
The list of existing and currently
planned SAC overseas
bases requested by the Targets Analysis Group (which we shall
tag "TAG") is attached in Appendix A. This list is
not the same as a list of bases SAC now plans on using;
and neither of these is likely to be an optimal list.
By eliminating some of the vulnerable bases, the
list might be reduced; it may also be increased to advantage.
Since, in part, the worth of the base system depends on the geographic
distribution of targets, it may be more profitable to make up
other lists for TAG at a later stage of its inquiry. Since the
problems of target selection which TAG is attacking are closely
related to the base problems which agitate Harry Rowen and myself,
it seems TAG will have other questions and it appears it should
be profitable to negotiate an exchange, or, better, a system of
trade. The following "off-the-cuff" notes suggest some
areas of mutual interest. I suspect they ask a good deal about
targets in return for the small question TAG has posed so far
about bases.
Sets of targets may be defined by (a) any of a number
of geographical characteristics having to do with the cost
of their destruction by various aircraft-base-weapons systems,
or (b) by characteristics having to do with what this destruction
yields in the conduct of war. The first kind of definition
might isolate, for example, a system of strategic targets reachable
with a A3D unrefueled from a given set of bases, within a combat
radius of 1,350 nautical miles or less. One example of the second
sort of delimitation might isolate such industry targets as are
capable of affecting the support of Soviet ground forces during
the first six months of the war.
Our own work yields some answers to questions of
the first sort; and a lot of questions about what SAC might accomplish
thereby for the conduct of war. TAG's work, having to do with
objectives rather than instrumentalities, I imagine, will reverse
this emphasis. In any case, answers or rough judgments of both
kinds are needed for base and for target selection.
a. Target regions of varying cost. Some
geographical regions entail much higher costs than others for
all likely attacking weapons and some are extremely sensitive
to differences in the specific bases and aircraft combined in
the weapon system. The main point to be observed is not that
some targets are reachable and others not (though too frequently
analysis stops here), but that there are sharp discontinuities
in the costs of reaching targets--at each point at which it
becomes necessary to add an extra tanker or enter the enemy defenses
by another route involving greater penetration and so on.
1. Close target systems. One such target
system which might be examined would be contained within regions
accessible to the A3D. This plane has a combat radius, carrying
an 8,000 pound bomb, of some 1,350 nautical miles. From selected
overseas bases this will get 35 to 40 per cent of MACS' 100-point
industrial targets. It appears that it might offer a considerably
lower systems cost. (Aside from the lower capital and operating
costs of the plane and its lesser vulnerability, there might be
a considerably greater value for alternative uses: long-range
interdiction targets, etc. The residual value of the unattrited
planes of our campaign analyses doesn't completely express the
worth of this flexibility. For example, we would want to consider
the case of our having not precisely the number of aircraft required
by the campaign assumptions for optimal destruction, but an excess.
This is more likely than that we will have precisely
enough.)[1]
A target system close to overseas bases may be reached
with smaller planes, either unrefueled or with little refueling. The radius
extension yielded by successive refuelings declines
in amount moreover.
One thing that gives importance to the close targets
is the great sensitivity to increases in combat radius of future
bombing systems: the low-altitude and supersonic bombers. It
should be observed also that the addition of air-to-surface missiles
of the Rascal type has the effect of considerably reducing combat
radius. For example, a B-47B equipped with a Rascal may not have
a radius of more than a couple of hundred miles in excess of the
1,350 nautical miles we have labeled "Close."
2. Shallow penetration target systems. One
such might be all targets within 300 to 350 miles of the early
warning network perimeter. Since, as I recall, this practically
reaches the Donets Basin, it should include some targets of interest.
It is certain that they will be less costly than the deeper ones.
Current RAND Campaign assumptions put attrition rates at a very
high level. Losses to enemy fighters are assumed under conditions
specified to increase in a linear way with miles of penetration
over enemy defenses. A list of targets near the perimeter of
defenses would involve much lower bomber losses. (On current
campaign analysis assumptions the first 150 to 250 miles are free.
The fighters have to be committed, must scramble, climb, and
cruise to meet bombers. If we add the Rascal to our arsenal another
hundred free miles may be added to the range so far as bomber
losses are concerned, and, of course, no attrition of the bomber
to local defense.[2]
Another way of defining a shallow penetration system
of interest might be taken as the limits of the fighter escort
penetration since it appears that there will be a jump in attrition
after this. The possibility of using fighters F101 as bombers
rather than merely as escorts stresses the importance of analyzing
these peripheral target systems.
3. Summer and winter targets. RAND campaign
analyses show a sizeable difference in the cost of the campaigns,
depending on whether the campaign is fought in the summer or the
winter. MACS shows a four to one difference. This is so because
a considerable number of the Russian targets are in daylight a
large proportion of the time in summer, and Russia has a great
many more day fighters than night fighters, and also because it
is assumed that the targets in all areas will be attacked each
time. Since the difference between winter and summer over the
U.S. targets is not as great, it has plausibly been assumed that
Russia, if it starts a war, will start it in summer and that the
strategic air campaign will be fought then. One might consider
a campaign which deferred the targets which would be best attacked
to the following winter and conduct attacks against only those
targets which were not affected. In any case, it would be interesting
to know what the effect of such deferral would be and to know
specifically the nature and value of the targets in the various
categories defined by areas with minimum hours of darkness for
penetration of Soviet defenses or without this minimum, in summer
and in winter.
4. Best regions for air-refueled ZI-based B-47
systems. Targets in the south of Russia are in general more
expensive for an air-refueled ZI-based system than targets in
other parts of Russia. The large distances from base to target
are increased by the sparseness of identifiable land masses over
which to refuel. Since these identifiable regions don't occur
at the optimal refueling points, range extension is less than
might be expected. (In any case, as we have mentioned, the second
pair of refuelings normally would not yield as much range extension
as the first, and the third pair even less.) With five
refuelings, 93 of MAC's industrial RGZ's can be hit, and seven
RGZ's are not reachable at all. (These seven are concentrated
in the Baku region.) (See Appendix.)
5. Best regions for ground-refueled ZI-based
B-47 systems. In the case of ground refueled systems, while
the range extension offered by refueling does not decrease with
additional refuelings, there are some problems analogous to the
ones indicated in the air-refueled systems which make specific
geographical regions more costly than others. In particular,
because of the sparseness and operations cost of bases north of
the Soviet Union, some targets when attacked with the B-47 unrefueled
need to be attacked via routes entailing more than the minimum
penetration of enemy defenses.
We could (and shall later) multiply the above examples
of geographically defined sets of targets showing significant
cost variations. However, the ones mentioned will serve as illustrations.
They raise the basic questions: Can one select targets in these
regions which are as good for SAC's various purposes as a target
set of equal number including points in other regions? If not,
is there any way of expressing how much we lose by excluding these
targets? All of this involves an analysis of what SAC's purposes
are in destroying targets.
6. Target systems defined by purpose or effect.
This is TAG's major concern, and the questions we hope TAG will
consider are already suggested in the preceding. We are interested
in knowing what broadly different target systems might be adapted
to broadly different ends such as (1) destruction of the enemy
strategic air force, (2) the retardation of the enemy advance
in Western Europe, (3) the destruction of enemy war potential
in a long war, (4) the destruction of enemy morale, etc. In particular,
we hope TAG will consider problems of physical vulnerability and
recuperation time, the effect on the worth of S. U. targets of
satellite production and the occupation of Western Europe, and
the time schedule of destruction indicated for various types of
targets in various strategic
situations.[3] Questions on specific
matters as the specific ends to be accomplished by demolishing
targets of various types are prior to--and softer than--the tough
problem of getting numerical measure of the relative worth of
various targets, but they are worthy questions. Target systems
so defined would be a considerable advance over the heterogeneous
assortment used so far in the various bomber studies. How these
specific purpose target systems intersect with target sets defined
by cost considerations is of major interest.
The Appendix includes besides the list of SAC overseas
bases, a few examples of target systems of varying cost, given
specific base-aircraft combinations. The two systems cited taken
the combination of (1) ZI-based KB-36 tankers and B-47B bombers,
and (2) ZI-based KB-36 tankers and B-52 bombers. We are also
preparing some target systems for ground refueled, ZI based bombers.
Measurements have been made to the following
targets:[4]
B-47B refueled by B-36 from ZI.
Target numbers 41, 63, 64, and 65 cannot be reached
at all. The subset of remaining targets can be reached with an
average of 2-1/2 refuelings and a maximum of 5 refuelings.
If we delete targets 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,
47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 and
62, the average costs to reach the target is very much lower.
The deleted targets need four or more refuelings with a B-36;
the undeleted 2-1/2 or less. What do we lose by this deletion
and by deletions of the targets that can't be reached at all?
What targets might be added within the indicated range?
B-52 refueled by the B-36 from ZI.
The total target system may be reached with an average
of 1.4 refuelings. Seven targets (10 RGZ's) require more than
two refuelings. The subset of targets excluding these is of some
interest, therefore, from the cost and feasibility standpoint.
Any replacements within the twice refueled B-52 radius?
TARGET RGZ's
1. Minsk 1
2. Leningrad 3
3. Moscow 6
4. Stalinogorsk 1
5. Kolomna 2
6. Noginsk 1
7. Rybinsk 1
8. Konstantinovskiy 1
9. Yaroslavl 1
10. Kolpino 1
11. Dzerzhinsk 2
12. Gorkiy 3
13. Saratov 1
14. Syzran 1
15. Ulyanorsk 1
16. Kazan 1
17. Kuibyshev 2
18. Kirov 1
19. Votkinsk 1
20. Molotov 2
21. Berezniki 1
22. Gubakha 1
23. Nizhniy Tagil 2
24. Alapayevsk 1
25. Sverdlovsk 2
26. Severskiy 1
27. Polevskoy 1
28. Sarana 1
29. Zlatovst 2
30. Miass 1
31. Chelyabinsk 2
32. Beloretsk 1
33. UFA 3
34. Magnitogorsk 2
35. Orsk 3
36. Omsk 2
37. Kemerovo 2
38. Stalinsk 1
39. Krasnoyarsk 1
40. Komsomolsk 2
41. Petrovak 1
42. Krivoy Rog 1
43. Dneprodzerzhinsk 2
44. Dnepropetrovsk 3
45. Zaporozhye 1
46. Zhdanov 2
47. Stalino 2
48. Makeyevka 1
49. Konstantinovka 1
50. Kramatorsk 1
51. Gorlovka 2
52. Ordzhonikidze 1
53. Taganrog 1
54. Krasnodar 1
55. Kamenskaya 1
56. Krasnyy Sulin 1
57. Lisichansk 1
58. Batjmi 1
59. Rustovi 1
60. Groznyy 1
61. Machachala 1
62. Baku 3
63. Guryev 1
64. Stalingrad 2
65. Krasnovodsk 1
66. Begovat
Adak NAS/DAVIS, Alaska
* Airfield A, Alaska
Anderson AFB, Guam
* Bascombe Downs RAF Sta., England
* Bassingbourne RAF Sta., England
* Bellows AFB, Hawaii
* Ben Guerir Apt., French morocco
* Boulhaut, Casablanca
* Bruntingthorpe RAF Sta., ?
* Burtonwood RAF Sta., England
* Carnaby RAF Sta., England
* Castel Benito Apt., Libya
Chelveston RAF Sta., England
* Desborough RAF Sta., England
Dillingham AFB, Hawaii
* Djema Sahim Area, French Morocco
Eielson AFB, Alaska
Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
Ernest Harmon AFB, Canada
* Fairford RAF Sta., England
* Foggia Area, Italy
* Futema AB, Okinawa
* Heathrow RAF Sta., England
* Hickam AFB, Hawaii
* Kadena AB, Okinawa
* Keflavik Apt/Meeks, Iceland
* Kindley AFB, Bermuda
* Lakenheath RAF Sta., England
* Lindholme RAF Sta., England
Luga Apt., Malta
Manston RAF Sta., England
* Marham RAF Sta., England
* Maurpiur Afld., Pakistan
* Mechra Bel Ksiri Apt., French Morocco
* Mildenhall RAF Sta., England
* Narsarssuak AB, Greenland
* Negombo Afld., Ceylon
* Nouasseur Apt., Casa Blanca
* Oakington RAF Sta., England
* Rabat/Sale Afld., French Morocco
* Sampablo Apt., Spain
* San Javier Afld., Spain
* Santa Maria Afld., Azores
* Scampton RAF Sta., England
* Sculthorpe RAF Sta., England
* Sidi Slimane Afld., French Morocco
* South Ruislip USAF Sta., England
* Standstead Afld., England
* Stavanger/Sola Apt., Norway
* Sturgate RAF Sta., England
* Thule A/S, Greenland
* Tibenham RAF Sta., England
* Torbay Afld., Canada
* Upper Heyford RAF Sta., England
* Valley Airdrome, England
* Waddington RAF St., England
* Wendling RAF St., England
* West Drayton RAF Sta., England
* Wheeler AFB, Hawaii
Wheelus Fld., Tripoli
* Woodbridge RAF Sta., England
* Wycombe Abbey RAF Sta., England
* Wyton RAF Sta., England
Yokota AB, Japan
Ramey, Puerto Rico
[2] This suggests the happy idea of a unit initial bomber stockpile for a campaign against perimeter targets, provided, of course, there were no time constraints on the campaign, and provided that the enemy didn't obligingly change his tactics, too. A considerable reduction in the force requirements currently bandied about! A standing patrol tactic in any case would mean lower attrition rates all over.
[3] The sort of questions we have here have been suggested in "Campaign Time Pattern, Sortie Rate, and Base Location," D-1147.
[4] Taking minimum penetration routes and using identifiable land masses as air refueling points. The target system is that used by MAC's.