Arms Proliferation and Control

This commentary appeared on GlobalSecurity.org on May 21, 2013.

As Daddy Warbucks once observed, “You always have to skin your own skunks.” Perhaps this insight is particularly appropriate if the United States adopts the elimination of chemical weapons as a goal for involvement in Syria.

First of all, neither side of the Syrian conflict has committed to elimination of chemical weapons. If the United States chooses to intervene militarily to stop chemical weapon use, it should recognize from the start that it has limited ability to destroy chemical munitions through strikes even if it has the ability to destroy Syrian forces. Large chemical weapon stocks will survive even a sustained bombing campaign.

This commentary appeared in Christian Science Monitor on May 3, 2013.

North Korea has captured global attention with its provocative behavior in recent months, the latest being this week's sentencing of US citizen and tour leader Kenneth Bae to 15 years of hard labor. Secretary of State John Kerry, during a recent visit to Seoul, vowed that “the United States will, if needed, defend our allies and defend ourselves.”

But after issuing threats, conducting nuclear tests, and launching missiles, what will North Korean leader Kim Jong Un do next?

The remainder of this commentary is available at csmonitor.com.

This commentary appeared in U.S. News & World Report on May 1, 2013.

Both Israel and the United States now believe that chemical weapons have been used in Syria's civil war, most likely by Syrian government forces. If the rebels have even some of the chemical weapons, that could be worse, for it will mean that they are no longer under government control. They could be used in Syria today and elsewhere tomorrow.

So now what? The pressure for doing something to remove the threat posed by chemical weapons stockpiles is mounting, but there are no good options. The U.S. could selectively provide additional arms and support for President Assad's foes, carefully avoiding those with al-Qaida affiliations. It could demand further investigation by international authorities, which could take months to approve and mobilize. Or it could launch a risky military intervention, with or without the help of allies, in the midst of a civil war.

Perhaps the worst thing the United States could do, though, is nothing.

This commentary appeared in U.S. News & World Report on April 11, 2013.

North Korea has escalated its inflammatory rhetoric and actions to new heights of bellicosity. What is really going on? Is there a real danger of war? How should the United States respond?

What we are witnessing is pretty much Pyongyang's standard operating procedure, which consists of incendiary verbiage and provocative behavior — albeit ratcheted up to a level higher than we've witnessed in recent memory. Why? This question cannot be answered with absolute certainty, but the most plausible explanation is that a youthful, 20-something, untested supreme leader believes he must work extra hard to prove his mettle.

Syria is looking more like a collapsed state every day. Spillover is destabilizing Lebanon, putting pressure on Jordan, an important regional partner, and imposing a major strain on Turkey, a NATO ally. The influx of Sunnis, some of whom are extremists, into Iraq from Syria is putting Iraq's tenuous stability at risk and pushing the Maliki government closer to Iran. Nearly a million people have now fled Syria for safety abroad. Meanwhile, the influence of extremist groups, such as the al Nusrah Front, continues to grow as these groups slip into the areas vacated by the Syrian state.

Then there is the question of Syria's chemical weapons. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recently expressed his concern to Congress that the Assad regime, “having found its escalation of violence through conventional means inadequate, might be prepared to use the chemical weapons against the Syrian people.”

This commentary appeared in U.S. News & World Report on March 6, 2013.

Iran's presidential campaign is well under way. The unprecedented public attack by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, in which Ahmadinejad accused Larijani of trying to control Iran through a family-run mafia, attests to a deep divide within the Iranian regime. But unlike in most real democracies, the likely contenders for the presidency are not trying to woo reluctant voters with snazzy TV ads or get-out-the-vote drives. Indeed, many regime officials would prefer that many Iranians—especially liberal urbanites—not vote at all.

The June election will not be about mobilizing the Iranian public. It is instead the culmination of a years-long evolution in Iranian politics: the transformation of the Islamic Republic from a mildly representative theocracy into a Revolutionary Guards-controlled kleptocracy. Ultimately, the election is meant to fulfill Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's ambition of wielding absolute authority. But far from strengthening his rule, the election could actually erode the credibility and legitimacy of a fading regime.

Key aspects of North Korea's third nuclear weapon test, carried out on Tuesday, remain unknown. We do not know whether it was a test of a plutonium or highly enriched uranium weapon, though many experts suspect the latter. We also do not know whether this weapon was a primitive design or miniaturized to fit on a ballistic missile (though North Korea has claimed the latter). Given the relative seismic readings, this test likely had about 2.5 times the weapon yield of North Korea's second test, which according to Dr. Sieg Hecker of Stanford was in the range of 2 to 7 kilotons, putting this test at about 5 to 18 kilotons.

While small in nuclear weapon terms, such a yield could still cause immense damage if detonated in a South Korean, Japanese, or U.S. city, or even in a Chinese city. This is one of the reasons why the regional countries have responded so strongly, and why a UN Security Council Resolution against North Korea should be forthcoming. In addition, China had previously threatened to reduce its assistance to North Korea if it did conduct a nuclear test.

In his State of the Union address, President Obama called for further cuts to U.S. strategic nuclear forces beyond those already agreed to in the New START treaty with Russia. Instead of a new treaty with Russia, which would involve long and extensive negotiations, the Obama administration is a seeking an informal agreement along the lines of the reductions achieved by President Putin and President Bush in the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

Reaching an informal agreement with Russia is likely to be extremely challenging for three reasons.

This commentary appeared on wilsoncenter.org on February 11, 2013.

Negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program are set to re-start in February, but Iran's previous foot dragging in agreeing to a time and venue for the negotiations has been vexing for U.S. and allied diplomats. Iranian behavior is particularly puzzling given the urgency of resolving the nuclear crisis peacefully and alleviating pressure on an increasingly vulnerable Iranian economy. What is Tehran thinking?

Some analysts have suggested that Tehran is divided internally and cannot make a decision. This is unlikely. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has consolidated power since the 2009 presidential election and makes decisions for the entire country. If Khamenei wants negotiations to proceed, then Iran's negotiators will respond accordingly. Rather, Khamenei is hesitant to engage the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) due to his ideological distrust of the United States. Specifically, he may view the P5+1 offer for Iran to stop uranium enrichment to 20 percent, ship out its highly enriched uranium, and close down the underground Fordo facility in return for a consideration of 4 sanctions relief as not only a trap but also a prelude to defeat for himself and his regime. Khamenei may be reluctant to make a deal, but mounting pressures from a broad section of the political elite and Iranian society may ultimately force his hand and even loosen his grip on power.

This commentary appeared on United States Institute of Peace's Iran Primer on February 5, 2013.

What is Iran's strategy on diplomacy today—now that a fourth round of talks is scheduled in Kazakhstan on February 26?

Iran is still willing to give diplomacy a chance after a seven-month hiatus, as demonstrated by the announcement of new talks. But Tehran wants the P5+1 to make the first move. The regime is inherently distrustful of negotiations, which explains its hesitation to engage in talks. The leadership appears to think Iran will not receive a fair deal—no matter what it does. This distrust is rooted in the Islamic Republic's historic view of the United States.

Tehran also has major issues with the proposal of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States—the so-called P5+1. The six world powers want a gesture from Tehran demonstrating its commitment to a diplomatic solution before considering sanctions relief. That could include suspending uranium enrichment to 20 percent at Fordo, its underground nuclear facility or shipping out its current stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium. The P5+1 has also asked Iran to shut down Fordo.