the terrace of this beautifully kept
colonial relic over a broad plain to a range of hills that seemed
to me to begin very nearby, perhaps a quarter or a half a mile.
Just beyond that and out of sight, Oka said, there was a military
encampment. And immediately beyond that another range of hills
at the Chinese border itself. The refugees gathered at the border
during the day, broke through at night, hid in the second range
of hills, then tried to make it to the near range the following
night; then across the plain at our feet to Sheung Shi.
That is, if they were not intercepted by either friends
or enemies. The plain seemed loaded with both. It was like an
infernal landscape by Hieronymus Bosch. Men and women up from
Hong Kong, who had heard by the grapevine of the escape of relatives
and friends, or were simply just hoping, moved over the fields
carrying fruit and bundles of clothing with Hong Kong labels.
They were calling the names of the escapees they hoped to find.
And, on the same plain, were groups of Tommies, Gurkhas, and
Hong Kong police trying to reach them first. Or to catch them
at any rate before they had disappeared into some Hong Kong disguise.
Above this, a helicopter whirled, helping the police in the search.
As we watched, some Hong Kong police caught several escapees,
in a kind of slow-motion, desultory, unresisted sweep, and walked
them back to the terrace where we stood. Another car had driven
out on to the terrace and unloaded a very tall Englishman dressed
in white Bermuda shorts, which shirt with epaulettes. This was
Stevenson, the public information officer for the Crown Colony.
We watched the escapees loaded dispiritedly into the back of
a truck, screened. This truck, unlike those in the news photos
from which escapees sometimes escaped a second time, had a wire
cage. It was the sort of paddy wagon the French call vividly
a "saladier," salad basket.
I talked for a while with Stevenson. Though somewhat
weary of the subject he was still eager to be heard and had a
much exercised set of answers which he had been used to giving
to reporters. In its general outlines it was rather faithfully
represented almost in all of the responsible Western newspapers
that I've read. In fact, the British got a remarkably good press
on their response to the exodus. The Times and the Washington
Post, for example, as well as the President, all expressed
strong sympathy with the plight of the British in returning the
refugees. It was clear that the British were in a pretty bad
plight, but I felt just a little more sympathetic with the refugees
themselves. Then, and in retrospect, it seemed to me that there
was something lacking in a policy which avowedly aimed mainly
at shifting the onus onto the Peking government for turning the
poor devils back. Within a week after my visit to the border
this triumph of Western policy was announced.
The burden of Sevenson's story was that Hong Kong
just couldn't take an indefinite number of Chinese refugees.
It had already over 3,000,000 people in some 350 square miles.
There are 600,000,00 Chinese. "It's as simple as all that,"
he said, and repeated the phrase several times during his explanation.
"We can't absorb another one in the working population and
we cannot tolerate refugee camps." Throughout Stevenson
stressed that these refugees were in economic want. The
British position was very different if they were taken to be political
refugees, since this raised issues of the right of asylum.
I asked about the Taiwan offer, which had started
as an offer to take in 10,000 and had just been made open-end.
Stevenson responded that not all the refugees would want to go
to Taiwan. This was obviously true. But between all and none,
there was quite a range of numbers. It seemed to me that some,
possibly a good many, might prefer to go to Taiwan rather than
go back. (I can confirm this on the basis of talks I had later.)
Stevenson answered that in any case he would regard any offer
from Taiwan skeptically. I asked whether it might not be possible
to hold the refugees while we tested the good faith of Taiwan.
Stevenson answered that Hong Kong could not hold them for a day.
They could not have concentration camps. Even if the Taiwanese
took the refugees, they could not tolerate holding them during
the period of processing. This struck me as being a rather extreme
position, and while I didn't say so at the time, I wondered again
whether Western ingenuity mightn't be used to find homes for these
refugees and speed up their processing rather than simply to work
out techniques for getting them back into China. Even more, I
wondered whether it might not be able to plan some time in advance
for the next such contingency. And not only in China.
After Stevenson had run through his set piece, he
talked less mechanically for a while. Then left. We looked a
little uncertainly at the truck full of refugees, who, it turned
out, had been watching our conversation with Stevenson. Several
of them were talking and gesticulating, and our driver, without
intended irony, said "Now that the Police Commissioner has
left, can't we talk to them?" I explained to the driver
that Stevenson wasn't a policeman. I got the permission of the
Hong Kong policeman who was guarding the truck to talk to the
escapees in their cage. It was, as I have indicated, disturbing.
One young fellow, I would guess in his early twenties,
was crying. His name was Tang, Fai. He was a radio technician.
I gathered from further questions that by this he meant that
he had operated a radio telegraph unit. He said that he had worked
in Canton 14 hours a day for two ounces of rice. He asked us
to get a message to his aunt who lived at an address on Shanghai
Street. he said that if he were sent back he would go to a work
camp in "Siberia" for 30 years. The word "Siberia"
in Cantonese sounded like the word in English. Evidently it is
the Chinese side of Siberia near the Chinese border, and the Amor
River province. He indicated he was in very bad trouble, that
his father was a capitalist who had also been convicted of smuggling
and now was in Siberia itself. When Tang, Fai was told that he
had to go back to the farm, he had protested very hard, kept it
up, when, suddenly, he realized he had been protesting too long.
He was then questioned. The subject of his father had been brought
up. Then he had been let go with a warning. After this he aid
he heard by the grapevine that he was going to be picked up again,
and he decided to light out for the border. Like most of the
other refugees, he had walked for days to get there. He was sure
now that if he was returned to China, after his protests and narrow
escape, he'd be sent to forced labor in Siberia and, he thought,
his death. If only we (Oka and I) would help him, he'd be willing
to do anything.
One of the troubling parts of the experience was
that there seemed no way to convince him that Oka and I were not
officials in a position of authority, able to influence if not
decide his fate. He said he'd be happy to go to Taiwan, when
we asked him about this, and repeated parts of his account of
his difficulties. It was clear that part of the reason for his
refusal to go to the country had been that he knew he would be
not a hand but just another mouth in an area where they had plenty
of mouths; but part of it also was a feeling of loss of identity
and status as a technician. Oka and I gave up trying to make
clear we were not officials and focused on getting across advice
on what to tell his British interrogators: Forget the hunger
and the 2 ounces of rice and concentrate on his capitalist father
and the political threat of imprisonment. He was obviously intelligent
but deeply disturbed. We left without any faith that he had understood.
[1] "Remarks of Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara at the Commencement
Exercises, University of Michigan," Ann Arbor, June 16, 1962,
attachment to D(L)-10250, Current RAND Operations No. 188,
July 20, 1962.
List of Wohlstetter documents